Air Land Battle And Maneuver Warfare: Do We Need Both? AUTHOR Major Mark L. Broin, USMC CSC 1989 SUBJECT AREA - Warfighting EXECUTIVE SUMMARY TITLE: AIR LAND BATTLE AND MANEUVER WARFARE: DO WE NEED BOTH? I. Purpose: To determine if the Army and the Marine Corps can utilize a single capstone manual. II. Problem: The need for interoperability as a function of joint operations has been identified in the area of equipment. The need for interoperability in the area of execution, although identified, has not been effectively acted upon. The Army and the Marine Corps have each recently published new caps tone doctrines which have not been coordinated or integrated at either the execution level or the Joint Chiefs of Staff(JCS) level. III. Data: This paper examines the utility of using a single capstone manual for the Army and the Marine Corps. It does this by an examination of three areas, the requirements of the law as contained in Title 10 of the US Code and Department of Defense (DOD) Directive 5100.1; current doctrinal fundamentals; and a comparison of the new service capstone manuals. Title 10 and DOD Directive 5100.1 establish the missions of each of the services and their particular areas of responsibility. Although specific mission tasks were different the underlying responsibility was accomplishment of the mission. In this regard once across the high water mark both services conduct the same types of operations, namely offensive and defensive. The review of current doctrinal fundamentals was conducted in the areas of offense, defense, and operational overlays. There were differences in each area that would inhibit interoperability, particularly with respect to overlays. The final area of comparison was the new service doctrines themselves, Air Land Battle for the Army, and Maneuver Warfare for the Marine Corps. These capstone manuals turn out to be remarkably similar in thought and intent. Even though the specific methodology of presentation is different in each manual the consistency of direction is evident. IV. Conclusions: There is nothing in the law, the current fundamentals, and the capstone doctrine that would prevent the Army and the Marine Corps from using a single capstone manual. The use of a single capstone manual would enable the doctrinal fundamentals to be synchronized and more importantly provide the basis for effective interoperability at the execution level. AIR LAND BATTLE AND MANEUVER WARFARE: DO WE NEED BOTH? OUTLINE Considering the need for interoperability between the Army and the Marine Corps, the similar nature of their actions, and the requirements of Goldwater-Nichols, can their parochial service attitudes, which have resulted in the uncoordinated rewriting of their service doctrines, be justified, or, in the interest of interoperability, can the Army and the Marine Corps use the same caps tone doctrine? I. Missions of the Army and the Marine Corps A. By law tasks and missions of the Army B. By law tasks and missions of the Marine Corps C. Comparison of the missions and tasks D. Conclusions II. Comparison of current fundamental doctrine A. Offensive B. Defense C. Overlays D. Conclusions III. Comparison of Air Land Battle and Maneuver Warfare A. Definitions B. Tenets C. Imperatives D. Conclusions Air Land Battle and Maneuver Warfare: Do we need both? This nation has had an Army, Navy, Marine Corps and more recently an Air Force as the primary forces used by the government to execute its policy and protect its interests. Each of the services has developed its own history, traditions, and doctrine through which they have effectively carried out the will of the nation. Throughout this time the doctrine by which the services fought has been left up to the individual service. As a result the writing of service doctrine has become a tightly held prerogative of each service. The National Security act of 1947 and subsequent changes to Title 10 of the US Code were written with the intent of providing a more effective method of preparing to fight and fighting the nations wars. The designation of specified and unified commands established the framework necessary to fight in the identified areas and allowed these commands to focus on their specific mission or area of responsibility. In order to establish these organizations the services needed to be able to communicate with each other, and to some degree understand each other. These requirements have produced an emphasis on joint doctrine that has lead to the formulation of the methods, processes, and formats for organizing, mobilizing, and directing the U.S. Armed Forces. A fundamental finding, as a result of conducting joint operations, has been the need for interoperability. This need has thus far been centered on equipment, particularly, communications equipment, computers, and battle field systems to include intelligence gathering and transmitting devices. Although the need for equipment interoperability has been identified and progress has been made, the need for interoperability at the execution level has been overlooked. Each of the services continues to develope its doctrine