Offensive Air Support And Maneuver Warfare: Do The Military Reformers Understand Them? AUTHOR Major Eddie A. Daniels, USMC CSC 1989 SUBJECT AREA - Warfighting EXECUTIVE SUMMARY OFFENSIVE AIR SUPPORT AND MANEUVER WARFARE: DO THE MILITARY REFORMERS UNDERSTAND THEM? I. Purpose: To point out misconceptions that several military reformers, specifically Mr. William Lind, have concerning the use of offensive air support and Marine aviation on the maneuver battlefield. II. Problem: The U.S. Marine Corps has undertaken an extensive modernization program of its aviation units to meet the demands of offensive air support and other missions critical to the MAGTF's warfighting capability; however, some military reformers are voicing concepts that would adversely impact the Corps' ability to conduct these missions safely and effectively. III. Data: With the adoption of maneuver warfare as its doctrine, Marine Corps aviation is another maneuver element to help the MAGTF commander win on the battle- field. Using offensive air support, the MAGTF comman- der can support his ground forces in the form of close air support and deep air support, while assault support gives him maneuverability. Mr. William Lind and other military reformers are questioning the efficacy of some combat-proven methods and aircraft in the performance of these missions. They question the use of air as the main effort of the MAGTF, the value of air inter- diction, and the survivability of the helicopter on the maneuver battlefield. Additionally, they challenge the need for air superiority and advocate that surface-to- air missiles and antiaircraft artillery will not be a threat on the maneuver battlefield. The reformers propose a slow-speed aircraft that can take a lot of small-arms fire and survives by high-energy jinking as a replacement for the F/A-18 and the AV-8B. IV. Conclusion: The reformers' proposals indicate a lack of experience in offensive air support, its requirements, and military aviation in general. Their ideas would adversely impact the Corps' ability to conduct these missions safely and effectively. V. Recommendations: The Marine Corps must ensure that it closely evaluates the reformers' proposals and adopt only those that would enhance our performance on the maneuver battlefield. While their intentions are good, the lack of experience in combat aviation can result in dangerous proposals. OFFENSIVE AIR SUPPORT AND MANEUVER WARFARE: DO THE MILITARY REFORMERS UNDERSTAND THEM? OUTLINE Thesis statement: The U.S. Marine Corps has undertaken an extensive modernization program of its aviation units to meet the demands of offensive air support and other missions critical to the MAGTF's warfighting capability; however, some military reformers are voicing concepts that would adversely impact the Corps' ability to conduct these missions and to utilize Marine aviation safely and effectively. I. Offensive air support missions A. Deep air support B. Close air support II. Factors essential to the success of the missions A. Air superiority B. Communications C. Response time D. Target location and identification E. Pilot training III. Reformers' misconceptions A. Aviation and the MAGTF main effort B. Air interdiction and maneuver warfare C. Helicopters on the maneuver battlefield D. Air superiority and offensive air support IV. Performance and the close air support aircraft A. Deficiency of the current Marine Corp inventory B. Reformers' proposed design C. The Surface-to-air threat D. Survivability and mission completion OFFENSIVE AIR SUPPORT AND MANEUVER WARFARE: DO THE MILITARY REFORMERS UNDERSTAND THEM? With the adoption of Maneuver Warfare as its doctrine, the Marine Corps has another maneuver element to help the MAGTF commander win: Marine Aviation. Primarily in the form of offensive air support, Marine air can out maneuver enemy units and apply combat power quickly and effectively at the critical place and time needed. Offensive air support missions are of particular interest to ground forces throughout the world. Effective offensive air support, or the lack of, can mean the differ- ence between victory and defeat on today's battlefield. The U.S. Marine Corps has undertaken an extensive modernization program of its aviation units to meet the demands of offensive air support and other missions critical to the MAGTF's warfighting capability; however, some military reformers are voicing concepts that would adversely impact the Corps' ability to conduct these missions and to utilize Marine aviation safely and effectively. These reformers have little or no experience in this area and the lack of experience is evident in many of their ideas. Observing exercises and reading books on offensive air support can enlighten one on the basic concepts of these missions, but cannot replace the knowledge acquired through actual training, participation, and experience. In order to understand the misconceptions of the military reformers, we must first understand what offensive air support is and factors affecting the success of these missions. Offensive air support is described in FMFM 5-1 as: A Marine Corps term to indicate those air operations that actually deliver firepower against enemy ground forces for the destruc- tion or neutralization of installations, equipment, and personnel.