Does The Marine Corps Need The EA-6B "Prowler" Aircraft AUTHOR Major R. B. Johnson,USMC CSC 1989 SUBJECT AREA - Aviation EXECUTIVE SUMMARY TITLE: DOES THE MARINE CORPS NEED THE EA-6B "PROWLER" AIRCRAFT? I. Purpose: To examine the need for EA-6B aircraft to support the MAGTF commander's effort to shape and focus the battlefield. II. Thesis: Airborne electronic warfare (EW) is critical for the success and the survival of the MAGTF's aviation combat element on the modern battlefield. III. Data: The EA-6B and its predecessor, the EA-6B, have demonstrated the merits of maintaining and upgrading dedicated EW platforms that have the flexibility to respond to a dynamic and ever-changing electromagnetic spectrum. The EA-6B on-board systems provide MAGTF commanders with several unique capabilities. The electronic intelligence (ELINT) collected by the EA-63, and processed and analyzed by VMAQ- 2's organic Tactical Electronic Reconnaissance Processing and Evaluation System (TERPES) can provide MAGTF commanders with insights on the enemy's disposition and intentions on the battlefield. The EA-6B's tactical jamming system can selectively neutralize/degrade enemy air defense systems and/or command and control nodes. The Prowler's capability to carry and fire the high-speed anti-radiation missile (HARM:) integrated with the aircraft's on-board systems enhances its air defense suppression mission. In peacetime, EW training of our forces is one of the most important missions of VMAQ-2. However, the single siting of VMAQ-2 on the east coast has created a severe discrepancy in EA-6B training and exercise support received by FMFPAC and its subordinate commands. If our MAGTF's and their aviation combat elements are going to train like they will fight, the reorganization of VMAQ-2 into three separate and distinct squadrons is needed. IV. Conclusion: The EA-6B will play an integral role in the planning, coordination, and intelligence efforts required to identify, locate, and defeat the air defense threats and command and control nodes of today and into the near future. The loss of the Prowler and its unique capabilities would not be in the best interest of the Marine Corps. V. Recommendation: The EA-6B is ready to handle future challenges on the battlefield, but changes in VMAQ-2 organization and structure are needed for the Marine Corps to benefit totally from this unique aircraft. DOES THE MARINE CORPS NEED THE EA-6B "PROWLER" AIRCRAFT? OUTLINE Thesis Statement: Airborne electronic warfare (EW) is critical for the success and the survival of the MAGTF's aviation combat element on the modern battlefield. I. Electronic Warfare Overview A. Critic's concerns about EA-6B's B. EW effectiveness on the modern battlefield C. Low intensity conflict II. Marine Tactical Electronic Warfare Squadron Two (VMAQ-2) A. EW mission B. Electronic Warfare Support Measures (ESM) mission C. Tactical Electronic Reconnaissance Processing and Evaluation System (TERPES) D. Electronic Countermeasures (ECM) mission E. High-speed anti-radiation missile (HARM) F. Electronic Counter-countermeasures (ECCM) mission III. Marine Corps EW Shortfalls A. FMFPAC/FMFLANT comparison B. I MEF/Third MAW EW support C. III MEF/First MAW EW support IV. VMAQ-2 Reorganization A. I MEF/III MEF Organic EW support B. Contingency responsiveness DOES THE MARINE CORPS NEED THE EA-6B "PROWLER" AIRCRAFT? There are critics both in and outside the Marine Corps who currently advocate stripping the regular Marine Corps of its only dedicated aviation electronic warfare (EW) platform, the Grumman EA-6B (Prowler) Improved Capability II (ICAP II) aircraft, and transferring these assets to the Navy and/or the Marine Corps Reserve. These individuals argue that the EA-6B is too costly in terms of manning requirements and fiscal demands to remain in the regular Marine Corps; especially in this era of funding and personnel constraints. They express concerns about the EA-6B's label as a national asset and question the likelihood of this particular aircraft being available to support the Marine Air Ground Task Force (MAGTF) commander during contingency operations. They further endorse the view that the Prowler will have limited, if any, utility in the perceived low intensity conflicts of the future. Contrary to these beliefs, the EA-6B and its predecessor, the EA-6A "Electric Intruder", have been in the vanguard of EW support aircraft since the Vietnam War. These aircraft have demonstrated over the past two and a half decades, the merits of maintaining and upgrading dedicated airborne EW platforms that have the flexibility to respond and adjust to the dynamic and ever-changing electromagnetic environment. If the trends in EW development and technological advances continue, the EA-6B, with proposed weapon system upgrades and aircraft improvement packages, will assume an even greater and more vital role in supporting the MAGTF commander's efforts to shape and focus the modern battlefield.1 Electronic warfare effectiveness is not a tangible commodity, unlike bombs on target or the occupying of a specific piece of terrain. Military history since World TWar II has demonstrated that EW