The Operational Level: Vital Knowledge For Today's Officer CSC 1989 SUBJECT AREA - Operations Author Major Charles Bauland EXECUTIVE SUMMARY TITLE: THE OPERATIONAL LEVEL: VITAL KNOWLEDGE FOR TODAY'S OFFICER I. Purpose: Educate the military officer on the operational level of war and its implementation through campaign planning. Also, to convince the officer of their importance and his obligation to study them and to acquire the ability to apply them. II. Problem: The study of the operational level of war has been neglected by the U.S. military since World War Two. Knowledge of this level of war and the ability to apply it through campaign planning is crucial to a nation's success in war. Future success of the United States in war may de- pend on a renewed interest by the officer corps in the oper- ational level. III. Data: Germany's failure in World War Two and the U.S.'s in Vietnam, are examples of not heeding the tenets of the operational level. These two cases emphasize, in particular, the critical importance of avoiding a strategic-operational disconnect, i.e., the strategic objectives being unclear or unsupportable by-operational level capabilities. Under current U.S. military structure, the unified command com- mander, the theater Commander-in-Chief (CINC), is the oper- ational level commander. As this level of war commander, he is responsible for theater operational planning. This planning is realized in the form of the campaign plan. How- ever, within the services, there is currently confusion as to what campaign planning and the campaign plan are. This situation also applies in the joint regime. The development of joint doctrine for campaign planning would be a first step toward resolving this problem. A proposed definition of a campaign plan is offered; further, what a campaign plan should contain is also given. Success at the oper- ational level mandates the requirement for a standardized, joint doctrine. IV. Conclusions: A resurgence of the study of the oper- ational level of war and campaign planning has been taking place since the early 1980's. This trend must con- tinue. Acceptable joint doctrine must be developed and embraced by the services to insure the theater CINC's ability to integrate each service's unique capabilities at the operational level. The individual officer has a professional responsibility to undertake the study of the operational level, understand his service's contribution to the joint effort, and be able to implement his knowledge through campaign planning. V. Recommendations: The services must continue to emphasize the study of the operational level by their officer corps. The military education system for officers, from pre-com- missioning to war college level, should emphasize study of the operational level and campaign planning commensurate with an officer's grade. THE OPERATIONAL LEVEL: VITAL KNOWLEDGE FOR TODAY'S OFFICER OUTLINE THESIS STATEMENT: The American officer has an obligation to understand and appreciate the operational level of war and its implementation through campaign planning. I. The study of war as a trilogy A. The three levels of war B. The neglect of the operational level in study and practice C. The three levels of war: defined, compared and their interrelationship II. Historical examples of the importance of the oper- ational level to success in war A. Germany B. Vietnam III. The crucial relationship of the strategic level to the operational level IV. The Commander-in-Chief's (CINC's) relationship to the operational level A. Operational planning B. Responsibilities of a theater CINC C. Political constraints on the CINC V. The importance of the enemy's center of gravity to the operational level VI. Campaign planning and the Campaign Plan A. The service and joint definitions B. The problems associated with the current definitions C. A recommended interservice definition D. A recommended framework for a campaign plan VII. Conclusions VIII. Recommendations THE OPERATIONAL LEVEL: VITAL KNOWLEDGE FOR TODAY'S OFFICER "War, like Gaul, is divided into three parts."1 Thus, Colonel David Jablonsky in his "Strategy and the Operational Level of War: Part I," metaphorically introduces an important concept. War needs to be studied as a trilogy on three dis- tinct levels: the strategic, the operational, and the tactical. This paper is about the middle level, the operational level of war. It is concerned with the American officer's obli- gation to understand and appreciate the concept of the oper- ational level of war and its implementation through campaign planning. The operational level connects all levels of war and is crucial in insuring that the military instrument is effective in achieving the nation's overall strategic goals. At this level, the commander's basic mission: ... is to determine the sequence of actions most likely to produce the military conditions that will achieve the strategic goals (see Figure 1 for the process). The operational commander, in other words, must be constantly interacting with the strategic level even as he gauges his adversary and determines how to use tactical forces to accomplish that sequence of actions. It is this interaction that makes strategy the key to the operational level of war.2 It should be noted that awareness and study of this level of war has been neglected in the recent past, notably since World War Two. Colonel L.D. Holder, in his "Operational Art in the US Army" states, "For all practical purposes, the study of operations ended in the US Army after World War II, ... We have not only neglected to discuss operational art, but have refused to even think about it."3 Only since the early 1980's has a resurgence of interest on the operational level and campaign planning occurred. click here to view image In order to build the foundation to grasp the concept of the operational level of war and its importance in the trilogy, let us begin by defining the three levels of war and show their intimate connection with