Does Our Nation's Security Strategy Address The Real Threats? AUTHOR LCDR. Charles J. Fairchild, USMC CSC 1989 SUBJECT AREA - National Military Strategy EXECUTIVE SUMMARY TITLE: DOES OUR NATION'S SECURITY STRATEGY ADDRESS THE REAL THREATS? I. PURPOSE: The National Security Strategy of 1989 addresses the expected primary threats that could confront the United States. This paper analyzes several of the more significant threats associated with national security strategy. II. Thesis: Deterrence remains the framework from which the United States Security Strategy is structured. Low-intensity conflict, nuclear weapon proliferation, and diminution of presidential prerogative represent serious challenges to the success of national security strategy and the protection of our freedom in the future. The national security strategy must appropriately address these threats and effectively promote changes to thwart them. III Data: Failure to identify and implement a pragmatic structured national security policy, which would properly addresses low-intensity conflict, nuclear proliferation, and loss of presidential prerogative, has led the United States down a path of uncertainty. Since the advent of atomic weapons, the United States has buried its head in the sand of deterrence against total nuclear war. Certainly, deterrence has and continues to avert total nuclear war, but the astonishing list of political and military failures of lesser conflict indicate the ultimate answer is elsewhere. IV. Conclusion: In the final analysis, the cornerstone of any new strategic gains is the meshing of national will political objectives, and military resources. Any new national security strategy must be inscribed in clear and understandable terms as to the objectives of political and military strategy with an enlightened assessment of all aspects of low-intensity conflict, nuclear proliferation, and presidential prerogative. Does Our Nation's Security Strategy Address the Real Threats? Deterrence remains the framework from which the United States Security Strategy is structured. Low-intensity conflict, nuclear weapon proliferation, and diminution presidential prerogative, represent serious challenges to the success of national security strategy and the protection of our freedom in the future. The national security strategy must address these threats properly and implement necessary changes. I. National Security Strategy A. Origins B. Framework of policies C. Does the strategy address low-intensity conflicts, nuclear proliferation, and presidential prerogative II. Low-intesity conflict A. Soviet threat B. Third world environment C. Terrorist attacks D. Failures of current policy III. Nuclear proliferation A. Deterrence and the delicate balance of power B. Nuclear weapons club C. Countries soon to enter the nuclear club IV. Presidential prerogative A. Executive Branch formulates and implements strategy B. Clear expression of policy C. Results of confusion D. Congressional resurgence E. Diminution of presidential prerogative F. Presidential power DOES OUR NATION'S SECURITY STRATEGY ADDRESS THE REAL THREATS? Until 1986, the United States had no written National Security Strategy. At that time, Congress mandated the Executive Branch to publish a National Security Strategy, and in 1987 the first document called "The National Security Strategy of the United States" was published. The fundamental, strategic nature of this document is threefold: one, furnish a historical perspective to past strategic structure; two, delineate the interest of the United States; three, analyze the threat and objectives of the United States, and the means to achieve these objectives. 1 Our National Security Strategy, in essence, was born of necessity from the atomic ashes of World War II. As the war ended, the United States was the supreme nuclear power, but shortly thereafter, in 1949, the Soviet Union began testing its own atomic weapons.2 For the first time, the United States began to realize the very real, indisputable possibility of nuclear attack on the Continent. Since then, any strategic thought concerning national policy, by force of impending threat, had to revolve around the implications of attack from the Soviet Union-- either via nuclear delivery systems against populations centers in the United States, or nuclear and conventional attack in Europe. The United States, as well as its allies, have long believed that its national security interest would be in jeopardy if a hostile state, or league of hostile states, were able to dominate the European land mass. Historically, the strategic significance of Europe was exemplified by the two world wars that we fought defending it during this century. With this formidable threat in mind, the United States and its Allies have undertaken a defensive posture known as "deterrence" in which the Soviet Union is made to realize they face the undeniable fact that aggression in any form will be met with a force of like response. For nearly forty years, the impending threat of mutually assured destruction (massive civilian casualties and large scale economic destruction) of the Soviet Union has proven effective in deterring war.3 Deterrence remains the framework from which the United States Security Strategy is