Artillery- A Different Perspective AUTHOR Major J. S. Dill, USMC CSC 1989 SUBJECT AREA - Artillery EXECUTIVE SUMMARY Title ARTILLERY - A DIFFERENT PERSPECTIVE Thesis. Although Marine Corps Artillery effectively supports a conventional non-mechanized maneuver element; it fails, however, to adequately support a mechanized force that is employing the concept of maneuver warfare in a high mobility environment. Issue. Maneuver warfare will require new artillery fire support techniques, mostly these will be techniques that provide rapid close fire support to the ground combat maneuver elements Point of Main Event. Artillery support will be worthless if it is not rapidly responsive. The amount of ordnance delivered on a target is less important than the rapid effect of ordnance on the target. The essential element of artillery fire support for maneuver warfare is time. Maneuver warfare is more than just movement, it is movement relative to the enemy. A combatant employing maneuver warfare tactics leads from the front focusing on the every situation by using initiative and rapid operational tempo. The importance of artillery fire support in maneuver warfare cannot be over emphasized. Obviously speed in movement and mobility are key aspects. However, tactical fire direction, positioning, fire planning, movement plans, resupply, all must contribute to foster tempo of operations not just fast moving howitzers. The artillerys function will be to keep up with the movement force probably travelling as an element of the force in order to provide rapid suppression fires. Conclusion. The mission of Marine Corps artillery will not change. Artillery will always have to provide timely, close, accurate and rapid fire support to the maneuver force. However, the importance of artillery fire support in maneuver warfare cannot be over emphasized. The artillery's function will be to provide rapid suppression fires in order to neutralize the enemy so that ground combat element can accomplish its mission. What will change is the tactics and techniques used to provide the required fire support. ARTILLERY - A Different Perspective THESIS STATEMENT: Although United States Marine Corps artillery effectively supports a conventional non-mechanized maneuver element; it fails, however, to adequately support a mechanized force that is employing the concept of maneuver warfare in a high mobility environment. I. USMC Artillery A. Mission B. Roles 1. Close Support Fires 2. Counterfires 3. Interdiction Fires II. Traditional Warfare Versus Maneuver Warfare A. Concept of Traditional War l. Managerial Approach 2. Tactical Objectives 3. Success Depends on Attrition B. Concept of Maneuver War l. Disrupt the Enemy's OODA Loop 2. Gain and Maintain the Initiative 3. Destroy the Enemy's Command and Control System 4. Firepower used to create gaps III. Artillery Support A. Traditional Warfare l. Movement Serves Firepower B. Maneuver Warfare l. Firepower Serves Movement Throughout history the artillery has been referred to as "The God of War" or "The King of Battle" and its importance has been emphasized by such Great Captains as Frederick the Great, Napolean and Rommel to name a few. Napoleon was the first commander in history to use his artillery as a mobile force employing it as a whole at the decisive time to create a "gap" thus enabling his maneuver elements to defeat the enemy. Napoleon felt that "the artillery, like other arms, must be collected in mass if one wishes to attain a decisive result."1 One might say that the mission of Napoleon's artillery was to destroy or neutralize the enemy by cannon fires. Today, the mission of the artillery is to destroy, neutralize or suppress the enemy by cannon, rocket and missile fires, and to assist in integrating all fire support into combined arms operations.2 Although Marine Corps artillery effectively supports a conventional non-mechanized maneuver element; it fails, however, to adequately support a mechanized force that is employing the concept of maneuver warfare in a high mobility environment. Doctrinally the minimum adequate support for committed units is considered to be one field artillery battalion in direct support of each committed Regiment. Traditionally artillery provides close support fires, counter fires and interdiction fires as required for maneuver forces. These fires suppress, neutralize, canalize or destroy enemy attack formations or defenses, obscure his vision and otherwise inhibit his ability to visually acquire friendly targets, and destroy targets deep in the enemy's rear with long range fires. Close support fires engage enemy forces, weapons, or positions that are threatening or can threaten friendly forces. They allow the commander to rapidly multiply combat power effects and shift fires quickly about the battlefield. The MAGTF commander provides close support to his maneuver elements by assigning tactical missions to the artillery. The four standard tactical missions are direct support (DS), reinforcing (R), general support reinforcing (GSR), and general support (GS). These missions make artillery support immediately responsive to maneuver forces. Close fire support expands the depth of the battlefield, erodes enemy forces and inflicts