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Soviet National Strategy
AUTHOR Major Royce D. Zant, USMC
CSC 1989
SUBJECT AREA - General
                     EXECUTIVE SUMMARY
                  SOVIET NATIONAL STRATEGY
     The Soviet Union is a country vast in size and diverse in
its population. While this is a country where the people have a
history of autocratic rule, centralized bureaucracy, it is also
a country where Soviet national and strategic policy is
undeniably offensive to the point of being preemptive in
nature, and where this policy has been developed by less than
six percent of the population.
     All the major powers felt compelled in 1914 to go on the
offense but by 1917 the tyranny of the offense, which often led
to disaster, was reverberating throughout the international
community. Defensive preparation and war of position were
thought by many to have won the war. Despite this acceptance
the Communist did not follow this, as a matter of fact Marxism
as a dynamic theory, saw defense only as a temporary condition
until the offense could be seized.
     In 1917 when Lenin established the communist regime, he did
not feel  the communist would play a decisive role in the
coming world order.Instead he looked at it as an essential link
for strengthening the revolutionary movement in other
countries.
     After the death of Lenin, Stalin's foreign policy
concentrated on the public pursuit of peace and the undercover
development of the Communist international conspiracy.This was
designed to lull the west during a period in which the Soviet
state considered itself vulnerable. It was also during this
period that Stalin applied inside the party the terror policies
that lenin applied outside.
     Deception and surprise have always been an integral part of
Soviet military strategy.Yet it was not until after World War
II that this became central themes in their doctrine.
Afghanistan in 1979 and Poland in 1981 are examples of the
degree to which surprise is valued.
     After the death of Stalin in 1953, a previously unknown
emerged as the new party leader, Nikita Khrushchev was a
volatile leader who was active in in the area of communist
theory. Probably his greatest impact on the development of
relations with the west, was his doctrine that war was no
longer inevitable with the capitalist society.
     During the 1970's, the Soviets realized there existed a
coalition of nuclear parity and recognized neither strategic
nor conventional forces were by themselves decisive but had to
be used in concert to have maximum effectiveness. This combined
arms doctrine shows that the offense is still the preferred
method of waging warfare.
     The 1980's have been turbulent years for the Soviet Union
and the West.Since coming to power in March 1985, Mikhail
Gorbachev has attempted to refine certain aspects of Soviet
military doctrine. He continues to emphasize a reduction in
both conventional and nuclear forces that will ensure a
continued declining "balance of reasonable sufficiency".
    Make no mistake, while the leadership may advocate a
reduction in the size of their conventional and nuclear forces,
their ultimate desire to dominate and convert the world to
Communism is as strong as ever.
                  SOVIET NATIONAL STRATEGY
                          OUTLINE
Thesis: This is a country where Soviet national and strategic
policy is undeniably offensive, offensive to the point of being
preemptive in nature, and where this policy has been developed
by less than six percent of the population.
I.   Introduction:
       A.  Marx and Engels influence on military strategy:
       B.  Marxist-Leninist ideology:
       C.  Defensive verses offensive operations during
       World War I:
II.  Post World War I to 1945:
       A.  The influence of Lenin on todays leaders:
       B.  Lenin's policy of peaceful coexsistence:
       C.  Stalin's foreign policy:
       D.  Stalin, Hitler and World War II:
III.   Post World War II:
       A.  Krushchev's role in the making of Soviet policy:
       B.  The emergence of the term" coexistence
       C.  The arms race starts :
IV.  1964 to Gorbachev:
       A.  Nuclear vs. conventional forces:
       B.  Nuclear pariity:
       C.  The incorporation of defensive operations into
        offensive strategy:
V.   The Gorbachev era:
       A.  The phrase "reasonable sufficiency" is termed:
       B.  Spending on the Soviet Military has increased by as
        much as 3% a year:
       C.  Gorbachev recognizes a need for true arms reductions:
                  SOVIET NATIONAL STRATEGY
   Soviet National Strategy is a complex topic. To begin to
understand how it is derived or what motivates the development
of the policy, you have to understand the culture, politics,
ideology, history and military capabilities of the country.
Military capabilities have been included because the soviet
economic system and military hierarchy are so interconnected
that failure of one could conceivably lead to the failure of
the other.