structured. But is this strategy the balustrade which protects the United States from all threats. World events have demanded a new enlightenment and restructuring of purpose which must be reflected in our current National Security Strategy. Low-intensity conflict, nuclear weapon proliferation, and presidential prerogative, represent serious challenges to the success of national security strategy and the protection of our freedom in the future. The national security strategy must address these threats properly and implement necessary changes. Deterrence alone is not the answer. security strategy policy. The United States can ill afford or even hesitate to prepare for the prevailing undercurrents of conflict emerging from the Third World today and in the future. The United States faces a continuum of conflict evolving from the political and economic unrest primarily in the Third World countries. The unrest prevalent in these countries will repeatedly evolve into armed conflicts which imperil our national interest on a global scale. The Joint Chiefs of Staff has defined low-intensity conflict as a limited politico-military struggle to achieve political, social, economic, and psychological objectives. It is often protracted and ranges from diplomatic, economic, and psycho-social pressures through terrorism and insurgency. Low-intensity conflict is generally confined to a geographic area and is often characterized by constraints on the weaponry, tactics, and the level of violence.4 Increasingly in the world today, the preponderance of conflict revolves around these small, dirty, little wars which receive little interest until another conflict demands attention. To this point in history, the United States political structure and the U.S. Military have continued to follow a strategy that is designed to reinforce NATO forces against an all out offensive, ostensibly by the Soviet Union and its surrogates. Pre-deployed ground and forward-deployed naval forces (under the assumption that an orchestrated attack from the Soviet Union along the European front is the more likely threat that will effect the United States and NATO countries) have received the bulk of U.S. defense dollars.5 Military thought in this arena appea8rs to have ignored the ever increasing conflicts arising in the Third World. The escalation and increased propensity toward revolution and counterinsurgency in destitute nations create a global as well as national security threats that cannot be easily disregarded. Since deterrence has proven to be incapable of resisting these conflicts, a reorientstion of current political and military strategic thought processes is necessary for a secure nation in the future. The Soviet Union has come to realize a strategic nuclear war would be a disaster of immense proportions, and that even if a war of this nature could be won, the fabric of their social and economic structure would be at risk of extinction The enormous price exacted by a strategic nuclear attack is not one the Soviet Union is willing to pay. The Soviet Union is currently experiencing dire economic stagnation. They have structured their military and civilian economies separately, each functioning independently of the other. Current military spending approaches 18% of their gross national product which consequently places tremendous internal stress on civilian economic sectors. The civilian economy can no longer support such a disproportionate spending pattern. At this point in time and extending into the near future, the Soviets must devote a larger portion of their gross national product to the civilian economy. The future continued growth of their military forces stands in jeopardy until the future economy enjoys a sound footing. The Soviets, therefore, must reduce the size, deployment, and build-up of their armed forces. One only has to realize the overtures toward military nuclear arms limitations, the withdrawal from Afghanistan and their expressed interest in force reductions in Europe hallmark their need to reduce military spending with consequent buttressing of their economy. In the Third World environment, the political elitist and colonial power structures were unable to establish the necessary infrastructure, create politico-economic stability or deal effectively with the ethnic differences present in most indigent countries. These governmental shortcomings promote fertile ground for continued political diffusion, provide unstable government structures, resurrect growing contingents of unskilled labor with little economic substructure to maintain them, and foster a growing need for technological advancement. The Soviet Union sees involvement in the Third World as low cost, low risk operations with high political strategic payoff--especially in areas along the sea lines of communication of the democratic world. The Soviet Union has substantially redirected its emphasis from world domination through nuclear destruction and large scale conventional warfare into fomenting communist revolution in Third Countries that are unstable and have a high degree of revolution potential.6 There is no question this threat is real. Thirty-nine wars are currently being conducted in the world today with the majority either directly or through proxies