(15:7) Offensive air support consists of close air support and deep air support missions. The distinction between the two is the amount of coordination required with supported ground units. (16:2) Deep air support, or interdiction, is a classical use of aviation as a maneuver element. It is attacking enemy targets and personnel beyond the boundary where close coordination with the ground unit is required. This boundary is called the Fire Support Coordination Line (FSCL). By utilizing deep air support, enemy targets, follow-on echelons, and reinforcements can be sufficiently attrited in order to reduce their influence on the ground battle. Additionally, FMFM 5-4A states that close air support (CAS) missions are: Air actions against hostile targets which are in close proximity to friendly forces and require detailed integration of each air mission with the fire and movement of those forces.(13:1.2) Close air support occurs inside of the FSCL, requiring close coordination with other fire support and ground maneuver units. Generally, close air support is utilized when artillery, naval gun fire or other supporting arms are unable to provide the necessary fire support. There are two types of CAS missions: preplanned and immediate. Preplanned CAS is further broken down into preplanned scheduled and preplanned on-call. Preplanned scheduled CAS missions, according to FMFM 5-4A. are: ...anticipated and requested sufficiently in advance to permit detailed mission coordination and planning. They are executed at a specific time specified by the supported unit and aircrews are assigned a time on target (TOT).(13:1.3) A preplanned on-call mission requires the aircraft to be loaded with ordnance for the specified target type, but not a specific target, and placed in an alert status awaiting a launch request from the supported unit. All mission essential information is usually not available to the aircrew prior to takeoff. An immediate CAS mission is: An airstrike on a target which is not identified and requested sufficiently in advance to permit detailed mission coordination or planning. These missions are executed in response to requests by the ground combat element to strike targets of opportunity. Prompt execution of these missions is normally a requisite. .. mission coordination must be accomplished while the CAS flight is en route, with the attack aircraft being briefed by the direct air support center (DASC), tactical air coordinator (airborne), (TAC(A)), or terminal controller....Successful execution of this mission is, therefore, highly dependent on extensive and reliable radio communications. Only by thoroughly practiced, standardized procedures can this be accomplished in a minimum communication environment. In the extreme case of no communications, immediate CAS is precluded.(13:1.3) Marine Corps manual FMFM 5-4 states the principal consideration in the employment of offensive air support is the MAGTF concept of operations. It must be integrated and coordinated with the ground scheme of maneuver to have significant effect on the battle. Aircraft that are randomly operating and attacking targets without regard for the concept of operations may disrupt the scheme of maneuver and cause additional confusion on the battlefield. At worst, friendly casualties may be incurred through incorrect target identification or the aircraft may be shot down by friendly fire. However, to enhance the success of any offensive air support mission, local air superiority must be attained. Air superiority may be achieved through the use of fighter aircraft or surface-to-air missiles, or a combination of the two. Another key consideration is communications. As previously stated, reduced communications require that pilots be thoroughly trained and utilize standardized procedures. When communications are precluded, CAS missions cannot be executed because of the high degree of coordination required to support the ground scheme of maneuver and prevent fratricide. Also, response time is paramount in the conduct of offensive air support. If airpower cannot be applied to influence the battle at the appropriate time and place needed, then its value is diminished. The following quotation is taken from the "Report of the Special Subcommittee on Tactical Air Support" concerning the adequacy of close air support during the Vietnam War: According to men fighting on the ground in Vietnam, whether Army or Marine, the most important single ingredient of close air support is getting on target fast. The Vietnamese war is a hit and run war in which the attackers strike suddenly and fade away rapidly. To a man pinned down by rifle or mortar fire, a minute can seem like an hour, and any delay can be the difference between life and death. The pilots who have flown in Vietnam have agreed fully that what they want more than anything else is to be over the target when needed.