   The Soviet Union is a country vast in size and diverse in
its population. This is a country where the Russian people have
a history of autocratic rule, centralized bureaucracy,and
control by intimidation.1 This is also a country where Soviet
national and strategic policy is undeniably offensive,
offensive to the point of being preemptive in nature, and where
this policy has been developed by less than six percent of the
population.2
   Because of this tight regimented political and social
system, the Russian people have been unable to assimilate basic
western concepts such as constitutionalism, democratic rule,
rights of the individual, and the concept of a free
entrepreneurial market.3 They are a people who take great pride
in what they believe to be a vastly superior political and
economic system, but are at times prone to feel inferior
because of the Western worlds unwillingness to accept them as
full and equal partners in world affairs.4
    When the communist seized power in October 1917, there was
no doubt in their minds that war, revolution, politics and
society were inseparable.5 This can be directly attributable to
the writings of Marx and Engels who early in their careers
wrote for the publication Neue Rheinische Zeitung about the
inseparability of foreign policy, war and internal affairs.6
Basic misconceptions regarding the teachings and writings of
Marx and Engels have played an important role in the lack of
attention to their military concerns. Many people feel the
concepts of military strategy and tactics were alien to Marx
and Engels whose declared policy was one of enmity toward the
military machine, the military caste, and the military state.
In fact Marx and Engels gave unremitting attention to tactical
problems and military considerations in their writings. Marx
and Engels can rightly be classed among the ancestors of modern
total war.7
   Marxist-Leninist ideology teaches that the Soviets are
engaged in a long term struggle between two basically different
political, economic, and social systems. As a result, the
Soviet Union has been able to justify their expansionist
policies over the past three centuries by asserting that the
Russian people have had a long and painful history of repeated
invasion and occupation. As a result of this repeated invasion
and occupation most of Russia's wars have been primarily of a
defensive nature against other European powers on Russian
territory. Napoleon's invasion of Russia in 1812 and the
German-Russian confrontation of 1914-18 and 1941-45 are the
best examples. During these three wars the Soviet strategy has
been to take advantage of her vast land area and austere
weather conditions, slowly immobilize the invaders and then
drive them out of the country, thereby transforming a defensive
operation into that of an offensive one 8.
   In 1914 all major powers favored or felt compelled to go on
the offense. The experiences of the First World War, in which
the tyranny of the offensive had led to disaster, was by 1917
reverberating throughout the international military community.
Defensive preparation and war of position were thought by many
to have won the war. In spite of this thinking, the notion of
"defensive" operations was foreign to communist thinkers;
Marxism as a dynamic theory of historical progress saw defense
only as a temporary condition until the offensive could be
seized 9. Trotsky on the other hand, who was at the time, the
People's Commissar for War, found worship of the offense
repugnant, having drawn his conclusions from the world war as
well as being influenced by such former imperial officers as
Tukhachevsky, Shaposhnikov, and his close confident A. A.
Svechin.10 While this debate survived Trotsky, a version of
this unresolved dichotomy still lingers in Soviet thought
today. Soviet political doctrine is explicitly defensive, but
Soviet military strategy is undeniably offensive, even
preemptive in character. There is a peculiar wedding of a
defensive political doctrine and an offensive military strategy
that would seek to gain the upper hand by initiating attack 11.
    This was a period when the Soviet leadership took great
pride in a political and economic system in which they believed
was vastly superior to the western system. The Soviet regime
claims to be the instrument of a necessary historical and
social development. The Soviet Union regards itself as the
accelerator of the evolution of mankind towards socialism and
communism. The official Soviet Textbook, The History of the
Communist Party of the Soviet Union.  (New York: International
Pub. 1939) states:
           The power of the Marxist-Leninist theory lies
           in the fact that it enables the party to find
           the right orientation in any situation, to
           understand the inner connection of current
           events, to foresee their course and to perceive
           not only how and in what direction they are
           developing in the present, but how and in what
           direction they are bound to develop in the
           future.12
As can be seen by the preceding, Marxist-Leninist doctrine has
always had a profound influence on Soviet policies.
    Lenin did not believe the Soviet regime, when established
in 1917, would play a decisive role in the coming world order
13. Instead, he looked at it as an essential link for
strengthening the revolutionary movement in the countries of
the west and the east,an essential link if victory for the
working people of the world over capitalism was to be realized.
