Strategic Loss In Indochina - U.S. Policy In Laos AUTHOR Major Michael E. Ruth, USAF CSC 1989 SUBJECT AREA - Foreign Policy EXECUTIVE SUMMARY STRATEGIC LOSS IN INDOCHINA - U.S. POLICY IN LAOS After World War II, the United States was the preeminent world power, but the rapidly growing number of nations in the world complicated the task of formulating foreign policy. The purpose of this paper is to examine the relationship of the U.S. with Laos, from WWII to 1962, to address problems in strategy formulation and the use of national power. Laos emerged from WWII with the same nationalistic ideals as many other former colonies. As a land-locked and very rugged country in Southeast Asia, Laos has very little strategic value, except for her shared border with Vietnam. After WWII, Laos supported the French during their war with the Viet Minh, and was given full independence in 1953. The Geneva Conference on Indochina in 1954 called for a neutral state in Laos and reconciliation with the communist guerillas, the Pathet Lao. This was accomplished in a coalition government formed in 1957. Soon after, the government moved away from the neutralist policy and toward the west forcing the communists out. Civil war broke out again in 1959. A coup by neutralist factions of the army brought about a three way fight until the neutralists joined with the Pathet Lao. A second coalition government was the result of a ceasefire in 1961 and was endorsed by the second Geneva conference in 1962. U.S. policy through these years was inconsistent and usually shortsighted. It suffered from three major problems. (1) There was no strategic objective to the policy of the U.S. toward Laos. Under the Truman and then Eisenhower administrations, military aid was sent to the French to fight the Viet Minh and later to the Laotians to build the same type of army to continue the fight. Economic aid was sent with no viable plan for its use. (2) The U.S. had no strategy for coordinated use of all elements of national power. Truman effectively cancel led out the use of political power by allowing the French to recolonize Laos after WWII in the face of strong nationalistic sentiment. At times during 1960, the U.S. was paying the soldiers of both sides of the conflict. (3) U.S. policy toward Laos consisted of a reactive rather than an active strategy. This phenomenon is mainly atributable to lack of intrest in Laos except at times of extreme crises. Since no coherent, defined strategy was in being, the U.S. was continually responding to, rather than directing the antagonists. The legacy of U.S. policy in Laos during this time was the loss of control over an area which would become stra- tegically important to America's enemy of the next decade. STRATEGIC LOSS IN INDOCHINA - U.S. POLICY IN LAOS OUTLINE Thesis: A study of the relationship between the United States and Laos from WWII to the signing of the Geneva accords in 1962, in order to address problems in U.S. strategy formulation and the use of national power. I. Background on Laos A. Geography and people B. Early history C. Beginning of U.S. policy in Laos D. French Indochina War E. Geneva agreements on cessation of hostilities in Indochina - July 1954 II. Aftermath of Geneva A. U.S. participation in the conference B. The first coalition government - 1957 C. Election of 1958 III. Renewed civil war in Laos - 1959 A. The government moves right B. Pathet Lao refuse integration C. Elections of 1960 D. The Kong Le rebellion E. The second coalition government - 1961 IV. Problems with U.S. policy in Laos A. No clear strategic objective B. Uncoordinated use of national power C. Reactive verses active strategy STRATEGIC LOSS IN INDOCHINA - U.S. POLICY IN LAOS Wisdom consists not so much in knowing what to ultimately do as in knowing what to do next. - Herbert Hoover On October 8, 1961, an agreement on the composition of a coalition government for the Kingdom of Laos was signed on the Plaines des Jarres with the support of the U.S. government. Four years earlier at this same location, the same parties had made an almost identical commitment to a very cold reception by U.S. policy makers. What was the reason for this change? Had U.S. national interests changed? What was the goal of U.S. policy in Laos and had it now been met? The answers are unclear. Unclear, not because history does not record the facts, but because the reasons, policies and goals were unclear and at times contradictory. Inconsistent or ineffective policies have in the past and continue to affect the relationship of the United States with the other countries of the world. The purpose of this paper is to study the relationship between the United States and Laos from WWII to the signing of the Geneva Accords in 1962, in order to address problems in U.S. strategy formulation and the use of national power. National policy is based on many variables including, ideology, political system, laws, and ethical standards to name just a few. These variables define our national personality and interests and are reflected in our relationship with other countries through U.S. policy. Once policy is defined, a national strategy should be developed to optimize the use of the elements of national power to support that policy. Strategy. The art and science of developing and using political, economic, psychological and military forces as necessary during peace and war, to afford the maximum support to policies, in order to increase the probabilities and favorable consequences of victory and lessen the chance of defeat. (11:350) It is at this level of national strategy development that post WWII U.S. policy toward Indochina in general, and Laos in particular, broke down. Laos is a landlocked country in central Indochina about the size of Oregon. Its borders are basically formed by two prominent geographical features, the rugged Annamite mountain chain defining its eastern border with Vietnam and the Mekong River on the west dividing it from Thailand and Burma. On Laos' northern border lies China and to the south, Cambodia. The geography of the country is extremely hostile, made up mainly of deep, narrow valleys surrounded by steep, saw- toothed mountains, all of which covered by dense jungle. The people are ethnically diverse; the Lao comprising barely one half of the population and inhabiting mainly the low flatlands along the Mekong and its tributaries are the politically and economically dominant group. Of the at least forty-two other tribal clusters in Laos, most live at varying altitudes in the mountains of the interior or on one of the two grassy, highland plateaus, the Plaines des Jarres in the north or the Bolovens Plateau in the south. Historically, the strategic value of what is now modern Laos has been little more than as a buffer state or territory between rival powers in the Southeast Asian region. With the exception of a two hundred year period between the 14th and 16th century, the ancient history of Laos is one of a country dominated by