(12:4868) Once the CAS pilot has arrived in the vicinity of the target, he now faces the difficult task of locating and destroying it. The pilot's ingress speed and delivery tactics are factors, and are dependent on the threat level. In a low threat environment he may be able to slow down or make multiple passes to locate the target. As the threat level increases, his survival and mission success is dependent on speed, surprise, and tactics. The necessity for marking the target becomes essential. In high threat environments, CAS may be precluded. In order for all the considerations previously mentioned to be employed in a manner that will impact the battle in a positive way, pilot training and proficiency must be high. Offensive air support is among the most difficult missions to master. Marine Corps pilots who fly these missions are professionals. They have studied the surface-to-air threat and the capabilities of their aircraft, its systems and performance. They have trained in accordance with the Marine Corps' Training and Readiness manual and are well versed in the tactics. Additionally, the pilots must have a clear understanding of the MAGTF commander's intent and concept of operations. Tactics, weapons systems, and aircraft capabilities are constantly being evaluated through exercises to determine their effectiveness against the perceived threat, and recommended changes are submitted as appropriate. The Marine Corps has adopted maneuver warfare as its doctrine. Marine Corps Manual OH 6-1 defines maneuver warfare as: An approach to war which emphasizes disrupting the cohesion of the enemy's tactical units and the mental process of the enemy commander -- his ability to make correct and timely decisions -- rather than simply attempting to inflict casualties at a greater rate than they are sustained.(14:1.5) In simple terms, it is forcing the enemy commander to react at an ever increasing rate to our actions until he is overcome by events. It is not attacking his strong points, but his weak points. It is applying pressure on him at unexpected places, causing confusion on his part. In a battle of this type, points of main effort may change quickly. Supporting arms must also be able to redirect its fire support in accordance with the change. This change in the main effort requires some sort of communications exchange if effective fire support is to be massed. With the understanding of these basics of offensive air support and maneuver warfare, we can now focus on the military reformers' perceptions and recommendations. Only those that would be detrimental to offensive air support and the use of Marine aviation in general, will be addressed. The majority of the comments and recommendations to be considered here are those of Mr. William Lind, president of the Military Reform Institute. In articles published in the Marine Corps Gazette and a currently unpublished manuscript, Mr. Lind and his reformers have described their perceptions and ideas for changes in the application of offensive air support and Marine aviation. In several instances, these concepts and ideas are flawed, generally due to a lack of experience in the offensive air support area and military aviation as a whole. In other areas, however, they are very perceptive and their recommendations are certainly worth considering. One false premise the reformers make is that "air" should not be the main effort. In his manuscript, Mr.Lind says: ...when we speak of an air Schwerpunkt. we are not saying that air is the Schwerpunkt for the MAGTF.. . .Because in almost all situations it is the ground battle that is decisive, the Schwerpunkt for the MAGTF is defined in terms of the ground battle....the air Schwerpunkt is the answer to the question, "What can air do that nothing else can do that will have decisive effect on the ground battle?" In other words, the air supports the ground. It is possible that there could be a few situations where an action by aviation would be the total force Schwerpunkt. ... But history suggests this will happen seldom, if ever. The history of attempts to achieve decisions by air alone is one of repeated failures.