Embracing Maneuver Warfare And Preparing For War AUTHOR Major P. B. Retter, Australian Army CSC 1989 SUBJECT AREA - Warfighting EXECUTIVE SUMMARY TITLE: EMBRACING MANEUVER WARFARE AND PREPARING FOR WAR I. Purpose: To examine what changes are required to current USMC training publications, formal courses, attitudes to Professional Military Education (PME) and FMF training before the USMC can develop a military environment which compliments the philosophy of Maneuver Warfare. II. Problem: The Marine Corps has formally adopted the philosophy of Maneuver Warfare as the basis of its warfighting doctrine. It remains to be seen; however, whether the Corps can put aside old prejudices and attitudes, and incorporate this new doctrine into the way in which it prepares for war. III. Data: The Commandant recently approved a new doctrinal publication titled "Warfighting". Designated FMFM l, the document represents the first major step taken by the Corps to implement Maneuver Warfare as the basis of its warfighting philosophy. Successful implementation of this philosophy will result in major changes to the way in which the Corps prepares for war on the modern battlefield. Four major "hurdles" to the effective implementation of this philosophy have been identified. These hurdles are: a lack of doctrine, a reluctance to put aside old attitudes and prejudices, a belief that Marines can become Maneuver Warfare "experts" overnight, and a need to overcome a number of "institutional" issues which may detract from the FMF's ability to prepare for war. While the Corps will soon issue FMFM 1 to all Marine officers, and implement a revised Professional Military Education (PME) Programme, more needs to be done. IV. Conclusion: Inadequate FMF training, a lack of Maneuver Warfare theory in NCO resident courses, persistent old attitudes and prejudices, and a need to find solutions to a number of institutional issues, still pose a threat to the effective implementation of Maneuver Warfare. The key to success remains with the unit and formation commanders of the FMF. V. Recommendations: Unit and formation commanders within the FMF must embrace Maneuver Warfare with determination, and encourage all Marines to develop the individual and unit skills necessary to succeed on the battlefield. They must demand those changes to courses, training and institutional problems necessary to effectively implement this new warfighting philosophy. EMBRACING MANEUVER WARFARE AND PREPARING FOR WAR OUTLINE Thesis The Marine Corps has formally adopted the philosophy of Maneuver Warfare as the basis of its warfighting doctrine. The Corps must now put aside old prejudices and attitudes and incorporate this new doctrine into the way in which it prepares for war. This will not be an easy process. I. The Challenge II. The Modern Battlefield and Maneuver Warfare A. Characteristics of the Modern Battlefield B. Description of Battle and the philosophy of Maneuver Warfare 1. Boyd's Action/Reaction Loop 2. Surprise and Risk 3. Mission Oriented Command and Control C. The Essential Elements of Maneuver Warfare 1. Speed of Action 2. Concentration of Combat Power 3. Firepower supports Maneuver 4. Suprise 5. Initiative and Boldness III. Implementing Maneuver Warfare A. The Need for Doctrine B. Old Prejudices and Attitudes C. Education and the Art of War D. Professional Military Education E. Resident Courses 1. Officer Courses 2. NCO Courses F. FMF Training G. Institutional Issues IV. Conclusion EMBRACING MANEUVER WARFARE AND PREPARING FOR WAR BY MAJOR P.B. RETTER During times of peace the most important task of any military is to prepare for war.... All peacetime activities should focus on achieving combat readiness. This implies a high level of training, flexibility in organization and equipment, qualified professional leadership and a cohesive doctrine.1 The Challenge In the past decade, much has been written by Marines on the subject of Maneuver Warfare. Debate on the merits or otherwise of the philosophy has been extensive. Some opponents of Maneuver Warfare have labelled it as little more than "common sense", while others have rejected the "attrition" verses "maneuver" comparisons of warfare as being unrealistic and too extreme. In the past, this debate has been viewed as both necessary and healthy. It should be noted, however, that the time for debate is now over. The USMC has formally adopted the philosophy of Maneuver Warfare as the basis of its "Warfighting" doctrine. The keystone doctrinal publication on warfighting, designated FMFM 1, was recently approved and signed by the Commandant. This publication will be available to all Marines within the next few months.2 The Corps must now put aside old prejudices and attitudes, and 1 MCCDC, USMC, "Warfighting", FMFM 1, (Quantico, 1989) p.41 2 Colonel M.D. Wyly, Doctrine and