other peoples as a client state, protectorate, colony, or conquered territory. Early recorded history begins with Laos as a part of the Khmer (Cambodian) Empire, subsequently overrun by Mongols from the north and constantly harrassed by its neighbors tothe east (Annam or Vietnam) and the west (Siam or Thailand and Burma). A French colony for over 60 years, Laos had a short period of independence following World War II (the period of focus of this paper), before being dominated and finally conquered by the Democratic Republic of Vietnam. Along with a history of continuing alliance and conflict with its neighbors to the east and west, Laos has always had warm, friendly relations with Cambodia and has always felt threatened by its powerful northern neighbor, China. Another factor in Southeast Asian internal politics and external relations is the influence of the Indo-Buddist culture west of the Annamite chain (Laos, Thailand, Burma, Cambodia) and Sino-Confucianism east of the mountains (Vietnam). For Laos, this heritage has fostered a "religious justification of kingly rule," (5:25) which, as will be seen later, has profound impact on the conduct of government and the influence of the Laotian "royals." French colonial rule of Laos was largely benevolent. The French maintained the colony merely as a buffer between economically important Tonkin (northern Vietnam) and the British and Siamese influence to the west. The French made minor improvements in schools, health and public works but generally allowed the traditional forms of government to operate. The Laotians for their part reciprocated this treatment by being "...the enfant sage (the well-behaved child) of the Indochinese union. " (5:31) Perhaps the only major mistake made by the French in their sixty years of tutelage in Laos was the extensive use they made at subordinate echelons of Vietnamese civil servants. As in the case of the Indian civil servant used by the British in Burma and Malaya, the result was that too few capable native administrators were trained to hold positions of responsibility in their own country. This deficiency was to make itself felt after full independence was gained..."(5:31) The French continued to administer Indochina during World War II under Japanese direction after skirmishes with Japan in northern Vietnam in September, 1940 (France asked for, but received no support from Pacific allies) and Japan's only asian ally, Thailand, in January, 1941. This arrangement existed until the waning days of the war when, with their empire crumbling, the Japanese ... lashed out in a destructive rage in all directions... On March 9, 1945, Japanese troops once more attacked without warning, wantonly killing French soldiers and civilians. French pleas for American help were ignored. Within a short time, all Frenchmeh in Indochina .. .were interned in Japanese camps; all, that is, except those in Laos. ... In a spontaneous movement of generosity and courage equaled only by the attitude of the Filipinos toward the Americans, the Laotian people came to the help of the French. Literally hundreds of Frenchmen were hidden from their Japanese pursuers by Laotian friends... (5:33) Some Lao, including the only organized Laotian military unit, the First Battalion of Chasseurs Laotiens (Laotian Light Infantry) created by the French in 1943, took to the hills with a handful of French officers and men to fight as guerillas against the Japanese. "[M]any of Laos' political leaders in the difficult years of the 1960's, both of the Right and of the Left, are `graduates' of the anti-Japanese underground." (5:33) Official American policy, that is, the policy of President Roosevelt toward Indochina at this time was perfectly clear. Since early 1943, he had made his position known to all the allies, including the French. Independence for the three countries of Indochina after a period of international trusteeship should be the goal. The French should not be allowed to reestablish colonial rule. By the Tehran conference, Roosevelt, Stalin and Chiang Kai-Shek were in agreement with this solution. Churchill, having colonial possessions of his own in East Asia objected on the side of the French, but the President cut him off at Tehran. "Now look here, Winston, you are out voted three to one. "(1:11) In a memorandum to Secretary of State Hull in January, 1944, FDR reiterated, ... Indochina should not go back to France but [should] be administered by ah international trusteeship.... France has milked it for one hundred years. The people of Indochina are entitled to something better than that. (1:13) However, ...Roosevelt's personal ideas had not been elaborated into an official and operational policy and apparently ran counter to the desires and activities of other Allied powers. In addition, both in Washington and in the field American policy makers at lower echelons often concentrated on objectives and policies which were effectively, although not necessarily overtly, competitive with Roosevelt's ideas. (1:5) Roosevelt's death on April 12, 1945, brought a halt to the ideological efforts of the American president to remove the yoke of colonialism in the world. The complete turn around of American policy can be demonstrated by President Truman's comments to Charles de Gaulle in August, 1945. "In any case my government offers no opposition to the return of the French army and authority in Indochina."(1:28) To Madame Chaing Kai-Shek, when asked of the trusteeship that President Roosevelt had spoken of, Truman stated, "that there had been no discussion of a trusteeship for Indochina as far as he was concerned."(1:28) At the Potsdam Conference in July, 1945, it was decided by the allies that the Chinese would accept the surrender of Japanese forces in Indochina north of the 16th parallel (Laos, N.Vietnam) and that the British would do the same south of that line (Cambodia, S.Vietnam). At the war's end, the Chinese did make token moves into Hanoi and the northern provinces of Indochina as the Japanese left, but Chiang Kai- Shek had other priorities in his own country, so there was never a total occupation. The resulting vacuum led to an opportunity which the Laotian leaders did not pass up. The pursuit of independence for Laos. The post WWII history of Laos has been largely shaped by four individuals, three of whom are brothers, all of whom are princes. The first, Prince Phetsarath, the Viceroy of the kingdom since 1941 was the oldest of the three brothers. The title of Viceroy put him in the position of intimate counselor to the King and in the event of the King's death with no heir, he would be responsible for selecting the new King from the princes of the kingdom, obstensively, himself Princes Souvanna Phouma and Souphanouvong are the younger brothers (Souphanouvong was born of their father's second wife). All three brothers were well-educated, including university study in France. The last of the four princes is Boun Oum. Boun Oum was the crown prince of the Kingdom