The Ace As A Maneuver Element AUTHOR Major Steven B. Donnell, USMC CSC 1989 SUBJECT AREA - Aviation EXECUTIVE SUMMARY TITLE: THE ACE AS A MANEUVER ELEMENT I. Purpose: To establish the ACE as a maneuver element within the MAGTF. II. Problem: Historically, the ACE has been relegated to a subordinate, supporting role to the GCE. Marine Corps doctrine is responsible, and as a result, the ACE is reac- tive not proactive. III. Data: The Marine Corps has repeatedly fought the GCE, not the MAGTF. Training programs have promoted this atti- tude with the Combined Arms Exercises being a good example. In fact, the MAGTF planning cycle calls for the GCE to devel- op the courses of action regardless of which element may be the focus of effort. Due to the expeditionary nature of the MAGTF, the GCE cannot stand alone on the battlefield for any period of time without the employment of the ACE's combat power. Since Close Air Support is just one sub-function of the ACE's capabilities, the ACE can provide additional sup- port to the MAGTF commander in the form of aviation maneuver elements that can see and shade the battlefield. Aviation maneuver elements can operate as the focus of effort, sup- porting attack or in a reserve capacity. The implications are many and varied: The GCE will have less direct support, the ACE, at times, will operate like the GCE, and the MAGTF planning cycle will need revising to allow the ACE to devel- op courses of action as the focus of effort. IV. Conclusion: The ACE is not only a supporting element for the GCE, but an additional maneuver element for the MAGTF. V. Recommendations: That the unique capabilities of aviation maneuver elements be recognized as a viable force within the MAGTF and the changes necessary to employ aviation maneuver elements be made. THE ACE AS A MANEUVER ELEMENT OUTLINE Thesis Statement. The Aviation Combat Element (ACE) is more than just a supporting arm for the Ground Combat Element (GCE) , it's an additional maneuver element that can assist the MAGTF commander in winning on the battlefield. I. Introduction A. ACE as a supporting arm B. ACE as a maneuver element 1. JCS Pub l definition 2. Examples a. Patton in Europe b. Vietnam War II. Employment Considerations A. Focus of Effort 1. Air Superiority 2. Reconnaissance 3. Airfield Seizure B. Supporting Attack 1. Deception 2. Flank Security 3. DAS short of the FSCL C. Reserves 1. FMFM 5-4A example D. Limitations 1. Sustainability 2. Target Acquisition E. Advantages 1. Mobility 2. Firepower 3. Intelligence Collection III. Implications A. Command and Control B. MAGTF Planning Cycle 1. Courses of Action 2. Apportionment and Allocation of Assets C. ACE as the GCE 1. GCE OPCON to the ACE 2. Mission Type Orders 3. Commander's Intent IV. Implementation A. MAGTF planning cycle revisions B. Apportionment and Allocation C. DAS short of the FSCL D. Aviation instruction in GCE tactics E. CAX revisions F. Turf battles V. Conclusion A. The perfect plan THE ACE AS A MANEUVER ELEMENT The Marine Corps has historically advertiged itself as an Air-around team with Marine Air supporting ground maneu- ver elements to present an integrated, combined arms force to the enemy. This concept has served the Corps well over the years; however, coordinating supporting arms is a diffi- cult task. As a result, the Marine Corps has invested heavi- ly in its live fire, Combined Arms Exercises (CAX) at the Marine Corps Air Ground Combat Center (MCAGCC), Twentynine Palms, California. The CAX program is the primary means to train and evaluate the officers and men of the Ground Combat Element (GCE) in the orchestration of supporting arms. Unfortunately, this puts the ACE (Aviation Combat Element) in a subordinate role to the GCE rather than a equal member of the MAGTF (Marine Air Ground Task Force). Although this paper is not about the CAX program itself, the training environment at MCAGCC fosters an attitude that the ACE is best employed as a supporting arm for the GCE. While this may be true in some cases, the fact is the ACE is more than a supporting arm: it is an additional maneuver element that can assist the MAGTF commander in winning on the battle- field. When the Commandant renamed the MAGTF's as expeditionary, he aptly described the mission of the MAGTF. That is, an armed force organized to accomplish a specific objective in a foreign country.