Development Branch, Warfighting Centre, MCCDC, Personal interview, 23 Feb 89. incorporate this new doctrine into the way in which it prepares for war. This will not be an easy process. The challenge is to develop a military environment which compliments the philosophy of Maneuver Warfare, and which allows commanders to develop the skills and procedures necessary to succeed on the future battlefield. This will require changes to current USMC training publications, formal courses, attitudes to professional military education (PME) and the way in which the FMF trains for war. The Modern Battlefield Future battles will be conducted in an environment which is extremely lethal, non-linear, and often uncertain. The lethality of weapons has improved dramatically in the past 20 years. As a result, units will need to employ greater dispersion and increased speed of movement if they are to survive. Forces opposing each other will no longer advance within well-defined linear boundaries. Opportunities for success on the battlefield will appear fleetingly as units maneuver to exploit their weapon systems or to protect themselves. Control on the battlefield will be more difficult to achieve and maintain. Commanders will be forced to make rapid decisions, often in the face of conflicting information and uncertainty. Maneuver Warfare and the Modern Battlefield The Philosophy of Maneuver Warfare attempts to make best use of this environment, and advocates that success will largely depend on our ability to adapt to constantly changing situations. 3 Current USMC doctrine defines Maneuver Warfare as "an approach to warfare that emphasizes disrupting the cohesion of the enemy's tactical units and the mental process of the enemy commander - his ability to make correct and timely decisions - rather than simply inflicting casualties at a greater rate than they are sustained."4 In Bill Lind's book it is put more simply: " Maneuver Warfare can be thought of as military judo. It is a way of fighting smart, of out-thinking an opponent you may not be able to overpower with brute strength."5 Maneuver Warfare is based on the belief that a battle consists of two forces pitted against each other. The actions of each force causes the other to modify existing plans. The force which can consistently replan and react first will gain and maintain the initiative.6 In a successful battle, the enemy is continually forced to modify his plans. After each modification, however, it is necessary for the friendly force to conduct further actions so that the enemy's plan repeatedly needs revision. At each repetition, the 3 MCCDC, USMC, "Warfighting", FMFM 1,(Quantico, 1989) p.57. 4 MCCDC, USMC, "Ground Combat Operations", OH 6-1, (Quantico, 1988) p. 1-5. 5 William Lind, "Maneuver Warfare Handbook, (Colorado: Westview Press Inc, Publishers, 1985) p.2. 6 Major J.D. Kelly, "Embracing Maneuver", Defence Force Journal No 69, (March-April 1988), p.39. enemy's response is increasingly inappropriate until, eventually, his organization loses cohesion and he is forced to disengage or face destruction.7 To force an enemy to alter his plan it is necessary to surprise him. To achieve surprise, that is to do something unexpected, requires some risk. If all risk is minimized, then the chosen course will be apparent and surprise will not be achieved. The acceptance of risk is essential to the attainment of surprise. 8 Having achieved surprise, the commander must now act more quickly than the enemy can react. Given the chaos which will reign on the battlefield, the commander's aim must be not to try to impose order, but rather to organize himself to cope with the disorder quicker than his opponent. A responsive mission oriented command and control system, where all commanders are aware of the intentions of their superiors at least two levels up, attempts to do this.9 In addition to the need for a mission-oriented command and control system, there is also a requirement for slick battle procedures, effective communications and superior mobility. These elements, when coupled with decisive and bold commanders, create the necessary environment for success. 7 Ibid. p 39. 8 Ibid. pp 39-40. 