Korea-Alliance In Transition CSC 1989 SUBJECT AREA - National Military Strategy Author Major Larry D. Beaver EXECUTIVE SUMMARY TITLE: KOREA-ALLIANCE IN TRANSITION I. Purpose: To analyze the U.S.-R.O.K. relationship in light of growing Korean nationalism and capabilities to determine adaptations which may be required in the future. II. Problem: There is a growing anti-American movement in South Korea. It is largely composed of younger individuals but is spurred throughout the populace by a swelling national pride. South Korea is one of the worlds economic powers and is becoming a military power in Northeast Asia. On the other hand, the U.S. is experiencing a shrinking defense budget and is rapidly approaching difficult economic times. It is time for a change in the alliance on the Korean peninsula. It may soon be demanded by both parties in the bilateral relationship. III. Data: Korea is of great importance. America must retain South Korean loyalties to the western world. Its strategic military, geographic, and economic characteristics are of great significance to the west. Koreans are seeking greater influence and command over their armed forces in peacetime as well as a self-sufficient military capability. Nuclear sensitivities have surfaced- and the South Koreans are desiring a greater impact in the control and use of nuclear weapons in a conflict. Further, Koreans are questioning what the American policy of "horizontal escalation" will mean for them in a global conflict. Then ultimately a large and growing segment of the population is requesting the reduction and final withdrawal of American troops. IV. Conclusion: The Korean alliance is maturing. Korea is ready to assume a position of strength. America and Soutn Korea must adapt their relationship to accommodate this new ability. The alliance is ready to stand side-by-side and not one behind the other. V. Recommendation: The U.S. should modify the Combined Forces Command structure to allow Korean control of their military at least in peacetime. The Americans should include the Koreans in policy concerning deployment and employment of nuclear weapons in a peninsular conflict. The implications of our national strategy must be discussed with the Koreans as to what we expect of them and they of us. Finally, given certain conditions, the reduction and withdrawal of American troops bust be considered. KOREA-ALLIANCE IN TRANSITION OUTLINE Thesis Statement. With growing economic and military capability, South Korea is ready and able to assume greater responsibility for its defense. In light of the Republic of Korea's growing nationalistic pride and fervor, the U.S.-R.O.K. alliance must adapt to accommodate this maturing Northeast Asian partner. I. An Alliance Requiring Change A. Korean Viewpoint B. American Viewpoint II. The Strategic Importance of Korea A. Geographically B. Politically C. Economically D. Militarily III. The Rise of Korean Nationalism and Adaptations A. The CFC Military Command Structure B. Nuclear Weapons Policy C. U.S. Maritime Strategy Implications D. Reduction of U.S. Forces in Korea KOREA-ALLIANCE IN TRANSITION It has been over 35 years since the cessation of hostilities on the Korean peninsula. Yet, American soldiers and airmen still occupy wartime positions and stand a wartime footing ever alert to the danger of a lightning war being precipitated by the Democratic Peoples Republic of Korea (DPRK, North) against the Republic of Korea (ROK, South). Many young Koreans and American taxpayers are beginning to question-the necessity of the American presence. Two passages reflect the emphasis of these concerns. The first provides insight to the Korean perspective. To a considerable extent American attitudes, behavior and policy have not kept pace with the growth of South Korea's power. They still reflect their origins in an era when Korea was weak and undeveloped. Yet the R.O.K. is already at the point where it could achieve military superiority on the Korean peninsula if it wished to do so, and its economic drive has distinguished it as a foremost exemplar of rapid development. But Americans have not absorbed these changes in South Korea's strength and its new sense of self-importance, changes that will necessarily affect the U.S. role and position in Korea. (8:1038) The second develops the more pragmatic view of the Americans. Whatever may be the benefits of the Korean alliance to the United States, the costs are considerable--economically, militarily, and politically. In economic terms, the costs of maintaining U.S. forces on the K.orean peninsula are substantial, despite large sutsidies from South Korea. The direct cost of maintaining U.S. troops in Korea in 1984, excluding weapons, equipment, plant, and reinforcements, was estimated at $ 2 billion. Total costs of the Korean commitment are likely to be much greater. U.S. Asian deployments, of which the Korean contingent is the largest component, are placed at $ 47 billion. In a period of fiscal austerity, pressures to reduce the overseas military burden are building in Congress, and will probably continue. (9:86) It must be generally accepted that the Korea of today is indeed a far cry from the Korea of the 195O's. It has become an economic giant and a significant military power in Northeast Asia. There is a rising swell of national pride within South Korea