of Champassak, one of the three historic kingdoms which make uo modern Laos. Under French rule the three kingdoms were administered separately. Under the Vichy, during WWII, the three were united to form the Kingdom of Laos. Under the unification agreement, Boun Oum renounced the throne of Champassak but retained the royal title for himself and his heirs. On September 15, 1945, Prince Phetsarath officially reaffirmed the union of the territories and proclaimed independence from France for the Kingdom of Laos. He became Prime Minister of the new government called Lao Issara (Free Laos) and on October 12th, a provisional constitution was approved establishing a constitutional monarchy. The one stumbling block was that the King, Sisavang Vong, refused to recognize the new government in favor of remaining a protectorate of France, and was susequently deposed. Public sentiment was with the Lao Issara but they became uncomfortable about the removal of the King and so, did what the Lao have always tried to do in a crises, negotiate. A common position was found and the King was enthroned again in Luang Prabang (the ancient seat of the kingdom) on April 23, 1946. By this time the French had returned to Southeast Asia and were fighting the meger Lao army up the Mekong valley. Meanwhile, Prince Souphanouvong, with the help of the American Office of Strategic Services (OSS), had sought help from Ho Chi Minh, the President of the newly declared, independent country of Vietnam (Ho claimed all of present day Vietnam, the French colonies of Tonkin, Annam and Cochinchina, but controlled only the territory north of the 16th parallel because the British occupied the south). Ho provided some Viet Minh advisors and weapons to help Souphanouvong form an army. On his return to Vientiane with his new force, Souphanouvong was named Minister of Defense in the Lao Issara. His efforts, however were not enough to defend against the overpowering French forces aided by British air support. On September 23, 1946, the last provincial capital in Laos fell to the French. The Lao Issara fled to Bangkok in advance of the French and set up a government in exile. The French, within the year, instituted a new constitution. It was signed by King Sisavang Vong just a year after the last, but now returning his country once again to the status of a protectorate of France. In November of 1947 the first National Assembly gathered in its inaugural session. Its power was legislative and covered internal affairs only, France still controlled foreign relations and the military. But, by July, 1949, the French ...because of their growing need to maintain a quiet rear area during their military operations against the Viet Minh, granted more substantial independence to Laos.... A Franco-Lao General Convention accorded Vientiane greater latitude in foreign affairs, including the right to apply for membership in the United Nations. (3:34) Laos was also allowed to field its own territorial army, alhough it was pooled with other French Union force; under a French Commander in Chief. By this time the Lao Issara had finally unwound. Phetsarath had been striped of his title as Viceroy by the King and would not consider reconciliation until that title was returned to him in 1957. Souvanna Phouma found the latest action by the French promising and flew to Paris to join the King at the signing of the Convention. Souphanouvong continued to press for international support for the Lao Issara throughout his time in Bangkok using FDR's rhetoric that the French should not be allowed to dominate the people of Indochina. He continued to meet with sympathetic agents of the OSS in efforts to secure U.S. support, but American attention was turned toward western Europe and China. Increasingly aware that the Viet Minh were the only entity actively supporting his cause, Souphanouvong turned to the North Vietnamese for support, broke with the Lao Issara and formed the Pathet Lao. During the next few years, the Viet Minh continued to battle the French while concurrently supplying and training "resistance" movements in Laos, Cambodia and South Vietnam. The Pathet Lao continued to grow during this time and established support areas in the provinces along the Vietnamese Laotian border. Then in 1953, two important events took place in Laos, one military and one political. That year brought the full impact of the French Indochina War to the Lao. In April, the Viet Minh launched a full scale attack with four divisions in a wide pincer movement to take control of northern Laos, the royal city of Luang Prabang and the capital at Vientiane. The first battle of the campaign was the capture, for the first time by the Viet Minh, of a border post along the historic invasion route into Laos, Dien Bien Phu, held at the time by a small unit of the Laotian army. The communist southern attack was stopped at the Plaine des Jarres where overwhelming French firepower and air support could be effectively employed in the open grassland of the plateau. The northern attack was repelled more by luck than skilled fighting. Approaching the outskirts of Luang Prabang the communists lost a main ammunition dump to French action in their rear and the monsoon season began early, thwarting their attack. On the political side, continuing pressure from Prince Souvanna Phouma, who had become Prime Minister in 1951, resulted in a Treaty of Amity and Association between Laos and France, in which France finally acknowledged the full independence of Laos and also provided for the mutual defense of the Kingdom. That agreement left no choice for General Henri Navarre, commander of the French forces in Indochina, but to defend all of Laos should she be threatened. On November 20, 1953, General Navarre ordered the recapture and fortification of Dien Bien Phu. To be sure, the French National Defense Committee had addressed to Navarre on November 13, 1953, a directive in which he had been "invited ... to adjust operations to his needs," but the fact remains, however, that Navarre had clearly realized that a total evacuation of northern Laos, including the two capitals, would have had such a demoralizing effect on both Viet- Nam and Cambodia as to make the continuation of the war fairly hopeless. The battle for Laos was, therefore, part of an overall strategy which could not be readily divorced from the physical and psychological environment of the war. A great part of the disasters in Laos and South Viet-Nam in 1960 and 1961 must be ascribed to the fact that this elemental truth was forgotten. (5:57) Back in the U.S., debate was heating up on whether America should intervene in Indochina. Already, the United States, beginning in Truman's administration and continuing at an even greater rate during Eisenhower's, was bearing a great share of the cost of the French war effort. By 1953, fully 70 percent of the cost of the war was borne by America, $954 million by the end of the conflict. (3:46) The French continued to ask for