Gorbachev The Leader AUTHOR - Major David J. Pyle, USA CSC 1989 SUBJECT AREA - Foreign Policy EXECUTIVE SUMMARY Title Gorbachev the Leader Thesis Gorbachev's charismatic leadership style and ability to portray the Soviet Union as the leading peace maker in the world is one of the greatest problems facing the Bush administration during the next four years. Problem The Soviet Union has been in a period of transition since Mikhail Gorbachev assumed power in March 1985. Under his leadership, the Soviet Union has abandon its confrontational style of world politics and become the driving force in improving east-west relations. He has shown himself to be a great communicator and visionary in addressing problems at home and abroad. His "new thinking" approach in world affairs has generated great optimism that "peaceful coexistence" between the superpowers is an achiev- able goal. Gorbachev is the first Soviet leader who has presented himself as a rational actor. He has discussed world problems openly with other leaders and candidly recognized shortcomings within the Soviet system. He has introduced liberalization to the Russian people with glasnost and perestroika. These changes have lead to political and economic changes within the Soviet Union which have been dramatic. Other chanages which have truly revolutionized world opinion toward the Soviets have been the progress in arms negotiation, and Gorbachev's willingness to question and challenge Marxist/Lenist ideology. Although these changes have been positive they have had an impact on some old alliances. Relationships which grew out of the cold war are now eroding as the world seemingly moves closer together. Allies who are hungry for a reduction in world tension are now questioning the role of the United States in Europe and the Pacific Basin. New economic ties are also developing which could serve to even further destabilize the situation. It appears that Gorbachev has been able to accomplish more in the last four years with his "charm offensive" than he ever could have with military force. Conclusion Gorbachev's leadership style and ability to convince the world that his nation is sincere in its efforts to ensure world peace are unprecedented. President Bush must recognize that he is dealing with a man who rivals some of the greatest leaders we have ever known. He has shown a willingness to change and back up his commitments with bold and audacious action. No one can truly interpret Gorbachev's motives nor do we know whether his future is secure; however, he has been successful at taking the initiative away from the United States in international politics. Gorbachev the Leader By Major David J. Pyle The Soviet Union has been in a period of transition since Mikhail Gorbachev assumed power in March 1985. Under his leadership, the Soviet Union has abandon its confronta- tional style of world politics and become the driving force in improving east-west relations. He has shown himself to be a great communicator and visionary in addressing problems at home and abroad. His "new-thinking" approach in world affairs has generated great optimism that "peaceful coexis- tence" between the superpowers is an achievable goal. Within the Soviet Union he has stirred the very foundation of its politidal and economic systems in an attempt to stimulate a nation whose people endure a quality of life which ranks 60th in the world. Although the United states has not been idle while Gorbachev has waged his "charm offensive" this nation has not fully comprehended the impact he has had on world politics. Gorbachev's charismatic leadership style and ability to portray the Soviet Union as the leading peace maker in the world is one of the greatest problems facing the Bush administration duringthe next four years. President Bush must determine whether Gorbachev's words and actions are sincere or whether they are a deception hiding a loaded gun which is pointed at the heart of our nation. In many ways Gorbachev has become the un-leader when compared to previous Soviet heads of state. In the book, Soviet Decisionmaking for National Security, the traditional Soviet leader is pictured as being "cold, calculating, and in active pursuit of a master plan ... extending the influence and power of the Soviet regime and creating a world socialist system". (18:273) Few can forget the barbaric behavior of Khrushchev at the United Nation in the early 1960's when he removed his shoe and banged on the table to get the attention of the other delegates. This type of behavior would not play well in todays political setting and it certainly would not add to a leaders credibility. Now, for the first time, the world has been afforded the opportunity to see the human side of a Soviet leader. He smiles, he buys Italian