with its attendant expectations and problems. Too, America must recognize and adapt to the reality of the world as it exists today accommodating both the burgeoning of Korean nationalism and the fiscal restraints brought on by economic austerity. America's role in Korea is changing, and it must. The peninsula of Korea and the foothold that South Korea occupies is of vital strategic import to American interests in Northeast Asia. If the United States is to continue its long tradition of close military, economic, and political cooperation with South Korea then America must no longer fear the rise of Korean nationalism but must come to understand it and develop new attitudes and means of dealing with this most valued ally. Just as Berlin is a focal point in Europe where the interests of great powers meet, Korea is the focal point in Northeast Asia where the world's four great powers paths cross. South Korea has come to present the symbol of where communism stops and capitalism begins It's strategic importance to the United States is inestimable. The Korean peninsula is geographically, politically, economically, and militarily significant to American interests. Our foreign policy in East Asia is focused on Japan and its. gateway to the continent--Korea. Located in the heart of the Far East, the peninsula of Korea is of great strategic importance. Extending southward from Manchuria and the Union of Soviet Socialist Republics (U.S.S.R.), it is bounded on the north by the Yalu and Tumen rivers. The peninsula is bordered by three bodies of water: in the south by the Korea-Strait, in the west by the Yellow Sea, and in the east by the Sea of Japan. (10:457) The Korean peninsula is 966 kilometers long and 217 kilometers wide. The eastern half is covered by a rugged, largely unpopulated mountain range. On the west coast lies a coastal plain containing most of the agriculture and the population. The northern portion has most of the natural resources. Coal and ore mines have undergone heavy development during the past eighty years. The South has traditionally been the breadbasket, with 22% of the arable land and therefore farmed intensively. There are very few good ports on the east coast. The south and west coasts are much better off as they support a large fishing and maritime shipbuilding industry. (7:190) On the grander strategic scale, Korea has a significant geographic importance (Ref. Fig. 1). In the sea it lies astride the critical Korean Strait that forms a choke point for a major sea lane that travels from Vladivostok all the way to Southeast Asia. Further, the Korean peninsula is a classic invasion route to Japan and to some degree presently serves as a forward defense Click here to view image shield to create a more secure Japan. (12: 14l) It is a "dagger pointed at the heart of Japan." Considering John Keenan's global strategy of "containment" for the communist world, Korea is a frontline state. It stands toe-to-toe with arguably the most aggressive communist dictatorship in the world. South Korea also provides the only military installations available to the United States in Northeast Asia providing us a strategic foothold on the Asian continent during conflict. Bounded on the north by the Peoples Republic of China and the Soviet Union and only thirty miles from the closest Japanese island, the Korean peninsula is the one area where the interests of the four great powers in Asia (the U.S., the U.S.S.R., the P.R.C., and Japan) converge. (13:1) The key to preserving Japan's independence, our most vital Northeast Asian ally, rests in the survival of a free South Korea. This delicate balance is dependent upon U.S. support and participation in the defense of the Republic of Korea. For economic and nationalist reasons, both Koreas desire reunification, but on their own political terms. It is unlikely that either the North or the South will be successful in their attempts at reunification due to the strong political currents in the region. North Korea will remain impoverished and militarized as long as Kim Il Sung is in power. The North will continue-to pursue a strategy of violence, including assassination, terror, and armed threats, to try to frighten the South into capitulation. (7:195) South Korea continues to pursue a dual strategy, that of maintaining a strong and reliable army while expanding the economy in heavy industry and consumer goods. (7:195) The United States wants to keep enough combat power in the region to prevent North Korea from attacking the South. Further, America wants to ensure some overly aggressive South Korean government doesn't decide to attack the North. The U.S. appears to be satisfied with the status-quo. (7:195) The Kremlin will not easily give up a satellite (i.e. Czechoslovakia). Russia appears pleased to keep North Korea poor and militarized, relying on Russian arms and economic support. A militarized ally is always useful to the Soviets. North Korea gives Russia the ability to threaten Japan and China without directly involving Russian troops. (7:195) The Chinese would love a demilitarized Korean peninsula and a united, neutral Korea. Getting Russia and the United States off the peninsula would create a pliant buffer state between China and Japan. (7:195) The Japanese are in the throes of being the world's economic power. They are deeply tied