National Security Strategy. Time For A Change? AUTHOR Major C.S. Huddleston, USMC CSC 1989 SUBJECT AREA - National Security EXECUTIVE SUMMARY TITLE: NATIONAL SECURITY STRATEGY. TIME FOR A CHANGE? I. Purpose: To examine the current status of the objectives and interest of U.S. National Security Strategy in light of the current world situation. specifically, the balance of military and economic power. II. Problem: While current U.S. National Security Strategy outlines broad, general objectives and interests, the focus of the application of national power has been the eurasian landmass. (5:17) Such a focus may not be in line with the current state of world affairs. This may be especially true with regard to U.S. military and economic concerns and the needs of our allies. III. Data: The traditional focus of U.S. power has been in the prevention of conflict within the eurasian landmass. National security goals, partic- ularly those requiring military power, tend to draw our attention to Europe. The preponderance of our overseas military forces are based in or around the continent. We have strong historical and diplomatic ties to this region. Further, the greatest perceived threat to world peace, the Soviet Union, has also focused its attention on Europe. However, recent Soviet moves, both diplomatically and militarily tend to lessen this threat. More importantly, the Russians have been making dramatic changes to strength- en their position in the Pacific. When this is coupled with the realization that the United States has an overwhelming economic interest in the re- gion, the need to correct our security posture becomes apparent. (3:1) IV. Conclusions: Changing the focus of U.S. national power from Europe to the Pacific would be a difficult task to accomplish. While U.S. foreign trade concerns have shifted from European to eastern nations, our other elements of power have not kept pace. We currently do not have sufficient military power in the Pacific to protect our investments or honor our treaty obligations. V. Recommendations: The Executive Branch of our government must change the thrust of our security strategy to answer the challenges we face in the Pacific. The potential gains that might be made will outweigh the risks we might face in Europe. The U.S. should pursue new markets in the Pacific. Our military power should be realigned to protect current and future investments, while countering the rising Soviet threat in the re- gion. NATIONAL SECURITY STRATEGY: TIME FOR A CHANGE? Thesis Statement Current U.S. National Security Strategy does not place adequate emphasis on the Pacific Basin region. I. Current status A. U.S. national security strategy B. U.S. defense partners C. U.S. foreign trade II. Future concerns A. U.S. and NATO B. U.S. and the Soviet Union C. U.S. and the Pacific nations III. Potential Status A. Emerging nations B. Potential interests C. Possible solutions For over forty years, the focus of U.S. National Security Strategy has been containment of any hostile threat to the eurasian landmass. In this regard, our principal adversary has been the Soviet Union. (3:2) As a result of this national focus, all supporting strategies and effort are. of necessity, aimed at the deterrence of war in Europe. Such a strategy tends to force the United States into a position of countering every move the Soviets make, no matter where such moves might occur. Perhaps it is time to examine our strategy in light of current and potential changes in the world situation. If a change in strategy is required, a major reorientation and shifting of assets may be required as well. This paper will center on the possible need for such a change in emphasis. Specifically, that the current U. S. National Security Strategy does not place adequate emphasis on the Pacific Basin region. In his National Security Strategy of the United States statement of January, 1988, President Reagan outlined his view of where our national interests and objectives lie. Those interests were: 1. The survival of the United States as a free and independent nation, with its fundamental values intact and its institu- tions and people secure. 2. A healthy and growing U.S. economy to provide opportunity for individual prosperity and a resource base for our national endeavors. 3. A stable and secure world, free of major threats to U.S. interests. 4 Healthy and vigorous alliance relationships. These then are the stated interests of our National Security Strategy. Our national interests may also be stated as goals. The objectives of these goals are also outlined in the President's National Security State- ment. Our security strategy is tailored to accomplish these goals. As presented by the President, our national objectives are: 1. To maintain the security of our nation and our allies. 2. Fo respond to the challenges of the global economy. 3. To defend and advance the cause of democracy, freedom, and human rights throughout the world. 4. To resolve peacefully disputes which affect U.S. interests in troubled regions of the world. 