independent of the other services. The lack of effective interoperability was one of the deficiencies identified by congress. As a result of this identification the Goldwater-Nichols Act of 1986 tasks the Chairman of the Joint Chiefs of Staff(CJCS) with "Developing doctrine for the joint employment of the armed forces."1 This task is written into the law to prevent the problems encountered when the services operate and train to individual service doctrine and then try to fight together in joint operations. Further, this tasking recognizes the need for interoperability at the execution level. The Marine Corps and the Army are both adapting their forces to new service doctrine. This doctrine is captured in capstone manuals issued in 1986 by the Army and 1989 by the Marine Corps. Although this doctrine is a significant shift from previous service doctrine, it has been developed without cooperation and coordination between the two services. Both the Army and the Marine Corps have a similar purpose in fighting the nations enemies and when this fighting occurs the types of operations conducted by them are essentially the same above the high water mark, in that they both conduct offensive and defensive operations. Considering the need for interoperability between the Army and the Marine Corps, the similar nature of their actions, and the requirements of Goldwater-Nichols, can their parochial service attitudes, which have resulted in the uncoordinated rewriting of their service doctrines, be justified, or, in the interests of interoperability, can the Army and the Marine Corps use the same caps tone doctrine? To answer this question it will be necessary to review the roles and missions assigned to the Army and the Marine Corps by Title 10 of the US Code and Department of Defense (DOD) Directive 5100.1; their current doctrinal fundamentals for offense, defense, and operational overlays; and their new capstone doctrines. These reviews will determine if it is practical, legal, and necessary for these two services to have a single capstone manual in order to achieve effective interoperability in joint operations. It will also allow a determination of whether or not having a single capstone doctrine would interfer with operations when the Army and Marine Corps are operating independently. The Army, as the principle land force of this nation, is tasked by congress to be capable "in conjunction with the other armed forces"2 of conducting its missions and responsibilities. In particular, Title 10 states, (b)... the Army, within the Department of the Army, includes land combat forces and such aviation and water transport as may be organic therein. It shall be organized, trained, and equipped primarily for prompt and sustained combat incident to operations on land. 3 This clearly identifies that the primary focus of the Army will be sustained land operations. DOD Directive 5100.1 tasks the Army to, *.. specifically, forces to defeat enemy land forces and to seize, occupy and defend land areas; *develop airborne doctrine, procedures, and equipment that are common to the Army and Marine Corps; *organize, equip, and provide Army forces for joint amphibious, airborne, and space operations and train such forces in accordance with joint doctrines; *A collateral function of the Army is to train forces to interdict enemy sea and air power and communications through operation on or from land.4 These tasks reinforce the the assignments in Title 10 in more specific terms and in greater detail. The Army is specifically tasked with developing airborne doctrine that is common to both the Army and the Marine Corps. It is required to have forces capable of operating in joint operations using joint doctrine, and has to defeat enemy land forces giving it the lead in developing land battle doctrine. The Marine Corps is also tasked in both Title 10 and DOD Directive 5100.1, under Title lO the Marines are tasked to, (a)...be organized, trained, and equipped to provide fleet marine forces of combined arms, together with supporting-air components, for service with the fleet in the seizure or defense of advanced naval bases and for the conduct of such land operations as may be essential to the prosecution of a naval campaign. In addition, the Marine Corps shall provide security detachments for the protection of naval property at naval stations and bases, and shall perform such other duties as the President may direct.... (b) The Marine Corps shall develop, in coordination with the Army and the Air Force, those phases of amphibious operations that pertain to the tactics, techniques, and equipment used by landing forces.5 DOD Directive 5100.1 essentially restates Title 10. As with the Army the Marine Corps is clearly tasked with certain specific responsibilities in regard to its war fighting missions. Among these are to develop, in conjunction with the Army, amphibious doctrine, and, in conjunction with the seizure of advance naval bases, conduct-necessary land operations. A comparison of the roles and missions of the Army and the Marine Corps clearly shows that there are overlapping