Marine Aviation Logistics Support Concept AUTHOR Major George J. Hayn, Jr., USMC CSC 1989 SUBJECT AREA - Aviation EXECUTIVE SUMMARY TITLE: MARINE AVIATION LOGISTICS SUPPORT CONCEPT I. PUPRPOSE: To report on the current status of the Marine Aviation Logistics Support Concept (MALSC) and to evaluate the ability of the Marine Aviation Logistics Squadron (MALS) to deploy and employ as an integral component of the Marine Air Ground Task Force (MAGTF) Air Combat Element (ACE). II. PROBLEM: Although the complex challenges of providing logistics support for the MAGTF ACE are theoretically met by MALSC, the true confirmation of the ACE's supportability and sustainability will only be accomplished by fully exercising the deployment/employment cycle. The ACE must exercise in peace the same logistics support that it requires in war; otherwise, the logistics will not be there when required. III. DATA: Marine Corps aviation is not organized in garrison as it will be as the ACE of a MAGTF. In order to provide the six functions of Marine aviation, all aircraft types are combined in the MAGTF ACE from the source Marine Aircraft Groups (MAGs). The transfering of aircraft is not so much the problem, as is the transfering of the logistics support. The organization that is tasked with performing logistical support for the aviation units attached to the MAG/the MAGTF is the MALS. The other concepts that facilitate support of the composited ACE are the Contingency Support Package (CSP), and the Fly-in Support Package (FISP). The CSP includes personnel, parts, support equipment and mobile facilities. The FISP contains parts required at the squadron/detachment organizational maintenance level for a specific duration. The primary means by which the composited MALSs and CSPs are both transported to and can operate in theater is the Aviation Logistics Support Ship (T-AVB). IV. CONCLUSIONS: The MALSC, encompassing the MALS, CSP, FISP and T-AVB, is quite sound in theory, but should be fully exercised in order to prove and improve upon the concept while simultaneously conducting realistic training. V. RECOMMENDATIONS: The USMC must insist upon two annual Marine Expeditionary Brigade (MEB) training exercises, one in the Fleet Marine Force (FMF) Pacific, and one in the FMF Atlantic, to be conducted utilizing the full Maritime Prepositioning Force (MPF) ACE together with all assiciated Maritime Prepositioning Ships (MPS), U.S. Transportation Command assets, and both T- AVBs. Two exercises such as these should be the capstones to the annual continental U.S. training cycle. OUTLINE MARINE AVIATION LOGISTICS SUPPORT CONCEPT THESIS: The Marine Aviation Logistics Support Concept (MALSC)is a concept that provides the aviation logistics support for the Marine Air Ground Task Force (MAGTF) Air Combat Element (ACE). However, in order to be a credible concept, MALSC must be bully and continually exercised in realistic training scenarios. I. ORGANIZATION OF MARINE CORPS AVIATION A. Garrison B. MAGTF ACE Transition Challenge C. Comparison witn USN Transition II. MALSC A. Marine Aviation Logistics Squadron (MALS) l. Evolution From Headquarters and Maintenance Squadron 2. Unity of Command B. Aviation Logistics Support Ship (T-AVB) l. Description 2. Utilization C. Fly-in Support Package (FISP) D. Contingency Support Package (CSP) l. Personnel 2. Support Equipment 3. Mobile Facilities 4. Spares and Repair Parts III. Concept of Operations A. Deployment with Assault Follow-on Echelon B. Employment IV. deed to Exercise the MALSC MARINE AVIATION LOGISTICS SUPPORT CONCEPT The purpose of this paper is not to make the reader an expert aviation logistician, but to show that all of the elements except the training necessary to implement the Marine Aviation Logistics Support Concept (MALSC) are now, or will soon be in place. After briefly illustrating Marine Corps aviation's organizational challenges, I will proceed directly to a discussion of the key factors in supporting the transition of Marine Aviation from garrison to a deployed mode. My thesis is that the complex challenges of providing logistics support for the Marine Air Ground Task Force (MAGTF) Air Combat Element (ACE) are mat by the resources of the Marine Aviation Logistics Squadron (MALS). However, unless the MALS capability to deploy/employ is exercised in conjunction with the Aviation Logistics Support Ship (T-AVB), then our warfighting capability will not only be untried, but also untrained. According to the MAGTF Master Plan draft, permanehtly assigned MAGTFs will train as they intend to fight. (27: prologue) Unfortunately, concomitant realistic logistics training is non-existent. Even more disturbing is the fact that combat service support training for the ACE is the least realistic of all!