Logistics For Low-Intensity Conflict AUTHOR Major R. S. Patterson, USMC CSC 1989 SUBJECT AREA - Logistics EXECUTIVE SUMMARY TITLE: LOGISTICS FOR LOW-INTENSITY CONFLICT I. PURPOSE: To define and highlight important logistical considerations in low-intensity conflict (LIC). II. PROBLEM: The current viewpoint of logistics is that it is the same at all levels along the spectrum of conflict; the only difference is in the scale of the operation. This simplistic viewpoint fails to recognize the unique challenges of the LIC environment and can result in inadequately prepared logisticians. III. DATA: This paper provides considerations for the employ- ment of logistical support in low-intensity conflict (LIC). While the principles of logistics apply across the entire spectrum of conflict, it is the adaptation of these principles to the LIC environment that present different challenges for the logistician. It is usually carried out under peacetime laws and regulations. It requires imagination and flexibility to task- organize the logistics resources available to effectively and efficiently support the mission. In the LIC environment, the logistician will oftentimes be expected to take the lead and will be a planner, operator, and teacher. These roles will require proper planning as well as a good dose of common sense. IV. CONCLUSIONS: Success in LIC will often hinge on the ability of the logistician to take the lead in defining and planning for the mission from the outset rather than just reacting to operational requirements during a crisis. In many LIC situations, the logisticians will be the first or may be the only military personnel deployed; logisticians must be prepared for these situations. V. RECOMMENDATIONS: The U.S. military should incorporate more thorough discussions of logistics for LIC in their operational doctrine. The service headquarters should conduct detailed studies of their systems to ensure that the logistics systems, procedures, and resources are capable of adapting to the various LIC environments. LOGISTICS FOR LOW INTENSITY CONFLICT (LIC) THESIS: The current logistics system and procedures in place to operate and prepare for the "Big War" can provide the right kind of logistics for LIC if certain considera- tions are met in the various LIC environments. I. LIC/LOGISTICS/CSS A. Logistics Capabilities and Principles B. LIC categories II. PEACEKEEPING MISSIONS A. Definition B. Logistics Considerations 1. Limited Base Development 2. Mixed Support Structure III. INSURGENCY/COUNTERINSURGENCY A. Definition B. Logistics Considerations 1. Foreign Internal Defense Support 2. Humanitarian Assistance IV. COMBATTING TERRORISM A. Definitions B. Logistics Considerations 1. Defense Against Vulnerabilities 2. Reliability Factors High VI. PEACETIME CONTINGENCY OPERATIONS A. Definitions B. Logistics Considerations 1. Crisis System Planning 2. Logistics Infrastructure Limited LOGISTICS FOR LOW-INTENSITY CONFLICT This paper will provide some considerations for the employment of logistical support in low-intensity conflict (LIC). While the fundamental principles of logistics apply across the entire spec- trum of conflict, it is the application or adaptation of these principles to the LIC environment that present problems for the logistician. Low-intensity conflict is not business as usual. It is usually conducted under peacetime laws and regulations. It requires imagination and flexibility to task-organize the logistics resources to effectively and efficiently support the mission objective. In the LIC environment, the logistician will oftentimes be expected to take the lead as a planner, operator, and instructor. These roles will require some imagination as well as a good dose of common sense. LIC is defined as a limited politico-military struggle to achieve political, social, economic, or psychological objectives. It is often protracted and ranges from diplomatic, economic, and psychosocial pressures through terrorism and insurgency. Low- intensity conflict is generally confined to a geographic area and is often characterized by constraints on the weapons, tactics, and the level of violence. (7: 1) In LIC, logistics elements may precede other military forces into the area of operations or may be the only forces deployed. This logistics preparation of the battlefield, as a specific task or as a side benefit of assistance to a host-nation, can be critical to the successful execution of a current or future LIC operation. Logistics systems supporting either U.S. or host nation forces must operate within the environmental restrictions of the host-nation and the legal and political constraints governing U.S. involvement. Therefore, these systems must have the flexibility to task-organize support to the local situation. Logistics support in LIC involves not only providing materiel and supplies to U.S. and host-nation combat forces, but also, in most cases, developing logistics systems and procedures for the host-nation along with the training of host-nation logistics personnel. Logistics support in LIC can be complicated by the wide dispersion of forces, the need to protect all bases and installations, the need to provide