It is apparent that through the years and up to his death he
formulated many opinions and policies that continue to have a
profound influence on todays leaders. Lenin never regarded the
Republic of Soviets as an end in itself. He always looked on it
as an essential link for strengthening the revolutionary
movement in the countries of the West and the East, an
essential link for facilitating the victory of the world over
capitalism 14.
   During the leadership of Lenin, the new Soviet regime
developed and propagandized the idea that dedication and hard
work for the regime were essential from all Soviet citizens.
This was because the Soviets felt they were in constant danger
of attack from the malevolent capitalist world. "Capitalist
encirclement" as it was termed was embodied in the new Soviet
Constitution of December 30,1922 15. According to Lenin,
Utopianism makes the Soviet regime appear to be always right;
only evil forces oppose it, and these must be destroyed as soon
as the power conditions make it possible. He believed the world
was divided into two camps. The camp of the angels or the
leaders of the Soviet Union and the camp of the devils or those
not associated with the Soviet Union 16.
   Probably one of Lenins boldest strokes and proof of his
power of foresight and capacity for clear thinking, was his
insistence of the German terms at the signing of the treaty of
Brest-Litovsk during March 1918 14.This treaty in the short
term cost the Soviet Union 1.3 million square miles of
territory and included the Baltic States, the Ukraine, and the
Transcaucasion states.17 This treaty effectively got Russia out
of the war and cleared the way for the ultimate communist
victory in the revolution. The left-communist, as Lenin
referred to them, rejected the humiliating conditions of the
treaty, Lenin in order to justify the acceptance of the
Brest-Litovsk treaty said "So long as we remain weaker than the
rest of the capitalist world so long as we shall keep to that
rule: we must know how to exploit the contradictions and
antagonisms among the capitalists." 18
   While Lenin as a result of the treaty of Brest-Litovsk, had
a policy of peaceful coexistence, Stalin on the other hand
argued that the Soviet Union had no choice but to become as
strong as possible, arm, and await the next war. Feeling that
Lenin's peaceful coexistence policy had left the Soviet Union
weak and resulted in needless suffering,Stalin declared, "The
Soviet Union must never be toothless and groveling before the
west again." 19 To ensure the Soviet Union as a whole country
was prepared for total and decisive war, Stalin in 1926,
adapted the rationale originally put forth by M.V. Frunze in
1920 of, "socialism in one country". With the approval of
Stalin the military began to advocate the mobilization of the
entire economy to support the military and its role of
diplomacy in positioning the Red Army for military success.20
It is this thought, as it evolved from the uncertain days of
1917 to the victory over Germany in 1945, that is the basis on
which Soviet military power is built.
   After the death of Lenin, Stalin's foreign policy
concentrated on the public pursuit of peace and the undercover
development of the Communist international conspiracy. This
public pursuit of peace was designed to lull the west during a
period in which the Soviet state considered itself especially
vulnerable.21 During a meeting of the 18th Party Congress
Stalin gave the following clear and explicit report which is
based upon Lenin's foreign policy of the Soviet Union:
           1. We stand for peace and the strengthening of
           business relations with all countries, that is
           our position; and we shall adhere to this
           position as long as these countries maintain
           like relations with the Soviet Union, and as
           long as they make no attempt to trespass on the
           interests of our country.
           2. We stand for peaceful,close and friendly
           relations with all the neighboring countries.
           3. We stand for the support of nations which
           are the victims of aggression.
           4. We are not afraid of threats of aggressors
           and are ready to deal two blows for every blow
           delivered by instigators of war who attempt to
           violate Soviet borders.22
   Many people believe there were substantial differences
between Lenin and Stalin. Unfortunately, nothing could be
further from the truth. Both were totally committed to the
revolution, and both used every means available in order to
accomplish their goals. Lenin has been portrayed as the loving,
kind father of the Soviet regime while Stalin has been
portrayed as the ruthless, tyrannical, totalitarian leader.In
fact both men were ruthless and tyrannical. What distinguishes
Stalin from Lenin is the fact that Stalin, after some initial
hesitation, applied inside the party the terror policies which
Lenin applied outside the party.23
   In spite of or perhaps because of the ruthless way Stalin
dealt with his people, Soviet life transformed significantly in
two ways relative to the west, they are a vast program of
industrialization aimed at matching and exceeding the
accomplishments of the western societies, and the development
of a Soviet foreign policy which culminated in World War II.24
  By 1939 Stalin had grown fearful of the growing power of
Hitler. Realizing that the western powers were reluctant to
halt Hitler's expansionist dreams, Stalin decided to remove
himself from involvement, at least in the early stages,in any
future war. In August 1939, Stalin signed the Nazi-Soviet pact,
which ensured Stalin that Hitler's war would be with the west.
