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The Goldwater-Nichols Act Of 1986:  Resurgence In Defense Reform And The Legacy Of Eisenhower
CSC 1989
SUBJECT AREA - History
                        
                   WAR IN THE MODERN ERA SEMINAR
                 The Goldwater-Nichols Act of 1986:
                  Resurgence In Defense Reform And
                      The Legacy of Eisenhower
                     Major Greg H. Parlier, USA
                           15 May 1989
                Marine Corps Command and Staff College
                Marine Corps Combat Development Center
                      Quantico, Virginia  22134
                           ABSTRACT
TITLE:  THE GOLDWATER-NICHOLS ACT OF 1986:  RESURGENCE IN
DEFENSE REFORM AND THE LEGACY OF EISENHOWER.
AUTHOR: Major Greg H. Parlier, United States Army
DATE:   15 May 1989
        The recently enacted Department of Defense
Reorganization Act of 1986 has been described as comprehensive
in scope, far-reaching in impact, and, as so much of the recent
rhetoric suggests, "dramatic" in its effect upon our national
defense apparatus.  Such descriptive phrases  end to reinforce
the popular notion that this law, commonly referred to as the
"Goldwater-Nichols Act", mandates "revolutionary" reform of our
national defense organization.  A natural inclination would be
to counter this "revolutionary" hypothesis by suggesting the Act
to perhaps embody a more "evolutionary" change to process and
procedure, in contrast to genuine organizational reform.
         The purpose of this paper, however, is to challenge both
of these arguments by conducting a through analysis of the
larger historical  context of defense reform issues extending
back to World War II.  A chronological approach is used to
develop recurrent themes and trends in the attempt to "unify"
the defense establishment, beginning with the Arcadia Conference
when the Joint Chiefs of staff concept was created by FDR
shortly after America declared war on Japan.  The analysis
includes the divisive interservice rivalries that emerged after
the war and are reflected in both the pre- and post-1947
National Security Act debates.  Special emphasis is placed upon
Eisenhower's role as Army Chief of Staff after the war, problems
confronting him as "presiding officer" of the JCS in 1948, and
his criticism and reform proposals in 1953 and 19 58 when
President.  The historical chronology concludes in early 1982
when proposals for defense reform were advocated publicly by two
encumbent members of the JCS, resurrecting issues that had
remained "dormant" since 1958.  A thematic approach is then used
to explain a confluence of events that occurred beginning in
1979 shaping the form of the new legislation and providing
impetus for eventual passage of the Act:  recent joint military
operations; procurement and acquisition problems; the military
"reform" movement; fear of an American "General Staff", and the
influence of key military and Congressional personalities during
the debate preceding passage of the law in September 1986.
        References used to prepare this paper include
autobiographies, biographies, official defense and legislative
histories, Senate and House Armed Services Committee hearings,
Congressional reports, numerous study and commission reports,
books focused on national security issues, journal and newspaper
articles concerning the 1986 Act, recent joint doctrinal
publications, Service and Congressional documents, letters and
memoranda, and of course the law itself.
        My research reveals the debate preceding passage of the
Goldwater-Nichols Act in 1986 to be neither "revolutionary" nor
"evolutionary" in content but rather more accurately described
as a "resurgence" of interest in reform measures proposed a
quarter-century earlier by President Eisenhower.  I conclude
that Ike probably would be pleased with most of the contents in
the new Act, impressed with the momentum for reform that had
developed and was reflected in the final near-unanimous vote,
but distressed that his earlier proposals had taken so long, at
such great cost to the Nation, to finally be accepted.
                         TABLE OF CONTENTS
                                                                Page
I.     INTRODUCTION:  REVOLUTION, EVOLUTION, OR RESURGENCE IN
       DEFENSE  REFORM                                             1
II.    GENESIS OF AN AMERICAN NATIONAL MILITARY ESTABLISHMENT
       (1942-1947)                                                 8
           CREATING AN AMERICAN WARTIME HIGH COMMAND.
           INTERSERVICE RIVALRY AND THE UNIFICATION EFFORT
           DURING WORLD WAR II.
           EISENHOWER AS ARMY CHIEF OF STAFF (1945-1947).
III.   THE NATIONAL SECURITY ACT OF 1947 AND THE UNIFICATION
       DRAMA (1947-1952)                                          23
           THE NATIONAL SECURITY ACT OF 1947.
           THE THREE "ACTS" OF THE POSTWAR UNIFICATION "DRAMA."
IV.    EISENHOWER'S REFORMS AND THE DRIVE FOR UNIFICATION
       (1953-1958)                                                40
          REORGANIZATION PLAN NO. 6 OF 1953.
          THE DEFENSE ORGANIZATION ACT OF 1958.
V.     LEGISLATIVE DORMANCY (1958-1982)                           62
          CHANGING CIVIL-MILITARY POWER RELATIONSHIPS.
           STUDIES, MORE STUDIES BUT NO ACTION.
VI.    DECADE OF THE `80'S:  MANDATES FOR ACTION                  72
           THE RECORD OF RECENT MILITARY PERFORMANCE: COMMAND
           AND CONTROL PROBLEMS.
           PROCUREMENT AND ACQUISITION CHAOS.
           INTERSERVICE RIVALRY  THE MILITARY REFORM MOVEMENT,
           AND THE "POLITICIZATION OF STRATEGY."
VII.   THE LEGISLATIVE PROCESS (1982-1986)                        86
           GENERAL JONES, GENERAL MEYER, AND THE DEFENSE
           ORGANIZATION PROJECT.
           ALTERNATIVES FOR REFORM.
           FEAR OF THE "GENERAL STAFF" MODEL.
           THE LAW: EISENHOWER'S LEGACY AND GOLDWATER'S
           INFLUENCE.
VIII.  CONCLUSIONS                                               117
           AFTERMATH AND TRENDS.
           FINAL THOUGHTS.
                  TABLE OF CONTENTS (CONTINUED)
                                                              Page
ENDNOTES                                                       125
BIBLIOGRAPHY:   PRINCIPAL SOURCES                              144
BIBLIOGRAPHY:   ADDITIONAL SOURCES                             151
APPENDIX  A:  CHRONOLOGY OF DEFENSE REFORM 1942-1982           155
APPENDIX  B:  LEGISLATIVE CHANGES TO THE JCS                   158
APPENDIX  C:  EVOLUTION OF THE JOINT STAFF                     159
APPENDIX D:  LEGISLATIVE HISTORY OF THE GOLDWATER-NICHOLS
              ACT                                              160
APPENDIX  E:  SUMMARY OF MAJOR PROVISIONS OF 1986 ACT          161
APPENDIX  F:  CURRENT ORGANIZATION FOR NATIONAL SECURITY       168
APPENDIX  G:  THE JOINT STAFF: 1989                            169
                             FIGURES
1.  TRUMAN'S DEFENSE REORGANIZATION PLAN (COLLINS PLAN)         18
2.  NATIONAL SECURITY ORGANIZATION PROPOSED BY WAR AND
    NAVY DEPARTMENTS                                            21
3.  THE CHAIN OF COMMAND BEFORE AND AFTER THE
    REORGANIZATION ACT OF 1958                                  56
4.  ALTERNATIVE JOINT REFORM OPTIONS                            95
               The Congress shall have power...                    
               To Make Rules for the Government and Regulation
                  for the land and naval Forces; [clause 14]
               To make all Laws which shall be necessary and
                  proper for carrying into Execution the
                  foregoing Powers... [clause 18]
                                            The Constitution     
                                            Article I, Section 8
                                   
                           Chapter I
             INTRODUCTION:  REVOLUTION  EVOLUTION,
               OR RESURGENCE IN DEFENSE REFORM?
       These final years of the 20th Century are indeed
interesting and exciting times.  Perhaps this is true because
they are so replete with dilemma, contradiction, and
paradox.  A vivid example is the recent Intermediate-Range
Nuclear Forces (INF) Treaty which eliminated an entire class
of nuclear weapons from Europe.  Ironically, this was
possible only after the historic Reagan defense build-up
initiated to close the "window of vulnerability."  The great
paradox, of course, was the necessity to first deploy our own
nuclear-tipped cruise missiles and Pershings in order to
negotiate their subseguent removal.  It was this
manifestation of Western resolve that ultimately led to the
Treaty, reversing the otherwise sorry tale of endless arms
control negotiations spanning the previous two decades which
settled little.  Now the stage has been set for potential
deep cuts in land-based "heavy" ICBMs.  Few would have
thought such an event possible when Ronald Reagan was first
elected to the Presidency.
       We have also witnessed during this decade an
unprecedented revival in strategic thinking. The larger
defense debate has been invigorated by disparate, almost
bizarre, elements ranging from self-proclaimed military
"reformers" to our own Catholic Bishops, and is reflected in
the astonishingly rapid climb in 1988 to "best-seller" status
of The Rise and Fall of the Great Powers by Professor Paul
Kennedy.  This widespread interest has now been given
tangible form with the passage in September 1986 of the
landmark Defense Reorganization Act symbolizing renewed
concern for national purpose, strategic objectives and goals,
and military capabilities.
       At the same time, there has been a seemingly endless
litany of "waste, fraud, and abuse" episodes in the Pentagon
suggesting a need for acguisition and procurement reform.
Although recent incidents have dominated front-page
headlines--the $700 hammer, the $640 toilet seat cover, the
air defense gun that allegedly locked onto a latrine fan, and
the latest financial scandal involving high government
officials--the root causes of the current defense debate
extend back to the late 1940s.  That period culminated a
four-decade rapid ascent to great power status of the United
States.
       World War II had a revolutionary impact on U.S.
strategic thinking.  As former Under Secretary of Defense for
Policy Robert W. Komer has pointed out:
     It marked our definitive entry into balance of
     power politics, further confirmed the value of
     overseas force projection, [and] also saw the
     birth of elaborate joint and combined planning
     mechanisms... For the first time, serious strategic
     differences between the services.. .were hashed out
     in the new Joint Chiefs of Staff (JCS) forum that
     was created in 1942 to facilitate development of
     U.S. positions vis-a-vis the British Chiefs of
     Staff (the model for the JCS). [1]
The end of the war also demonstrated the advent of nuclear
weapons and long-range delivery systems which enabled us
shortly thereafter to adopt a doctrine of "deterrence" and,
with large standing forces semi-permanently deployed
overseas, to formalize for the first time a grand strategy of
"containment" outlined in NSC 68 in 1950.  Although different
nuclear doctrines would prevail--initially "massive
retaliation", then "assured destruction", and finally the
paramount strategic contradiction of the nuclear age,
"mutually assured destruction" (MAD) --those basic strategic
objectives of nuclear deterrence and containment specified in
NSC 68 have remained unchanged for four decades.  There have
been no major military conflicts between the two superpowers
and the United States has not lost any assets truly vital to
our interests. Without trivializing regional conflicts in
Korea, Vietnam, and Afghanistan, the 44 years since World
War II represents one of the longest periods without war
between major states of the developed world since the days of
the Roman Empire.  However, up until the late 1970's we were
able to procure "defense-on-the-cheap" through nuclear
weapons and, as a consequence, "no comparable attention has
been paid to non-nuclear strategy since 1945." [2]  More
recently, the loss of our comfortable cushion of nuclear
superiority accompanied by a series of less-than-spectacular
conventional military operations in Vietnam, Iran, Lebanon,
and Grenada has prompted a growing public interest in
national security issues.  In no small way, the Defense
Reorganization Act of 1986 reflects this interest and the
debate preceding its passage resurrected issues which had
been neglected and dormant for nearly 30 years.
       In drafting this legislation lawmakers grappled with
traditional issues of civil-military relations and the
dilemma inherent in democratic societies requiring the
counterbalancing of an admittedly effective and highly
efficient military organization on one side of the scale with
civilian control and dominance over the uniformed military
establishment on the other.  This has been particularly
difficult in the United States, as noted military
correspondent and author Richard Halloran argues, because
"Americans, since the early days of the Republic, have had
difficulty reconciling military power with democracy." [3]
In at least one aspect this balance has been impossible to
achieve because proposals for organizational reform that
might attain such a level of efficiency inevitably smack of
creating a "German General Staff."   With all that this term
implies in the Anglo-American political culture, such a
concept is still, in America at least, as politically
infeasible today as it is completely misunderstood and
historically misrepresented.  Furthermore, as General Emory
Upton discovered last century, attempting to impose
revolutionary reforms upon an unwilling military bureaucracy
can prove futile even if there is great merit in the
proposals. [4]
       Nonetheless, Public Law 99-143: "The Department of
Defense Reorganization Act of 1986," commonly referred to as
the "Goldwater-Nichols Act," has been widely heralded as
constituting the most comprehensive and sweeping reform of
the National Defense Establishment since the National
Security Act of 1947.  The new law directed a "complete
overhaul" of existing defense organization by increasing the
authority of the Chairman of the Joint Chiefs of Staff and
the respective unified commanders, giving them greater
latitude and full authority to organize assigned forces as
they deem necessary.  Additionally, the law requires
substantial changes in the organization, size, and
relationships among other principal elements of the defense
establishment.  All of this became necessary because, in the
words of the Act's principal architect, Senator Barry
Goldwater, the defense establishment "is broke, and we need
to fix it." [5]
       The current Chairman of the Joint Chiefs of Staff,
Admiral William J. Crowe, has acknowledged the new law's
penetrating impact by citing the Act as an "important
impetus" toward ensuring "that we do a better job of
organizing and employing our military forces." [6]
Nonetheless, aspects of the legislation have proven bitterly
controversial.  For example, the previous Army Chief of
Staff, General John A. Wickham, Jr., testifying before the
House Armed Services Committee, stated that "the law is so
micro-detailed, you have hobbled us... [and it is]...going to
ravage the field Army...We've got 50,000 regular field grade
officers in the Army who are disturbed about this law."  The
current Chief of Naval Operations, Admiral Carlisle A. H.
Trost, has been equally vocal in addressing the dramatic
impact the law will have upon U.S. Navy operational
capabilities. [7]  The rhetoric and concern, which today
still continue unabated, tend to suggest that the
Goldwater-Nichols Act does indeed mandate revolutionary
change in our defense structure and organization.
       The primary purpose of this research endeavor,
however, is to present a contrary argument.  Although the
Goldwater-Nichols Act is indeed comprehensive in scope,
far-reaching in impact, and, as so much of recent rhetoric
tends to suggest, "dramatic" in effect, these descriptive
phrases tend to reinforce the popular notion that the Act
mandates "revolutionary" reforms in national defense.  I
contend that this impression is not true and can be plausible
only if one disregards the longer American historical context
of the defense debate which extends over much of this
century.  This paper will provide that historical context in
an attempt to illuminate the fallacy of those contemporary
beliefs which suggest that this recent defense reform
legislation contains "revolutionary" measures.
       A natural inclination, then, would be to counter this
"revolutionary" argument by hypothesizing perhaps a more
"evolutionary" change of process and procedure, in contrast
to genuine organizational reform of our vast, bureaucratic
national security apparatus.  Again, to the contrary, I
believe a thorough analysis of the larger historical context
will reveal the debate preceding passage of the
Goldwater-Nichols Act of 1986 to be neither "revolutionary"
nor "evolutionary" in content.  Rather the recent debate can
be more accurately described as a "resurgence" of interest in
reform measures first proposed by President Eisenhower.
However, those issues would remain dormant thereafter only to
be resurrected again a quarter-century later.  As Senator
Goldwater persuasively warned his fellow legislators in early
1985, referring to his colleagues who occupied the same
Senate chamber three decades earlier, "They should have
listened to Ike."
                            Chapter II
GENESIS OF AN AMERICAN NATIONAL MILITARY ESTABLISHMENT (l942-1947)
           CREATING AN AMERICAN WARTIME HIGH COMMAND
       The National Security Act of 1947 would later embody
the World War II experience by codifying into law the
national military command structure which was created during
that war and which still exists today:  the Joint Chiefs of
Staff, the Joint Staff, and the unified and specified
commands.  President Roosevelt had initially established the
JCS following the outbreak of war to facilitate U.S. -British
military cooperation and coordination.  At the Arcadia
Conference held in Washington in late December 1941 and early
January 1942, Roosevelt and Prime Minister Churchill agreed
upon the Combined Chiefs of Staff as the "supreme military
body for strategic direction of the Anglo-American effort."
At that time the U.S. had no established high command
structure for providing advice on defense policy as a whole.
The British, however, had earlier created in 1924 a "Chiefs
of Staff Committee" which provided administrative
coordination, tactical control, and strategic direction to
British forces.  The British Chiefs of Staff, consisting of a
service chief for each of the air, land, and sea services
were supported by planning and intelligence staffs and also
were charged, as a corporate body, for giving military advice
to both the War Cabinet and the Prime Minister.
       The U.S., in sharp contrast to the established British
system, had no comparable structure capable of coordinated
staff work to provide input into a Combined Chiefs of Staff
arrangement.  Consequently, in 1942 an American "unified high
command" was adopted and, patterned after the British, became
informally known as the U.S. Chiefs of Staff.
     This first Joint Chiefs of Staff worked throughout
     the war without legislative sanction or even
     formal Presidential definition, a role that
     President Roosevelt believed preserved the
     flexibility required to meet the needs of the
     war.  The first members of the Joint U.S. Chiefs
     of Staff were the "opposite numbers" to the
     British Chiefs of Army, Navy, and Royal Air Force
     (an autonomous and co-equal military
     organization):  Admiral William D. Leahy,
     President Roosevelt's special military adviser,
     with a title of Chief of Staff to the Commander in
     Chief of the Army and Navy; General George C.
     Marshall, Chief of Staff of the Army; Admiral
     Ernest J. King, Chief of Naval Operations and
     Commander in Chief of the U.S. Fleet; and General
     Henry H. Arnold, Deputy Army Chief of Staff for
     Air and Chief of the Army Air Corps. [1]
Under Roosevelt's leadership, this new command arrangement
grew in influence to become the primary agent in coordinating
and providing strategic direction to the Army and Navy.
Roosevelt regarded the JCS as immediately responsible to him
as Commander in Chief and dealt with them directly, without
using the service secretaries as intermediaries.  The JCS
operated on the basis of unanimity, on the premise that if
decisions were not unanimous they were not truly joint
decisions and consequently not decisions of the Joint Chiefs
of Staff.  Directives of the Joint Chiefs of Staff were
issued to the senior military executive of the Service
responsible for seeing that they were carried out, who
functioned, in effect, as the executive agent for the Joint
Chiefs of Staff.  In December 1944 all four JCS members were
promoted to five-star rank and by the end of the war their
authority had expanded to include primary responsibility for
setting military strategy and directing military operations.
Much of this authority, granted by Roosevelt for effective
prosecution of the war, was later withdrawn from JCS control.
       Though the British at the outbreak of World War II
were far ahead of the U.S. in their efforts to merge the
different military services into a coherent joint planning
staff and to allocate resources and provide strategic
direction, their experience offered a premonition of a
similar problem the U.S. would soon encounter and which
continues to persist nearly a half-century later.  The
problem, now referred to as "dual hatting", was reflected in
a letter to Prime Minister Churchill in 1942 from the former
British Director of Military Operations in 1918, Sir
Frederick Maurice, who wrote:
     The one defect in the present [British] system, as
     I view it from outside, is the Joint Planning
     Committee.  My experience is that the members of
     this committee are, ex officio, too much occupied
     with the affairs of their own Services to give
     their minds to joint planning, and that when they
     meet they are disposed rather to find difficulties
     in, and objections to, proposals for action than
     to initiate such proposals...   [2].
       The forerunner of the current Joint Staff was also
created in 1942, but consisted of a series of twelve
interlocking committees, boards, and agencies rather than a
single joint staff.  This ad hoc creation did
     evolve during the war, more in response to
     immediate needs than in fulfillment of any
     conscious design.  The structure that arose was
     not an independent, multiservice staff responsible
     directly to the JCS, but, rather...consisted of
     service representatives who were temporarily
     detailed (to these committees) from the service
     staffs. [3]
       The third element of the new joint military structure
was the establishment of a system of unified operational
commands.  These commands were established in each combat
theater during the war and, although intended to facilitate
joint and combined operations and planning, were arranged in
such a way that a single service dominated each.
     By the end of the war, the United States
     had. . established five operational commands, each
     of which was identified with a particular
     service:  the European and Southwest Pacific
     commands with the Army; the Pacific Ocean command
     with the Navy; and the two bomber commands with
     the Army Air Force.  The sponsoring service
     provided the commander and the bulk of the
     operating forces.  It also acted as an executive
     agent for the command, and transmitted the
     directives of the Joint Chiefs of Staff.  The
     World War II command arrangements resulted in a
     system in which each of the commands was, in
     effect, an operating arm of one of the services.
     [4]
       Immediately after the cessation of hostilities, first
in Europe and then in the Pacific, the need for some form of
joint command structure was apparent in order to manage the
immense occupation tasks and to develop rational security
policies to guide America in her new-found, although
unsought, role as the singular global power rising from the
ashes of a war-ravaged world.  The JCS system provided just
such a structure and, following its formalization by the
National Security Act of 1947, laid the foundation for a
series of legislative and executive changes that have
ultimately produced today's defense organization.  However,
the road toward a formal unified command organization would
prove long and, to say the least, controversial.
        INTERSERVICE RIVALRY AND THE UNIFICATION EFFORT
                      DURING WORLD WAR II
       Following the war several military study groups
recommended shifting more authority from the individual
services to a joint military structure and establishing a
single armed forces chief of staff to preside over the JCS.
The central issue was whether the U.S. should unify the
military departments (then called the War and Navy
Departments) into a single department of defense.  In General
Marshall's view, "the lack of real unity has handicapped the
successful conduct of the war" and the JCS had proven "a
cumbersome and inefficient method of directing the efforts of
the Armed Forces."  Secretary of War Henry L. Stimson
declared the JCS to be "an imperfect instrument of top-level
decision"  because "it remained incapable of enforcing a
decision against the will of any one of its members." [5]
The initial unification debate did not, however, occur
immediately after the war, but rather during it.
       As early as November, 1943, Marshall had become
convinced of the need for a unified department and pushed
within the JCS for agreement on the general idea of a single
military establishment as a basis for organizational
planning, leaving for later resolution service differences on
roles and missions.  Marshall's convictions were a result of
the Pearl Harbor disaster which closer interservice
coordination at Oahu might have prevented;  chaotic war
production planning caused by service interests which led the
Navy, for example, to favor battleship and carrier production
over amphibious shipping and landing craft resulting in the
LST shortage which forced the postponement of OVERLORD; and
the growth of a large air force which had simply become too
unwieldy for the Army to administer.  One of his biographers
would write in 1947:
     Marshall looked at the organization of which he
     was a member--the Joint Chiefs of Staff--Marshall,
     Leahy, King, Arnold.  Their achievements had been
     great; but there had been failures, too, and the
     weakness of the group was that, despite himself,
     each member had been caught by the fears and
     ambitions of service prestige and made an advocate
     of special, instead of national, interest.  When
     that happened there was no one short of the
     President to render a decision on what was, after
     all, a purely military problem... The national
     security is a single problem, and it cannot be
     provided for on a piecemeal basis, [had been
     Marshall's] summation. [6]
Marshall concluded that warfare had become so complex that a
unified command arrangement, rather than mutual cooperation,
had become necessary.
       In the Spring of 1944, a House Select Committee on
Postwar Military Policy, chaired by Representative Clifton A.
Woodrum [Democrat, Virginia], considered a proposal to
establish a single department of armed forces.  Although the
Army, reflecting Marshall's views, was strongly in favor of
the proposal, then Under Secretary of the Navy James V.
Forrestal effectively blocked the idea, contending that the
"whole question of military organization deserves and should
receive an objective and thorough study. " [7]  Navy testimony
was construed as implied opposition to a single department
and the Woodrum committee recommended the matter be put off
until the end of the war.
       In May 1944, as Woodrum's committee was disbanding,
the JCS created a "Special Committee for Reorganization of
National Defense."  Despite basic agreements which
accommodated the creation of an Air Force Service and allowed
the Navy to retain the Marine Corps and "requisite" naval
aviation and the Army to keep its "specialized" aviation, the
JCS committee, after conducting world-wide interviews with
senior military leaders, delivered a split report.
     The majority endorsed a single department of the
     armed forces, with the Air Force assigned a
     position coordinate with the Army and Navy.  The
     department would be headed by a civilian
     Secretary.  Under him there would be a single
     Commander of the Armed Forces who would also act
     as Chief of Staff to the President.  The Commander
     would be provided with an Armed Forces General
     Staff, and he would coordinate laterally with an
     Under Secretary who would serve as overall manager
     of the business side of the military Services.
     The Secretary, the Commander, and the military
     commanders of the three Services would constitute
     the "United States Chiefs of Staff", whose job it
     would be to advise the President on military
     strategy and budgetary matters.  There would also
     be a council, composed of representatives from the
     Department of Armed Forces and the Department of
     State, "to correlate national policies and
     military preparedness." [8]
The senior committee member, retired Admiral James O.
Richardson, dissented from this majority view remaining
unconvinced of the need for a separate air force while
contending that an overall "Commander of the Armed Forces"
would exercise too much power.  Above all, Richardson feared
"that the establishment of a single department would hamper
the full and free development of the Services... [His] dissent
reflected the growing misgivings within the Navy about the
threatened loss of its air arm to the Air Force and possibly
even the loss of its Fleet Marine Force to the Army." [9]
        EISENHOWER AS ARMY CHIEF OF STAFF:  1945 - 1947
       Dwight Eisenhower assumed duties as Army Chief of
Staff in December 1945.  Two weeks later, President Truman
submitted his proposal for an armed forces unification plan
to the Congress.  Earlier, then-Senator Truman had served as
chairman of a special Senate committee investigating national
defense programs.  This experience significantly influenced
his views on service unification:
     I had not fully realized the extent of the waste
     and inefficiency existing as a result of the
     Operation of two separate and uncoordinated
     military departments until I became chairman of
     the special Senate committee created in 1941 to
     check up on the national defense program.  I had
     long believed that a coordinated defense
     organization was an absolute necessity.  The
     duplications of time, materiel, and manpower
     resulting from independent Army and Navy
     operations which were paraded before my committee
     intensified this conviction. [10]
Though Ike had just assumed his Chief of Staff role, the plan
had been developed largely by the Army and presented to the
Congress earlier on October 19 by his Chief of Information
(Public Relations), Lieutenant General J. Lawton Collins.
Fortunately, though they never became close friends, Truman
and Ike had compatible views regarding unification and other
defense propositions as well, such as the need for a
universal military training (UMT) program. [11]
       Eisenhower's wartime experience deeply affected his
views on the need for better interservice coordination at the
strategic level.  In his wartime memoirs, reflecting on the
aftermath of the Normandy invasion and service cooperation
during OVERLORD, he wrote:
     ...The accomplishment in Europe of the three
     services operating under unified command strongly
     influenced my determined advocacy of a similar
     type of organization in postwar Washington. [12]
Eisenhower appreciated Truman's genuine concern for
unification of the armed forces and spent much of his time as
Army Chief of Staff arguing publicly for its serious
consideration.  He was such a strong advocate of unification
that he proposed a single uniform for the armed services, and
a service academy exchange program sending cadets to
Annapolis and midshipmen to West Point during their third
year.  Both Ike and Truman also
     shared the general Army prejudice against the
     Marine Corps, and, although neither could ever say
     so publicly, they would have liked to eliminate
     the Corps (indeed, according to the Marines, that
     was the chief objective of unification). [13]
      Truman's unification proposal (the Collins plan)
which implicitly assumed that interservice rivalry was the
greatest barrier to more effective defense planning, was
indeed timely and
     coincided with the [postwar] congressional
     investigation of the Pearl Harbor debacle, which
     each day seemed to uncover further shocking
     examples of the need for service unification.
     Truman's unification proposal thus rose on a
     groundswell of favorable public opinion. [14]
In his message to Congress of December 19, 1945, he argued
that "there is enough evidence now at hand to demonstrate
beyond question the need for a unified department."  During
the war, unified direction or command in Washington never
really existed leaving the President alone as the sole
arbitrator of disputes between the War and Navy Departments.
Even in the field, despite the creation of the unified
operational commands, Truman believed that
     our unity of operations was greatly impaired by
     the differences in training, in doctrine, in
     communication systems, and in supply and
     distribution systems, that stemmed from the
     division of leadership in Washington. [15]
The President cited nine critical reasons for combining the
two existing departments, including a need for "integrated
strategic plans and a unified military program and budget,"
the "strongest means for civilian control of the military,"
"parity for air power," "unity of command in outlying bases,"
and "consistent and equitable personnel policies" among the
services.  Truman's reorganization plan included the
proposals listed in Figure l.