suits, he allows his wife to play the role of his country's First Lady, and he discusses world problems openly with other leaders. The sweeping changes he has introduced contrast the label affixed to the Soviet Union early in the Reagan Administra- tion as being the "evil empire". In effect, Gorbachev has made it more and more difficult for the west to portray him as the eneny. Although many actions associated with his new revolution must be considered superficial they have served to intrigue and satisfy the world that Gorbachev can be trusted. A dangerous fallout of this change is the new feeling growing in the west which is similar to the natural desire of compet- itors to embrace their opponents at the end of a athletic contest. Many of our allies are hungry for world peace and are more than willing to make friends with Gorbachev based on perceptions rather than actions. In this case, however, no one can be certain that the competition is over or that he will remain the leader of the only nation in the world that can truly change our way of life. Perhaps the one change that has served to enhance Gorbachev's image more than any other has been his willing- ness to question and challenge the Soviet system. He had to address the fact that "fifty years after Stalin announced that the Soviet Union had entered socialism and nine years after the date by which Khrushchev promised that the Soviet Union would reach full communism, the his country was ... in, deep crisis and in need of radical restructuring". (11:28- 29) Previous leaders had failed to balance ideology with the world political and economic systems. Gorbachev recognized that he could just not adapt Marxist/Leninist ideology to deal with inefficiency within the Soviet Union he would have to shake the very foundation of the Soviet system. In his 7 December 1988 address to the United Nations he called for unilateral cuts in Soviet armed forces in Europe, but more importantly he sent a between the lines message that the Soviet system had failed and the west had won. He acknowl- edged that the Soviet Union had to and was changing and that he hoped that the world would accept them as respected part- ners. This type of talk draws sharp contrast to that of previous Soviet leaders who often presented propagandistic phrases as opposed to rational words. Today Gorbachev speaks of the need for world peace and not of the long-term struggle of the workers who will eventually rise up to triumph over capitalism. He calls for mutual understanding and honest negotiations, and not of the ultimate clash between the east and the west. He has also pressed for change within the Soviet Union to make his nation more efficient and more competitive in the world market. In other words, he has begun to convince the world that he favors butter over guns and peace over ideology. No action that Gorbachev has taken has had as much impact on world affairs as his willingness to compromise during east-west arms negotiations. He has presented himself as a rational actor who will make bold concessions to reduce tension and appease these who question the intent of the Soviet military machine. The military has always been an important political tool for the Soviets. During the last ten years when their economy had been in a state of turmoil it was their military which allowed them to remain prominent in world affairs. Once again, this his why Gorbachev's pro- posals to cut both strategic and conventional forces has been considered so dramatic. The question that must be answered is whether these changes are motivated by a genuine desire to reduce world tension or because economic inefficiencies within the Soviet Union have made it impractical to continue their present level of defense spending. Welcoming Soviet military cutbacks is an important first step in securing a more favorable balance of military power in the world; howev- er, proposed levels are still in excess of what should be considered "reasonable sufficiency". Also, "to date, there is no reason to conclude that 'reasonable sufficiency' represents a renunciation or even an alteration of the inher- ently offensive Soviet military strategy. Gorbachev and his allies are as keenly aware as their predecessors that the Soviet Union's superpower status and future ability to achieve its strategic objectives will still be derive from its military power." (17:12) Some NATO allies have proposed cuts to match Gorbachev's offer and argue that modernization of the military force in Europe is no longer required. This reaction is to be expected, but we must ensure that cooler heads prevail and that the western response still considers the Soviet a potential adversary. Gorbachev's actions in foreign affairs have been revolu- tionary; however, the political