responsibilities between the two services. Both services are tasked to conduct land operations, the Army as a primary function and the Marine Corps as an adjunct when necessary. In amphibious and airborne operations each service is tasked with developing the doctrine for the other service and to be prepared to conduct those kinds of operations. These areas of overlap, the operation plans of the various unified commanders, and the CJCS tasking under the Goldwater-Nichols Act demonstrates the need for the Army and the Marine Corps to possess the ability for interoperability at the execution level. The requirement for both services to write doctrine for the other service further reinforces the need for a common reference. Without a common reference the services would either have to write the doctrine to their particular service doctrine and hope the other service understands their intent or they write the doctrine together and end up with numerous excerpts and asides. Either method would present problems with interoperability, would result in confusion, and a lack of synchronization when the two services are required to operate together in joint operations. As an example, to illustrate the potential problems that could arise, a joint task force(JTF) is assigned the mission of securing an advanced naval base using a land ward approach that includes a link-up with airborne forces. The JTF is comprised of both Army and Marine Units and is commanded by a Naval officer. There is joint doctrine for amphibious operations, however, what happens to these forces once command is passed ashore? Whose doctrine does the JTF commander use, whose symbology is used on the overlays, which doctrine is he skilled in? Unless the answer to these questions is the identification of the need for a single multi-service capstone doctrine the situation does not bode well for the unity, focus of effort, and synchronization of the force. These are questions that would not need to be asked if a single capstone manual was available. The overlap of assignments in Title 10 and DOD Directive 5100.1 clearly demonstrates that while particular mission tasking may be different the end requirement is the same, defeat the enemy or accomplish the mission. How we maximize our forces to defeat the enemy in-both independent operations, and in the more common joint operations should be fundamentally the same. When the decision is made to engage an enemy our forces have to be ready, the focus has to be the mission and there has to be effective interoperability at the execution level. There will be no room for parochial attitudes. The reason for using a single capstone manual is the need for interoperability at the execution level to accomplish the mission. The requirement in Title 10 and DOD Directive 5100.1 is clear that the services must be prepared to participate in joint operations. These regulations also show that although the Army and the Marine Corps have different specific tasks the underlying requirement is the same, engage the enemy and defeat him. Defeating the enemy is essentially done in land combat above the high water mark. A single capstone doctrine would not prevent both services from accomplishing their specific tasks, it would make writing the doctrine required by the law simpler, and it would provide the doctrinal base needed for effective interoperability at the execution level. While the tasks in Title 10 and DOD Directive 5100.1 are such that a single caps tone doctrine would not inhibit either the Army or the Marine Corps from performing their assigned tasks, the fact that these services have been writing their own doctrine without coordination has resulted in a number of differences in fundamental areas. These differences include overlay symbols, forms of offensive maneuver, types of offensive combat and some aspects of the defense. Since both services are conducting the same types of actions, attacking, defending, seizing, etc., there should not be any difference in fundamental areas. However, in the following paragraphs differences in each of the areas will be identified. The Army describes the envelopment, turning movement, infiltration, penetration, and frontal attack as the forms of offensive maneuver. The Marine Corps defines offensive maneuver as envelopment, flanking attack, and frontal attack. The Army has five types of offensive operations, movement to contact, hasty attack, deliberate attack, exploitation, and pursuit. The Marine Corps has six types adding reconnaissance in force. On operational overlays the Army and the Marine Corps have different symbols for start and release points, linkup points, passage points, rally points and the depiction of restrictive fire control measures. In defensive operations the Army sees the purpose of the defense to, *Destroy the enemy. *Weaken enemy forces as a prelude to the offense. *Cause an enemy attack to fail. *Gain time. *Concentrate forces elsewhere. *Control key or decisive terrain. *Retain terrain.6 The Marine Corps sees the purpose of the defense as, *To destroy enemy forces. *To retain or control terrain or prevent the