Maritime Prepositioning Forces--Are They What They Seem? AUTHOR Major Douglas A. Darling, USMC CSC 1989 SUBJECT AREA - Strategic Issues EXECUTIVE SUMMARY TITLE: MARITIME PREPOSITIONING FORCES-- ARE THEY WHAT THEY SEEM? I. Purpose: To investigate current doctrine concerning Maritime Prepositioning Forces (MPF's), how it came into being and will it provide the guidance needed for future employment. II. Problem: Although never intended to replace amphibious shipping, MPF's have gained instant credibility within our own organization simply because the forces, once assembled, have overwhelming combat power; however, current MPF doctrine does not address the most likely deployment/employment environment. III. Data: MPF's grew out of the decline of defense spending in the late seventies. Today, MPF's provide America strategic sealift sorely needed. Current doctrine stipulates several prerequisites prior to MPF employment. The most important of these being a secure/permissive/benign area in which to conduct the operations. This doctrine is in disagreement with senior Marine Corps leaders- statements and ideas concerning MPF capabilities. Additionally, the current doctrine does not address MPF utilization across the spectrum of warfare. IV. Conclusions: MPF doctrine is in need of updating to reflect the most likely type and place of employment in the future. V. Recommendations: The Marine Corps needs to refocus its concept of operations for MPF's in order to give the National Command authorities the options for employment. The best way to do this is through changes in current doctrine; training and education; and tailoring the MPF ships for more flexibility. MARITIME PREPOSITIONIN6 FORCES--Are They What They Seem? During the Carter Administration many decisions were made that would be regretted for years to come. Among the most detrimental was the erosion of America's military and the industrial base that supports it. For decades, our National Strategy of Deterrence had worked--in large part due to our strategic systems, their Mutually Assured Destruction (MAD) and America's ability to rapidly move combat forces to crisis areas around the world. During the years 1976-1980, as our fleet of World War II amphibious Ships reached the end of their lifecycle, government policy, world trade recession, and the Soviet Navy expansion into a global naval power exposed a significant weakness in U.S. strategy: strategic sealift. To answer, in part, the problem of sealift shortfall, a Presidential directive was issued in March 1979 providing guidance establishing formation of contingency forces to meet non-NATO commitments. (2:35) This force was called the Rapid Deployment Force (RDF) and evolved into what was then called the Rapid Deployment Joint Task Force (RDJTF). In conjunction with development of the RDJTF, a new concept was developed that placed equipment and supplies aboard ships which would be positioned around the worlds troubled areas. If called upon, the RDJTF would marry-up with the ships and prepare for hostilities. This concept saved tremendous amounts of air-lift and allowed a much faster assimilation of combat capability. The concept was named near term pre-positioning ships (NTPS) program. Simultaneously with the establishment of RDJTF and it's NTPS, the U.S. Navy was tasked to enhance the mobility of the Marine Corps. (2:35) Although this was the true beginning of the Maritime Prepositioning Ships (MPS) program, much confusion and intermixing of terms and concepts surrounded the program start-up due to RDJTF and NTPS. Essentially, the major differences between the two programs were NTPS was a joint force primarily directed towards Southwest Asia (SWA) and contained fifteen days of supply (DOS) aboard ships which must unload at port. MPS, on the other hand, was a Navy/Marine unique team with worldwide capability and ships with thirty DOS which could unload in-stream or in-port. This concept today has evolved into Maritime Prepositioning Forces (MPF) consisting of; equipment and supplies prepositioned aboard forward deployed Maritime Prepositioning Ships (MPS), a Marine Expeditionary Brigade (MEB) and a Naval Support Element (NSE) that are airlifted into an objective area to assemble with their equipment in preparation for operations ashore. (11:ES-1) This forward basing of equipment and supplies saves time and money and helps alleviate sealift shortfall. Just what are these MPF's and how will they be used? According to current doctrine "MPF operations are a strategic