to South Korea in bilateral economic agreements. Japan would prefer to see the status-quo remain in place with the U.S. providing a very visible military deterent supporting a political and military buffer-state between it and the communist powers, China and Russia. Japan, although not technically a military partner of South Korea, is beginning to realize the necessity of engaging militarily in defense of the region on a limited scale. They would not readily accept losing South Korea as a free state on this historical invasion route. A graphic depiction of superpower interest in the region is illustrated in Figure 2. (7:196) Although China is Russia's major threat in Asia, Korea is its backyard. The United Sates is interested in maintaining its South Korean ally and protecting Japan. China has an interest in neutralizing a Russian ally and using Korea as a buffer state. The Japanese see Korea as the classic invasion route over the centuries. But the overriding factor in all the strategic political rivalries is that they all wish the peninsula to remain peaceful. Once one of the largest recipients of American economic and military aid, the Republic of Korea can no longer be regarded as a struggling, underdeveloped country. In fact, in 1987 South Korea achieved a gross national product (GNP) of $ 118 billion, larger than Austria; a per capita income of $ 2,813, higher than Portugal; and a trade volume of $ 88 billion, which placed it twelfth among the world's trading nations. (2:385) South Korea has in many respects followed the Japanese "model" of riding from complete devastation by war to economic greatness. This progress has been founded in several factors: a firm conimitment to development, a strong partnership between government and business, a well-educated, disciplined and industrious work force, and a positive integration with the international economy. (2:385) South Korea has two major trade partners in the Click here to view image international economic arena, Japan and the United States. South Korea is now Japan's second largest trading partner in Asia. Japan accounts for 25% of all South Korean trade. (2:391) In 1986 Korea bought 34% of its imports from Japan, primarily machinery and intermediate goods. Japan also accounted for 19% of South Korean export business. (9:77) Further, the Japanese account for 47% of all foreign investment in South Korea. (2:391) Through the past three decades the United States has been the principal sponsor of the Republic of Korea's economic success. The U.S. looms largely as South Korea's primary economic trade partner. South Korea stands as America's seventh largest trade partner. (8:1045) In 1986 the U.S. was a customer to South Korea for over $ 19 billion (8:1053) in exports and in 1987 purchased over 30% of South Korea's products. (2:391) The U.S. also accounted for 21% of foreign investment in South Korea. (2:391) After decades of deficits, Korea is managing to achieve significant trade surpluses with the United States amounting to $ 7.6 billion in 1986 and approximately $ 9.5 billion in 1987. (8:1046) But the South Korean economy is not without its problems as the trade deficit with Japan and the trade surplus with the United States continue at high levels. Traditionally, Koreans do not like to live beyond their means and being in debt to foreigners above all is disturbing for a nationalistic people. South Korea ranks as the world's fourth largest debtor among less developed countries, and Asia's largest, with a debt approaching $ 45 billion. (8:1045) The Koreans feel that the bilateral deficit with Japan, just over $ 5 billion in both 1986 and 1987, threatens their ability to service their international debt and indirectly contributes to protectionist frictions with the United States and the EEC. (2:390) The success of Korea in penetrating the U.S. market is meeting increasing resistance. The Korean economy is burdened by an overwhelming dependence on continued growth of export markets. The Koreans are attempting to shift export production away from traditional products such as clothing and electronics into products with a higher value added through requiring more skilled labor and advanced production techniques. These industries include ship-building, steel, petro-chemical products, and motor vehicles. (9:77) The wave of protectionism sweeping the United States, Korea's largest export market, is due in part to this renewed threat of Korea, especially in automobiles. The American Congress terminated U.S. military credits to South Korea on the grounds tnat a country with such a large trade surplus could afford to pay for its own weaponry. America is also beginning to put pressure on Korea to open its own market doors to allow American exporters new opportunities as these have been closed very much like those of Japan. In response, South Korea is consciously trying to diversify itself away economically from overdependence on its main partners, Japan and the United States, through Koreanization of imports and expanding efforts to export to the European Economic Community. Nevertheless, they will still remain the Republic of Korea's main trading partners. The Republic of Korea's major security concern lies with the threat inherent in the stated ambition of its communist neighbor to the north to reunify the country by force on its