security for ground and air movement of supplies, and the difficulties of obtaining local resources. Because of these factors, airlift may be the most secure means of transportation. Also, logistics facilities and stock levels should be kept to a minimum both to reduce the security burden and the chances of supplies falling into enemy hands. Local resources should be used to the maximum, but this use should not adversely impact the local forces or population. (11: 5-23) Logistics flexibility, planning ahead, rapid response, and making maximum use of local resources will be required to meet the needs of widely dispersed forces operating in circumstances of continuous, short-notice changes in the operational situation. A high degree of mobility is required to reduce or eliminate excessive stocks in forward areas, restrict logistics bases to safe areas, and provide the capability to evacuate casualties rapidly. Air resupply reduces or eliminates the need for escort troops and reduces targets and sources of supply for the enemy. Some special considerations affecting logistics support include continuous maintenance of strict security, close cooperation with local civil authorities (to include assistance in community program and essential maintenance services), the requirement for special equipment, higher than average wear-and-tear on clothing and equipment, and the need for camps, services, and facilities for supported personnel. (11:5-32) The logistics capabilities required to accomplish this include the following: - Secure and protected lines of communications (i.e. a reliable logistics communication network). - Logistical mobility stressing tactical airlift and support helicopters. - Means to utilize local resources to the maximum extent possible within the constraints of the political and social environment of the conflict. - Means to protect logistics sites. - Resources for construction of camps, repair of buildings, and maintenance of services. - Means to establish a casualty evacuation and treatment center. - A flexible maintenance system. - Means of feeding isolated forces separated from the main body. - Financial arrangements to allow for payments for goods and services received. - Legal services for the protection of assigned forces. - Automated inventory and movement control to maintain visibility and rapidly adjust supplies and equipment. (11: 5-32/33) Some of the principles that guide the establishment and operation of logistical systems in LIC are a flexible task-force organization tailored to be implemented in a particular theater or country. Routine use of host-nation support to include local services, supplies, facilities, and transportation is emphasized along with maximum use of existing lines of communications, ports, and airfields. The minimum handling of supplies is necessary to include the requirement that for short duration conflicts (less than 90 days) units will be supported by preplanned resupply packages as much as possible. In this vein, use of both strategic and tactical airlift will be routine until surface transportation can be made available. Finally, the means for self-protection and passive protection measures for the logistics units must be planned for. (10:2) Low-intensity conflict operations often require the ability to execute time-sensitive, clandestine deployment. In addition to speed, the system used to mobilize and deploy the force must operate in such a high security environment that normal pre- deployment coordination is limited. These heightened security restrictions may require a significant change to standard mobilization procedures and care should be taken so that these mobilization "signatures" are not different than day-to-day operational "signatures." However, such requirements must not prevent the minimum logistics planning and coordination necessary to ensure mission success. (3:30) The U.S. Armed Forces' mission in LIC falls into four cate- gories: peacekeeping, insurgency and counterinsurgency, combatting terrorism, and peacetime contingency operations. (1:2) The logistical considerations for each of the categories are explored in the remainder of this paper. Peacekeeping operations are military operations conducted in support of diplomatic efforts to achieve, restore, or maintain peace in areas of potential or actual conflict. (1:7) Peace- keeping operations are usually conducted as a multinational effort with military units from two or more nations. Such operations may be under the direction of the United Nations or some other international organization. The United Nations Participation Act of 1945 authorizes U.S. forces to provide logistics support directly to United Nations Peacekeeping Forces. Such support is provided under peacetime laws and regulations and is usually characterized by limited base development and a mixed military and civilian contractor support. (10:5) A logistics support concept for peacekeeping operations can be divided in separate phases to take the force from initial concept to full development. Each phase should include the essential logistics tasks required to accomplish stated goals and time frames to provide target dates for