The Ace's Role In Maneuver Warfare And The Marine MAGTF AUTHOR Major Michael W. Karnath, USMC CSC 1989 SUBJECT AREA - Aviation EXECUTIVE SUMMARY TITLE: THE ACE'S ROLE IN MANEUVER WARFARE AND THE MARINE MAGTF I. Purpose: To discuss the current state of understanding and application of maneuver warfare doctrine as it applies to the employment of the Aviation Combat Element (ACE) within a Marine Air/Ground Task Force. II. Problem: Although maneuver warfare has been officially adopted as Marine Corps doctrine there still remains a lot of confusion concerning how to employ maneuver within both combat elements of the MAGTF, the ACE and the Ground Component Element. III. Data: Acceptance of basic command relationships which exist within the MAGTF and historical analysis of successful airpower campaigns accompanied by an honest evaluation of how the ACE can best embrace maneuver warfare leads to some basic tenets of where the thrust of the ACE should be placed while operating with the MAGTF. IV Conclusions: The Ace should always look first to establishing air superiority, followed by deep air support (DAS), and finally by close air support (CAS) and troop lift as its focus or point of main effort (POME). This does not imply that the GCE's POME will not be initially supported by the ACE. With the mix of aircraft in the ACE Commander's posession, simultaneous support of all functions of marine aviation can be accomplished. However the marines that comprise the GCE and ACE must realise that multi-role aircraft such as the F/A-18 probably will be more heavily allocated towards the ACE's POME vice the GCE's at least initially in a conflict. THE ACE'S ROLE IN MANEUVER WARFARE AND THE MARINE MAGTF I. Maneuver Warfare is new Marine Corps doctrine A. Maneuver warfare must be standardized and understood B. Current focus is toward GCE's role C. Maneuver warfare is method of thinking 1. GCE applications 2. ACE applications. II. MAGTF command structure A. ACE and GCE have co-equal status B. Historical perspective 1. WW II Italian campaign 2. Korean and Vietnam campaigns III. Highest MAGTF priority for ACE A. Air superiority--initial POME for ACE B. Concept applies to all marines IV. Next highest MAGTF priority for ACE A. DAS/isolation of battlefield B. Enemy maneuver capability V. CAS responsiveness during maneuver warfare A. Preplanned Scheduled B. Scheduled on-call The ACE'S ROLE IN MANEUVER WARFARE WITHIN THE MARINE MAGTF The Marine Corps has officially adopted maneuver warfare as doctrine.1 Much discussion and debate led up to the adoption of maneuver warfare as doctrine and is ongoing as we try to standardize the wording and meaning of the associated phraseology so that comprehension is enhanced. The main buzzwords/phrases of maneuver warfare are, point of main effort (POME), mission-type orders, commander's intent, OODA loop cycle ( Observation of the situation, Orientation to it, making a Decision to reacts and implement the Action), surfaces, gaps, and reconnaissance pull.2 The majoritiy of past and present discussion, whether written or verbal, focuses on maneuver warfare as centering on the ground combat element (GCE) since a ground unit within the GCE is normally designated as the POME. This has led to a general perception within the aviation community that the term "maneuver warfare" is a ground warriors term. Because of this, maneuver warfare is currently less understood by aviators than by their ground counterparts.3 This situation cannot be allowed to continue. In order to achieve the maximum effectiveness of the Marine Air/Ground Task force (MAGTF), the aviation community must understand and accept the tenets of maneuver warfare as fully as those who serve with the GCE. Conversely, the ground community of warriors must understand the fashion that aviators can and should best support the MAGTF in the evolving area of maneuver warfare doctrine. The aviation combat element (ACE) is not merely a supporting arm that provides air support to the GCE while that entity promulgates the land battle using the concepts of maneuver warfare. Rather the ACE, as its name implies, is one of two combat elements that comprise a MAGTF. It is a combat element that can maneuver rapidly on the battlefield (albeit in the air), extend far forward of the GCE, and deliver impressive combat power onto the enemy with subsequent detrimental effects.4 While the ACE may not normally be the POME of the MAGTF Commanding Officer (although this does not necessarily have to be the case) the ACE CO and all of his subordinate CO,s down to individual officer's leading flights of aircraft must understand our new doctrine. Maneuver warfare is Marine Corps doctrine and not just simply GCE doctrine. Every commanding officer within the MAGTF must establish his own POME and clearly relay his intent to those units under his command regardless of whether he has been designated the POME by his superior. This is not meant to imply that an ACE commander who is not designated as the MAGTF POME is free to conduct warfare independently of the GCE. It simply means that in order to support the MAGTF CO's designated POME if it happens to be a ground unit, the ACE CO will have to designate an appropriate POME (maintenance of air superiority, interdiction against enemy second echelon etc.) that will allow him to dedicate the appropriate amount of assets required to support the MAGTF POME.5 Conversly, the GCE CO needs to understand that while an appropriate number of ACE assets will be dedicated to directly supporting his POME, the entire ACE