supported by the Soviet Union. In this way, they can threaten our peace, security, and freedom. The United States still has the greatest accumulation of military power than any other nation, but many theorist on war argue that much of its might is directed toward implausible threats. The general consensus among military planners is that continued readiness of manpower and equipment focused on the proposed European areas of battle, presupposes these same forces are ready and equipped to fight organized terrorism, counterinsurgency, and revolution in Third World Countries which are characteristically distant locales, remote areas, and usually unfriendly.7 The hijacking of Trans World flight 847, the Iranian hostage crisis, the terrorist attack on the U.S. embassy in Lebanon and the Marine barracks there, and the Nicaraguan conflict, while individually appearing finite in scope, present a broad range of low-intensity conflicts for which the U.S. has failed to suitably plan, prepare, and equip. These tragic failures of U.S. geo-political policy and strategy underscore the strategic dead end U.S. policy makers have allowed themselves to follow. A definite sense of reluctance permeates American policy makers thought processes (directly as a result of the Vietnam war and indirectly from strong moral and ethical considerations based on an increasingly liberal society) creating a reluctance to support conflicts militarily. The United States, however, cannot adopt a policy of nonenvolvement or indifference only to watch the Soviets nibble away at our interest abroad, narrow our sea lanes of communication, and slowly strangle the economic support developed in the the Third World. American leadership must deal with this burden by being very selective in choosing those conflicts that more directly reflect the nations strategic policy. The United States will have to depend (as demanded by popular public support) on high-technology, low manpower operations in support of foreign governments, allies, or revolutionary parties in low-intensity conflicts. 8 The decreased possibility of direct confrontation, between NATO forces and the Soviet Union, on the European front coupled with the Soviets continued use of subversive tactics and coercive diplomacy in the Third World necessitate a revaluation of present national security strategy to encompass this new threat-- low-intensity warfare. Since the experimental explosion of their first atomic weapon, the Soviets have posed a grave threat to the continued domestic stability of the United States via the impending possibility of full scale nuclear war. Both their first strike capability and retaliatory power have permeated an uncomfortable feeling throughout the American populace. As time has shown, the United States and its nuclear allies through the display and deployment of nuclear weapons have successfully deterred the Soviet Union from using its nuclear arsenal. The Soviet nuclear threat is a real one, but there remains an even greater threat which goes relatively unnoticed and unchallenged. Nuclear proliferation has become a slowly spreading and ever-expanding cloud of impending devastation since the first use of these weapons. The unwelcome spread of nuclear weapons to other nations threatens the status quo of our fragile envelope of protection-- deterrence. The ever-present delicate balance of power among nations with nuclear arsenals is at risk of confrontation caused by the spread of these weapons thereby fostering a deleterious instability in the world.9 There are at present six nations with the bomb-- the United States, the Soviet Union, Great Britain, France, China and India. 10 All these countries have exploded nuclear devices, but they do not remain the only candidates holding this means of destruction. Pakistan hoodwinked the European uranium consortium and gained technical help for its bomb program. Pakistan may be ready for a test in a few years. South Africa may have exploded a nuclear device in 1979. Israel, according to some estimates, may already posses two hundred nuclear warheads. Colonel Muammar Quaddafi has a bid on the world market to buy the "Moslem bomb." If the Iranian revolution of Ayatollah Khomeini had occurred years later, the Shah could have developed a bomb from the four nuclear power plants under construction. In addition, Iraq would have had nuclear weapons if Israel had not preempt its attempts by destroying the supposed nuclear research plant. 11 Even more worrisome is the unbelievable numbers of other countries capable of developing nuclear weapons. Some of these countries are our allies, but the situation is no less disconcerting. The Federal Energy Research and Development Agency compiled this list of bomb-potential nations: Countries technically capable of detonating a nuclear device within less than one year and up to three years if they chose to do so: Argentina, Canada, West Germany, Italy, Japan, Spain, and Sweden. Countries capable of detonating a nuclear device within four to six years: Belgium, Brazil, Czechoslovakia, East Germany, South Korea, The Netherlands, Norway, Poland, and Switzerland. Countries capable of detonating a nuclear device within seven to ten years: Austria, Denmark, Egypt, Finland, Iran, Mexico, Portugal, Romania, Turkey, and Yugoslavia. 