damage well beyond direct fire ranges. Counterfires attack enemy indirect fire systems such as mortar, artillery, and air defense units. Counterfires allow freedom of action to supported maneuver forces and is accomplished with mortars, cannons, guns, and aircraft. It must be remembered that counterfire is not a separate artillery battle but rather a combined arms battle. Within the artillery, counterfire is normally the responsibility of General Support or General Support reinforcing units. Interdiction fires disrupt, delay, neutralize, or destroy enemy forces that, because of range limitations or other reasons, cannot fire their weapons on friendly forces. Since I've established a foundation for the mission and roles of the artillery, I'd like to compare the concept of traditional warfare to maneuver warfare. Traditional or "attrition warfare" is the managerial approach to warfare focusing on body counts, kill ratios, target servicing and mutual bludgeoning contests. Forces are ground down by casualties. War is reduced to a simple mathematical equation and the side with the most men and material can absorb losses, endure the meat grinder longer, and win by being quantitatively superior. Tactical objectives sought are terrain features, attacks are frontal, and defenses are linear. Battles are set piece and movement is ponderous. Speed of operations is sacrificed for the methodical coordination of supporting arms. There is an over reliance on technology to do the job. Technological solutions for combat are emphasized instead of tactical ones. David Palmer in his book, "Summons of the Trumpet" notes how the helicopter provided United States forces in the Republic of Vietnam with superior technological mobility, but it was the North Vietnamese army that clearly retained superior tactical mobility by staying light on their feet. The attrition style of war continues to seek technological answers to tactical problems. Combat effectiveness is replaced by managerial efficiency and the net result of such a high degree of reliance on technology is an overwhelming depen- dence on machines. Tactics are simply disregarded.3 Historically, the military forces of the United States of America have fought the traditional or attrition warfare of force on force, meat grinder style of war. Ulysses Simpson Grant followed it, John J. Pershing followed it, Dwight D. Eisenhower followed it, and the United States Marine Corps fought it throughout World War II. The concept of maneuver warfare is best thought of as a continuous tactical thought process. One that seeks to combine tactics, techniques, and the art of war in imaginative ways to cut inside the enemy's observation, orientation, decision and action cycle commonly referred to as his OODA loop. The enemy's cohesion and fighting organization are destroyed by staying ahead of him in thought and action thus forcing him to be reactive vice proactive in a given tactical situation. This requires the commander to create a fluid and turbulent environment for the enemy, by repeatedly presenting the enemy with new, unexpected, and tactically dangerous events and operational crises. The idea is to gain and maintain the initiative so that the enemy is responding to one perceived situation when he's hit with another. If successful, the enemy is overcome by a feeling of hopelessness and shock. No matter what he does, he is always one step behind reacting to an old crisis. The primary objective is the enemy's mind. The ultimate goal is to destroy his nerve network and his command and control system. The common operational theme is to move forces into unexpected places at unexpected times, with surprising speed. Firepower is used to divert the enemy's attention, exploit his weaknesses, create gaps within his surface, shatter cohesion, and create dangerous tactical events which ultimately affect his observation, orientation, decision and action loop. Firepower in a maneuver context allows the commander to close with the enemy for decisive action. This is unlike attrition warfare where firepower is generally used at great ranges in a standoff mode. The operational theme is to kill the enemy man by man and destroy each machine one by one, in set piece battle. The enemy is never actually closed with nor is the moment of decision forced upon him when he can least handle it.4 Therefore, maneuver warfare is based on operational tempo. Speed, and mobility are key aspects emphasizing the disruption of the enemy's cohesion and tactical thought process denying his ability to make correct and timely decisions on the battlefield. Its focus is on the enemy with commanders leading from the front and controlling the speed of operations. On the other hand, traditional warfare is fought from a position of overall numerical superiority in both men, materials, and firepower to reduce enemy forces through attrition. United States Marine Corps artillery, throughout its history has supported, for the most part, maneuver elements that are not mechanized by using traditional firepower attrition tactics and techniques which emphasizes the timely amount of accurate ordnance delivered on a target vice rapid effect on a target. However, if a maneuver element within the