C4I2: A Command Dilemma AUTHOR Major Charles E. Cooke, USMC CSC 1989 SUBJECT AREA - C4 Click here to view image EXECUTIVE SUMMARY C4I2 A COMMAND DILEMMA I. PURPOSE: To identify the criticality of integration of command, control, communications, computers, intelligence and interoperability (C4I2 ) systems at tactical command levels in the USMC and to investigate the impact of the theft of C4I2 technology by the Soviet Union. II. PROBLEM: C4I2 systems burden commanders through tactical limitations, enemy technology theft, logistical support, human interaction, and tactical employment; however, C4I2 systems are force multipliers that provides the tactical commander with state-of-the-art equipment to control and maneuver his forces. III. DATA: The commander's need for command and control procedures and information is as old as the military itself. Command and control is a function performed by commanders and the entire range of C4I2 systems are dependent on the performance of thousands of people. Today's C4I2 systems must survive interoperability in a joint environment. That is, they must provide services to and accept services from other systems, units or forces and to use the services so exchanged to enable them to operate effectively together. Accepting the premise that human interaction is critical to C4I2 systems' success, then survivability, responsiveness and flexibility reduces the clouds of uncertainty on the battlefield. This paper reviews the dilemmas of what C4I2 systems a commander faces on the battlefield. These C4I2 dilemmas include: (1) Addressing the relationship between command and control; (2) operational direction from a joint interoperability perspective; (3) analyzing the interface of command, control and the commander's intent; (4) and assessing the impact of technology thefts by the Soviet Union. IV. CONCLUSIONS: C4I2 systems rule the battlefield. Systemically blending them with weapon systems creates a powerful force in combat. Recognition of the above relationships and the maintenance of the proper balance between C4I2 systems are essential elements to winning future battles and campaigns. V. RECOMMENDATIONS: The USMC must become better managers of C4I2 systems at the tactical level. U.S. armed forces should conduct more joint/NATO operations and exercises to increase C4I2 systems compatibility. C4I2 systems should be built to do only what is necessary and be kept simple and inexpensive. C4I2: A COMMAND DILEMMA Thesis Statement: C4I2 burdens commanders through tactical limitations, enemy technology thefts, logistical support, human interaction, and tactical employment; however, C4I2 systems are force multipliers that provide the tactical commander with state-of-the-art equipment to control and maneuver his forces. I. Commander's battlefield needs A. Command and control B. Communications C. Intelligence II. Interoperability requirements III. Command, control and commander's intent A. Strategy B. Objectives C. Center of gravity IV. Strategic impact of C4I2 systems A. Nuclear B. Conventional V. Technology thefts A. U.S.S.R B. Allied profits VI. Future Developments: Meeting the CINC's C4I2 needs A. Procurement B. Interoperability C. Timeliness C4I2: A COMMAND DILEMMA Command and control on the modern battlefield is a major concern. How is a commander expected to use all the information available, make decisions and issue orders in the most effective and efficient manner possible? The problem is not a new one but one that must be addressed. Current command, control, communications, intelligence, and interoperability (C4I2) policies hamper the commander's ability to effectively adapt C4I2 technology to the battlefield. Yet, without this technology, the Marine Corps would resemble an underdeveloped nation's army of the past -- led by the horse cavalry instead of the air cavalry. The Marine Corps cannot ignore C4I2 technology. Instead, the Marine Corps must harness and adapt C4I2 systems to battlefield use by changing policies so that battlefield commanders are as comfortable with C4I2 employment as they are with tactics. The key element in structuring C4I2 systems is to ensure the total system is responsive to the commander's mission of defeating the enemy on the battlefield. To accomplish this mission they must be just as survivable, and endurable as the weapons they support. COMMAND AND CONTROL PHILOSOPHY Present USMC doctrine pertaining to command and control is mechanistic, emphasizing facilities, procedures and organization. The humanistic functions engendered in command and leadership are subordinated to the concept and function of control. Current doctrine fails to address the relationship between command and control. The recognition of that relationship and the maintenance of the proper balance between command and control are essential to winning future battles and campaigns. Given this doctrinal state of affairs, an appropriate command and control philosophy for the Marine Corps must be determined -- that is, a command and control philosophy which will support winning future battles and campaigns. A theory of command and control is also needed to support this philosophy. In the July 1986 issue of the Military Review magazine, U.S. Army Major Timothy