5. To build effective and friendly relationships with all nations with whom there is a basis of shared concern. Given these stated goals and objectives, how then might the United States go about accomplishing them? The Executive Branch is the re- sponsible government agency tasked with the application of national power, through policy, to see our goals and objectives realized. (13:1) The method is simple to state, very difficult to execute. It requires the balanced application of our diplomatic, economic, informational, and military power. (13:1) The difficulty arises in the determination of the proper balance and proper region(s) of the world. A look at the objectives of national security provides the best clue as to how our power might be applied. Where are the security of the nation and our allies most threatened? What is the greatest challenge to our ecomomy and where does it come from? Where does the greatest opportunity to advance the cause of democracy and human rights exist? Where might the U.S. have the greatest chance of peacefully resolving disputes? Finally, with whom do we have the greatest basis for shared concern? The answers to these questions are not obvious and are the subject of great debate and disa- greement within the government. Perhaps an examination of our current foreign interests and concerns will lead to a conclusion as to whether our National Security Strategy is reasoned and balanced enough to accomplish the goals our President has outlined. The United States has been active in keeping global peace by making and maintaining numerous defense and military assistance agreements with our international neighbors. A brief review, by region, is in order to assess our current policies. NATO. In April of 1989, the North Atlantic Treaty Organization alliance between the democracies of North America and Europe will be forty years old. The freedom and security of Western Europe are vital to our national security. (5:49) The peace that has been maintained in Europe since the end of WWII has been, to a large measure, the result of the success of this alliance in deterring war. While there is a new climate in the Soviet Union that seems to indicate a lessening of the threat, such a perception is countered by the fact that the Soviet Union continues to produce large numbers of conventional weapons. As a result of such actions, the United States maintains the highest levels of military power (outside of the U.S.) in the NATO countries and in the seas around them. (5:19) The reasons for this are obvious, or apparently so. The Soviet Union and its allies, the Warsaw Pact, hold a quantitative edge over NATO in most catagories of weapons systems and is positioned to hold that advantage for at least the next five years. (5:19) In the face of the facts, it would seem that the NATO nations would want to at least match the Soviet effort, to maintain balance and deterrance. Recent trends, however, indicate just the opposite. Calls for conventional troop reductions are beginning to come from our allies. The political climate in one of our staunchest allies is changing from hot to lukewarm very quickly. West Germany has been the scene of the strongest support for U.S. troop withdrawals.(10:1) Political changes in thiscoun- try combined with the desire to reduce foreign troops,on their soil, have produced a situation in which the Germans would welcome a reduction of the NATO forces.(4) WESTERN HEMISPHERE. Since the United States is located in the western hemisphere, it is only natural that we would accord our highest defense priorities for this region of the world. (5) The United States Forces Command has the responsibility for the defense of the United States and has, as its forces, over one million active, reserve, and National Guard personnel throughout the country. The United States Space Command has the responsiblity for space operations, early warning, surveillance, and ballistic missile defense. In the years immediately following WWII, nations in the Western Hemisphere posed little or no security threat to the U.S. This changed in the early 1960's with the Castro revolution in Cuba. His exportation of revolution and subversion to Central and South America and the Caribbean has created serious concerns for the security of the region, and the United States in particular.(5:52) As a result of these threats, the United States Southern Command was created and headquartered in Panama. Given the responsibility of protecting our southern flank, this command has seen its job become more difficult with the influence of the Marxist-Leninist revolution in Nicaragua. Added to the threat of military action and political subversion is the new threat to national security, the drug trade. The Department of State has taken the lead in dealing with foreign drug traders, but the Department of Defense has been called on to assist on several occasions. However, the Department of Defense's greatest contri- butions in this region of the world have been in the area of nation building. (5:54) Military assistance, construction of facilities, and the training of local defense forces constitute the major efforts of the United States to promote peace and security in Latin America. (5:54) Our ties with our neighbor to the north, Canada are very strong. The mutual defense of our two nations is based on the requirements for early warning of attack and defense of the continent. The combined command, The North American Aerospace Defense Command (NORAD) takes care of the first requirement. Forces Command coordinates the defense of the two countries. (5:54) NEAR EAST, S. ASIA. and AFRICA. Our concerns in this region of the world center