effectiveness lies in the friendly force's capability to exploit and neutralize the enemy's use of the electromagnetic spectrum, while retaining its own ability to control and protect it. EW, when properly exploited, results in reduced aircraft loss rates and the capability to achieve air superiority against both an adversary's air threat and his air defense systems. Indirectly, the control of the different facets of EW also results in a greater number of aircraft available to support both the anti-air warfare (AAW) and the offensive air support (OAS) requirements of the fighting forces. Marine Corps planners and policy makers must not overlook this time proven capability. Its effective utilization is critical on the modern battlefield and absolutely essential to the survival of our aviation assets. A review of the United States' experience in the Vietnam War and international conflicts which have occurred since Vietnam, highlight the essential role that EW has come to play on the battlefield of today. The Vietnan War resulted in an U. S. technological boom in electronic weaponry and equipment to deal with the vast array of Soviet radars and missile systems being introduced into North Vietnam. As the war progressed, a direct correlation was established between the capability of the U. S. to counter the North Vietnamese radar and missile threats, and the U. S. aircraft survivability rate. For example, the initial deployment of Soviet SA-2 surface-to-air missile (SAM) systems into North Vietnam in 1965 resulted in the U. S. Air Force losing one of its aircraft for every two SA-2 missiles fired. Several months later, these numbers changed dramatically to a thirty- to-one ratio due to the introduction of new EW aircraft, new EW systems, and new tactics designed to defeat this specific threat.2 The United States military's recognition of this EW and survivability correlation resulted in the introduction of the Marine Corps' EF-l0 and EA-6A into Vietnam in 1965 and 1966 to respond to the North Vietnamese missile system threat. If EW lessons-learned from Vietnam needed additional confirmation, the experiences in the Yom Kippur War of 1973, the Bekaa Valley confrontation of 1982, the Falkland Island conflict of 1982, and the United States' retaliatory attack on Libya in l986 revalidated and reinforced the need for friendly forces to control and exploit the electromagnetic spectrum on the fields of combat. The Yom Kippur War found the Israelis on the brink of defeat due to new developments in electronic technology and weaponry. The Egyptians and Syrians surprised the Israelis by employing new Soviet air defense systems consisting of acquistion radars, SAM systems, and anti-aircraft artillery (AAA) which initially established a protective air defense umbrella around their military forces and effectively neutralized the Israeli Air Force (IAF). The IAF was able to overcome this initial setback by responding immediately to this new threat with new equipment and tactics, but at a tremendous cost in aircraft--over 100 destroyed.3 The 1982 Bekaa Valley confrontation was the culmaination of Israel's experience from the Yom Kippur War. The Syrians had received sophisticated integrated air defense systems (IADS) from the Soviets. As a show of force against the Israelis' involvement in Lebanon, the Syrians deployed these systems into the Bekaa Valley. The IADS were designed to be a formidable threat to any IAF air operations into the Bekaa Valley due to the overlapping, and mutually supporting radar and SAM/AAAA envelopes. Unfortunately, for the Syrians, the IAF integrated its aviation and ground-based EW systems, intelligence assets, and supporting arms into a coordinated attack designed to disrupt and neutralize these systems. The employment of these tactics proved highly successful with the IAF virtually destroying the Syrian IADS in the Bekaa Valley while incurring minimal losses. The demonstrated success of employing a full spectrum of supporting arms against air defense systems has become the standard tactic for attacking and suppressing these threats. EW also played an integral role in the outcome of the air battle which developed over the Bekaa Valley in 1982. Israeli aircraft reportedly jammed the ground-based Syrian surface-to-air command, control, and communication networks used to control the Soviet-built aircraft flown by the Syrians. The effectiveness of this tactic contributed to the shootdown of ninety-six Syrian aircraft by the IAF in air-to-air combat, with the Israelis losing only six aircraft, all to Syrian SAM's.4 The Falkland Islands conflict demonstrated again the vulnerability of aircraft to SAM systems, with the British downing 37 Argentinian aircraft which were without EW equipment and protection.5 The United States' retaliatory air strikes against Libya in 1986 provided contemporary illustrations of the importance of EW exploitation. Marine Corps and Navy EA-6B's, and Air Force EF-111's utilized to support the Libyan strikes proved to be effective in jamming and neutralizing the radar and missile threats posed by the Libyan air defense. These EW platforms enabled the A-6E, F/A-18, and