own terms. North Korea is a highly militarized state and reveals an extremely offensive orientation in support of its stated goal. Further, Kim Il Sung has acknowledged that the North is ready to intervene in the South, should domestic turmoil there ever present the opportunity. As a result, South Korea maintains a high state of readiness out of concern that the North might attempt a surprise attack. An integral part of South Korean security is the Mutual Defense Treaty with the United States signed in 1953. A major component in the South Korean defense structure is the sizeable commitment of U.S. forces to it--the largest outside of the U.S. commitment to NATO. The U.S. deploys over 40,000 Army, Air Force, Marine, and Navy personnel in South Korea who regularly train with South Korean forces in simulated wartime exercises such as Team Spirit. The armed forces of the Republic of Korea are comprised of the Army, Air Force, and Naval Marine Force. The South Korean forces are heavily influenced by the U.S. military in terms of organization, command, arms of service and dress. Their equipment has been and continues to be exclusively U.S. (Ref. Fig. 3). (6:541) Click here to view image Noteworthy from the order of battle is the 1950's vintage of a significant portion of the Korean armed forces equipment. The imbalance that has arisen as a consequence of inadequate modernization for the R.O.K. could establish the conditions necessary for the renewal of conflict on the Korean peninsula. The R.O.K. is seeking greater defense self-sufficiency and upgrade through a series of five-year Force Improvement Plans (FIPs). The first FIP covered from 1976-1980, but was extended one year due to fiscal constraints. The second completed in 1986 covering the years 1982-1986 emphasized development of the indigenous arms industry. (6:540) Much of the South Korean arsenal has been purchased from the U.S. in the past, but the R.O.K. is moving to produce in-country all unsophisticated items used by the armed forces. This full-scale modernization coupled with a determination on the part of the United States to deter foreign intervention will certainly contribute to preventing conflict on the Korean peninsula. That consensus rests on a general agreement that the U.S. military relationship with South Korea contributes importantly to the regional balance of power, and that the United States could not extract itself from the equation without heightening the risk of war on the peninsula and without far-reaching effects in Japan and the rest of East Asia. Over half of all American ground and air combat forces in the western Pacific are based in Korea under extremely attractive operational arrangements. While the mission of these forces is defense of South Korea, they are also a vital constituent of the strong U.S. presence throughout Northeast Asia, a presence that has offset growing Soviet power and undergirded our own ties with Japan, China, and the R.O.K. as well as improving relations with them. These realities...also mean that the R.O.K. cannot eliminate a continuing dependency on the United States. In these circumstances Washington needs to adjust its military ties with Seoul not only to accommodate the evolving requirements of both sides but also the new nationalism in Korea. (8:1052) The U.S.-R.O.K. military relationship should be reviewed and revised to ensure that America's policies and posture accommodate both South Korea's new strength and national pride and promote the national interests of the United States. The United States seems suspicious of nationalistic assertion by virtually any third world or developing nation. The Americans are particularly suspect of the rising South Korean nationalistic attitude toward U.S.-Korean relations. This outcry may result significantly as being a consequence of American paternalism. Within the military, nationalistic concerns about the consequences of the present military structure of the alliance are beginning to emerge. Several concerns require timely attention: the Combined Forces Command structure, nuclear weapons policy, implications for Korea in the U.S. global strategic doctrine of "horizontal escalation," and the reduction of the American presence in South Korea. (9:85) Due to the overwhelming dominance of U.S. forces in the U.N. force fighting during the Korean War, the U.S. commander was given operational command over all forces including those of South Korea. When in 1953 President Syngman Rhee refused to sign the armistice, the U.S. commander became solely responsible for U.S. -R.O.K. enforcement of the agreement. The military command structure still reflects those Korean War conditions. The senior U.S. military commander in Korea is in charge of almost all South Korean, as well as American forces in wartime and a good portion in peacetime, as well in the guise of one of seven command positions he holds in the Combined Forces Command. (15:35) Third command arrangement is a painful reminder to South Koreans of their dependence on the United States and is beginning to grate on nationalist sensitivities. On an international scale, legally the U.N. Command may have to remain in place with an American in charge to enforce the armistice agreement unless and until this agreement is replaced by a treaty between the beligerants. However, change to allow