Click here to view image
       1.  Creation of a single "Department of National
       Defense."
       2.  Designation of a cabinet-level "Secretary of
       National Defense," assisted by one civilian Under
       Secretary and several civilian Assistant Secretaries.
       3.  Three co-equal branches:  one for land forces, one
       for naval forces, and one for air forces, each under
       an  Assistant Secretary with the Marine Corps
       remaining an "integral part of the Navy."
       4.  A single "Chief of Staff" of the Department of
       National Defense" to serve a relatively short tenure
       but with operational command authority who, together
       with the service department chiefs, would constitute
       an "advisory body to the Secretary of National Defense
       and to the President." [author's emphasis added]
       5.  The creation of a "State-War-Navy Coordinating
       Committee" to address the "formulation of a
       comprehensive national security program."
Figure 1.  Truman's Defense Reorganization Proposal (Collins
Plan) [16]
       Despite Truman's strong plea backed by the prestige
and power of his office and the tremendous public esteem for
Eisenhower, the Navy effectively neutralized his proposals.
Using the Eberstadt Report, which concluded that the JCS
system had performed well during World War II, the Navy again
argued that the adoption of a single chief of staff with
command authority--which the Army contended was consistent
with the principle of war referred to as "Unity of
Command"--placed too much power in the hands of a single
individual.  Ferdinand Eberstadt, Forrestal's personal friend
who had played a distinguished role in the resource
mobilization effort during the war first as civilian chairman
of the Army-Navy Munitions Board and later as vice chairman
of the War Production Board, argued that planning
difficulties were not due to interservice rivalry but a lack
of civilian-military interagency coordination.  Navy
partisans in Congress were able to generate sufficient
political emotion to effectively checkmate Truman's
proposal.   As historians Alan Millett and Peter Maslowski
commented:
     Led by the redoubtable [Navy Secretary] James V.
     Forrestal, [the Navy] fought the Army plan to a
     standstill in the White House and Congress, for it
     saw the War Department plan as a blueprint for the
     end of its maritime security mission.  Forrestal
     knew the unpublished assumptions of the War
     Department proposal:  cuts in naval aviation, the
     transfer of land-based naval air to the Air Force,
     no Navy nuclear weapons, the reduction of the
Marine Corps to minor peacetime security
     functions.  A future war, probably with the Soviet
     Union, would not involve major naval campaigns,
     since the Russians did not have a global navy.
     Therefore, so the Army and AAF planners thought,
     the Navy should finally relinquish its role as the
     first line of defense, surrendering that function
     to the Air Force. [17]
       For almost two years (1945-47), coinciding with
Eisenhower's 27-month stint as Chief of Staff of the Army,
two coalitions of defense reorganization battled furiously.
General Omar N. Bradley, Administrator of the Veterans
Administration at the time, described the period as follows:
     Truman's proposal led to lengthy congressional
     hearings in the spring of 1946.  These hearings
     broadened to examine such questions as "Why do we
     need a Navy at all?"  "Why do we have separate
     ground forces in the Marine Corps and Army?"  "Why
     do we have three air forces--Army, Navy, and
     Marine Corps?"  By that time, the Navy and Marine
     Corps, sincerely fearing they would be diminished
     to ceremonial forces, were passionately and
     publicly opposing unification.  The admirals made
     sensational anti-Army and anti-Air Force charges
     in the hearings.  For example, it was revealed
     that Ike wanted to reduce the Marine Corps to a
     few lightly equipped regiments for "minor
     operations" and Spaatz wanted control of all
     guided missiles in the future.  The new Chief of
     Naval Operations, Admiral Chester Nimitz, charged
     that "the ultimate ambition of the Army Air Force
     [is] to absorb naval aviation in is entirety and
     set up one large air force."  The Navy and Marine
     Corps testimony was so heated and controversial
     that Truman was forced to fall back and regroup.
     He asked the new Secretary of the Navy, James V.
     Forrestal, and the new Secretary of War, Robert P.
     Patterson, to seek a compromise solution for
     presentation to Congress the following year. [18]
Truman and the Congress, exhausted and increasingly wary of
Russia, finally forged a compromise solution in the National
Security Act of 1947, signed into law on July 26 of that year.
The national security organization finally agreed to by both
Secretary Forrestal and Secretary Patterson is shown in
Figure 2.
Click here to view image
        Throughout this ordeal, as biographer Stephen Ambrose
observed, Eisenhower
     had urged the principle of unity of command for
     American armed forces in the various theaters
     around the world; he had advocated unification of
     the armed forces, not through a loose federation
     at the top (as happened with the creation of the
     Department of Defense in July 1947) but through a
     real integration that would stretch from the high
     command in Washington to the smallest unit in the
     field; he had fought against a pell-mell,
     helter-skelter demobilization; he had argued for
     universal military training, with every American
     boy (and girl too, in his view) spending his or
     her eighteenth year either in the armed services
     or in some form of national service job; he had
     supported the idea of international control of
     atomic energy, if it could be achieved consistent
     with America's security interests. .. [20]
However, when General Bradley relieved him in early February,
1947, Ike had lost on every point.  He retired bitter and
"fed up" with the "long succession of personnel, budgetary,
and planning problems" from a job he characterized as being
"as bad as I always thought it would be."  He spent six
months writing the account of his wartime experiences,
published under the title Crusade In Europe, and then
accepted the Presidency of Columbia University.
                         Chapter III
              THE NATIONAL SECURITY ACT OF 1947
            AND THE UNIFICATION DRAMA (1947-1952)
              THE NATIONAL SECURITY ACT OF 1947
       The Congress, in finally passing the National Security
Act of 1947, settled the unification issue largely in favor
of the Navy by legislating the Joint Chiefs of Staff as a
committee of "principal military advisors."  The Act did not
establish an informal "Chairman" although it retained Admiral
Leahy's position as "Chief of Staff to the Commander in
Chief."  It provided the JCS a "Joint Staff" of 100 officers
to assist them in preparing joint strategic and logistic
plans and provided for establishing unified commands in
strategic areas.  By late 1947 seven unified geographic
commands and two specified commands would be established but,
almost from the beginning, the debate of service dominance
over the JCS structure surfaced. [1]  Within each unified
command, at least theoretically, Army, Navy, and Air Force
troops were under commanders of their respective services and
under the overall supervision of a commander in chief
designated from one of the services by the Joint Chiefs.  In
practice, however, the principle of unity of command under
this single unified commander was not really achieved.
       The Act created the Air Force as a co-equal service, a
Secretary of Defense to exercise direction over the three
services, the Central Intelligence Agency, and a National
Security Council to assist the President with national
sevurity policy formulation.  As Millett and Maslowski note:
     The new defense organization--labeled the
     "national military establishment"--was not a
     centralized, "unified" system, but a federation of
     the World War II model.  The Secretary of Defense,
     aided by a small staff, had only general,
     coordinating powers.. .The law specified service
     roles and missions, particularly for the navy and
     Marine Corps, which saved all naval aviation
     functions and the Fleet Marine Force by inspired
     lobbying with Congress.  Interservice relations
     remained bound to tbe JCS system of military
     negotiation...Navy partisans were even more
     pleased with what had been avoided.  Secretary of
     War Robert Patterson would not accept the new
     defense post, [so Navy Secretary] Forrestal became
     the first Secretary of Defense.  General
     Eisenhower did not become a single, powerful
     military defense chief and could only function
     informally as a presidential advisor. [2]
Each of the three military services retained much of their
former autonomy.  Although the new Secretary of Defense,
accorded cabinet rank, was clearly intended to be the central
figure in coordinating the overall National Military
Establishment, the service secretaries retained authority for
administration, training, and supporting their respective
forces.  All three were designated executive department heads
and, though they lacked cabinet rank, had direct access to
the President.  In effect, the Secretary of Defense, with
only coordinating powers, a small staff, and no single
principal military advisor, was "held hostage" to the
services.  Army Chief of Staff General Bradley expressed his
dismay with the final result:
     I had supported and testified for Truman's
     original unification plan and was not very happy
     with the final outcome.  The act had been so
     watered down to mollify the Navy that the end
     result was not truly "unification" but rather a
     loosely structured "federation." [3]
The Army's official history would later reinforce Bradley's
views in assessing flaws in the new organizational structure:
     The signal weakness of the act, however, was not
     that it left the armed forces more federated than
     unified, but that the Secretary of Defense,
     empowered to exercise only general supervision,
     could do little more than encourage cooperation
     among the departments.  Furthermore, the direct
     access to the President given the three service
     secretaries tended to confuse the lines of
     authority. [4]
     THE THREE "ACTS" OF THE POSTWAR UNIFICATION "DRAMA"
       In his memoirs, A General's Life, Bradley neatly
divides the "drama of postwar unification and interservice
planning...into three acts or phases, the `Forrestal Phase,'
the `Ike Phase,' and the `Louis Johnson Phase.'"  Between
March 1948 and October 1949, initially at Forrestal's
direction, the JCS attempted to develop, for the first time,
a "unified" war plan and military budget to support Truman's
defense policy while also providing sufficient atomic forces
to defeat the Soviet Union in all-out war.  Bradley describes
this 18-month attempt as the
     bitterest "interservice war" in our history.  It
     resulted in a revolt of the Navy and a near-revolt
     of the Air Force.  The acrimony and pressures led
     many distinguished military men and top defense
     civilians to commit career suicide, and the taxing
     battle helped bring on Forrestal's real suicide.
     The pressures felled others--Ike for one--with
     severe illnesses. [5]
       Forrestal Phase:  The need to develop a short-range
emergency war plan was prompted by the Czech coup in
February 1948 along with the combined effects of the Berlin
Blockade and occupation commander General Lucius Clay's
Shocking statement that war could come "with dramatic
suddenness."  Operation HALFMOON was prepared to counter a
Soviet invasion of Europe by using Air Force-delivered atomic
bombs on Russia, followed by the Army's mobilization to
occupy both Europe and the Soviet homeland in order to "help
restore law and order and stable governments."  The plan was,
in effect, the precursor to the "massive retaliation"
strategy that would constitute the basis for deterrence in
the early years of the new Eisenhower administration.
However, agreement among the Joint Chiefs on the allocation
of Truman's $14 billion budget ceiling proved impossible.
       The new Air Force Secretary, W. Stuart Symington, and
Air Force Chief of Staff, General Hoyt S. Vandenberg (whose
uncle was a prominent Republican Senator) openly defied
Truman by seeking congressional support for a
disproportionate share of the limited defense budget that
would enable the Air Force to provide a "cheap-easy-
victory-through-air power-alone" plan for HALFMOON.
Forrestal, quickly losing Truman's confidence because of his
inability to counter this "brazen Air Force end run," now
realized he needed more high-level military advice in his
small office than was authorized by the `47 Act.  At the same
time, the Navy, which had gradually been losing prestige
since the war, became acrimonious and bitter about the lack
of naval power envisioned in HALFMOON.  The Air Force-Navy
rivalry spilled over into an "unseemly semi-public brawl."
Since Bradley, as Army Chief of Staff, had not yet become
involved in-the feud, Forrestal asked him to serve as his
"principal" military advisor, a sort of "dispassionate
referee" to assist him, without violating existing law, in
somewhat the same capacity that Admiral Leahy had served
President Roosevelt.
       Ironically, Secretary of Defense Forrestal, who had
earlier opposed an independent JCS first as Under Secretary,
then as Secretary of the Navy, now "condemned their inability
to offer integrated advice on any matter involving important
service interests, particularly defense budget issues." [6]
He now supported creating the position of "chairman" to the
JCS, an idea recommended in November 1948 by the Committee on
National Security Organization.  President Truman obviously
concurred
     and proposed a chairman to head the Joint Chiefs
     of Staff and to act as the principal military
     advisor to the president and the secretary of
     defense.  Turman thus attempted to move from a
     service-dominated joint structure toward a system
     in which an independent chairman would assure that
     the joint structure produced military planning and
     advice that rose above individual service
     interests.  He did not return, however, to the
     earlier Army proposals that called for an even
     stronger joint military leader--an armed forces
     chief of staff, who would both chair the JCS and
     command military operations.  Indeed, the Truman
     Administration made no proposals to reduce service
     dominance of the operational commands. [7]
       The administration's reluctance to push for the single
chief of staff proposal was also due to strong opposition by
legislators who preferred the model established by Admiral
Leahy during World War II.  Although anointed as Roosevelt's
special military advisor with the title "Chief of Staff to
the Commander in Chief of the Army and Navy," Admiral Leahy
had not in any sense been a "commander" and in daily practice
had operated as a liaison between the JCS and civilian
leadership.  Though the senior member and JCS "presiding
officer," he occupied a position that was in no way superior
to that of General Marshall and Admiral King.  In fact,
Congress was emphatic in rejecting any suggestion that the
establishment of a chairman meant acceptance of an armed
forces chief of staff or an armed forces general staff
system.  Later, in a 1949 Amendment to the original Act,
Congress would specifically prohibit any such notions by
amending the National Security Act's Declaration of Policy:
     In enacting this legislation, it is the intent of
     Congress to provide... [for] the effective
     strategic direction of the armed forces and for
     their separation under unified control and for
     their integration into an efficient team of land,
     naval, and air forces but not to establish a
     single chief of staff over the armed forces nor an
     armed forces general staff... [8]
Congress thus precluded the new chairman from exercising
command authority over either the JCS or any of the military
services although it did provide for an increase in the size
of the Joint Staff to 210 officers.
       Though he would later become the first occupant of the
JCS "Chairman" position created by the `49 Amendment, Bradley
now turned down this initial offer to serve as Forrestal's
"dispassionate referee."   According to Secretary of the Army
Kenneth C. Royall, he could not be "spared at this crucial
point in the Army's history" especially since he had been
Chief of Staff for only three months, but also because of the
political uncertainty of the upcoming 1948 election.
       Forrestal further sought to moderate the increasingly
vehement interservice squabbles by gathering the chiefs
together at Key West in March 1948 and again in August at the
Naval War College, Newport, in an effort to secure a
gentlemen's agreement on service roles and missions.  The
Army was to retain primary responsibility for land
operations, for providing a ground-based air defense
capability to defend the United States against air attack,
and for occupation forces and overseas security garrisons.
The newly created Air Force would receive sole jurisdiction
over strategic air warfare, air transport, and combat air
support for the Army.  The Navy would retain responsibility
for surface and submarine operations and control of its own
sea-based aviation and the Marine Corps with its organic
aviation.  Although the Navy would be allowed to develop
nuclear weapons to support all phases of a naval campaign, it
was not to develop a "strategic air force."  And though the
Marines were to retain air-ground amphibious forces, they
were precluded from creating a "ground army."  Forrestal,
however, was ultimately unable to curb the interservice
rivalries or to develop a consensus due to service and
Congressional pressures.  The final Key West "Agreement"
proved to be little more than a description of service
capabilities as they actually existed in 1948. [9]  One
provision of the agreement required designating a member of
the JCS as "executive agent" for each of the unified
commands.  This soon caused considerable confusion in command
relationships and lines of authority.
       Ike Phase:  Following his re-election in late 1948,
Truman decided to bring two strong allies into his defense
camp.  He persuaded Eisenhower to take a leave of absence
from Columbia in January 1949 for the purpose of coming back
to Washington for two or three months as a military
consultant to Forrestal, a sort of "Presiding Officer" over
the JCS.  Truman needed Ike's prestige, hoping that he "would
exercise his legendary conciliatory magic over the JCS,
persuading [them] to agree unanimously on war plans, `weapons,
and budgets, thus heading off a brawl in Congress."  At this
time the JCS included Chief of Staff of the Army (CSA)
General Bradley, Chief of Naval Operations (CNO) Admiral
Louis E. Denfield, and Air Force Chief of Staff General
Vandenberg.
       Simultaneously, Truman made preparations to replace
the ailing Forrestal with a staunch campaign supporter,
millionaire lawyer Louis A. Johnson.  By early 1949,
Forrestal had completely lost Truman's confidence.  Bradley
noted Forrestal's "increasingly irrational behavior.  He had
sunk into deep depression and was on the verge of a nervous
breakdown."  And when Eisenhower arrived in January he was
"shocked" at seeing Forrestal, noting in his private diary
that "Jim is looking badly" as a result of his own anxiety
and "terrific, almost tragic, disappointment in the failures
of professional men to `get together'...." [10]  Ike felt
that Forrestal greatly exaggerated any help that he could
provide in the task of "unifying" the services and, after two
weeks with the JCS wrote:
     Except for my liking, admiration, and respect for
     [Forrestal's] great qualities I'd not go near
     Washington, even if I had to resign my commission
     completely.  [11]
Eisenhower was dismayed by the intensity of the budget
controversy and the near insubordination of the Air Force and
Navy leaders, noting:
     Some of our [military] seniors are forgetting that
     they have a Commander in Chief.  They must be
     reminded of this, in terms of direct, unequivocal
     language.  If this is not done soon, some day
     we're going to have a blowup... [12]
       Ike was determined to be fair-minded.  Even CNO
Admiral Denfield later wrote that Ike's "effort to be an
impartial presiding officer met with success." [13]
Nonetheless, he still thought the Marine Corps was an
"unwarranted and expensive duplication of the Army" and
shared Bradley's views that the Navy's budget should be cut.
He recommended that Truman cut certain Navy programs, such as
the new supercarrier [USS United States, CV-58], in order to
obtain more money to support the strongest possible Air
Force.  He did not agree with the air power zealots that all
carriers be eliminated but thought ten or so carriers would
be "our greatest asset" in the first months of a war.
However he had in mind using existing carriers already built
and did not believe hundreds of millions should be spent on
the new supercarrier program, believing that a supercarrier
would just be a "super" target.
       Despite Eisehower's logic, charm, reputation, and his
good intentions, the JCS could not come to agreement on a new
plan to replace HALFMOON, now renamed OFFTACKLE in deference
to Ike's football background!  The divergence in proposed
military forces, however, proved so great as to defy
reconciliation.  Ike became disenchanted with the constant
"split" JCS decisions caused by the intransigence of both CNO
Denfield and Air Force Chief Hoyt Vandenberg, writing in
March in his diary:
     The situation grows intolerable...I am so weary of
     this interservice struggle for position, prestige
     and power that this morning I practically `blew my
     top'...The bitter fight still goes on...The whole
     performance is humiliating--I've seriously
     considered resigning my commission, so that I
     could say what I pleased, publicly. [14]
       On March 21, Ike became gravely ill and bedridden,
suffering from chronic ileitis.  At Truman's suggestion, lke
spent three weeks recuperating first at the Winter White House
in Key West, then for another month in Augusta.  Although he
returned briefly to Washington in late summer to assist new
Secretary of Defense Louis Johnson, he asked to be relieved of
his assignment, recommending that Bradley take the newly
legislated JCS Chairman position that he refused to accept.
Ike returned to Columbia "convinced that Washington would
never see me again except as an occasional visitor." [15]
       Johnson Phase:  One week after Ike became ill Louis
Johnson became Secretary of Defense.  Forrestal was now barely
able to attend his own farewell ceremony in the
Pentagon courtyard.  In early April, while resting in
Florida, he broke down completely and was placed in the
psychiatric ward at Bethesda Naval Hospital.  A month and a
half later, on May 22, Forrestal climbed through an unguarded
window on the 16th floor and leaped to his death.
       Louis Johnson's major goal was to work a miracle in
the Pentagon by bashing heads, cutting budgets, and stopping
the interminable interservice rivalry by truly unifying the
services.  Completely opposite to Forrestal in character,
many felt the flamboyant and outspoken Johnson had his eyes
on the White House.  In Bradley's view, he doubted
     seriously if Johnson knew much about military
     strategy or weapons systems.  He was probably the
     worst appointment Truman made during his
     presidency.  In a little more than a year, he too
     would be gone, a victim of his own ambition and
     excesses. [16]
       Gradually, Truman and others became suspicious of
Johnson's public behavior.  Truman later acknowledged that
     Something happened.  I am of the opinion that
     Potomac fever and a `pathological condition' are
     to blame.  Louis began to show an inordinate
     egotistical desire to run the whole government.
     He offended every member of the cabinet. . .He never
     missed an opportunity to say mean things about my
     personal staff. [17]
Secretary of State Dean Acheson regarded Johnson's conduct as
"too outrageous to be explained by mere cussedness."  A few
years later, Johnson had a brain tumor removed.  Regrettably,
as Bradley remarks in his memoirs, Truman had "unwittingly
replaced one mental case with another." [18]
       Johnson was an airpower advocate, determined to remove
the Navy from the strategic air mission.  He did so by
cancelling construction of the supercarrier USS United States
on April 23, 1949.  This act caught the Navy completely by
surprise and the reaction was one of outrage:  Navy Secretary
Sullivan resigned in protest, Truman's naval aide described
the decision as "criminal," and the now infamous "Revolt of
the Admirals" ensued.
       On August 10, Congress enacted Public Law 81-216:
"The National Security Act Amendments of 1949" which amended
portions of the original National Security Act.  Key
provisions were the renaming of the "National Military
Establishment" as the "Department of Defense," redesignating
the services as "military departments" as opposed to
"executive departments," and the removal of the service
secretaries from the National Security Council.  This 1949
Amendment also created the position of "Chairman," JCS and
abolished Admiral Leahy's former billet "Chief of Staff to
the Commander in Chief. "  The Chairman, JCS, would serve a
two-year term with the possibility of only one
reappointment.  Amazingly, however, he was deprived of any
formal "vote" among the JCS.
       After Ike rejected Johnson's offer to serve as the
first Chairman, the Secretary of Defense then turned to
Bradley although the general had earlier indicated he did not
want the job.  But Bradley now changed his mind and agreed to
serve in the position for one term, later explaining why:
     The main reason for my change of heart was my deep
     concern about the state of the military
     establishment.  Owing to the cancellation of the
     supercarrier, there was a vicious mutiny afoot in
     the Navy.  With his crazy bull-in-the-china-shop
approach, Johnson was in no way fitted to deal
     with it.  A Navy mutiny could conceivably tear
     apart the Department of Defense, possibly tempting
     the Kremlin to capitalize on our military
     disarray.  A firm but fair JCS Chairman, assisted
     by a neutral Army general (my replacement as Army
     Chief of Staff), might be the moderating force
     that could prevent a crippling brawl. [19]
On August 16, 1949, Omar Bradley was sworn in as the first
Chairman of the Joint Chiefs.  However, like Ike before him,
he would prove ineffective as a "moderating" chairman and
could prevent neither a "crippling brawl" nor the Navy
"vicious mutiny" from occurring.
       The issue which sparked the "Revolt of the Admirals"
surfaced in June 1949.  The Navy charged that the Air Force's
new B-36 intercontinental bomber was a "billion dollar
blunder" and was being produced only because Louis Johnson
and Air Force Secretary Stuart Symington had financial ties
to the contractor, Consolidated-Vultee Aircraft.  Navy
supporter Congressman James E. Van Zandt then demanded a
congressional investigation.  Van Zandt, a Pennsylvania
Republican, had been called to active naval duty as a
Congressman during the war and served in both the Pacific and
North Atlantic before being discharged as a captain in early
1946.  Carl Vinson, Georgia Democrat and chairman of the
newly created House Armed Services Committee (HASC), who had
earlier chaired the Committee on Naval Affairs, broadened the
scope by launching a sweeping investigation into the national
military establishment, its decision-making processes,
strategic doctrine, and roles and missions of the services
which lasted for three months.
       During the HASC hearings the Navy, led by aviator
Admiral Arthur Radford, attacked Johnson, the B-36 and the
Air Force, and the validity of strategic bombing, arguing
that a strategy comprised of a "single atomic blitz" was both
foolhardy and immoral.  The Navy further argued that a plan
to completely abolish the Marine Corps was being prepared
and, evidenced by their support of the decision to cancel the
new supercarrier, contended that neither Bradley nor
Vandenberg had any understanding of sea power.  Bradley,
"shocked" and "angered" at these accusations, felt that the
Navy's senior leaders had been "completely dishonest":
     For the Navy to raise public doubt about the
     effectiveness--or morality--of atomic bombs was
     the height of hypocrisy.  Ever since I had been a
     member of the JCS the Navy had been fighting
     relentlessly not to be excluded from utilizing
     nuclear weapons.  The principal purpose of the
     supercarrier was to accommodate aircraft large
     enough to carry atomic bombs.  The cancellation of
     the supercarrier had, in effect, denied the Navy a
     decisive role in nuclear bombardment.  This
     denial, in fact, was the main cause of the Navy's
     revolt.
       Bradley insisted that charges of a plan to eliminate
the Marine Corps were also "dishonest" especially since a
provision in the 1947 Act protected the Corps.  Bradley felt
that this charge had been "designed to incur the sympathy of
the millions who regarded the Marine Corps as sacrosanct as
motherhood."  Like Ike, however, he did believe that the
Marine Corps was far too large and a wasteful duplication of
the Army's mission.  Hence Bradley, as he later wrote,
     had proposed deep cuts in its size.  But these
     cuts were more or less proportional to the cuts
     proposed for the Army and did not represent an
     attempt to abolish the Marine Corps.  Moreover,
Marine Corps aviation was still wildly out of
     balance, consisting as it did of twenty-one
     squadrons, which was the equivalent of seven Air
     Force tactical support groups.  At the peak of
     Twelfth Army Group operations in the ETO, we never
     had more than fourteen groups supporting
     twenty-eight to thirty divisions in the line.
       Bradley was "furious about the grievous psychological
damage" caused by the Navy, believing that
     The crybaby attitude of the naval aviators and
     Marines had been, in my opinion, gravely damaging
     both at home and abroad.  The admirals were
     insubordinate, mutinous.
Bradley, now discarded his "moderator" image and lashed
back.  Testifying before Vinson's committee, he predicted
that "large scale amphibious operations will never occur
again... [because] the atomic bomb properly delivered almost
precludes such a possibility" and reminded the HASC that at
Sicily and Normandy, "two of the largest amphibious assaults
ever made in history," not a single Marine was present.  He
concluded his "hard hitting" remarks with:
     many in the Navy are completely against unity of
     command and planning as established in the laws
     passed by the Congress of the United States.
     Despite protestations to the contrary, I believe
     the Navy has opposed unification from the
     beginning, and they have not, in spirit as well as
     deed, accepted it completely to date.  As a
     policy, yes, but as the final and authoritative
     vehicle for planning our collective defense, no.
     World War II should have taught all military men
     that our military forces are one team--in the game
     to win regardless who carries the ball.  This is
     no time for `fancy Dans' who won't hit the line
     with all they have on every play, unless they can
     call the signals.  Each player on this
     team--whether he shines in the spotlight of the
     backfield or eats dirt in the line--must be All
     American.
       The admirals' "revolt" had no effect on Truman's
budget and the supercarrier remained cancel led.  The
principal outcome was the "professional death" of CNO
Denfield.  He was replaced by Admiral Forrest P. Sherman who
had remained close-mouthed during the "revolt," but Sherman
would die of a heart attack in less than two years.
       By late August these headlines were replaced with news
of the Soviet explosion of their first atomic bomb, believed
to have occurred on or about August 29, and the Communist
victory in China forcing the Nationalist Chinese under Chiang
Kai-Shek to withdraw to Formosa.  These two events provoked a
reappraisal of our foreign and military policy, culminating
in April 1950 with NSC 68.  This document was prepared
largely by Paul Nitze who had been selected by Secretary of
State Dean Acheson to replace George Kennan as head of the
State Department's Policy Planning Staff during the summer of
1949.  It has become the enduring philosophical statement
behind the post-War transformation of American strategic
policy and the adoption of "containment."
       Although the "Revolt of the Admirals" was overshadowed
by these global events and soon the Korean War, the defense
issues which surfaced during this turbulent period would
constitute recurrent themes that would link future reform
efforts and even now, four decades later, still dominate the
defense debate:
       1.  DOD civilian relations with industry and ethical
       issues involving favoritism and influence for
       political or financial gain as well as inevitable
       Congressional pork-barreling.
       2.  Bickering over "roles and missions" resulting in
       an increased tendency toward competitive rather than
complementary service relationships.
       3.  Interservice rivalries which thwarted a "unified"
       defense effort and "politicized" strategic issues.
       4.  The abhorrence of adopting a general staff system
       and establishing unity of command at the highest
       military level for fear, respectively, of the "German
       example" and the "man on a white horse" syndrome.
       5.  Above all, problems of civil-military relations in
       a democracy and the absolute need to assure civilian
       control of the military.
