Complexion Of Engineer Support AUTHOR Major Ed J. Maguire,USMC CSC 1989 SUBJECT AREA - Logisitics EXECUTIVE SUMMARY Title COMPLEXION OF ENGINEER SUPPORT Thesis The complexion of Marine engineer task are not supported by present doctrine, training, equipment, or organization, although its valid combat missions are recognized by the Marine Corps. Issue Over time the quest for certainty of the engineer mission has caused an imperfect relationship between the tasks performed, the standards or degree of the tasks, the environment in which those tasks are performed, and who is actually assigned those tasks. Undoubtedly, some of the factors responsible for this imperfect relationship are inherent in the nature of modern war. Others unduly emphasis excessive specialization, centralization, and instability in the organization of the engineers. This could conceivably have been avoided by a better distinction of engineers, that of a combat arm or that of a combat service support element. A walk through history will show how the lack of distinction between the two has caused the complexion in the evolution of todays' engineer mission. In 1927, Major General Commandant Lejeune published a paper describing his thoughts on the role of engineers in the Marine Corps. He envisioned a service organization whose capabilities spanned the broad spectrum from performing military engineering as a member of a Marine Division in an amphibious assault to cabinetmakers for the garrison posts. As the remainder of the combat arms evolve, with modern, highly lethal weapons and rapid- paced, tactics of maneuver, engineers experience inadequacies of current doctrine, training, equipment, and organization. Today, we still expect one young Marine, military occupational speciality (MOS) 1371, Combat Engineer, to perform all the following duties: Bricklayer, Bridge Carpenter, Cabinetmaker, General Carpenter, Woodworking Machine Operator, General Painter, Sawmill Operator, Engineer Demolition Specialist, Basic Engineer, Construction Crew leader, and Camoufleur.(MOS) These are in addition to the special "combat engineer" skills a 1371 Marine also needs in order to accomplish mobility, countermobility, and survivability tasks in combat. Conclusion Engineers at every level are seeking solutions and creating innovative but local alternatives to meet today's mission requirements with limited assets, outdated equipment, and ill-defined doctrine and techniques. The Warfighting Center has taken the lead on the complexion of the engineer support problem, largely beginning with a engineer conference scheduled for early May. Here, the Commandant of the Marine Corps will listen to approximately fifty of the key engineers within the Marine Corps to determine what actions should be taken. If all goes well the combat mission of engineers will be supported by doctrine, training, equipment, and organization. RESEARCH PAPER COMPLEXION OF ENGINEER SUPPORT Topic: Explain a problem situation: Thesis Statement: The complexion of the Marine engineer tasks are not supported by present doctrine, training, equipment, or organization, although its valid combat missions are recognized by the Marine Corps. I. History of Marine Engineers A. Influence by Army engineers B. Influence by German engineers C. Influence by Navy Seabees D. Name changes from pioneers to combat engineers II. Doctrine Changes A. Tactical mission vs. non tactical mission B. Jack of all trades C. Military occupational skills (MOS) changes D. Three way split wing, force, and combat engineers III. Training Improvements A. Engineer School B. On the job training C. Increasing the number of individual tasks training D. Changing the training between peace time and war IV. Equipment A. From shovels to bulldozers B. Impact on mobility C. Procurement problems D. Does the description of task fit the equipment V. Organization A. Post WW II peace time posture cuts in troop numbers B. The changes from the Vietnam war C. MAGTF combat engineer support vs. general engineer D. Responsibilities chances on the organization make up RESEARCH PAPER COMPLEXION OF ENGINEER SUPPORT One of Webster's definitions for complex is "a group of obviously related units of which the degree and nature of the relationship is imperfectly known". This definition fits the state of the engineer community within the Marine Corps today. In the past there was one engineer unit that performed all of the engineering tasks incumbent within the engineer mission. Today there are three engineer units that split the engineering tasks in order to accomplish the engineer missions. Over time the quest for certainty of the engineer mission has caused an imperfect relationship between the tasks performed, the standards or degree of the tasks, the environment in which those tasks are performed, and who is actually assigned those tasks. The complexion of Marine engineer tasks are not supported by present doctrine, training, equipment, or organization, although its valid combat missions are recognized by the Marine Corps. Undoubtedly, some of the factors responsible for this imperfect relationship are inherent in the nature of modern war. Others unduly emphasis excessive specialization, centralization, and instability in the organization of the engineers. This could conceivably have been avoided by a better distinction of engineers, that of a combat arm or that of a combat service support element. A walk through history will show how the lack of distinction between the two has caused the complexion in the evolution of todays engineer mission. There is a common misperception within the Corps that the engineer organization was created initially as a combat arm. Our attachment to the U.S army engineers, in terms of much of our doctrine, training, and equipment, has