(l:138) Expeditionary also means light, mobile forces ready to deploy on short notice. As light infantry the GCE cannot stand alone on the battlefield for any period of time without the employment of the ACE's combat power. Since Close Air Support (CAS) is just one sub-function of the ACE's capabilities, the ACE can provide additional support to the MAGTF commander in the form of aviation maneuver elements that can see and shape the battlefield. The ACE operating as a maneuver element is not a new concept. Patton often used the 8th Air Force to protect his flank during the European campaign in WW II.(2:686) American aviation units operating out of air bases in Thailand during the Vietnam War were not only maneuver elements but the main effort, with Marine ground units providing airfield securi- ty. Maneuver is defined as the employment of forces on the battlefield through movement in combination with fire, or fire potential, to achieve a position of advantage in re- spect to the enemy in order to accomplish the mission. (1:220) Obviously, an aviation unit could qualify as a maneuver element based on this definition. Indeed, the CSSE (Combat Service Support Element) would also qualify under certain conditions. Would the ACE operating as a maneuver element change the mission of Marine Corps aviation? No, not at all. The primary mission of Marine aviation is still to participate as the supporting air component to the Fleet Marine Force, i.e., MAGTF, in the seizure and defense of advance naval bases and the conduct of such land operations as may be essential to the prosecution of a naval campaign. Operating as a maneuver element under the direction of the MAGTF commander could hardly be construed as a violation of the mission of Marine Corps aviation. Would the ACE operating as a maneuver element require additional capabilities beyond the six functions normally associated with Marine aviation? Again, the answer is no. The issue is not what the ACE can do, but how the ACE is employed. Any employment of the ACE as a maneuver element would probably fall into three categories: focus of effort (main attack) , supporting attack, or reserves. The ACE could become the focus of effort simply as the only effort at a given point in time. A good example would be pre-landing operations during an amphibious assault where the ACE is tasked with gaining air superiority. Similarly, the ACE could be the main effort in the first phase of an attack as the MAGTF's eyes and ears with its various reconnaissance aircraft determining the size and location of enemy forces prior to any ground units crossing the line of departure. In both cases described above the ACE is the main effort by default. They are the only unit in action; therefore, not competing with other units for the priority of fires. Nevertheless, in each case the ACE is conducting a critical phase of the MAGTF's operation essential to the accomplishment of the mission. Another example of the ACE as the main effort would be during the evacuation of noncombatants where the MEU(SOC) (Marine Expeditionary (Unit [Special Operations Capable]) must seize an airfield and a port facility. With the infantry battalion taking the port, the ACE commander would be responsible for seizing the airfield and, no doubt, would need ground forces assigned to his operational control. There are many possible missions that the ACE can per- dorm in a supporting role, such as simulated troop lifts as part of a deception plan. Even though the ACE possesses different capabilities than the GCE, there are certain sup- porting attacks suited to the abilities of an ACE maneuver element. Providing flank/rear security is a viable mission for the ACE. FMFM 5-4A. Close Air Support and Close-In Fire Support provides an excellent example. (4;J-1,2,3) In this situation a battalion is tasked with defending a corridor on the regiment's left against an enemy armored thrust, while the remainder of the regimental assets are maneuvered. During the ensuing battle. the Battalion AO (Air Officer) passes control to a FAC(A) , Forward Air Con troller (Airborne) , due to poor visibility. Flying in a UH-1N the FAC(A) employs three flights of AH-1W Cobras armed with TOW missiles and 2.75 rockets, plus a flight of AV-8B's. Under the cover of friendly artillery, the first flight of Cobras attacks the armored column forcing them to deploy. As the engagement progresses, the second flight of Cobras continues the attack while the first flight proceeds to the FARP (Forward Arming and Refueling Point) to rearm and refuel. The AV-8B's are called