As Millet and Maslowski conclude, all of this had one major
continued consequence:
     For the armed forces, the functional and
     organizational disputes of the late 1940s helped
     create an environment that encouraged civilian
     intervention in military affairs, even in matters
     that might have been narrowly interpreted as
     "internal, professional" matters.  The postwar
     years opened an area of controversy about the
     relationship of the armed forces to reform within
     American society.  In 1949 Congress approved the
     Uniform Code of Military Justice, which extended
     civilian substantive and procedural legal
     principles to the armed forces,... [and] created
     the all-civilian Court of Military Appeals. [20]
       And so, despite the incredible human toll and his own
extraordinary effort during the great unification "drama,"
when Dwight Eisenhower assumed the presidency three years
later, the JCS still "continued to operate on the World War
II model as a weakly led committee of service
representatives, with only a small service-dominated Joint
Staff." [21]
                           Chapter IV
EISENHOWER'S REFORMS AND THE DRIVE FOR UNIFICATION (1953-1958)
       Eisenhower had severely criticized the inadequacies of
the joint structure during the 1952 Presidential campaign.
He took office in 1953 intent on reforming it, stating
shortly after his inauguration:
     As a former soldier who has experienced modern war
     at first hand, and now as President and Commander
     in Chief of the Armed Forces of the United States,
     I believe that our Defense Establishment is in
     need of immediate improvement.  [1]
Under Eisenhower's "New Look," following the termination of
operations in Korea, defense expenditures and the Armed
Forces were to be reduced with the military brought under
greater subordination to civil authority and policy.
       In 1953 and again in 1958 President Eisenhower
proposed measures to improve the performance of each of the
three components of the joint structure.  However, efforts to
increase the authority of the chairman, for example, by
giving the chairman the right to vote in JCS proceedings and
control of the Joint Staff, were only partially successful.
Eisenhower sought to clarify the division of labor between
the services and the operational commands by separating
administrative responsibilities from operational control of
the forces, the former belonging to each of the services and
the latter to the various CINCs.  His attempts to create a
truly independent military staff and to reduce service
influence over the Joint Staff were also largely
unsuccessful.  Although the committee system was eliminated,
it was replaced by elaborate staffing procedures which
required service concurrence with all Joint Staff papers.
Thus, the staff was kept a "captive of the services [which]
lacked the independence to provide broad, cross-cutting
advice and recommendations." [2]
               REORGANIZATION PLAN NO. 6 OF 1953
       To assist the transition to a new Republican
administration and provide a bipartisan foundation for
subsequent reform measures, President Truman asked his
outgoing Secretary of Defense, Robert A. Lovett, to prepare
an assessment of organizational shortcomings.  Lovett's
letter of November 18, 1952 acknowledged the necessity for
civilian control and "evolutionary" improvements to the
overall unification effort but stressed the inadequacy of the
existing joint structure.  Regarding the JCS, Lovett wrote:
        I do not consider the present organization
     adequate, not only because it leaves certain
     responsibilities obscure but also because in its
     present form it does not provide the type of
     military guidance needed if the full benefits of
     unification are to be attained...By their very
     makeup it is extremely difficult for the Joint
     Chiefs of Staff to maintain a broad non-service
     point of view.  Since they wear two hats--one as
     Chief of an Armed Service and the other as a
     member of the Joint Chiefs, it is difficult for
     them to detach themselves from the hopes and
     ambitions of their own Service without having
     their own staff feel that they are being let down
     by their Chief.  The maintenance of an impartial,
     nonpartisan position becomes increasingly
     difficult in times of shortage of either men,
     money, or material...
        It is extremely difficult for a group composed
     of the Chiefs of the three Military Departments
     and charged, with the exception of the Chairman,
     with heavy responsibilities placed upon them by
     law with respect to each individual Service, to
decide matters involving the splitting of
     manpower, supplies, equipment, facilities,
     dollars, and similar matters.
        In over-simplified form, one of the major
     difficulties with the present Joint Chiefs of
     Staff organization is that they are grievously
     overworked [and] too deeply immersed in day-to-day
     operations, frequently of an administrative
     character, to have adequate time to devote to
     their major responsibilities--the preparation of
     overall, joint and combined strategic plans, the
     development of logistic plans, the review of such
     plans in the light of the material and personnel
     situation and the effect of new weapons... [This
     is] aggravated by the fact that the Secretary of
     Defense has no military staff... [3]
Lovett viewed the Joint Staff to be little more than a
"clearing house for papers," contending that
     Fear of an "Armed Forces General Staff" again
     seems to have dominated our thinking.  The broad
     national service point of view, as compared with
     the single service point of view, is not merely a
     problem of the individuals making up the Joint
     Chiefs of Staff, but is more likely in the Joint
     Staff which prepares the papers and submits the
     analyses and studies to the Joint Chiefs of
     Staff.  This Staff, by law, consists of officers
     of approximately equal numbers from each of the
     three Armed Services.  They are of relatively
     junior grades and their future careers and
     promotions lie in their separate services.  It is
     not unnatural therefore, that they should from
     time to time become the advocate of their own
     Service's point of view.  There is, furthermore, a
     natural temptation to indulge in the indoor sport
     of "back-scratching." [4]
He offered two alternatives to enhance unification.  The
first consisted of strengthening the role of the Chairman,
JCS while relieving the dual-hat burdens of the service
chiefs by delegating powers for day-to-day operations to the
Vice Chiefs of each service.  As part of the same proposal,
Lovett advocating the creation of a General Staff Corps to
provide a cadre of officers, immune from service retribution,
to man the Joint Staff. Lovett readily admitted that this
proposal appeared to violate the legal prohibition against an
"Armed Forces General Staff."   For that reason, which
resulted from the inherent Anglo-American assumption that
part of the cause of the war had been the power and influence
of Germany's General Staff, the proposal was politically
untenable.
       Lovett's second proposal, admittedly "radical" and
therefore "disruptive," called for former service chiefs to
become members of a "Combined Staff" forming a body of
national military advisors rising above parochial service
interests in areas of "strategic planning, logistic planning,
military requirements, and overall military policies." [5]
Lovett also warned against the bureaucratic tendency towards
increasing layers of headquarters and argued, as had both
President Truman and Eisenhower when he was Chief of Staff of
the Army, the peacetime need for Universal Military Training
(UMT):
     The problem of the number of Headquarters in the
     field as well as in the zone of the interior is
     steadily growing.  There are, in my opinion, far
     too many levels of headquarters in the Military
     Services thus adding to the overhead and inevitably
     causing delay.  One of the most promising areas of
     reduction of cost lies, in my opinion, in keeping
     the standing military forces to a minimum to
     protect against disaster while having immediately
     available a basically trained Reserve.  The only
     satisfactory method of accomplishing this desired
     result, that I am aware of, is through a system of
     Universal Military Training and Service.  I believe
     that steps should be taken promptly to make this
     system effective. [6]
Given the new President's personal views and repeated
frustration earlier as Army Chief of Staff after the war, as
"presiding officer" of the JCS in 1949, and his recent
experience as SACEUR in NATO (January 1951 - May 1952),
Eisenhower could especially appreciate Secretary Lovett's
departing observations.
       Shortly after assuming the Presidency, Ike constituted
a standing committee, chaired by Nelson Rockefeller and
including, among others, both former Secretary Lovett and
General Bradley (still JCS chairman), to review the basic
organization and procedures in the Defense Department.
Recommendations from this "Committee on DOD Organization"
formed the basis of Eisenhower's "Reorganization Plan No. 6"
and were presented to Congress on April 30, 1953.  Objectives
included:
       1.  A "clear and unchallenged responsibility in the
           Defense Establishment."
       2.  "Maximum effectiveness at minimum cost."
       3.  The "best possible military plans." [7]
       Eisenhower sought to clarify lines of authority and
strengthen civilian responsibility within DOD.  As he
explained in his transmittal message to Congress:
     The provision of the Key West agreement, under
     which the Joint Chiefs of Staff designate one of
     their members as an executive agent for each
     unified command, has led to considerable confusion
     and misunderstanding with respect to the
     relationship of the [JCS] to the Secretary of
     Defense, and the relationship of the military
     chief of each service to the civilian Secretary of
     his military department. [8]
To fix responsibility along a definite channel of accountable
civilian officials, Ike directed the Secretary of Defense to
     Designate in each case a military department to
     nerve as the executive agent for a unified
     command.  Under this new arrangement the channel
     of responsibility and authority to a commander of
     a unified command will unmistakably be from the
     President to the Secretary of Defense to the
     designated civilian secretary of a military
     department. [9]
       To provide for greater economic efficiency within the
Department of Defense, Reorganization Plan No. 6 abolished
the "unwieldy board" system which Eisenhower considered "too
slow and too clumsy to serve as effective management tools
for the Secretary."  The boards were replaced with six new
Assistant Secretary positions and a General Counsel to
"provide authoritative legal opinions and interpretations."
Ike also directed special studies to examine each of the
service departments, believing that "improvements are badly
needed in the Departments of the Army, the Navy, and the Air
Force."  In an unprecedented intrusion into traditional
service matters, he directed service secretaries to instruct
officer promotion boards
     To give the same weight to service in the Office
     of the Secretary of Defense and the efficiency
     reports from that Office as to service in the
     military department staff and to efficiency
     reports of departmental officers.  These actions
     are desirable in order to reward military officers
     equally for service on behalf of the Department of
     Defense and service on the staff of a military
     department. [10]
     Finally, Eisenhower set out to improve the strategic
planning machinery by enhancing the military advisory role of
the corporate JCS.  He did so by removing the service chiefs
from their "executive agent" roles to the unified commands
and by increasing the chairman's authority.  Reorganization
Plan No. 6 gave the JCS Chairman responsibility for selecting
the Director of the Joint Staff, subject to Secretary of
Defense approval, and authority to both manage the Joint
Staff and approve those officers selected by the other
service chiefs to serve on the Joint Staff.  Amazingly, up
until 1953, the senior military officer in the United States,
despite his great responsibilities, did not have the
authority to approve officer assignments to either his own
staff or its director or even to manage the day-to-day
activities of the Joint Staff!
             THE DEFENSE REORGANIZATION ACT OF 1958
     During the mid-1950's, new tensions were generated
within the defense establishment as a result of radical
changes in warfare brought on by scientific and technological
advances and the rising costs of new weapon systems.
Controversies erupted over tactical air support, airlift for
Army ground forces, anti-missile missiles, intermediate-range
ballistic missiles, carrier vs. land-based aviation, and the
adequacy of existing military organizations for meeting
future problems.  In 1956, the House Appropriations Committee
attacked the continuing problem of interservice rivalry:
     Each service, it would seem, is striving to
     acquire an arsenal of weapons complete in itself
     to carry out any and all possible missions.  It is
     the firm belief of the committee that this matter
     of rivalry is getting completely out of control.
     It is expensive and undesirable, and points up the
     need for more effective control and direction.  A
     sincere and self-sacrificing effort must be made
by all concerned to substitute real unification
     for the present loose federation.  [11]
Critics increasingly charged that the parochial attitudes of
individual service chiefs made it difficult for the Secretary
of Defense to receive impartial military advice.  Again the
plea was made for an armed forces general staff with a single
chief of staff from whom authoritative military advice could
be obtained.
       In his January 9, 1958 State of the Union address,
Eisenhower told the Congress that additional defense reforms
were "imperative" and acknowledged the revolutionary impact
science and technology was having on warfare:
     Some of the important new weapons which technology
     has produced do not fit into any existing service
     pattern.  They cut across all services, involve
     all services, and transcend all services, at every
     stage from development to operation.  In some
     instances they defy classification according to
     branch of service. [12]
Shortly before his address Eisenhower had received a report
from Rockefeller's standing advisory committee.
Recommendations included "organizing operational forces as
truly unified commands and running the chain of control from
the President through the Secretary of Defense (and Joint
Chiefs of Staff) directly to commanders of each unified
force, rather than through the service Secretaries."  The
committee also urged further strengthening of the JCS
Chairman's role and consolidating research and development
activities under the Secretary of Defense. [13]
       Unlike the 1953 changes, which had been accomplished
under a 1949 provision that allowed the President to
reorganize the executive branch unless reversed by
congressional veto, any new proposals in 1958 would now
require affirmative congressional action.  Eisenhower has
written in his memoirs of the battle that lay ahead during
1958:
     The most spectacular legislative battle of that
     year involved the reorganization of the Department
     of Defense.  When, in my State of the Union
     message, I had said America wanted interservice
     rivalries stopped, the line had drawn enthusiastic
     approval.  Yet reorganization was to be neither
     easy nor automatic...Military organization was a
     subject I had long lived with; while I had
     definite ideas of the corrective measures that
     needed to be taken, I heartily approved of an
     objective exploration of the widest possible
     scope, in the hope--which proved vain--that with a
     report from such a distinguished body of broadly
     experienced individuals a bill could be drawn that
     could command my approval and overwhelming support
     in the Congress. [14]
In his message of April 3, accompanying his legislative
proposals to Congress, he predicted--wishfully in
retrospect--that:
     Separate ground, sea, and air warfare is gone
     forever.  If ever again we should be involved in
     war, we will fight it in all elements, with all
     Services, as one single concentrated effort.
     Peacetime preparation and organizational activity
     must conform to this fact. [15]
       In his proposals, Ike contended that four existing
joint structure characteristics inhibited the Department from
effectively performing as an integrated force:
       1.  The chairman's lack of independent authority.
       2.  Dual-hatting of service chiefs as members of the
           JCS and as military leaders of their services.
3. Dominance of the individual services in Joint
           statf actions.
       4.  Weakness of the unified and specified commanders.
       First, to enhance the authority of the chairman,
Eisenhower proposed a repeal of the provision that denied the
chairman the right to vote.  Even though the JCS, in fact,
did not function by vote, this provision seemed to suggest
that the chairman was somehow inferior to the service
chiefs.  He proposed other measures as well.  However, in
enacting the 1958 Act, Congress substantially weakened
Eisenhower's proposals.
     The act assigned the chairman greater
     responsibilities, but did not endow the position
     with the independent authority that the president
     had requested.  Congress repealed the provision
     that denied the chairman a vote in JCS
     proceedings, but carefully circumscribed his
     authority over the joint staff.  Instead of
     granting the chairman exclusive authority to
     assign duties to the joint staff, Congress
     retained a parallel authority to select the
     director of the joint staff, but only in
     oonsultation with the JCS.  Moreover, the
     chairman's previously unencumbered authority to
     manage the joint staff was qualified in the 1958
     act by the phrase `on behalf of the Joint Chiefs
     of Staffs' [16]
       Second, he tried to reduce the JCS workload by
legislation that would shift much of their service-specific
administrative duties to their vice chiefs.  The Secretary of
Defense could then "require the chiefs to use their power of
delegation to enable them to make their Joint Chiefs of Staff
duties their principal duties." [17]  However, Eisenhower's
objective of a nonparochial JCS was never realized either.
One frequently cited article, consistent with Secretary of
Defense Robert Lovett's earlier observations, explains why:
     The measures that allowed the service chiefs
     greater authority to delegate their service duties
     did not address the primary source of the chiefs'
     inability to put joint interests over service
     interests...  A service chief's authority over his
     service derives largely from how effectively he
     represents its interests in outside forums, such as
     the JCS.  At the same time, the service chief's
     power and stature within the joint arena, the
     defense department, and before the Congress, derive
     primarily from the resources and personnel that he
     controls as the military leader of his service.
     Moreover, in formulating joint positions, a service
     chief relies on the staff that works exclusively
     and directly for him--the service staff, which
     itself has strong incentives to ensure that
     important service interests are not sacrificed in
     the joint forum.  Since the 1953 and 1958 reforms
     did nothing to alter these organizational
     realities, they had little affect on the character
     or content of JCS decisionmaking. [18]
       The third focus of the 1958 reforms was on the
structure and procedures of the joint staff.  Eisenhower
believed that the existing joint decision procedures
subverted the development of integrated military positions.
He criticized the extent of service dominance over the joint
staff inherent, for example, in the requirement for each
service to review and approve each joint paper at multiple
levels.  Resulting plans, he later wrote in his memoirs,
"were little more than a worthless scheme to balance various
service considerations and prejudices" [19] and in his
April 3 message to Congress he stated:
     These laborious processes exist because each
     military department feels obliged to judge
     independently each work product of the Joint
     Staff.  Had I allowed my interservice and
     interallied staff to be similarly organized in the
     theaters I commanded during World War II, the
     delays and resulting indecisiveness would have
     been unacceptable to my superiors. [20]
To abolish the practice of implicit single service vetos in
joint staff actions, the Secretary of Defense was directed to
reform joint staff structures and procedures, the joint staff
committee system was eliminated, and Congress was asked to
eliminate or raise the statutory limit of 210 officers on the
joint staff.  Eisenhower's intent was to transform the joint
staff from that of a "broker for service views" into an
"independent military staff with a unified national
perspective." [21]
       However, his proposals drew emotional charges of
another attempt to create a "Prussian-style" general staff.
Carl Vinson, previously mentioned as a staunch naval
supporter and chairman of the House Armed Services Committee,
was one of his strongest critics.  Two weeks after forwarding
his proposals, in an appearance before the American society
of Newspaper Editors, Eisenhower responded to Vinson's
charges:
     It will also be said that [it sets up] a monstrous
     general staff--usually called "Prussian."  I am
     always amused when I hear that word, because I
     nearly always ask the individual to explain it to
     me by telling me what he thinks a Prussian general
     staff was.  Few can do it.  In any event, they
     fear that this monstrous staff will be set up to
     dominate our armed forces and in due course will
     threaten our liberty.  This is nonsense... There
     will be:
     --no single chief of staff;
     --no Prussian staff;
     --no czar;
     --no forty-billion-dollar blank check;
     --no swallowing up of the traditional services;
     --no undermining of the constitutional powers of
       Congress. [22)
When finally signed into law on August 6, the 1958 Act
authorized an increase in Joint Staff strength to 400
officers.  The committee system structure which had existed
since 1942 when Roosevelt first created the JCS was replaced
by a "unified joint staff" organization patterned after the
practice of creating directorates in the unified command
staffs.  However, the law placed specific restrictions on
Joint Staff authority and organization to prevent the
emergence of a "general staff corps" of officers.
Section 143(d) of Title 10, United States Code states:
     The Joint Staff shall not operate or be organized
     as an overall Armed Forces General Staff and shall
     have no executive authority.
To prevent the emergence of anything even remotely resembling
such an elite, and presumably dangerous staff, duty was
limited by law to a maximum of three years after which the
same officer could not be reassigned back to the Joint Staff
for a minimum of three years.  In the case of the Director of
the Joint Staff, the law specifically prohibited his
reassignment to the Joint Staff in any capacity whatsoever.
Additionally, even though the committee system had earlier
been disbanded the single service veto remained through
elaborate staffing procedures that continued to circulate
papers to the military departments for approval at each level
of preparation.  Thus, the 1958 reforms reorganized the joint
staff, but they did not substantially change the procedures
that prevented it from operating independently of the
services.  It continued to serve as an executive secretariat
that coordinated, rather than integrated, service views.
       The fourth and overriding objective of the 1958
proposals was the necessity of reducing the services' grip on
the combatant commands by establishing a more unified
structure that would promote integrated operations and
planning while also asserting greater civilian control over
the operational chain of command.  In his April 3 message
Eisenhower stated:
           The need for greater unity today is most
     acute at two points--in the Office of the
     Secretary of Defense, and in the major operational
     commands responsible for actual combat in the
     event of war...  We must organize our fighting
     forces into operational commands that are truly
     unified, each assigned a mission in full accord
     with our over-all military objectives.  This
     lesson, taught by World War II, I learned from
     firsthand experience.  With rare exceptions, as I
     stated before, there can no longer be separate
     ground, sea, or air battles...  Because I have
     often seen the evils of diluted command, I
     emphasize that each unified commander must have
     unquestioned authority over all units of his
     command.  Forces must be assigned to the command
     and be removed only by central direction--by the
     Secretary of Defense or the Commander in
     Chief--and not by orders of individual military
     departments.  Commands of this kind we do not have
     today...  We must recognize that by law our
     military organization still reflects the
     traditional concepts of separate forces for land,
     sea, and air operations, despite a Congressional
     assertion in the same law favoring `their
     integration into an efficient team of land, naval,
     and air forces...'  This separation is clearly
     incompatible with unified commands whose missions
     and weapons systems go far beyond concepts and
     traditions of individual services.  Today a
     unified command is made up of component commands
     from each military department, each under a
     commander of that department.  The commander's
     authority over these component commands is short
     of the full command required for maximum
     efficiency.  In fact, it is prescribed that some
     of his command powers shall take effect only in
     time of emergency. [23]
Later in his memoirs, he elaborated on the influence of his
own experience and the need for "unquestioned authority" in
the unified commander:
           Our overseas forces had operated under
     so-called "unified commands" since the early days
     of World War II.  But the component units,
     divisions, carriers, and wings were normally
     assigned to the specified commander for tactical
     operations only; for other functions the separate
     services were in a controlling position.  In some
     respects the authority sought for unified
     commanders was even more sweeping than that I
     exercised over all the American Forces assigned to
     OVERLORD in World War II.
           In my own experience in the European Theater
     I had found little difficulty with a loose theater
     organization, partly because of the spirit of
     cooperation existing in wartime and partly because
     I was also the administrative commander of by far
     the largest single component force in Europe, the
     United States Army, which included the Air Force.
     At SHAPE in 1951, likewise, President Truman had
     been careful to spell out that the Sixth Fleet
     operating in the Mediterranean was directly under
     my command.  But my experiences, I well realized,
     were not universal... I have always believed that a
     nation's defense would be most efficiently
     conducted by a single service, comprising elements
     of land, sea, and air.  I did not (and do not)
     join those who insist that a system of "checks and
     balances" among services contributes to a nation's
     security.  Successful defense cannot be conducted
     under a debating society. [24]
       Toward this end, Ike proposed greater clarity in the
division of labor between the military departments and the
operational commands.  The unified commands, organized
geographically, and the specified commands, organized
functionally, would "command and operate" the forces while
the military departments, still organized along the
traditional distinctions between land, sea, and air warfare,
would be responsible for the "maintaining functions
including recruiting, organizing, training, and equipping the
forces.  As a result, the military departments were to have
only administrative responsibility, relinquishing operational
responsibility over deployed forces.  This scheme represented
an attempt to press "the task force concept applied with such
great success in World War II to its logical conclusion [and]
sought to relegate the services to supporting functions
roughly equivalent to what the Army Service Forces and Army
Ground Forces commands did" during the war. [25]
       In the 1958 Act, Congress, at Eisenhower's request,
repealed the statutory authority that the service departments
previously held, as "executive agents," to command forces.
At the same time Secretary of Defense Neil McElroy issued a
directive establishing two command chains:  an operational
chain of command for deployed forces and an administrative
chain for support.  The operational chain would now run from
the president to the secretary of defense, through the JCS
for transmittal of orders, then to the unified and, specified
commanders.  The support chain would run from the president
to the secretary then to the service secretaries and,
finally, the service components in each operational command
as shown Figure 3.
Click here to view image
       Finally, in his 1958 reform effort, Eisenhower again
sought to further strengthen the power of the Secretary of
Defense.  Increased authority was needed to further enhance
civilian control over budgetary matters and to eliminate the
incessant interservice rivalry and perennial disputes over
strategy, force levels, and funds which he knew from his
earlier frustrating experiences, did little to promote
effective unification and rapid decision-making that the
Nation now required.  In his April 3 message he outlined the
budgetary problems in DOD:
     I regard it as fundamental that the Secretary, as
     civilian head of the Department, should have
     greater flexibility in money matters, both among
     and within the military departments.  Firmly
     exercised, it will go far toward stopping the
     services from vying with each other for
     Congressional and public favor...  Today most of
     our defense funds are appropriated not to the
     Secretary of Defense but rather to the military
     departments... the Secretary of Defense needs
     greater control over the distribution of functions
     in his Department.  His authority must be freed of
     legal restrictions derived from pre-missile,
     pre-nuclear concepts of warfare.  Various
     provisions of this kind becloud his authority.
     Let us no longer give legal support to efforts to
     weaken the authority of the Secretary.  On this
     point the law itself invites controversy.  On the
     one hand, the National Security Act gives the
     Secretary of Defense `direction, authority, and
     control' over his entire Department.  Yet the same
     law provides that the military departments are to
     be `separately administered' by their respective
     Secretaries.  This is not merely inconsistent and
     confusing.  It is a hindrance for efficient
     administration.  The contradictory concept,
     however, that three military departments can be at
     once administered separately, yet directed by one
     administrator who is supposed to establish
     `integrated policies and procedures' has
     encouraged endless, fruitless argument.  Such
     provisions unavoidably abrade the unity of the
     Defense Department...I suggest that we be done
     with prescribing controversy by law. [27]
       Eisenhower's intent in 1958 represented an effort to
end one major aspect of the traditional role of the military
departments since they were no longer to have any part in the
directing of combat operations.  The JCS and the unified
commanders were to occupy stage center, while the defense
secretary and his assistants were to exercise tighter control
of service functions though increasing budgetary and
management supervision. [28]  In practice, however, the
reform effort failed to remove the services from operations
and the division between operating and maintaining functions
would prove largely cosmetic.  The arrangements that
eventually prevailed frustrated the original intentions of
the proposed reform measures.  Although subordinate service
component commanders in a unified command were now
responsible to the CINC for "operational" matters, they were
still responsible to their respecitve chiefs of service for
essentially everything else, which, in peacetime, is almost
everything of importance.  Even 25 years after the 1958 Act
former component commander and later JCS Chairman, Air Force
General David C. Jones, expressed his experience in testimony
before the Senate Armed Services Committee:
     I received all my money, all my airplanes, all my
     people, my people got promoted and were reassigned
     by the Chief of Staff of the Air Force.  I
     received nothing in the way of money or equipment
     from my Joint Commander (the CINC); therefore, my
     service chief had much more influence on me and my
     command than did the joint system. [29]
In future years, the military services would use "their
control of the budget and administration of the forces to
maintain their dominance over the unified commands" and, as a
result, the "statutory division of labor between the military
services and the unified and specified commands has never
been fulfilled in practice." [30]
       Eisenhower's inability to incorporate his strong
views, based upon his own wartime experiences, into the
defense establishment resulted both frog widespread
bipartisan Congressional Concern about undercutting civilian
control over the military and also more partisan concerns
about Congressional control over military budgets and
activities.  Regarding the former, Senator Hubert Humphrey's
views captured these sentiments in 1956:
     It is my firm conviction that there has never been
     a greater example of the inherent genius of our
     governmental institutions than the American
     developed Joint Chiefs of Staff concept.
Later, in 1959, Senator Humphrey went on to explain why:
     The Joint Chiefs of Staff concept is the only
     system for military planning at the seat of
     government which possesses superior military
     effectiveness and at the same time does not clash
     with the concepts of the type of democratic
     government it is a part of and supports. [31]
Regarding Congressional influence and control, Eisenhower
wrote in his memoirs about the battles he had with the
Democratic HASC Chairman, Carl Vinson, who, according to Ike:
     viewed with suspicion any proposal which might
     diminish the degree of control which he and his
     committee and the Congress exercised over military
     activities, many of which were matters of detail
     only.  Recognizing my determination to bring about
     a modernization of Defense organization, he let it
     be known that he was going to try to defeat the
     effort. [32]
Eisenhower patiently explained to Vinson, who had been in
Congress since 1914 and had served as Chairman of the Naval
Affairs Committee from 1931 to 1949:
     All we're trying to do is to set up an
     establishment that will function in peacetime, as
     it necessarily must in wartime, under the
     Secretary of Defense. [33]
       Vinson, however, remained unconverted.  When
Eisenhower finally signed the bill into law on August 6, 1958
it contained a few provisions inserted by Vinson that Ike had
earlier described as "legalized insubordination." [34]
Despite his disappointment he felt that "traditional inertia"
had been overcome with "remarkable results" and informed his
close associates that the Reorganization Act of 1958:
     Was just another step toward what the majority of
     experienced military men knew was necessary.  Not
     only would new developments demand further
     revision, but it was quite clear that the members
     of the Congress, only a few of whom are
     knowledgeable in the principles of military
     organization and operations, normally display too
     much concern for the old, even the obsolete. [35]
Among those close associates who witnessed his remarks was
Eisenhower's staff secretary, then Brigadier General Andrew
Jackson Goodpaster.  Ironically, appearing before the HASC a
guarter-century later, Goodpaster would transmit Ike's
intentions and perceptions regarding defense reform measures
as the Congress of a later era deliberated on another Defense
Reorganization Act--ultimately to be known as the
Goldwater-Nichols Act of 1986.
       Thus, the last of the Eisenhower reforms in 1958
culminated the postwar development of the joint military
establishment.