L. McMahon states most doctrinal publications define command and control as a whole -- an inseparable entity -- failing to recognize the separate natures and functions of each. Even when the terms are defined separately, the mechanistic nature of control is reflected in the definition of command1. Only rarely are the humanistic functions of leadership used to define command in this context. Current command and control doctrine must be inadequate when the definitions upon which that doctrine is based are inadequate. The terms need to be defined separately and then as a joint process. COMMAND Command is the dynamic process of the identification and promulgation of intent and the infusion of will in subordinate commanders and organizations. It clarifies priorities and direction. It is oriented toward the coordination of effort and the reduction of internal conflict. The process directs adherence to standards providing behavioral certainty. Command is subject-oriented rather than mechanically oriented. The functions of effective leadership are the primary means used to achieve effective command2. CONTROL Control is a support mechanism for command. It is mechanically oriented and characterized by high volume, routine and vertical communications; the coordination of activities between internal and external elements; and the creation of structure which limits command involvement3. Management procedures are the primary means used to achieve efficient control. Communications, computers and intelligence are tools used to support command and control. COMBINED COMMAND AND CONTROL The separate definitions suggest what the proper relationship between command and control ought to be. Control mechanisms support the intent of the commander by providing necessary decisionmaking information, ensuring that all subordinate commanders and organizations are operating according to the commander's intent, and creating a structured base from which to exercise command. Command and control as separate entities -- the latter designed to support the former -- are in a dynamic relationship. That is, a tension, or balance, exists between command and control. The commander must maintain the proper balance. The command and control process is oriented toward the accomplishment of a given mission or the fulfillment of the commander's intent. This balance is not fixed. Environmental conditions influence the balance, and the primary one is uncertainty. As the situation facing the commander becomes less certain, control increases with the objective of creating certainty. The actions of subordinates are limited to reduce uncertainty. The ideal command environment exists when the commander's intent and will are so well assimilated and control measures are so subtly applied in the context of command functions that certainty is maintained in the face of changing environments. Figure 1 -- which follows -- depicts this theory. SEE FIGURE 1 INSERT -- NEXT PAGE Control, communications, computers, intelligence, and interoperability support the functions of command. They are a necessary means to command, but they neither are an end in itself Click here to view image nor contrary to command. STRATEGIC C4I2 Strategic C4I2 systems are designed to meet three vital needs: to supply the warning and intelligence necessary for the National Command Authorities to make decisions, to provide command centers and decision aids, and to provide the capability to transmit that decision to the military and their control operations. C4I2 systems enable the NCA, JCS, and commanders at appropriate subordinate levels to plan, direct, coordinate and control the operations of U.S. military forces. From a strategic context, C4I2 for nuclear forces includes essential elements in the deterrence of nuclear war. As noted by Charles A. Zracket in his article "C3I" dated 22 June 1984: The present C3I system has vulnerabilities associated with its reliability, survivability and endurance under attack, thereby weakening deterrence by increasing the ambiguity in our capabilities4. Development of a reliable and enduring C4I2 system would reduce the ambiguity alluded to by Charles Zracket. Its reliable, positive control of nuclear forces would give the national leadership more time to assess situations, ensure discriminate retaliation, and improve our ability to manage crises in combat. These capabilities could help to stop a war rapidly should one start. A reliable and enduring C4I2 system will be needed for a long time to come, even if a freeze on strategic nuclear forces were accomplished or other arms control successes achieved. Indeed, C4I2 systems may be the best source today of confidence-building measures to reduce tensions and the threat of nuclear catastrophe. While C4I2 systems are delicate and complicated to maintain, they are force-multipliers in winning on the battlefield. Thorough and detailed pre-combat planning prevents periods of confusion, doubt, and indecision in times of war. For the Marine Corps, planning for C4I2 systems efficiency and survivability must address the (1) nuclear, biological, and chemical (NBC) environment; (2) the environment that house and protect the C4I2 systems; and (3) our ability to operate, maintain, standardize