in; however, due to counterbattery fire, the friendly artillery, a 155mm battery, is unable to provide marking or SEAD (Suppression of Enemy Air Defense) fires. Instead, the Cobras mark and suppress with 2.75 rockets as the AV-8B's first drop air delivered mines to trap the enemy and then reattack with CBU's (Cluster Bomb Units). With the enemy in retreat, the final flight of Cobras held in reserve pursues by fire to exploit the withdrawing forces. Even though the ACE was in support of the GCE during this engagement, the MAGTF commander could have assigned this mission to the ACE instead of the GCE, thereby allowing the infantry battalion to remain with the regiment. In doing so, the ACE maneuver element would have become an adjacent unit to the regiment, responsible for defending, delaying and destroying enemy forces within a geographical area, without having to seize, occupy and hold a particular piece of terrain. If there is one area on the battlefield where the ACE could have a major impact as a maneuver element, it would be air strikes against hostile targets shore of the FSCL (Fire Support Coordination Line), but beyond the area normally associated with CAS (Close Air Support). Generally, this area would include first echelon reinforcements, lateral lines of communications, assembly areas for massing forces, forward based helicopters and any other surface targets that pose a direct threat to friendly forces. The Army and Air Force has labeled air strikes into this region as BAI (Battlefield Air Interdiction). (3:F-3) Since the air strike would be short of the FSCL, coordination with the FSCC (Fire Support Coordination Center) is required, but control, essentially the decision as to where, when and how to strike, rests with the ACE. Doctrinally, the Marine Corps does not recognize BAI.(6:7) Instead, air strikes on hostile targets beyond observation of friendly lines are performed by the ACE, primarily at the request of the GCE. This method works but it puts the ACE in a reactive role similar to CAS, when preferably, ACE maneuver elements could actively pursue these targets on their own initiative given the proper mission-type orders from the MAGTF. In this manner, the ACE would be a MAGTF main or supporting attack, which, in con- junction with the efforts of the GCE, would mutually support the accomplishment of the overall mission. Even though the ACE can operate as a maneuver element similar to the GCE, it has certain limitations unique to aviation. Unlike troops, aircraft have to be fed about every two hours and since man, not God, made the machines, they tend to break more often. Similarly, pilots have a crewday limitation based on their ability to function effectively in the cockpit under combat conditions, especially during periods of reduced visibility and darkness. As a result, sustainability is a key planning factor for the MAGTF and the ACE when employing aviation maneuver elements. In order to survive in a high threat environment an aircraft must be able to operate at high airspeeds. Unfortu- nately, a pilot in a fast moving aircraft has difficulty acquiring and identifying hostile targets without someone on the ground to assist. Since aviation maneuver elements infer a certain amount of autonomous operations, aircraft may have to make repeated passes over the target area, there- by increasing their exposure to enemy fire. With advances in technology, the ability of pilots and/or aircraft to acquire targets will improve, but unless an airborne or ground source can put the pilot's eyes on the target, single-pass destruction flights will be hampered. While airspeed may be a drawback to target acquisition, it gives the aviation maneuver element great mobility above the battlefield. This mobility allows the ACE to respond quickly to hostile threats or attack deep into the enemy rear. Further, the ACE can deliver a tremendous variety of firepower at a given point and time and gather intelligence over a large area with real time data link to the TACC (Tac- tical Air Control Center). Of all the possible missions listed thus far for an ACE maneuver element, there are none that Marine aviation has not done before. Whether an aircraft is part of a maneuver element or not, it still drops bombs or carries troops and supplies. So what's different about an aviation maneuver element? The answers are command and control. No longer will just the GCE be in command on the battlefield with the ACE in a supporting role. As the focus of effort, the ACE will be responsible for the accomplishment of the MAGTF mission, and possibly, terrain and ground forces. As a maneuver element, the ACE will exercise more control over its own actions and the shaping of the battlefield. There are additional implications with the ACE as a maneuver element, as listed below. 