each other. The U.S. Army's FM 100-5 Operations, describes military strate- gy as the: ... art and science of employing the armed forces of a nation or alliance to secure policy objectives by the application or threat of force. Military strate- gy sets the fundamental conditions of operations in war or to deter war. It establishes goals in thea- ters of war and theaters of operations. It assigns forces, provides assets, and imposes conditions on the use of force.4 From a wider perspective, Colonel Michael Morin of the U.S. Army War College defines the strategic level of war as "... the level of war at which a nation or group of nations determines national or alliance security ob- jectives and develops and uses national resources to accomplish those objectives."5 As the continuum of war extends, the strategic level transitions into the oper- ational level. Referring again to FM 100-5, the Army's perspective on the operational art (in the U.S. lexicon, operational art and operational level of war are synonymous for the purpose of this paper. However, academic disagreement over this previously accepted equivalency has recently occurred. See "The Operational Trilogy" by Colonel John F. Meehan III.) is "... the employment of military forces to attain strategic goals in a theater of war or theater of operations through the design, organization, and conduct of campaigns and major operations."6 Another definition of the operational level further refines the concept. Colonel Morin defines the oper- ational level of war as: The level of war at which campaigns and major oper- ations are planned, conducted and sustained to accomplish strategic objectives within theaters (areas) of operations. Activities at this level link tactics and strategy by establishing operational objectives, sequencing events to achieve the oper- ational objectives, initiating actions, and applying resources to bring about and sustain these events.7 The tactical level of war, the level with which the neophyte officer is first introduced, and, in some cases, unfortunately never moves beyond, is described in FM 100-5 as "... the art by which corps and smaller unit commanders translate potential combat power into victorious battles and engagements."8 For Colonel Morin's part, he describes the tactical level as "... the level of war at which battles and engagements are planned and executed to accomplish the objectives assigned to tactical units or task forces."9 Now that we have established a common ground by clari- the requisite definitions, it should be apparent that, as illustrated in Figure 1, there is a clear-cut linkage from the strategic to the operational to the tactical levels. Colonel Holder delineates that linkage from one viewpoint: At its upper end, where it connects with strate- gy, operational art is truly a military art-the fitting of means to the tasks at hand, the analysis of complex situations, and the designation of military objectives which, when secured, will fulfill the needs of strategy. At its lower end, operational art ad- dresses the ways in which campaigns are designed and pursued in a theater-determining when and where to fight, disposing forces in anticipation of battle, and acting to derive the greatest advantage from tacti- cal actions whether or not fighting takes place.10 Colonel Morin takes another tack in relating the oper- ational level to the strategic and the tactical. He states that, "These activities (at the operational level) imply a broader dimension of time or space than do tactics; they ensure the logistic and administrative support of tactical forces, and provide the means by which tactical successes are exploited to achieve strategic objectives."11 The importance of appreciating the operational level cannot be overstated. Without clear-cut, understandable guidance in the form of strategy, neither exquisite oper- ational art or brilliant tactical application will make up for it. Colonel Jablonsky illustrates this point, quoting Marcus Tullius Ciciero, "... (an) army is of little value in the field unless there are wise councils at home."12 Another prime example of the importance of a true understanding of the operational level's critical relationship to the strategic is Germany's performance during World War Two. Despite exceptional operational and tactical ability, shortcomings in the strategic concept affected the outcome of the war. Colonel Jablonsky further notes: Germany was defeated primarily because Hitler's strategic objectives exceeded his military capa- bilities. To this strategic-operational disconnect, Hitler's field commanders responded, as one his- torian has noted, "like short-money players in a table-stakes poker game, concentrating on winning battlefield victories to demonstrate their `victu' and avert the end as long as possible."13 There is a striking similarity in the underlying reasons for Germany's failure in World War Two and the United States' failure in Vietnam. I am referring to the absence of operational level of war considerations in the conduct of the Vietnam war and, further, the operational- strategic disconnect that we now realize, too late, existed. Strategic objectives were unclear. No operational level commander, i.e., a theater commander-in-chief (CINC) ever queried the National Command Authority (NCA) for clear- cut strategic objectives. Rather, NCA direction ran direct from the Joint Chiefs of Staff to the Commander of U.S. military forces in Vietnam-- a tactical commander. This lack of specific oper- ational direction was significantly responsible for a con- fused, sporadic effort by the U.S. military to achieve vague objectives. With no operational level commander to translate strategic objectives into operational objectives, there was a loss of focus. What occurred was, according to Colonel John F. Meehan III in his astute article, "The Operational Trilogy," a loss of that very focus: If he (the commander) loses his focus, if he becomes actively involved, in the tactical activities of his command to the extent that he loses his perspective, he may win the battles but fail to execute his mission. This was our great failure in Vietnam. We became so enamored of tactical successes that we failed to recog- nize that the sum of these tactical successes would not yield the strategic objective (itself unclear) we sought. 