and employ C4I2 equipment on the battlefield. TECHNOLOGY THIEVES In today's nuclear environment, many military strategist believe new U.S. weapons may make Americans less secure. Bruce Van Voorst states in 12 February 1989 Time magazine: Hopes of achieving national military superiority disap- peared in the radioactive clouds over Hiroshima; today nuclear deterrence is built on the shaky assurance that either the U.S. or Soviet Union could absorb an attack and still devastate its enemy in response. By this log- ic, a first strike would never be attempted5. However, if a first strike is attempted by either nation, C4I2 technology will provide the stabilizing alerting force. Experts warn that weapon systems such as the Strategic Defense Initiative and the just -- unveiled Stealth bomber could make the world more dangerous by prompting a hostile Soviet response. Other weapons that were first introduced by the U.S., such as cruise missiles and multiple-warhead ICBM's, have been copied by the Soviets and now pose a greater threat to Americans. The weapon systems are depicted in figure 2 below. Click here to view image Just how destabilizing such systems could be was recently illustrated when the army conceded that SDI could severely threaten the Soviet Union's satellite system. Both the U.S. and the U.S.S.R. depend heavily on low-orbit satellites for military intelligence, navigation and communications. The star wars antimissile weapons sitting in space, could easily be turned against Soviet satellites traveling in predictable orbits. Such a prospect is as unacceptable to the Soviets as it would be to the U.S. To combat this advantage the Soviets are willing to do whatever is necessary to protect their systems and their defense network. If that means stealing C4I2 technology from the U.S. then they will do it. U.S. former Secretary of Defense Robert McNamara describes SDI as: So destabilizing that he believes the Soviets would "be justified in shooting the system down, even in peace- time"6. Another concern or burden that today's battlefield commanders must confront is the possibility that the Soviet generals might be tempted to launch a pre-emptive attack on the radar avoiding B-2 stealth bomber, which former Defense Secretary James Schlesinger boasted: "Makes obsolescent $200 billion worth of Soviet air defenses"7. Traditional wisdom holds that U.S. bombers are not first strike weapons, since they would take up to eight hours to reach their targets. But if the B-2 can fly over undetected, the Soviets could reasonably fear a sneak "decapitation" attack on their leadership. In this case as stated by the June 1988 Aviation Week magazine: "This new U.S. deterrent might serve to incite them, not reassure them"8. Strategic advantage can vanish quickly as the Soviets steal or copy U.S. military technology and turn it against its inventors. Former Secretary McNamara states that: It takes the Soviets on the average only four years to catch up to U.S. advances and then the weapons may pose more of a threat to Americans than to Soviets9. The U.S., for example, already has both air and sea launched cruise missiles, and plans to build thousands of new, advanced, low-observeable "stealth" versions. Because they fly slowly compared with ICBM's, American cruise missiles are not by themselves considered a first-strike weapon -- like bombers, they take hours to hit targets deep inside the Soviet Union. But Soviet cruise missiles represent a far- reaching threat to the U.S. Half the American population and industrial capacity sit within 150 miles of the ocean coasts, where cruise missiles launched from Soviet submarines could strike quickly and unexpectedly. The U.S. has virtually no defense against such missiles, particularly when the Soviets also employ stealth technology. The threat is compounded by the difficulty in negotiating a cutback in cruises; they are so small and portable that their numbers would be almost impossible for either side to verify, and conventionally armed missiles cannot be distinguished from nuclear weapons10. As you can see, technological developments continues to burden future battlefield commanders. To combat these new developments, we must train harder and allot more money for future research. We must also convince our allies and developers not to sell our secrets to the enemy at any price. Politically, American and European societies are being persuaded by Mikhail Gorbachev that the Soviet Union is no longer a threat to our way of life. The January 1989 issue of U.S. News and World Report states that Gorbachev is proclaiming a defensive doctrine of "reasonable sufficiency": To create the impression of a military still able to defend the motherland but less threatening to other nations11. As military leaders and battlefield commanders we must closely analyze this proposal and realize that his goal is to make military reforms as economically as possible without sacrificing Moscow's relative strategic position. To achieve this goal, the Soviets will and are stealing technology. As noted earlier, the Soviet Union lags about four years behind the U.S. in scientific development. Worry about technology, in fact, may be the single greatest force behind Gorbachev's