(9:46) Hopefully, the bibliography appended to this paper provides basic references and background reading for continued thought, discussion and action by others, like me, who are not only involved in, but dedicated, and committed to supporting Marine Aviation. Almost all USN and USMC personnel are aware of the fact that Naval Aviation is comprised of both USN and USMC air arms. Less well known are the differences between how the two services transition the support of their air elements from a garrison to a deployment mode. The transition from garrison to deployment support is wuch smoother and more readily accomplished for the USN than for the USMC. The reason is that the USN has organic aircraft carriers outfitted for deployment, While the USMC is dependent upon the USN or USAF for strategic lift. The Marine transition from the garrison, or Marine Aircraft Group (MAG), to the deployment, or Marine Expeditionary Brigade (MEB) Air Combat Element (ACE), is a complicated transfer of aircraft, personnel, support equipment, supplies and mobile facilities from the esisting homogeneous MAG to the multi-mission capable multi- type/model/series (T/M/S) heterogeneous MEB ACE. This organizational upheaval was well addressed recently in an article in the October, 1988 issue of the Marine Corps Gazette by Captain Timothy Junette. (See figure 1 which illustrates the transfer of squadrons from their parent MAG to the MAGTF MEB ACE.) Captain Junette's recommendation is that the Marine Corps reorganize its air wings in accordance with the MAGTF MEF/MEB ACE structure. (11:19) He also suggests that the initial investment in personnel, facilities and support equipment necessary to accomplish a MAG to MEB Click here to view image ACE reorganization should be seriously considered for a phased implementation. Until much a reorganization occurs, he contends that Marine aviation will not be a fully integrated MAGTF team member. The Navy accomplishes the same garrison to deployment transition by moving the various squadrons and detachments from their parent Naval Air Stations (NASs) to their carrier battle group/carrier air wing assignment. This process is streamlined in that the support equipment, supplies, and maintenance facilities are prepositioned on board each carrier in anticipation of the exact composition of the air wing. Support at each air station is provided for thirty days duration at peacetime flying hours, whereas carrier support is provided at ninety days duration at combat flying hours. Additionally, each type aircraft at the NAS is only supported at a fixed percentage of the number of aircraft assigned there to accommodate the reduced numbers when the squadrons deploy to the carrier air wing. (Refer to specific T/M/S weapon system planning document.) The end result is that USN aircraft have prepositioned support at either the NAS or on board the carrier. MAGs are outfitted just like carrier's with ninety days of support at combat flying hours.(25:1-5) Marine Corps Air Stations (MCASs) are outfitted just like NASs, but usually only for search and rescue and other "headquarters"--type aircraft. An expension of the role of the MCAS in support of Marine aviation a'la the NAS with their integral aircraft intermediate maintenance and supply departments could provide a partial answer to the MAG/MEB ACE transition dilemma. Procedures are currently in place to support Marine Corps aviation's transition from MAG to MEB ACE; however, these complex procedures, the Marine Aviation Logistics Support Concept (MALSC), are theoretical and yet to be actually exercised.(2:7-2) A process similar to the Navy's whereby the MB's are outfitted by fixed and rotary wing T/M/S aircraft should be inplemented with MEB deployments replacing the current WestPac unit deployment scenario. For example, the 9th MEB, which is the WestPac amphibious MEB of III MEF, could be the rotational MEB to WestPac in a revised unit rotation cycle that would be tailored in accordance with MAGTF concept. The oft used phrase that a "MAG is just like a CV" is no longer valid, and should now be restated to a "MEB ACE is just like a CV." This reprioritization will help accelerate the pace of the evolutionary changes from the MAW to the MEF ACE.