enemy's capture of terrain. *To gain time without surrendering ground. *To economize, to allow the concentration of forces elsewhere. *When the force is to weak to attack or must halt its advance to replenish. *To develop more favorable conditions for offensive operations.7 Further, the Army lists four fundamentals, preparation, disruption, concentration, and flexibility. The Marine Corps has as fundamentals, preparation, concentration, flexibility, offensive action, maneuver, use of terrain, defensive in depth, surprise, and knowledge of the enemy. The above areas highlight what has happened as the services have developed their own doctrine in fundamental areas without coordinating that doctrine. When both the Army and the Marine Corps are planning and conducting operations that are the same, offensive,defensive, etc., there shouldn't be any reason why their plans are formed from different sets of fundamentals. The reasons for these differences are not readily apparent but there are two factors that probably influenced them. The lack of firm guidance from the Joint Chiefs of Staff(JCS) to direct the services to coordinate their capstone manuals, or the failure of the JCS to write a capstone manual for all the services is the first reason. The second reason follows that in the absence of firm direction from the JCS the Army and the Marine Corps, each jealous of its own prerogatives, chose to write its own doctrine to achieve its own independent goals. In the area of fundamentals the Army and the Marine Corps are not synchronized. There are a number of similarities and some of the differences are only a matter of wording, however, there are significant differences in how both services look at the same type of operation. Perhaps, the most glaring of these is in the area of overlay symbols which prevents the simple exchanging of overlays without detailed explanations of what a symbol means or the added work of providing a key. A single caps tone manual would provide the doctrinal synchronization needed to write the fundamental doctrines of offense and defense. In joint operations the need for interoperability precludes the Army and the Marine Corps from having a different way of doing the same thing. This is not meant to imply that there will not be differences, differences will arise because of the unique nature of each force. The differences that do arise should only be in the area of techniques due to the differences in equipment and organizational structure. These application differences would not affect fundamental areas. For example, because of the differences between the Bradley Infantry Fighting Vehicle(IFV) and the AAV the techniques of fighting these vehicles would be different. This difference would necessitate separate application manuals in this area but would not change the fundamentals of offensive or defensive operations. The final area of comparison is the new capstone doctrine that both the Army and the Marine Corps are implementing. The Army published their first edition of their new capstone doctrine in FM 100-5. Operations, in 1982 and called it Air Land Battle. They published their revised edition of FM 100-5, Operations, in 1986 and it is still called Air Land Battle. The Marine Corps is publishing their capstone doctrine now as FMFM-1, Warfighting, dated 1989 and it is called Maneuver Warfare. Although this doctrine has been developed separately by each service it is markedly similar. However, by the titles being different, and there having been worked on separately, without integration or coordination, it implies that they are different, in fact many people in both services have stated as such. To understand if the these capstone manuals are similar enough to allow the use of just one common doctrine a comparison of the basic tenets of each is necessary. The Marine Corps doctrine, Maneuver Warfare, is defined as, ... a warfighting philosophy that seeks to shatter the enemy's cohesion through a series of rapid, violent, and unexpected actions which create a turbulent and rapidly deteriorating situation with which he cannot cope.8 The Army defines Air Land Battle in the following terms, The object of all operations is to impose our will upon the enemy--to achieve our purposes. To do this we must throw the enemy off balance with a powerful blow from an unexpected direction, follow up rapidly to prevent his recovery and continue operations aggressively to achieve the higher commander's goals.. ..From the enemy's point of view these operations must be rapid, unpredictable, violent, and disorienting. The pace must be fast enough to prevent him from taking effective counteractions.9 Although the word usage is different and the Army's definition is longer, the philosophy that is stated is essentially the same. They are so similar that one, the Armys, could be a more detailed explanation of the Marines definition. The Army and the Marine Corps use a different approach in discussing their respective doctrines in their capstone manuals. The Marine Corps has divided their manual into four chapters, Chapter one, The Nature of War; Chapter