At the time the Soviet leadership preferred a pact with Hitler
to an alliance with the western powers for many reasons, but in
large part because the pact allowed the Soviets to recover
those territories lost as a result of the treaty of
Brest-Litovsk. Stalin felt that any treaty with the western
powers would make the recovery of this territory extremely
difficult if not impossible.25
   When war with the Axis powers erupted in December 1940,
Stalin observed an apparent return to a traditional Russian
patriotism by the people. Stalin was able to use this love of
the motherland to defeat the Germans at Stalingrad and later at
Kursk.By the end of the war he also saw the party was in danger
of being pushed into the background and in true Stalin fashion
counterbalanced any further decline of the parties power, by a
general tightening of party control over Soviet life.26
   From the Tsars to the Bolsheviks, deception and surprise
have always been an integral part of Soviet military strategy.
Yet it was not until after World War II that this strategic
surprise and deception became central themes in Soviet military
doctrine. The Soviet Union learned the value of surprise and
deception from the German Blitzkrieg Strategy, particularly the
German attack on the Soviet Union of 22 June 1941, the Japanese
attack on Pearl Harbor and the British practice of Stratagem
during World War II. The direct Soviet intervention in
Czechoslovakia in 1968, Afghanistan in 1979, as well as the
direct intervention in Poland in 1981, are examples of the
degree to which surprise is valued by Soviet leaders.27
   With the death of Stalin in 1953, a new and somewhat
flamboyant leader, at least as Soviet leaders go, emerged.
Nikita Khrushchev as the new party leader, was a volatile
individual who up until now, had been underrated by the party
and virtually unknown to western leaders. Active in the area of
Communist theory, Khrushchev, in a speech given February 1956
to the 20th Party Congress of the Communist Party of the Soviet
Union, attacked the "cult of personality" which had developed
around Stalin.28 Not surprisingly this had tremendous
repercussions among the Communist parties of the west as well
as the world. Probably the greatest impact he had on the
development of relations with the west came in his doctrines
that war was no longer inevitable with the capitalist society,
and that "coexistence" was possible between "societies of
varying social systems." Khrushchev maintained that these views
were possible because the world socialist camp controlled
sufficient world power to deter any capitalist war, and that
economic warfare was now the weapon for capitalist defeat.29
Despite these statements, the arms race between the two
superpowers started during this period and can be directly
attributed to the continued Soviet military and political
thinking that stipulates Soviet military strategy aims to
prepare for war in order to defend the achievements of the
workers and crush aggressors.This is unlike the strategy of the
imperialist west which is directed toward preparing for war as
a means of solving international problems.30
   Until late in 1964 when Khrushchev was removed from power,
the Soviet leadership acknowledged and expected the next war,
if in fact there was one, would begin with a nuclear exchange.
This exchange would be followed by the use of conventional
forces that would be used to exploit the early success of
nuclear strikes and would seize and hold enemy territory.31 The
mid 1960's brought statement form the Soviets that discussed
the growing possibility of brief conventional phases of what is
now referred to as low intensity conflict. It is during this
period that the West saw a wide ranging modernization of Soviet
conventional forces as well as a continued build up of nuclear
forces. This assured the Soviet leadership that they had the
ability to fight on either a conventional of nuclear
battlefield.
   During the 1970's the Soviets realized there existed a
coalition of nuclear parity and considered that the next
conflict would be conventional with the possibility of it
escalating to the nuclear level to be extremely remote.32 The
primary reason for the shift in this thinking was mainly due to
a rapid increase in the sophistication in the conventional
forces of both sides. Soviet military doctrine recognized that
neither strategic nor conventional forces are by themselves
decisive, but that they can only achieve their maximum
effectiveness in concert. This combined-arms doctrine has
pervaded Soviet thinking which reveals that the offense is
still the preferred method of waging warfare. Surprise, the
offensive and the acceptance of necessary preemption form the
doctrine that is contradictory with current soviet political
statements that they would use weapons (especially nuclear)
only in response to provocation.33
   The 1980's have been both turbulent and fruitful years for
the soviet Union and the West. During this period the Soviet
military, despite their hidden feelings about defense, have
felt compelled to incorporate defensive operations into
offensive strategy. This is due to NATO's offensive concepts of
Follow-on-Forces Attack, and AirLand Battle combined with the
improvement of NATO's conventional forces.34 While they have
publicly stated that they are a defensive people, the Soviet
leadership has realized that short term defensive operations
would have to be fought prior to commencing the offense, which
has always been their primary strategy.