deployment option, the salient requirement of the operation is a secure area. In addition there must be adequate strategic airlift, off-load forces, arrival airfield, port/beach, and a road network between the port/beach and the airfield. "(11:1-1--1-3) Translated, the above characteristics require two hundred-fifty C-141 (or equivalent) Military Airlift Command (MAC) sorties, people to do the work, a beach or port at which to off-load the ships, a C-141/C-5 capable airfield, roads to get back and forth, and above all else a secure/permissive/benign area in which to accomplish all of the above. Additionally, "The unique nature of MPF operations require timely political and military decisions by a wide spectrum of command's, agencies and organizations from the National Command authority down through the chain of command to the forces which make up the MPF."(11:2-1) and finally, in plain English Operational Handbook (OH) 7-6 states "MPF deployment operations are essentially logistical in nature. "(11:ES-2) Are MPF's what they seem? No, they are not. Although never intended to replace amphibious shipping, MPF's have gained instant credibility within our own organization simply because the forces, once assembled, have overwhelming combat power; however, current MPF doctrine does not address the most likely employment. To see how this perception (immediate, upon demand combat power) can flourish, one needs only to look at a Table of Organization (T/O) for a MPF MEB. It includes a Regimental Landing Team, Direct Support Artillery Battalion, Tank Battalion(-), Assault Amphibian Battalion(-), two Light Assault Vehicle Companies, Combat Engineer Battalion(-), Recon Company and when teamed with the TAVB, the MEB has the capability to perform all six functions of Marine aviation. Add to this Combat Service Support for the 16,000 Marines and the ability to sustain itself for thirty days and you have a force to be reckoned with. It's easy to compare, side-by-side, MPF and amphibious operations because the names and sizes of the units are the same. Here are some excerpts from congressional testimony by senior Marine Corps leaders regarding MPF's: "This contingency response program is one of the most significant developments in recent Marine Corps history"(10:7); "Maritime Prepositioning Ships (MPS) has added a truly new dimension to our projection forces"(10:8); "It [Maritime Prepositioning Ships] substantially increases mobility, sustainability and flexibility in the projection of naval power. "(10:7) Even our current doctrine leads one to believe MPS and amphibious operations are synonymous; "Maritime prepositioning can be used for introducing forces to: (a) Preemptively occupy and defend key points along lines of communications. (b) Support an ally or friendly nation. (c) Reinforce an amphibious operation. (d) Occupy/reinforce advances naval bases. (e) Augment fleet defense by providing tactical air support from ashore. (f) Establish a sizeable force in support of a sustained operation ashore. (g) Send political signals. ll(11:1-3) But what signals are we sending? Our National Maritime Strategy, forward naval presence, bust be credible to our enemies in order for deterrence to work. How can MPF's be considered power projection when friendly ports and permissive airfields will, in all likelihood, not be in a crisis area? Some experts list approximately one hundred-fifty ports/beaches that meet the requirements stated in current doctrine for a MPF operation. Of these one hundred-fifty, only about one percent are considered in friendly countries. With budget problems at home and foreign aid dwindling, the probability that access once "friendly" nations provided is now in jeopardy. If MPF's are selected, forcible entry from the sea will be a prerequisite to the "logistical" operations to follow. Hand-in-hand with the strategic mobility that MPF provides, a requirement for tactical mobility exists that only an amphibious force can provide. Let's not fall into the "fix-all-trap." To fix the paucity of amphibious shipping we propose independent operations for MPF's. To fix the problem with overseas bases we now have MPF's or floating supply depots. To fix the problem of terrorism we will use MPF to send political signals. We need to ref ocus our concept of operations for MPF's. To help focus, the following questions can be asked: a. Where/when is the most probable place of deployment for MPF's today? b. In low/mid-intensity conflicts will there be "timely political and military decisions by a wide spectrum of commands..."