direct American military involvement, but Eisenhower was leary about sending combat troops into another Asian war so soon after Korea. Indeed, a Gallup poll in March, 1953 had reported 85 percent of Americans opposed to U.S. involvement in Indochina, and Congressional mail reflected the same attitude. (3:49) The Joint Chiefs of Staff were split on the idea of intervention, but Secretary of State Dulles proposed an international coalition of Britain, the U.S., and friendly Asian nations to commit ground forces to help the French. Eisenhower approved the proposal but the British reception was cold for three reasons: they were not consulted in advance, they believed it weakened the western position at Geneva, and they were unsure this was a sincere U.S. policy. "You cannot ask us to agree when the Cabinet ministers, senators and military leaders have not yet made up their minds about what we are to agree upon," an influential [British] official said. (3:50) The confusion of the U.S.public was summed up by Representative John W. McCormack, Minority Whip of the House. The American people are confused, and I cannot blame them. When members of Congress are confused, it is only natural that our people should be. This lack of knowledge, creating uncertainty and confusion, is not confined to the Democratic members alone. I have had a number of Republican members tell me they do not know where we are or where we are going. (3:50) Fighting continued through the winter of 1953-1954 with a major Viet Minh/Pathet Lao offensive in all sectors of Laos. The main objective was to spread out the French forces and set up the demoralizing defeat of the garrison at Dien Bien Phu. The Pathet Lao with the aid of their North Vietnamese sponsors made significant gains initially, but even with the fall of Dien Bien Phu, were unable to hold on to any more territory than the two northern provinces of Sam Neua and Phong Saly, which they had held since the spring of 1953. In July, a ceasefire was finally ageed upon in Geneva. For Laos, the consequences were a complicated ùset of political relationships and the yoke of international involvement for years to come. Throughout the Geneva meetings the Lao had insisted that they were not engaged in a civil war (as the Vietnamese were), but that the fighting in Laos was the result of foriegn intervention, specifically, the Viet Minh. This approach did prevent the Pathet Lao from being seated at the conference, but in the agreements they were recognized and requirements were put on the Laotians to incorporate the Pathet Lao into the government. The other main requirement of the accords was that all foreign forces would leave Laos except for a 5000 man French force, made up of advisors and the units stationed at two air bases, and that Laos would not enter any military alliances. For their part, the Laotians realized that their only hope of survival was to follow a policy of non-alignment and neutrality, counting on the pledge of each conference participant, renouncing military expansion into Laos. The U.S. took exception to the wording of the final declaration at Geneva, fearing that it would not prevent communist expansion in Southeast Asia, and so, with non- communist Vietnam, did not sign the accords. The agreements had a positive point in favor of Laos, in that they did not restrict the bi-lateral economic and military aid program begun in 1951 with the United States. Prince Souvanna Phouma wasted no time in putting on a diplomatic "full court press" to ensure the integrity of his small country and to isolate the Pathet Lao from their external sponsors. By removing the outside influence, he reasoned,the Lao people could resolve their differences. This effort would take time to bring results, but by 1956 he had persuadedhis brother, Prince Souphanouvong,to join the government and integrate the Pathet Lao forces into the Royal Laotian Army. To do this Souvanna Phouma had spent a lot of time talking mainly to Chinese and North Vietnamese officials in an effort to bring pressure on the Pathet Lao to negotiate. These efforts included visits to Peking and Hanoi which greatly distrubed the U.S., especially Secretary of State Dulles, because both communist governments demanded that Laos forbid the installation of any American bases or military advisors on its soil. Souvanna Phouma was willing to make this concession in light of the fact that China and North Vietnam had no objection to the French presence permitted under the Geneva Accords. Discord in the royal government now reared its head, as some conservatives, motivated by U.S. threats of a cutoff of aid, got cold feet about a coalition. Several negative votes in the spring of 1957, concerning the August 1956 agreement with the Pathet Lao, lead to a crises of confidence and the resignation of Souvanna Phouma. Two attempts were made at forming another government and after both failed, Souvanna Phouma was again asked to form a government. He submitted the same coalition he had tendered six months before and this time it passed the Assembly. On November 18, Prince Souphanouvong, ù ...after eleven years in rebellion, formally returned to the authority of the King the provinces of Sam-Neua and Phong Saly and the Pathet Lao personnel under his command. One day later, on November 19, 1957, the Laotian National Assembly, recalled into special session, gave its unanimous vote of approval to the new government which now included two Pathet Lao members. The whole assembly and the spectators broke out in spontaneous applause as the vote was announced. Laos was finally at peace for the first time since World War II. (5:80) Reaction to the news in Paris and London was elation; in the Soviet Bloc, mellow but positive; in Washington however, the State Department commented as follows, The United States feels, however, that a coalition with the Communists is a dangerous line of conduct, for the history of similar coalitions elsewhere in the world reveals that they end tragically in penetration and seizure of the country by the Communists. Consequently, the evolution of the situation in Laos is a source of serious concern to the United States, which is observing very closely the situation in that country. (5:81) The Defense Department took the opposite tack, pointing out that this was a victory for the west because the two communist controlled provinces had been peacefully returned to Royal control. Once again, the U.S. Government could not agree on the success or failure of U.S. policy, because it was not clear what that policy was. Two years before at Geneva, this same administration had agreed at the conference table that a permanent solution must include the Pathet Lao, and now they were out to undermine that solution. The euphoria of peace and reconciliation was shortlived. Subtle interference by two external forces would conspire to undermine the fragile balance that Souvanna Phouma had so carefully achieved. Those two influential factors took the form