military reforms. Israeli technicians found Soviet-made tanks captured during Mideast wars faulty in design. American experts examining the MIG-25 foxbat interceptor delivered by a defector in 1976 first guffawed at wings of stainless steel, not aluminum and ancient vacuum tubes12. However, contempt gave way to grudging respect when they concluded that the MIG-25 could do what it was supposed to: Bring down a U.S. SR-71 spy plane. Often the Soviets can put stolen western technology into the field faster than the embarrassed originators. For the first months and years of the Gorbachev era, western analyst remained skeptical of his intent to reduce the threat. Of course they said Moscow needed to cut costs to rescue its economy. Afghanistan was going badly. A longer leash for Eastern Europe was risky, but Gorbachev could not deny satellites the liberalization he decreed at home. Yes, he had accepted unprecedented on-site inspection under the INF treaty, but INF looked steadily less like a good bargain for the democracies. Gorbachev simply could not afford, the skeptics concluded, to sacrifice the fundamental Soviet reliance on huge offensive forces. The Gorbachev strategy is eroding West European will for modernized forces and encouraging Americans anxious to cut defense costs. Skepticism about Gorbachev is less fashionable, especially in West Germany. Gorbachev dares hope that NATO's disarray is permanent. By reducing the perceived threat, he increases his credibility with his own uneasy generals. As the Vienna negotiations run their course, he may be asking them for harder decisions, to accept conventional parity at lower levels, putting their natural instinct for superiority at risk. They can take some comfort from geography. It alone argues that their troops east of the urals, immune from negotiated cuts, can always drive toward the Atlantic faster than Americans withdrawn can recross it. For the battlefield commander, Gorbachev's foreign-policy dimensions significantly cloud the order of battle in future conflicts. In the February 1989 issue of U.S. News and World Report, John Galvin (European Secretary charged with defense of the west) states: The uncertainties are so great that he sees risks in any likely outcome. The Soviet metamorphosis could prove more dangerous than periods we have seen in the past. The Soviets were big but predictable. Now they are big and not so predictable13. The Soviets say they are revising their military encyclopedia. Their Defense Minister (Dimitri Yazov) stated in the March 12, 1989 issue of Time magazine that their main objective is to practice defensive goals14. Whether this strategy is a fact or not our commanders must be prepared to confront them. Superior C4I2 technology is one way for the U.S. to reduce the burdens on commanders and achieve victory in such a battle. FUTURE DEVELOPMENT: MEETING THE CINC'S NEEDS The challenges to the C4I2 system is to determine what is required to synchronize the force and meet the CINC's needs. We must also incorporate the following improvements to increase capabilities: * Get the most out of what we are buying. * plan systems to meet guidance and doctrine require- ments. * Make the systems interoperable where needed. * Do only what is necessary, and keep C4I2 systems relatively simple and inexpensive. * Bring C4I2 systems on-line in a timely manner At the same time, military services want to capitalize on emerging technology and be flexible enough to respond to changes in the requirements and in the threat. The Marine Corps' approach to satisfying requirements should reflect flexibility to use the right tool for the right job. Several factors make the task particularly challenging. C4I2 systems are unique in their required degree of "cross-service" applications and interoperability with allied nations. There is a rapidly evolving technology base, multiple requirements for systems interfaces and a high degree of reliance on automatic data processing hardware and software. What the C4I2 community needs are affordable systems that meet the national defense objectives and contribute to the U.S. war fighting capability. The C4I2 community must ensure that the technology used contributes to the mission and is not "technology breeding technology". Maintaining efficient man-machine interfaces are essential. Matching the architectures described earlier does not mean that C4I2 systems must look alike, from the national level command centers to the combat units in the field. Computers do not need to be all big main frames or all micros. Increased expenditures for computer technology do not necessarily mean a corresponding increase in military capability. Alternative system designs need to be assessed critically. There is, for example, a place for individual micros. The equipment needs to be tailored to the job, the people and the environment. In the November 1984 Signal magazine, LtGen. C.E. McKnight, Jr. stated: "There is a tendency to move the garrison (Strategic- systems at Corps level) to the field". What we have in some cases are large, bulky equipments, quasi-fixed, outsized loads, which are difficult to airlift, con- tractor dependent for support and burdened with a lengthy acquisition process, which almost