on containing Soviet aggression, reducing the tensions between several warring nations, and providing security for U.S. assets, the most important of which is our supply of foreign oil. (5:56) Our response to these challenges is two-pronged. First, a vigorus diplomatic effort to reduce tensions and promote peace. Second, continuing our long-standing security assistance and defense cooperative efforts with friends in the region. (5:56) Our most extensive relationships are with two former foes, Egypt and Israel. These relationships have greatly increased our ability to respond to a crisis in the region. We are also increasing our aid and strengthening our ties with the nations of the Saharan sub-continent in order to better respond to threats in the Persian Gulf area. South Asia is in an important transition period. The withdrawal of Soviet forces from Afghanistan and the death of Pakistan's President Zia have left that part of the world in a state of turmoil. The United States has maintained its security assistance to the rebels in Afghanistan and a balanced policy with both India and Pakistan has improved relationships in the area. India, the region's preeminent power, has been the recipient of a developing joint security policy with the U.S. Should this policy continue, the U.S. will have fewer concerns for peace within the region. (5:59) Africa joins with two areas of prime concern to the United States, the Middle East and the southern tier of NATO. The recent past has been marked by great changes in the political map of the region. Direct Soviet and Cuban intervention has tended to destabilize the region. The United States' response to these challenges has been balanced between economic assitance to alleviate social problems and military support for selected nations. It is apparent that the leadership of our nation sees the social problems as the greatest threat. Of the roughly two-hundred and fifty million dollars spent in aid to African nations last year, the ratio of economic aid to military aid was seven to one dollar spent. (5:60) Money is the prime tool in promoting peace and maintaining security within this region. Only four hundred U.S servicemen are posted to the continent, and half of these are Marine security guards.(5:61) EAST ASIA and the PACIFIC. Our security arrangements in this part of the world are extensive. They are marked by regional cooperation and the support of emerging democracies. Further, it is in this region that the Soviet Union has made the greatest expansion of its military capability. The Soviet Union's Pacific Fleet is that nation's largest, far out-gunning its adversary, the combined U.S. Seventh fleet and Japanese Maritime Defense Force. (11 :402) That this threat is recognized by the United States is evidenced by the fact that of eight bilateral defense treaties the U.S. maintains, five are with Pacific nations. (11:403) It is with Japan that the U.S. forms the cornerstone of its defense of the region. Japan provides a formidable defense shield challenging Soviet access to the Pacific. The United States is responsible for providing the offensive strike capability for the nothwest Pacific. The Japanese provide defense and bases for this capability. Since Japan no longer limits defense spending to a percentage of its GNP, but rather seeks to spend in response to the threat, closer ties and smoother relationships may be expected in this key defense arrangement. (5:56) The regional stability that was once provided by the trilateral agreement between the U.S., Australia, and New Zealand now depends on the strong and growing relationship between the U.S. and Australia. Australia is one of the United States' oldest military partners. We have fought a common foe four times this century. With the absense of New Zealand as a partner in this area of the Pacific, our ties with Australia have only grown stronger. Our agreements with the Phillipines and South Korea are very similar. In both cases we are supportive of emerging democracies. In both cases we lend military assistance to support a direct communist threat. In Korea, the threat is conventional and well known. In the Phillipines, the threat is revolutionary and not so well known. Both these countries occupy strategic territory in the region and are crucial to American defense eforts.(5:56) Perhaps the most stabilizing effort the United States has attempted is the development of a defense relationship with the Peoples Republic of China. This country is a giant, in many ways, in the region. It poses the most serious threat to the borders of the Soviet Union. It has the greatest reserve of natural resourses. Further, its strategic potential is just beginning to develop.(7:8) Our policy toward this nation has just started, but the potential for stability in the region is great. (2:1) While we may fix our attention too greatly on the need for military security strategy in the keeping of world peace, it is sometimes more il- luminating to examine where the interests of our economic strategy lie in determining our goals. Since the United States is a capitalistic nation, a brief review of where our economy is leading us may provide another clue as to where our national interests truly lie. The United States is a major power in the world economy. We trade with almost every nation in the world. Our economic power is one of our nation's greatest assets. We compete in the International arena with every trade partner. In the past twenty-five years our major competitor has become the force of the Japanese economy.