of economic aid from the United States and continued ideological pressure from North Vietnam. In general, the backdrop of the latter influenced the affect of the internal turmoil caused by the former. The Viet Minh continued to supply, train and control the Pathet Lao in varying degrees throughout the next five years. The threat of intervention from the east continually exacerbated any conflict or crises the government of Laos faced over this period. By 1960, when the civil war was in full swing again, the North Vietnamese had advisors and troops with the Pathet Lao as well as artillery units supporting neutralist factions of the Royal army. The gains made by the Pathet Lao and the Viet Minh along the entire eastern border region, allowed construction to begin on a project of far-reaching impact for the future, the Ho Chi Minh Trail. By 1957, U.S. economic aid had reached a level of $40-50 million per year and was the highest per capita U.S. aid program in Southeast Asia. (3:105) Included in this program was underwritten the cost of the entire Royal Laotian Army. Here again, coordinated use of U.S. national power was non- existant. The JCS had advised the Secretary of Defense in 1954 that support of a Laotian armed force for other than internal security was not realistic. Laotian forces to prevent external agression were unthinkable; afterall, the French Union forces during the war had numbered over 450,000 men. The State Department however, decided that for "political reasons," a force of 25,000 men should be supported. Congress questioned the logic of that decision years later. U.ùS. support of a 25,000-man army, of the entire military budget, and of segments of the civilian economy is, in fact, based on a political determination, made by the Department of State contrary to the recommendations of the Joint Chiefs of Staff. In Laos, the only country in the world where the United States supports the military budget 100 per cent, military judgments have been disregarded.(3:99) The military aid though was not the main problem. With the influx of large amounts of American wealth into a barter economy, Laos was unable to handle the resulting inflationary pressure. The opportunity to improve one's financial position was significantly increased for the Laotian who could serve in the government. The average Laotian however, was watching the cost of living steadily rise while his lot got worse. In this atmosphere, elections were held in May of 1958 to fill 21 seats in the National Assembly, made by the reintegration of the two northern provinces and a restructuring of some other districts. The political party of the Pathet Lao, the Neo Lao Hak Sat (NLHS) campaigned vigorously against the extensive corruption in the administration of the foreign aid program, emphasizing the fact that less than 10 percent of the aid went to projects which would benefit the people, such as, schools, roads, and medical care. Their opponents on the other hand were feeding coal to the fire. The Nationalist and Independent Parties might have eight or nine candidates running for the one seat, the motivation being to get into the Assembly and take advantage of the financial opportunities offered by control over U.S. aid money. To make matters worse, the U.S., in an effort to address the shortcomings presented by the NLHS, pumped an additional $3 million into the country, late in the campaign for public works projects. Unfortunately, much of the money went to buy off some of the competing candidates of the two non-communist parties so that the NLHS would not be able to benefit from a split vote. Even under these conditions, on the eve of the election, all parties, including the Pathet Lao itself, felt that the NLHS was approaching extinction. Prince Souphanouvong said in an interview with the New York Times: ... that he favored the participation of the NLHX in a coalition government regardless of the outcome of the elections and that he would accept the verdict at the polls even "if the majority parties were unwilling to take in Neo Lao Hak Xat representatives," provided that the new government pursued a policy of peace and neutrality. (5:86) When the vote was counted the NLHS had won nine seat in the Assembly, four more were won by the leftist Santiphab (Peace) Party. Even with this moral victory at the polls the NLHS and its ally had only 13 of 59 total seats in the National Assembly, but it shocked the conservative elements of the government and the military. The extent of the NLHS "victory" demonstrated, if nothing else, the fairness of the selection, but American officials were both surprised and distraught by the outcome. A new government was formed by a coalition of the two non-communist parties after Souvanna Phouma received a no confidence vote in the Assembly, based on the lax administration of the American aid program and the strength of the NLHS showing in the election. With Phoui Sananikone as Prime Minister, the Rally of the Laotian People (RPL) Party excluded the NLHS from the cabinet. The escalation of internal conflict, exaggerated by external interference, again threatened to undermine the stability of the government and embroil Laos in civil war. The new government moved away from the pure neutrality Laos had maintained since Geneva, by allowing a diplomatic mission from the Republic of China (Taiwan) and a full embassy from the Republic of Vietnam (South), thereby, heating up the propoganda machines of the communist bloc. Subsequent statements by the Prime Minister that American military instructors would be allowed into Laos and in February, 1959, that Laos had fully accomplished the requirements of the Geneva Agreements and "was no longer bound by its provisions," further infuriated the East, particularly the People's Republic of China. (5:97) Border violations by Viet Minh forces were reported and used as justification for the government's more "pro-American" stance. In May of 1959 the integration of two battalions of Pathet Lao soldiers into the Royal Laotian Army served as the next flashpoint. During the days before the 1958 election, the Pathet Lao fighting units had been demobilized and had turned in their arms and equipment to the Royal Lao forces. In the coalition agreement, two battalions of 750 men each were to be integrated into the government army. At formal ceremonies to finally integrate the two battalions, one at the Plaine des Jarres and the other at Xieng-Ngeun, the Pathet Lao soldiers refused to accept their enlistments in the Royal Army. Seven days of tension and negotiation followed when finally the Xieng-Ngeun battalion accepted integration. The unit on the Plaine des Jarres still refused and even though surrounded by four battalions of Royal Army troops, slipped out of camp that night, with their families, crossed the plain the next day and into the jungle. Attempts by the army to capture the errant battalion went for naught. In Vientiane, the leaders of the NLHS, including Souphanouvong and