FB-111 strike packages to successfully ingress and egress against SAM/AAA- protected targets, unimpeded by electronic surveillance and tracking, to deliver their ordnance. Events which took place in the Yom Kippur War, the Bekaa Valley, the Falkland Islands, and the Libyan retaliatory air strikes clearly provide military planners with a view of future battlefields. Again and again, one of the essential combat factors in each of these conflicts proved to be the capability to control the electromagnetic spectrum. Mr James J. Townsend, fellow at the Georgetown Center for Strategic and International Studies, states, "... the U. S. probably would not face such an enemy as unsophisticated as the Syrians in Lebanon....The corollary is that, whenever and wherever the United States may fight again, it is likely to encounter EW threats much more serious than any it has ever faced before."6 The conflicts discussed above are dwarfed when one begins to recognize the tremendous EW buildup in terms of acquistion radars, EW aircraft, AAA systems, and SAM systems which the Soviet Union and its Warsaw Pact satellites have undertaken over the last decade. The Warsaw Pact currently has 10,000 intercept radars, over 700 electronic warfare aircraft, 12,000 radar directed AAA systems, and 13,000 SAM systems deployed in eastern Europe. The Soviets have deployed these systems and aircraft to their satellite states because their research and development programs have shown that these weapons, if not countered, will impede our air operations by destroying our aircraft. For those who contest the need for EA-6B's in low intensity conflicts (LIC), the environment and scenario in which these conflicts are contemplated must be fully defined. For example, any Third World country capable of importing Soviet and/or free world weaponry and technology has the potential to inflict unacceptable losses on military forces trying to impose their will on them. "During the period 1982-1987, the Soviets exported ... 20,000 surface-to-air missiles to the Third World."8 Potential adversaries such as Libya, Syria, and Nicaragua could pose a formidable force in terms of Soviet surrogate air defense threats, and represent the type of enemy the Marine Corps would most likely oppose in future conflicts. "The unchecked spread of modern weapons ... has raised the degree of sophistication of the threat even in the remotest of these regions to a level where EW assets are not merely useful to possess, but a necessity."9 The eighteen EA-6B Improved Capability II aircraft currently in the Marine Corps inventory, the aircrew of four (pilot and three electronic countermeasure officers [ECMO]) which operate each of these aircraft and its weapon systems, and the approximately six hundred support and maintenance personnel who keep the aircraft flying are trained for, and ready to handle, challenges on the future battlefield. First, we need to review Marine Tactical Electronic Warfare Squadron Two's (VMAQ-2) organization to better understand its mission and charger. VMAQ-2 is the sole EA-6B squadron in the Marine Corps. It is tasked with supporting the aviation EW requirements of Fleet Marine Force, Pacific (FMFPAC), Fleet Marine Force, Atlantic (FMFLANT), and their subordinate commands. Electronic Warfare is subdivided into three operational areas--electronic warfare support measures (ESM), electronic countermeasures (ECM), and electronic counter countermeasures (ECCM).10 To accomplish EW training, exercise, and contingency support requirements for both FMF's, VMAQ-2 maintains the capability to function as three separate detachments with six EA-6B aircraft each. Each detachment is augmented with its own maintenance, logistic, and administrative support when tasked to conduct independent operations away from homebase. The Prowler and its aircrew conduct ESM missions by using the aircraft's on-board system (0BS) to collect electronic intelligence (ELINT), and by relying on the ground-based Tactical Electronic Reconnaissance Processing and Evaluation System (TERPES) for processing and analyzing the ELINT data collected by the aircraft. The OBS is a fully automated system which consists of several frequency receiver antennae integrated with an on-board computer. The data gathered through the different receivers is processed and analyzed by the computer for threat system identification. Once a threat radar identification is correlated, alfa- numeric symbology identifying that particular threat appears on cathode ray tubes (CRT) situated in front of the two back- seat ECMO's for monitoring and appropriate action. Totally software dependent, the OBS is fully reprogrammable and designed to provide our MAGTF commanders with a credible and technological edge in EW capabilities. TERPES is organic to VMAQ-2 and was designed and developed to provide EA-6B mission planning, ESM mission processing, and intelligence and targeting support. Besides supporting VMAQ-2 requirements, TERPES also provides the MAGTF with an enemy's Electronic Order of Battle (EOB) gathered by external intellence sources and updated with ELINT data received from EA-6B ESM flights. This