   Since coming to power in March of 1985, Mikhail Gorbachev
has attempted to further refine certain aspects of Soviet
military doctrine. During his 27th party congress speech in
February 1986, he phrased, without any real explanation the
concept of "reasonable sufficiency".35 As evidenced by the
signing of the recent INF treaty, Gorbachev continues to
emphasize a reduction in both conventional and nuclear forces
that will ensure a continued declining "balance of reasonable
sufficiency".36 There is not, at least at the present, any real
justification to believe that the term "reasonable sufficiency"
means the backing away or detour of the offensive minded Soviet
leadership. In fact the term "sufficiency" as defined, at least
on the surface, by the military leadership determines the
extent of the threat from the western powers. It also appears
that any reduction of Soviet military effort and military
forces would occur only when an East-West negotiated agreement
occurred. Gorbachev and the leaders of the Warsaw pact have no
misguided illusions that the powerbase and superpower status
they enjoy, is derived from its military power. If anything the
Soviet Union has continued on a commitment to modernize its
conventional and nuclear forces.
   This commitment has been verified, at least in part, by
General John Galvin, Supreme Allied Commander in Europe. During
a speech to parliamentarians from NATO and in a essay in the
Washington Quarterly, he acknowledges that Gorbachev has
initiated significant domestic changes but adds "is external
policy really changing?"37 Galvin has noted that despite the
rhetoric about how the shift from offensive strategy to
defensive strategy is taking place, the Soviets have not really
changed. Spending on the Soviet military has not experienced
any reduction at all. In fact, the military expenditures
continue to run between 15 and 17 percent of the Gross National
Product and has been estimated that over the last several
years, spending has increased by as much as 3 percent a year.38
He has backed up his statement by detailing how armaments
production has remained virtually unchanged since Gorbachev
came to power, the Soviets under Gorbachev have or are
producing 700 combat aircraft per year, launching a nuclear
submarine every 37 days and are producing 280 tanks a month.39
   Gorbachev perhaps recognizing that the will of the people
has dictated a profound renewal of their entire Socialist
system and acknowledging that a one sided reliance on military
power ultimately weakens other components of national security,
has promised to cut back the military. During a historic speech
to the United Nations General Assembly on December 7, 1988, he
said the cuts would be made to reorganize the forces currently
in Eastern Europe and that these cuts would transform these
troops from the offensive to the defensive mode. He further
stated that "their structure will be different from what it is
now, and that after a major cut back of tanks their purpose
will become clearly defensive".40 While many continue to
question this move, Michael McGuin, an analyst of Soviet
national security policy for the Brookings Institute said "this
is the color of their money and they are going to stop
preparing for world war, these unilateral cuts are a first
step.41 What is not being said is that while these cuts are in
fact real, they are for the most part, old and technologically
inferior weapons systems.
   A lot can be said about what is or is not Soviet strategy.
Soviet strategy is that strategy which will strengthen the
present system both militarily and economically. We have been
witness to this by a military build-up of vast proportions
which has taken place over the years and by the route Gorbachev
has embarked on with his Glasnot which is intended to give
publicity to problems and Perestroika which is designed to
rebuild a stagnate economy. Much has been reported in recent
weeks about Gorbachev losing political stature and power within
the hierarchy of the party and with the people. This is due
primarily to the continued economic problems and the recent
policy of military reductions in Western Europe. Despite these
problems the Soviet military may be supporting these reforms
because they will strengthen the military and enhance defense
modernization in the long run. These powerful Generals have
stated that the technologies that contribute to overall
"scientific-technical progress" will also contribute to
"military-technical progress", the end result is a Soviet state
that is stronger than the West.42 Gorbachev will also preserve
the rule by whatever means are available. The results of this
has been a replacement of the old hardliners with younger men
who follow his way of thinking. While Gorbachev and the
leadership will avoid war unless it is to their advantage to
initiate, they also strive to maintain a strong dominance over
their Communist and non-Communist neighbors in order to extend
their influence world wide.