and economic changes within the Soviet Union have been almost as dramatic. "His program is proceeding on two levels: glasnost and perestroika. Glasnost means giving publicity to problems, issues, and proposed solutions to generate support for perestroika, which means restructuring the bureaucracy and rebuilding the econo- my and industry." (8:38) The document, "Soviet Military Power: An Assessment of the Threat", 1988, makes the follow- ing assessment: "To promote the image of a revitalized political system, the leadership renewed the crackdown on official corruption, The new leaders also initiated a sweep- ing shake-up of the Soviet bureaucracy designed to replace Brezhnev-era holdovers with new management more technically competent and attuned to Gorbachev's domestic programs. Gorbachev and his allies also endorse a policy of `democratization', which called for a selective expansion of work force participation in enterprise decision making, and permitted the popular election of its managers. The goal was to give workers a greater stake in the management of their own factories, thereby increasing the pressure on the manag- ers to be more efficient". (17:10) On the surface these ideas seem rational and longs overdue; however, the Soviet leadership is divided on the merits of `perestroika. Many powerful leaders have been ousted as a result of Gorbachev's programs and the Soviet GNP fell short of planned levels in 1988 by $21 billion. All this has served to raise uncertain- ty with regard to Gorbachev's ability to balance the need for change with the willingness of the people to adapt. In a speech delivered on 15 February 1989 Gorbachev said, "for all the current difficulties in perestroika ... that which we have encountered in this, the beginning of the second stage ... we must decide not on the path of stopping, not on the path of returning back. No! We must move forward." (5:A1O) Another important aspect of the reforms is the need for importing more western technology. Gorbachev realized that increasing efficiency in his factories alone would not allow them to catch the west which has been experiencing an unprec- edented technology boom. He has been eager to expand trade, to look for beneficial joint ventures, and to increase the number of business dealings with the west. To date, inter- face with western companies has been limited. The Soviets are ideally looking for opportunities which will allow them to gain western technology in an effort to manufacture portable goods. Western companies on the other hand see the Soviet Union as a land of opportunity. A major concern for the United States must be that restrictions on "dual use" technology remain intact. We can not afford to allow prod- ucts or information which may have military application to fall into the hands of the Soviets. A surprising fall-out of the reduced tension between the Soviets and the United States has been the impact it has had on some old alliances. Many relationships that grew out of the cold war are now eroding as the world moves closer to- gether. Of particular concern is the change in attitude of some of our European allies. In January 1989, U.S. News & World Report published results of a public opinion poll conducted in West Germany. This poll showed that a large percentage of West Germans do not consider the Soviet Union a threat and that they had a higher opinion of Gorbachev than they did of President Reagan. This is a drastic change when compared to studies done in 1985. It appears that the "kinder gentler Kremlin is in control of the trend lines". (7:27) These results do not reveal any immediate indication that NATO may fail or the Soviets can have a free hand in Europe. What this change in attitude does show is that the Europeans are eager to reduce tension and that they see Gorbachev taking greater initiative to improve east-west relations. Economic links are becoming more important and are resulting in improved relations between nations which were once the bitterest of enemies. No place can this be better seen than in the Pacific basin. North Korea, South Korea, China, Vietnam, Cambodia, and other nations are moving toward or have realized the benefits of a market economy. The United States has been the dominant power in Asia, but we are quickly losing ground to Japan. Gorbachev, recognizing the potential of this area, has also made attempts to take advan- tage of these realignments. With promises of new economic links and cutbacks in his military force he hopes to show these new friends that the Soviets want to be an honest player in the Asian market. As the United States' influence in this area declines and economic relationships become more important we will have to carefully evaluate our role and recognize that Gorbachev may