The Marine Corps Reserve: Times Are A Changin AUTHOR Major David M. Kirkwood, USMCR CSC 1989 SUBJECT AREA - Manpower EXECUTIVE SUMMARY TITLE: THE MARINE CORPS RESERVE: TIMES ARE A CHANGIN I. Purpose: To contrast current roles of the Marine Corps Reserve with current changes in force structure and philosophy II. Problem: The Marine Corps Reserve will under go many changes during the 1990's in order to meet the changing requirements within the active force structure. Moreover, the decision as to how the reserve will be actually employed upon mobilization continues to rage. III. Data: The Marine Corps Mobilization Plan MPLAN) has outlined the four catagories for mobilization as: partical mobilization, selective mobilization, full mobilization, and total mobilization. The MAGTF Master Plan address the "spectrum of conflict" as High Intensity being general war, Mid Intensity being coventional operations short of general war, and Low Intensity being stabilizing operations. The majority of force structure changes were directed in order to return to the days of four rifle companies per infantry battalion. These changes have resulted in the transfer of units and responsibilities to the reserve. Furthermore, the MAGTF Master Plan indicates the active force should be able to handle anything short of general war with little reserve participation. The roles of the Marine Corps Reserve have not changed; however, the emphasis is being placed on the augmentation/reinforcement role. IV. Conclusions: The Marine Corps Reserve will be able to continue as a "force in readines." Moreover, the individual reservist is our greatest manpower resourse and his military skill proficieny should be our main concern. V. Recommendations: The MAGTF Master Plan should be the foundation for all future plans to include the moblization plan. Additionally, we should be realistic in our plans for employing reserves and stress individual skill proficieny vice unit proficieny. OUTLINE I. The Marine Corps Reserve A. Levels of Mobilization B. Roles of the Marine Corps Reserve C. Composition of the Marine Corps Reserve D. Total Force Contributions of the Reserve II. The Spectrum of Conflict A. High Intensity (HIC) B. Mid Intensity (MIC) C. Low Intensity (LIC) III. Force Structure Changes A. Designated Augmentation Program B. 4th Marine Division-FSSG-Wing Changes IV. The Delimea A. Reserve Units as Units B. Reserve Units as Individuals V. Solutions A. MAGTF Master Plan B. Emphasis on Individual Training THE MARINE CORPS RESERVE: TIMES ARE A CHANGIN "In the approaching years of defense budget austerity, the Marine Corps will not be able to do everything. MAGTF's (Marine Air-Ground Task Force) will become the nation's `force of choice' in most likely future conflicts at the lower end of the so called `spectrum of conflict. ` In so focusing its efforts; however, the Fleet Marine Force (FMF) will retain usefulness in general war with its three active Marine Expeditionary Forces (MEFs) and gain depth of capability and sustainability through augmentation and reinforcement from the reserve." (4:1) The above is from the draft of the MAGTF master plan which is to be the road map for the future of our Corps. To under-stand the impact of the proposed MAGTF master plan we must understand the "spectrum of conflict" and the roles assigned the Marine Corps Reserve upon mobilization. The Marine Coros Reserve will under go many changes during the 1990's in order to meet the changing requirements within the Marine Corps. The Congress and the President hold the key to unlocking the mobilization capability of our nation in the event of war or other national emergency. Mobilization may be defined as the process by which the armed forces are brought to a full state of readiness for war or other national emergency. The President under Public Law can call-up 200,000 reservists for 90 days if a national emergency. This process is called the Presidental 200K call-up. The Marine Corps Mobilization Plan (MPLAN) has defined four levels of mobilization, besides the 200K call-up. The President and Congress can mobilize Reserve Component units and individuals by: (1) Selective mobilization of units and individuals to meet domestic emergencies (2) Partial mobilization of units and individuals, up to 1,000,000 individuals, in case of war or national emergency (3) Full mobilization of all reserve units, ready reservists, retired military personnel and the resources necessary to fill out existing force structure (4) Total mobilization of the armed forces beyond existing force structure (5:par. c,I-A-3) "The mission of the Marine Corps Reserve is to provide trained and qualified units and individuals to be available for active duty in time of war, national emergency, and at times as national security may require." (7:1) The Marine Corps Reserve upon mobilization will be called upon to fill the following roles: (1) Selectively augment the active Force in order to field three MEF's at full wartime structure (2) Selectively reinforce the active MEF's with Selected Marine Corps Reserve units (3) Provide the capability to field a Marine Expeditionary Brigade to reinforce an active MEF (4) If augment/reinforce is not ordered, provide the capability to field a Division, Wing, and Force Service Support Group with reduced capability (7:1) The Marine Corps Reserve, by law is composed of the Ready Reserve, which includes the Selected Marine Corps Reserve (SMCR) and the Individual Ready Reserve (IRR), the Standby Reserve, and the Retired Reserve. The Ready Reserve which consists of those individuals members liable for duty in time of war or national emergency proclaimed by the Congress or when otherwise authorized by law. The first category of the Ready Reserve is the Selected Marine