the 8 other members of the National assembly were arrested. During the remainder of 1959, the Pathet Lao returned to guerilla warfare in their historic stronghold of Sam Neua and Phong Saly provinces. In December, Prime Minister Sananikone tried to restore calm by using the rhetoric of two years before, calling for reconciliation and a "neutral Laos." This time the army acted to "save" the country. On 25 December, the military, with all five generals in agreement, deposed Sananikone and ten days later a new government was named by the King with a civilian prime minister, but with General Phoumi Nosavan as Minister of Defense. The next showdown of power was the national elections to be held in April. Fearful that the NLHS/Pathet Lao influence in the rural areas, even with the political leaders under guard in Vientiane, was growing, the government devised countless methods of "officially" reducing the chances of the NLHS at the polls. Restructuring districts, requiring higher educational standards of the candidates, and good-old ballot box stuffing were some of the methods. The results were that no NLHS or Santiphab candidate won election. The results were incredible. In Sam Neua, the Pathet Lao base area, the NLHS candidate, a former governor of the province, was reported to have received a total of 13 votes to the successful candidate's 6,508. ... In another, the NLHS candidate was credited with 4 votes to the opposition's 18,189, although there were at least 5 members of his immediate family eligible to vote for him. (3:133) The conservatives firmly entrenched in power and the Pathet Lao leaders safely locked up, events seemed to calm down in Laos. This was not to last. On 23 May, Prince Souphanouvong, the other jailed NLHS members and their guards escaped into the hills; the crises was on again. What happened next in Laos was completely beyond the imagination of the diplomats, intelligence experts and anthropologists: A young army captain took over the reins of power in Vientiane for no other reason than that he was "sick and tired of it all"--the graft and corruption, the fratricidal war, the loss of Laotian values, and foreign control of Laotian affairs.(5:184) Captain Kong-Le was perhaps the best military officer in Laos. He commanded the elite Second Parachute Battalion of the RLA. On 9 August, he captured Vientiane and all government offices in an almost bloodless coup, while most officials were attending the funeral of King Sisavang Vong in Luang Prabang. He then enlisted Prince Souvanna Phouma, who was the chairman of the National Assembly, to become Prime Minister again with the concurrence of 34 of the 59 members of the Assembly. Souvanna Phouma accepted, but in the meantime, General Phoumi, the rest of the cabinet, and the remaining members of the Assembly went south to Savannakhet and declared themselves the legal government. With a basically military power base this southern group needed a legitimate civilian leader to prevent the appearance of a military dictatorship. Prince Boun Oum was drafted to fill this role. Now there were three antagonists in Laos, all armed and intent on providing in their own way, what the people of Laos wanted, peace. But the price was more war. Souvanna Phouma was able to get the new King's approval to form a cabinet, thereby becoming the "legal" government in Laos. But, with only a small number of loyal army units, his ability to control the country was limited. The Pathet Lao, although rapidly attempting to control the hinterland, were not yet strong enough to take full advantage of the situation. In the south, Boun Oum and Phoumi were being supported by the U.S. and had the major military force, but had to wait for the monsoons to let up before they could use that force effectively. The country was now in chaos. Souvanna Phouma tried to negotiate with both extremes from the middle ground of "neutrality" for Laos. The task was overwhelming. U.S. policy, if it could be called that, was incoherent. A Time magazine cover story stated, ...Though the U.S. had recognized the Kong-Le--Prince Souvanna government, it soon shifted the bulk of its aid to General Phoumi. The aim, explained the CIA, who called Phoumi "our boy," was to "polarize" the Communist and anti-Communist factions in Laos.(5:189) To which the eminent Southeast Asian reporter and historian, Bernard Fall editorialized, If that was truly one of America's main objectives in Laos in the autumn of 1960, then it can only be said that it succeeded rather too well, for the "polarization" process occurred at an alarming rate. By the time it was completed on December 16 with the artillery bombardment of Vientiane, it had repelled into the waiting arms of the Pathet Lao, the Soviet Union, Red Chiha, and North Vietnam not only Captain Kong-Le and his tough paratroops (who all had won their spurs, or rather, wings, fighting the Communists) but Souvannaphouma who in the past had done more to extricate his homeland from Communist domination than all the leaders put together of the so-called "right-wing"--for in fact they had no political views. (5:189) It is ironic to note here that almost every country in the "west" and "east" not only officially recognized the Souvanna Phouma government in Laos, including the U.S., but that most truly supported, with the exception of the U.S., his efforts at trying to resolve the crises. As the fighting heated up in the fall, General Phoumi was determined to rid the country of the neutralists first and then presumably the real enemy from the left. In fairness to the General at this time, as a military man, he was almost certainly more concerned about the rebellion of a unit in his own army than he was about the Pathet Lao. Before he could effectively face the enemy, he must restore discipline in his own ranks. Fighting was bitter all the way up the Mekong and the battle for Vientiane began on December 16, 1960. Before the battle, which was a bloody one lasting four days, Souvanna Phouma took three dramatic steps. First in October, he accepted Soviet economic aid and a diplomatic mission to Laos. In November, he reached an agreement with his half-brother, Souphanouvong, and formed a new coalition cabinet which included not only neutralists but more NLHS members than the two he had accepted in 1957. British and French recriminations of U.S. policy were loud: "support for General Phoumi Nosavan from the United States [had] thrust Premier Souvanna Phouma into the waiting arms of the Communists."