1. The MAGTF planning cycle is inadequate. 2. The ACE must use GCE tactics. 3. The GCE will become a supporting unit. 4. The GCE will have less support aircraft. Historically, the Marine Corps has fought the GCE with the ACE and CSSE in subordinate, supporting roles. Doc- trine dictates it. (7:3-6) In the MAGTF planning cycle the GCE develops the courses of action while the ACE and CSSE produce concepts of employment and estimates of supportabili- ty. What if the ACE was the focus of effort during a partic- ular phase of an operation? Would not the ACE be the best qualified to develop those courses of action? If not, cer- tainly the MAGTF staff should. In any event, if the ACE determines that he needs ground forces to accomplish the mission, the GCE will need to provide an estimate of supportability. Currently, the planning models do not have the flexibility to allow the ACE and GCE to reverse their traditional roles. As a maneuver element operating in a similar manner to the GCE, the ACE must use GCE tactics. Specifically, the ACE must be able to function effectively with mission-type orders. Further, he must understand commander's intent to the extent that he can continue to fight without further guidance and, more importantly, that the aviators and any ground forces under his charge be able to do the same. The idea of ground forces under the control of an aviator is a scary thought, at least in the minds of most grunts and probably quite a few aviators, too. The fact that some MAGTF commanders are aviators does not count, since their MOS is coincidental to their position as the overall commander. FMFM 3-1 discusses in great detail the various ways of assigning one unit to support another. Whether it's OPCON, attached, direct support, general sup- port, or reinforcing, eventually, the ACE will have to pro- vide some guidance to the ground forces supporting his scheme of maneuver. As soon as one maneuver element is employed by the ACE for operations independent of the GCE, the total number of aircraft available to support the GCE is reduced. Not only does the ACE have to provide backups for the scheduled takeoff, but must set aside a reserve component for that maneuver element. This may be frustrating to a company commander who is unable to get helicopters to lift his unit, or AV-8B's for a CAS mission,but that aviation maneuver element may be performing a mission that an infantry company or battalion would normally have to do, or engaging enemy forces that otherwise might be directed against his unit. The concept of an aviation maneuver element may be a palatable thought to most; however, if this maneuver element is to be fully incorporated into the MAGTF, some fundamental changes are necessary. The Marine Corps needs to develop a MAGTF planning cycle that allows that element of the MAGTF which is the focus of effort to develop the courses of action for the MAGTF com- mander's approval. A generic model will not work: the FMFM 3-1 version being a good example.(5:47) Ultimately. the perfect MAGTF planning cycle would be versatile enough to facilitate compositing into higher and adjacent planning models such as joint, amphibious or MEU(SOC) rapid plan- ning. Regardless, as long as the GCE continues to develop the courses of action, the ACE and CSSE will not be fully employed and the MAGTF will suffer as a whole. The MAGTF staff would not be a good choice for develop- ing courses of action. If they did, there would be no need for ACE and GCE commanders. Instead, all the squadrons and battalions would work directly for the MAGTF commander and his staff. Besides, in joint operations the MAGTF will be too busy dealing with higher and adjacent units to tell the division and wing commanders how to employ their units. While on the subject of planning, the ACE needs to spe- cifically address apportionment and allocation in the Avia- tion Estimate of Supportability. Under current formats the ACE dicusses his ability to support the various courses of action in general terms. If operating in the joint arena or when utilizing aviation maneuver elements, more detailed planning is required