near-real time intelligence enables the MAGTF commander to gain insights on the enemy's disposition and intentions. For example, the Soviet's emphasis on mobile SAM's, AAA, and their associated radars will provide an electronic picture of the battlefield by correlating known threat systems with their movement on the battlefield. Collected ELINT data further assists in the tactical planning of offensive air support missions to minimize potential aircraft losses. A thorough analysis of this data identifies weaknesses and/or strengths in the enemy air defenses, while providing updated jamming targets for future EA-6B ECM missions. The ECMO's conduct ECM missions with a state-of-the-art ALQ-99 tactical jamming system (TJS) which consists of wing- mounted jamming pods, jamming control modules, OBS, computer system and a computer keyboard which provides an interface between the ECMOs' and the TJS. The TJS provides a limited capability to counter tactical voice communications and data link transmissions, enabling the MAGTF commander to selectively attack and neutralize enemy command and control nodes through electronic means. The EA-6B's TJS is primarily designed to deny and/or degrade the targeting capability of early warning, acquistion, and SAM/AAA threat radars, thus permitting attack and fighter aircraft to successfully penetrate enemy air defenses. The ECM0 achieves the desired results by assigning different types of computer generated jamming modulations which have been developed to defeat or deceive the effectiveness of the specific radars targeted. The EA-6B weapon system was recently given an offensive weapon capability to attack SAM/AAA systems and their associated early warning/acquistion radars. The capability to carry and fire the high-speed anti-radiation missile (HARM) was integrated into the EA-6B weapon system, providing an offensive capability for which the Prowler was well suited. The Prowler's ability to search for, intercept, locate, and immediately recognize a threat signal, used in conjunction with the HARM's capability to home in on parametric data emitted by a radar antenna, allows the EA-6B to identify and destroy priority targets with greater assurance. In peacetime, accomplishing the ECCM mission is the most important of the three EW subdivisions. By accomplishing this mission we properly train and prepare our military forces to function in a hostile EW environment. VMAQ-2 conducts ESM and ECM missions against our own equipment and operators to familiarize them with potential enemy EW threats and help them identify and combat the different effects of EW. "If and when war should come, the outcome almost assuredly will not be determined by what new technologies are on the drawing-boards of the adversaries involved, but by what systems already have been fielded and how well, they are being used. In the final analysis, therefore, readiness and training count for at least as much as hardware."11 ECCM training is also the one area where VMAQ-2 has been unable to meet the total EW requirements of the Marine Corps, due largely to the centralization and single siting of our EA-6B's at Marine Corps Air Station (MCAS) Cherry Point, North Carolina. If the Marine Corps is going to train like it is going to fight, then VMAQ-2 should be supporting FMFPAC and its two Marine Expeditionary Forces (MEF) with the same proportionate amount of EW training and exercise support that FMFLANT and its single MEF currently receive. As modern warfare has demonstrated, "... there may be no time, once a war begins, to make up for previous peacetime neglect."12 A comparison of FMFPAC's and FMFLANT's primary aircraft authorization suggests FMFPAC forces have a greater need for EA-6B support, especially when one realizes that 62 per cent of the Marine Corps aviation assets reside in FMFPAC. In spite of this apparent requirement, I MEF and its aviation combat element (ACE),the Third Marine Aircraft Wing (MAW), sited at MCAS El Toro, California have had limited EW training and exercise opportunities over the last three years. First Marine Expedition Brigade (MEB) and its ACE, Marine Aircraft Group (MAG)-24, sited at MCAS Kaneohe Bay, Hawaii have not received dedicated EA-6B training in over seven years and that was conducted in conjunction with a deployment to the continental United States. III MEF and its ACE, First MAW, have experienced 21 months of EA-6B gapping in the unit deployment program (UDP) over the last seven years due to U. S. Navy carrier (CV) commitments. I MEF and Third MAW have averaged less than two per cent of the total EA-6B flight hours flown for the last three years. Over these three years, VMAQ-2 flew 42.7 hours during fiscal year 1986, 230 hours during fiscal year 1987, and 156.9 hours during fiscal year 1988 in support of I MEF's EW requirements, while the Marine Corps' EA-6Bs flew over 5,250 flight hours in each of these years! This discrepancy in the amount of flight hours flown in support of EW training and exercise can be attributed to both the single siting of VMAQ- 2 on the east coast and the ongoing reductions in travel funds and flight hours. Although there is a memorandum