9 Ibid. p 40. Maneuver Warfare is not a new concept. While the Germans have often been regarded as the premier exponents of the "maneuver" style of war, they have not been alone. Other countries have for many years advocated similar philosophies. For example, in 1965 an Australian philosophy was developed for commanders on the confused battlefield. The creed included the following points: * act boldly on contact * if the situation is confused, do something and do it right away * if opportunity beckons, seize it * if the stake is worth it, then the gamble is justified * battles can be won without detailed knowledge of the enemy * battles can be won even when all troops are not fully briefed * the unexpected immediate action usually achieves surprise * when the battle hangs in the balance quick decision is more likely to succeed than a deliberate estimate and plan 10 There are many similarities between this creed and the essential elements of Maneuver Warfare. The Essential Elements of Maneuver Warfare Before attempting to implement Maneuver Warfare, it is important to analyze the essential elements of the philosophy. The following list of elements is not intended to be restrictive, but rather to serve as a framework for discussion: * Speed of Action * Concentration of Combat Power * Firepower supports Maneuver 10 Major H.L. Bell, "Audacity in Battle", Australian Army Journal, (February 1965), p. 1-5. * Surprise * Initiative and Boldness Speed of Action relates both to time and space. It is not just our ability to move fast, but also our ability to operate quickly; that is to assimilate information, to decide on an appropriate course of action, and to execute the resultant plan. The modern battlefield will continue to be, chaotic, violent, and confused. This fact was noted by US military officers in the 1930's when introducing infantry officers to the "fog of war" on the battlefield: " In war obscurity and confusion are normal. Late, exaggerated or misleading information, surprise situations and counter orders are to be expected." 11 Officers who wait for complete information or who refuse to take risks will often find that the enemy has reacted faster and taken the initiative. Speed of Action demands that commanders be capable of making decisions quickly when surrounded by uncertainty. Concentration of Combat Power relates to our ability to mass forces at a key point on the battlefield at a decisive moment. The key is to concentrate at the decisive place and time and strike at a key enemy weaknes. Concentration of force at a key point will often require a commander to accept risk elsewhere on the battlefield. 11 "Infantry in Battle", (Washington DC: The Infantry Journal Inc, 1939) p. 16 When concentrating forces on the battlefield, a commander must effectively utilize both firepower and maneuver. This quote from "Infantry in Battle" illustrates the point: Fire without movement is indecisive. Exposed movement without fire is disastrous. There must be effective fire combined with skillful movement.12 The point to remember is that firepower, if used effectively, allows us to successfully maneuver, and concentrate our combat power at the decisive point and time on the battlefield. Surprise implies striking an enemy where and/or when he does not expect it. Surprise can often be achieved through avoidance of familiar patterns and techniques. Commanders must stress the need for deception, flexibility, and originality when developing courses of action. A successful surprise attack may paralyse an enemy and can cause disproportionate results far greater than the physical forces used would normally indicate. Surprise will often be difficult to achieve and generally requires the commander to accept some degree of risk. Surprise, if achieved, must be exploited through bold action and initiative. In the history of warfare, there are numerous examples of golden opportunities being thrown away because of a lack of audacity on the part of commanders. If opportunity beckons, the commander must seize it. 13 12 Ibid. p 223. 13 Major H.L. Bell, "Audacity in Battle", Australian Army Journal, (February, 1965) p 1-2. If an enemy mistake creates an opportunity, a commander who hesitates to seize it commits the gravest of errors. If by our own efforts we create an opportunity, failure to seize it is a waste of the lives lost in the creation. As opportunities are usually fleeting, only the commander who reacts quickly will reap the benef its. 14 Subordinate commanders must be encouraged to seize fleeting opportunities and implement decisions based upon an understanding of what their superior would want them to do. A decentralized, mission-oriented command and control system is essential if operations are to be conducted at a high tempo. Maneuver Warfare requires competent commanders at all levels, who can be trusted to exploit opportunities in accordance with their superiors' "intent" without reference to higher headquarters. Implementing Maneuver Warfare The implementation of this warfighting philosophy will not occur overnight. Major R.K. Dobson, an instructor at the Command and Staff College, has identified four major "hurdles" which have, to date, prevented the Corps from effectively implementing the philosophy of Maneuver Warfare. These hurdles are; * a lack of doctrine * a reluctance to put aside old attitudes and prejudices 14 Ibid. p. 1-5. * a belief that Marines can become Maneuver Warfare "experts" overnight * a need to overcome a number of "institutional" issues which detract from the FMF's ability to prepare for war 15 The Need for Doctrine At present Maneuver Warfare means different things to different Marines. Following a 1986 survey of 375 Marines from the 2d Marine Division, Captain Kevin Clover stated, " We have a considerable amount of educating to do throughout the ranks of the Marine Corps. Marines are just not "reading off the same sheet of music" when it comes to Maneuver Warfare terminology." 