12 The Agency developed this inventory in the early eighties. This registry of nations crashing the nuclear club seems a very startling. The possible scenarios are terrifying. Suppose Libya, who is determined to acquire nuclear weapons, receives a gift of the bomb from Pakistan as an act of Islamic solidarity. Colonel Quaddafi brandishes it against Israel, and the crisis escalates. The Soviet Union, Libya's ally, joins the confrontation and so does Israel's ally, the United States; the conflict quickly builds to regional and then a global nuclear catastrophe. The Soviet threat is known. There are carefully calculated counter forces in place to thwart any actions the Soviets take. Where there is a lack of direction and purpose no preparations can be made, no plans set into motion, and no defenses bolstered to provide and effective defense. A heightened awareness should be proposed by our leadership, a greater voice raised by civilians, and a redirected National Security Strategy should be set in motion. Look not to the Soviets in fear of nuclear attack. Rather, direct attention to those emerging nations who are developing the powers of mass destruction. The burgeoning numbers of these countries in the nuclear club is a direct overwhelming threat to our national security which must be pursued in the National Security Strategy. 13 The United States can protect itself from an unknown nuclear attack precipitated by the undaunted spread of nuclear arms, yet if there is no preparation there is no protection. Successful administration of a complex and far-reaching policy like our National Security Strategy must have sound, concrete objectives with a single, strong leadership to carry it out. The executive branch formulates National Security Strategy and employs it by exercising the elements of National Power-- political, economic and military. 14 To more concisely focus the three elements of National Power, strong political leadership is necessary to promote a unity of purpose. Our National Security Strategy has a global influence, yet we do not have one voice but many voices expounding a direction for policy-- the executive branch, the legislative branch, the media, and the public. There should be no confusion of our purpose in countries that threaten the U.S. If there are many sources dictating policy decisions, the success of those policies is diluted in direct proportion to the confusion expressed by the sources. There is more effective control if our goals are expressed by one leader. A clear expression of policy will enable other countries of the world to know what to expect when their policies conflict with those of the U.S. In return, a certain amount of deterrence can be expected-- our major strategic goal.15 The "START Treaty" was negotiated from a position of unity in the United States and has resulted in an agreement with Soviet Union that could cut strategic offensive arms by 50 percent. In contrast, our confused, indecisive policies in Nicaragua have served us poorly because we failed to approach these policies with a unified leadership; furthermore, these policy vacillations in Nicaragua create a fog that obscures our political goals in other Latin American countries. Until the Vietnam war, the president had power of executive prerogative, especially during war, to administer national security policy with only minor interference from congress. 16 Presidential initiative brought the U.S. into a war in Asia which gradually became unpopular. Nightly, the American public experienced the horrors of war via television. As a consequence, presidential prerogative came under attack. Congress passed the "War Powers Act" which helped to precipitate a resurgence of congressional power and a dilution of presidential power. The constitution gives the president the power to make and execute national security policy, but it also gives or grants congress the power to make war. Hence, there has been an adversary relationship developing between the executive and legislative branches. The formulation and execution of U.S. policies and strategies should be reflected by a clarity of positive leadership from the executive branch. The current power structure between the executive and legislative branch should be reassessed with an accentuation on executive prerogative. The congress can never speedily make any decision or speak with unity. The reluctance of congress to provide the financial resources necessary to support our National Security Strategy is a cause for rising concern. 17 When our leadership formulates policies, initiates strategy, and fails to carry them out because congress wavers, a diverse message is sent to the American people and to those countries affected by these policies. An ambiguous stance on security policy results in a failure of the policy or strategy to the detriment of our National Security interest and threatens our national structure. Technology access exposes leaders failures and successes quickly. A more informed public and congress closes the gap between leaders and followers informatively. There is a necessity for consensus in congress and in the public toward a better understanding of our National Security Strategy, thus enabling the U.S. to speak with unity. Ronald Reagan understood the need for presidential prerogative when he wrote: America's national power is sometimes thought of only in coercive or military terms. I believe, however, that national power is also derived from a nation's moral legitimacy and leadership, as we exemplified by the Marshall plan after World War II- an act of strengthening allies, of enlightened self-interest. Today nations understand that the effective use of national power is something more than the simple use of force and we seek to follow a National Security Strategy that ensures we have rapport with other nations based on credibility rather than simple capability. 