Corps Reserve (SMCR). The SMCR consists primarily of organizations and units who train individuals in time of peace for immediate mobilization. SMCR units shall conform, as far as practical, in organization, training, and equipment with corresponding units of the Regular Establishment. This practice is called "mirror imaging." The SMCR now provides 43,600 trained individuals which may be assigned as members of units or as individual replacements, upon mobilization. The SMCR is composed of non-prior service and prior service Marines. The breakdown of non-prior service to prior service Marines is 70:30. Non-prior service Marines receive approximately six months' active duty initially, which is devoted to basic "warrior training" and MOS training. Besides initial entry level training, non-prior service Marines receive 39 days of training a year, which breaks down to 14 days of annual training duty (ATD) and 48 drills. Reservists are paid in 4-hour increments, each 4-hour period is called a "drill." Two drills equal one day, two days equal a weekend drill. The majority of (SMCR) experience lies within the 30 per cent of prior service Marines. Usually, these Marines have served between three and eight years or more of active duty. Not only are they pretrained, but they provide valuable skills in many different areas, such as instructors, recruiters, drill instructors, and NC0/SNC0 academy graduates. Individual Mobilization Augmentees (IMA) are members of the SMCR; however, they fill individual billets within W series T/0's for various bases, stations, and selected FMF units. Upon mobilization, IMA's will report to their assigned unit, doing the same duties as when they drill. IMA's receive the same training opportunity as do members of SMCR units, but are grouped administratively into Reserve Augmentation Units. There are currently 2700 IMA billets approved in the reserve structure; however, because of congressional limit on SMCR end strength, the Marine Corps has limited the total number of filled billets to 1300. This leaves a 1400 man shortfall upon mobilization. "The Full-time Support program (FTS) provides SMCR reservists, who serve on active duty, to administer, train, and supervise the Marine Corps Reserve. Active Duty FTS manpower can be allocated to operational commands, staffs at appropriate headquarters, bases and stations in order to provide more effective management of the Marine Corps Reserve program and integration into the active component." (7:7) There are roughly 2,000 Marines serving on active duty with the FTS program. Normal contracts run for 2-3 years, then a new billet and contract are given. The second category within the Ready Reserve is the Individual Ready Reserve (IRR). The IRR will provide most of pretrained manpower upon mobilization. The IRR is composed of those Marines who have completed their initial enlistment but have not completed their military obligation. The most significant change in recent history occurred in 1985, Congress passed a law changing the military obligation from six years to eight years. As a result of this change, the IRR will double in strength to over 75,000 by 1994. Under current regulations, members of the IRR are required to maintain their uniforms and keep the Marine Corps Reserve Support Center, Overland Park, Kansas, informed of a current mailing address. There is not a recurring requirement for training; however, members of the IRR who desire to participate in refresher training do so through the reserve counterpart training program (RCT). The RCT program, which is voluntary, provides reservists the opportunity to perform two to four weeks of active duty training alongside their active counterparts. The picture of the IRR is constantly changing. Eventual the strength is growing, so are the problems associated with managing the IRR suLch as mobilization readiness, M0S skill degradation, physical fitness, and combat skills retention. "The Standby Reserve consists of those members, other than those in the Ready Reserve or Retired Reserve, who are liable for active duty in time of war or national emergency declared by Congress or when otherwise authorized by law."(7:3) The Retired Reserve consists of those members whose names are carried on a retired list (active and reserve) pursuant to 10 USC 274. In Secretary of Defense, Carlucci`s annual report to Congress, Fiscal year 1990, he stated, "individuals from the Ready Reserve would be used to bring active and reserve units to authorized strength and to replace untrained or partially trained unit members as well as initial casualty losses. "(1:170) The following illistrates the current organization of the Marine Corps Reserve: Click here to view image The demand for pretrained reserve manpower is great. First, 14,000 members of the SMCR are the Marine Corps appropriation within the Presidential 200K call-up. Second, bases and stations have identified 2700 individual mobilization augmentee billets which are critical to the mobilization process and must report by M+3. More important, only 1300 of the 2700 billets can be filled because of SMCR end strength limitations, leaving a 1400 man shortfall. Third, bases and stations have identified more than 10,000 pre-assigned billets to be filled by members of the IRR and retired reserve. Again, like the IMA's, these billets are essential to the mobilization process and the individuals must report before M+10. The proposed MAGTF master plan addresses the "spectrum of conflict", with high intensity conflict (HIC) being general war, low intensity conflict (LIC) being stabilizing operations, and mid-intensity conflict (MIC) being conventional operations conducted short of general war. The Marine Corps will most likely be involved in conflicts at