(27:4-1) Until such time as the Marine Corps decides whether it will continue to maintain the existing MAW structure or fully implement the MAGTF concept, the supporting establishment will be required to work twice as hard to support the dual structures--both MAG and MEB ACE. The T-AVB and the activation of the MALS are steps in the right direction that I will address later in this paper. While the USN provides a streamlined model for the complex but smooth deployment of Naval Aviation, the USMC continues to wrestle with the difficult integration of Marine Aviation into the MAGTF model. Nearly all Department of Defense personnel are familiar with the Marine Corps amphibious operations scenario in which the Marine Division (ground combat element) assaults the ob- jective from amphibious ships. During this evolution, fixed wing aviation support will be provided either by the carrier air wing, or from a benign airfield, and Marine organic ro- tary wing support will come from the LPH, the LHA, or also from a benign airfield. However, how and when are the rest of the Marine air combat element (ACE), and its aviation logistics squadrons introduced into the operational theater? The answer varies with each scenario, but is primarily de- pendent upon the mode of transportation used to move the forces. You may be wondering why an individual should concern himself with a topic as mundane as aviation logistics support. The reason is twofold. Primarily, without its supporting logistics element the estimated half-life of the average tactical aircraft squadron is three days! The Marine Corps, through the naval aviation inventory control point, the Navy Aviation Supply Office, has procured Fly-in Support Packages (FlSPs) consisting of high usage organizational parts to support the ACE. (14:30) Secondarily, and personally, as an unrestricted aviation supply officer, aviation logistics is my raison d'etre. The Marine Logistics Squadron (MALS) is tasked with providing the supply and intermediate maintenance support required by the operational squadrons. (5:1) MALS functions as the aviation force multiplier in the areas of maintain- ability, sustainability, and some of the others "...ilities" with its ninety day endurance support package. A primary goal for the MALS is to deploy/employ as readily as a USN carrier's maintenance and supply departments. What is a MALS? As of 1 October, 1988, the MAGs were reorganized. (5:1-5) This reorganization focused primarily on the redesignation of the Headquarters and Maintenance Squadron (H&MS,aka HAMSTERS)to the MALS. Under the previous H&MS organizational concept, the maintenance, supply, avionics, and ordnance officers were not only H&MS billet holders, but also special staff officers for the group commander. This concept was in direct opposition to the Clausewitzian principle of unity of command with these special staff officers in the unenviable position of having to serve two masters, both the H&MS and MAG COs. The MALS concept rectifies this dual loyalty quandary because the MALS CO becomes the sole individual who is responsible to the MAG CO for aviation logistics support. The maintenance, supply, ordnance, and avionics officers (and their departments) now work directly, and only, for the MALS CO. I will not be addressing the integration of the key logistics functions performed by the Marine Air Control Groups, Marine Wing Support Groups and Marine Wing Weapons Units in this paper. Even the USN is in the process of adopting the MALS concept at its Naval Air Stations. An initiative is underway to create Aviation Support Activities (ASA) by combining the Aircraft Intermediate Maintenance Division and the Aviation Support Division. (18:4) When implemented, this initiative is expected to significantly improve both support and readi- ness. Another quantum improvement contained within the MALS command structure is the designation of the CO/XO billets as unrestricted aviation maintenance and supply officers. I am not implying that the aviators and naval flight officers who predominantly held these billets in the past were incompetent. We have our combat aircrews, but where are our combat logisticians? (3:23) My point is: Who is more capable of "fighting" the aviation logistics squadron than the aviation logisticians? From my extensive H&MS experience, I see the need for a technically competent CO, with an in-depth knowledge of both the Navy supply and maintenance systems. This is a prerequisite, especially when he will be confronted with the complex challenge of coordinating with others in forming composite MALS. Who will command the fixed- and rotary-wing Marine Expeditionary Brigade (MEB) MALS? A parent MEB MALS has been identified for each of the six fixed- and six rotary- wing MEB air combat elements (ACEs).