The Ace's Rear Area Headache Airfield Security AUTHOR Major Kenneth T. Reed, USMC CSC 1989 SUBJECT AREA - Aviation EXECUTIVE SUMMARY TITLE: THE ACE'S REAR AREA HEADACHE AIRFIELD SECURITY As we continue to train with yesterday's tactics and ground equipment, we need to look into the spectrum of war and ask ourselves, "where will Marine Aviation fight next? " No matter what the answer is, Marine Aviation will have to come ashore somewhere, and there lies the problem of protecting those valuable assets--aircraft. Aviation commanders need to begin to plan, train, and employ tactics for airfield security. I. Purpose: To suggest ideas on solving the problem of who should provide airfield security and how it should be accomplished. II. Problem: Although the problem of airfield security is not a new issue, it does present a problem to the MAGTF commander. Does he allow his ground forces to protect and secure the airfield or allow the aviation units to provide airfield security, thus allowing the ground forces to focus on the battle to the front? III. Data: By training aviation units in the planning and execution of airfield security the mission can be accom- plished and be established as doctrine within the Aviation Combat Element. This concept can be employed in two steps: (1) training in using METT-TS-L analysis and (2) establishing an Airfield Security Department within the Marine Wing Support Squadron (MWSS). The training of the personnel within this department would expand their basic infantry trained skills. IV. Conclusion: This concept of an aviation unit providing airfield security is already manned and partially trained within the MWSS. The restructuring of this department is minimal and an on-going training period can turn this concept intoa mission statement. OUTLINE I. History A. Fleet Marine Force B. DaNang Air Base C. Marble Mountain D. Beirut II. Ideas for Airfield Security A. METT-TS-L B. MWSS III. Command Structure A. Airfield Security Department B. Responsibilities C. Functions IV. Airfield Security Plan A. Priorities B. Planning THE ACE'S REAR AREA HEADACHE AIRFIELD SECURITY "Every airfield should be a stronghold of lighting air-groundmen, and not the abode of uniformed civilians in the prime of life protected by detach- ments of soldiers." Sir Winston Churchill, 1941 There you are three weeks TAD to 29 Palms for CAX X-8X. You're a brand new pilot on your first squadron deployment. It's so hot on the ramp that you can't preflight your air- craft without wearing flight gloves. The squadron CO calls you in from the flight line and tells you you're not going flying this afternoon. Instead you've been hand picked by the Aviation Combat Element (ACE) Commander to be the OIC for airfield security! What now lieutenant? Your knees begin to shake and the line chief has to help you sit down. If there were any other pilots around they are now long gone and not around for warmth or help. Although the situation could come to pass, I'm sure the ACE Commander will have a better plan than getting one solo lieutenant to act as the Officer In Charge (OIC) of Airfield Security. His years of experience and wisdom will enable him to best provide for the defense of the airfield. Since early in this century the Marine Corps has always been ready to defend and protect airfields not only for follow-on forces but also Marine aviation. In fact, one of the major reasons why our forces were renamed the Fleet Marine Force was due to air base defense. "As in the l920s.. .pressed by the Army to consider the transfer of Marine aviation to the Army Air Corps and to have the Marine Corps assume all base defense missions while relinquishing expeditionary duty... in 1931... Commandant Ben H. Fuller... also argued that the objectives of amphibious assault would be not only enemy naval bases but also air bases that menaced fleet operations." "As Marine units returned from China and Nicaragua, General Fuller saw an opportunity to integrate the old expeditionary forces into the fleets' organiza- tional structure, which might help the Corps to obtain more funds and encourage the Navy operating forces to train for amphibious warfare. At the urging of his assistant, Major General John H. Russell, Fuller asked the Chief of Naval Operations to approve a name change for Marine expeditionary units. Heartened by a successful fight in Congress to stop another manpower cut, Russell suggested that the expeditionary forces be renamed the Fleet Marine Force, a title that would cover both base defense and amphibious assault units. Approved by Admiral Pratt, the Fleet Marine Force (FMF) became a conceptual reality with Navy Department Order 241 of December 7, 1933."1 Since the early 1930s, Marine aviation has continued to modify the mission and tasks of different units to improve the security of airfields. A specific example is the creation of Marine Wing Support Squadrons (MWSS) in June 1986, to function as an integral unit to the