   Make no mistake, while the leadership may advocate a
reduction in the size of their conventional and nuclear forces,
their ultimate desire to dominate and convert the world to
Communism is as strong as ever.
                        FOOTNOTES
   1Soviet Military Power (Washington: U.S. Government Printing
Office,1988), P.8.
   2W. J. Manthrope, A Background for Understanding Soviet
Strategy N.P., N.D.
   3Soviet Military Power (Washington: U.S. Government Printing
Office, 1988), p.8.
   4Ibid. p.8.
   5P. Paret, ed., Makers Modern of Strategy (Princeton:
University Press Princeton, 1986), p.648.
   6Ibid. p.264.
   7Ibid. pp.262-263.
   8G. E. Thibault, ed., The Art and Practice of Military
Strategy ( Washington D.C.: National Defence University, 1984),
p.737.
   9P. Paret, ed., Makers of Modern Strategy (Princeton:
University Press Princeton, 1986), p.657.
   10Ibid. p.657
   11Ibid. pp.657-658
   12W. Gurian, ed.,The Soviet Union, Background, Ideology,
Reality (Notre Dame: University of Notre Dame, 1951), p.1.
   13W. Gurian, ed., Soviet Imperialism, Its_Origins
and Tactics (Notre Dame: University of Notre Dame, 1953), p.6.
   14W. G. Andrews, ed., Soviet Institutions and Policies,
Inside Views (Princeton: D. Van Nostrand Co. Inc., 1966), p.65
   15L. J. Oliva, ed., Russia and the West from Peter to
Khrushchev ( Boston: D.C. Heath and Company, 1965), p.185
   16W. Gurian, ed., Soviet Imperialism, its Origins
and Tactics (Notre Dame: University of Notre Dame, 1953),
pp.4-5.
   17M. T. Florinsky, Russia, A History and an Interpretation
(New York: The Macmillian Co., 1953), p.1473.
   18W. Gurian, ed., Soviet Imperialism, its Origins
and Tactics (Notre Dame: University of Notre Dame, 1953), p.6.
   19P. Paret, ed., Makers of Modern Strategy (Princeton:
University Press Princeton, 1986), p.661.
   20Ibid. p.661.
   21L. J. Oliva, ed., Russia and the West, From Peter to
Khrushchev (Boston: D.C. Heath and Co., 1965), p.195.
   22J. Stalin, Leninism, Selected Writings (New York:
International Publishers, 1942), p.443.
   23W. Gurian, ed., The Soviet Union. Brackground, Ideology,
Reality (Notre Dame: University of Notre Dame, 1951), pp.5-7.
   24L. J. Oliva, ed., Russia and the West, from Peter to
Khrushchev (Boston: D.C. Heath and Co., 1965), p.195.
   25W. Gurian, ed., Soviet Imperialism, Its origins
and Tactics (Notre Dame: University of Notre Dame, 1953), p.30.
   26W. Gurian, ed., The Soviet Union, Background, Ideaology,
Reality (Notre Dame: Universtiy of Notre Dame, 1951), p.10.
   27G. E. Thibault, ed., The Art and Practice of Military
Strategy (Washington D.C.: National Defence University, 1984),
p.748.
   28L. J. Oliva, ed., Russia and the West, from Peter to
Krushchev (Boston: D.C. Heath and Co., 1965), p.258.
   29Ibid. p.258.
   30W. G. Andrews, ed., Soviet Institutions and Policies,
inside Views (Princeton: D. Van Nostrand Co. Inc., 1966),
p.403.
   31Soviet Military Power (Washington: U.S. Government Printing
Office, 1988), p.11.
  32Ibid. p.11.
  33Ibid. pp.11-12.
  34Ibid. p.12.
  35Ibid. p.12.
  36Ibid. p.8.
  37George F. Will, Real Iron From the USSR,The Washington
Post, December 4, 1988.
  38Defense 89, January/February (Government Printing Office,
1989), p11.
  39George F. Will, Real Iron from the USSR, The Washington
Post, December 4, 1988.
  40Margaret Roth, Soviet Troop Cuts Could Vastly Change
East-West Relations, the Navy Times, December 19,1988, p.14.
  41Ibid. p.14.
  42Defense 89, January/February (Government Printing Office,
1989), p.11.
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Lehman, R.F. Defense 89,January/February.
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Evens, Robert. Soviet ideology signals change,
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