14 In On War, Clausewitz knew of the imperative of clear- cut strategic guidance when he stated that one should not go to war "... without first being clear in his mind what he intends to achieve by that war and how he intends to conduct it."15 As previously indicated, the United States had no evident strategic objectives in Vietnam. Jablonsky observes: Without these objectives, there could be no overall grand strategic design. In the absence of such a design, the Joint Chiefs advocated a strategic concept that included partial mobilization, land and air actions in Laos and Cambodia, a naval blockade of North Vietnam, and the preparation of a US lo- gistics base in Thailand to deter intervention by the People's Republic of China. The fact that these recommendations were never fully accepted consigned General Westmoreland to a protracted struggle of attrition at the operational level. As a consequence, the Chiefs became caught up in MACV (Military Assistance Command Vietnam) requests for ever higher force levels that could only be reviewed, as General Palmer (General Bruce Palmer, former Vice Chief of Staff of the U.S. Army) has pointed out, "in a stra- tegic vacuum without a firm feeling for what the ultimate requirement might be."16 Strategic guidance, however, will not accomplish national objectives even if properly applied through the operational and tactical media. The strategic guidance needs also to "... contain a balanced blend of ends (objectives), ways (concepts), and means (resources)."17 Applying the proper balance of the ends, ways, and means is more of a contemporary problem than one encountered in the past. Jablonsky quotes Henry Kissinger," In the past the major problem of strategists was to assemble superior strength; in the contemporary period, the problem more frequently is how to discipline the available power into some relationship to the objectives likely to be in dis- pute. "18 Further, the proper balance of ends, ways, and means should ideally result in a minimal amount of tactical engagements to achieve the desired strategic objectives. Jablonsky believes that this balancing did not occur during the Vietnam conflict.19 General Palmer also perceived that it was the government's responsibility "... to see that the ends and means are kept in balance -- that the strategic objectives under the strategic concept adopted are achievable with the forces and other resources expected to be availa- ble. "20 Within the U.S. military structure, commanders charged with responsibility for the operational level of war are found at the theater level. Specifically, they are the unified commanders -- the CINC's, e.g., CINCPAC, CINCLANT, CINCCENT. In the theater, the CINC, in order to attain strategic objectives, designs a unified operational plan. This "... operational planning involves bridging the gap between strategic and political aims and actual military measures."21 The unified operational plan that results from the planning is more precisely called a campaign plan. The campaign plan is the mechanism which transforms the intent of the operational level of war into a tangible framework. It is the mechanism which lays out the oper- ational level commander's plan to translate strategic objectives into military objectives. This "... theater campaign plan must conform to strategic requirements and provide guidance to ground, air, and sea forces in a clear, effective concept of operations."22 (See Figure 2.) A CINC, as the operational level of war commander, "... must think big," as Field Marshall Slim observed.23 click here to view image Jablonsky further notes that, "... at this level the commander must deal, however derivatively, with stra- tegic goals that require him to focus on broad but decisive operational objectives extended over time and space beyond the tactical realm. These objectives can range anywhere from destruction of committed forces or reserves to co-opting allies to even more abstract goals such as eroding the enemy's public support. "24 In view of his role as the operational level commander, Colonel Morin comprehensively lays out a framework of the responsibilities of a theater CINC: a. A CINC must understand his operational environ- ment and the global and regional threats within it. b. A CINC must determine his theater strategy based on the strategic direction he receives and his own estimate of the situation. c. A CINC must determine how he intends to organize his theater and provide unified direction for the conduct of warfare or taking appropriate actions to achieve the President's strategic direction. d. A CINC must integrate the types of military oper- ations or forms of warfare that must be unified to achieve the strategic direction. e. Finally, a CINC must provide the vision which ensures a unity of effort in the planning and conduct of military campaigns and operations.25 CINC's interpret the national strategic direction and insure that strategic and operational direction is meaning- fully understood by his subordinates within the theater. As previously discussed, in order that strategic objectives are sure to be attained, the NCA should "... allocate forces to him, define the logistical support available, identify the enemy, and impose time or space requirements for the operation."26 These elements must be incorporated into the successful campaign plan. Aside from the designation of ends, ways, and means, the operational level commander must be aware that national objectives, in general, are also constrained by internation- al and domestic political considerations. "These consider- ations, in turn, determine actions or