ACE and to conduct airfield operations including security for flight line, ammunition, and fuel storage. History has taught us how important security is to air- field operations through examples such as DaNang Air Base, Marble Mountain, and Beirut. During the Vietnam conflict it was envisioned that U.S. Forces should establish air bases such as DaNang and from these bases reach out and conduct operations. "Beyond question, the U.S. Marine Corps at DaNang conducted the most distinctive air base defense system and (in the eyes of the Air Force) the most satisfactory. ... Initially, defense operations at DaNang were just as dis- organized and uncertain as those at other joint US/RVN air bases. This state of affairs was soon righted after General Walt, III MAF Commanding General took charge of DaNang's overall defense. "2 However, General Walt did not succeed at first and in fact started to remove infantry units from their security role at the air base and ordered the establishment of an air base defense battalion. This battalion was formed from various logistic service support units and was to be organized as a conventional infantry battalion. This new unit proved to be less efficient than infantry units because of a lack of skill and manpower. It wasn't until a Military Police Battalion from the U.S. arrived that the defense of DaNang really took shape. "Firming up DaNang's defense force consumed around 15 months. Defense at first rotated among the infantry battalions of III MAF. To free them from this static onbase role, a provisional battalion was formed in July 1965 of men from various logistic and service units. This procedure so weakened support services that it was ended after 1 month, forcing the infantry to resume the defense job until June 1966. At that time, the 1st Military Police Battalion arrived from CONUS and assumed the base defense mission permanently, having been expressly organized trained, and equipped for the task."3 (Emphasis Added) While DaNang's security problems continued, the airstrip at Marble Mountain had a few of its own. The Commanding Officer of MAG-16 had additionally been designed as the Marble Mountain Coordinator for Defense. In much the same way as General Walt started to use combat service support personnel, the MAG-16 Commander used squadron personnel for manning defensive positions. Following a night raid on 27-28 October 1965, where an enemy raiding force attacked the helicopter facility, the MAG-16 commander lost an estimated 45 percent of the helicopters at Marble Mountain and caused a significant change into the division operational plans for several months to follow. Another example of securing an airfield while continuing to conduct combat operations is during the Beirut deploy- ment. Here we learned how important airfield security is to the MAGTF commander. During these operations the Marines performing a "presence" mission had to continually coordinate with the international airfield in Beirut. At the same time Lebanese forces controlled the Shauf Mountains, and in addi- tion, they held and controlled buildings and urban areas outside of the Marines' perimeter. Was the ground force security too much at the airfield and not enough somewhere else? What, then, is the answer to airfield security? Ground forces could be used to defend the airfield, but the MAGTF commander will need the Ground Combat Element to focus on the battle to his front, or perhaps the ACE's very own MWSS, with personnel trained to accomplish an airfield security mission should be used. "Yeah, that's the ticket." That way our lonely young pilot can read on and learn how best to secure an airfield. There are two concepts that he must learn or relearn to the problem of airfield security. The best place to start is with an old and familiar acronym. Let's see how it applies to this problem of airfield security and the security unit needed to defend it. Let's start with the ACE's estimate of the situation in a defensive posture. This can be made easy by the tried and true application of the Commander's Estimate of METT-TS-L. 1. Mission--the ACE must analyze his assigned tasks carefully. This analysis is of two general types: a. Specified--are explicitly stated in the directive of the higher commander, e.g., seize and defend the airfield. b. Implied--certain additional tasks may be deduced from the intent of the higher commander, e.g., provide for perimeter airfield security. 2. Enemy--capabilities a. Unconventional warfare (SPETSNAZ) b. Infiltrators c. Guerrillas d. Airborne/helicopterborne assault e. Operational Maneuver Groups 3. Terrain and Weather a. Terrain (KOCOA) (1) Key Terrain. What is key, both from enemy and friendly viewpoint? (2) Observation. Where can the enemy observe/ shoot me? (3) Cover and concealment. Where can the enemy move undetected and without harm from my fires? (4) Obstacles. What obstacles can we use to deny enemy capabilities? (a) Barbed wire entanglements (b) Mines (c) Ditches (d) Felled trees, logs (e) Antivehicular (5) Avenues of Approach. What are mechanized, vertical, waterborne, motorized, and foot avenues of approach into my position. b. Weather. Best time for both enemy and friendly patrols is during rainy, windy and wet weather. 