for two reasons. First, ACE maneuver elements reduce the number of aircraft available to the rest of the force -- the GCE and CSSE need to know for their own planning. Second, apportionment is the determination and assignment of the total expected effort by percentage and/or by priority that should be devoted to the various air opera- tions for a given period of time. (1:32) Allocation is the translation of that apportionment into total number of sor- ties by aircraft type available for each operation. (1:24) If the ACE's assets are not fully utilized by the MAGTF, then the Air Component Commander of the joint Task Force can siphon those "excess sorties". If the ACE is to maximize its assets, then the Marine Corps must recognize and label this grey area between CAS and DAS. Procedures need to be developed that allow ACE maneuver elements, CAS diverts or airborne alerts to immedi- ately engage hostile targets beyond CAS range without bureau- cratic delays. Perhaps, SOP's or letters of agreement be- tween the ACE and GCE (FSCC) could streamline the coordina- tion/deconfliction procedures for air strikes short of the FSCL. Or, more simply, the flight leader could be given a full tank of gas, a full load of ordnance, the commander's intent two levels up (ACE and MAGTF), and told to pass his BDA (Bomb Damage Assessment) to the G-2 upon landing. Aviators need to learn GCE tactics with emphasis on mission-type orders, commander's intent, and de-centralized control. The Commandant's new PME program is a good start, but it's long term and not enough by itself. The wing should mirror the division's AO program by having a company grade infantry officer assigned to each squadron as a liai- son, instructor, and advisor to the commanding officer. Once the ACE and GCE are on the same sheet of music, the CAX program needs to be changed. Too much money and time is being invested not to include the ACE in operations other than providing the GCE with CAS and assault support. The GCE "higher headquarters" should be replaced with a MAGTF headquarters and squadrons should be evaluated on how well they operate as maneuver elements in concert with the MAGTF's mission. Finally, the Marine Corps has got to come to terms with the ACE as a maneuver element. Waging turf wars will only complicate the transition. This means disregarding old perceptions, maintaining open minds, avoiding stereotypes, and dropping the heat shields. The infantry community should be able to trust an aviation unit on its left flank and the ACE can no longer think of Schwerpunkt as a bad German wine. Regardless of how the ACE may be employed, the ultimate objective is a fully integrated MAGTF with all three elements (ACE, CSSE, GCE) providing the assistance necessary for the MAGTF commander to win on the battlefield. Perhaps the following excerpt from a "concept of operations" best illustrates this idea. Phase One. The ACE is the focus of effort with its reconnaissance aircraft enabling the MAGTF commander to see the battlefield. Phase Two. The ACE remains the focus of effort as maneu- ver elements shade the battlefield by gaining air Superiori- ty and interdicting the enemy's capability to reinforce the head-knocking area to the extent that the GCE can chew them up. Phase Three. The GCE becomes the focus of effort and prosecutes the battle within the head-knocking area with the ACE providing CAS and assault support. Phase Four. After the attack reaches a culminating point, the CSSE becomes the focus of effort with the ACE providing aerial resupply. As the example above shows, the ACE can play a pivotal role either as a main or supporting attack. And if the capabilities of Marine aviation are to be fully exploited, then the Marine Corps must fight the MAGTF, not the GCE, and in doing so, employ the ACE as a supporting and maneuvering element. BIBLIOGRAPHY 1. Department of Defense. Joint Chiefs of Staff. Dictionary Of Military Terms, JCS Pub 1. Washington, D.C., l987 2. Farago, Ladislas. Patton: Ordeal and Triumph. New York: I Obolensky, 1964. 3. U.S. Army. Department of the Army. Fire Support in Combined Arms Operation, FM 6-20. Washington, D.C. 1984. 4. U.S. Marine Corps. Close Air Support and Close-In Fire Support. FMFM 5-4A. Quantico, 1988. 5. U.S. Marine Corps. Command And Staff Action, FMFM 3-1. Quantico, 1979. 6. U.S. Marine Corps. Marine Aviation, FMFM 5-1. Quantico, 1979. 7. U.S. Marine Corps. Marine Air-Ground Task Force Doctrine, FMFM 0-1. Quantico, 1979.