18 The president must boldly answer the big questions without fear of reprisal. A decrease of congressional involvement in executive affairs would allow the president to effectively administer the National Powers in order to secure our future freedom. "The direction of war implies the direction of the common strength and the power of directing and employing the common strength forms a usual and essential part in the definition of the executive authority," with these words Alexander Hamiltion described the valued role of the presidentin national security affairs.19 The president plays multiple roles in the execution of policy, but he also acts as a party leader, a national spokesperson, a peacekeeper, a manager of prosperity, and a world leader. The complexity and scope of administering to national security affairs has increased the need for augmentation of the presidential staff which greatly diffuses the responsibility-- adding voices to policy making. The elements of this collective institutionalization of national security administration are the National Security Council, the State Department, the Department of Defense, the Central Intelligence Agency, and the Office of Management and Budget, all playing a role in national security. If the products of these agencies are to be clear and concise, they must be filtered through the president as the leader in national security. Our forefathers structured the Constitution in order to diffuse the power structure between the congress and the president. As Jordon and Taylor wrote, ". . . the president is the commander and chief. . ., but he has nothing to command unless congress uses the power it possesses to raise and support armies and to support and maintain a navy. "20 The president must be the focal point of National Security Strategy. The actions of congress are painfully slow and open to world scrutiny. During a crisis, only the president can make expedient, prudent National Security Policy decisions. The workings of congress are spread across many committees which may unduly influence its policies. As a result, there is no focal point in congress to express the broad views held; each committee tends to formulates its own views. Still, congress could be unduly swayed by public opinion (especially the House of Representatives) because members are worried about reelection. The general public is often better informed than in the past but it is mostly influenced by the news media which tends to bend the news to its own designs. The news media may unwittingly contribute to a public opinion which does not consist of all the vital information necessary to make a correct decision on a National Security level. The congress, the media, and the public continue to challenge and question the policies of the executive branch hindering its function as intended by the constitution. A search for an adequate answer to this problem insures dilemma. There are no easy answers, for we live in a democracy based on freedom of expression; nevertheless, in order to realize the success of our National Security Strategy there can be, as in the military, only one leader. BIBLIOGRAPHY 1. Reagan, Ronald. "The National Security Strategy of the United States." The White House (January 1988). 2. Markey, Edward. Nuclear Peril. Cambridge, Mass: Ballinger Publishing Co., 1982, 125. 3. Drew, Dennis and Donald Snow. Making Strategy-- Introduction to National Security Processes and Problems. Maxwell Airforce Base, Alabama: Air University Press, 1988, 27-44. 4. Decker, Michael H., Capt, USMC. "The MAGTF and Low-Intensity Conflict." Marine Corps Gazzette (March 1988), 45. 5. Turner, Stansfield. "The Formulation of Military Strategy." in The Art and Practice of Military Strategy, Ed. George E. Thibault. Washington D.C.: National Defense University, 1984, 15-27. 6. Drodge, Dolf. 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Boulder, Colorado: Westview Press, 1984. 16. Jordan, Amos and William Taylor, Jr. American National Security Policy and Process. Baltimore, Maryland: The John Hopkins University Press, 1981. 17. Reagan, Ronald. "The National Security Strategy of the United States." The White House (January 1988). 18. Reagan, Ronald. "The National Security Strategy of the United States." The White House (January 1988). 19. Jordan, Amos and William Taylor, Jr. American National Security Policy and Process. Baltimore, Maryland:The John Hopkins University Press, 1981, 83. 20. Jordan, Amos and William Taylor, Jr. American National Security Policy and Process. Baltimore, Maryland: The John Hopkins University Press, 1981, 83.