     The 1953 and 1958 reforms succeeded in
     strengthening some of the joint military actors
     and reducing service influence in the joint
system. But they fell far short of achieving
     Eisenhower's objective of a more independent and
     integrated joint military structure, in which
     unburdened service chiefs, led by a strong
     chairman and supported by an independent joint
     staff, operated as a unified military planning and
     advisory ... In short, despite the concerted
     efforts of the Eisenhower Administration, the
     joint system continued to operate on the World
     War II model of a service-dominated, committee-
     coordinated structure. [36]
As the official Legislative History of the Goldwater-Nichols
Act notes, the structure that emerged in 1958, with only
minimum changes, is the same system that was operating up
until passage of this recent Reorganization Act in
1986. [37]  The perceived deficiencies in the system--which
was not modified for nearly 30 years--are indeed the legacy
of the incomplete reforms that had been sought during
Eisenhower's presidency.
                         Chapter V
                LEGISLATIVE DORMANCY (1958-1982)
       Although the period between the Department of Defense
Reorganization Act of 1958 and its successor in 1986 did not
include any fundamental statutory changes related to defense
organization, these intervening years did contain a
proliferation of studies and inquiries into the Defense
Department--at least one for every White House occupancy
change.  Two other significant events during this period are
worth noting.  Although legislative action on the great
unification issues of the Eisenhower era would lay "dormant"
during this next quarter-century, Kennedy's appointment of
Robert S. McNamara as Secretary of Defense would profoundly
impact upon civil-military power relationships, especially
regarding defense budgeting matters.  At the same time,
Congress refused to enhance the authority, influence, and
prestige of the JCS Chairman despite consistent study
recommendations to do so.
           CHANGING CIVIL-MILITARY POWER RELATIONSHIPS
       In his 1958 proposals Eisenhower, in order to provide
greater unity of military effort, had sought increased
authority for the JCS Chairman including greater control over
the Joint Staff.  However, Congress had viewed such proposals
with misgivings since the role of the service chiefs in the
JCS would simultaneously be diminished.  Service parochialism
and JCS "splits," from the Congressional perspective, were
not necessarily undesirable.  One argument
advanced to support this view is the following:
     Under the Constitution, Congress shares
     responsibility for the national defense with the
     executive branch.  Since Congress lacks direct
     military staff assistance and military expertise
     of its own, it wants a range of alternatives to
     consider.  The JCS system, based as it is on the
     three separate military Services, does promote the
     generation of alternative views.  In a single
     staff system such would not be the case. [1]
Consequently, in 1963, when Major General Goodpaster,
previously Ike's White House staff Secretary from 1954
through 1961, was nominated to occupy the new position of JCS
"Deputy Chairman," Congress refused to grant the appointinent
believing that creation of such a position would excessively
enhance the power and prestige of the JCS Chairman.  This
rejection was certainly not a reflection on Goodpaster's
qualifications, so an accommodation was reached by instead
naming him as "Assistant to the Chairman," JCS.  [2] Later he
would advance to four-star rank and occupy, like his former
commander-in-chief, the NATO post of Supreme Allied Commander
in Europe.
       In contrast, Eisenhower's proposals to invest greater
civilian control over the military were more successful.  The
1958 Act strengthened the Secretary of Defense by giving him
the authority to enhance overall defense "effectiveness,
ecomony, or efficiency" by consolidating "any supply and
service activity common to more than one military department"
[3].  The Act also clarified the relationship between the
service secretaries and the secretary of defense.
Previously, the service departments were, by law, "separately
administered by their respective Secretaries."  Eisenhower
had referred to this as "legalized insubordination" because
the law encouraged--literally required--the service
secretaries and chiefs to present their respective cases to
the President directly and to personally testify before
Congress.  The 1958 Act changed this provision to read:
     "Each military department... shall be separately
     organized under its own Secretary and shall
     function under the direction, authority, and
     control of the Secretary of Defense.  The
     Secretary of a military department shall be
     responsible to the Secretary of Defense for the
     operation of such department as well as its
     efficiency..." [4]
Despite the increased authority provided to the Secretary of
Defense by the 1958 Act, the full power now legally available
was not to be fully exercised until the next decade beginning
with John F. Kennedy's appointment of Robert S. McNamara as
Secretary of Defense.  McNamara would ruthlessly exercise
this power using new decision-making tools that had not been
available to his predecessors.
       Systems analysis was introduced by Secretary McNamara
in 1961 as a school of strategic thought.  He and his key
assistants regarded the selection of strategies and weapons
systems as "fundamentally an economic problem... "[5]  The
attempt, for the first time, to answer the question "How much
is enough?" captured some of the very "best and brightest"
and completely transformed defense decision-making.  However,
both the phrase and the problem of relating strategy to
resources had been addressed in the preceding decade during
the second Eisenhower administration.  Ironically, this was
done not by an economist but by a military professional and
World War II hero, then Army Chief of Staff General Maxwell
D. Taylor.  Taylor, later recalled by Kennedy to active duty
for appointment as JCS Chairman, argued that the
determination of U.S. strategy had "become a more or less
incidental byproduct of the administrative processes of the
defense budget:"
     President Eisenhower has well said, `The waging of
     war by separate ground, sea, and air forces is
     gone forever.'  This statement means to me that we
     should organize our fighting forces on the task
     force principle, allocating a proper balance of
     Army, Navy, and Air Forces to the field commanders
     in consonance with the tasks to be accomplished.
     It is an anomaly that while thus thinking in terms
     of aggregate forces balanced for combat, we still
     `buy' our forces, so to speak, in terms of the
     Army, Navy, and Air Force.  As a result, no one
     really knows what the United States is getting for
     its money in terms of combat power from any single
     budget or from any series of budgets in
     combination...  Nowhere in the machinery of
     government is there a procedure for checking
     military capability against political
     commitments... How much of these forces is enough?
     [Others] have argued that these military matters
     cannot be submitted to scientific or engineering
     analysis [because] there are too many
     imponderables... It will never be possible for the
     JCS to produce an agreed tabulation of the forces
     needed for our security without first settling the
     basic question of how much is enough in the
     various operational categories.  These yardsticks
     of sufficiency are the building blocks necessary
     to provide a solid foundation for defense
     planning. ..[6].
       Secretary McNamara, formally President of Ford Motor
Company and a statistician by training, created the Office of
Systems Analysis and staffed it with mathematical economists
who had been developing  concepts such as systems analysis
and parametric cost estimation techniques at RAND's
Theoretical Economics and Cost Analysis divisions.  This
young, brilliant and motivated group quickly developed the
capability to relate objectives to costs as General Taylor
had suggested.  They established a Five Year Plan which laid
out, in matrix form, Congressional budget categories
segmented by "function" (such as strategic nuclear,
conventional, airlift/sealift, base operations, etc.) over
time.  This defense management system focused on outputs and
tried to relate requirements to least possible cost.
President Kennedy was kept well informed by McNamara and his
"Presidential Memoranda" formed the basis of Congressional
testimony and DOD decisions.
       The creation of the new defense financial management
system, known as Planning-Programming-Budgeting (PPBS),
seemed ideally suited for systems analysis with its economic
efficiency-oriented approach and its ability to quantify
trade-offs in a government where decision-making usually
turns on budgetary questions and, frequently, specific line
items.  Their view, expressed best by Charles J. Hitch, the
new Comptroller, was that "we regard all military
problems...as economic problems in the efficient allocation
and use of resources." [7]
       Systems Analysis became the decision-making process
because of its ability to quantify and lay out life-cycle
costs to support PPBS and especially its capacity to relate
objectives to costs.  The Office of Systems Analysis under
Assistant Secretary Enthoven, an MIT-trained mathematical
economist, became extremely powerful and some of its early
decisions were devastating to the military services.  Great
friction developed between the two as McNamara's "whiz kids"
early on "proved" the U.S. Navy's proposed nuclear powered
aircraft carrier to be cost-ineffective and reduced the Air
Force's proposed 10,000 Minuteman ICBM force to only 1,000
missiles.  Consequently, enormous power was transferred from
the services to the Office of the Secretary of Defense
(OSD).  Externally, OSD also successfully challenged the
State Department as the dominant power source in American
policy formulation:
     Systems analysis allowed Hitch, Enthoven, and
     their colleagues to compare (at least on a cost
     basis) the relative value of weapons programs that
     performed the same or similar missions... Applied
     with messianic energy by a new office, the
     Assistant Secretary of Defense (Systems Analysis),
     the new technique found many applications.  It
     became a marvelous tool for dismissing service
     requests and nonquantifiable professional military
     judgements... In practice, OSD, in collaboration
     with the NSC staff, challenged the State
     Department as the primary agency in determining
     American policy whenever that policy appeared to
     have military significance.  For almost a decade
     the most powerful knights of "Camelot" were the
     civilians and military officers who marched under
     McNamara's banner. [8]
       Some of the important outgrowths of NcNamara's systems
analysis "regime" include:  inculcating a habit of explicitly
quantifying as many factors as possible during the course of
analytical "due process" in Congress, OSD, and the services;
a decision-making process that today ironically resembles
judicial advocacy rather than scientific objectivism; a
process in military policy planning which now pervades not
only OSD but the services as well (some have argued that a
bizarre inversion has occurred between the two) and seems to
be irrevocably entrenched in a symbiotic relationship with
PPBS.  In addition to the aims of increasing civilian
control, standardizing service budgeting, and estimating
life-cycle costs while, in general, relating strategy to
resources, the systems analysis approach endorsed a greater
investment in logistics support such as sea and air cargo
transport and prepositioned stocks.  This new approach was to
especially have long-term impact as a result of increased
attention to strategic nuclear policy and arms control.
       McNamara also quickly seized his authority, granted by
the 1958 Act, to enhance defense "effectiveness, economy, or
efficiency" by consolidating any "supply and service activity
common to more than one department."  Within a year of his
appointment, he established the Defense Supply Agency and the
Defense Intelligence Agency, and, later in 1965, the Defense
Contract Audit Agency. [9]
       Successive secretaries would continue further this
consolidation process to increase efficiency by avoiding
service duplication.  For example, Melvin Laird established
the Defense Security Assistance Agency, Defense Mapping
Agency, Defense Civil Preparedness Agency, and Defense
Investigative Service.  However, the evolution of McNamara's
Systems Analysis Office reveals how contentious that original
source and focus of power would prove in subsequent years:
by 1965 the office was elevated to the statutory position of
"Assistant Secretary of Defense" under McNamara; in 1973
Elliot Richardson downgraded the office to the non-statutory
position of "Director, Program Analysis and Evaluation;" in
1974 James Schlesinger re-elevated the office to "Assistant
Secretary of Defense (Program Analysis and Evaluation);" in
1976 Donald Rumsfeld redesignated the position as "Director
of Planning and Evaluation;" and in 1978 Harold Brown
redesignated the office again as "Assistant Secretary of
Defense (Program Analysis and Evaluation)." [10]
               STUDIES, MORE STUDIES BUT NO ACTION
        During subsequent administrations following the 1958
Act a series of study groups and "blue ribbon" panels
continued to scrutinize defense organization and practices.
These studies are noteworthy for their consistency and also
because they were not, with the notable exception of the
recent Packard Commission, incorporated into law or executive
order.
        In 1960, Stuart Symington chaired the Committee on the
Defense Establishment for President Kennedy.  This study
recommended replacing the JCS with a single officer who would
act as the principal military advisor to the president and
secretary of defense, preside over a new "military advisory
council" similar in concept to Secretary Lovett's "Combined
Staff" proposal in 1952, and direct the combatant commands.
[11]  President Nixon appointed a Blue Ribbon Defense Panel
(known as the Fitzhugh Report) which concluded that "the
present combatant command structure does not facilitate
solving serious problems affecting national security" and
recommended "a major restructure of the statutory and
regulatory basis for the Department of Defense," including
the creation of three new unified commands--a Strategic
Command, a General Purpose Command, and a Logistics
Command--and integrating the secretariats and service
military staffs to eliminate duplication. [12]  More than a
year after the report was submitted to Secretary of Defense
Melvin R. Laird only one recommendation was acted upon:
creation of the "Director of Net Assessment" in OSD.
       The National Military Command Structure Study,
prepared by Richard Steadman as part of President Carter's
Defense Reorganization Study Project, also identified a
number of "fundamental shortcomings," including
     The absence of a single military superior to the
     commanders of the unified and specified commands
     in Washington, the inability of the Joint Chiefs
     of Staff to address effectively resource
     allocation and constrained force structure issues,
     a lack of direct input by the commanders of the
     unified and specified commands into the budget
     process, the inability of the Joint Staff to
     produce persuasively argued joint papers, and the
     unwillingness of the Services to assign quality
     officers to the Joint Staff. [13)
No formal action was taken on the Steadman Report
recommendations although, on April 7, 1979, the Secretary of
Defense did establish the Defense Resources Board (DRB) to
improve efficiency and effectiveness within the PPBS.
       A final study effort, which would soon prove to be
particularly influential, was known as the Defense
Organization Study of 1977-1980 (DOS 77-80).   Although
events in Iran were to paralyze the Carter Administration
during its final months, much of the doctrinal basis for
subsequent DOD reform can be found in the historical summary
of this "truncated" study:
     Unfortunately, the DOS 77-88 treatment of DOD
     organizational structure is unlikely to receive
     the attention it merits as the most comprehensive
     examination of the Department of Defense in at
     least a decade.  The study was thrust upon an
     unwilling Department of Defense by the Carter
     White House.  As long as Carter Administration
     interest remained high, the effort received
     attention at the highest DOD levels.  When, in the
     latter stages of the administration, White House
     emphasis on reorganization gave way to other
     concerns, the Department of Defense effort quickly
     faded.  By that time individual topical and
     issue-area studies containing scores of
     recommendations had been completed and
     organizations from throughout the Department of
     Defense community at large had provided hundreds
     of formal comments.  But the DOD effort stopped
     short of submitting a comprehensive, integrated
     report to the president based on the issue studies
     and comments. [14]
Consequently, no formal report was ever rendered to either
President Carter or Secretary of Defense Brown.  Nonetheless,
the effort was later captured and recorded by an Air Force
colonel who had served as the military staff assistant to the
Executive Secretary of DOS 77-80.  Colonel Archie D. Barrett
would subsequently serve as a Senior Research Fellow at the
National Defense University under whose auspices he published
Reappraising Defense Organization before retiring to become a
member of the Professional Staff, House Armed Services
Committee.  Here he would become one of the most influential
behind-the-scenes architects of the final Goldwater-Nichols
Act.   Today, he remains one of its most ardent supporters,
discouraging the HASC from entertaining any substantive
modifications despite service pleas to relax stringent
requirements in Title IV regarding joint officer personnel
policy. [15]
                         Chapter VI
           DECADE OF THE `80'S:  MANDATES FOR ACTION
       The resurgence of interest in defense reform can be
attributed to a confluence of events that occurred beginning
in 1980 with the failed Desert One hostage rescue mission.
The more visible of these events include the record of recent
military performance, particularly on "joint" operations, and
the outrage over soaring spare parts costs and seemingly
mismanaged weapons procurement programs responsible for
creating an atmosphere of chaos in Defense acquisition.
Inevitably, of course, more studies appeared, including the
highly acclaimed Packard Report on defense management which
rapidly gained widespread acceptance and a lesser known
independent study called the Defense Organization Project
initiated by Georgetown University's Center for Strategic and
International Studies.  Unlike the many that preceded them,
these two were not ignored.  Congressional impetus to
seriously consider mandating defense reform was provided by
the outspoken and unprecedented criticism of two incumbent
members of the Joint Chiefs of Staff and a general atmosphere
within Congress conducive to military reform which can be
attributed, at least partially, to the "defense reform
movement" and in 1981 the creation of the Congressional
Military Reform Caucus.
           THE RECORD OF RECENT MILITARY PERFORMANCE:
                 COMMAND AND CONTROL PROBLEMS
       The problems inherent in Eisenhower's failed proposals
to inculcate "unity of command" into the joint structure and
contingency planning process revealed themselves in a series
of operational failures.  The most dramatic of these occurred
during the early morning hours of April 25, 1980 with the
failed Iranian hostage rescue mission.  The official military
inquiry, chaired by former CNO Admiral James L. Holloway,
III, emphasized serious shortcomings in existing joint
command arrangements.  The Rescue Mission Report concluded
that:
     Forces from the several services were pulled
     together on an ad hoc basis, operated in
     unfamiliar configurations under ambiguous command
     and control arrangements, and organized with
     insufficient redundancy to handle unexpected
     attrition. . .JCS planning for the Iranian hostage
     rescue mission permitted Marine helicopter pilots
     to be assigned the unfamiliar role of flying long
     distances over land--a practiced Air Force
     mission.  Moreover, the rescue force lacked a
     single commander.  Instead, there was an Army
     Commander for the ground attack force, a Marine
     commander for the helicopters, and an Air Force
     commander at the Desert One landing zone. [1]
       The next debacle involved the Marine peacekeeping
force in Lebanon.  Both Congressional hearings and the 1983
Report of the DOD Commission on Beirut International Airport
Terrorist Act, chaired by retired Admiral Robert L.J. Long,
suggested that there were too many command layers between
Washington and the Marine force on the ground in Beirut.
Consequently, no one in the chain of command felt he had the
responsibility or authority to directly supervise the force:
     There were six command layers between Washington
     and the ill-fated Marine contingent at the Beirut
     airport.  Both the Congressional and Defense
     Department reports on the 1983 incident identified
     this attenuated command linkage as a significant
     cause of the Marine's unpreparedness for the
     terrorist truck bombing. . Although the mission
     assigned to the Marines changed substantially
     during the period of their presence ashore, those
     in the chain of command failed to make appropriate
     alterations in the explicit military instructions
     given the forces in Lebanon.  The Marines were
     left unprepared to deal with the evolving threat,
     and no one in authority took prudent steps to
     guard against it. [2]
The Investigations Subcommittee of the House Armed Services
Committee reached a conclusion identical to the Long
Commission:  the chain of command was too unwieldy and
inappropriate for the situation confronting the Marines.  It
would be this experience that prompted this very same
subcommittee to later advocate organizational reforms
enhancing control of the unified Commanders-in-Chief (CINCs)
over forces assigned to their commands. [3]
       Even the 1983 Grenada mission, hailed by Defense
Secretary Caspar Weinberger as an unqualified military
success, involved JCS commitment of both Army and Marine
ground forces necessitating the division of a tiny island
into two theaters of operation between which communication
was poor.  Inadequacy of joint communications was most
publicly demonstrated by the now infamous story of the 82nd
paratroop officer who, trying to coordinate fire support,
used his telephone credit card to contact Fort Bragg because
he could not communicate with the Navy ships offshore.  The
inadequacy of joint interoperability procedures was further
revealed when Army helicopters transporting wounded troops
were denied permission to land on the carrier Independence
because the pilots had not been qualified by the Navy for
carrier landings.  Then, after finally receiving permission
to land and offload the wounded, the Navy initially refused
to refuel them because funding compensation procedures had
not been resolved.
       Reminiscent of Eisenhower's earlier warnings, the
aftermath of these operations evoked criticism from all
quarters.  Typical comments are those of Morton and David
Halperin:
     When the military is ordered to combat, the
     problem forces units that have not trained
     together or coordinated procurement to suit each
     other's needs to suddenly combine and go into
     action.  Instead of inserting coherent permanent
     units, the United States deploys improvised
     coalitions of forces who must, on the spot, learn
     to work with strangers. [4]
and William J. Lynn and Barry R. Posen:
     There is a widespread recognition among
     experienced professionals that the moment of
     incipient hostilities is exactly the wrong time to
     improvise or adjust to new modes of operations.
     Yet, inadequacies in the joint planning
     capabilities of the U.S. armed forces--from the
     Joint Staff down to the level of the joint task
     force--as well as inadequacies in the joint
     operational capabilities of the forces themselves
     result in lashed-together improvisations that
     increase the risk of failure. [5]
       A military perspective can be found in the course
notes currently used to introduce the topic of "Joint and
Combined Warfare" at the National Defense University
(including both the National War College and the Industrial
College of the Armed Forces).  The introduction to this
course highlights the impact these recent operational
deficiencies were to have on the impending reform effort:
     Taken as a whole, our [recent] operational
     performance has been discredited by many in
     Congress and the media, even by some professional
     military men.  Often their complaints arise from
     20/20 hindsight, incomplete knowledge of the
     situation, naive dismay that confusion--a normal
     if unwanted spirit--attends military action, an
     unwillingness to accept that (as in the case of
     the [Iranian] hostage rescue attempt) great risk
     may result in great success or great failure.
     Nevertheless--and make no mistake about this--the
     undercurrent of skepticism regarding general U.S.
     military operational excellence is at the heart of
     the mood for change manifest in the 1986
     Reorganization Act. [6]
       These recent "joint" missions illuminated, in an
operational setting, the ambiguous command and control
problems and the splitting of functions and missions caused
by interservice rivalries that Eisenhower had earlier
attempted to resolve.
                PROCUREMENT AND ACQUISITION CHAOS
       Pressure for reform of the military procurement
process also increased in intensity in the early 1980s.  A
seemingly endless series of highly publicized examples of
"waste, fraud, and abuse" were occurring (and continue) but
the fundamental shortcomings stemmed from four problem
areas:
       1.  Insufficient assured connection between national
       military strategy and formulation of military
       requirements.
       2.  Failure to achieve feasible and desirable levels
       of common equipment.
       3.  Weak management and general resistance to joint
       programs.
       4.  Lack of effective service coordination of
       acquisition. [7]
       The Army, in particular, had developed a terrible
reputation for poorly managing new weapon systems during its
comprehensive modernization effort which began in the l970s.
Twelve-term Representative William V. Dickinson claimed:
     I have always believed...that part of the reason
     for the Army's lack of success in the budget
     battles was that they didn't always manage their
     programs that well.  The procurement landscape of
     the last decade is littered with Army fiascos--the
     Sgt. York antiaircraft gun, the Sheridan tank, the
     Viper antitank weapon, the Cheyenne helicopter,
     and the Aquila remotely piloted vehicle, to name a
     few. [8]
As a result, in Congress military "reform" was coming to be
identified with the proposition that the Army simply could
not be "trusted to develop its own weaponry and that Congress
must exercise a detailed and minute supervision over it." [9]
       Much publicity could also be gained by "uncovering
waste and inefficiency" in the Pentagon and Congressmen were
tempted to enter the "spare parts sweepstakes." Theodore
Crackle, in his article "Pentagon Management Problems:
Congress Shares the Blame," cited an "all-too-typical"
example:
     Senator Charles E. Grassley (R-IA) made headlines
     by detailing the fact that the Air Force was being
     charged...$1,118.25...for a small plastic cap for
     the leg of a navigator's stool.  Dina Rasor and
     her Project for Military Procurement, who provided
Grassley with the information, subsequently were
     besieged by calls from harried Congressional
     staffers who wanted similar examples of outrageous
     costs so that their bosses, too, could trigger
     such headlines. [10]
Although most of the examples of "overpricing" were
discovered and publicized by the Defense Department, this
sort of publicity proved harmful by undermining the clear
consensus for the long-needed military build-up that existed
in the early `80s.  Legislators were pressured to translate
indignation into action as a result of constituent demands to
"do something" without thinking through the consequences of
their legislative proposals for procurement reform. [11]
       These pressures led to incredible growth in the
imposition of new laws and regulations governing the
aerospace and defense industry:  more legal changes were
imposed in the 1980's than had been in the previous two and a
half decades.  Former Deputy Secretary of Defense David
Packard claimed that the effort to "micromanage to death" the
whole acquisition system led, for example, to:
     Wiretapping offices in the Pentagon and defense
     contracting installations.  Those are the kinds of
     actions you would expect to be characteristic of
     the most tyrannical types of police state.  They
     are absolutely the antitheses of what you'd expect
     in a free-enterprise economy and in a
     free-enterprise system...  Congress has not come
     to grips with the nature and dimensions of their
     responsibility.  First, it loudly proclaims that
     industry should be guided by the principles of
     enterprise, capitalism and competition which has
     shaped the industry in this country, then it sets
     about to legislate and regulate the industry to
     such a profound extent as to make the application
     of these principles utterly impossible. [12]
       By the mid-1980s, the consensus for increased growth
in the defense budget had evaporated.  During the Senate
floor debate preceding the FY `85 Defense Appropriations
Bill, the Chairman of the Defense Appropriations
Subcommittee, Republican Senator Ted Stevens of Alaska,
admonished his colleagues who were calling for deep cuts in
defense on one hand while protecting favored programs on the
other, asserting that "Congress has made the defense bill a
jobs bill." [13]  Striking examples of this intrusion of
narrow political interests into the defense budget include
the support "liberals" normally hostile to the Pentagon have
given to weapons produced in their own states and districts:
     [California Senator] Alan Cranston's support for
     the B-1 bomber, the endorsement that [Speaker] Tip
     O'Neill, [Representative] Robert Drinan, and
     [Senator] Edward Kennedy gave to the F-18 (whose
     engine is produced in Massachusetts), the support
     of the New York delegation for the A-1O and T-46
     (both produced on Long Island) --all testify to the
     potency of electoral considerations.  This
     propensity, however, is not confined to liberal
     Democrats.  It occurs with the same frequency on
     both sides of the aisle. [14]
       Pressure for acquisition reform intensified and,
despite a host of previous efforts such as the earlier
Packard initiatives in the late `60s and the Carlucci
initiatives in the early `80s intended to "streamline" the
process, Congress conducted extensive hearings and, in the
mid-l980s, passed two procurement laws (PL 98-525 and PL
99-145) to "improve" and "reform" the defense acquisition
system.  In addition to stipulating other procurement reform
measures, these laws have essentially mandated separate
career fields for military officers in procurement and
acquisition.  This notion of legislating specific
commissioned officer career patterns, including assignments,
training, and tour lengths, would soon appear again in joint
officer personnel policies mandated by the Goldwater-Nichols
Act. [15]
       The consensus for action in procurement reform was so
strong in both the legislative and executive branches that
President Reagan approved and decreed by executive order
(NSDD 219) in April 1986, some of the proposed organizational
reforms even before the Packard Commission's final report was
released on June 30 of that year. One such proposal that was
immediately adopted was the Senior Acquisition Executive
concept which removed the extensive "layering" between an
actual program manager and his superior.
       The title of the Packard report, A Quest For
Excellence:  Final Report to the President by the Blue Ribbon
Commission on Defense Management, bore a striking resemblance
to a recent best-seller on successful management practices in
civilian corporations.  In fact, one coauthor of In Search of
Excellence, Dr. Tom Peters, advocated attractive ideas during
hearings preceding the 1986 Act.  Those portions of the Act
requiring both a transfer of certain functions from the
service staffs to the service secretariats as well as the
specific directive to significantly reduce the number of
personnel assigned to high level staffs was a direct
application of the "Peters Principles."  [16]
     INTERSERVICE RIVALRY, THE MILITARY REFORM MOVEMENT,
            AND THE- "POLITICIZATION" OF STRATEGY
        As the foreword to the Defense Reform Debate:  Issues
and Analysis notes, the current reform movement originated in
the late 1970s, as a "distinctive but not unprecedented
effort to bring about changes in American military doctrine,
strategy, weapons, and organization."  The predecessors of
the current defense reform movement include the strategists
and limited-war theorists of the l950s who wanted to relate
military force to political purpose, then McNamara's systems
analysts of the l960s who wanted to relate cost to military
effectiveness and to quantify "how much is enough" using an
exclusive economic approach, and the arms controllers of the
`70s who wanted to "elevate arms control to equality with
deterrence in American security policy" in order to establish
acceptable limits on arms build-ups. [17]
        Although referred to as a "movement," which implies
some unity of thought and purpose, the current reformers
really seem to have only three commonly shared views.  First,
they concentrate almost exclusively on conventional issues
rather than nuclear weapons and nuclear strategy.  Second,
they emphasize our historical attrition-oriented approach to
warfare.  As General Jones has asserted:
     Although most history books glorify our military
     accomplishments, a closer examination reveals a
     disconcerting pattern:  unpreparedness at the
     start of a war; initial failures; reorganizing
     while fighting; cranking up our industrial base;
     and ultimately prevailing by wearing down the
     enemy--by being bigger, not smarter. [18]
The reformers also dichotomize warfare by advocating
so-called "maneuver" warfare over "attrition" warfare.
Finally, they wish to shift emphasis in procurement from a
smaller number of sophisticated but expensive weapons to a
larger number of "proven" but cheaper weapons.