(17:1) They have also become, second only to Canada, our major trading partner.(3:3) A look at our trade deficit, on a global scale provides a chart of our economic interest. The most recent figures (Feb. 1989) are as follow: Western Europe--minus forteen billion dollars Western Hemisphere--minus seventeen billion dollars Southwest Asia-- minus one point seven billion dollars Pacific Rim--minus seventy-eight billion dollars (fifty-two billion dollar deficit with Japan alone!) (3:1) The above figures graphically depict where our economic interest has been placed. The United States remains the most powerful economic force in the world today, however this leadership is facing serious challenges. One such challenge is in the form of the imminent formation of the European Economic Community. The formation of this multi-national trading cartel in Western Europe will remove all trade barriers between member nations. Such a move will remove most of the comparative advantages the U.S. has when dealing with individual nations.(18:3) Another challenge is the growth of capitalism in the Soviet Union. Currently, the U.S. is a major trading partner with the Soviet Union for goods that the Russians cannot, or will not, produce for themselves. The demand for services and consumer goods, produced in the Soviet Union is growing. If the Soviets are successful in producing such goods and services, the United States might find the two point one billion dollar surplus in trade with the USSR significantly reduced. (3:1) While trade with the European and Middle Eastern countries are important to the economy, they are only a small percentage of our foreign trade. The recent free trade agreement with Canada has served to drop all import/export barriers with our largest, single trading partner. This action is predicted to increase and strengthen our two countries' economic power. (3:2) Both nations together, however, cannot equal the rising economic power of the nations of the Pacific rim. Our trade with those nations continues to grow. The Japanese have started to forge partner- ships with other Asian nations which, if successful, will make the far eastern trading cartels the major economic force in the world. Bilateral Japanese and Korean economic agreements are breaking this trail and have proven to be quite benificial for both nations. (17:1) One nation, in par- ticular has been encouraging the U.S. to counter this economic force by increasing productivity and making favorable trade agreements...China.(2:2) China is a is a country of almost unlimited human resources and vast natural resources. The importance of this potential, in regards to U.S. national security, cannot be overlooked. This then is the current status of the national security concerns and goals. What might the future hold and how might the interests of the United States change? Predictions of this nature are usually educated guesswork, at best. However, some trends are emerging which might eliminate some of the guesswork. As was stated in our most recent statement of national security, the Soviet Union was seen as the most dangerous potential adversary. Further, that the hazard was, primarily, centered on the eurasian landmass. Several recent events have served to somewhat lessent his threat. First, the dramatic changes in Soviet leadership. The current leaders are beginning to focus a great deal more attention on internal problems. This has been coupled with a realization that the Soviet economy cannot afford to regenerate its failing economy and maintain its large conven- tional force posture in Europe.(6:1) This realization has been manifested by the Soviet willingness to negotiate force reductions in Europe and its even more surprising desire to reduce conventional forces as well as nuclear weapons.(12:21) Second, the withdrawal from Afghanistan has taught the Russians their first lesson in the limitations of power of a great nation. This lesson was learned, just as painfully, by the United States in Viet Nam. As in this country, a period of introspection and realignment of national goals may be predicted for the Soviet Union. While the USSR will remain a major force, it will be a bit more hesitant to use military power to achieve its goals.(9:30) Third, the political changes that are occuring in the Soviet Union are not isolated to that nation. Similar changes are apparent in many of its closest allies. Autonomous political changes are being manifested in such critical Soviet allies as Poland, East Germany, Hungary, and Czechoslova- kia. In addition, there are growing nationalistic movements in some of the ethnic regions of the Soviet Union itself. These factors tend to point to a time of resolving internal problems and developing national goals for the Soviet Union.(9:17) That is not to say that the USSR is no longer to be considered a potential adversary, only that the hazard is somewhat mi- tigated by problems and challenges the Russians face closer to home. One area of the world in which the Soviet Union is breaking new ground, diplomatically and militarily, is the Pacific region. As has already been mentioned, the Soviet Pacific Fleet is their largest. They have aggressively sought and secured warm-water ports and access for their ships. The Soviet Union's ties with Viet Nam and North Korea have made these goals a reality. Further, the USSR has been able to exercise its fleet in all parts of the Pacific without fear of being cut of from its lines of communication.