completion. This phasing effort provides a common basis that focuses every unit's efforts and allows commanders to prioritize activities. It is important that the logistics planners be in direct contact with the logistics operators, and coordination of every aspect of the logistics operations should be agreed upon prior to commitment. One method to ensure that planning has been thorough and precise is to use the backwards planning sequence. Using this approach, the logistics planner forecasts a fully developed force and its logistics system, and then adds the forces' requirements through time-phasing in reverse to achieve the final-developed plan. The logistics operation should deploy, set up, and become operational before other operating elements arrive in theater. This is the major difference between supporting combat operations in a mid-intensity conflict and LIC. If conditions do not permit this early introduction of logistics support, an intermediate support arrangement must be developed. Although the force may be multinational, as stated earlier, the logistics system should be common to all. The logistics system should be standard, simple, and apply to all units. An entry point into the DoD supply system must be estab- lished. A supply support plan should be based on current consumption data for similar operations. Minimum changes should be allowed during initial operations or until sufficient demand patterns are established. Contingency stocks should be sufficient to support the worst case situation until the demand data is developed. The supply system design should detail the flow of supplies from the origin to the user. The logistics operators must provide sufficient training for using-unit logisticians on the supply system, distribution system, and forms and records to be used. This training should be complemented with an adequate customer service program. The logistics support unit should provide support directly to the major using units, but not to the subordinate sub-elements. Each using-unit will be responsible for the distribution of supplies to its subordinate organizations. The logistics support concept should provide for the automation of supply records as soon as the operation is established enough to support an automated system. Automated inventory records, property receipts, requisitions, and management reports are essential to efficient operations. In addition, to protect limited resources, property accountability and responsibility must be established as soon as practicable. In conjunction with this, unit requisitioning activities must be monitored to ensure excessive quantities are not requested, the priority system is not violated and supply discipline is observed. (2:102-107) The majority of supplies will be common to all. Therefore, the majority of the items stocked by the force will satisfy normal unit needs. Standardization of equipment throughout the force will enhance this commonality of supply. Nonstandard items should be provided by the units themselves to satisfy their unique requirements. But, the purchase of commercial, off-the-shelf equipment should be considered in place of unit-unique equipment. Using this combination of requesting items from the DoD supply system and purchasing from commercial sources saves money and provides more flexibility to support. The deployed force must have a local purchase capability and sufficient funds to provide support for its units. This is particularly important during initial operations prior to full development of the logistics support unit. To the greatest extent possible, high volume, bulk items should be obtained locally. (2: 102-107) Available facilities in theater must support the deployment schedule and prioritized to meet mission requirements. There should be backup alternatives when facility plans cannot support the mission requirements. Secondary support sites might be considered to provide intermediate logistics support bases as backups to breakdowns in the resupply system and to provide a contingency stock. Warehouse facilities must be large enough to provide a surge capacity to handle large safety stock levels during initial operations. Also, the use of modular structures should be utilized to improve the efficiency of operations and provide for troop quarters at the least cost. (2: 102-107) There must be an interface with the DoD transportation system and a commercial freight contractor that provides a reliable tracking system to allow the force to obtain shipping status and provide item visibility. Obtaining this accurate data on supply shipments and transportation dates may be critical. Force transportation assets must be sufficient to clear ports and airfields in a timely manner to prevent loss of supply tracking. In this regard, a movement control center to provide internal control of force transportation assets is essential and must be included in the logistics support plan. Units must be required to exhaust use of their organic transport assets prior to seeking additional support from the force-level. Finally, specialized equipment, such as unloading cranes and lifts, should be cen- tralized and operated by the transportation