         Beyond these similarities it is difficult to find
consensus and, on many issues, they hold contradictory
views.  In fact, reformers have been able to use "strategic
thought" as a means of reinvigorating the Army-Navy rivalry
dating back to the debates preceding the National Security
Act of 1947 and the 1949 Amendment by "politicizing U.S.
strategy."  While the "strange politics of JCS reform" is
couched in arcane phrases such as "strategic monism vs.
strategic pluralism" and "strategism vs. managerialism," the
more outspoken reformers, such as Robert Komer and Edward
Luttwak, have simply been critical of the Navy's recent
buildup.  They believe that more resources should be
allocated to the Army and complain of the inability of the
JCS to provide good advice.  As one commentator observes:
       They support a strengthened Chief in the apparent
       belief that he would share their view that the
       heart of American military interest abroad lies in
       the Central Front of Europe.  Perhaps this
       explains why, in the words of James Woolsey, "the
       Navy has historically been the most skeptical
       service of unifying moves in the U.S. defense
       structure." [19]
Others, notably Jeffrey Record, acknowledge the strategic
imperative to defend Europe but contend that a corporate form
of JCS advice is consistent with a "maritime/power
projection" and "transatlantic division of labor" strategy
which suggests ways that the U.S. can defend Europe other
than by concentrating American resources on the Central
Front.  In this way:
     The U.S. would tap its comparative advantage in
     providing naval and expeditionary "balanced"
     forces to deal with contingencies outside of
     Europe, while the Europeans would exploit their
     geographical and logistical advantages by
     providing heavy formations to defend the Central
     Front.  It is a variation of this approach
     (maritime superiority and balanced forces in
     pursuit of strategic pluralism) that has prevailed
     during the Reagan Administration over the
     strategic monism (emphasis on NATO, deemphasis of
     U.S. regional objectives) of the Carter
     Administration... Reform of the JCS reflects a
     deeper debate over strategic doctrine.  The
     pro-reform group has as its hidden agenda an
     emphasis on Europe and on the land forces to
     defend the Central Front.  Reformers want a
     powerful military advocate for their own position,
     and hence criticize the advice of the corporate
     JCS because it does not.  Anti-reform opinion
     generally supports the maintenance of a variety of
     balanced forces which can be called upon to deal
     with a diverse range of contingencies. [20]
       Thus, as MacKubin Owens argues, interservice rivalry
is the "centerpiece of the debate over the JCS" and the
reason that since 1942, the Army and Air Force have favored a
national defense staff approach with a strong chief, and the
naval services have opposed it. [21]
       Those reformers were also joined by a few thoughtful,
experienced, and serious military correspondents and defense
journalists who articulated their own reform measures.
Notable among these are Arthur Hadley's The Straw Giant,
published in 1986, and Richard Halloran's To Arm A Nation,
also published in 1986--the year that Goldwater-Nichols was
enacted.  These authors, along with writer  Edward Luttwak,
who published The Pentagon and the Art of War in 1984, all
advocated dramatic structural changes to the defense
organization.  Luttwak, for example, argued the need for a
National Defense Staff consisting of "national-defense" staff
officers whose assignments and promotions are no longer
controlled by their original service.  Such arguments, though
perceptive, tend to disregard what General Emory Upton had
discovered in an earlier era--military reforms cannot be made
without regard to the American political environment and the
national culture.  Also, an unwilling military bureaucracy
will normally resist change, regardless of the merit in the
proposals.  As Colonel Barrett points out in Reappraising
Defense Organization:
     Studies are simply too prone to advance
     far-reaching proposals while remaining insensitive
     to possible sources of support and opposition in
     the bureaucracy, White House, Congress, and
     public.  If they are to influence the shape of
     public institutions such as the Department of
     Defense, organization studies and other literature
     of this genre must advance reorganization
     proposals developed with an informed appreciation
     of the likely boundaries of the politically
     possible. [22]
       In 1981, general Congressional disenchantment with the
inability of both armed services committees, especially the
HASC, to exercise genuine oversight led to the creation of
the "Military Reform Caucus" within Congress.  This occurred
largely as a result of the unavoidable conflict of interest
charges faced by HASC members with their narrow political
intrusions into the defense budgeting process.  Initiated by
Senator Gary Hart, Colorado Democratic Congressman, and  Bill
Whitehurst, Virginia Republican, the group now contains over
130 members about evenly split between the two parties.
members of this caucus have exhibited keen interest in
military reform but that interest also translated into 200
amendments to the 1988-89 National Defense Authorization
Act!  This clear indication of a breakdown in the
Congressional budget resolution process, described recently
by the SASC Staff Director as "totally bankrupt," obviously
reveals that the Defense Department is not the only federal
agency in need of reform. [23]
                         Chapter VII
              THE LEGISLATIVE PROCESS (1982-l986)
              GENERAL JONES, GENERAL MEYER. AND
               THE DEFENSE ORGANIZATION PROJECT
       In March 1982, four months before his retirement,
General David C. Jones, USAF, then Chairman of the JCS,
published an article in Armed Forces Journal entitled "Why
the Joint Chiefs of Staff Must Change."  This was followed in
April by another critical article, advocating even stronger
reform measures, written by General Edward C. Meyer, then
Chief of Staff of the Army, also in Armed Forces Journal:
"The JCS--How Much Reform Is Needed?."  These two articles,
representing public expressions by two encumbent members of
the JCS, were highly critical of the entire JCS system.  This
unprecedented and outspoken criticism by two senior active
military leaders not only caused resurgence of a debate that
lay dormant for 25 years but also spurred Congress to act.
       Before his article was published, General Jones had
established a study group consisting of five retired flag
officers, representing all the services, and project director
William K. Brehm, a former Assistant Secretary of Defense, to
"analyze the effectiveness of the Joint Chiefs of Staff
organization, procedures, planning, and staffing, to document
any need for change, and to develop appropriate
recommendations."  Their report, known as the Chairman's
Special Study Group on The Oraanization and Functions of the
Joint Chiefs of Staff (the "Brehm Report"), concluded that
the existing system required "substantial change" and
recommended increased authority for the chairman, creating
the position of Vice Chairman, JCS, strengthening the Joint
Staff, and greater participation by the unified and specified
commanders in the resource and force allocation
decision-making processes.  The report did not mince words:
     The JCS generally have been seen by civilian
     leaders as unable to provide useful Joint advice
     on many issues.  Joint Staff work often comes
     across as superficial and predictable, and of
     little help in resolving issues.  the JCS and the
     Joint Staff do not have a significant role in
     setting objectives or in resource allocation. [1]
Although both Generals Jones and Meyer would soon retire,
their influence in the subsequent defense reform debate,
which they initiated while on active duty, was tremendous.
       In their public articles calling for "substantial
changes" to the joint structure, both Generals Jones and
Meyer incorporated Eisenhower's earlier arguments to
reinforce their own criticisms of the existing joint
structure.  General Jones, in "Why the Joint Chiefs of Staff
Must Changed" lamented:
     despite many studies that have periodically
     documented problems with this military committee
     system and made cogent recommendations for
     improvements, the system has been remarkably
     resistant to change... Most of the problems and
     some of the approaches I will address have been
     discovered--then reburied--many times in the past
     35 years.
As an aide to SAC Commander General Custis LeMay, General
Jones had earlier observed the intense debate preceding the
`58 Act during Eisenhower's presidency.  Jones recalled the
signing of the 1958 Act when Ike had reminded his associates
that it was just another step toward what was necessary.
Now, 24 years later, Jones wrote:  "....I believe he
[Eisenhower] would be disappointed that further steps have
not been taken."  In his April 3, 1958 message to Congress
Eisenhower had stated "We must free ourselves of emotional
attachments to service systems of an era that is no more."
Now, 24 years later, General Jones, echoed those thoughts,
elaborating further:
     Deep-seated Service traditions are important in
     fostering a fighting spirit, Service pride, and
     heroism, but they may also engender a tendency to
     look inward and to perpetuate doctrines and
     thought patterns that do not keep pace with
     changing requirements.  Since fresh approaches to
     strategy tend to threaten an institution's
     interests and self-image, it is often more
     comfortable to look to the past than to seek new
     ways to meet the challenges of the future.  When
     coupled with a system that keeps Service
     leadership bound up in a continuous struggle for
     resources, such inclinations can lead to a
     preoccupation with weapon systems, techniques, and
     tactics at the expense of sound planning.
       Contending that "the need for correction is more
urgent now than at any time," General Jones attributed the
most serious deficiencies to joint officer personnel policies
and organizational structure and procedures.  He advocated
three changes:
     1.  Strengthening the role of the Chairman, JCS by
     authorizing the position of Deputy Chairman:
         the Chairman should be authorized a deputy.
         It is an anomaly that the military officer
         with the most complex job is virtually the
         only senior--and in many cases not so
         senior--officer who does not have a deputy.
     2.  Limiting service staff involvement in the joint process:
         the Service staffs dwarf the Joint Staff with
         many of the Service officers duplicating the
         work of the Joint Staff.  There are two basic
problems.  First, the Service staff involvement
         is a cumbersome staffing process and, second,
         the Service Chiefs receive their advice on
         joint matters from their Service staffs... we
         should abolish the current system in which each
         Service has almost a de facto veto on every
         issue at every stage of the routine staffing
         process.  President Eisenhower noted 23 years
         ago that "these laborious processes exist
         because each military department feels obliged
         to judge independently each work product of the
         Joint Staff."  The situation has not
         changed.  It is unrealistic to expect truly
         inter-Service advice from a staff comprised of
         officers from only one Service.  The Joint
         Staff can and should provide such advice.
     3.  Broadening the training, experience, and rewards for joint
         duty:
         More officers should have more truly joint
         experiences at more points in their
         careers--and should be rewarded for doing so.
         There should be more interchange among
         Services, as Eisenhower advocated, and
         preparation for joint assignments should be
         significantly upgraded.  The joint educational
         system should also be expanded and improved.
         An assignment to the Joint Staff or to a
         Unified Command headquarters should be part of
         an upward mobility pattern, rather than a
         diversion or end of a career, as has been the
         case so often in the past.  It is difficult to
         see how present patterns can be changed,
         however, without some influence by the Chairman
         on the selection and promotion of officers.
         Also, the statutory restrictions on service on
         the Joint Staff should be removed. [2]
       General Jones concluded his article hoping that "a
middle ground" could be found "to strengthen our joint
system" thus precluding "major surgery."  General Meyer, in
contrast, offered more radical "full-scale reform" measures
contending that "major surgery may be necessary":
     Reform...is long overdue.  Tinkering with the
     mechanisms will not suffice.  Only by addressing
     the issues which have been considered to be too
     tough to cope with in the past do we have a chance
of instituting the reforms necessary to develop
     the smooth-running machinery required to see our
     nation through to the 21st Century with our
     freedoms and national values intact.
Meyer further identified three major problem areas beyond
those mentioned by Jones:
     1. Divided loyalty demanded of service chiefs caused by
     dual-hatting them as members of the JCS--in Meyer's view
     this was the "root cause of the ills... addressed these
     past 35 years."
     2. A joint structure incapable of rapidly transitioning
     to war due to disconnects between resource allocation
     and operational planning.
     3. Lack of participation by the various CINCs in the
     defense decision-making process.
        General Meyer proposed a major institutional change
to correct the divided loyalty issue inherent in dual-hatting
service chiefs:  creation of a "National Military Advisory
Council."  This council would consist of active duty
"distinguished four-star rank officers" with "particular
expertise in areas of special importance to the joint arena;
e.g., strategic nuclear policy; unconventional as well as
conventional warfare; and command, control, and
communications."  These officers would "never return to their
respective service," and would constitute a "body of
full-time military advisors to the President and Secretary of
Defense, thus ending the dual-hatting which has proved so
troublesome." [3]  This idea was not novel either.  Thirty
years earlier it had first been proposed to the incoming
Eisenhower administration in November 1952 by departing
Secretary of Defense Robert A. Lovett.  Just as Meyer was now
proposing such a committee to resolve the dual-hatting issue,
Lovett's earlier vision consisted of a body of national
military advisors who could likewise rise above parochial
service interests.  In 1960, Senator Symington had also
suggested the concept of a "military advisory council" in the
report submitted by his "Committee on the Defense
Establishment" to President Kennedy.
       After retiring, General Meyer worked as a key member
of a special "Defense Organization Project," initiated by
Georgetown's Center for Strategic and International Studies
(CSIS) in mid-1983.  One of the three CSIS project chairmen
was Andrew Goodpaster, Ike's former presidential staff
secretary and now a retired four-star general.  In addition
to previously serving as Assistant to the JCS Chairman,
Director of the Joint Staff, SACEUR, and later recalled to
active duty to become Superintendent at West Point,
Goodpaster's testimony during the extensive hearings
preceding the Goldwater-Nichols Act would soon provide a
critical link back to the Eisenhower era of defense reform.
Published in 1985 under the title Toward A More Effective
Defense, the CSIS project took as its beginning premise:
     The failure to complete the reforms proposed by
     President Eisenhower in 1958 is among the root
     causes of current problems within the defense
     establishment.  President Eisenhower's three
     objectives for reform were:
     1. Clarify and strengthen the authority of the
     Secretary of Defense relative to the individual
     Service departments over all defense activities.
     2.  Improve the quality of the military advice
     given to civilian leaders by granting more
     authority to the Chairman of the Joint Chiefs of
     Staff and giving him full control over the Joint
     Staff.
     3.  Ensure the unity of operational command of the
     U.S. armed forces in the field by separating the
     military Services from the unified and specified
     commands.  The services should perform maintaining
     functions such as training and equipping the armed
     forces.  The unified and specified commanders
     should be responsible for combat. [4]
The analysis and recommendations contained in the CSIS report
were categorized by separate working groups studying joint
command structure, defense planning and resource allocation,
weapons acquisition, and the defense budget process.  This
report was frequently cited in a special report on Defense
Organization by the Senate Armed Services Committee and
heavily influenced their deliberations and hearings on
defense reorganization conducted later in 1985 and again in
1986.
       Clearly, the continued participation by Generals Jones
and Meyer, whether testifying before Congress or
participating in well-coordinated and influential study
efforts after their retirement, provides ample evidence that
the senior leadership within the military had again become
convinced that reform measures were imperative but could only
be imposed from outside the DOD bureaucracy.  First, however,
it had been necessary to voice those concerns within it.
                   ALTERNATIVES FOR REFORM
       All of these influencing factors played out during the
course of the HASC Investigations Subcommittee hearings
conducted in 1982 and 1983 and later again during SASC
hearings in 1985 and 1986.  The Defense Authorization Act of
1985 took some interim steps toward strengthening the Joint
Staff by allowing longer maximum tour lengths (up from three
years to four), two years minimum time between assignments to
the Joint Staff, and gave the Chairman the authority, which
he did not previously have, to select the officers assigned
to the Joint Staff from among those nominated by the
services. [5]
        Nonetheless, the Services provided the nominations for
Joint Staff duty and continued to establish their own
promotion policies and promotion board guidance.  In another
article written shortly after his retirement, "What's Wrong
With the Defense Establishment?," General Jones explained the
impact of these service dominant policies and lack of power
by unified commanders:
     Virtually their only power is that of persuasion.
     The services control most of the money and the
     personnel assignments and promotions of their
     people wherever assigned, including in the Office
     of the Secretary of Defense, the Joint Staff, and
     the Unified Command Staffs.  Officers who perform
     duty outside their own services generally do less
     well than those assigned to duty in their service,
     especially when it comes to promotion to general
     or admiral.  The chiefs of staff of the services
     almost always have had duty on service staffs in
     Washington but almost never on the Joint Staff.
     Few incentives exist for an officer assigned to
     joint duty to do more than punch his or her ticket
     and then get back into a service assignment.  I
     cannot stress this point too strongly:  He who
     controls dollars, promotions, and assignments
controls the organization--and the services so
     control, especially with regard to personnel
     actions. [6]
The Brehm Report, prepared at General Jones' request and
published in April 1982, provided considerable evidence
substantiating General Jones' views:
     All professional military assignments have special
     requirements for prior training and experience.
     Submarine skippers, F-15 pilots, and infantry
     battalion commanders all require--and are
     given--careful preparation...The same should be
     true for officers in joint assignments... Few do.
     Of those officers now serving in the Organization
     of the Joint Chiefs of Staff (OJCS), only 2% had
     any previous joint staff experience...Only 13%
     have attended the five-month resident course at
     the Armed Forces Staff College, the school
     specifically designed to train young officers for
     joint duty.  Of the colonels and Navy captains now
     assigned to the joint staff...less than
     one-quarter have been to one of the two joint
     schools--NWC and ICAF--that are specifically
     provided for joint education...In the OJCS--the
     most complex and important military staff in the
     defense establishment...the average experience
     level on the staff is no more than fifteen months,
     and there is virtually no corporate memory.  The
     leadership positions in the joint staff are filled
     by general and flag officers... the average level
     of experience on the joint staff for generals and
     admirals is about one year.  For those who served
     during the past five years, less than 60% had
     served previously in a joint assignment, even
     though DOD policy states that a joint duty
     assignment is a prerequisite for promotion to flag
     rank.  The Armed Forces Staff College prepares
     officers at the 0-3 and 0-4 levels for joint
     duty.  However, there is no assurance that most
     AFSC graduates will ever be assigned to joint
     duties.  The same is true of the more senior
     National War College and the Industrial College of
     the Armed Forces... [7]
Attempting to resolve the issue of joint officer personnel
policy would soon produce the expected results: acrimonious
debates, bitter tensions, and the inevitable cries of alarm
over creating an elitist Ganeral Staff Corps incompatible
with American democratic values.
       During the course of the hearings and various
independent staff studies, three alternative "models" for
joint military restructuring evolved and were compared with
the existing "service dominant" structure.  Figure 4 compares
each alternative in terms of the historic issues that had not
been seriously addressed, at least by Congress, since
President Eisenhower's proposals for reform in 1958. The
models are arranged from left to right in increasingly
greater degrees of unification, with the "General Staff"
model representing complete unity of command in a single
military authority, supported by a professional, independent
general staff. [8]
Click here to view image
       Each of the proposals had influential supporters:
General Jones favored the "Strong Chairman" model which is
what he advocated in his 1982 article "Why the Joint Chiefs
of Staff Must Change"; General Meyer strongly argued for a
"board" of National Military Advisors separate from the
Service chiefs because of his strong views against
"dual-hatting"; and Senator Barry M. Goldwater, Arizona
Republican and a staunch supporter of the original Eisenhower
proposals for reform, favored a completely unified command
structure with a single Armed Forces Chief of Staff, as did
former Secretary Harold Brown who strongly advocated a
General Staff concept, despite strong Congressional
resentment and the existing statutory prohibition against any
form of a general staff system. [9]  Few issues have
persistently evoked greater anxiety and emotional rhetoric,
or such mixed feelings of fear and awe while remaining at the
same time so incredibly uninformed and full of historical
distortion, as the notion of adopting an American General
Staff.
                FEAR OF THE GENERAL STAFF MODEL
       The Declaration of Policy which accompanied the 1949
Amendment to the National Security Act of 1947 states, in
part:
     In enacting this legislation, it is the intent of
     Congress to provide a comprehensive program for
     the future security of the United States;.. .to
     provide for the effective strategic direction of
     the armed forces and for their operation under
unified control... but not to establish a single
     Chief of Staff over the armed forces nor an armed
     forces general staff...
And the 1958 Defense Reorganization Act contains the
following provision:
     The Joint Staff shall not operate or be organized
     as an overall Armed Forces General Staff and shall
     have no executive authority.
Since World War II Congressional attitudes toward adopting a
General Staff system have certainly been a product of
deep-rooted concern to ensure absolute civilian control over
American military forces.   As the 1985 SASC report on
Defense Organization notes:
     Congressional hostility to a General Staff is a
     principal reason why this concept has not been
     seriously considered for application in the U.S.
     military establishment.
It is interesting to note, however, that such hostility has
not always existed and is a tendency that emerged only
following World War II.  In fact, during the debates
preceding the National Defense Acts in 1903, 1916, and 1920
the German General Staff was never criticized for "leading to
or representing militarism, dictatorship, or faulty strategic
planning."  During the 1903 debate, which concluded with the
actual creation of the U.S. Army General Staff,
Representative Richard W. Parker [Republican, New Jersey]
expressed the widely shared view that "The whole civilized
world has found out that a general staff is an absolute
necessity." [10]
       No doubt the greatest obstacle to a dispassionate
analysis of an American General Staff proposal is our
association of the General Staff with Hitler and the rise of
German National Socialism during the interwar period.  This
perception continues today despite the clear historical
evidence indicating that the German General Staff was not a
Nazi institution, nor was Hitler a stooge of the German Army
or even brought to power by the military:
     But it was not the German General Staff that
     brought on the horrors of World Wars I and II, it
     was the civilian leadership:  a vain and
     indecisive Kaiser Wilhelm and a madman politician
     named Adolf Hitler, who came to power through
     democratic elections.  However the Prussian-style
     General Staff was misused by the civilian German
     command, it was the most educated, efficient,
     effective, useful, and brilliant military
     organization of its kind in history. .. [11]
Perhaps, as Army Major Tim Lupfer suggests in his recent
article "The German Model and American Military Reform:"
     The strengths of the German military have been
     misunderstood by Americans because the German
     military, and especially the German General Staff,
     were able to synthesize elements which, to the
     American mind, are essentially contradictory.
According to Lupfer these successful "syntheses" included:
the ability of the General Staff to combine conformity and
creativity--for example, the concept of "aufstragstaktik,"
now gaining popularity in our own U.S. Army and Marine Corps;
to balance action and reflection, wherein the German General
Staff was largely able to reconcile the natural antipathy
between "thinkers" and "doers"; and to integrate the
functions of command and staff, rather than keeping them
completely distinct, for example, by investing legal
authority as we do in only one leader at every level of
command. [12]
       Regrettably, as Colonel Trevor Dupuy, USA (Retired),
notes in A Genius for War:  "The United States has generally
ignored (rather than rejected) the example of the German
General Staff."
       This is particularly troublesome because
       objective evaluations of the concept would only
       seem possible after the strong emotions
       associated with World War II began to subside.
       The establishment of a General Staff is a
       far-reaching option that might substantially
       contribute toward resolving the existing
       inadequacies of the Joint Staff.  The
       fundamental characteristic of a General Staff is
       that its officers, once selected, remain General
       Staff officers throughout the remainder of their
       careers, regardless of their assignments.  Their
       promotions are determined by their superiors on
       the General Staff, not by their original
       Service. [13]
       Even as late as the Congressional debate following
Eisenhower's 1958 proposals, the General Staff concept
continued to suffer from erroneous American views about the
German military "model" and its alleged influence in German
history:
     A general staff organization--which is
     unswervingly oriented to quick decision and
     obliteration of alternative courses--is a
     fundamentally fallible, thus dangerous, instrument
     for determination of national policy... [general
     staffs] attempt to control all national policies
     involved in war--notably foreign and economic
     policy, both of which lie far beyond the proper
     sphere of military planners... [14]
Congressional opposition to a General Staff concept was
articulated by Congressman Carl Vinson's House Committee on
Armed Services in 1958.  Vinson's committee submitted a
special report accompanying the final 1958 Act explaining why
a general staff concept was "dangerous."   Summarized,
general staff deficiencies were "found" to include the
following:
     (1) a failure to systematically consider the full
     range of alternatives; (2) rigidity of thought;
     (3) an attempt to control national policies that
     are beyond military affairs; (4) isolation of
     civilian officials from other points of view; and
     (5) erosion of civilian control of the military by
     concentrating too much power in the hands of the
     military officers immediately below the senior
     civilian official. [15]
Then as now, these Congressional criticisms are inaccurate
and cannot be supported by recent historical analysis of the
performance of General Staffs, particularly those of Prussia
and Germany.  Even the recent SASC report ironically asserts
that "these criticisms more accurately reflect the actual
deficiencies of the current Joint Staff than they do the
imagined shortcomings of the General Staff concept." [16]
       The dominant criticism of the General Staff system has
always been that it is alien to and would threaten democratic
institutions generally, and civilian control of the military
particularly.  Although Major Lupfer's observations regarding
U.S. inability to understand the German General Staff may be
valid in a "technical" sense, the more fundamental issue is
found in the larger American culture and value system.  These
values are based upon an egalitarian, democratic,
geographically isolated and maritime-oriented society which
is largely anti-military in outlook, possessing an inherent
distrust of things military as connoting excessive efficiency
and a threat to the "liberties of the people."   This
sentiment has been echoed repeatedly since the initial
unification debate following World War II.  Excerpts from
Senator Edward V. Robertson's [Republican, Wyoming] comments
during the floor debate preceding the 1947 Act illustrate
this perception:
     It is the imperceptible, gradual, and constant
     accumulation of authority in carrying out the
     policy of their so-called superior authorities
     that national general staffs became a dominant
     force in their government.  It is almost axiomatic
     that militarism in any country increases
     proportionately to the power of the Nation's
     general staff.
     Its members will become a permanent national
     general staff corps, an inner circle of
     professional military men of the Nation... It will
     be a short step indeed from such a position of
     actual power to a position of titular power and a
     position of dominance in the affairs of the
     Nation.
     The development of the German General Staff has
     been characterized by continued efforts to bring
     all elements of the armed forces under control of
     a single agency controlled directly or indirectly
     by the general staff... we should remember that any
     plan that would place all armed forces directly or
     indirectly under the General Staff...would conform
     to a method by which the German General Staff
     militarized Germany.  The arguments voiced by our
     War Department for its plan for unification of the
     armed forces and creation of a high command seems
     inspired by the philosophy of those who
     militarized Germany.
And from remarks by Representative Gerald R. Ford
[Republican, Michigan] during the debate preceding the 1949
Amendment:
     A deep-seated conflict between those, both in the
     military and in civilian life, who favor a
     republican form of government and those who
     apparently believe an extreme concentration of
     authority and power of decision is a very small
     and carefully selected cadre of officers known as
     the general staff.
Senator Hubert H. Humphrey [Democrat, Minnesota], in 1956,
offered his view of a general staff as:
     ... the form of highly centralized supreme general
     staff system which is anathema to every concept of
     democracy. [17]
Once again the basis for this persistent fear is historical
analogy to the experience of the German Army General Staff.
However, this analogy is fallacious for several reasons:
     First, the German General Staff was solely an army
     staff, not an all-arms institution as proposed for
     the United States.  Second, unlike pre-1945
     Germany, the legislature provides a significant
     check on the power of military institutions in the
     United States.  Third, the record of the German
     General Staff with regard to civilian control is
     mixed.  The determining factor in the German
     military's role in both world wars was the
     character and strength of the political
     institutions, not the type of military command
     structure.  Finally, the American military has
     very different roots than those of the German
     Army.  Civilian control is deeply ingrained in the
     traditions and institutions of the American
     military establishment; and unlike Wilhelmine
     Germany, military officers do not represent a
     separate social class with interests at odds with
     other groups in society. [18]
       Military historian Daniel Hughes recently observed at
an annual meeting of the American Military Institute that
German history and their military tradition are viewed by
Americans without any real understanding of German culture
and the context within which German military institutions
such as the General Staff were created and evolved. [19]
       Although historians can write at length about the
historical reality, this will not necessarily change the
context of the popular culture or its reflection in the
Congress.  Summarizing his analysis in "The Evolution of
Congressional Attitudes Toward A General Staff in the 20th
Century," Robert L. Goldich concludes:
     The vehemence of objections to an elite general
     staff based on the assumption that such an
     organization would threaten American political
     democracy seems misplaced.  Yet the congressional
     opponents of "the general staff" may very well
     have been correct in sensing something
     "un-American" about it.  The missions of a general
     staff--to prepare for war, based on the assumption
     that there will be a "next war"; to conduct
     systematic long-range planning; to do all this in
     an atmosphere of at least relative secrecy--all
     fly in the face of the traditional American
     qualities of optimism (there need not be a next
     war), ad hoc pragmatism (long-range planning is an
     undemocratic narrowing of options by technocrats),
     and openness (the public's `right to know').
     Congressional attitudes toward a general staff in
     the 20th Century, therefore, may indicate the
     persistence of American social myths... and the
     truly representative nature of the Congress in
     reflecting popular attitudes and beliefs, however,
     inchoate, formless, or subliminal.  If the
     Congress changes its attitudes about a general
     staff... it may indicate a strong confidence in the
     ability of American political institutions to
     control the military, regardless of how the
     Nation's highest military command is structured.