two, The Theory of War; Chapter three, Preparing for War; and Chapter four, The Conduct of War. Each chapter provides the basis for the next one and provides the practitioner with the necessary frame work to understand where Maneuver Warfare derives its methods and why the doctrine is necessary. This has resulted in a very concise manual that concentrates strictly on the purpose, derivation, and method of Maneuver Warfare. It avoids detailed lists and the appearance of being a how to manual in the prescriptive sense. The Army has created a larger manual that covers essentially the same areas as the Marine manual, but not in the same order or with the same conciseness. The Army manual has a number of lists as they have tried to codify their doctrine more, however, close reading of it makes it clear that it is not prescriptive. Inaddition the Army manual covers how their doctrine applies to sustainment, environment, offensive and defense, and joint, combined, and contingency operations and provides the frame work for how these areas should be viewed in light of their new doctrine. 10,11 In their discussions about their respective doctrine the following tenets or principles are presented to guide the practitioner in understanding the doctrine and its philosophy of execution. The Army identifies four tenets that it feels are necessary to the understanding and execution of Air Land Battle, initiative, agility, depth, and synchronization. In FMFM-1 the last chapter is, The Conduct of War, within this chapter is the definition of maneuver warfare and those areas that have been identified as having an impact on it, these are, Maneuver Warfare, Philosophy of Command, Shaping the Battle, Decision Making, Mission Tactics, Commander's Intent, Focus of Effort, Surfaces and Gaps, and Combined Arms. The thoughts from these areas will be used in comparison with the tenets. A look at the definitions will revel that the same points are covered by each service. Initiative to the Army is the effort needed to force the enemy to conform to our operational purpose and tempo while allowing our forces freedom of action. It stresses the need for leaders and soldiers to act independently within the commanders intent. Speed to seize the initiative enables the force to dictate the terms of combat and keep the enemy off balance. In Maneuver Warfare, under Philosophy of Command, it says that command must be decentralized, that subordinate commanders must make decisions on their own initiative based on their understanding of their senior's intent. Under Commanders Intent, it states,that we achieve harmonious initiative, which is talked about in Mission Tactics, through the use of the commanders intent. The Army talks about agility as the ability of friendly forces to act faster than the enemy, as a prerequisite for seizing and holding the initiative. Agility is the process where, by operating quicker than the enemy you disrupt his plans, slowing his responses and causing him to piecemeal his efforts. Agility is both mental and physical, the need to think fast and take advantage of situations is inherent in agility. The Marine Corps talks about the aim of maneuver warfare to shatter the enemies cohesion. To impose menacing dilemmas which happen unexpectedly and faster that the enemy can react or respond-to them. Further, by the use of mission tactics, the commander provides the freedom for initiative that permits the high tempo of operations that are necessary to keep the enemy off balance. Depth, as the Army views it, is the extension of operations in space, time, and resources. By using depth effectively thee necessary space to maneuver, and the necessary time to plan, arrange, and execute operations is gained. The Marines view Maneuver Warfare as maneuver in both space and time to generate a faster operating tempo than the enemy. Shaping the Battle states that we should try to shape events in such away that allows us reserve options so that by the time the moment of encounter arrives we have not restricted ourselves to only one course of action. Synchronization is the arrangement of battlefield activities in time, space, and purpose to produce maximum relative combat power at the decisive place. Supporting fires are synchronized with maneuver and shifted to support the attack as it progresses. It is based on fully understanding the commanders intent. Maneuver Warfare addresses supporting arms as applied selectively in support of maneuver. Violence is the concentration of strength against enemy vulnerabilities, striking quickly and boldly. These comparisons identify that except for the ordering of the explanations and the specific word used to identify a particular area the explanations and the areas covered by them are essentially the same. After the tenets the Army talks about combat imperatives. These imperatives are a guide to the application of their doctrine, principles that the commander, as he prepares to execute and executes, considers but is not rigidly held to. They are, *Ensure unity of effort. *Anticipate events on the battlefield. *Concentrate combat power against enemy