(27:4-3) Each MALS CO should assume command for his assigned composite MEB MALS and the other staff billets should be coordinated with the joining MALS. Specific table of organization (T/O) billet assignments should also be made for each contingency. What are some additional pertinent factors to be con- sidered when planning for the deployment of the MALS? After the task organizations of the parent MALS have been determined, the only remaining job is to transport approxi- mately 500 mobile facilities (MFs=8'x8'x20' containers), 700 Marines, and other miscellaneous bulk equipment and supplies. (12:3) This is no small endeavor, and it is further complicated by the requirement to be operational in theater within a constrained timeframe in order to support the ACE's fly-in echelon. Previous exercises such as Team Spirit, Northern Wedding and Bold Guard have reconfirmed the fact that, even though it is possible to support a small detachment with a supply pack- up and a rapid logistics support umbilical cord to the home base, this ad-hoc type operation would not be feasible for an actual MEB commitment. It is imperative that the Marine Corps, if it really professes to be the nation's "force in readiness," must plan to cut its support umbilical cord and rely on organic maintainability and sustainability. (for an opposing viewpoint see 21:14-15) The primary means for transporting Marine forces is in ships. Unfortunately, strategic sealift is a dangerous weak- ness in the fundamental structure of U.S. strategy. Admiral Thomas Hayward, former CNO put it most bluntly, "Without adequate and reliable sealift, none of the (U.S.) military plans is executable."(1:31) General Alfred M. Gray, Commandant of the Marine Corps, has provided this dictum for Marine Corps planning and readiness: "Light enough to get there, heavy enough to win. " (19:27) During the Reagan administration more than $7 billion was invested in sealift. What did we get for our money? Eight fast sealift ships, two hospital ship's, ten heavy lift vessels, too aviation logistics support ships, and 91 ready reserve fleet ships. (8:63) The Ready Reserve Fleet (RRF) is a fleet of sealift ships that can be deployed on 5, 10 or 20 days notice. (13:23 and 25:4-4) Current options for transporting the MEB's two MALS from the Marine Corps Air Station (MCAS) to the theater of operations include USN amphibious shipping, USAF Military Airlift Command (MAC), Civil Reserve Air Fleet (CRAF), and the Military Sealift Command (MSC) Ready Reserve Fleet. (RRF) A partial solution to the problem of having transportation dedicated to the deployment of the MALS was implemented with the procurement, modification, and activation of the Aviation Logistics Support Ships (T-AVBs).(16:1-5) Two T-AVB ships are in the RRF in layberth status for five day readiness. (25:2-5) The total cost of the program through FY 91 will be $44.7 million (22:58) as opposed to the higher initial budget estimates. (26:TABLE 1) Even though a C-141 can accommodate three MFs (vans), it would still require approximately 200 sorties to deploy the two composite logistics squadrons by air, with the additional qualifying assumption that we have access to a benign airfield! Al- though airlift will have to augment the overall deployment, sealift will, of necessity, be the prime mover since MAC will probably be seriously overtasked in any major confrontation. The T-AVB, a converted commercial container ship, is the best existing solution to the dedicated lift requirement of the aviation logistics support element. (2:7-1 and 4:67) Depending upon whether the T-AVB is loaded to support func- tioning or tightly stowed MFS, its capacity varies from approximately 300 to 65O TEUs (twenty foot equivalent units) (28:1-4) Berthing is available for 300 marines plus crew. (24:7-1 and appendix B-12,13) Unfortunately, there are only two of these Seabridge class roll-on, roll-off ships, one homeported in Philadelphia, Pennsylvania, and the other in Long Beach, California. (see figure two) Activation of the deployinent cycle would commence with the warning order to the units involved. (23:3-3) The most important thing for the MALS to do during its work-up initiation is to identify the actual aircraft deckload and ACE task organization to ensure there is no deviation from the deckload upon which the contingency plan was based. Once the numbers and types of aircraft are identified, the parent MALS can begin coordinating the selective process of staging the support equipment, and supplies with the other supporting MALS, and assigning the personnel to the task-organized units. The notional Mobile Prepositioned Ships (MPS) MEB ACE Click here to view image includes roughly 75 fixed-wing and 60 rotary-wing aircraft. (20:3) A MALS is required for each major type of aircraft, i.e. rotary or fixed-wing. In order to embark and deploy the entire MEB ACE on a single T-AVB, the MFs would have to be stowed in an inaccessable mode, precluding any operations enroute.