South Korean command over its own ground forces at least during peacetime will be necessary to maintain high levels of military cooperation. There has been a fundamental slight delivered to the national pride of the Korean military commanders who own the overwhelming majority of defense forces, i.e. eighteen divisions for the Koreans vice one division for the Americans. It is unlikely that American forces would ever be placed under a South Korean commander, however American dominance of command responsibilities does not appear to be possible much longer given the present social environment. (8:1047) During the past twenty years, U.S. nuclear weapons have been present on the Korean peninsula and have been one of the pillars of the Korean defense strategy. Policy commits the use of these weapons against invading North Koreans especially in the defense of Seoul, the supreme strategic objective in all of South Korea. Tactical considerations for use of tactical nuclear weapons are arguable. The proximity of friendly troops and Seoul, a city of 10 million a mere 30 kilometers south of the DMZ, begs the question of feasibility of use. Further, the Koreans, are not only beginning to question the use of such weapons, but also that they would be used by Americans, i.e. foreigners not Koreans. Korean sensibilities are additionally irritated by the exclusion of Korean military planners and commanders from the nuclear command structure. There must be a rational joint control command structure placed over U.S. nuclear weapons (9:85) Americans are extremely sensitive about their own nuclear weapons on their own soil. One can only surmise that similar Korean national feelings exist and are especially susceptible to the aspect of foreign command and control. The United States Maritime Strategy as detailed by admiral James D. Watkins in January 1986 introduces the concept of "horizontal escalation" as the process of denying the Soviets the luxury of fighting a one-theater war. (16:13) This doctrine suggests that a war with the Soviet Union may be conducted in a region of the world other than where the initial conflict breaks out. Therefore, it becomes quite obvious Korea could become the scene of a major war for reasons that have nothing to do with South Korea's defense against the North. This fact distresses the South Koreans somewhat. The R.O.K. seeks primarily the goal of local defense on the Korean peninsula with a mixture or blending of regional deterence provided by its alliance with the United States. The U.S. on the other hand tends to place strategic primacy on regional deterence vis-a-vis the Soviet Union with a component of that strategy being local defense of South Korea from Northern agression. (12:149) It is reasonable to believe that doubts have begun to surface about the wisdom of such an affiliation by military members with a nationalist bent. The U.S. and R.O.K. must seek a formulation of joint strategies on terms more strictly tied to Korean definitions of national interest, while also providing for the common defense of the region against a growing Soviet threat. (9:85) With growing nationalist sentiment and political upheaval there has been an effort to reduce the visibility of American troops in South Korea. The recently installed Bush Administration reiterated the American commitment to a free R.O.K. and that an adjustment of the military relationship between the nations would be well-conceived and in the interests of both nations. In other words, the U.S. is not reducing its strength in Korea as yet; however, as R.O.K. military capabilities grow the reconsideration of some reconfiguration or withdrawal of some of the 40,000 American forces in Korea will be forthcoming. With the potential for the R.O.K. to reach war- fighting parity with the north by the mid 90's, the need for so many troops will decrease. However, there are many factors the U.S. will have to consider before taking such an action other than just the simple pressure of some urban unrest. As we enter the decade of the 90's reduction of forces may well be justified for a number of reasons: a self-sufficient Korea, a remilitarized Japan, Gorbachev's initiatives in force redutions. But, among the most touted will be the cost savings as America enters a time of fiscal restraint. If forces are withdrawn on the basis of saving money, it must be realized that probably no money would be saved by returning them to the United States or rebasing in the Pacific. The expense of such a move and the construction and support of facilities would likely be greater than costs are now (5:64) Thus the impact that this would have on the federal budget would have to be carefully considered as well as the alternative sites availabe for basing in an ever shrinking world. Another factor that must be considered is how troop reductions would be perceived by nations in the area. Certainly, the Koreans and Japanese would have to be consulted. The U.S. would require a high degree of credibility and also a confidence on the part of Korea and Japan that they could handle increased responsibility for their own defense. The U.S. on reduction or withdrawal may offer the reason that it is husbanding a vital portion of its military capability thus preserving its flexibility to respond more effectively to any threat arrising in the