     It might also reflect a changed, deeper, and more
     substantial acceptance and understanding of the
     nature of wars and military institutions
     themselves among not only Members of Congress, but
     the people they represent. [20]
Nonetheless, as noted earlier in the discussion on
interservice rivalry and the "politicization of strategy,"
the belief still persists that creation of such a prestigious
and elite organization may go too far toward centralization
and concentration of authority, creating the risk that
planning may be slanted to reflect a single strategic
perspective. [21]
       Finally, few understand the distinction between a
general staff concept as a functional organization and a
General Staff Corps which has historically been an elite and
separate branch of the career officer corps.  One of the very
few in either the House or the Senate who did realize this
distinction, and their potential application to the U.S.
military within the context of American democratic
institutions, was Senator Goldwater.  During the 1958 debate,
sounding much like Eisenhower advocating complete unification
a decade earlier, Goldwater spoke from the Senate floor on
July 18:
     I state again, as I have stated before in
     discussions on this subject, that I believe the
     ultimate organization of the armed services must
     be one military, one uniform, a General Staff, and
     a Chief of Staff, surrounded by proper civilian
     protection and surrounded by Congress and the
     President, so as to eliminate any chances that
     there might occur what some people seem to think
     could possibly occur under such a system. [22]
Now, twenty-five years later, Senator Goldwater would play a
central role in pushing another comprehensive defense reform
package through the Congress.  But, even then, almost half a
century after the beginning of World War II, the idea of
installing an American General Staff would still prove as
politically untenable in 1986 as it had earlier in 1947 and
1958.
     THE LAW:  EISENHOWER'S LEGACY AND GOLDWATER'S INFLUENCE
       Although both Generals Jones and Meyer would retire
shortly after publicizing their defense reform proposals,
their influence in the subsequent defense debate, which they
initiated while on active duty, was tremendous.  Their
proposals sparked debate in both the Senate and House Armed
Services Committees.  During 1982 and 1983 the HASC
Investigations Subcommittee conducted hearings, interviewing
numerous former chairmen of the JCS, service chiefs,
secretaries of defense, national security council advisors,
and commanders-in-chief of unified and specified
commands. [23]  The lead-off witness during the initial
hearings in early May 1982 was General Meyer, followed
immediately by General Jones.
       Among the many called to offer their views on Jones'
and Meyer's proposals was the one individual who could
provide a clear historical perspective and could "speak for
Ike":  recently retired General Andrew J. Goodpaster.
Subcommittee Chairman Whitehurst posed the inevitable
question:  "...how do you think President Eisenhower would
assess the proposals that have been put forward...?"
Goodpaster readily admitted that, although hesitant "to speak
for [Ike]...I suppose I have had as much discussion with him
on issues of this kind as any other human being."  As a
result of his perspective when earlier serving as Ike's staff
secretary and personal confidante, the highly esteemed
Goodpaster was regarded as "the single most reliable source
for what happened in the Eisenhower Presidency." [24]  Thus,
his testimony carried great weight and would prove
influential in the final outcome of the 1986 Act.  In
Goodpaster' s words,
     It took the unique experience of an Eisenhower
     administration and the unique confidence of the
     American people in his military judgement to
accomplish the reform measures of 1958, and even
     those did not go as far as he desired... [25]
He felt that Eisenhower "would deplore the parochialism that
was being shown" and judge the JCS system as having "not
measured up to his hopes."  Goodpaster offered his own
critical assessment as of May 1982:
     ... the mechanisms for developing and advancing
     individual service interests and promoting
     individual weapons systems are stronger by far
     then those for providing coherent overall
     strategic plans and responding to overall national
     security interests and needs...  The `corporate
     duties' of the Joint Chiefs of Staff have not had
     priority... The service chiefs are heavily burdened
     with service responsibilities.  The staff process
     for joint matters is cumbersome, laborious and
     subject to watering-down and log-rolling through
     repeated layers of review and revision
     [and]. ..lacks the timeliness and responsiveness it
     should have, reflects too much of `weapons push'
     and service proponency rather than an `operational
     requirements pull' based on overall strategy...The
     truth is that the weaknesses are systemic and that
     it is systemic improvement that is needed.
Goodpaster concluded his prepared remarks by offering his own
views on JCS reform which strongly reinforced the reform
proposals advanced by General Jones:
     It is... unmistakably clear that a strengthening of
     the role of the Chairman of the Joint Chiefs of
     Staff will be critical... He should have full
     authority over the Joint Staff... The Joint Staff
     itself should be strengthened.  The participation
     of service staffs in the joint process should be
     discontinued in its present form. [26]
       The hearings provoked considerable public debate in
the print media and further propelled the "military
reformers" toward a new flurry of articles, books, and study
documents as committees were formed and think tanks issued
their reports.  At least four legislative proposals were
introduced in 1982 and 1983 designed to remedy perceived
weaknesses.   These bills ranged from minor changes to the
joint structure (H.R. 3718--the 1983 Nichols Bill) to drastic
overhaul by abolishing the JCS and Joint Staff altogether and
replacing them with a single Chief of Staff to the National
Command Authorities who would have operational authority over
the ClNcs, staff support from a Joint Military Staff, and
advice offered by a National Military Advisory Council--
essentially a combination of the "National Military Advisors"
and "General Staff" models (H.R. 2560--the 1983 Skelton
Bill).  Nonetheless, with the exception of a few
non-controversial portions of the Nichols Bill, these
proposals were never enacted into law due, at least at that
time, to disinterest on the part of leading figures in the
Reagan Administration who were focused on other aspects of
military "reform," notably the defense budget build-up.
       In June 1983, Senator John Tower (Republican, Texas),
then Chairman of the SASC, and Senator Henry M. Jackson
(Democrat, Washington), ranking minority member, initiated a
"comprehensive review of the organizational relationships and
decision-making procedures of the Department of Defense."  As
part of this project, the committee held a series of 12
hearings in which it took testimony from 31 witnesses. [27]
A 645-page staff report entitled Defense Organization:  The
Need For Change was completed under study director James R.
Locher in October 1985 and presented to Senator Goldwater,
who had replaced Tower as SASC Chairman.
       Although this SASC "Task Force on Defense
Organization" addressed some 34 specific problem statements,
key organizational deficiencies focused on four areas:
operational failures and deficiencies; acquisition process
deficiencies; lack of strategic direction; and poor
interservice coordination. [28]  One "obvious conclusion" of
the SASC effort, was that these problems were not new at all:
     The problems currently plaguing the Department of
     Defense have not just recently evolved.  For the
     most part they have been evident during much of
     the post-World War II period; some problems even
     predate this period... [29]
       The Defense Organization staff report would constitute
the Senate's analytical basis for the eventual
Goldwater-Nichols Act which was enacted less than one year
later.  Released by Senator Goldwater and SASC ranking
minority member Senator Sam Nunn of Georgia on
October 16, 1985, the report was described as a "landmark"
effort, prompting Armed Forces Journal to publish an "Extra"
since the magazine's editor regarded the report as "the
single most important body of work on national security
matters done so far this century."  It was only the third
such "Extra" in the 122-year publishing history of the
Journal. [30]  The special edition reprinted chapters of the
report and also printed six Senate floor speeches delivered
by Senators Goldwater and Nunn on the 1st, 2nd, 3rd, and 8th
of October.   The Goldwater/Nunn statements shifted focus
each day, beginning with "Congressional Oversight of National
Defense" on October 1.  Goldwater delivered his address
first, expressing shock
     At the serious deficiencies in the organization
     and procedures of the Department of Defense and
     the Congress.  If we have to fight tomorrow, these
     problems will cause Americans to die
     unnecessarily.  Even more, they may cause us to
     lose the fight... The inability to solve these
     problems is not due to a lack of attention.  It is
     both the extreme complexity of the Department of
     Defense and its inherent organizational resistance
     to change, particularly in the military Services,
     that has served to frustrate previous efforts...
     Congress is is compounding the problems in the
     Department of Defense, and major changes in the
     way we conduct our business are long overdue.  We
     are at a critical time when change is absolutely
     essential.  Congressional oversight of the Defense
     Department has degenerated into debate over the
     wrong issues and that irrelevant debate occurs
     more than once each year.  Discipline in Congress
     has broken down.  The discussion is becoming less
     substantive and balanced.  As we direct that
     changes be introduced into DOD to improve overall
     national security, we must make changes
     ourselves.  I am casting the first stone and I am
     throwing it an our glass house here in the
     Congress.
Senator Nunn followed:
     If we are going to demand reform in DOD, we are
     going to have to reform ourselves.  Congress needs
     to exercise some self-restraint.  We need to
     restore discipline to the legislative process... Our
     preoccupation with trivia is preventing us from
     carrying out our basic responsibilities for broad
     oversight... Shifting the focus of the Congress
     away from inputs toward outputs, from trivia to
     fundamentals, from micromanagement to oversight,
     will require the active collaboration of Congress
     and DOD... Fundamental systemic reform is essential
     if we are to minimize these inefficiencies.  This
     reform must include the Congress.
       The second day of Senate floor speeches focused on the
historical perspective of DOD organization.  Goldwater
addressed historical examples of American unity of command
problems:  the Spanish-American War, both Pearl Harbor and
Leyte Gulf during World War II, and the seizure of the Pueblo
in 1968.  Later, Nunn continued by citing similar problems
encountered at Desert One and in Grenada.  Goldwater spoke of
Eisenhower's earlier efforts to correct these "unity of
command problems":
     A weak unified command structure means our ability
     to defend ourselves and protect our interests in
     regions vital to our national security are still
     held-hostage to the will of the individual
     services... In 1958 President Eisenhower proposed
     changes to the 1947 act to strengthen the unity of
     the Armed Forces and their ability to conduct
     joint operations... But unfortunately, the
     influence of the individual Services remained too
     strong.  Although Congress approved Eisenhower' s
     proposals, the concept of unified command that Ike
     articulated has not been adequately implemented by
     the Department of Defense at any time over the
     last 27 years.  They should have listened to
     Ike... President Eisenhower's proposals remain the
     last serious attempt in this century to correct
     these serious flaws in our unified command system;
     1958 was a long time ago, but the problems Ike
     identified have not been corrected.  And it is
     clear that the Department of Defense won't make
     the necessary changes.  It is going to be up to
     the U.S. Congress.  This is our challenge; this is
     our responsibility under the Constitution... Thus
     the problems that General, and later President,
     Eisenhower identified persist. [31]
Not surprisingly, Goldwater had always held Eisenhower in
high regard.  In his memoirs, written after leaving the
Senate, he compared all the Presidents with whom he had
worked over the years going back to Truman, concluding:
     Eisenhower, contrary to many political pundits
     then and now, was our best all-around chief
     executive.  He was helped by choosing extremely
     able men to be around him, but that does not
     diminish his own excellence. [32]
       The focus on the third day was "The JCS and Unified
Commands."  Again, service dominance and interservice
rivalries were cited by Goldwater as central problems
resulting in an
     Inability of the JCS to provide useful and timely
     military advice; the poor performance in joint
     operations; the inadequate quality of the [Joint
     Staff]; the confused command lines; and the lack
     of adequate advocates for joint interests in
     budgetary matters... Many of these problems have
     their roots in the fact that the Services continue
     to dominate the JCS structure.  I regret to
     conclude after years of observing this process
     that the system is such that the members of the
     Joint Chiefs rarely override their individual
     Service allegiances.  When the rope from the
     individual Services pulls in one direction and the
     rope from the Joint Chiefs pulls in the other
     direction, the individual Services invariably win
     that tug-of-war.  The Services win the tug-of-war,
     but the country lose... ...it is widely accepted
     in the Services that it is not a good career step
     to serve on the Joint Staff.  An officer's
     prospects for promotion and command are much
     better if he or she serves on their own Service
     staff... Some Services have even acknowledged that
     in their personnel system, duty on a joint staff
     is a low priority.  For the most part, military
     officers do not want to be assigned to joint duty
     where they are pressured or monitored for loyalty
     by their Services.  They are not prepared by
     either education or experience to perform joint
     duties.
Nunn, reciting the Napoleonic maxim that "Nothing is so
important in war as undivided command," reiterated comments
made by some of the CINCs during the SASC hearings.  General
Bernard Rogers, SACEUR, testified to:
     An imbalance between my responsibilities and
     accountability as a unified operational commander
     and my influence on resource decisions... There
     remains in Washington a preeminence of service
     goals in the program and budget process.
And General Nutting of Readiness Command stated:
     There is an imbalance between my operational
     responsibilities and influence over resource
     decisions... The system as it is presently
     constituted depends inordinately on cooperation
     and goodwill in order to function--which is to say
     the present system contains internal
     contradictions.
       On October 8, Goldwater delivered his concluding
remarks, reminding his colleagues of their "constitutional
duty and responsibility to oversee the armed forces of our
nation:"
     I believe we have failed in that duty.  The last
     time we really did anything significant was almost
     30 years ago in the Defense Reorganization Act of
     1958.  That act sought to correct the
     organizational deficiencies which were disclosed
     by World War II and first addressed by the
     National Security Act of 1947...that purpose has
     not been fully carried out... The reorganization
     of the Department of Defense may be the most
     important thing that Congress does in my
     lifetime.  It will be the most important thing
     that I tried to do in mine. [33]
Although the actual passage of the 1986 Act was now less than
a year away, Goldwater recalled in his recently published
memoirs that he was then anything but optimistic about the
chances of success for reform:
     When the reorganization effort began in February
     1982, only a handful in Congress supported
     reform.  When Nunn and I began to make our move
     [in 1985], I wouldn't have bet more than a sawbuck
     on our chances of success.   History and tradition
     were against us.  Yet I had made up my mind that I
     would not retire from the Senate without giving
     reorganization my best shot. [34]
       The joint structure proposal that was eventually
crafted by the SASC "Task Force on Defense Organization"
under the leadership of Senators Goldwater and Nunn conformed
closely to the "Strong Chairman" model.  Senate Bill 2295
stressed the civilian supremacy of the President and
Secretary of Defense:  "The Secretary has sole and ultimate
power within the Department of Defense on any matter on which
the Secretary chooses to act."  The bill retained the
dual-hatting of service chiefs but strengthened the Chairman
by making him, rather than the corporate JCS, the principal
military advisor to the President, NSC, and Secretary.  The
proposal also called for the creation of a four-star deputy
to assist the Chairman and gave the Chairman, for the first
time, exclusive "authority, direction, and control of the
Joint Staff," which previously had also been provided by the
corporate JCS.  The Chairman's position was further enhanced
by transferring to him several other responsibilities
previously performed by the corporate JCS, plus new tasks
including net assessments, periodic reviews of service roles
and missions, establishing joint doctrine, and preparing
fiscally constrained strategic plans.  The statutory limit on
the size of the Joint Staff, which had been capped at 400
since the 1958 Act, was now more than quadrupled to 1,627 to
assist the Chairman in carrying out his new
responsibilities.
       The existing unified command structure was retained;
however field commanders could now input their views, through
the Chairman, on resource procurement and decisions.  The
intent was clear: by legislating specific combatant commander
authority power would be decentralized out of Washington and
pushed down to the field level responsible for conducting
joint warfighting.  This provision, along with the reduction
in size and subsequent capping of personnel strengths on
service headquarter staffs and a reduction in the number of
defense reports required by the Congress, reflected the
influence of the "Peters Principles," such as "simple form,
lean staff" with "few people at the upper levels," "few
administrative layers," and other "power down" ideas
advocated during the earlier HASC hearings by Dr. Tom
Peters.  The bill also "requires the President to submit an
annual report to the Congress on the national security
strategy of the United States," [35] a provision clearly
reflecting the widespread belief, strongly voiced by a
handful of Senators acknowledged as defense "experts," that
the Reagan Administration was incapable of articulating a
consistent, comprehensive national security strategy because
one simply did not exist.
       The reform issue that would prove most contentious in
the future was the clearly evident need to improve the
quality of the Joint Staff.  Goldwater clearly expressed the
intent of the Senate bill's framers:
     By direct order of the Congress, a career
     specialty would be created for officers on joint
     duty assignment.  In the past, the military
     generally viewed such assignments as just this
     side of Siberia.  Under the new system, future
     assignments and promotions would depend, to a
     significant extent, on joint duty... [promotion
     boards] would be required to have a joint duty
     member.  Procedures would be established to
     monitor the careers of joint duty officers.  A
     record of joint duty would be needed for
     consideration for flag rank...top posts... would be
     reserved for officers with significant joint duty
     experience... The JCS staff can no longer be a
     dumping ground for inept officers. [36]
       Toward the end of the HASC hearings in early 1986,
current members of the JCS provided testimony advocating
retention of the status quo.   Several CINCs, however, made
open pleas for change. [37]  This disunity among those on
active duty represented not only a fundamental split between
the Service chiefs and the CINCs, but also fostered
antagonism between Congress and OSD/JCS.  Additionally, as an
Army major who had served an "internship" with the HASC
during this period noted in his after action report:
     The HASC membership was not much impressed by what
     they saw as a de facto OSD policy of stonewalling
     and obstruction in at least the initial stages of
     the legislative effort.  That stand quickly led to
     a "we-they" mentality, so much so that the Chiefs'
     endorsement of "evolutionary" rather than
     "revolutionary" change was seen as a code-phrase
     that really meant, "We'd actually prefer no change
     at all."  From a military standpoint, it appeared
     at times that Congressional meddling had reached a
     new and dangerous low point... [38]
Despite the perceived OSD "stonewalling," vast momentum for
change had now developed resulting from the convergence of
all the previously described "confluence of events."  The
passage of defense reform legislation, which had not even
been attempted since 1958, had now become inevitable.
       On May 7, 1986, the Senate passed their reorganization
bill (S. 2295) by a vote of 95 to 0.  The House later
approved a slightly modified conference revision by a
near-unanimous vote of 406 to 4. On October 1, 1986, the
Goldwater-Nichols DOD Reorganization Act was signed by
President Reagan into law.  At the signing ceremony, the
President commented:
     [The Act] is a milestone in the long evolution of
     defense organization since our national security
     establishment was created in 1947... After long
     and intense debate, we have set a reasonable
     course of action... affirming the basic wisdom of
     those who came before us--the Forrestals,
     Bradleys, Radfords, and Eisenhowers--advancing
their legacy in the light of our own experience. [39]
        Though the legislative process had consumed four and
one-half years, in the end Senator Goldwater's earlier
pessimism proved unwarranted.  His own characteristically
blunt words from his memoirs best illustrate his elation:
     ... Seldom in its history has Congress spoken so
     clearly. I did too:  `It's the only god-damn thing
     I've done in the Senate that's worth a damn.  I
     can go home happy, sit on by hill, and shoot
     jackrabbits.' [40]
                        Chapter VIII
               CONCLUSIONS:  AFTERMATH AND TRENDS
       The joint structure "model" that was finally adopted
by a Congress wary of the "Upton Paradox" was, as might be
expected, the "Strong Chairman Model."  Some minor
organizational and structural changes were made, such as the
creation of a Vice Chairman, JCS, and some reallocating of
missions between Service staffs and secretariats.  However,
the changes to process, procedures, and responsibilities are
far-reaching and comprehensive.  These are indeed more than
cosmetic changes, as William V. Kennedy, military affairs
journalist and former military assistant to the Assistant
Secretary of Defense (Comptroller), has noted:
     The Defense Reorganization Act of 1986 was not
     just one more adjustment of a familiar,
     essentially timeless system.  By placing the
     Chairman of the Joint Chiefs of Staff firmly above
     the level of his former peers, the Service chiefs,
     and by making it plain that the Joint Staff, not
     the Service staffs, is to be responsible for
     formulation of US military strategy, the Congress
     has set in motion one of the most profound changes
     ever to have occurred in US military history and
     policy. [1]
The obvious Congressional intent has been to change the
balance of power--perhaps more precisely, the imbalance of
power--between the individual services and joint military
institutions.
       The balance of power shift is particularly conspicuous
in the relationship of the JCS Chairman to the service chiefs
who were formerly dual-hatted as his JCS co-equals.  The
increased stature now legally invested in the Chairman is
reflected in one of the Title II provisions which authorizes
"the Chairman, subject to the direction of the President, to
attend and participate in National Security Council
meetings."  This one provision allegedly became so important
to the collective JCS that by May 1986 they were willing to
abandon their earlier opposition especially when it became
evident that Senator Goldwater's determined advocacy for
defense reform, coupled with all the other influencing
factors, made some form of defense reorganization legislation
compelling and imminent, regardless of the level of OSD and
JCS support.  However, as a corporate body they could not
publicly endorse the proposed legislation since Secretary
Weinberger early on had consistently opposed any
Congressionally-directed DOD reorganization schemes. [2]
       Among the Chairman's many new statutory
responsibilities contained in Title II, not previously shared
by the corporate JCS, are those for:  "preparing fiscally
constrained strategic plans;" "performing net assessments;"
"advising the Secretary of Defense on the critical
deficiencies... identified during the preparation of
contingency plans;" "establishing and maintaining a uniform
system of evaluating the readiness of the... combatant
commands;" and "developing joint doctrine." [3]  To discharge
these new responsibilities, the current Chairman, Admiral
William J. Crowe, has already used his new statutory
authority to exercise exclusive direction of the Joint Staff
by creating two new joint directorates (J-7:  Operational
Plans and Interoperability, and J-8:  Force Structure,
Resource, and Assessment) to develop joint doctrine; to
wargame, analyze, and refine joint operational plans and
force structure; and to perform military net assessments.
This increased stature and prestige was symbolized when,
during the first JCS "tank" session after the Act had become
law, for the first time ever the four-star chiefs of all the
services rose to attention as the Chairman entered the
room. [4]
       This shift away from traditional service dominance
toward more effective joint institutions has been especially
visible to the military officer corps in a "startling change
to the historical prerogatives of the military departments"
contained in Title IV of the Act concerning joint officer
personnel policy.  Despite yet persistent fears of an
American "General Staff" and the continued legal prohibition
against such a system, as Army Colonel Don Snider has
observed:
     The joint officer personnel provisions of the new
     law create a historic departure for officer
     development and management in our armed
     forces.  Congress has finally overcome the
     unfortunate spectre of `The Man of Horseback', and
     has now legislated the foundations necessary for a
     joint staff of the armed forces, one that can be
     educated, trained, and promoted over time to
     insure its progression, continuity, and freedom of
     action from undue influence from the services. [5]
        Indeed, the requirements contained in Title IV are so
demanding that they probably will not be met, certainly not
by the Navy, for the "foreseeable future." [6]  The
comprehensive and unbelievably detailed provisions of this
portion of the Act (refer to Appendix E), combined with
recent Congressionally-directed officer endstrength
reductions and the impact of budget cuts, has forced the Army
to literally micromanage its officer corps:
     Incredibly intense career management will be
     necessary in order to comply with Title IV while
     providing maximum professional development
     opportunity yet still retaining a cadre of
     relatively young combat arms commanders at all
     levels, especially in view of recently mandated
     tour stabilization policies. [7]
This Congressional tendency toward increasingly detailed
prescriptions is dramatically revealed not only in the
requirements for joint officer personnel policy, but also in
the reporting requirements they have imposed to ensure that
these new rules are being enforced.
       Despite some of these more onerous provisions which
have caused the Services considerable agony in
implementation, the 1986 Goldwater-Nichols Act, followed by
the 1987 Senate hearings on national security strategy
chaired by Senator Nunn, and the President's annual National
Security Strategy reports for 1987 and 1988 (which were
mandated by this law), clearly indicate a sorely needed
resurgence in strategic thinking prompted by a revival of
classic geopolitical thought.  At the same time, the American
professional military has benefitted tremendously from a
rediscovery of the importance of the operational art of war
placing much greater emphasis on joint interoperability
requirements, the synchronizing of strategic deployment and
logistical support to warfighting effectiveness, and campaign
planning to link the strategic and tactical levels of war.
Additionally, the Act should not be viewed as a singular
event but perhaps as the centerpiece of a set of
complementary initiatives resulting from the larger and more
diverse aspects of the reform movement.  These include
defense management and acquisition reforms recommended by the
Packard Commission and implemented in April 1986 by executive
authority in NSDD 219, and also the creation of two new
unified commands for special operations forces and strategic
deployment and mobility by the 1987 Defense Appropriations
Act.
                       FINAL THOUGHTS
       In most respects, the decision-making process that
ultimately led to this legal document illustrates the tenor
of the times and is representative of many other evolving
trends.  Included among these are the tendency to create ad
hoc "blue ribbon" commissions to assess and recommend changes
within a large, ever-expanding, and increasingly entrenched
federal bureaucracy.  Power sources have become increasingly
more diffuse with infighting and "turf" battles practically
inviting paralysis and checkmating internally generated
"reform" efforts.   However, even when resorting to these
external sources for independent and objective review, the
recent history of defense reform well illustrates the need
for system failure to actually be evident, not just imminent,
before any significant reform measures can be successfully
instituted.  The tension, animosity, and distrust between the
Congress and the executive, in this case DOD, was clearly
revealed when it became apparent to OSD and the Services that
"far-reaching" measures would be legally imposed, especially
in the area of traditionally service-dependent officer career
assignment patterns and promotion philosophies.  Regrettably,
there continue to be incidents and issues in the wake of the
Act, (especially involving Title IV "oversight" by the HASC),
which indicate that this antagonistic relationship has not
altogether abated. [8]  This situation is obviously not
healthy.  Yet, as Mac Owens has noted, our political system
precludes an easy resolution:
     The Constitution dictates that Congress and the
     President share responsibility for national
     security.  In the contemporary international
     environment, the roles of Congress and the
     Executive Branch-- intended by the founders to be
     complementary--have, in many cases, become
     competitive and even conflicting.  Thus, while it
     is possible to improve the U.S. national security
     process by refining the functions of the two
     branches, the Constitution itself limits what can
     be done. [9]
All of this seems to suggest that Congress is indeed
cognizant of the "Upton Paradox"--political consensus simply
cannot be achieved on issues relating to major organizational
and structural reform.  Thus, as Goldwater-Nichols also
demonstrates, the tendency of the Congress toward
micromanaging internal processes and procedures rather than
mandating drastic organizational reform.  Finally, as one
former staff director of the Senate Foreign Relations
Committee suggests, this law is another example of a series
of legislative restraints, beginning in 1965, "borne of
Congressional frustration and inability to control events.
This `fabric of legislative restraint' is obviously intended
to serve as a barrier and an impediment to executive
authority." [10]
       Noted military historian Martin Blumenson, in his May
1987 Army magazine article entitled "Reorganization:  Army
Shifts Gears," observed that the Goldwater-Nichols Act "is
billed as the most dramatic and far-reaching reorganization
effort since 1947."  [11]  While these two adjectives might
be warranted, any stronger description would not accurately
convey the origins and history behind this renewed effort at
defense reform.  The historical record proves this recent
debate anything but "revolutionary" in scope or content.  In
fact, the history of the defense debate since the end of
World War II clearly reveals the Defense Reorganization Act
of 1986 to truly be another step--despite an intervening
legislative lapse of almost 30 years--toward the effective
unification of the National Defense Establishment originally
proposed by General Marshall, initiated by President Truman,
vigorously sought by President Eisenhower, and encouraged by
numerous commission reports since.
       This is not to suggest, however, that defense reform
has been "evolutionary" either.  Although Goldwater-Nichols
represents another "adjustment" to the defense
establishment--following lengthy debate, extensive analysis,
and critical review--a statutory void lasting more than a
quarter-century can hardly be categorized as an
"evolutionary" process.  Furthermore, the legislative history
of defense reform suggests this recent Act more accurately
manifests a "resurgence" of interest in reform measures
proposed three decades ago by President Eisenhower rather
than symbolizing a "revolutionary" or "evolutionary" point
event in the larger history of defense-related public law.
       By and large, I suspect that Ike would have been
pleased with the contents of the 1986 Act, possibly excepting
certain unwarranted and excessively detailed provisions
contained in Title IV.  He probably would have been
impressed--if not truly amazed--with the overwhelming,
near-unanimous vote symbolizing the strong consensus that had
finally emerged for many of his earlier proposals.  But I
also think he would have been deeply distressed that it had
taken so many years, at such great cost to the Nation, to
finally secure what had been obvious to him and so clearly
needed long, long ago. Now, in the immediate aftermath of the
Act, it appears that Senator Goldwater was indeed right:
"They should have listened to Ike!"
                          ENDNOTES
                          Chapter I
           INTRODUCTION: REVOLUTION, EVOLUTION, OR
                RESURGENCE IN DEFENSE REFORM?
     1Robert W. Komer, "Strategymaking in the Pentagon",
Reorganizing America's Defense, ed. by Robert J. Art, Vincent
Davis and Samuel P. Huntington (McLean, VA:  Pergamon-
Brassey's, 1985), pp. 207-208.
     2Ibid., p. 209.
     3Richard Halloran, To Arm A Nation:  Rebuilding
America's Endangered Defenses (New York:  MacMillan, 1986),
p. 12.