(10:6-7) There is a minor disagreement with the above quote. What is not realized is that Marine aviation is a co-equal maneuver element of the MAGTF. The Norway Air-Landed MEB scenario is an excellent example of where Marine air has much greater mobility and maneuver than do the ground forces and is the main effort of the MAGTF. Marine aviation makes the scenario feasible. In the concept of maneuver warfare, if the designated main effort is stopped by enemy forces, the main effort should be shifted. Aviation is fully capable of assuming the role of the main effort, as necessary. Consideration should be given to the following when determining the point of main effort: intelligence, speed or reaction time, depth, firepower, flexibility, survivability, command and control, all-weather/ austere capabilities, logistics, and the enemy's center of gravity. If the balance of these considerations shift in favor of Marine aviation, then the main effort should also shift to Marine aviation. The Commandant has stated that the purpose of Marine aviation is not to support the ground units, but to help the MAGTF commander win the battle.(5) The reformers believe that air interdiction means attacking fixed targets and is, therefore, of little value in maneuver warfare. Mr. Lind says: ...In general, destroying fixed targets -- LOCs, rail yards, supply dumps, etc. -- does not have much effect on the enemy's ability to fight effectively. The targets that matter are, in general, enemy combat units, and more specifically units that are doing something critical in the ongoing battle. Attacking fixed targets -- interdiction bombing -- has a long history of failure... (10:10) The definition of deep air support in Marine Corps Manual FMFM 5-1 and the definition of air interdiction in JCS Pub 1 are very similar, and is an: Air action conducted against enemy targets which does not require detailed integration of each mission with the fire and movement of friendly ground forces. Deep air support missions are normally conducted beyond the fire support coordination line (FSCL).. ..The most important of the deep air support tasks is air interdiction. ...air interdiction plays a vital role in the design of deep air support to neutralize or destroy the enemy's fighting capability.(15:100) Field Marshal Erwin Rommel summed up the impact of air interdiction during the Normandy invasion as follows: During the day, practically our entire traffic -- on roads, trucks and in the open country -- is pinned down by powerful fighter- bomber and bomber formations, with the result that the movement of our troops on the battle- field is almost completely paralyzed, while the enemy can maneuver freely. Every traffic defile in the rear areas is under attack and it is very difficult to get essential supplies of ammunition and petrol to the troops.(6:476-77) The use of deep air support, or air interdiction, is both desirable and critical in maneuver warfare. When coordinated with the ground scheme of maneuver, it is deadly to the enemy. The survivability of the helicopter on the maneuver battlefield is seriously challenged by Mr. Lind: A battlefield where forces are intermixed also poses a major challenge to helicopters. The attack helicopter, because its ability to hover, may be significantly better able to find and identify targets than can a fixed-winged aircraft. But all helicopters face a new and serious survivability problem. Helicopters attempt to survive by flying very low -- nape-of-the-earth. But on battlefields where forces are intermixed, this means they will continuously be flying low over enemy units. Modern ground forces have a large number of automatic weapons, and they can be counted on to point them in the direction of helicopters and shoot. Directly over them, at low level, helicopters will be relatively easy targets.(10:9) Helicopters will be vulnerable to enemy fire, as will every other type of aircraft. Army Brigadier General Patrick Brady, Chief of Army Public Affairs, was an Army combat helicopter pilot during the Vietnam War and a recipient of the Medal of Honor for his exploits as a pilot. In the General's opinion, the helicopter is more survivable than other types of aircraft and the tank on today's battlefield. General Brady sighted the helicopter's maneuverability and ability to use the terrain as the principal reasons.(2) The assumptions that Mr. Lind bases his argument on are: (1) the battlefield will be intermixed, and (2) helicopters will continuously be flying low over enemy units. The battlefield may be intermixed with forces, and it may not be. Our commanders should be wise enough to protect their flanks and rears to prevent encirclement, allowing for reinforcements and logistics resupply by helicopters without them "continuously flying low over enemy units." Attack helicopter pilots use tactics whereby they position themselves in defilade near critical areas or LOCs. As the enemy comes within range, they pop up and fire, then reposition themselves in defilade for subsequent attacks. This tactic is effective and survivable. The helicopter provides maneuver to the MAGTF commander, allowing him to rapidly displace ground forces and force the enemy commander to react. If the enemy forces are utilizing helicopters, then the MAGTF commander should also, or he may find his forces out-maneuvered by the enemy. It must be understood that one doesn't deploy helicopters to an area that is prohibitive to its survival. The