prevented us from recognizing that we were created as a service organization. The first Marine engineers started in June 1913 with Company "H", 1st advance Base Regiment formed at Marine Barracks, Philadelphia, Pennsylvania. The 1st Regiment was a "fixed defense" regiment, with "H" company performing the duties of an engineer company and a machine gun company. The engineer company was used as an extra rifle company and did not perform any real engineer tasks. In October, 1920, "H" company was transferred to Quantico. From 1920 until 1927 the size of the engineer unit at Quantico varied (2). In 1927, Major General Commandant Lejeune published a paper describing his thoughts on the role of engineers in the Marine Corps. He envisioned a service organization whose capabilities spanned the broad spectrum from performing military engineering as a member of a Marine Division in an amphibious assault to cabinetmakers for the garrision posts. There tasks would be the operation of captured of newly constructed advance base facilities until relieved by Army or Navy counterparts (3). Other duties consisted mostly of what we know today as landing support duties: supervising labor details, clearing the landing beach of hindrances to landing, organizing the beach to receive and issue supplies, and preparing the beach to receive and unload landing boats. Each regiment had its organic pioneer platoon to perform these tasks. Overcoming obstacles and other "combat engineer" tasks were performed by the attacking infantry as a matter of course. From 1927 until early 1935, the "engineers" performed primarily base service and support functions. Concurrent with the early development of the Marine engineer organization, the army was in the midst of a major reorganization that drastically reduced the scope of the engineers. In fact, in 1935, Army Chief-of-Staff General Malin Craig advocated eliminating engineers from the division entirely (4-9). He argued that proper reconnaissance would allow divisions to avoid obstacles and barriers. In addition to re-organization, the army was greatly increasing its emphasis on mechanization and mobility A conflict of events since the larger dependence on mechanization the larger the requirement should be for the engineers to provide mobility, countermobility, and survivability. The Marine Corps for once did not follow the Army lead on this issue, but to a certain extent adopted the German engineer philosophy. The disparity between the American and the German philosophy on engineers was recognized by General J.L Schley, USA, who on 3 October, 1939, wrote: "The Germans believe that the modern trend toward motorization and mechanization demands a much larger proportion of engineers... We seem to be moving in exactly the opposite direction" (6-9) In the German army, the general engineer support services, (which American engineers usually perform), were left to semi-military labor and construction units, usually composed mostly of civilians. By 1942 the Marine Corps had elected to build up the size of the engineer force but split the engineering tasks into two main areas: tactical engineering and general engineering. Tactical engineering was performed by the Engineer Battalion and general engineering by the Pioneer Battalion (11). Although the the new term "tactical engineering" appeared, there was no new combat- oriented doctrine, equipment, training, or organization specifically developed. The engineers still operated with commercial/ civilian construction equipment, slightly modified to meet military needs. In manning and equipment, the pioneer battalion was quite similar to the engineer battalion. Pioneers normally landed with landing teams, on D-day, to begin establishing supply dumps in support of the assault units. During the initial landings, they would be used as stretcher- bearers, runners, scouts, or for whatever purpose they were needed. In 1947 the Pioneer Battalions name was changed to "Shore Party Battalion" to better reflect its mission. The Navy would help the Pioneer Battalion's engineering effort with the creation of the Navy Construction Battalion (Seabees) into the Marine engineer organization. In 1942 admiral B. Morrell, Civil Engineer Corps, USN, created the Seabees in order to fill the urgent need for more experienced construction workers in the theater of operation. If Marine Engineers are characterized as "Fighters who build", the Seabees are characterized as "Builders who fight". As soon as general unloading began, Seabees battalions came ashore to augment and expand upon the construction or repair work began by Marine engineers. For instance, until the later part of World War II, the Seabees provided the majority of construction support to Marine aviation. In support of Marine aviation the Marine Corps established a third type of engineer battalion called the aviation engineer battalion. The direct control of the Seabee engineer support was lost in 1950 when the Navy's Seabees were removed from the Marine engineer organization. To fill the gap created by this action, a memorandum of understanding between the Marine Corps was pursued, and the Force Engineer Battalions were created (7). The Force Engineer battalions primarily had their roots in the separate, or aviation engineer battalions of World War II. Their mission was to provide engineer support to the landing force as a whole, including the aviation element, and to reinforce, augment, and expand on the efforts of the divisional engineer battalions. Consequently, they were much larger and much more heavily equipped than their divisional counterparts. Independent bridge companies were also created, just prior to the Korean War. Located in Force Troops, these units held all the FMF's bridge capability, separate from either the