16 When preparing for war, unity of effort is essential. Doctrine provides the framework for unified action by establishing the way in which we practice our profession. It provides the basis for mutual understanding on the battlefield. 17 With the issue of FMFM 1, the Marine Corps will have taken the first step in ensuring all members of the Corps understand the USMC's warfighting philosophy. An additional five "keystone" doctrinal publications are planned to be issued within the next two years. These publications will cover the three levels of war (strategic, operational and 15 Major R.K. Dobson, Instructor Command and Staff College, MCCDC, Personal Interview, 16 Mar 89 16Captain K.R Clover, "Maneuver Warfare: Where Are We Now?", Marine Corps Gazette, (February, 1988) p. 120. 17 MCCDC, USMC, "Warfighting", FMFM 1, (Quantico, 1988) p. 43. tactical), amphibious operations, and the way in which the Marine Corps should task organize for war. These publications will form the basis of all USMC teaching. Training manuals will be updated to reflect this new warfighting approach as techniques and procedures are revised and/or new technology and equipment render current procedures obsolete. 18 It should be stressed that the development and issue of this doctrine will only be the first step in ensuring this philosophy is understood at all levels within the Marine Corps. Old Prejudices and Attitudes Traditionally, the Marine Corps, like many other military institutions, has resisted change. Colonel John Studt USMC (retd), in describing the reasons for this resistance, stated that the Marine Corps had "never institutionalized a system that encourages innovative ideas or criticism from subordinates". 19 In addition, some Marines have reacted negatively to criticism from prominent "maneuverists" like Bill Lind. In some cases, this has reinforced their reluctance to deviate from traditional attitudes and procedures. Hopefully the issue of FMFM 1 will demonstrate that "Maneuver Warfare" is more than an "academic" philosophy, and hasten its acceptance. The support of unit and 16 Colonel M.D. Wyly, Doctrine and Development Branch, Warfighting Centre, MCCDC, Personal interview, 23 Feb 89. 19 William Lind, "Maneuver Warfare Handbook", (Colorado: Westview Press Inc, Publishers,1985) p xii. formation commanders will be crucial in this process. Education and the Art of War The Art of War has no traffic with rules, for the infinitely varied circumstances and conditions of combat never produce exactly the same situation twice. It follows then that the leader who would become a competent tactician must first close his mind to the alluring formulae that well meaning people offer in the name of victory. To master his difficult art he must learn to cut to the heart of the situation, recognize its decisive elements and base his course of action on these. The ability to do this is not God-given, nor can it be acquired overnight; it is a process of years. He must realize that training in solving problems of all types, long practice in making clear, unequivocal decisions, the habit of concentrating on the question at hand, and an elasticity of mind are indispensable requisites for the successful practice of the art of war.20 To successfully implement Maneuver Warfare as its warfighting philosophy, the Marine Corps must develop professional leaders at all levels of command. All commanders must be able to analyze situations on the battlefield and quickly develop workable plans, often without reference to higher headquarters. Sound military judgement, while initially based on a thorough knowledge of techniques, rules and procedures, must be developed through years of experience. In peacetime this experience should not be limited to periods of "formal training", but rather reflect a continuous process of education. The aim of the Corps education and training programme must be to produce Marines who know how to think "on 20 "Infantry in Battle", (Washington DC: The Infantry Journal Inc, 1939) p. 1. their feet" and quickly produce appropriate solutions to complex problems under difficult conditions. Ideally it would aim to produce Marines who are experts in the "Art of War". It should be noted that to produce an "expert" is a difficult process. In a 1989 Amphibious Warfare School (AWS) instructional handout entitled "Introduction to Tactical Concepts", an analysis is made of the five phases of development a person goes through to become an expert. The first phase is that of a "beginner", where essentially all you do is learn the "rules and techniques of the game". Actions are based on following these rules. The environment in which these rules are applied is not considered. The next stage is that of "advanced beginner". In this stage you apply the rules to a variety of situations and see whether they still work or not. Experience is gained by a process of trial and error. The beginner makes mistakes and learns that some rules and techniques do not work in some situations. In Stage 3 you become "competent". Based on your environmental experience and your thorough understanding of the rules you develop a hierarchy of rules which you selectively apply given a variety of situations. Stage 4 is the "proficient" stage. You know the rules, you know the game, and you know the environment so well that you start to develop a style of your own. You become intuitive. Finally you become an expert. Your skills are so developed that your actions are natural, almost always correct, and carried out sub-consciously.21 For example, the majority of infantry 2nd Lieutenants who complete the Basic Officers Course (BOC) at The Basic School (TBS) will probably graduate in the "advanced beginner" category. By the time they finish the Infantry Officers Course (IOC), they should have progressed to the "competent" stage. When they arrive in their units, they should be striving to develop into "proficient" and finally "expert" platoon commanders. Only a few of these officers will ever reach the "expert" level; however, the aim of the training programme should be to produce "thinking" platoon commanders who have not only learnt "rules and techniques", but more importantly have learnt how to think logically under battlefield conditions by selectively applying or modifying the "rules and techniques". This process is further complicated by the need to prepare all leaders for promotion. For example, while the infantry Lieutenant is developing into an expert platoon commander, he must also be exposed to the "techniques and environment" associated with becoming a company commander. This training and education is essential for all Marines since death and injury will often necessitate rapid promotion in wartime. Within the FMF, commanders must ensure that all Marines understand this five step education process, and recognise that to become warf ighting "experts" they will need to do more than just 21 AWS, MCCDC, "Introduction to Tactical Concepts", (Quantico, 1989) p.DO-2. learn the "buzz" words. Excellence will not be achieved overnight, but rather as a result of an education system which includes theoretical and practical instruction, extensive reading and practical experience in FMF units. Professional Military Education For some time it has been recognized that the intense demands of FMF training, periodic non-FMF assignments, and infrequent formal courses, have resulted in many Marines neglecting their own professional military development. In November 1988, General A.M. Gray established a compulsory Professional Military Education (PME) programme for all officers, staff NCOs and NCOs. The purpose of this programme is to ensure a continuity of education for all Marines throughout their careers. Marines are required to complete a series of resident or correspondence courses at various stages of their careers. These courses will be supplemented by an extensive professional reading list. 22 Development of the reading list is now well advanced. A PME task group at Quantico has developed a draft list of required reading. Each officer, SNCO and NCO will be required to read between eight and 30 books prior to promotion to the next rank level. The reading list is expected to be approved by the 22 CMC msg to all Marines dated 10 Nov 88 ( ALMAR 255/88 DTG 102002 z Nov 88). Commandant within the next few weeks.23 The success of PME will depend, to a large degree, on the interest shown in the reading programme by unit commanders. FMFM 1 states: "Commanders should see the development of their subordinates as a direct reflection of themselves. "24 Commanders should set realistic reading goals commensurate with work commitments. Written assignments, based on these readings, should also be requested. Discussion and debate on issues directly related to topics covered in the readings should be encouraged. Unit commanders must ensure that their subordinates develop the ability to analyze issues and think logically. This is particularly important among junior officers. Resident Courses Past criticism of "formal" education in the Marine Corps asserted that resident courses run by the Corps were entirely devoted to "what" to think, and neglected "how" to think. In 1985 Bill Lind stated: The Marine Corps education system is, in reality, one devoted to techniques. While the argument can be made that, due to long periods of absence from the FMF and the increasing complexities of modern combat, officers must be solidly grounded in the technical fundamentals, the relative exclusion of innovative thought is tragic. Despite some historical analysis at AWS and the Command and Staff College aimed at improving decision-making skills, there seems little room for questioning and creative thinking. Even more tragically, many officers show little inclination for creativity. Beginning at 23 Colonel P.K. Van Riper Memo, "PME Reading List", dated 17 Feb 89. 