helicopter has its place. The importance of air superiority as it relates to the ground battle is also challenged. The reformers do not realize the vital service air superiority and air-to-air missions perform for the MAGTF commander in allowing him to prosecute offensive air support and assault support missions. Mr. Lind sees it this way: Usually, we are told that we must win air superiority before we can do much ground support. The air-to-air battle is given priority in time: it comes first. Maneuver warfare challenges this dictum on two counts. First, the purpose of aviation is to help achieve a decision on the ground. Therefore, the ground situation, not some abstract rule, determines the priority of air-to-air compared to air-to-ground. If the ground battle is such that air must concentrate on air-to-ground action at the outset in order to have a decisive effect, then this is what it must do. If, for example, the enemy catches us by surprise at the outset and breaks through our rear with major armor forces, aviation must concentrate on helping destroy those forces. It must do so at once; it cannot wait while it first fights a private battle with the enemy air force. Secondly, enemy air may or may not be a significant threat to our ground forces, depending on how well it can meet the above challenges. Is it focused on doing something decisive? Can it mass quickly in the face of the unexpected? Can it operate in a fluid, rapidly changing situation, i.e., with mission orders? Can it distinguish friend from foe on the ground where forces are intermixed? Can it effectively hit targets that matter, such as our reserves while they are moving to do something of critical importance? If not, it probably won't matter much. It will cause random attrition, but it is not likely to have a decisive effect. This is true even if it has lots of aircraft and modern ones.(10:14-15) Marine aviation has the capability of flying both air- to-air and air-to-ground missions simultaneously, in support of each other, and the ground commander. Air superiority over the objective area or battle area is essential to the MAGTF commander in the prosecution of his battle, and the number of sorties required to accomplish this is determined at air apportionment and allocation conferences. Air superiority accomplishes several things. First, it prevents enemy close air support and deep air support missions from being executed against MAGTF forces. Secondly, it allows offensive air support missions to be flown in support of MAGTF forces. Also, it assists the MAGTF commander in maneuvering heliborne forces rapidly on the battlefield to critical locations with a reduced threat from enemy air or air defense weapons. In this context, air superiority also means the destruction or neutralization of enemy surface-to-air missiles and anti-aircraft artillery. With the advent of nuclear, biological, and chemical weapons (NBC), the MAGTF commander cannot allow even small numbers of enemy aircraft to fly over his ground forces in hopes of determining if they are going to do something decisive, or to see if they can identify friend from foe, etc. We must remember that aircraft are essential to intelligence collection and enemy aircraft must be denied overflight rights. This prevents their massing of forces against us at a decisive point. Air defense entails the use of aircraft, antiaircraft guns, and surface-to-air missiles and is a critical component of the commander's responsibility for security and protection of his force.(14:4.23) One cannot eliminate air-to-air missions from the air defense concept; they are an integral and coordinated part of protection on the battlefield from enemy air activity. Therefore, air-to-air operations are an essential element of maneuver warfare. According to LtCol Bingham of the U.S. Air Force: Past campaigns have often achieved success even though few commanders seemed to understand how or why ground maneuver and air interdiction complemented and reinforced each other, let alone the importance of their synchronization. Instead, favorable circumstances, including air superiority and often overwhelming air resources, generated dubious choices for the enemy more by accident than by design. Unhappily, this is not likely to be the case if we are faced with a Soviet offensive. As this assessment should make clear, not only do we need to quickly gain and maintain air superiority, we must also synchronize ground maneuver and air interdiction. (1:28) In his analysis of the 1973 Arab-Israeli War, Clarence Olschner has this to say concerning air superiority: The breakout losses by time...reflects the extreme difficulty of providing close air support and interdiction where air superiority has not been achieved. The demand for ground support under these conditions cost the IAF 80 aircraft in the first three days and cost the EAF 150 aircraft in the last eight days of the war.