?(11:2-1) c. In the battle of the future will all of our heavy lift aircraft make it to the objective area? d. With the advent of runway denial munitions, if the aircraft make it to the objective area will they be able to land? e. Should we depend on host nation support to accomplish our mission? To answer these, the following suggestions are provided with a brief explanation and rationale: a. Tie, inextricably, amphibious doctrine and MPF doctrine together. The most probable form of MPF employment in the next ten years will be in a reinforcing/sustaining mode. Any number of modern day scenarios can be written where a forward deployed MAGTF (Marine Expeditionary Unit ((MEU)) must be supported. The MEU could conduct an opposed amphibious landing to secure a port/airfield for the follow-on MPF unit. This is not as simple as it sounds without practical experience. The compositing of MAGTF's is a much talked about but little practiced idea in the Marine Corps today which should not be tested during hostilities. If in fact there is friendly host nation support, the job becomes all the easier. Port facilities, indigenous labor, traffic control and security will not need to be taken forcefully. We should however, prepare for the worst-case scenario. b. Training and educating Marines in MPF operations. There should not be a single exercise in the future without the role of MPF being considered. According to former Secretary of the Navy, John F. Lehman, Jr., "...the status of our Merchant Marine fleet and shipbuilding capability are absolutely critical."(13:10) How do we expect our equipment and supplies to arrive at the objective area if not by MPF? MPF has been operational since 1985, yet not until 1989 were MPF exercises conducted at the Marine Corps Command and Staff College! We must teach and train all Marines in the effective use of MPF's. c. Change the capability in the MPF Ships to transit more Marines. Again, the worst case scenario would be proliferation of hand-held surface-to-air missiles (SAM's) around the arrival airfield. This is not to suggest that the Marines could conduct an offensive landing but aircraft and airflow cannot be the only option for moving people. "The capability and space are currently on the MPF ships. Little or no modification is required. " (16) d. Tailor MPF loads for maximum flexibility. The current load plans for the MPF ships have no flexibility for off-loading supplies and equipment of a unit any smaller than a MEB. This reduces the contingency response and supportability of any selective off-load. By tailoring the ships' loads, small unit contingency response packages could be supported. Certainly, this course of action is not without penalty. There will be reduced cube and square due to somewhat inefficient loading but the increased flexibility given to commanders far out-weights the disadvantages. The idea that MPF's can only be used in an environment where there is little threat; where the host nation is anxious for the U.S to be there; and when there is advance decision making by policy makers is the ideal. Our doctrine, education and training should provide the flexibility of deployment AND employment. Are MPF's what they seem? No, they are more! MPF's give America the strategic sealift sorely needed. The capability exists today to make MPF's the dynamic force which provides the National Command authorities strategic flexibility. With only the addition of forward-thinking MPF doctrine and training, the Marine Corps can continue it's tradition of "any clime or place." BIBLIOGRAPHY 1.Aquilino, John and Sanders, James. "Strategic Sealift: The Achilles Heel of America's Defense. " Amphibious Warfare Review, 6 (Winter 1987-1988), 30-35. 2.Brown, David B., LtCol, USMC(Ret). "MPS: An Evolving Entity. " Marine Corps Gazette, Jan 85, 34-39. 3.Brown, David B., LtCol, USMC(Ret). "MPS: Aviation Combat and the TAVB." Marine Corps Gazette, Feb 85, 64-67. 4.Brown, David B., LtCol, USMC(Ret). "MPS: The Navy's Crucial Role." Marine Corps Gazette, Mar 85, 71-75. 5.Brown, David B., LtCol, USMC(Ret). "MPS: Combat Capability in the Objective Area." Marine Corps Gazette, Jul 85, 75-83. 6.Brown, David B., LtCol, USMC(Ret). "MPS: How Goes It?". 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"Maritime Prepositioning--A New Dimension for Rapid Deployment." ARMED FORCES, Mar 88, 122-126. 15.White, Carl. "Send in the Marines." SEA POWER, Nov 86, 12-22. 16.Wood, Anthony A., LtCol, USMC. Personal Interview, Feb 89.