divisional engineer battalion or the Force Engineer Battalion. Headquarters Marine Corps (HQMC) thought that this system was more responsive to the needs of the whole force . In the next several years HQMC would make many changes within the engineering area, in a quest to provide more responsive engineer support to the Marine Air- Ground Task Force (MAGTF). In recognition of the hasty, expedient nature of the divisional engineer battalion's capabilities, HQMC adopted the name "Pioneer Battalion" for the divisional engineer battalion. As the results of a composition board, referred to as the "Hogaboom Study", HQMC attempted to show a distinction between the Pioneer Engineers (divisional) and Force Troop engineers. This was the first attempt by HQMC to show the difference between the two engineer units through a mission statement. The Pioneer's mission would read combat engineer support and the force engineer's would read service support. Along with the name change and the different mission statement, the Pioneer Battalion would also receive a seizable reduction in manpower and equipment. A reduction in construction capability was reflected in the personnel reduction of about 15% and equipment reduction of about 34%. The net reduction in construction capability, in consideration of dispersed type operations, is estimated at approximately 50% (32). These "Pioneer Battalions" existed until 1963 until they were redesignated as "Engineer Battalions". A few years later the build up in Vietnam began and both engineer battalions and force engineers had the mission of performing similar tasks. Vietnam was the classic engineer example of an imperfect relationship between unit's missions and the tasks assigned because of the specific time and place. The vast majority of engineer task in Vietnam were service - oriented and assigned by area. As a consequence, distinction between unit mission, although it existed on paper, was never really considered. The 11th Engineer Battalion (force engineers) found themselves sometimes in direct support of an infantry unit while 1st Engineer Battalion (division engineers) found themselves sometimes making mount out boxes. Unfortunately, due to the "Hogaboom Study", the division engineer battalions, still equipped essentially as pioneer battalions, had much less capability for construction - type tasks. But, the nature of war, in this specific place and time, reinforced the belief that all engineers are indeed "jack of all trades", and perform the same tasks no matter what type unit that they belong to. If you were to ask an infantryman from Vietnam about how he remembers the engineers and he will fondly recall the hot shower and cold beer that awaited him back at the combat base. But mostly, his vision of engineers will be more like a bunch of construction workers in uniform, spending time building and maintaining the vast support network that characterized Vietnam. The "McNamara Line" was one such network. A series of fortified bases, linked by cleared traces a minimum of 200 meters, was supported by barbed wire, minefields, and other constructed obstacles. It would be a linear barrier extending from a point on the South China Sea just south of the DMZ, to the DONG HA mountains. This is not to say that engineer battalions did not provide direct support in the the actual prosecution of the fight against the enemy but that the engineer effort in Vietnam was decidedly service - oriented. It did not give a true distinction between engineers, as a combat arm or as a service support. Post - Vietnam would bring the Marine engineer organazation some subtle, yet important, changes. In 1976, the name of the divisional engineer battalion was again changed to "Combat Engineer Battalion". This was done to distinguish it from the support battalion and reflect the battalion's "combat" nature. At this time public opinion of its armed services was at the lowest level in history. The Marine Corps reacted to this difficult post - Vietnam period by restructuring to make the most effective use of its remaining active units. The Force Service Support Group (FSSG) was formed. Many of the divisional support or service elements (including the force engineer battalions) found themselves reassigned to the newly created FSSG's. The Combat Engineer Battalion remained in the division but with still an imperfect relationship between the tasks performed, the standards or degree of the tasks, and the environment in which those task are performed. Figure #1 portrays the evolutionary development of the Marine engineers from 1913 until the present. The Combat Engineer Battalion was still equipped with commercial construction equipment, little changing from World War II. Its overall capability was still practically identical to the pioneer battalion of the late 1950's. The Marines assigned to the engineer occupational fields received no further combat training after departing boot camp or the Basic School. The missions of the units within the engineer organization have changed little since the early 1940's. Consequently, the tasks and capabilities that compose those missions have not changed. The engineer organization has, resident within it, approximately the same number of task that it had 50 years ago. The reductions in personal to adopt a peace - time posture, but not a reduction in tasks performed, implies that today fewer people are trying to accomplish the same number of things. Today, we expect one young Marine, military occupational specility (MOS) 1371, Combat Engineer, to perform all the following duties: Bricklayer, Bridge Carpenter, Cabinetmaker, General Carpenter, Woodworking Machine Operator, General Painter, Sawmill Operator, Engineer Demolition Specialist, Basic Engineer, Construction Crew leader, and Camoufleur.