     4Despite great merit in Upton's proposals--many of
which were later implemented--he did not take account of
"political traditions and institutions in his quest for
change" and discovered that "policy cannot be made without
regard to the American political environment."  See MacKubin
T. Owens, "The Hollow Promise of JCS Reform", International
Security, Vol. 10, No. 3 (Winter 85/86), pages 98 and 102,
and also Allan R. Millett and Peter Maslowski, For The Common
Defense:  A Military History of the United States of America,
p. 258.
     5From a Senate floor speech delivered by Senator Barry
Goldwater on 3 October 1985.  This speech, one of six
addressing the need for defense reorganization delivered by
Senators Goldwater and Sam Nunn, was reprinted in full in a
special issue of Armed Forces Journal International (AFJI),
October 1985 "Extra", p. 19.
     6Admiral William J. Crowe, Jr. (CJCS), "Our Commanders
in Chief:  Leading Edge of Deterrent Strategy", Defense `87,
November/December issue, Armed Forces Information Service, p.
3.
     7P.J. Budahn, "Service Chiefs Seek to Change
Reorganization", Army Times, 8 June 1987.
     8AFJI, October 1985 "Extra", p. 13.
                         Chapter II
           GENESIS OF AN AMERICAN NATIONAL MILITARY
                  ESTABLISHMENT (1942-1947)
     1Armed Forces Staff College Publication No. l (AFSC
Pub 1), National Defense University (Washington:  US GPO, 1
July 1988), p. 31.  Noted military historian D. Clayton
James, in his masterful work A Time for Giants: The Politics
of the American High Command in World War II, provides an
interesting account of the creation of the Combined Chiefs of
Staff during the Arcadia Conference: "The [U.S.] Joint Chiefs
of Staff as a corporate entity evolved from the Arcadia
Conference as a belated American effort to match the
impressive interservice high command system of the
British... The [JCS) grew out of two needs that became
apparent to Roosevelt...: the necessity for better
coordination between the American services...; and the need
for an American high command body to counter British efforts
to dominate Anglo-American strategy making. "  See Chapter
One:  "Preparing for Wartime Commands," pp.7-8.
     2Winston S. Churchill, The Hinge of Fate (Boston:
Houghton-Mifflin, 1950).  The quote is reprinted in the
Report for the Chairman, Joint Chiefs of Staff by the
Chairman's Special Study Group (Brehm Report), April, 1982.
     3William J. Lynn, "The Wars Within:  The Joint
Military Structure and Its Critics", Reorganizing America's
Defense, p. 171.
     4Ibid., p. 171.
     5Quotes attributed to Marshall and Stimson appear in
Lynn's article, pp  171-172.
     6William Frye, Marshall, Citizen Soldier
(Indianapolis:  Bobbs-Merrill, 1947), p,
     7Harry B. Yoshpe and Theodore W. Barrer, Defense
Organization and Management (Washington:  Industrial College
of the Armed Forces, 1967), p. 12.  Forrestal's views were
Presented to the House Select Committee on Postwar Military
Policy and are contained in the House report Proposal to
Establish a Single Department of the Armed Forces (78th
Congress, 2nd Session:  Washington:  US GPO, 1944), p. 124.
     8Ibid., pp. 12-13.  Author's emphasis added.  The
report of the JCS Special Committee for Reorganization of
National Defense was Published by the Senate Military Affairs
Committee in Department of Military Security, S. 1942,
Hearings (79th Congress, 1st Session:  1945), pp  411-439.
Chapter II (con't)
     9Ibid., p. 13.  General Omar Bradley was one of the
Army field commanders interviewed by the committee.  He wrote
in his memoirs that the principal reasons for the opposition
expressed by naval officers was their fear of "losing control
of Navy and Marine Corps aviation, and possibly the aircraft
carriers."
     10Arthur T. Hadley, The Straw Giant (New York:  Random
House, 1986), p. 76.  The quote is from President Truman's
transmittal message to the Congress accompanying the "Collins
Plan" proposal for service unification.
     11Stephen E. Ambrose, Eisenhower:  Vol. I (New York:
Simon and Schuster, 1983), p. 443.  Biographer Stephen E.
Ambrose, whom Eisenhower personally selected after his
retirement from formal public service as President, recently
delivered a presentation on Ike to the USMC Command and Staff
College.  During seminar discussions on 12 October 1983,
Ambrose emphasized Eisenhower's extreme, but genuine, views
on complete unification--to the extent of "single service,
single uniform".  Ambrose also stated that Eisenhower
regarded UMT as the "centerpiece" of his views on the
appropriate national defense policy for the United States
given the stature and global responsibilities facing America
in the post-World War II era.
     12Dwight D. Eisenhower, Crusade In Europe (Garden
City, NY:  Doubleday, 1948), p. 262.
     13Ambrose, Eisenhower (Vol. I), p. 443.
     14General of the Army Omar N. Bradley and Clay Blair,
A General's Life (New York:  Simon and Schuster, 1983), p.
465.
     15The Department of Defense:  Documents on
Establishment and Organization, 1944-1978, ed. by Alice C.
Cole, et. al. (Washington:  OSD Historical Office, 1978),
p. 9.  The quote is from President Truman's message to the
Congress on 19 December 1945.
     16Ibid., pp. 7-17.
     17Alan R. Millett and Peter Maslowski, For The Common
Defense: A Military History of the United States of America
(New York:  Free Press, 1984), pp. 479-480.
     18Bradley, A General's Life, p. 466.
     19The Department of Defense:  Documents on
Establishment and Organization; 1944-1978, p. 34.
     20Ambrose, Eisenhower, p. 472.
                        Chapter III
             THE NATIONAL SECURITY ACT OF 1947 AND
               THE UNIFICATION DRAMA  (1947-l952)
     1Public Law 253 (80th Congress, 1st Session):  The
National Security Act of 1947, Section 211(a) through 211(c).
The complete Act is reprinted in The Department of Defense:
Doouments on Establishment and Organization, pp. 35-50.
Under the "Unified Command Plan," approved by President
Truman on 14 December 1946, the geographic commands were the
Northeast (consisting of forces in Newfoundland, Labrador,
and Greenland), Far East, Pacific, Alaska, Caribbean,
Atlantic, and Europe.  The specified commands were the Air
Force Strategic Air Command and U.S. Naval Forces, Eastern
Atlantic and Mediterranean.  However, the term "specified
command" was not used until 1951.
     2Millett and Maslowski, For the Common Defense,
p. 480.
     3Bradley, A General's Life, p. 466.
     4Maurice Matloff, general editor, American Military
History (Army Historical Series), Office of the Chief of
Military History, US Army (Washington:  US GPO, 1973),
p. 532.
     5Bradley, A General's Life, p. 488.
     6Lynn, "The Wars Within", Reorganizing America's
Defense, p. 173.
     7Ibid., p. 174.  Author's emphasis added.
     8Public Law 216 (81st Congress), commonly referred to
as "The 1949 Amendment", Section 2:  Declaration of Policy,
reprinted in The Department of Defense: Documents on
Establishment and Organization, p. 86.  Author's emphasis
added.
     9See Millett and Maslowski, For the Common Defense,
p. 481; Matloff, American Military History, p. 532; and
General Maxwell D. Taylor, The Uncertain Trumpet (Westport,
CT:  Greenwood Press, 1959), p. 165.
     10In this and the preceding paragraphs, words and
phrases in quotes are those of General Bradley in A General's
Life, pp. 497-498.
     11Eisenhower's remarks are from his personal diary and
are quoted in Ambrose, Eisenhower (Vol. I), p. 486.
     12Eisenhower's remarks here, again from his diary, are
found in Bradley, A General's Life, p. 499.
Chapter III (Con't)
     13Brad1ey, A General's Life, p. 499.
     14Ambrose, Eisenhower (Vol. I), p. 487.
     15Ibid., p. 489.
     16Bradley, A General's Life, p. 502.
     17Ibid., p. 503.
     18Ibid., p. 503.  Acheson's comment is from his
memoirs, Present at the Creation:  My Years in the State
Department (New York:  W.W. Norton, 1969), p. 374.
     19 This quotation from Bradley, along with the next
four, are from his memoirs, A General's Life, pp. 505-511.
     20Millett and Maslowski, For the Common Defense, p.
482.
     21William J. Lynn and Barry R. Posen, "The Case for
JCS Reform", International Security (Vol. 10, No. 3:  Winter
85/86), p. 73.
                         Chapter IV
              EISENHOWER'S REFORMS AND THE DRIVE
                 FOR UNIFICATION (1953-1958)
     1The quote is an excerpt from President Eisenhower's
message to the Congress on 30 April 1953.  This message
accompanied Reorganization Plan No. 6, an executive order
transmitted to the Congress for review.  Since no unfavorable
action was taken by either the House or the Senate within 60
days, the plan thus became effective on 30 June 1953.
     2William J. Lynn and Barry R. Posen, "The Case for JCS
Reform", International Security (Vol. 10, No. 3:  Winter
85/86), p. 74.
     3Secretary Lovett's letter of 18 November 1952 is
reprinted in full on pp. 115-126 of The Department of
Defense:  Documents on Establishment and Organization, p.
120.
     4Ibid., p. 121.
     5Ibid., pp. 121-123.
     6lbid., p. 125.
Chapter IV (Con't)
     7Harry B. Yoshpe and Theodore W. Bauer, Defense
Organization and Management (Washington:  Industrial College
of the Armed Forces, 1967), p. 32.  The Report of the
Rockefeller Committee on Department of Defense Organization
was printed by the Senate Committee on Armed Services (83rd
Congress, 1st session), 11 April 1953.
     8The Department of Defense:  Documents on
Establishment and Organization contains Eisenhower's 3 April
1953 transmittal message to Congress for Reorganization Plan
No. 6 on pages 149-157.  This excerpt is found on p. 151-152.
     9Ibid., p. 152.
     10Ibid., p. 154.
     11This quote attributed to the 1956 House
Appropriations Committee is found in Yoshpe and Bauer,
Defense Organization and Management, p. 35.  Committee
concern with degenerating interservice cooperation and
increasing rivalry occurred as a result of its review of
several DOD documents attempting to clarify service roles and
missions.  These documents extended from 1948 to 1957 and
were reproduced in House Document 436 (85th Congress, 2nd
Session):  United States Defense Policies in 1957
(Washington:  US GPO, 1953), pp. 106-119.
     12This excerpt from President Eisenhower's 9 January
1958 State of the Union address is found at the bottom of
p. 37, Defense Organization and Management.
     13Dwight D. Eisenhower, The White House Years:  Waging
Peace. 1956-1961 (Garden City, NY:  Doubleday, 1963), p. 244.
     14Ibid., pp. 244-245.
     15This frequently cited quote is from Eisenhower's
3 April 1958 message to Congress transmitting his proposals
for defense reorganization.  The entire message is in The
Department of Defense:  Documents on Establishment and
Organization.  This excerpt can be found on p. 175.
     16 William J. Lynn, "The Wars Within:  The Joint
Military Structure and its Critics", Reorganizing America's
Defense, p. 175.
     17The Department of Defense:  Documents on
Establishment and Organization, p. 181.
     18Lynn, "The Wars Within", Reorganizing America's
Defense, p. 177.
Chapter IV (Con't)
     19Eisenhower, The White House Years:  Waging Peace,
pp. 249-250.
     20From Eisenhower's 3 April 1958 message to Congress.
This excerpt can be found on p. 181 in The Department of
Defense:  Documents on Establishment and Organization.
     21Lynn, "The Wars Within", Reorganizing America's
Defense, pp. 177-178.
     22 Eisenhower, The White House Years: Waging Peace,
p. 251.
     23The Department of Defense:  Documents on
Establishment and Organization, p. 179.
     24Eisenhower, The White House Years:  Waging Peace,
pp. 247-248.  Portions of this lengthy citation appear on
these two pages as footnotes #6 and #8.  Author's emphasis
added.
     25 Paul Y. Hammond, Organizing for Defense:  The
American Military Establishment in the Twentieth Century
(Princeton, NJ:  Princeton University Press, 1961), p. 372.
     26This figure has been extracted from Yoshpe and
Bauer, Defense Organization and Management, p. 43.
     27The Department of Defense:  Documents on
Establishment and Organization, pp. 184-185.
     28Maurice Matloff, general editor, American Military
History (Army Historical Series), Office of the Chief of
Military History, US Army (Washington:  US GPO, 1973),
p. 582.
     29General Jones' statement is in the SASC report
Hearings on Organization, Structure, and Decisionmaking
Procedures of the Department of Defense, 4 October 1983,
p. 142.
     30Lynn and Posen, "The Case for JCS Reform",
International Security, p. 74.
     31These two quotes attributed to Senator Humphrey
appear in the Report of the Chief of Naval Operations Select
Panel, Reorganization of the National Security Organization,
March, 1985, pp. B-1 and B-2.
     32Eisenhower, The White House Years:  Waging Peace,
p. 246.
Chapter IV (Con't)
     33Ibid., p. 246.
     34Ibid., p. 252.
     35Ibid., p. 253.
     36Lynn, "The Wars Within", Reorganizing America's
Defenses, pp. 180-181.
     37Legislative History of Public Law 99-433, Senate
Report No. 99-280, p. 4.
                          Chapter V
                LEGISLATIVE DORMANCY (1958-1982)
     1 Harry B. Yoshpe and Theodore W. Bauer, Defense
Organization and Management (Washington:   Industrial College
of the Armed Forces, 1967), p. 76.  This assertion that
"Congress lacks military staff assistance and military
expertise of its own..." was probably valid 22 years ago.  In
the intervening years the trend has been toward increasing
"staff support and assistance" including the creation of the
Government Accounting Office (GAO), the development of
knowledgeable professional staffs supporting the SASC and the
HASC (e.g., Archie Barrett of the HASC Staff), and expertise
within the Congressional Research Service of the Library of
Congress (e.g., Robert L. Goldich and John M. Collins).  At
the same time, however, collective "military expertise," in
terms of the military experience of individual Members has
gradually been declining.
     2Ibid., p. 75.
     3The Department of Defense:  Documents on
Establishment and Organization, 1944-1978, ed. by Alice C.
Cole, et. al. (Washington:  OSD Historical Office, 1978), pp.
198-199.
     4Ibid., p. 189.
Chapter V (Con't)
     5This remark appears in a variety of sources,
attributed to McNamara's premier "whiz kid", Dr. Alain
Enthoven, a young, brilliant MIT-trained mathematical
economist installed initially as the chief of the newly
created Office of Systems Analysis.  Later, the position was
elevated by statute to "Assistant Secretary of Defense"
status.  For critical views on the impact of systems analysis
see Eliot Cohen, "Guessing Game:  A Reappraisal of Systems
Analysis" in The Strategic Imperative, ed. by Samuel P.
Huntington (Cambridge, MA:  Ballinger, 1982), pp. 163-191;
also Richard K. Betts, "Dubious Reform:  Strategism Vs.
Managerialism", in The Defense Reform Debate, ed. by Asa A.
Clark IV, et. al. (Baltimore:  Johns Hopkins University
Press, 1984), pp. 62-82.  This quote appears on p. 165 of
Cohen's article.
     6Maxwell D. Taylor, The Uncertain Trumpet (Westport,
CT:  Greenwood Press, 1959), pp. 83, 118.  General Taylor,
one of the architects of "Flexible Response", was recalled to
active duty by President Kennedy to serve as Chairman, JCS in
the McNamara Defense Department.
     7Charles J. Hitch and Roland N. McKean, The Economics
of Defense in the Nuclear Age (New York:  Atheneum, 1978);
originally published in 1960 by the RAND Corporation.  Hitch
and McKean, in their introduction, state:  "Economy and
efficiency are two ways of looking at the same characteristic
of an operation.  In other words, there is no conflict
between the budgeteer who is supposed to be interested in
economizing and the military commander who is supposed to be
interested in efficiency...".  pp. 1-7.
     8Allan R. Millett and Peter Maslowski, For the Common
Defense:  A Military History of the United States of America
(New York:  Free Press, 1984), p. 532.
     9The Department of Defense:  Documents on
Establishment and Organization  1944-1978 (Washington:  OSD
Historical Office, 1978), p. 239.
     10Ibid., pp. 239-240.
     11A summary of the key elements proposed by
Symington's Committee on the Defense Establishment is
contained in Archie D. Barrett, Reappraising Defense
Organization (Washington:  National Defense University,
1983), p. 6.
     12Report of the Chief of Naval Operations Select
Panel, Reorganization of the National Security Organization,
March 1985, p. B-4.
     13Ibid., pp. B-11 and B-12.
Chapter V (Con't)
     14Barrett, Reappraising Defense Organization, p. 9.
     15See, for example, Army Times article, "Experts See
Benefits in DOD Reorganization", 29 June 1987, pp. 18 and
28.  Numerous internal Army memos and Army Times articles
illustrate Dr. Barrett's influence and power as a HASC Staff
Member.
                           Chapter VI
            DECADE OF THE `80S:  MANDATES FOR ACTION
     1Admiral James L. Holloway, III, USN (Ret.), Chairman,
JCS Special Operations Review Group, Rescue Mission Report
(Washington:  JCS, 1980), pp. 15-36; a more recent,
well-documented appraisal of the Iranian hostage rescue
mission is offered by Captain Paul B. Ryan, USN (Ret.), The
Iranian Rescue Mission:  Why It Failed (Annapolis, MD:  Naval
Institute Press, 1985).
     2Admiral Robert R.J. Long, USN (Ret.), Chairman,
Report of the DOD Commission on Beirut International Airport
Terrorist Attack; reprinted by the HASC Investigations
Subcommittee in Adequacy of U.S. Marine Corps Security in
Beirut (98th Congress, 1st Session:  19 December 1983), pp.
43-52.
     3Extracted from a Department of the Army Memo:   "An
Inside Perspective on the DOD Reorganization Act of 1986", 8
January 1987, p. 3, by Major C. Kenneth Allard.  Allard
served a fellowship as a member of the HASC Staff and worked
for Congressman Bill Nichols and Dr. Archie Barrett preparing
the House version of the bill that, after conference
modifications, became the Goldwater-Nichols Act.
     4Morton H. Halperin and David Halperin, "Rewriting The
Key West Accord", Reorganizing America's Defense, p. 352.
     5William J. Lynn and Barry R. Posen, "The Case for JCS
Reform", International Security (Vol. 10, No. 3:  Winter
85/86), pp. 84-85.
     6Colonel James E. Toth, USMC (Ret.), course director,
Joint and Combined Warfare:  Theater Warfare; Phase I Course
Syllabus for JCW 175, National Defense University, AY
1988-89, p. 3.
     7Staff Report of the Senate Committee on Armed
Services (99th Congress, 1st Session), Defense Organization:
The Need for Change (Washington:  US GPO, 1985), p. 6.
Chapter VI (Con't)
     8Army Times, 22 February 1988, p. 3.  Representative
William V. Dickinson was interviewed by the Army Times weekly
newspaper.
     9David C. Hendrickson, Reforming Defense:  The State
of American Civil-Military Relations (Baltimore, MD:  Johns
Hopkins University Press, 1988), p. 82.
     10Crackle is cited in Mackubin Thomas Owens,
"Executive and Legislative Influence on U.S. National
Security Policy", The Reorganization of the Joint Chiefs of
Staff, ed. by Alan R. Millett (Washington:
Pergamon-Brassey's), pp. 37-38.
     11Ibid., p. 38.  See also "Congress' Role in Defense
Mismanagement" by Owens in Armed Forces Journal
International, April 1985, pp. 92-96.  For example, on p. 94
Owens states:  "The budget process undermines whatever
coherence PPBS may have and almost ensures that the outcome
will be wasteful and inefficient."
     12David Packard, "Micromanagement:  The Fundamental
Problem With the Acquisition System", Defense `88,  Special
Issue, Armed Forces Information Service, p. 7.
     13Owens, "Executive and Legislative Influence on U.S.
National Security Policy", p. 37.
     14Hendrickson, Reforming Defense, p. 33.  A more
recent example of this "intrusion of narrow political
interests" is the Congressional reaction to the bipartisan
military base closure study recommendations.
     15These two laws, "The Defense Procurement Reform Act
of 1984" (PL 98-525) and "The Defense Procurement Improvement
Act of 1985" (PL 99-145), were an outgrowth of hearings
conducted by the SASC Subcommittee on Defense Acquisition
Policy in 1984 and 1985.  The SASC exhibited "continued
interest. .. in the establishment and maintenance of a distinct
career path for individuals pursuing acquisition as the
primary part of their careers."  See the SASC staff report
Defense Organization:  The Need for Change, p. 560.  Although
these laws became fully effective this summer (July 1989),
the Army still continues to view its Material Acquisition
Management Program as an "additional skill" held by officers
in the program rather than a distinct career field for
personnel management and professional development purposes.
     16Allard, "An Inside Perspective On the DOD
Reorganization Act of 1986", pp. 2-3.
Chapter VI (Con't)
     17Asa A. Clark, IV, et. al., eds., The Defense Reform
Debate:  Issues and Analysis (Baltimore, MD:  Johns Hopkins
Press, 1984), pp. ix-x.
     18The quote from General Jones (former Chairman, JCS)
is taken from the introduction to the final chapter ("Toward
Reform") in Edward N. Luttwak, The Pentagon and the Art of
War (New York:  Simon and Schuster, 1984), p. 266.  General
Jones' comments are similar to those of General Emory Upton
last century.  Though historically accurate, the problem
would likely confront any maritime-oriented "island"
democratic state when it must engage in an overseas
protracted land war.
     19Mackubin Thomas Owens, "The Hollow Promise of JCS
Reform", International Security (Vol. 10, No. 3:  Winter
85/86), p. 107.
     20Ibid., pp. 107-108.
     21Ibid., p. 106.
     22Archie D. Barrett, Reappraising Defense Organization
(Washington:  National Defense University Press, 1983). p. 7.
     23Author's notes from lectures delivered by John
Heubusch, Legislative Director for Representative Denny
Smith, and Arnold Punaro, Staff Director, SASC, on "Congress
and National Security Policy", Georgetown University, 26
March 1988.  Senator Goldwater lamented Congress'
unwillingness to reform itself.  Shortly after retiring he
wrote an article in the February 1987 issue of AFJI,
"Overdose of Oversight and Lawless Legislative," remarking:
"Reform of the Pentagon was accomplished through the [`86
Act, but SASC] efforts to initiate meaningful Congressional
reform failed, primarily due to insufficient interest among
Members of Congress... Until fundamental reforms on Capitol
Hill are realized, our defense effort will be plagued by
instability, inefficiency, delay, and confusion..." pp.54-56.
                        Chapter VII
             THE LEGISLATIVE PROCESS (1982-1986)
     1Citations are from the Report for the Chairman, JCS
by the Chairman's Special Study Group, April, 1982.  An
abridged version of the report is contained in Chapter 13:
"The JCS--Views of Participants", Reorganizing America's
Defense (Washington:  Pergamon-Brassey's, 1985),
pp. 275-291.  The retired senior officers of the Group were:
General Walter T. Kerwin, USA(Ret.), former Vice Chief of
Staff, U.S. Army; General William V. McBride, USAF (Ret.),
former Vice Chief of Staff, U.S. Air Force; General Samuel
Jaskilka, USMC (Ret.), former Assistant Commandant, U.S.
Marine Corps; and Admiral Frederick H. Michaelis, USN (Ret.)
former Chief of Staff, U.S. Pacific Command.
     2Quotes attributed to General Jones are all extracted
from his original article, "Why the Joint Chiefs of Staff
Must Change", Armed Forces Journal International (AFJI),
March, 1982, pp. 62-72.
     3General Meyer's remarks and proposals are all
extracted from his original article, "The JCS--How Much
Reform Is Needed?", AFJI, April, 1982, pp. 82-90.
     4The Final Report of the Georgetown Center for
Strategic and International Studies (CSIS) Defense
Organization Project was published under the title Toward A
More Effective Defense, edited by Barry M. Blechman and
William J. Lynn (Cambridge, MA:  Ballinger, 1985).
     5Legislative History of Public Law 99-433,  Senate
Report No. 99-280, p. 5.
     6General David C. Jones, USAF (Ret.), "What's Wrong
With the Defense Establishment?", The Defense Reform Debate
(Baltimore:  Johns Hopkins University Press, 1984), p. 282.
     7"The JCS--Views of Participants", Reorganizing
America's Defense, pp. 286-287.
     8The chart is taken from William J. Lynn, "The Wars
Within", Reorganizing America's Defense, p. 184.
     9Harold Brown, Thinking About National Security:
Defense and Foreign Policy in a Dangerous World (Boulder,
CO:  Westview, 1983), p. 210.
     10Citations are from the SASC Staff Report, Defense
Organization:  The Need for Change, pp. 257-260.
Chapter VII (Con't)
     11James Gates and Michael Kilian, Heavy Losses:  The
Dangerous Decline of American Defense (New York:   Penguin
Books, 1985), p. 128.
     12Major T.T. Lupfer, "The German Model and American
Military Reform", 1987 Review, Canadian Forces Command and
Staff College, pp. 65-77.
     13SASC Staff Report, Defense Organization:  The Need
for Change, p. 228.
     14The quote is from H.R. Report 1765, DOD
Reorganization Act of 1958, 22 May 1958 and appears in
Colonel John M. Collins, USA (Ret.), US Defense Planning:  A
Criticue (Boulder, CO:  Westview, 1982), pp. 58-59.
     15SASC Staff Report, Defense Organization:  The Need
for Change, p. 231.
     16Ibid., p. 231.
     17Excerpts from Congressional floor debates in this
paragraph are contained in a special annex in the SASC Staff
Report prepared by Robert L. Goldich, "The Evolution of
Congressional Attitudes Toward A General Staff in the 20th
Century", pp. 244-274.  See pp. 260-261, 266-267, and for
Senator Humphrey's remarks, p. 235.
     18William J. Lynn and Barry R. Posen, "The Case for
JCS Reform", International Security (Vol. 10, No. 3:  Winter
85/86), pp. 87-88.
     19Author's discussion with LtCol Donald F. Bittner,
USMCR, USMC Command and Staff College Military Historian, on
27 April 1989.  Professor Hughes' views are summarized from
comments made at the annual meeting of the American Military
Institute held at the Virginia Military Institute, Lexington,
Virginia on 14 April 1989.  He is the Command Historian at
Fort Leavenworth.
     20Goldich, SASC Staff Report, pp. 269-270.
     21Lynn and Posen, "The Case for JCS Reform", pp.
88-89.
     22Goldich, SASC Staff Report, p. 264.
     23For testimony presented to the subcommittee see two
HASC reports:  Reorganization Proposals for the Joint Chiefs
of Staff (HASC No. 97-47) and Reorganization of the Defense
Department (HASC No. 99-53).  See also the Report of the
Chief of Naval Operations Select Panel, Reorganization of the
National Security Organization, March, 1985, Annex B.
Chapter VII (Con't)
     24Stephen E. Ambrose, Eisenhower:  Vol. II (New York:
Simon and Schuster, 1983), p. 676.
     25HASC Hearings, Reorganization Proposals for the
Joint Chiefs of Staff (HASC No. 97-47), p. 462.
     26Ibid., pp. 443-445.
     27SASC Staff Report, Defense Organization:  The Need
for Change, p. 13.
     28Ibid., p. 15.
     29Legislative History of Public Law 99-433, Senate
Report No. 99-280, p. 7.
     30The AFJI "Extra" was published in October, 1985.
Editor Benjamin F. Schemmer (author of the authoritative
account of the Son Tay POW rescue effort, The Raid) was
noticeably impressed with the Goldwater/Nunn speeches and
their SASC "Task Force on Defense Organization" Staff Report,
remarking in his editorial introduction to the "Extra:"
     "...Congress' once-disciplined oversight of our nation's
defenses has deteriorated to the point of legislative
anarchy.  Its deliberations are now characterized by
contradiction, conflict, and confusion; delay; and
micromanagement.. The Senate's deliberate action on [the SASC
Task Force] conclusions and recommendations may well endure
as the greatest contribution to America's security we'll see
in our lifetimes...".
     31AFJI "Extra", October, 1985, pp. 4-13.  Senator
Goldwater, as his memoirs clearly illustrate, had been deeply
impressed with Colonel Charles Beckwith and his views on the
aftermath of Desert One where Beckwith had been the assault
commander.  Goldwater had "long talks" with Beckwith,
especially on the subject of the need for "team effort"
through better unified command arrangements, and summarizes
these in his memoirs (pp. 344-347).  Beckwith's personal
account of the failed hostage rescue mission is Delta Force
(New York:  Harcourt, Brace, Javonovich, 1983).
     32Barry M. Goldwater and Jack Casserly, Goldwater (New
York:  Doubleday, 1988), p. 392.
     33Remarks by Senators Goldwater and Nunn on 3 October
1985 and Goldwater's concluding remarks from the Senate floor
on 8 October are reprinted in full in the AFJI "Extra", pp.