(11:403) Another recent shift which gives cause for concern is the renewed friendship between the Soviet Union and China.(8:12) While it is too early in this relationship to predict the outcome, the limited detante does provide for a lessening of tensions between the two countries. This allows for a shift in assets in the Soviet Union and reduces the Chinese need for stronger U.S. relations.(2:2) In any case, the Soviet Union will remain a major player in the Pacific region for some time to come. Three of its major beneficiaries of military and economic aid are Pacific rim nations (Viet Nam,Mongolia, and Korea). (5:67) It may also be worth noting that the USSR has not made any over- tures for an arms reduction in the Pacific. That the Soviet Union will remain interested in the Pacific appears to be a resonable assumption. What of the United States interests in the Pacific in the future? Current policy and the recent actions of some of the Pacific nations may provide some answers. One of the most notable changes in the relationship between the U.S. and Japan is the recent decision by the Japanese people to accept an expanded role for their self-defense force. Since the implementation of their constitution, Japanese defense spending has been limited to a strict percentage of their GNP, usually less than one percent. (1:105) This represents a major shift in the psyche of the Japanese people. It also tends to lessen the strength of the American argument that the Japanese were not sharing a large enough portion of their own defense burden. This move has been both welcomed and met with suspicion by her allies. The U.S. tends to welcome this move, as it may slow down the rapidly growing Japanese economy while at the same time providing a new market for U.S. arms sales.(17:3) Japan's closest neighbors tend to look at a resurgent Japanese military with a great deal of apprehension. (1:118) The basis of these concerns are, primarily, what would a strong and independent (militarily) Japan do if there was a significant shift away from the United States? Our relationship with Australia has been strengthened since we ended our relationship with New Zealand in the trilateral treaty between the U.S., Australia, and New Zealand. Australia looks to the United States to provide regional security in the Pacific southwest. The United States has reason to want to provide this service. The Pacific trade routes from the Persian Gulf and the Southeast Asian nations must transit this regIon. Australia provides the strongest military in the area, along with a significant national concern, to maintain the peace of this part of the world. (1:272-273) further, the Australians are trying to increase their share of the foreign trade with the emerging Asian nations.(1:287) Next to Japan, the Republic of Korea has the fastest growing economy in the region. Its principle trading partner is the U.S. (18:2) After the Korean War, the United States devoted a large measure of aid to assist in the rebuilding of the Korean economy. This effort was quite successful. While the Koreans rebuilt their economy, the American armed forces provided the required security. Now that the Koreans are experimenting with a new, more liberal democracy, and being blessed with a booming economy, many in the U.S. question the need for continued high levels of military aid.(9:165) The new bilateral trade agreements with Japan make Korea an even more powerful economic force.(18:2) If the U.S. is to remain a major economic power in the region, our intrests in Korea must remain viable. All of the above considerations are either known facts or reasonable assumptions. The biggest question mark on the Pacific rim is also the largest in terms of resourses. The Chinese remain, traditionally, inscrutable. How the Chinese chart their future will, to a large degree, determine the future of the region. China has been, for over five thousand years, the key to political and economic power in the western Pacific.(3:2) The resources that this country contains are almost unlim- ited The United States has been trying to tap these resources since the Nixon years.(7:2) That stronger ties with the Peoples Republic of China is a trump card in the U.S.' security strategy has been an accepted element in American foreign policy since 1972.(2:3) The problem has been that the Chinese move slowly and carefully, while the Americans look for more immediate results. The Chinese are quite adept at statesmanship. Every time the U.S. pushes too hard, the Soviet Union and the Chinese reopen relations in an attempt at reconciliation.(8:14) The potential for U.S. businesses in China is beyond estimation, and clearly an incentive for stronger Sino-American relations.