4. Troops and Fire Support Available a. Where can I get personnel to perform security functions? b. Where can I get close in fire support assets, e.g., mortars, artillery, air, TOWs...? 5. Time and Space. How much area do I need to control? How much time do I have to prepare my defenses? 6. Logistics. Can vehicles/helicopters resupply airfield? The ACE's estimate may determine that certain key areas outside the airfield perimeter must be held by troops or controlled by patrolling. In addition to the ACE's estimate for providing security to an airfield, he must organize the defense in such a way that all members of a command know their assignments and responsibilities. To begin with, the primary goal is to allow those combat operations that the MAGTF commander needs in support of his scheme of maneuver to continue uninterrupted, while security of the airfield is upheld. As stated in this February 1989 article about the Air Force's efforts in Air Base Operability. "As it charts its many future requirements and their associated systems, the Air Force has not neglected the critical need to keep its air bases operating in time of war. This "mission," like electronic combat, strategic offensive action, and other wartime business, carries with it a demand for specialized top-flight "weapons." These other technologies underline a number of new system concepts proposed for possible future use. They will enhance the defensive fighting positions from which US base-defense troops would try to ward off commandos seeking to disable a base."4 Now that the ACE Commander has considered and analyzed METT-TS-L, he must turn to a unit to carry this operation through. As I mentioned before MWSS has the task of security of the airfield; in addition, one can see by Figure 1, that a MWSS has the personnel and some, though not a lot of weapons to provide this security. Click here to view image However, I would like now to propose a command structure within a MWSS organization that can accomplish the task of airfield security. This command structure would be an ad hoc department and would only be implemented for wartime or exercises which require this mission to be performed. This department and its forces/sections will form the security system for con- tinued airfield operations and are below in Figure 2. Click here to view image The department would be headed by an OIC known as the Airfield Security Officer (ASO). He is responsible for implementing the commander's security policy and for the direction of day-to-day security matters. Within this department the ASO would be the central point for collecting and disseminating all information concerning airfield security. To accomplish his mission he will: - Provide required training to security forces. - Issue necessary SOPs, directives and other such instructions. - Requisition essential equipment for security. - Coordinate the flow of intelligence.6 The Interior Defense Force will man the fixed interior guard position and will be augmented by a company-size reaction force. The reaction force should be well trained in both hostage and bomb incidents. This Interior Defense Force is organized as a tactical unit and will utilize procedures that are well established for defense operations. Their functions include: - Manning protective positions along the inner perimeter. - Engaging and neutralizing enemy attacking forces. - Assist the military police force at ingress/egress points. - Plan and coordinate a tactical deception plan. - Provide security at sensitive areas such as fuel and storage dumps. - Assist the exterior guard force in their obstacle plan. - Providing a reaction force in response to enemy attack. The Exterior Guard Force is responsible for providing physical security to control the outer perimeter area. This can be accomplished by patrolling and scouting areas or specific routes leading to the airfield. This force will plan and coordinate the obstacle plan which will include such considerations as: barriers, guard dogs, lighting installations, sensors, and portals which control the ingress/ egress points. Their functions include: - Gathering information by patrolling and scouting specific areas and routes. - Providing the initial warning of an enemy attack. - Assist the military police force at ingress/egress points. The Military Police (MP) Force is well trained for providing physical security and is responsible for critical areas of flightline, command post7 and ingress/egress points. The MP Force contains Marines that are fully trained (MOS 5811) in their duties and responsibility. In addition they can provide a small reaction force to augment the interior defense