16-38.
     34Goldwater and Casserly, Goldwater, p. 340.
Chapter VII (Con't)
     35Extracted from the "Summary of Major Provisions" of
the conference substitute amendment which was later accepted
by both Houses and enacted as the "Goldwater-Nichols Act of
1986".  The specific provision cited here can be found on p.
98 under "Title VI--Miscellaneous".
     36Goldwater and Casserly, Goldwater, pp. 354-355.
     37General Edward C. Meyer, USA (Ret.), "JCS
Reorganization:  Why Change?  How Much Change?", The
Reorganization of the Joint Chiefs of Staff, ed. by Alan R.
Millett (Washington:  Pergamon-Brassey's), p. 58.
     38Department of the Army Memo, "An Inside Perspective
On The DOD Reorganization Act of 1986", 8 January 1987, pp.
1-2.
     39Weekly Compilation of Presidential Documents,
2 October 1986, p. 1317.
     40Goldwater and Casserly, Goldwater, p. 357.
                         Chapter VIII
               CONCLUSIONS:   AFTERMATH AND TRENDS
     1William V. Kennedy, "What Future For The Service War
Colleges", Armed Forces Journal, June 1988, p. l6.
     2Mark Perry, Four Stars:  The Inside Story  of the
Forty-Year Battle Between the Joint Chiefs of Staff and
America's Civilian Leaders, (Boston:  Houghton-Mifflin,
1989), pp. 336-340.  Also, in Chapter II of his recently
published memoirs (Goldwater, New York:  Doubleday, 1988),
Goldwater describes a meeting he and Senator Nunn had with
the JCS in "the tank" in early February, 1986:  the current
JCS was generally opposed to organizational reform--"They
didn't believe in reorganization, and they were telling us to
go to hell"; at the conclusion of the meeting two JCS
members, CNO Admiral James Watkins and USMC Commandant
General P.X. Kelley, refused to shake hands with either
Senators Nunn or Goldwater (p. 338).  Later, Navy Secretary
John Lehman "did everything he could to torpedo the plan"
according to Goldwater (p. 339).  Interestingly, in Lehman's
recent book (Command of the Seas, New York:  Charles
Scribner's Sons, 1988), he does not once mention the
Goldwater-Nichols Act of 1986.
Chapter VIII (Con't)
     3See JCS Pub 2:  "Unified Action Armed Forces
(UNAAF)".  This joint doctrinal publication was immediately
updated after the Act and now lists 49 JCS Chairman
responsibilities.
     4Mark Perry, Four Stars, p. 340.  Admiral Crowe
replace General John W. Vessey, Jr, as Chairmans, JCS on
2 October 1985.  Among the many factors that must have been
considered in selecting Crowe was the fact that he held a
PhD. from Princeton.  His doctoral dissertation analyzed
military cooperation in the British Joint system!
     5Don M. Snider (Colonel, USA), "DOD Reorganization:
Part I, New Imperatives", Parameters, September, 1987, pp.
95-96.
     6From the prepared statement of Vice Admiral Leon A.
Edney, Chief of Naval Personnel, delivered before the SASC
Manpower and Personnel Subcommittee on 17 March 1988.
Chapter VIII (Con't)
     7
     From a Department of the Army study "Impact Analysis
of Title IV, DOD Reorganization Act of 1986", US Army
Military Personnel Center (DAPC-PLF), 28 May 1987.  The
requirements in Title IV (refer to Appendix E) now force the
services to assign their best field grade officers to joint
duty positions, including the Joint Staff in Washington,
joint and combined staffs in the field, and defense
agencies.  This "reallocation" of top quality officers
(defined in the Army, far example, as "former commanders")
into joint duty assignments (JDA) will cause a significant
reduction in the number of such officers serving in
Service-specific commands.  The impact in the Army is indeed
significant (perhaps even more dramatic for the Navy) as the
charts below reveal.  In Chapter I, the author cited General
Wickham's (CSA) comment to the HASC that the law,
specifically Title IV, will "ravage the field Army" (refer to
endnote #7).  The two "Title IV Impact" charts below,
extracted from the study cited above, were used by General
Wickham during his testimony to graphically illustrate what
he meant.
Click here to view image
Chapter VIII (Con't)
     8For example, in a letter to Secretary Weinberger on 9
October 1987 the late Congressman Bill Nichols, then Chairman
of the HASC Investigations Subcommittee, admonishes DOD for
failing to meet legislative reporting requirements regarding
the Title IV directive for DOD to review joint progressional
military education (JPME) programs and further accuses the
JCS of attempting, by creating so-called "joint education
tracks" at service staff colleges, to "circumvent legislative
intent".  In another letter to Secretary Carlucci on 18
December 1987, HASC Chairman Les Aspin informs DOD that he
has appointed a special HASC "Panel on Military Education",
chaired by Congressman Ike Skelton, that will thoroughly
investigate overall professional military education and
suggests that "long term decisions await the results of the
panel's review".  The CJCS-approved joint "track" concept
proved to be short-lived indeed, lasting only one academic
year (AY 88-89), before being replace by a two-phase JPME
program recommeded by the HASC PME panel.  More recently,
Arch Barrett, the highly influential HASC professional staff
member who also served on the Skeleton PME panel, has charged
that the services have been "more successful than they should
have been" in evading the Title IV provisions (Law's
Architect Questions Success of Joint-Service Guideline," Navy
Times, 5 Dec 88).  The current Investigations Subcommittee
chairman commented upon reviewing a critical GAO report
released on 3 April 89:  "It has been two and a half years
since passage of [the Act].  At some point, `trying to
implement' the law becomes basic non-compliance with its
provisions."  ("GAO to Joint Chiefs:  Use Power on Budget,
Personnel Choices", Army Times, 17 Apr 89, p. 20).
     9MacKubin T. Owens, "Executive and Legislative
Influence on U.S. National Security Policy", The
Reorganization of the Joint Chiefs of Staff:  A Critical
Analysis, by Allan R. Millett, et.al., (New York:
Pergamon-Brassey's, 1986), p. 40.
     10From a lecture delivered by Dr. William B. Bader,
former Senate Foreign Relations Committee Staff Director and
currently Vice-President, SRI International, on "Congress and
National Security Policy", Georgetown University National
Security Studies Program, 26 March 1988.  Other elements of
this "fabric of legislative restraint" include:  the War
Powers Resolution; Congressional Control and Impoundment Act
(created CBO); and the Hughes-Ryan Amendment in 1974 on
Congressional oversight of intelligence activities.
     11Martin Blumenson, "Reorganization:  Army Shifts
Gears", Army, May 1987, p. 44.
               BIBLIOGRAPHY:   PRINCIPAL SOURCES
BIOGRAPHIES AND AUTOBIOGRAPHIES:
Ambrose, Stephen E.  Eisenhower, Volume I:  Soldier, General
     of the Army, President-Elect. 1890-1952, New York:  Simon
     and Schuster, 1983.  This volume, one of three by
     biographer Ambrose (whom Ike personally selected after
     his retirement from formal public service as President),
     served as the major reference source for the subchapter
     on Eisenhower's service as Army Chief of Staff (CSA)
     after the War.  Although Ike continually kept a diary, he
     did not convert his immediate post-War experiences into
     book form as was the case during the War (Crusade in
     Europe) and as President (The White House Years).  This
     source also complemented General Bradley's autobiography
     (A General's Life) as a major source for my third chapter
     on the post-War "unification drama" and provides
     tremendous insight into those factors which later
     influenced Ike to ultimately seek the 1958 defense
     reforms.
Bradley, Omar N. and Clay Blair.  A General's Life.  New
    York: Simon and Schuster, 1983.  I drew extensively from
    Chapters 49 through 52 on Bradley's views regarding the
    "Battle of the Potomac" and the incredibley bitter and
    acrimonious interservice fights preceding and following
    the `47 Act.  Bradley's perspectives, since he followed
    Ike as CSA then became the first JCS Chairman in 1949,
    though valuable in their own right, were used as a way of
    correlating Ike's views as expressed by Ambrose.
Eisenhower, Dwight D.  The White House Years:  Waging Peace,
    1956-1961.  Garden City, NY:  Doubleday, 1963.  Chapter
    X, pp. 244-257, were used as a primary source for
    background and events leading up to and following passage
    of the `58 Act.  These few pages are also crucial to an
    understanding of the subsequent debate and unresolved
    issues that ultimately led to the `86 Act.
Goldwater, Barry M. with Jack Casserly.  Goldwater.  New
    York:  Doubleday, 1988.  Goldwater's recently published
    memoirs are easy--actually fun--to read and provide an
    incisive, as opposed to purely partisan, Congressional
    perspective on events of the past three decades.  I used
    Chapter II: "Duty-Honor-Country" to illuminate
    personality-related issues and power relationships
    leading up to final passage of the `86 Act.  In my
    opinion, without Goldwater's staunch advocacy and dogged
    persistence, there would not have been an `86 Act.
Taylor, Maxwell D.  The Uncertain Trumpet.  New York: Harper
    and Brothers, 1959.  Written just after he retired as
    CSA.  Contains the original plea to determine "How Much
    Is Enough?", advocates a new strategy of "Flexible
    Response"--later adopted by JFK, and calls for revisions
    still being voiced by "reformers" today.  Recalled to
    active duty by JFK and appointed CJCS under McNamara.
OTHER BOOKS:
Art, Robert J., Vincent Davis, and Samuel P. Huntington,
    eds.  Reorganizing America's Defense:  Leadership in War
    and Peace.  Washington:  Pergamon-Brassey's, 1985.  The
    most useful "anthology" of defense reform articles for my
    project:  "The Wars Within:  The Joint Military Structure
    and Its Critics", by William J. Lynn, was especially
    useful in developing a historical framework to discuss
    alternative reform proposals; "Strategymaking In The
    Pentagon", by Robert W. Komar, offered a useful
    historical perspective; and "Rewriting The Key West
    Accord", by Morton and David Halperin, offers historical
    insight into the yet persistent "roles and missions"
    issues which, along with divisiveness caused by budgetary
    pressures, has been (and still is) a major cause of
    interservice rivalries.  Also contains an abridged
    version of the CJCS Special Study Group (Brehm Report) in
    "The JCS--Views of Participants".
Blechman, Barry, and William J. Lynn, eds.  Toward A More
    Effective Defense:  Report of the Defense Organization
    Project.  Cambridge:  Ballinger, 1985.  Probably the most
    influential study impacting upon the content of the law
    in its final form.  Incredible cast of "heavy hitters",
    including Generals Jones and Meyer (after they retired);
    countersigned by six former Secretaries of Defense;
    deliberately did not advocate drastic reform measures but
    incremental changes needed to move toward Eisenhower's
    original intent for unified national defense articulated
    in 1958.
Clark, Asa A., IV, Peter W. Chiarelli, Jeffrey S. McKitrick,
    and James W. Reed, eds.  The Defense Reform Debate:
     Issues and Analysis.  Baltimore:  Johns Hopkins University
     Press, 1984.  The best single document describing and
     analyzing all aspects of the contemporary "defense reform"
     effort:  strategy, doctrinal, force structure,
     modernization and weapons acquisition, and defense
     policymaking.  Wide spectrum of contributors including
     Newt Gingrich, Richard Betts, Bill Lind, Pierre Sprey;
     military contributors include Colonel Wass de Czege
     (co-author of the new AirLand Battle doctrine) and Major
     Tim Lupfer; the editors are all professors at West Point.
     Chapter 16: "What's Wrong with the Defense Establishment",
     by General Jones, expands upon his initial call for reform
     shortly before he retired as CJCS.
Hartman, Frederick H. and Robert L. Wendzel.  Defending
     America's Security.  Washington:  Pergamon-Brassey's,
     1988.  Contains two chapters on defense reform
     summarizing the recent debate and a good discussion of
     the impact of the `86 Act as well as additional reform
     measures still needed.
Hendrickson, David C.  Reforming Defense:  The State of
    American Civil-Military Relations.  Baltimore:  Johns
    Hopkins University Press, 1988.  "Of defense reform,"
    writes David Hendrickson, "it might fairly be said that
    while there is a consensus that we need it, there is no
    agreement on what it is."  In an attempt to ease the
    confusion surrounding military reform, Hendrickson
    categorizes major reform movements that have arisen in
    the 1980s:  military, organizational, and
    administrative.  In the first part of his book,
    Hendrickson places these reform movements within a
    historical context that stresses traditional,
    theoretical, and practical dilemmas raised by
    civil-military relations.  In Part 2 of his book he shows
    how the many reform proposals--particularly those of the
    military reformers--are misconceived and might serve to
    undermine the effectiveness of the military.  When the
    subject is considered in total, Hendrickson concludes
    that a civilian attempt to impose a reform program on the
    services could result in very serious consequences and
    might make things worse, not better.  The real case for
    reform, he argues, lies in the transformation of American
    strategic doctrine, in those institutional changes that
    would combat the lack of unified direction in
    civil-military relations, and in the strengthening of
    military professionalism within the American officer
    corps.  Hendrickson does an excellent job of discussing
    all aspects of the various issues confronting the defense
    establishment.
Millett, Alan R., Mackubin Thomas Owens, LTG Bernard E.
    Trainor, USMC (Ret.), GEN Edward C. Meyer, USA (Ret.),
    and Robert Murray.  The Reorganization of the Joint
    Chiefs of Staff:  A Critical Analysis.  Washington:
    Pergamon-Brassey's, 1986.  A chapter by General Meyer
    (former CSA) bears a striking resemblance to provisions
    of the final law, especially Title IV.  Also helpful was
    the chapter by Owens, "Executive and Legislative
    Influence on US National Security Policy".
Perry, Mark.  Four Stars:  The Inside Storv of the Forty-Year
    Battle Between The Joint Chiefs of Staff and America's
    Civilian Leaders.  Boston:  Houghton-Mifflin Company,
    1989.  Recently published (February, 1989), this book
    gives an extraordinary account of personalities and
    "agendas" operating behind the scenes which simply are
    not available in the "official" published histories
    (legislative, JCS, and defense).  This source gave me the
    best account of General Vessey's and Admiral Crowe's
    participation, influence, and views on the reform effort
    after General Jones' retirement.  This is also the only
    public document I know of that alleges plans for a mass
    resignation by the entire JCS, led by CJCS General Earle
    Wheeler, to protest the LBJ/McNamara handling of the
    Vietnam War.  Literally at the last minute on 26 August
    1967 Wheeler reversed the unanimous JCS agreement and
    cancelled the public announcement.
ARTICLES
Cohen, Eliot.  "Guessing Game:  A Reappraisal of Systems
     Analysis."  The Strategic Imperative, edited by Samuel P.
     Huntington, Cambridge:  Callinger, 1982:  163-191.  A
     good explanation of the impact of systems analysis in the
     McNamara regime and the misguided attempt to apply
     quantitative techniques as a "mode of strategic thought".
"Defense Organization:  The Need for Change."  Armed Forces
     Journal International 123 (October 1985 Extra):  3-61.
     Contains the complete text of the Goldwater/Nunn Senate
     floor speeches on defense reform delivered 1-8 Oct 1985.
     I have quoted liberally from this source in Chapter VII.
     The AFJI editor, Ben Schemmer, describes Senate action on
     the debate as the "greatest contribution to America's
     security we'll see in our lifetimes...".
Jones, David C.  "Why the Joint Chiefs of Staff Must
     Change."  Armed Forces Journal International 119 (March
     1982):  62-72.  Four months before his retirement, this
     is the CJCS public statement--literally a plea--calling
     for substantive reforms in the defense establishment.
Lynn, William J., and Barry R. Posen.  "The Case for JCS
     Reform."  International Security 10 (Winter 1985/86):
     69-97.  Argues that Congress had two choices: adopt a
     General Staff System or mandate less drastic
     "evolutionary" change.  Highlights fallacies of "German
     General Staff" fears.
Meyer, Edward C., GEN, USA.  "The JCS--How Much Reform Is
    Needed?"  Armed Forces Journal International 119 (April
    1982):  82-90.  Meyer's proposals were a call for more
    radical reforms than those offered by CJCS Jones.
Owens, Mackubin Thomas, Jr.  "The Hollow Promise of JCS
    Reform."  International Security 10 (Winter 1985-86):
    98-111.  Reminds current reformers of the traditional
    resistance of military establishments to effect reform
    efforts by citing the historical example of General Emory
    Upton's unsuccessful attempt to generate internal reform
    after the Civil War.  Many of his ideas, however, were
    later accepted and adopted near the turn of the century.
Snider, Don M.  "DOD Reorganization:  Part I, New
    Imperatives."   Parameters 17 (September 1987):  88-100.
    Excellent explanation of impact of `86 Act on US Army
    written by an Army colonel.
PUBLIC DOCUMENTS PUBLISHED:
Armed Forces Staff College Publication No. 1 (AFSC Pub. 1.
    National Defense University.  Washington:  US GPO, 1 July
    1988.  Contains good summaries, in chart form, of JCS and
    Joint Staff changes over the years.  See Appendices B and
    C.
Cole, Alice C., Alfred Goldberg, Samuel A. Tucker, and
     Rudolph Winnacker, eds.  The Department of Defense:
     Documents on Establishment and Organization. 1944-1978.
     Washington: Office of the Secretary of Defense
     Historical Office, 1978.  The most current official DOD
     history on defense reform.  A primary source for Chapters
     II-IV.
Yoshpe, Harry B. and Theodore W. Bauer.  Defense Organization
     and Management.  Washington:  Industrial College of the
     Armed Forces, 1967.  I found Chapter II:  "The Growing
     Pains of Unification" a useful account of the `49, `53,
     and `58 reforms.
U.S. Congress.  Public Law 99-433:  "Goldwater-Nichols
    Department of Defense Reorganization Act of 1986", 99th
    Congress, 2d. sess., Oct 1, 1986.  This is the actual
    law.  It is amazing in both scope and detail.  A summary
    of the major provisions of the law is provided at
    Appendix E.
U.S. Congress.  House.  Committee on Armed Services.
    Investigations Subcommittee.  Hearings on Reorganization
    Proposals for the Joint Chiefs of Staff.  97th Cong., 2d.
    sess., 1982.  HASC No. 97-47.  These hearings initiated
    Congressional action which, more than four years later,
    led ultimately to the `86 Act.
U.S. Congress.  Senate.  Committee on Armed Services.
    Defense Organization:  The Need for Change.  Staff report
    to the Committee on Armed Services, United States Senate,
    October 16, 1985.  99th Cong., 1st sess., 1985.  S. Prt.
     99-86.  Contains as a stand-alone, sole-source document,
     the research, analysis, alternative proposals for reform,
     and recommendations presented by the SASC Staff to the
     Senate Armed Services Committee.  Explains the rationale,
     at least from the Senate perspective, for the legislative
     proposal (S.2295) finally enacted on October 1, 1986.
U.S. Congress.  Senate.  Committee on Armed Services.
     DeDartment of Defense Reorganization Act of 1986 - Report
     (to accompany S.2295).  99th Cong., 2d sess., 1986.
     Senate Report 99-280.  This is the official Senate
     legislative history of the Goldwater-Nichols Act.  I used
     it to help clarify the relationships between SASC and
     HASC reform proposals and bills beginning in 1982.
PUBLIC DOCUMENTS UNPUBLISHED:
Report of the Chairman's Special Study Group for the
    Chairman, Joint Chiefs of Staff:  The Organization and
    Functions of the JCS, April 1982.  This is the "Brehm
    Report".  CJCS Jones used it as the analytical basis for
    his reform proposals, especially those pertaining to
    personnel reforms need in joint institutions.
Joint Chiefs of Staff Publication No. 2 (JSC Pub 2):
    "Unified Action Armed Forces (UNAAF)".  Joint Chiefs of
    Staff, Washington, D.C., December 1986.  JCS Pub 2 was
    quickly updated by December 1986 to accommodate the new
    authority invested in the CJCS by the `86 Act.  However,
    no substantive changes were made to service roles and
    missions.
Joint Chiefs of Staff Special Historical Study:  Role and
    Functions of the Joint Chiefs of Staff--A Chronology.
    Historical Division, Joint Secretariat, Joint Chiefs of
    Staff, Washington, D.C., January 1987. This is the
    current JCS official history on defense reform affecting
    joint institutions.  I have summarized its contents in
    Appendix A
Report of the Chief of Naval Operations Select Panel:
    Reorganization of the National Security Organization,
    March 1985.  Contains superb chronological listing of
    statutory history behind reform.  Summarizes testimony
    taken from numerous high officials during hearings in
    1982 and provides insight into "mandate for reform"
    perceived by Congress and their subsequent views on DOD
    stonewalling. "
Department of the Army Memorandum:  "An Inside Perspective on
    the DOD Reorganization Act of 1986", Office of the Chief
    of Staff, US Army, 8 January 1987.  Interesting
    perspective offered by an Army Major assigned to HASC as
    a one-year Congressional Fellow.  Offers explanation for
    current antagonism between "intransigent" lawmakers and
    "ravaged" service officials.
Lupfer, Timothy T.  "The German Model and American Military
    Reform", 1987 Review, Canadian Forces Command and Staff
    College (1987):  65-77.  Lupfer's manuscript provided a
    valuable analysis of the German Army General Staff and
    its potential relevance to the American military today.
              BIBLIOGRAPHY:  ADDITIONAL SOURCES
The following additional sources also provided relevant
background information.  Some were used as general reference
material and others were used to verify statements attributed
in or inferred from another source.  In most cases, each
source was used for documentation in at least one instance in
the text.
BIOGRAPHIES AND AUTOBIOGRAPHIES:
Acheson, Dean.  Present At The Creation:  My Years in the
    State Department.  New York:  W.W. Norton, 1969.
Ambrose, Stephen E.  Eisenhower. Volume II:  The President.
    New York:  Simon and Schuster, 1984.
Eisenhower, Dwight D.  Crusade in Europe.  Garden City, NY:
    Doubleday, 1948.
Frye, William.  Marshall:  Citizen Soldier.  New York:
    Bobbs-Merrill Company, 1947.
Lehman, John F., Jr.  Command of the Seas.  New York:
    Charles Scribner's Sons, 1988.
Manchester, William.  American Caesar:  Douglas MacArthur
    1880-1964.  Boston:  Little, Brown, and Company, 1978.
Pogue, Forrest C.  George C. Marshall:  Organizer of Victory
    1943-1945.  New York:  Viking Press, 1973.
OTHER BOOKS
Abshire, David M.  Preventing World War III: A Realistic
    Grand Strategy.  New York:  Harper and Row, 1988.
Barrett, Archie D.  Reappraising Defense Organization:  An
    Analysis Based on the Defense Organization Study of
    1977-1980.  Washington:  National Defense University
    Press, 1983.
Brown, Harold.  Thinking about National Security.  Boulder:
    Westview Press, 1983.
Coates, James and Michael Kilian.  Heavy Losses:  The
    Dangerous Decline of American Defense.  New York:
    Penguin Books, 1986.
Collins, John M.  U.S. Defense Planning:  A Critique.
    Westview Press, 1982.
Dupuy, Trevor N.  A Genius for War: The German Army and
    General Staff. 1807-1945.  Englewood Cliffs:
    Prentice-Hall, 1977.
Hadley, Arthur T.  The Straw Giant.  New York:  Random House,
    1986.
Halloran, Richard.  To Arm A Nation:  Rebuilding America's
    Endangered Defenses.  New York:  Macmillan, 1986.
Hammond, Paul Y.  Organizing for Defense:  The American
    Military Establishment In The 20th Century.  Princeton:
    Princeton University Press, 1961.
Hitch, Charles J. and Roland N. McKean.  The Economics of
    Defense in the Nuclear Age.  New York:  Atheneum, 1978.
James, D. Clayton.  A Time for Giants:  Politics of the
    American High Command in World War II.  New York:
    Franklin Watts, 1987.
Korb, Lawrence J.  The Joint Chiefs of Staff:  The First
    Twenty-Five Years.  Bloomington:  Indiana University
    Press, 1976.
Luttwak, Edward N.  The Pentagon and the Art of War.  New
    York:  Simon and Schuster, 1985.
Millett, Allan R.  The American Political System and Civilian
    Control of the Military:  A Historical Perspective.
    Mershon Center Position Paper No. 4 in the Policy
    Sciences.  Columbus:  The Ohio State University, April
    1979.
------------ and Peter Maslowski.  For The Common Defense:  A
    Military History of the United States of America.  New
    York:  Free Press, 1984.
Moses, Louis J.  The Call for JCS Reform.  Washington:
    National Defense University Press, 1985.
Rearden, Steven L.  The Evolution of American Strategic
    Doctrine:  Paul H. Nitze and the Soviet Challenge.
    Boulder:  Westview Press, 1984.
Ryan, Paul B.  The Iranian Rescue Mission:  Why It Failed.
    Annapolis:  Naval Institute Press, 1985.
Van Creveld, Martin.  Command In War.  Cambridge:  Harvard
    University Press, 1985.
ARTICLES:
Blumenson, Martin.  "Reorganization:  Army Shifts Gears."
    Army (May 1987):
Crackel, Theodore J.  "Defense Assessment."  In Mandate for
    Leadership II:  Continuing the Conservative Revolution,
    edited by Stuart M. Butler, Michael Sanera, and W. Bruce
    Weinrod, 431-448.  Washington:  Heritage Foundation,
    1984.
Crowe, William J. (CJCS).  "Our Commanders in Chief:  Leading
    Edge of Deterrent Strategy", Defense `87 (November/
    December 1987):
Davis, Vincent.  "The Reagan Defense Program:  Decision
    Making, Decision Makers, and Some of the Results".  The
    Reagan Defense Program:  An Interim Assessment, edited by
    Stephen J. Cimbala, Wilmington:  Scholarly Resources,
    Inc. (1986):  23-62.
Kross, Walter.  "Military Reform:  Past and Present."  Air
    University Review 32 (July-August 1981):  101-108.
McKitrick, Jeffrey S.  "The JCS:  Evolutionary or
    Revolutionary Reform?"  Parameters 16 (Spring 1986):
    63-75.
Mearsheimer, John J.  "The Military Reform Movement:  A
    Critical Assessment."  Orbis (Summer 1983):  285-300.
Packard, David.  "Micromanagement:  The Fundamental Problem
With the Acquisition System", Defense `88 (Special Issue):
PUBLIC DOCUMENTS PUBLISHED:
American Military History (Army Historical Series), Maurice
    Matloff, general editor, Office of the Chief of Military
    History, U.S. Army, Washington, D.C.:  US GPO.
A Quest For Excellence:  Final Report to the President, Blue
    Ribbon Commission on Defense Management, David Packard,
    chairman, June 30, 1986.
National Security Strategy of the United States, The White
    House, January 1988.
U.S. Congress.  House. Committee on Armed Services.  Report
    of the Panel on Military Education of the One Hundredth
    Congress.  101st Cong., 1st sess., April 21, 1989.
    Committee Print No. 4.
U.S. Congress.  House.  Committee on Armed Services.
    Investigations Subcommittee.  Hearings on Reorganization
    Proposa's for the Joint Chiefs of Staff--1985.  99th
    Cong., 1st sess., 1985.  HASC No. 99-10.
U.S. Congress.  House.  Committee on Armed Services.
    Investigations Subcommittee.  Hearings on Reorganization
    of the Department of Defense.  99th Cong., 2d sess.,
    1986.  HASC No. 99-53.
U.S. Congress.  Senate.  Committee on Armed Services.
    Hearings on Organization, Structure, and Decision Making
    Procedures of the Department of Defense.  98th Cong., 1st
    sess., 1983.  S. Hrg. 98-375 pt. 1 thru pt. 12.
U.S. Congress.  Senate.  Committee on Armed Services. Report
    on The Department of Defense Reorganization Act.  99th
    Cong., 2d sess., 1986.
PUBLIC DOCUMENTS UNPUBLISHED:
Report to the President and the Secretary of Defense on the
    Department of Defense, Gilbert W. Fitzhugh, Chairman, 1
    July 1970.
Joint Chiefs of Staff Special Historical Study:  The Evolving
    Role of the Joint Chiefs of Staff in the National
    Security Structure.  Historical Division, Joint
    Secretariat, Joint Chiefs of Staff, Washington, D.C., 7
    July 1977.
National Defense University (NWC and ICAF) Phase I course
    syllabus for "Joint and Combined Warfare":  Joint and
    Combined Warfare:  Theater Warfare, AY 1988-89.
Department of the Army:  "Impact Analysis of Title IV, DOD
    Re-Organization Act of 1986."  Officer Planning Section
    (DAPC-PLF), Deputy Chief of Staff for Plans, U.S. Army
    Military Personnel Center, 28 May 1987.
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