of understanding addressing the semi-annual deployments of EA- 6B's to the west coast for I MEF/Third MAW training and exercise support, the funding and flight hour costs associated with sending a detachment of personnel and aircraft to the west coast will continue to be prohibiting factors.13 Since 1981, III MEF and First MAW'S scheduled EA-6B UDP detachments of four EA-6B's have been diverted on three different occasions from the western Pacific to support Navy CV commitments in the Atlantic: April 1981 through February 1982 aboard the USS Nimitz; February 1984 through November 1984 aboard the USS Saratoga; and May 1986 through November 1986 aboard the USS America. If this CV requirement for Marine EA-6B continues, and there are indications it will, the Marine Corps can anticipate yet another CV tasking in the near future. As in the past, a CV commitment would result in at least a six month gap in III MEF's scheduled EA- 6B UDP detachment. As already pointed out, VMAQ-2 maintains the capability to function as three independent detachments with six EA-6B aircraft, each detachment capable of being augmented with its own maintenance, logistic, and administrative support. Reorganizing VMAQ-2 into three separate and operational distinct squadrons; one based on the east coast to support II MEF, one based on the west coast to support I MEF, and one based in the western Pacific to support III MEF, could well be the key to the Marine Corps success on the modern battlefield by increasing the availability of critical EW training for FMFPAC units. The VMAQ-2 reorganization initiative would provide the Commanding General's of I MEF and III MEF and their subordinate commands with organic and uninterrupted EA-6B support, which certainly is not the situation today. The capability to integrate EA-6B's into all aspects of exercises and training, i.e. fighter, attack, and command and control, would pay immeasurable dividends in terms of combat readiness for those aviation and ground units which currently receive minimal EW training. This multi-site proposal would be more responsive to the EW requirements of both I MEF and III MEF, while reducing the disportionate share of EA-6B support received by II MEF. Although there are advantages inherent in situating and centralizing EA-6B maintenance and personnel support at MCAS Cherry Point, the operational disadvantages in terms of training, combat readiness, and lack of responsiveness to the FMF's EW reguirements exceed the monetary and personnel savings associated with the centralization issue. Most contingencies and operational plans (OPLANS) supported by Marine Corps forces have at least a four EA-6B aircraft detachment or larger assigned to the time phased force and deployment list. In some contingency scenarios, where two or more OPLANS are being conducted simultaneously, I MEF and/or III MEF could find themselves without dedicated Prowler support. This is especially possible in a situation where a VMAQ-2 detachment has been CV designated or deployed. The EA-6B is not an end-all; however, it was designed and developed as an EW platform to respond and counter the ever-changing EW environment. The Prowler plays an integral role in the coordination and intelligence effort required to identify, locate, and defeat the air defense systems of today and the future. Its state-of-the-art ECM system and ESM capabilities enable the MAGTF commander to both neutralize and exploit potential enemies' use of the electromagnetic spectrum. The loss of the EA-6B and its unique capabilities would not be in the best interest of the Marine Corps. Does the Marine Corps need the EA-6B? The answer is emphatically, "Yes", but several changes in the VMAQ-2 organization and structure must be accomplished if the Marine Corps is to benefit totally from this unique aircraft. FOOTNOTES 1Grady L. Jackson, "Maintaining the Edge," Journal of Electronic Defense (April 1987) ,pp.4l-46,103. 2Gowri S. Sundaram, "Modern Airborne Electronic Warfare: New Concepts, Programs, and Products Proliferate," International Defense Review (February 1985),p.169. 3Sundaram,p.l69. 4Sundaram,p.170. 5Sundaram,p.169. 6James J. Townsend, "Electronic Warfare: The Invisible Dimension of Victory," Sea Power (October 1985),p.55. 7Jonn M. Porter, "Tactical Aircraft Survival Dependent on EW Capabilities," Armed Forces Journal International (February 1989) ,p.79. 8Porter,p. 79. 9Sundaram,p.169. 10U. S. Marine Corps FMF 5-1, Marine Aviation,pp.114-115. 11Townsend, p.57. 12Townsend, p. 57. 13 Memorandum of Understanding between FMFPAC and FMFLANT for EA-6B Support,dated 15 April 1986. BIBLIOGRAPHY Jackson, Grady L., Rear Admiral, USN., "Maintaining the Edge," Journal of Electronic Defense (April 1987) Memorandum of Understanding between FMFPAC and FMFLANT for EA-6B Support, (15 April 1986) Porter, John M., "Tactical Aircraft Survival Dependent on EW Capabilities," Armed Forces Journal International (February 1989) Sundaram, Gowri S., "Modern Airborne Electronic Warfare: New Concepts, Programs, and Products Proliferate," International Defense Review (February 1985) U. S. Marine Corps FMFM 5-1, Marine Aviation (24 August 1979)