(28:1-4) In all likelihood, the employment of the fixed- and rotary-wing aircraft will be to geographically separate operating sites. Each MALS has about 500 Marines, so at least 700 would have to be airlifted. How then do we simultaneously deploy both of the MEB ACE's MALS to the objective area while maintaining unit command, control, and operational flexibility? The answers consistently boil down to additional strategic lift, and an encounter with the circumstance. Strategic lift deficiencies are in the too often neglected realm of logistics support. Those of us in the Department of Defense who are wrestling with the challenge of integrating people, doctrine, and technology, must concomit- antly consider the issues of logistics support and strategic lift. As S.L.A. Marshall wrote in The Soldier's Load and the Mobility of a Nation: Strategy is the art of the general. And like any other art, it requires patience to work out its basic concepts. But the odd part of it is that among higher commanders that branch of the art most apt to be treated with a broad stroke, though it calls the loudest for the sketching in of minute details, is the logistics of war. (15:3) The ability of the aviation logistics system to support the MAG squadrons while in garrison is proven. However, supportability is a proper concern during the transition from the current garrison MAG structure to the combat organized MEB ACE. It is possible to have only one or two T/M/S aircraft in a MAG, whereas in a MEB ACE there will be approximately four different T/M/S helicopters, and seven various fixed-wing aircraft. This variety is essential if all six functions of Marine aviation are to be available in a single combat package. Although the aircraft squadrons remain intact, their supporting establishments must be reorganized and reoutfitted to provide support for the reconstituted air arm. This reorganization of the supporting establishments is now accomplished, and the necessary logistics support can be provide by theMALSC. The Contingency Support Package (CSP) was developed in recognition of the fact that we are not logistically organized in peacetime in the manner in which we intend to deploy in wartime. (5:3) The "tailoring" of the support requirements for the MEB ACE is accomplished via the CSP concept. The CSP consists of people, support equipment, supplies, and MF's. Even though the squadron's material remains stays with them, replenish- ment and support of that material is the responsibility of the reorganized MEB ACE MALS. Organizational support equip- ment will either deploy with the aircraft squadron, or will be available from the Mobile Prepositioning Ships (MPS), or from the Norway prepositioning program. (24:6-4) Customary naval aviation maintenance procedures are accomplished at three levels. They are the organic or squadron level, the intermediate, and the depot. A key decision in the tailoring of the CSP is the level of repair capability desired at the intermediate level. The choice is either to have the MALS repair components on site, or to retrograde the repairables to the depot concurrent with a supply reorder requisition. Repair of complex aircraft components takes specially skilled personnel, a vast array of test equipment, and parts for both the components and the test equipment. The level of repair analysis is based on a number of factors of which the most important is the component's inherent mean time between failure. (10:3-7) The foregoing analysis helps to determine whether the supporting MALS will either attempt to repair the broken parts, or will stock extra components. Stocking extra parts to compensate for the lack of repair capability can be a very expensive proposition. Current CSP policy is to establish a limited MALS repair capability with the supply department's stocking objectives adjusted accordingly. Almost all of the MALS' equipment, primarily supply assets and maintenance equipment, are housed and are trans- portable in the 8'x8'x20' MFs.