Marine Air-Ground Task Force (MAGTF) is mechanized and identified as the Point Of Main Effort (POME), the artillery commander needs to figure out how to bring his artillery up with the mechanized force to provide responsive and rapid support that might not have pinpoint accuracy, the key word here is rapid. Maneuver warfare will require fire support techniques that provide immediate artillery fires that are rapidly available. The essential element of artillery support will always be time and if fires are not responsive, they will be worthless. Therefore, the artillery commander has the potential of being confronted with a mobility problem. This mobility problem, simply stated, is that a fast moving mechanized task force could out run its supporting artillery in the movement to contact phase, the exploitation phase or in an attack to seize deep objectives, such as landing force objectives. Since the artillery cannot shoot while it's moving, the artillery commander is faced with a dilemma. Traditional doctrine and techniques dictate that the artillery commander move his artillery by unit, by echelon, or by battery "leapfrogging" in order to provide timely and accurate fire support to the ground combat element.5 When the artillery commander employs conventional doctrine does his artillery unit possess the adequate mobility required to solve the difficulty in keeping up with a mechanized task force? I submit the answer to this question is no. This is due to the disparity between the mobility of the artillery and the type of equipment it would support in a mechanized task force such as Assault Amphibian Vehicles (AAV's), M60 tanks, and Light Assault Vehicles (LAV's). If the fire support provided is not responsive enough to the maneuver element, the maneuver force will out run its support and be forced to come up with an alternate means of fire support in order to meet the mission. The key to the field artillery man's success in battle is his ability to focus combat power.6 In order for the artillery to support a maneuver force employing the concept of maneuver warfare, the artillery above all must be capable of great mobility.7 However, if the artillery is task organized into a "fire support package" with a mix of howitzers to support a mechanized maneuver unit the artillery commanders dilemma of mobility could be overcome. A new perspective to the employment of artillery support could be explained in the following hypothesis scenario. To provide artillery support for a Marine Air-Ground Task Force maneuver element that is mechanized, one approach is for the artillery to replace its wheeled vehicles with Assault Amphibian Vehicles (AAV's) or possibly Light Assault Vehicles (LAV's), of course this would be a trade-off which the Marine Air-Ground Task Force commander would have to determine. The idea is to task organized the artillery so that it is a lean and highly mobile fighting force. Of course the preferred weapon system would be the Ml09 self-propelled howitzer but towed howitzers could also do the job, with great mobility, if prime movers and ammo carriers were tracked vehicles. Although this approach might limit sustainability, it would enhance the feeling of all around protection and the ability of the field artillery to keep up with the mechanized maneuver force. The artillery would deploy in visual contact with the mechanized maneuver force. As mentioned previously the conventional doctrine of "leapfrogging" batteries or moving in echelon would be abandoned since it might result in firing batteries being left in vulnerable positions or never being able to catch up with the fast moving maneuver force. Tactical control of firing batteries would be centralized, controlled by the battalions Operations Officer (S-3), to ensure that adequate fire support is provided while technical control would be retained by firing batteries. Battery movement would be characterized by move-hipshoot-move tactics. Firing batteries would have to be ready to engage direct fire targets if the situation dictated and fire support coordinators would have to make and update simple quick fire plans. Fire support coordinators must also develop a fire support scheme of maneuver that reflects the maneuver commander's intent and compliments the scheme of maneuver. Movement would be based on the tempo of operation, the artillery commander would lead from the front seeing the battle with the maneuver commander. The relationships between the maneuver commander and the supported commander would be similar to that described in Shelford Bidwell and Dominick Graham's book Fire Power, "I found the infantry brigade commander and the field artillery commander at the side of the road, their wireless sets chattering away and the pair of them jointly and effectively in touch with what was going on and in charge of the battle. This enabled fire-plans to be developed quickly, to support whatever was required and the action needed to implement that support such as the issue of orders and the attack of targets almost simultaneously."8 The tactics for this approach call for the artillery to be dedicated or in "Direct Support" of the mechanized maneuver force and moving as an element of the maneuver force