unit. (2: 102-107) Depending upon the length of the peacekeeping operation, the logistics support unit should be as stable as possible limiting personnel turnover. Logistics operations in foreign theaters are enhanced by the assignment of bilingual support personnel. In some cases, the assignment of bilingual personnel may be mandatory for the success of a logistics operation. Additionally, a civilian support services contractor may be able to support a peacekeeping force with some of the service functions now provided in CONUS. However, the contractor's support plan must be care- fully reviewed to ensure feasibility with the force logistics support concept. (2: 102-107) The second LIC environment is counterinsurgency defined as those military, paramilitary, political, economic, psychological, and civic actions taken by a government to defeat subversive insurgency. (6: 185) The characteristics of the counterinsurgency environment which make logistics support under these conditions different from those expected in general warfare include the following: (5: 2) - Inadequate communication system - Inadequate logistics facilities - High level of guerrilla activity - Political factions of local population - Need for rapid deployment of U.S. forces - Low health and sanitation levels - Absence of a clear declaration of war - Some targets and areas not likely to be attacked - Logistical support units prepared on short notice In the early phase of an insurgency, U.S. forces can assume noncombat support functions with the host-nation's military forces. These roles can range from operational (advisors or instructors) to logistics support (combat service support to augment the host-nation's effort) that will create a framework upon which to build U.S. forces, if such employment should become necessary. A critical element in this counterinsurgency strategy is that U.S. forces remain in the background in their support role. This helps maintain the credibility of the host-nation government and bolsters its popular support. (1: 10) U.S. security assistance organizations, training teams and special operations forces should focus on ensuring the local military structure is adequate to meet potential threats and to avoid the need for direct U.S. combat intervention. At all levels, U.S. organizations should take care to ensure all security assistance efforts comply with U.S. law and support the host nation counterinsurgency strategy. These efforts should be combined with psychological and civil affairs operations. (1 :11) Logistical support can be very important. The need to adequately supply troops in the field is not just a military problem. Often in developing states, poor logistical systems mean that forces operating away from home bases will try to live-off the land, which will mean off the local villagers. This leads directly to illegal actions by our forces and produces local resentment against the government. Therefore, adequate and timely logistical support is an important element in developing a response to an insurgency. Logistical support is an area in which the U.S. is relatively strong, but the trick is not to redesign local forces to comply with U.S. logistical requirements but to design a logistical support effort that will fit into local needs and capabilities. Assuming that the main U.S. role in an insurgency may be logistical support and advice to a host country, logistics becomes even more important and it may be the main effort of U.S. military involvement. Therefore, it is essential to develop a system that can function with flexibility and task- organize its capabilities to support local needs. (12: 60-61) Humanitarian assistance may be part of a counterinsurgency plan to change or prevent situations detrimental to the U.S. interests. The logistics support units involved will usually support civilian agencies and may be under civilian control. Combatting terrorism consists of those defensive (antiterrorism) and offensive (counterterrorism) measures to meet the growing terrorism threat. (1: 14) Terrorism is the unlawful use of force or violence against individuals or property for intimidating governments or societies and often for achieving political or religious objectives. (4: 2) Because of their high visibility, logistics units and facilities are particularly vulnerable to the terrorism threat. All logistics units should be aware of this threat and the defensive measures needed to reduce their vulnerability. Logistics plans and military construction programs should include specific antiterrorism measures. Counterterrorism operations demand precise timing and execution because of the international political attention of such operations. Therefore, the logistics support of these operations can mean the difference between success and failure. Equipment failures are not acceptable in this environment where a guarantee of 100% reliability is often demanded prior to approval of this mission. Logistics planners must participate from the beginning in the planning for counterterrorism operations. Since security is a key consideration in counterterrorism planning, logisticians should be trained to use