(2:3) Clearly, the United States has many concerns in this region of the world. Just how important are they? It is apparent that the future of U.S. foreign trade is in the Pacific rim. The figures tell a tale of overwhelming economic power. The United States is so far in debt to Pacific countries that we may very well be forced to devote more attention to protecting our interests there. The Soviet Union is making more and more moves, both diplomatically and eco- nomically, to strengthen its share of the wealth in the Pacific. If we don't meet the challenges and opportunities offered there, we might as well re- spond as an English gentleman recently did to a representitive of a U.S. trade mission in Japan. After a few drinks in a bar the Englishman said "Why don't you respond like we have, just admit you're second."(18:1) Such a response is not in the American character...at least not yet. What, then, might be reasonable and feasible courses of action for the U.S. in response to the growing challenge of Pacific competition and how does this affect national security strategy? It iIs important to remember that our security strategy is based on the goals and interests stated by the President. Further, that these goals and interests are not geographically motivated. It is apparent, however, that the United States has placed the greatest proportion of its military power in a region of the world far separated from our diplomatic and economic concerns. That this issue needs to be addressed is the first area in which the U.S. National Security Strategy might be altered. To effectively counter Soviet military moves in the Pacific, U.S. naval power must be shifted. Currently, only one and one-third carrier battle groups are assigned to the U.S. Seventh fleet. The U.S. Third Fleet is responsible for Alaska, the east and mid-pacific, and the Bering Sea, must share assets with the Seventh Fleet. Since there is no dedicated fleet for the Indian Ocean and the Persian Gulf, these two fleets are stretched to the limit. It wasn't until 1987 that the first battleship battle group was assigned to the western Paclfic.(11 :404) Reassignment of at least two more battle groups and a battleship battle group would restore peacetime U.S supremacy to the Pacific. Where would these assets come from? Perhaps our NATO allies will provide the answer. Demands for force reductions are comming at us from both are allies and the Warsaw Pact. If forces are to shifted, then let us do it and place the forces where they can be better used. However,this is only part of the soultion. Given that this region of the world is, primarily, water, other mari- time issues need to be addressed. Military strength is only one element of national power to be used in the accomplishment of national goals. Eco- nomic power must also be used. The U.S. Merchant Marine has declined to the point that no U.S. merchant vessels are being built in the U.S., nor are any foreign constructions being flagged.(16:30) If the U.S is to compete in the Pacific, U.S. goods must be transported on U.S. carriers, protected by our navy. One short term solution would be to take advantage of the free trade agreement with Canada. They could be the carriers, we could provide the security. Another area that needs to be addressed is the military indepen- dance of Japan and Korea. Neither country has sufficient assets to face a major threat alone.(1:66&127) It may be in the best interests of the U.S. to allow this situation to continue. If the U.S continues to guarantee the security of these nations, then greater concesions must be made regarding trade with the U.S. The Roman Empire made a good business of providing protection for tribute. We must make renewed efforts to gain markets for our goods in China. China has the potential to provide our economy a tremendous boost in the area of foreign trade.(2:3) As a competitive entity, China could take almost all of our export trade, if the market is fully developed. Our other trading partners would be forced to respond or lose our business. The trade in China could erase our foreign debt. This is clearly in our national interests. What would the Chinese be interested in buying? The products that they are in the most need of are to be found in areas of our economy that are currently slumping. Agriculture and agicultural technology, heavy in- dustry, transportation, and oil technology. Other areas that the U.S. could exploit are arms sales, consumer products, space technology, and commun- ications. We would recieve in return a vast labor source, access to raw materials, and, most importantly, new markets to stimulate our economy. Development of the Chinese potential could be the most important step in the return of U.S supremacy on the world market. Finally, we must be true to our national goals and ideals. Our stated policy of supporting human rights and fostering democray might best be realized in the Pacific. There are currently twenty-two new, independant nations in the Pacific Basin alone.(1:266) The countries of the Pacific are governed by a broad mixture of systems from liberal democracies to mon- archies and military dictatorships. Many are just evolving and emerging as soverign nations. They are experimenting and searching for independence. It is here that the traditional values of western democracy and concern for individual rights can best be fostered. The United States should be the leader in this quest. We should support the efforts of these nations with all the elements of are national power. It is here that they are most needed. It Is here that our shared concerns are the greatest. 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