(11:70) And: Air superiority can be achieved over the modern battlefield only by defeating both the surface-to-air and air-to-air capabilities of the enemy.(11:82) In the following vivid description, General Herzog gave this account of support for the 3d Armor Battalion during the same war: As the sun rose, four Israeli Skyhawks swooped in to bomb the Syrians, but as they approached their target the tell-tale signs of surface-to-air missiles were seen. All four planes exploded in the air in full view of the hard-pressed troops of the battalion. Undeterred, a second flight of four planes flew in. Two exploded.(7:87) It is clear from the previous accounts that before aircraft can conduct offensive air support and other missions in support of the MAGTF and operate as a maneuver element in its own right, suppression of enemy air defenses (SEAD) is critical to preclude unacceptable aircraft losses. The reformers have voiced their opinion that aircraft currently in the Marine Corps' inventory are inadequate to conduct offensive air support on the maneuver battlefield. As stated in Mr. Lind's manuscript: Aircraft such as the F-13 and AV-8 depend on speed for survival, but at high speed aircraft often cannot find and identify enemy units, which are the prime targets. We need a new ground support aircraft for both CAS and armed reconnaissance. Its basic characteristics should be: o Slow speed but very good agility (a combination of classic and energy maneuverability and transient characteristics). Slow speed is necessary to do the mission; survivability comes from constant high- energy jinking. Systems that permit aircraft to place ordnance accurately while jinking are of critical importance. o Ability to take hits from small automatic weapons and keep flying and fighting. The main threat in this environment is not SAMs and dedicated anti-aircraft guns, but automatic weapons fire from machine guns and individual weapons.... o Low cost, because only large numbers of aircraft can have a decisive effect on the ground battle. (10:26-27) The F/A-18, A-6, and the AV-8B were developed to perform specific mission requirements under current and projected threat capabilities. The performance designed into these aircraft was not a guess on the part of the manufacturer, but a collection of specific military specifications derived from actual combat lessons-learned and exercises. Even in slow-speed aircraft, the pilot will have difficulty finding and identifying targets as friend or foe, attacking those targets, and surviving. Camouflage, dust and smoke will further hinder the pilot's efforts. John Killen says: From the tentative beginnings in the latter stages of World War I, manned aircraft have been used to augment ground firepower through the delivery of a variety-of munitions with an ever-increasing set of capabilities. Throughout this history, it was recognized that the man in the air needed help to identify when, where, and against what to deliver his ordnance. (9:77) Once a pilot enters a combat zone in a slow-speed aircraft, he is affording the enemy a greater amount of time to bring weapons to bear on him. In the case of CAS, his proximity to the earth's surface will require him to allocate much of his time to avoid hitting the ground. His visual lookout and comprehension of cockpit sensors alerting him to impending enemy anti-air attack will consume more of his concentration. Once the shooting starts, the pilot is going to be more concerned about his survival, regardless of whether his aircraft can take a lot of small-arms fire. The maneuvering required by a slow-speed aircraft in avoiding surface-to-air missiles and anti-aircraft artillery fire would be necessarily extensive and probably preclude the pilot from engaging the ground target. If the target is not marked in some fashion, the chances of proper target engagement are inversely proportional to the threat to the pilot's survival. And lastly, the reformers assume surface-to-air missiles and anti-aircraft artillery will not be a significant threat on the maneuver battlefield, as stated in the quote on page 15. This is a deadly assumption to make. Figure 1 shows the Soviet-Warsaw pact integrated air defense system (IADS) for the battlefield.