deception, cover stories, or other active and passive measures to maintain the required security. During an operation, logistics resource needs must not compete with other high priority requirements. Finally, to provide the desired reliability, logistics support units must be dedicated to the counterterrorism operations until completion of the operation. Peacetime contingency operations are politically sensitive military operations characterized by the short-term, rapid projection of forces in conditions short of conventional war. (1: 16) Logistics units must have a working knowledge of the operational plans they are supporting so that they can build complementary plans and procedures. Logistics units, like combat units, must train together to achieve teamwork. Additionally, the senior headquarters must integrate the logistics units into the planning process and allow those units to rehearse those plans affecting their operations. (13: 80) Peacetime contingency operations are likely to be of short duration and have a small number of objectives with limited personnel and equipment. In this case, this will usually mean the logistics support units will be limited in favor of deploying the maximum number of combat units. Therefore, detailed logistics planning will be required to arrive at the correct balance of logistics to combat power. The key is to keep the logistics structure limited but adequate to support the deployed force. (10: 13) If a contingency force is deployed to a country where a Host-Nation Support Agreement is in effect, the logistics support unit should be task-organized to take advantage of the support provided by such an agreement. If not, logistics requirements must be met initially by U.S. forces or locally contracted services and supplies. To accomplish this, contracting personnel must be among the first deployed. (10: 12) The contingency force will have its home base either in the CONUS or in a third country and will rely on strategic airlift and sealift for rapid deployment and resupply. Normally, the major logistics activities will be accomplished outside the area of operations. (10: 13) The deployment of the logistics support package must be phased to correspond with the deployment of the combat force. Con- tingency forces may be staged near the area of operations to cut down the length of the lines of communication. However, the forward staging of the force presents a large logistics problem, requires time, facilities, and protection, and can be done only when a friendly country consents to the use of its country to deploy war materiel. (10: 14) The deployment and management of logistics support units usually pass through a series of phases. In the early stages, most logistics units will be small and without an on-site headquarters element. However, to ensure effective command and control, some type of logistics headquarters should be phased in during the later deployed increments to organize these smaller logistics elements. (10: 14) Supply support of a peacetime contingency operation in an unestablished area will be provided to the deployed force through a combination of unit supplies and predetermined, preplanned supply support. Sufficient supplies must accompany the con- tingency force to enable it to accomplish its initial objectives and sustain itself until resupply begins. Logistics plans must provide for normal and emergency resupply. (10: 15) Low-intensity conflict presents many challenges for the logistician. Perhaps the biggest challenge will be dealing with a dynamic environment of competing and sometimes conflicting political, social, economic, and military requirements. The theme of this paper has been flexibility of logistics systems and procedures that have been tailored (or task-organized) to plan for and execute short notice, highly visible, and sometimes changing missions. In addition, logisticians may have to take the lead in defining and planning for these missions from the outset rather than reacting to operational requirements during a crisis. The majority of logistics planning is dedicated to supporting current operations and preparing for the "big war." Because of this, logistics to support LIC will be met by adapting these "big-war" logistics systems, procedures, and resources to the different challenges of LIC. BIBLIOGRAPHY 1. Army/Air Force Center for Low-Intensity Conflict. "Operational Considerations for Military Involvement in Low-Intensity Conflict." Langley AFB, VA, June 1987. 2. Creel, Joe C., Lieutenant Colonel, USA and Wright, James M., Lieutenant Colonel, USA. "Coalition Logistics--The Multi- national Force and Observers Model." Student Paper, US Army War College, Carlisle Barracks, PA, 19 May 1986. 3. Department of the Air Force. "Draft Aerospace Operational Doctrine Special Operations." AF Manual 2-XS, Washington, DC, 30 January 1987. 4. Department of Defense. "Protection of DoD Personnel and Resources Against Terrorist Acts." DoD Directive 2000.12, 16 July 1986. 5. John Hopkins University, Operations Research Office. "Prob- lems of Logistic Operations in Suport of US Operations in Limited-War Areas." 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