24 MCCDC, USMC, "Warfighting", FMFM 1, (Quantico, 1989) p. 51. the Basic School, techniques are memorized with little broad understanding of the conceptional foundations. This emphasis on techniques - the so called "basics" - has led to stagnancy in Marine Corps Education.25 This criticism may well have been deserved; however, Mr Lind has also noted that "excellence in techniques is very important in Maneuver Warfare... .A major difference between a military that can do maneuver warfare in combat and one that can only talk about it is excellence in techniques."26 The Marine Corps must design balanced courses which produce officers who are both "educated" in how to think and "disciplined" in what techniques they use or modify. An examination of TBS, AWS and the Command and Staff College in 1989 has revealed an evolving formal education system, more attuned to producing officers who are able to think logically, and whose solutions are not restricted to checklists or textbook formulas. The BOC now exposes 2nd Lieutenants to the philosophy of Maneuver Warfare early on in the course. They become familiar with concepts such as "Commanders Intent", "Focus of Main Effort", "Surfaces and Gaps" and "Combined Arms". Practical exercises stress sound military judgement as opposed to the memorizing of basic techniques. A recent article in the Marine Corps Gazette stated: Companies (of 2nd Lieutenants) often fight outnumbered and must continually improvise, exercise initiative consistent 25 William Lind, "Maneuver Warfare Handbook", (Colorado: Westview Press Inc, Publishers, 1985) p 42. 26 Ibid. p 12. with the commander's intent, and integrate combined arms with rapid maneuver to achieve decisive results. Unfortunately, my own observation of recent 2nd Lieutenant infantry graduates from the BOC has revealed a lack of knowledge and experience when selecting fire positions, conducting patrols and implementing other basic "warfighting" skills. 28 While these observations are not conclusive, my concern is that the BOC staff may need to spend more time concentrating on basic techniques. Having said this, I am confident that as FMF commanders assess the strengths and weaknesses of these officers, the BOC will find the right balance between developing sound military judgement and teaching the "basics". An examination of current AWS instructional material has revealed a well-balanced tactics package, where historical examples and practical exercises are effectively combined to assist students in analyzing why past military commanders have been successful or otherwise on the battlefield.29 Discussions with AWS staff have indicated that students are well versed in concepts such as "Commanders Intent" and "Focus of Main Effort", and that effective use is made of practical exercises to develop the 27 The Basic School Staff, "TBS: Genesis of Marine Professional Military Education", Marine Corps Gazette, (March, 1989) p 53. 28 Observations occurred during a visit to an IOC field exercise at TBS on 5 Jan 89. 29 AWS, MCCDC, "Offensive Tactics", and "Introduction to Tactical Concepts", (Quantico, 1989). decision-making skills of the students. 30 The Command and Staff College course has been revised significantly this year. Increased emphasis has been placed on the implementation of plans during two-sided command post exercises (CPXs). Students have been exposed to the "fog" and "friction" of war, and forced to implement plans in the midst of uncertainty. While the course will continue to evolve, the major changes this year have seen students thoroughly exposed to the philosophy of Maneuver Warfare. 31 While it appears that officer courses are evolving to meet the needs of Maneuver Warfare, little evidence of change is apparent in current non-commissioned officer (NCOs) courses. Although emphasis should still be placed on "techniques", squad leaders, platoon sergeants and first sergeants must also thoroughly understand the concepts associated with Maneuver Warfare. While many of these concepts will be covered during FMF training, resident courses must include discussions and practical exercises designed to develop thinking NCOs capable of initiative and decisive action. Failure to expose NCOs to these concepts may result in a junior leadership characterized by "robots" who cannot think for themselves, or act independently when confronted with unusual battlefield situations. 