(5:196) But, in the midst of a bitter Presidential campaign, the American attitude toward Allied warnings was glib. In fact, it had become an axiom among certain Far Eastern experts that their policy moves were correct when " the French were bitching again " (5:197) The third action by Souvanna Phouma was one of desperation and probably frustration. In early December, he turned over the reigns of the government to the only official of his cabinet still in Vientiane and went into exile in Cambodia, reasoning that if the capital fell, he would be forced to resign. When their position became untenable in Vientiane, Kong-Le's battalion evacuated the city with his Soviet equipped, North Vietnamese manned artillery and the support of Pathet Lao units covering his escape into the jungle. The civil war was now in high gear. "The various factions kept on fighting each other as if the greatest prize in the worldwide Cold War was to be Prime Minister of Laos." (5:195) The Kong-Le/Pathet Lao alliance eventually provided the impetus to return to the conference table. By the spring of 1961, the situation was stalemated in Laos. The Boun Oum government with its American supported, conventional, heavy armor equipped forces held only the Mekong valley and the cities. Kong-Le and the Pathet Lao with their light mobile Soviet support army held the rest of the country. A cease fire was negotiated to begin on May 3, 1961. The situation resembled a similar one seven years before with the French and Viet Minh forces in Vietnam. Once again, The West would ... reluctantly walk to a conference table at Geneva with yet another military defeat hanging like a dead albatross around its neck (5:208) The second Geneva Conference, in less than a decade, concerning the future of Laos was convened May 16, 1961. Before it was adjorned in 1962, the Laotians had finally formed another coalition government with Souvanna Phouma as Prime Minister. Four years after forming the first coalition with the Pathet Lao, Souvanna Phouma, submitted his cabinet to the King, consisting of 16 members: four Right-wing, four Pathet Lao, and eight followers of the Prince. However, the political landscape had changed dramatically. Bernard Fall wrote in 1961; There were a few far ranging differerces, however. Instead of two Communists in cabinet positions, there would be four now: instead of having too deal with 1500 poorly armed Pathet Lao fighters, there were close to 10,000 now, well-armed with new Soviet weapons; instead of being neutral without ties to a Communist country. Laos now had diplomatic relations with almost all of them; in addition to assistance rendered by American and French technicians, it was now to receive aid from several Soviet bloc countries (including Red Chna and North Viet-Nam); and instead of being able to count on either the "umbrella clause" of SEATO or the as yet unchallanged readiness of the West to support it. Laos was now completely isolated from effective help when it needed it most. Finally, in spite of the enormous sums of money which it had received from the United States, it is today as poor as ever and covered with the searing scars of corruption, chaos, and civil war. (5:229) It is tough to measure the success or failure of an endeavor without some point of reference from which the evaluation is based. However, it would be difficult to view American policy in Laos after World War II a success from any reference. Three glaring problems are evident in the way U.S. strategy was developed for Indochina in that period, and it can be said that those problems still exist today. These three problems are: lack of a strategic objective of the policy, uncoordinated use of national power to achieve that objective, and a reactive rather than active strategy to support U.S. policy. All of these problems are interrelated. It would be wrong to say that the U.S. never had a strategic objective in Laos. The United States did not get involved in Southeast Asia until WWII. At that time U.S. policy and objectives were very clear, at least at the decision making level. President Roosevelt understood that the only national interest America had in Indochina was an ideological one. This was true for Laos even more than the other countries in the region. Laos, as has been previously discussed, had no strategic importance to tne United States in the way of geographic positions raw materials, agriculture or industry. What was important for the U.S. was the abolition of the old, world order. America was the great power now and it was time for the rest of the world to participate in the American dream, self-determination and independence. Roosevelt's policy toward Laos held just those elements. Realizing that with no training, the Laotian people may find the transition from protectorate to independence difficult, his strategy was to set up an international trusteeship to guide this former colony, and others, in developing a viable government. During the Truman years there was no national interest in Southeast Asia and the President said as much in his talks with de Gaulle and the Chinese. By adopting a policy of pre- war status quo, the U.S. forfeited any rights in or responsibility for the region. With the establishment of the People's Republic in China and the advent of war in Korea, American policy now became linked with the French in Asia under the title of containment. The U.S. seemed to have no strategic objective at this time other than to finance an indefinite French holding action against the "Viet Minh in Southeast Asia. This policy carried over to the Eisenhower administration but still no defined objective. What was the goal of American policy? In 1958, there was a stable, popularly elected government in Laos. Representation in that government of communist and leftist parties was less than that of a number of Western European governments. The communist field army had demobilized (the only time in history, then and since, that that has happened) and two communist-held provinces had been returned to Royal government rule (again, a rare exception in history). If this was not containment, it would be difficult to find a better example. However, at that time this outcome was unacceptable to the American government. Four years, and another American administration later, a similar solution was acceptable with much greater concessions to the Pathet Lao. If nothing else, the Kennedy administration could read history. In the case of Laos, it is clear that there was still no strategic objective to U.S. policy, but it was understood that for an acceptable price (without committing U.S. forces), the government presented in 1961 was as good as it would ever be. The cohesion of any strategy is the ability of all participants to focus on the objective. After FDF's death the U.S. lost that focus in its relationship with Laos. The second problem with U.S. policy in Laos over this period was the lack of consistency and coordination among the various branches of the American government in applying national power to influence the success of those policies. Mainly an internal bureaucratic problem steming from the large size of the government and poor communication between the various branches, it was acentuated by the lack of clear, definable goals in the case of Laotian policy. The lack of communication between U.S. agencies was obvious. In one sample, the OSS, acting on the policy outlined by Roosevelt that the French be prevented from