the lower end of the spectrum. "Low intensity conflicts are characterized as operations conducted to provide assistance to friendly or allied governments in order to maintain internal stability and public welfare." (4: sec. 5, p. 1) "The concept of employment of the MAGTF in general war (HIC) requires the use of the total force, active and reserve, with a requirement to expand to five MEF's." (4:ES) Initially, the Marine Corps could provide two HIC MEF's without activation of the reserves. However, this solution would require assets from the third active MEF; moreover, selected reserve units will be called upon to provide the three active MEF's with general capabilities not present in large quantities in the active peacetime structure. Especially in light of the changes taking place as a result of the MAGTF force structure study. The fourth MEF would activate and draw its forces from the 4th Division-Wing-Force Service Support Group, and the IRR. "Manning a fifth MEF would require expansion of overall military manpower...the core of the MEF command element could be designated in peacetime from a variety of organizations including the MAGTF Warfighting Center, a designated Reserve Augmentation Unit or a combination." (4: Annex b, part 4, p.2) Sustainment of three MEF's will require augmentation and reinforcement by designated units from the SMCR. The residual SMCR units/individuals will form the core of the 4th MEF. The IRR, as well as the additional manpower that mobilization would bring, would allow, in the planner's minds, round out of the 4th MEF and formation of a nucleus for a 5th MEF. Marine Corps involvement in a mid-intensity conflict would rely primarily on the active force structure to conduct conventional combat operations, although the Marine Corps allocation of the 200K call-up, may be available, if the President exercises the 200k call-up option. General Al Gray, thirty-seventh Commandant of the Marine Corps, has directed wide-sweeping changes within the total Marine force. The total force policy was adopted as a strategy by the United States in the early 1970's and is meant to allow the orderly integration of U.S. guard and reserve components with active duty forces. Moreover, it is intented to allow the United States to maintain a smaller active peacetime force as national security and military strategy will permit; while maintaining a full mobilization capability in a expanded guard and reserve. The Marine Corps total force policy resulted in a "mirror image" relationship between the reserve force structure i.e. 4th Marine Division, 4th Marine aircraft Wing, 4th Force Service Support Group, and like units within the active force structure. The major drawback of the Marine Corps mirror image policy has been when a shortage of critical Military Occupational Skills (MOS) occur within the active structure, the same shortages exist within the reserve structure. Moreover, because the force structure is relatively the same, the reserve is not overloaded with combat units such as infantry, tanks, and artillery, all of which will be critical in the event of war or other national emergency. The following chart illistrates the current reserve total force contributions: Click here to view image "Excellence in infantry units has been the greatest single combat strength of the Marine Corps." (4: Sec. 8, p.7) General Gray's emphasis has been on putting more teeth in the bite of the infantry by adding a fourth rifle company to each infantry battalion. In order to accomplish this, certain units have been cadred and a designated augmentation program established between regular and reserve units. Specifically, sixteen reserve rifle companies will augment the following active duty battalions: Click here to view image The only USMCR infantry regiment not participating in the augmentation program is the 24th Marines. This program will allow the sixteen rifle companies to train along with their active counterparts. But what of the five battalion headquarters with their weapons companies and the regimental staffs of the 23rd and 25th Marines? Additional force structure changes will occur over the next two years as certain active force artillery and tank units are deactivated. Delta company, 2d Tank Battalion is scheduled to be deactivated during the first quarter of FY91, followed by Delta company, 1st Tank Battalion on a date to be determined. A company within 8th Tank Battalion (USMCR) will be designated to augment 2d Tank Battalion. Likewise, a company from 4th Tank Battalion (USMCR) will augment the 1st Tank Battalion. Three active general support artillery battalions, 4/10, 4/11, and 5/11 will be deactivated along with two general support batteries, P/5/10 and P/5/11. The following reserve units will assume the following active force missions: (6:1) Click here to view image The biggest tasks facing the reserves begins with the scheduled transfer of bulk fuel companies during the third quarter of this fiscal year. The three bulk fuel companies, three bridge platoons, and one longshoreman platoon, for a total of 1,752 structure spaces, are scheduled to be transferred to the reserve. Upon transfer, the reserve will deactivate one bridge platoon and one longshoreman platoon. Additionally, bakery, salvage, and graves registration platoons were originally earmarked for cadre status in the SMCR for a total of 591 structure spaces. Other force structure changes occurring within in the total force are the activation of two firing batteries within the 4th LAAD Battalion and the reorganization of the 1st, 2d, and 3d LAAM Battalions to contain two batteries each. The 4th LAAM Battalion will add a battery for a total of three. How do these changes effect the current mobilization plan for the Marine Corps? More