air complement will not show up over his unit on the forward edge of the battle area (FEBA) to drop ordnance. This gives focus to the subordinates and enhances comprehension of how the ACE fits into maneuver warfare and the MAGTF structure.6 As a starting point it is appropriate to reiterate how the basic MAGTF command structure should operate. First and foremost is the fact that the ACE and GCE Commanding Officers are co-equals (the ACE is not subordinate to the GCE) and as such the ACE develops his mission-type orders' and commander's intent and issues them to his subordinates based on the direction provided by the MAGTF CO and not the GCE CO. Conversely, it should be readily apparent to a MAGTF CO that while hem or more appropriately his staff are developing courses of action for the MAGTF to follow, as much consideration must be given to ACE concerns as to the GCE's before mission-type orders and commander's intent are issued by the MAGTF CO. The MAGTF, ACE, and GCE must clearly understand how to use maneuver warfare in the air as well as on the ground to enhance overall combat power. There are historical examples of how airpower when employed without regard to ground maneuver has failed to achieve significant results in relationship to tactical, operational, or strategic goals. Airpower and ground maneuver must be synchronized so that each complements and reinforces the other.7 The key word is synchronization of the efforts of the ACE and GCE, not subordination of the efforts of the ACE to the GCE. The campaign in Italy during World War II provides a contrast between what can be achieved by airpower alone and what can be achieved when synchronized with ground maneuver. During a unilateral air campaign named Operation Strangle allied airpower attempted to interdict the enemy's flow of supplies into Italy and reduce it to a level that would force withdrawal. It soon became apparent that when not faced with coordinated ground operations to react to the Germans were able to circumvent the application of airpower to their flow of supplies.8 However, during the next offensive called Operation Diadem, the allies conducted ground maneuver in coordination with airpower directed at interdicting the German elements as they maneuvered behind the lines. This left the Germans with the choice of repositioning by day and suffering heavy, unacceptable losses or repositioning under the cover of darkness and suffering loss of initiative to the allied ground efforts through delay.9 Of course the German's were soon overcome and forced to withdraw. General von Senger's (one of the German commanders) postwar remarks clearly tells that airpower and ground maneuver in conjunction played a decisive factor in the German defeat: The enemy's mastery of the airspace immediately behind the front under attack was a major source of worry to the defender, for it prevented all daylight movements, especially the bringing up of the reserves. We were accustomed to making all necessary movements by night but in the event of a real breakthrough this was not good enough. In a battle of movement a commander who can only make the tactically essential moves by night resembles a chess player who for three of his opponent's moves has the right to only one.10 In similar fashion, air campaigns in Korea (Operation Strangle) and Vietnam (Rolling Thunder and Linebacker I) offered similar contrasts of what happens or fails to happen when ground and airpower are not synchronized to achieve a mutual goal.11 The next aspect that is required for effective utilization of the ACE by the MAGTF commander is a realization that airpower is much more flexible and responsive to the needs of the MAGTF when air superiority is gained and maintained. Also an interdiction campaign that is in tune with and adjusted to the GCE maneuver warfare scheme of maneuver and timetables is required.12 This statement is generally accepted on the surface by all marines but when discussions of maneuver warfare pop up there is confusion of what that means. It has been my experience that while ground officers admit air superiority and interdiction is important on the one hand, they also feel that when the MAGTF CO designates a POME within the GCE then by definition a majority of CAS capable aircraft must be dedicated to direct support of the POME unit at the expense of other ACE concerns. This is an attitude that needs to be changed. Even many marine aviators are confused by this subject because written Marine Corps guidance in the form of OH's, FMFM's or other definitive sources are yet forthcoming on the fundamentals of how to apply maneuver warfare specifically to the ACE. Whereas the ground combat arms side of the Marine Corps has OH 6-1: Fundamentals of Maneuver Warfare to refer to. Air superiority should be the initial POME of the ACE in any conflict that we fight. This means that the required number of air- to-air sorties that can accomplish this task have to be allocated by the ACE. Since a substantial number of CAS platforms owned by an ACE are also air-to-air platforms (F/A-18's) this will necessarily convey a picture to the unperceptive ground or aviation officer that the ACE is not supporting the MAGTF's POME which probably rests with the GCE. Of course when analyzed this does not hold up. Absolutely no good can come of neglecting the higher priority ACE POME of establishing air superiority and thus giving the GCE freedom to maneuver without the threat of prohibitive enemy air interference.13 If air superiority has been yielded to the MAGTF either