(3:6) The following account clearly shows what can happen to a modern fighting force when antiair defenses are deployed effectively, as in the Yom Kippur War: The A-4 Skyhawks played the heaviest ground-attack role, with Phantoms and Mirages giving air cover. The Israelis' targeting was so precise that tank commanders could call down air strikes only a few yards from their positions. But losses were heavy, for among the defense screen that the Syrians had moved up to their Golan lines was the latest Soviet mobile anti-aircraft missile, the SAM-6. . . In the first afternoon, Israel lost thirty Skyhawks and about ten Phantoms over Golan, all to SAM-6s or the devastating flak of the mobile ZSU- 23 anti-aircraft batteries...which chewed up the Skyhawks if their pilots dropped to deck level in an effort to beat the SAMs. There were rarely any parachutes... .The scale of losses was so clearly insupportable that in mid-afternoon, Chief of Staff Elazar actually abandoned air strikes over Golan.... (8:161) The Soviet systems are mobile and accompany the ground units. Because the Soviets realize their systems are less effective when on the move, they deploy them in leapfrog fashion so that there is continuous anti-aircraft coverage. (4:1-36) "Exposure to surface-to-air defenses could be significally decreased by aircraft maintaining very low altitude and high speed under the weather and under defense radar coverage throughout the entire flight". (12:5) The type aircraft the reformers promote must be inexpensive because the Marine Corps would need a large reserve due to attrition. The topics discussed were an attempt to point out some perceived misconceptions on the part of Mr. Lind and other military reformers. The profession of military aviation is demanding, both physically and mentally. To perfect and maintain the capability to perform the various missions assigned requires continuous training and application. When others make recommendations that will affect aviation combat performance and have not trained in or experienced that profession, we must look closely at their proposals. Since maneuver warfare is doctrinal within the Marine Corps, the use of Marine aviation as a maneuver element in its own right must be accepted and exploited by our leaders. One could make an exceptional case for Marine air as the main effort in the Norway Air-Landed MEB scenario. The first essential order of battle for the MAGTF commander before he can begin his ground battle is to ensure that his ground forces will not be destroyed by enemy air action. He must prevent his forces from being the object of enemy air reconnaissance and observation which would allow the enemy to mass an attack against our critical areas. He must use his offensive air support, or interdiction capability, to take the battle to the enemy. The MAGTF commander's intent and concept of operations has to be understood by all elements of his command. The next conflict will be a "come as you are" event. The Marine Corps will go into combat with the aircraft currently in its inventory. The F/A-18, AV-8B, and A-6 are superb machines designed to accomplish their missions and survive on today's battlefield. Replacing them with inferior aircraft would be a step backwards. The helicopter gives the MAGTF commander mobility in the maneuver warfare arena. Its vulnerability to small-arms and antiaircraft fire has to be realized, then employed accordingly. The military reformers have our best interest at heart and their ideas should be listened to and evaluated. Good recommendations often come from those not so closely involved in a specific endeavor. However, we must be careful that those proposals which would be detrimental to our success in combat be eliminated. Experience is essential. Click here to view image Bibliography 1. Bingham, Price T. "Ground Maneuver and Air Interdiction in the Operational Art." Parameters. XIX NO.1 (March 1989) 2. Brady, Patrick, Brigadier General, Chief of Army Public Affairs. Personal interview about helicopter survivability in combat. Quantico, Virginia, March 10, 1989. 3. Crawford, Natalie W. Low Level Attack of Armored Targets. California: The Rand Corporation, 1977 4. Crutcher, Michael H. "Soviet Tactical Air Defense." Defense Intelligence Report. (June, 1980) 5. Gray, A.M., General, Commandant of the Marine Corps. "Views of the Commandant", presented at Little Hall, MCCDC, Quantico, Virginia, January 9, 1989. 6. Hart, Liddell, ed. The Rommel Pacers. New York: Harcourt, Brace, 1953. 7. Herzog, Chaim. The War of Atonement Boston: Little, Brown, and Co., 1975. 8. Insight Team of the London Sunday Times. The Yom Kippur War. New York: Doubleday & Co., 1974. 9. Killen, John. A History. of the Luftwaffe, 1915-1945, New York: Berkley Publishing Corp., 1967. 10. Lind, William. "Maneuver Warfare and Aviation". dtd 1988 Unpublished manuscript, Washington, D.C. 11. Olschner, Clarance E., III. The Air Superiority Battle in the Middle East, 1967-1973. Ft. Levenworth, Kansas: U.S. Army Command and General Staff College, 1978. 12. U.S. Congress. House. Committee on Armed Services. Close Air Support, Report of Special Subcommittee on Tactical Air Support. 89th Cong., 2nd sess., 1966. 13. U.S. Marine Corps. Marine Corps Combat Development Command. Close Air Support and Close-in Fire Support, FMFM 5-4A. Quantico, 1988. 14. U.S. Marine Corps. Marine Corps Combat Development Command. Ground Combat Operations, OH 6-1. Quantico, 1988. 15. U.S. Marine Corps. Marine Corps Development and Education Command. Marine Aviation, FMFM 5-1. Quantico, 1979. 16. U.S. Marine Corps. Marine Corps Development and Education Command. Offensive Air Support. FMFM 5-4. Quantico, 1979.