(MOS) These are in addition to the special "combat engineer" skills a 1371 Marine also needs in order to accomplish mobility, countermobility, and survivability tasks in combat. Further, all types of assault minefield and obstacle breaching, assault gap crossing, engineer reconnaissance, and all types of obstacle and field fortification building are demanded as well as the continuing actions expected of combat Marines (12). This broad range of tasks expected of the majority of the engineer community limits the attainment of proficiency in any given area. If this young Marine transfers to a wing engineer organization, he will have to be proficient in the construction and maintenance of airfields. With three different engineer units to be assigned to (combat, force and wing), tasks performed by the individual Marine are highly conditional. These conditions are dependent on the mission / unit to which the engineer is assigned in regards to environment, conditions, an standards. Thus, for example, a combat engineer would cut a rough trail through the jungle with hand tools while under enemy fire, while a force engineer would cut a main supply route wath heavy equipment with the absence of enemy fire. The engineer school only gives a broad overview of this engineer field that contains a tremendous task list. This formal school can only qualify a Marine at the basic level. Time constraints prevent the school from preparing a Marine for all the possible changes to environment, conditions, and standards. This generic instruction package reinforces the "Jack of all Trades" stigma instead of stressing the distinction between the three different engineer units. In the 1980's, the Marine engineer continues to follow the Army's lead in training and equipment even though they have two entirely two different missions. As the remainder of the Marine combat arms evolve, with modern, highly lethal weapons and rapid- paced, tactics of maneuver, engineers experience equipment inadequacies. The combat engineer battalion with the mission of mobility enhancement for the MAGTF is equipped with commercial bulldozers which are the tallest, loudest, slowest vehicles on the battlefield. They can barely be loaded aboard ship. They are, in fact, a detriment to the mobility of the assault element. In spite of all of this, a combat role for combat engineers is valid. History has proven this again and again. Marine engineers, unfortunately, are not yet prepared for it. How does the future of the engineers look? "During times of peace the most important task of any military is to prepare for war. As the nation's rapid response force, the Marine Corps must maintain itself ready for immediate employment in any clime and place and in any type of conflict. All peacetime activities should focus on achieving combat readiness. This implies a high level of training, flexibility in organization and equipment, qualified professional leadership, and a cohesive doctrine" (10). Engineers at every level are seeking solutions and creating innovative but local alternatives to meet today's mission requirements with limited assets, outdated equipment, and ill- defined doctrine and techniques. The Warfighting Center has taken the lead on the complexion of the engineer support problem, largely beginning with a engineer conference scheduled for early May. Here, the Commandant of the Marine Corps will listen to approximately fifty of the key engineers within the Marine Corps to determine what actions should be taken. "The essential thing is action. Action has three stages: the decision born of thought, the order or preparation for execution, and the execution itself. All three stages are governed by will. Will is rooted in character, and for man of action character is of more critical importance than intellect. Intellect without will is worthless, will without intellect is dangerous" (1) -- Hans von Seekt If all goes well the combat mission of engineers will be supported by doctrine, training, equipment, and organization. History owes the engineers and even our beloved Corps no less. Click here to view image BIBLIOGRAPHY 1. Cal von Clauswitz, ON WAR, trans. and ed. M. Howard and P.Paret (Princeton University Press, 1984) p119. 2. Donnelly, Ralph W. "A Brief History of U. S. Marine Engineers," Historical Branch, G-3 Division, Headquarters, USMC. 3. Lejeune, John A. MGEN Commandant, USMC. "The Engineer Battalion of the Marine Corps," Leatherneck Magazine. (Aug 1928). Reprinted obtained from Reference Section, United States Marine Corps Historical Center, HQMC, Washington D.C. 20380. 4. Maripoti, Major James A. USMC. "Combat Engineers; Obstacles to overcome,"United States Naval Institute Proceedings, 107. June, 1981. 5. McCalister, Captain F.M. "Engineering Problems of Marine Brigades," Marine Corps Gazette, Vol. 24, No. June, 1940. (pg.7). 6. Montross, Lynn. "All In A Day's Work, The Engineers and Shore Party In Korea," Marine Corps Gazette, September, 1952. 7. Smith, Lt. Colonel Robert L. USMC. "A New Look For the Engineers," Marine Corps Gazette, December, 1954. 8. Telfer, Gary L., Major, USMC. U. S. Marine in Vietnam: Fighting the North Vietnamese: 1967. History and Museums Division, HQMC, Washington, D. C. 1984. Library of Congress No. 77-604776. 9. U. s. Department of the Army. The Corps of Engineers: Troops and Equipment. by B. D. Coll, J. E. Keith, and H. H. Rosenthal. A volume in the Technical Services subseries of United States Army In World War II. Washington, D. C. 1958. 10. United States Marine Corps. Warfighting (FMFM-2) Manual draft copy 1989. 11. United States Marine Corps. FMF Organization and Composition Board Report - Service Element,1957. 12. United States Marine Corps. Military Occupational speciality (MOS) Manual. MCO P1200.7. 8 July 1986.