post- war participation in Indochina, worked closely with Ho Chi Minh during and after the war. It was the OSS that involved Prince Souphanouvong with the Viet Minh in 1945 and continued to work with him through 1946 while he was in exile in Thailand with the Lao Issara. All of this went on despite the revised policy of Truman that the U.S. had no objection to French reoccupation of her colonies. In the mid 1950's the U.S. sent tremendous amounts of economic aid to Laos with no conditions, assuming that the Lao, with very little experience in government administration (under colonial rule the French brought in Vietnamese civil servants), would know how to use it effectively. That, as has been shown, was not the case and the resultant corruption played into the hand of the Pathet Lao. Concurrently, military aid was being supplied with advisors (American military advisors were prohibited by the Geneva accords so they wore civilian clothes) to train and equip a Laotian army in the image of the French one which had just been defeated in Vietnam by the same "people's" army which now threatened Laos. Did this situation make sense? Not to the Pentagon, who objected to that course of act on but were overruled by the State Department on this matter of military strategy. Even more ironic and incoherent was the state of affairs during the crises in 1960-1961. American policy changed almost daily during this period but for a time in the fall of 1960, the U.S. officially recognized a government that had aligned itself with the communist Pathet Lao, paid the salary of its forces which were now supplied by the Soviet Union and supported by North Vietnamese artillery units, and at the sametime, equipped and supplied by "rebel" force which opposed it. Although this policy ensured that the United States was backing the winning side, it certainly was not cost effective nor politically wise. Lastly, U.S. policy in Laos utilized a reactive strategy. Once again, the lack of a clearly defined goal prevented the formulation of a coherent, active strategy. Because there was no established framework for building effective and coordinated use of the instruments of national power in a relatively minor country, the job of day to day oversight fell to one individual or office. In the case of Laos and many other small countries like it, the American ambassador is that individual. Not until there was a "crises" in the country did any higher coordinating authority get involved and when it happened, this was usually the Secretay of State or the President, bypassing the huge bureaucracy at the State Department. This, of course, is not the case in relations with old allies, large trading partners and mortal enemies, but for small, strategically unimportant countries, unless there is a strong, clear objective, reaction to crises is the modus operandi of the U.S. government. During the most important time in America's relationship with Laos, two individuas had tremendous impact, both negative. John Foster Dulles, the Secretary of State under President Eisenhower, spoke loudly and pretended to carry a big stick, to adapt a phase from Theadore Roosevelt. Especially where Asia was concerned, Dulles consistently used the threat of American military power in an attempt to contain communism by "bullying." In reality however, the chance of using that power was slim, and it soon became obvious that he was just "crying wolf." The other individual was J. Graham Parsons, Ambassador to Laos from 1954 to 1952 and Assistant Secretary of State for Far Eastern affairs from 1958 to 1961. The man who had the most direct influence over American policy in Laos commented frankly in 1957, "I struggled for sixteen months to prevent a coalition." (3:86) He was regarded by Laos' most influencial politician, Prince Souvanna Phouma, in this way: He understood nothing about Asia and nothing about Laos. The Assistant Secretary of State is the most nefarious and reprehensible of men. He is the ignominious architect of disastrous American policy toward Laos. He and others like him are responsible for the recent shedding of Lao blood. (3: 170) The Individual charged with the responsibility for U.S. policy can make a tremendous impact on its success or failure. Without objective oversight, that impact will, as in the case of Laos, more often than not, be negative. There is no doubt that American intentions were good in Laos. As Richard Nixon would write of the subsequent American involvement in Vietnam, "Our goals were noble in Vietnam. But a just cause is not a substitute for strategy. "(9:47) Fifteen years of an aimless policy toward Laos resulted in a weak, three-party coalition government and a comunist army occupying more than half the contry, including an important supply route, the Ho Chi Minh Trail, which would greatly affect the next fifteen years of American policy in Indochina. Once America gave up the moral high ground in Laos by allowing the French return in 1945, the United States was commited to a strategic loss in Indochina. Arthur Dommen wrote in 1964: ... A decade after independence, a visitor to Laos could not but feel that the prestige of France, a colonial power defeated in a liberation war that took a heavy cost in French lives and honor, was actually higher than that of the United States, the champion of the self- determination of peoples. In subordinating its native belief in the liberty of peoples to what appeared to be a temporary necessity, the United States had forfeited the powerful appeal of this ideal and thereby undermined its long-range goal of assisting the construction of a politically stable society willing and able to resist the Communist "wave of the future." (3:xiv) Herbert Hoover is only partially correct, the wisdom of the next move is important, but the goal should be defined at the outset and, if it is worth pursuing, should not chance. Click here to view image BIBLIOGRAPHY 1. Cameron, Allan W., ed. Viet Nam Crises, A Documentary History Volume I:1940-1956. Ithaca:Cornell University Press, 1971. 2. Champassak, Sisouk Na. Storm Over Laos. New York: Praeger Publishers, 1961. 3. Dornmen, Arthur J. Conflict in Laos. 2nd ed. New York: Praeger Publishers, 1971. 4 Dommen, Arthur J. Laos: Keystone of Indochina. Boulder Westview Press, 1985. 5 Fall, Bernard Bù Anatomy of a Crises, Garden City: Doubleday and Company, Inc., 1969. 6. Fall, Bernard B. Last Reflections on a War. Garden City: Doubleday and Company, Inc., 1967. 7. Hull, Cordell. The Memoirs of Cordell Hull. New York: The MacMillan Company, 1948. 8. Langer, P.F., and J.J. Zasloff. Revolution in Laos: The North Vietnamese and the Pathet Lao. Santa Monica:The Rand Corporation, 1969. 9. Nixon, Richard M. No More Vietnams. New York:Arbor House, 1985. 10. Thibault, George E., ed. The Art and Practice of Military Strategy. Washington, D.C. :National Defense University, 1984. 11. U.S. Joint Chiefs of Staff. Dictionary of Military and Associated Terms, JCS Pub 1. Washington D.C., 1987.