importantly, are we creating a false sense of security unnecessarily? What is the relationship between the total force policy and the MAGTF master plan? "Title 10 United States Code 673(b) gives the president the authority to call-up reserve forces when he...determines that it is necessary to augment the active forces for any operational mission...." (2.28) The use of this statuary authority in a carefully applied manner would demonstrate the capabilities and importance of reserve forces in the overall defense structure. Therefore, in order to augment the active force, the president would have to order it. For years, in closed circles, many heated discussions have taken place concerning the question; "how will reserves be employed upon mobilization?" Certainly, the roles the Reserve will take on during mobilization are well-thoughout and practical; however, the delimea lies in how they will be employed. The delimea is this: Reserve units train as units and will be employed as units or do they train as units and will be employed as individuals, thus losing their identity as units? How the Reserve will be employed, upon mobilization, should be the driving force behind how they train in peacetime for war. The mirror image, total force relationships between the Regular and Reserve establishment provides a management model during peacetime and a plan for rapid mobilization during war. However, our planning stops once the reservists has reached his station of initial assignment, whether he is an individual or part of a unit. During the Korean War our Reserve establishment was in its infantancy and quite unexpectedly many reservists were called to active duty. "The fighting men of the 1st Marine Division (who fought in the Korean War) were almost evenly divided between Regulars and Reserves, the Reserves coming from 124 selected cities across the nation." (3.xi) These Reserve Marines were assembled and trained at Camp Pendleton, California prior to going to Korea. We have changed our force structure to meet changing times. However, regardless of how you structure the force, the over-riding factor in determining the speed which reservists can be employed, revolves around their level of military competence. We may be able to mobilize quickly, but if the unit or individual does not demonstrate basic military combat and military occupation skill (M0S) proficiency, he must be trained prior to employment as part of a fighting force. The Reserves are not alone in this rowboat. Any Marine who has been serving in a billet outside his M0S will undoudtly suffer skill (military and MOS) degradation. Marine leaders have side-stepped the issue of how the Reserve will be employed long enough . Furthermore, the current reorganization underway within the Marine Corps total force coupled with the Reserve Designation Augmentation Program, adds to the confusion. First, the active force should be structured in such a way as to be able to handle any situation short of total war, without Reserve participation. Moreover, plans should be developed according to the MAGTF Master Plan which initially calls for two Marine Expeditionary Forces (MEFS) in the event of a High Intensity Conflict (HIC) i.e. total war. These two MEF's would be composed from the three MEF's currently maintained within the active force. The third MEF would be composed of Regulars and Reserves, with the possibility of a fourth being constituted from residual reserve units and the individual ready reserve. The designated augmentation program only gives commanders a false sense of security. Both Regular and Reserve Commanders believe, in the event of total war, 16 Reserve rifle companies will immediately join their active duty battalion, which is a contradiction to the proposed MAGTF Master Plan. The over-ridding factors which should drive the whole mobilization process are: how well do we want our Marines trained and how much time do have to train them, prior to deployment into a theater of war. Training is habitual. While it is desirable for training to be challenging, adventurous, and even "fun", there is no substitute for repetition. The Marine must be made in peacetime (and in wartime) to practice his individual duties over and over and over again, until he has learned them so well that he can perform them under the most distracting of circumstances. The Marine Reservist has thirty-nine days a year to devote to maintaining his military proficiency. Our highest priority should be in maintaining his individual military skill proficiency at the highest possible level, Times are a changin!. As we enter the 1990's, it is time to be realistic in regards to our expectations for the reserve establishment. Words must give way to action. Sacred cows must be sacrificed. The individual reservist, whether he be a member of the SMCR or the IRR, is our most valuable resource and must be polished into a smooth fighting machine, before marching off to war. BIBLIOGRAPHY 1. Department of Defense. "Secretary of Defense's Annual Report to Congress, Fiscal Year 1990," Washington, D. C., 2. "Give Reserves Greater Defense Roles," Defense News February 20, 1989, p. 28. 3. Hopkins, William B. One Bugle No Drums. Chapel Hill: Alognoquian Books, 1986. 4. United States Marine Corps. "MAGTF Master Plan (Draft)," Marine Corps Combat Development Center, Quantico, Virginia, December 5, 1988. 5. United States Marine Corps. "Marine Corps Mobilization Plan (MPLAN) Volume I," Headquarters, Marine Corps, Washington, D. C., October, 25, 1988. 6. United States Marine Corps. "Reserve Force Structure Brief for ACMC," Headquarters, Marine Corps, Washington, D. C., November 7,1988. 7. United States Marine Corps. "Total Force," Headquarters, Marine Corps, Washington, D. C., June, 1988.