30 Colonel R. I. Neal, Director AWS, MCCDC, Personal Interview, 24 Feb 89. 31 Colonel P.K. Van Riper, Director Command and Staff College, MCCDC, Personal Interview, 16 Feb 89. Training in the FMF The purpose of all training is to develop forces that can win in combat. Training is the key to combat effectiveness and therefore is the focus of effort of a peacetime military. "32 While most current unit training programmes appear adequate, the advent of Maneuver Warfare will necessitate development of training programmes which are more realistic and challenging. The following guidelines should be examined when developing FMF training programmes. Initial training should ensure all Marines have mastered basic tactical techniques and have understood the value of battle procedure and unit SOPs. This initial training is crucial to all future training. As Marines gain experience and develop their skills, so too should the scope and complexity of their training increase. During this training, commanders must stress that subordinates think for themselves and make their own decisions consistent with their superior's intent. There is a need for unit commanders to cultivate an attitude where a subordinate who makes a mistake, is preferred to one who never makes one by always playing "safe". Subordinates must be "trusted" to implement orders based on their own initiative and experience. Training, be it a unit-sized force on force exercise, a tactical exercise without troops, or a command post exercise, should force all participants to analyze situations and react to 32 MCCDC, USMC, "Warf ighting", FMFM 1, (Quantico,1989) p. 46. them quickly. Throughout this training the fog and friction of the battlefield should be stressed. Two-sided exercises are the ideal training medium for commanders to develop their tactical skills. In these situations, commanders are pitted against an adversary, uncertainty, and the clock. Invariably the commander who reacts more quickly with a workable plan will prevail over the commander who waits for the complete tactical picture to unfold before activating a superior plan. Marine training must stress that sound techniques, a thorough knowledge of battle procedures, and the ability to quickly analyze incomplete and contradictory information are all necessary if Marines are to be prepared for the battlefield of the future. Institutional Issues There are a number of outstanding issues which may affect the FMF's ability to effectively implement the Corps' warfighting philosophy. These issues range from "personnel" policies concerning promotion and assignments in the FMF, to "operational" issues, such as the need to streamline the current Marine Air Ground Task Force (MAGTF) command organization. Solving many of these problems will take months, if not years; however, in dealing with these issues, the overriding concern must be to find solutions which allow FMF units to "train" more effectively. All senior Marine officers must insist that the FMF be "organized for warf ighting and then adapted for peacetime rather than vice versa."33 Conclusion The development of doctrine and the PME programme appear to be "on track"; however, old attitudes and prejudices, inadequate FMF training, the lack of Maneuver Warfare theory in NCO resident courses, and the need to find solutions to a number of current "institutional" issues, still pose a threat to the implementation of Maneuver Warfare. The degree to which the Corps successfully embraces Maneuver Warfare will depend, to a large degree, on how FMF unit and formation commanders react to this warfighting philosophy. Hopefully, they will embrace Maneuver Warfare with determination, and encourage all Marines to develop the individual and unit skills necessary to succeed on the future battlefield. The junior leadership of the Marine Corps will eagerly embrace the philosophy of Maneuver Warfare if given the chance. 33 Ibid. pp. 41-42. 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"Warfighting", FMFM 1, Quantico, 1989 USMC, MCCDC, AWS Instructional Handout, "Introduction to Tactical Concepts". Quantico, VA, 1989 USMC, MCCDC, AWS Instructional Handout, "Offensive Tactics". Quantico, VA, 1989 Van Riper, P.K. Colonel, Director Command and Staff College. Memorandum "PME Reading List", Quantico, VA, 17th February 1989 Van Riper, P.K. Colonel, Director Command and Staff College. Personal interview. Quantico, VA, 16th February 1989 Wyly, M.D. Colonel, Branch Head Warfighting Centre. Personal interview. Quantico, VA, 23th February 1989