guarantees obsolescence upon deployment15. Solutions to the requirements for monitoring activities around the globe, conducting operations and being prepared for complex modes of warfare involve technology that spans the realm of data processing, sensors, radio and fibre optic communications, position determination and navigation. There are clearly technological applications that improve our operational capabilities. We need to be selective and realistic in our application of technology and employ those advances that provide an improved operational capability. The goal of the C4I2 community must be to match the systems to the job within the constraints of affordability in dollar costs and manpower, to give the operating commands the best systems to support their missions. CONCLUSION On the battlefield, few plans are executed and even fewer are completed with certainty from start to finish. In peacetime, Captain W.F. Fullam states in his book, History of Communications Electronics: We talk a great deal, drill a great deal, work very zealously and accomplish little or nothing in the few vitally important points that would tell in war16. Over the years our nation's defense has moved forward with technology -- from hand and arm signals to multichannel radio terminals, from pigeon messengers to honda motorcycles, and from wireless telegraph to space satellites. C4I2 systems' integration -- command, control communications, computers, intelligence, interoperability -- represents another breakthrough. Wise use of these systems and improved technology can enable commanders to make decisions faster and more accurately. Like many new technologies, C4I2 systems provide great opportunities for use in defense systems. Although they introduce problems that must be managed at the tactical level, they are a tremendous force multiplier for the small unit commander. The future challenge is to make C4I2 systems survivable, inexpensive, reliable, and maintainable on the battlefield. Once effective training is completed on C4I2 systems, our forces will be prepared for a decisive victory. FOOTNOTES 1Timothy L. McMahon, "The Key to Success: Developing a C2 Philosophy", Military Review (July 1986), p.42. 2Joe Holloran, "Command, Control, and Interoperability", Signal (August 1987), p.38. 3McMahon, 44. 4Charles A. Zracket, Command, Control, Communications and Intelligence (C3I)", Military Review (June 1984), p.82. 5Bruce Van Voorst, "Two Sides of the Nuclear Sword", Time (6February 1989), p.24. 6Jacob V. Lamar, "Will This Bird Fly?", Time (December 1988), p. 21. 7Henry Trewhitt, "The Next Arms Control Treaty", U.S. News and World Report (December 1988), p.20. 8Edward Aldridge, "How the Stealth Evades Detection?", Aviation Week (June 1988), p.14. 9 Margaret Carlson, One Superpower to Another (Stackpole Books and Press, 1987), p.22. 10Voorst, p.45. 11Douglas Stanglin, "When Ideology Bows to Economics", U.S. News and World Report (January 1989), p.30. 12Henry Trewhitt, "A Different Call to Arms", U.S. News and World Report (March 1989), p.18. 13Trewhitt, p.24. 14LtGen. C.E. McKnight, Jr., USA, "Meeting the CINC's Needs", Signal (November 1984), p.30. 15Captain W. F. Fullam, History of Communications-Electronics (Harper Press, 1965), p.6. BIBLIOGRAPHY 1. Air Command and Staff College, Strategic C3I: An Overview, Montgomery, Alabama, 1985. 2. Erickson, John F. "Soviet Command and Control". Military Review (January 1972), 41. 3. Presidential Documents, Department of Defense. The Strategic Importance of the Emerging Pacific. East Asian and Pacific Affairs, Washington, D.C., 1986. 4. Naval War College Review, Clausewitz on the Moral Forces In War, Newport, R.I., 1987. 5. Hamilton, Mark R. "Command and Control and Maneuver warfare". Military Review (January 1987), 2. 6. Smith, George W. "Clausewitz in the 1970's: Prescription for Dilemma". Military Review (July 1972). 7. Naval War College Review, Soviet Nuclear Strategies: Will They Do The Unexpected, Newport, R.I., 1985. 8. Carr, Robert, Capt. USMCR. "Communication Control at the Infantry Battalion Level". CSC Research Paper (6 May 1976). 9. U.S. Marine Corps, 3D Marine Division, C4I2 Study, February 1988. 10. Frommelt, Todd W., USMC. "An Analysis of the Command and Control and Integration of Marine Air-Ground Task Force Fixed Wing Aviation in Sustained Joint Force Operations Ashore", CSC Research Paper, 1 April 1985. 11. Armed Forces Journal, Soviet Gains in Weapons Shape U.S. Army Master Plan, Pittsfield, Ma., 1989. 12. Thornburg, David D. "Computer Impact: Shaping the Next Decade", Computer Magazine (January 1989), p.14. 13. Gray, A.M. Gen., USMC. "Equipping Marines for Combat in the Next Century". Marine Corps Gazette (June 1988), 9. 14. Trewhitt, Henry. "How to Respond to Gorbachev?". U.S. News and World Report (19December 1988), 16. 15. Gergen, David. "NATO in Disarray? This Time, Reality". U.S. News and World Report (23 January 1989), 24. 16. Perle, Richard. "Why Military Spending Pays Off". U.S. News and World Report (16 January 1989), 23. 17. Keegan, John. The Mask of Command. New York: Elisabeth Sifton Books, 1987. 18. Naval War College, Unified and Specified Commands, Newport, R.I., 1987. 19. 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