area. (5:65) These two allies may be rightfully concerned about the American's ability to respond in the event of crisis. Several conditions must exist before the U.S. could safely reduce its presence in Korea. One is that intelligence sources woud have to be enhanced so as to provide adequate warning of a surprise attack or the imminent outbreak of hostilities. A second is that America must have the strategic mobility to move a significant amount of force into the arena to either deter or defeat an aggressive act. (5:64) Presently the U.S. does not possess either one of these capabilities and to purchase them is more cost prohibitive than keeping troops in place. Finally, the R.O.K. must carry to fulfillment the ongoing and future modernization of the R.O.K. armed forces to stabilize the military balance between the north and the south. It will be essential. for the United States to ensure that no misleading signals about unwavering commitment are delivered to any external player--North Korea, the Soviet Union, or China. There must be no circumstances which might give the impression that the United States is reducing its presence due to fiscal restraint, a surge in isolationism, or bowing to internal pressure. Professor Yuan-Li Wu of the University of San Francisco provided a statement on this issue of perceptions ...The more confident an ally is in his own capability and in the capability and resolve of the United States, the lower will be the required level of U.S. presence on the spot. The same applies to the perception of the adversary. All of this implies that both the safe level of U.S. force reduction and the geographical aspect of deployment of a smaller force in Pacific-Asia are functions of confidence. When allied confidence is low, a greater presence and more forward defense will be required The contr&ry is true when confidence is high or building...When confidence is fully reestablished, force reductions required for budgeting or other reasons will be safe and feasible (5:66) As Admiral Gaylor has commented, "...The presence that counts is the presence that's were the East Asian leaders can see its..." If peace and stability are our goals on the Korean peninsula then it seens essential that the United Statea should retain its bases and forces in the area. This objective will not be obtained without cost, economic and political. There simply is no inexpensive way to maintain bases ard forces overseas. Futher, to remove forces from the area of potential aggression is to risk aggression occurring. Reducing American presence and visibility under the present nationalistic political and social conditions must be considered. But, not at the risk of losing the trip-wire functions, bi-lateral linkages, and uniquely American military capabilities that have served in preserving South Korea's security as well as stability throughout Northeast Asia. Clearly, in view of the rising tide of national sentiment, America must reevaluate its military structure and posture in Northeast Asia on the Korean peninsula. Korean command over their own forces is a logical outgrowth of the development of a highly professional officer corps and a military self-sufficiency in many areas. The deployment of American nuclear weapons on foreign soil, always a contentious issue, brought wide-ranging protest in Europe in the past decade. It should not be surprising or upsetting that the Koreans are beginning to question the wisdom of their use, as their conventional power grows, as well as desire an input into their command and control and employment. The American naval strategic issue of "horizontal escalation" is bothersome to Koreans because it carries with it the implication of involvement in the world war that may start in Europe or the Middle East and have nothing to do with Korean national interest. For a nation that looks primarily to local conflict and has a limited regional interest, this strategy presents problems that complicate ties to the U.S. and their sensitivities must be considered by national command authorities. Reducing the presence of American forces on the peninsula, though not a time sensitive issue, must be evaluated in light of South Korean military capabilities, perceptions of friend and foe alike, and ultimately the U.S. federal budget. These issues are complex and intertwine. Only through a truly dedicated effort and understanding by both South Korea and the United States can a mutually beneficial and reliable agreement be reached on these issues. America must recognize the import of Korean nationalism and must make some accommodations to maintain a strong alliance. The Koreans on the other hand, while nationalism is a natural outgrowth of a strong nation, must not let its fervor get out of hand and destabilize a relationship that forms the basis of stability in Northeast Asia. BIBLIOGRAPHY 1. Bok, Lee Suk. The Impact of U.S. Forces in Korea. Washington D.C.: National Defense University Press, 1987. 2. Bridges, Brian. "East Asia in Transition: South Korea in the Limelight," in International Affairs, Vol. 64, No. 3. Royal Institute of International Affairs, Summer 1988. 3. Bunge, Frederica, ed. North Korea A Country Study. Washington D.C.: American University Press, 1981. 4. Bunge, Frederica, ed. South Korea A Country Study. 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