vulnerabilities. *Designate, sustain, and shift the main effort. *Press the fight. *Move fast, strike hard, and finish rapidly. *Use terrain, weather, deception and OPSEC. *Conserve strength for decisive action. *Combine arms and sister services to complement and reinforce. *Understand the effects of battle on soldiers, units and leaders.12 The Marine Corps has also identified principles to guide the commander and they are contained in OH 6-1. As with the Army they are not binding but are references or keys for the commander to consider. They are, *Philosophy of command. *Shaping the battle. *Decision making. *Mission tactics. *Commanders intent. *Focus of effort. *Surfaces and gaps. *Combined arms.13 These imperatives show the same consistency between the caps tone doctrine of the Army and the Marine Corps as the tenets did. The major difference is that the Army goes into greater detail in its lists and descriptions prompting some to think that the Army is trying to be prescriptive. However, repeatedly in the discussions of their doctrine FM 100-5 emphasizes the commanders and subordinates role in keying in on intent and using these imperatives and tenants as guides. This is the same as the Marine Corps which says that warfare cannot be prescriptive and the there are no set solutions. The explanations, tenets, and imperatives of Maneuver Warfare and Air Land Battle are essentially the same. As a concept of thinking, fighting, and employing ones forces to defeat the enemy these doctrines represent a similarity of thought that is fundamental for interoperability. Although, reached by different means these doctrines represent the foundation upon which a single doctrine for both services could be compiled. Do the Army and the Marine Corps need a separate caps tone doctrine, the answer is no. The need to defeat the enemy and accomplish the mission is the most important function of the services and the Goldwater-Nichols Act as part of Title 10 has recognized this. There is no failure in accepting a fighting doctrine that accomplishes the mission and provides for the best opportunity for success. As the two services that provide the majority of this nations ground forces and who, in most unified command campaign plans, will fight side by side the need for interoperability and effective synchronization are more important than whose doctrine it is. Title 10 is clear in its tasking and in review shows that the roles and missions of both services are essentially the same in that they are required to accomplish the mission and defeat the enemy. The differences that do exist can be taken care of in the application manuals. The review of current manuals identified some fundamental differences that should not be there because when the services fight they are conducting essentially the same types of operations. However, a review of the new capstone doctrine reveals a consistency of thought and ideas. They provide excellent common ground for the development of one doctrinal publication governing the concept of fighting for both services. FOOTNOTES 1Supplemt V, United States Code, (Washingjon, D.C.: United States Government Printings Office, 1987),p.856. 2Title l0, Armed Forces, United States Code Volumn III (Washington, D.C.: United States Government Printing Office, 1983) ,p.465. 3United States Code, Volumn III, p.465. 4National Defense University, Armed Forces Staff College, The Joint Staff Officers Guide. AFSC, Pub. 1, (Norfolk, Va., 1988) ,p.l0. 5United States Code, Volumn III, p.606. 6Headquarters Department of the Army, The Tank and Mechanized Infantry Battalion Task Force, FM 71-2 (Washington, D.C., 1988),p. 7MCDC, Ground Combat Operations, OH 6-1 (Quantico, VA., 1988) ,p. 8Headquarters United States Marine Corps, Warfighting, FMFM-1 (Washington, D.C., 1989) ,p.59. 9Headquarters Department of the Army. Operations; FM 100-5 (Washington, D.C., 1986),p.l4 10FMFM-1, 11FM 100-5, p. 12FM 100-5, p.23. 13FM 100-5, p. BIBLIOGRAPHY National Defense University, Armed Forces Staff College. The Joint Staff Officers Guide, AFSC Pub 1. Norfolk, Va.,1988. Title 10 United States Code Volumn III, Armed Forces, 1982 Edition. Washington, D.C.: United States Government Printing Office, 1983. United States Code, 1982 Edition, Supplement V. Washington, D.C.: United States Government Printing Office, 1987. U.S. Army, Headquarters Department of the Army. Operational Terms and Symbols, FM 101-5-1. Washington, D.C., October 1985. U.S. Army. Headquarters Department of the Army. Operations, FM 100-5. Washington, D.C., May 1986. U.S. Army. Headquarters Department of the Army. The Tank and Mechanized Infantry Battalion Task Force, FM 71-2. Washington, D.C., September 1988. U.S. Marine Corps. Department of the Navy. Headquarters United States Marine Corps. Command and Staff Action w/change 1, FMFM 3-1. Washington, D.C., August 1988. U.S. Marine Corps. Marine Corps Combat Development Command. Ground Combat Operations, OH 6-1. Qauntico, Va., January 1988. U.S. Marine Corps. Department of the Navy. Headquarters United States Marine Corps. Warfighting, FMFM 1. Washington, D.C., March 1989.