methods that can con- strain commanders at the operational level." notes Jablonsky.27 An example of current international political consideration for the operational level commander is the demand by the Europeans for a forward defense concept in NATO. Where constraints and restrictions may negatively impact the attainment of desired military objectives and, in turn, the ultimate strategic objectives they are based on, operational commanders have a duty to "... seek either relaxation of the offending restrictions or adjustment of the goals accordingly."28 Jablonsky quotes Liddell Hart in support of this concept, "The military objective should be governed by the political objective, subject to the basic condition that policy does not demand what is mili- tarily. . impossible. "29 Again, I turn to the Vietnam conflict as a cardinal of what may happen if the operational level com- mander does not make the political leadership aware of conflicting goals or restrictions which inhibit attain- ing national objectives. Jablonsky emphasizes "... the importance of such a process was demonstrated during the Vietnam War when US military leaders failed to advise the civilian leadership that the strategy being pursued was not working and that it would in all probability fail to achieve American objectives."30 To be successful, the operational plan must seek to disrupt the enemy's center of gravity, a concept originated by Clausewitz. In disrupting (which does not necessarily mean destroy, since a center of gravity may not be a physi- cal thing, as we shall see) the enemy's center of gravity, objectives are attained which "... makes the enemy's po- sition untenable either in the entire theater or in a sig- nificant part of it."31 Holder goes on to expand the center of gravity concept: The concept of center of gravity assists planners in concentrating on narrow, well defined objectives, but it does not solve the problem of discovering what those centers actually are. They may be straightforward terrain or force objectives, such as the control of an industrial region or a capital city or the defeat of a large opposing for- mation. "Soft", nongeographical aims, though, like physical security or loyalty of a population, are just as likely.32 The importance of the center of gravity concept should be obvious. It is particularly important to the operational level of war commander, but applies across the continuum of war. Jablonsky notes that when the "strategic link" can be ascertained "... what Clausewitz termed the enemy's center of gravity stands revealed, and it is possible to take the initiative, even control of the war, by focusing on the hub of all power and movement, on which everything depends.' "33 Jablonsky cites the example of the Punic Wars in support of his analysis. Here Scipio attempted to defeat Hannibal on the Italian peninsula, but failed. Correctly choosing the Carthaginian's center of gravity, Scipio moved his legions to North Africa. This move forced Hannibal to cease cam- paigning in Italy, and return to Carthage. After this re- turn, Hannibal was ultimately defeated. Jablonsky also credits Sherman's campaign in the "heart" of the Confederacy with being decisive in the Civil War. He criticizes the Confederacy for maintaining its main effort in northern Virginia, likening it to Hannibal's failure to prevent the Roman effort on Carthage's center of gravity, Carthage itself. Thus far, we have looked at, in some detail, the oper- ational level of war and touched on its relationship to campaign planning. Let us now turn to the particulars of the campaign plan itself. What is a campaign plan? How is it defined? Is there intraservice or interservice doctrine for developing campaign plans? What are the particular characteristics of a campaign plan? The remaining portion of this paper will address these questions and overall campaign plan development. As noted previously, CINC's are responsible for campaign plan development. The campaign itself is subject to a number of different definitions which presents a problem to a CINC or his staff officers attempting to develop a plan to conduct a campaign. For example, the Army's FM 100-5 defines a campaign as "... a series of joint actions designed to attain a strategic objective in a theater of war.... "34 FM 101-5-1 describes a cam- paign as a "... connected series of military operations forming a distinct phase of a war to accomplish a long range major strategic objective. "35 In the joint realm, and ,for that matter, the only publication which currently defines a campaign plan, is Joint Chiefs of Staff Publication Number 1. It states that a campaign plan is a "... plan for a series of related military operations aimed to accomplish a common objective, normally within a given time and space."36 In 1974, JCS Publication 2 had perhaps the best definition, since replaced by the foregoing JCS Pub 1 definition. JCS Pub 2 defined a campaign plan as a: ... broad plan to accomplish a long-range major strategic objective. Usually divided into a series of related military operations. A campaign plan is a device used by major commands to express the commander's decision in terms of specific operations projected as far into the future as practicable.... Its purpose is express an orderly schedule of the strategic decisions made by the commander to allow sufficient time to procure and provide the means to secure desired or assigned objectives.37 The current JCS definition is very general. As Mendel and Banks note, "... it could apply to almost any plan.... "38 The 1974 JCS Pub 2 is more refined and detailed than the currently accepted definition but still leaves some question as to what a campaign plan is and what it is supposed to do. At this point, it is necessary to note that al- though there is a JCS definition for a campaign plan, there "... exists today no properly sanctioned doctrine for campaign planning in either the joint or combined arenas."39 Hand in hand with the