achieve more through trade than he ever could have with military force. Gorbachev's "new thinking" has had a profound impact on the west, yet it is uncertain as to whether he can survive within his own political system. Soviet control of the Russian people and satellite nations has historically been based on the oppressive authority of the Communist Party back by the threat of military force. The rigid political and economic system left little room for free thinking or ini- tiative. Gorbachev's programs have changed that to a degree with the indication that liberationzation will continue as long as he and the Communist Party are not threatened. Today, we see the start of free elections in the Soviet Union; and Easter Bloc countries on the verge of sweeping political reforms. But, we also see Gorbachev's power base within the Communist Party becoming somewhat fragmented as a result of the internal shake-ups and slow economic progress. The harsh reality of Gorbachev's'task is that he must appease all the players in this very difficult game and ensure that the Soviet Union moves forward as they approach the 21st century. Gorbachev is facing the ultimate irony of his own agenda. He can only succeed by giving up power in favor of a more demo- cratic system, yet the system he is creating is sure to undermined his authority. How Gorbachev handles this dilemma will determine whether he is able to pull off one of the great power plays of this century. Gorbachev's leadership style and ability to convince the world that his nation is sincere in its efforts to ensure peace are unprecedented. President Bush must recognize that he is dealing with a man who rivals some of the greatest leaders we have ever know. He has shown a willingness to change and back up his commitments with bold and audacious action. No one can truly interpret Gorbachev's motives nor do we know whether his future is secure; however, he has been successful at taking the initiative away from the United States in international politics. For the time being he is doing all the right things. His "new thinking" approach, combined with changes at home and abroad, are reassuring even to the most pessimistic observer. To the west he is a glim- mer of hope who if allowed to work his magic may change the course of history by reducing the risk of a superpower show- down. To the Russian people and the east he is the "gate keeper" who wisely opened the door before the walls of eco- nomic and social despair came falling down. History will tell us whether this man was fact or fiction. Lets just hope the all the books telling his story are not written in Rus- sian. BIBLIOGRAPHY 1. Arkin, William M. "Gorbachev Talks But Who Listens?" Bulletin of the Atomic Scientists, (March 1989), pp. 5-6. 2. Bialer, Seweryn. "Reform: Moscow vs. Beijing." U.S. News & World Report, 6 February 1989, pp. 32-34. 3. Doerner, William R. "Comrades Once More." Time, 13 February 1989, pp.44-45. 4. Gorbachev, Mikhail. "U.S.S.R. Arms Reduction, Rivalry Into Sensible Competition." Prime Minister of the Soviet Union. Delivered before the United Nations, New York, NY, 7 December 1988. 5. "Gorbachev Reappears, Reaffirms Perestroika," The Washington Times, 15 February 1989, Section A., p. 10. 6. Kipp, Jacob W. "Soviet Military Doctrine and Conventional Arms Control." Military Review, 48 (December 1988), pp. 2-23. 7. Knight, Robertœ "A New German Nationalism in the Age of Gorbachev." U.S. News & World Report, 23 January 1989, pp. 26-27. 8. Manthorpe, William H. J. ""What Is Pushing Gorbachev Into Arms Control?" Proceedings, 114/12/1030 (December 1988), pp. 37-43. 9. Larrabee, F. Stephen. "Perestroika Shakes Eastern Europe. "Bulletin of the Atomic Scientists, (March 1989), pp. 25-29. 10. Rosenblatt, Roger. "He Saw the Past and It Did Not Work." U.S. News & World Report, 19 December 1988, pp. 9. 11. Sikorski, Radek. "The Coming Crack-Up of Communism, Decline or Fall?" National Review, 27, January 1989, pp. 28-29. 12. Smolowe, Jill. "Let's Count Down." Time, 20 March 1989, pp. 32-34. 13. Staglin, Douglas. "When Ideology Bows to Economics." U.S. News & World Report, 6 February 1989, pp. 30- 31. 14. Trimble, Jeff. "Building A Military Machine." U.S. News & World Report, 13 March 1989, pp. 31-37. 15. Trewhitt, Henry. "A Different Call To Arms." U.S. News & World Report, 13 March 1989, pp. 18-26. 16. Trewhitt, Henry. "Responding to Gorbachev." U.S. News & World Report, 19 December 1988, pp. 20. 17. U.S. Department of Defense. "Soviet Military Power: An Assessment of the Threat." Washington, D.C., 1988. 18. Valenta, Jiri, and William C. Potter. Soviet Decision Making for National Security. London: George Allen & Unwin, 1984. 19. Mortimer B. "Inside Gorbachev's Gift Bag." U.S. News & World Report, 19 December 1988, p.72.