force. Their functions include: - Law enforcement. - Control access to ingress/egress point. - Provide flightline and command post security. - Crowd and riot control. The Communications Section is responsible for establishing a dedicated security communications system. In addition to tactical vehicle mounted radios, the security forces are issued AN/PRC-77 single-channel radios (total of 88 in a Marine Wing Support Group). It should be expected that approximately 22 of these radios can be found in support of security one airfield.8 Telephone sets (buried, hand-wired) are also available and should be the prime and most secure method of communications between the security forces. This section is also in charge of communications security (COMSEC). The following are some recommendations for COMSEC: - Disperse antennas throughout airfield. - Exercise burst transmissions. - Avoid known/common call signs. - Avoid commonly known frequencies. - Avoid scheduled net changes. - Vary the reporting in/out reports. - Use couriers. These responsibilities and functions should be very flexible; however, as stated before the billet assignments within the MWSS for the Airfield Security Department (ASD) should only be needed for exercises or in a real-time situation. Generally speaking, individuals performing guard, patrolling, scouting, etc., have received little specialized security training and no ground tactical training beyond their initial basic training. Therefore individuals filling these billets would be required to receive additional train- ing in security related duties. For instance, a certain number of billets in the maintenance section, motor pool, dining facility, etc., would be identified as those partici- pating in the ASD operations by responding to either the Interior Defense or Exterior Guard Forces. The ASO would be responsible for ensuring that proper training is scheduled. The airfield security plan must not place such restraints on the MWSS that it cannot continue to function effectively. To accomplish the airfield security mission, the MWSS must continue to function without degrading combat operations of its support role to the ACE; therefore, all units on the airfield must be prepared to defend against attempts to dis- rupt operations, they must plan and execute both active and passive security measures. Some of these measures include establishing aircraft dispersion, revetments, camouflaging and improving basic infantry skills. In planning for an airfield security mission, plans and provisions should be established for staffing, equipping and training, based on the commander's assessment of the different threat conflicts. The basic security plan may have to consider supporting arms as a form of reinforcements; however, within the ACE's reach is offensive air support and antiair warfare which can counter most viable threat conditions. Therefore thorough planning will result in effective, timely and efficient implementation of a well coordinated fire support airfield security plan. When enemy forces conduct large-scale attacks, the MAGTF commander may have to task organize the ACE with resources from the GCE to employ as a maneuver force in defeating this threat. "Well lieutenant if you're still with me, I hope I've given you some food for thought, and your knees have stopped shaking. Remember now, these are only concepts!" Footnotes 1Alan Reed Millett, SEMPER FIDELIS The History of the United States Marine Corps (New York: MacMillan Publishers Co., Inc., 1980), p. 329-330. 2Roger P. Fox, AIR BASE DEFENSE IN THE REPUBLIC OF VIETNAM 1961-1963 (Washington, DC: Office of Air Force History, United States Air Force, 1979), p. 116. 3Fox, p. 117. 4Robert S. Dudney, "Air Base Operability," AIR FORCE MAGAZINE, February 1989, p. 42. 5Vulnerability Analysis and Integrated Security Design for a U.S. Marine Airfield, dtd 15 July 1985 (BETAC Corporation, 1401 Wilson Boulevard, Arlington, Va.), p.6-4. 6Vulnerability Analysis and Integrated Security Design for a U.S. Marine Airfield, p.6-6. 7Vulnerability Analysis and Integrated Security Design for a U.S. Marine Airfield, p.3-2. 8Vulnerability Analysis and Integrated Security Design for a U.S. Marine Airfield, p.3-4. Bibliography 1. BETAC Corporation. Vulnerability Analysis and Integrated Security Design for a U.S. Marine Airfield. Arlington, Va: BETAC Corporation, 1985. 2. Dudney, Robert S., Senior Editor. "Air Base Operability." AIR FORCE MAGAZINE, February 1989. 3. Fox, Roger P. "AIR BASE DEFENSE IN THE REPUBLIC OF VIETNAM 1961-1973." Office of Air Force History United States Air Force, Washington, D.C., 1979. 4. Millet, Alan R., "SEMPER FIDELIS The History of the United States Marine Corps." New York: MacMillan Publishers Co., Inc., 1980. 5. Murphy, John R., Corporal, USMC. "Landing Zone Defense." Marine Corps Gazette, February 1988. 6. U.S. Marine Corps Development and Education Command. TERRORISM COUNTERACTION, OH 7-14, Quantico, Va., 1984.