through an effective air campaign or because we are fighting a foe that has no viable air threats then and only then can the ACE reduce the allocation of F/A-18's from fighter roles to air-to-ground ordnance delivery. Even when this happens the ACE and the MAGTF CO will probably determine that deep air support (DAS) or that air support that is delivered beyond the GCE commander's immediate area of interest will next become the ACE's POME that best supports the MAGTF and GCE's POME. Since amphibious assaults and over-the-horizon capability training is focusing on landing the MAGTF where the enemy is weak, or at least not as strong, the ability to interdict the second echelon that may be coming towards the area of operation to reinforce becomes important. Interdiction of the enemy command and control structure, tactical repositiong capability, and in some cases the logistical capability in the area of operations will do more to disrupt an enemy than will overwhelming concentration of CAS on the GCE's POME. This is not an advocation for giving minimal direct support to the GCE but rather an explanation of why the ratio of CAS to DAS to air superiority might sometimes appear out of proper proportion to those maneuver warfare proponents that do not fully understand how important air superiority and DAS are to the GCE and their enactment of maneuver warfare doctrine. Certainly, if air superiority does not have to be fought for to be gained and if the enemy forces inside and outside the area of operations are weak than a preponderance of ACE assets can be dedicated to providing overwhelming CAS wherever the GCE POME is located. The next point of discussion is how to best increase the responsiveness of the ACE assets that can and will be dedicated to direct support of the GCE during rapidly changing, fluid, ground maneuver warfare style of combat. Some maneuver warfare proponents looking on the surface feel that the 24 to 36 hour fragging process is a big impediment to being able to mass dedicated CAS aircraft at a particular point and time that was not planned for because a tactical opportunity all of a sudden opens up that needs to be exploited. This is incorrect logic on several points. First of all, the air tasking orders and frags that are published by the ACE well in advance of flight operations are the basis for logistical allocaticn, ordnance buildup, fuel positioning, organizing the maintenance effort for aircraft and aviation support equipment, accommodation of requests from the GCE, combat service support element (CSSE), and even within the ACE itself, and are the best estimate to focus combat capabilities. These events are not instantaneous and require considerable effort, time, and planning.14 The answer to this dilemma is for the ACE and the MAGTF staff to (specifically the MAGTF air operations section and the ACE fragging section ) break away from the mindset that a mission that goes on the ATO or daily frag has to be preplanned. Generally, in order to maximize the responsiveness of ACE assets to the GCE in a maneuver warfare environment advance scheduling of direct support assets (direct support to the GCE POME) should consist almost entirely of scheduled on-call missions (either airborne or on alert) with suitable ordnance loads or troop lift capacity that follows the MAGTF CO's and GCE CO's intent. Then as the battle unfolds for the GCE, the GCE will have already dedicated but as yet unassigned assets to rapidly place at the proper place and time through direct coordination between the GCE CO's air section and the ACE's direct air support center (DASC) which is doctrinaily co-located with the senior maneuver fire support coordination center (FSCC). It is past time for discussion of the ACE's role within the MAGTF organization as the Marine Corps embraces maneuver warfare as doctrine. Common understanding of the role that the ACE must take to best support the concept of maneuver warfare must be established. Otherwise, the Corps will suffer from well intentioned but nonetheless piecemealing of scarce aviation assets towards goals that on the surface seem to support the GCE POME but in fact are not the best solution. The aviation community already understands the importance of air superiority and DAS, after all, that is paramount to the way the aviation community has operated in the Marine Corps. However the community must stand firm and convince itself and the others that comprise the MAGTF that the ACE will have a POME that, although it does not appear to, will best allow the GCE to maneuver act boldly and decisively, and vanquish the enemy while being more flexible and responsive to the direct support needs of the GCE. BIBLIOGRAPHY 1. OPERATIONAL HANDBOOK, USMC, (OH) 6-1, Ground Combat Operations, Section 1303. 2. Ibid. 3. Clover, Kevin R., Capt, USMC. "Maneuver Wafare: Where Are We Now?" Marine Corps Gazette, February 1988, 54-59. 4. Dailey, John R., MajGen, USMC. "Air Issues Reviewed." Marine Corps Gazette. February 1989, 22-24. 5. Clover Kevin R., Capt, USMC. "Maneuver Warfare: Where Are We Now?" Marine Corps Gazette, February 1988, 54-59. 6. McCutcheon, Richard L., Capt, USMC. "Marine Corps F/A- 18s Now More Than Ever." Marine Corps Gazette, October 1988, 31-33. 7. Bingham Price T., LtCol, USAF. "Ground Maneuver and Air Interdiction in the Operational Art." Parameters, March 1969, 16-31. 8. Ibid. 9. Ibid. 10. Ibid. 11. Ibid. 12. Treichler, Donald R., Col, USMCR. "MAGTF Aviation Battlefield Effectivness." Marine Corps Gazette, February 1989, 25-26. 13. Ibid. 14. Ibid.