(22:D-5,6) These MFs are similar to the containers used in private industry. The TAV-Bs have been specifically altered to accommodate these vans. Even though MALSC can theoretically support the MEB ACE, the concept is yet to be exercised and tested. The building blocks are in place--the CSP, the T-AVB, and the MALS. Now is the time to practice in peace what we will do in war. "CSPs, FISPs, MPS, and T-AVBs provide the means by which Marine Aviation Logistics can rapidly task organize in support of a MAGTF. "(5:3) CONCLUSION The Logistician's Lament Logisticians are a sad embittered race of men, very much in demand in war, who sink resentfully into obscurity in peace. They deal only with facts, but must work for men who traffic in theories. They emerge during war because war is very much fact. They disappear in peace because, in peace, war is mostly theory. (3:30) Can you imagine a football team preparing for the big game without having had integrated training? In a real sense that is exactly how the Marine Corps is currently conducting MAGTF training. The backfield, the ACE, is practicing on one field, the linemen,the GCE, are practicing on another, and the logisticians; well, they are not even practicing, but are "waterboys" for the ACE and GCE on their separate fields! The analogy is not as far-fetched as it may seem. "The real danger of these training inadequacies is that commanders do not fully appreciate the impact of logistics on operations. And logisticians will be unable to assist the commander because they have not been educated ..."(3:24) The success of the implementation of the Marine Aviation Logistic Support Concept (MALSC), and its integration with MAGTF training will be a function of command attention and leadership. It will be costly and time consuming; however, just as in the popular oil filter commercial, it is truly a "pay me now, or pay me later" proposition. The impact on peacetime flight hours and readiness required to conduct realistic combat logistics training is readily apparent, and therein lies the mandate for command attention. (2:7-2) The MALSC is not just a scientific means of adapting the ACE to the didactic time-phased force deployment lists, but is aviation logistics doctrine that will assist in determining what can and, perhaps even more importantly, what cannot be accomplished. MALS commanders should not have to guess what the ACE commander needs to support the MAGTF. With realistic training in true operational scenaries, the ACE commander would know exactly what he wants, and the MALS commander will be able to tell him whether or not he can provide it. "Continual neglect of the logistical art is potentially more dangerous than our earlier neglect of the operational art" (17:40) This is a very exciting and dynamic era for the MAGTF ACE. Because of MALSC, even former "HAMSTERS" are acting boldly and audaciously. Before becoming overly optimistic, there are still several challenges that confront MALSC. Without delving into minutiae, the following some issues that are yet to be fully resolved. 1. Support of remain behind units at the parent MAG. 2. Integration and inclusion of reserves in the "Total Force" MALSC.(7:l) 3. Integration and inclusion of MWWUs, MWSSs, and MACGs in fully operational and logistical ACE exercises. 4. Establishment of direct access by the deployed ACE MALS to the supply system. Elimination of duplicate unit identification codes for deployed and remain behind units. 5. Minimization of peculiar T/M/S support systems. (As an apostle of the "Hornet Support Plan", I must plead guilty under extenuating circumstances!) Unity of effort is not possible without unity of under- standing. I truly hope that this paper contributes to a better understanding of the challenges of aviation logistics, and generates continued thought and discussion about the MALSC and ACE supportability. BIBLIOGRAPHY 1. Aquilino, John, Sanders, James "Strategic Sealift: The Achilles Hell of America's Defense". Amphibious Warfare Review Winter 1987-88, 30-35. 2. Aviation Logistics Support Ship Feasibility Study (T- AVB) prepared for Headquarters, U.S. MARINE CORPS by Tracor, Inc. November, 1982 3. Bartlow, Gene S. "The Operator-Logistician Disconnect" Air Power Journal, Fall 1988, 23-37. 4. Brown, David B. "MPS: Aviation Combat and the T-AVB" Marine Corps Gazette, February 1985, 64-67 5. CMC Washington D.C. Message 240057Z Dec. 87 Subject: USMC Aviation Logistics Support Concepts 6. CMC Washington D.C. Message 290006Z Sept. 88 Subject: Marine Aviation Logistics Squadron (MALS) and Marine Aircraft Group Headquarters (MAG HQ.) 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U.S. Marine Corps OH 7-6 Maritime Prepositioning Force (MPF) Operations MCCDC, Quantico, Va June 1987 25. U.S. Marine Corps OH 7-8 Deployment of the Assault Follow-On Echelon (AFOE), MCCDC, Quantico, Va June 1988 26. U.S. Marine Corps. "Maritime Prepositioning Ships (MPS) Aviation Combat Element Support", A Letter From CMC To CNO, Washington D.C., 2 March, 1982 27. U.S. Marine Corps, MCCDC, Warfighting Center, "MAGTF MASTER PLAN" Draft, December,1988, Quantico, Va. 28. U.S. Navy, Naval Sea Systems Command. Amphibious Warfare and Strategic Sealift Program. "T-AVB information Manual", Washington, D.C. 1986