which would provide not only flank security, but also antiair security. This technique is designed to specifically support mechanized offensive operations in the delivery of rapid and focused fires while retaining mobility and agility. Whenever the mechanized task force encounters opposition, the artillery would provide high volumes of rapid fires, 2,000 to 4,000 meters to the front and flanks of the force, to create gaps in the enemy's surface thus enhancing the maneuver capability of the mechanized task force. The reason for delivering a rapid volume of fire to the front and flanks of the task force is to immediately suppress the enemy. As Mr. Bill Lind has described in his book, "Maneuver Warfare Handbook," Firepower is very important in maneuver warfare. Some people have accused maneuver warfare advocates of downgrading the importance of firepower but nothing could be further from the truth. What changes in maneuver warfare is not the importance of firepower, but the purposes for which it is used. Traditional attrition warfare uses firepower mostly the way the term implies, to reduce enemy numbers through attrition. Movement serves firepower; you move to get into a better firing to cause more attrition. Maneuver warfare uses both firepower and movement in a maneuver context. What does this mean? Usually, you are moving not just to a better firing position, but to create a series of unexpected and dangerous situations for the enemy. Only this kind of movement qualifies as maneuver. The main role of firepower is to help you maneuver. Firepower is used most often to suppress the enemy while you move around or through him.9 Nonetheless, there are three obvious disadvantages in using this approach in the employment of artillery. The first disadvantage is the inability to mass fires you probably won't be able to mass all batteries at the same time. The second is the increased difficulty in command and control while moving. Finally, the third disadvantage is the added training requirements in order to be proficient in this approach. However, in a high tempo of operations environment the artillery might be unable to provide timely fire support and if the mechanized task force out runs the range of its artillery, the artillery certainly cannot mass its fires. Nevertheless, there are distinct advantages if the artillery deploys as an element of a mechanized maneuver force. There is a reduced operational separation between the supported maneuver unit and the artillery since the artillery commander is leading from the front with the maneuver commander. Also as part of the maneuver element the artillery's flanks are protected and it is inside the maneuver force antiair defense envelope. But most importantly the artillery will always be within supporting range of the maneuver force. We must remember that under the maneuver warfare concept, the artillery will become part of a focused violence and will have to rely on speed to overwhelm the enemy with concentrated fires at decisive points in time and space. Maneuver warfare is more than just movement, it is movement relative to the enemy and its a function of operational tempo. Obviously speed in movement and mobility are key aspects of the concept. However, tactical fire direction, positioning, fire planning, movement plans, resupply, all must contribute to faster tempo of operations - not just fast moving howitzers. The importance of artillery fire support in maneuver warfare cannot be over emphasized. It must be remembered that the essential element of artillery fire support is time vice pinpoint accuracy. The artillery's function will be to provide rapid suppression fires in order to neutralize the enemy so that the ground combat element can accomplish its mission. Therefore, the requirement for autonomous artillery operations in support of maneuver warfare demands not only technical, but also tactical excellence coupled with detailed planning, continuous training, and vigorous execution. As the United States Marine Corps moves towards a mechanized task force concept, the mission of the artillery is not going to change. Artillery will always have to provide timely, close, accurate and rapid fire support to the maneuver force. What will change is how that fire support will be provided. Task organizing artillery into light, lean, and mobile fighting elements that are responsive and fast is the solution. ENDNOTES 1"Napoleon's Army," Colonel H.C.B. Rogers OBE (Hippocrene Books, New York, N.Y. 1982). 2"Fire Support Tactics and Techniques," (U.S. Army Field Artillery, School, Fort Sill, Oklahoma, 1987). 3"Maneuver Warfare Readings," (Command and Staff College, United States Marine Corps, Marine Corps Combat Development Command, Quantico, VA, FY 1989). 4Ibid. 5"The Key to Field Artillery--Focusing Combat Power," General Crosbie E. Saint, Field Artillery Journal, October 1988. 6Ibid. 7"The Rommel Papers," B. H. Liddell Hart, (The Easton Press, Norwalk, Connecticut, 1988). 8"Fire-Power British Army Weapons and Theories of War, 1904-1945," Shelford Bidwell and Dominick Graham. (George Allen and Urwin Publishers, London, U.K., 1982). 9"Maneuver Warfare Handbook," William S. Find (Westview Press, Inc. Boulder, Colorado, 1985).