neglect of the study and application of the operational level of war, cam- paign planning too has been the victim of benign ne- glect. Mendel and Banks further observe that: There is no document approved by the Joint Chiefs of Staff as doctrine for theater warfighting, campaign- ing or campaign planning. Similarly, there are no such documents in the combined theaters that con- tain major U.S. forward--deployed forces--Europe and Korea. This lack of comprehensive doctrine is the basic factor contributing to the ambiguity surround- ing what a campaign plan is, who should prepare it, what it should address, and what the process is for developing it.40 As can be readily seen, there is no concept agreed upon by the four services as to what a detailed, proper campaign plan is. For the purpose of this paper, I will offer the definition of a campaign plan proposed by Mendel and Banks in their article "Campaign Planning: Getting It Straight," as one that should be mutually agreeable to the four services: A campaign plan translates strategic guidance into operational direction for subordinates. It provides broad concepts for operations and sustainment to achieve strategic objectives in a theater of war or theater of operations. It provides an orderly schedule of strategic military decisions that embody the commander's intent. The campaign is the com- mander's vision of how he will prosecute his portion of the war effort from the preparation phase through a sequence of military operations to a well defined conclusion that attains the strategic objective. The campaign plan clearly defines the initial phase(s) of the campaign and unambiguously establishes what spells success at the end of the campaign; however, in recognition of how war's "fog and friction" can affect planning and operations, the mid-phases of the campaign plan may necessarily show less defini- tion. Campaign plans therefore are supplemented with options (contingency or outline plans) for shifting lines of operation and accepting or de- clining battle in order to provide flexibility in dealing with the changing situation.41 A campaign plan must also focus on the enemy's center of gravity. This orientation will maximize the theater commander's ability to make the enemy's "... position in the theater disadvantageous, rob him of the initiative or his will to continue the fight, and defeat him. "42 Overall, the "seven tenets" of a campaign plan offered by Mendel and Banks perhaps gives the military officer of any service the best framework to understand and base pre- paring a campaign plan: Seven Tenets: A Campaign Plan Provides broad concepts of operations and sustainment to achieve strategic military objectives in a theater of war or theater of operations; serves as the basis for all other planning and clearly defines what constitutes success. Provides an orderly schedule of strategic military decisions; displays the commander's vision and intent. Orients on the enemy's center of gravity. Phases a series of related military operations. Composes subordinate forces and designates command relationships. Provides operational direction and tasks to sub- ordinates. Synchronizes air, land, and sea efforts into a cohesive and synergistic whole; is joint in nature.43 CONCLUSIONS Both the study and practice of the operational level of war and campaign planning have been neglected. A re- surgence of interest for both has surfaced in recent years and must be continued. Why? To avoid, in the future, the strategic-operational disconnect which, as I have shown in this paper, contributed so significantly to the calamitous loss of the Vietnam War. In the broad, philosophical context, I contend that all military officers need to be familiar with the entire spectrum of war from its extension as an "act of poli- cy" in the Clausewitzian sense to the specific appli- cation of force on the battlefield. Pragmatically, since today the operational level of war and campaign planning are manifested in theaters of operations under the auspices of CINC's, the prudent officer needs to be con- versant in currently accepted military thought-- that there are three levels of war and campaign planning is a vital adjunct to the operational level. RECOMMENDATIONS The professional military education of officers needs to include the study of the operational level of war and campaign planning to a much greater extent than has occurred in the decades since World War Two. This should be accomplished to a degree commensurate with the officer's rank and experience. In commissioning programs, all candidate officers should be exposed to the operational level of war as part of the continuum of war. The concept of campaign planning should be introduced. At the intermediate service school level, field grade officers should be steeped in the operational level and taught the me- chanics of campaign planning, as they will be the future staff officers who will have to do it. At the senior service school level, senior officers need to be exposed to the operational level and campaign planning from the broadest view possible,i.e., military and national strategy. General John Galvin, the current NATO military commander, in a recent issue of Defense 89, suggested a similar program when he recommended, "... at each level, the schools should seek to broaden the officer's horizon. For example, the command and staff colleges should focus on the operational level of war, stress joint operations and introduce strategy, while the war colleges should devote serious time to the higher perspective, strategy and its development, both national and military. "44 With a career long program in place such as this, officers from the junior to the senior grades will be continually presented with the main concepts of the operational level of war and campaign planning. More importantly, there should be a corporate capability throughout the officer corps of all services to put these concepts into practice. It is now time for the officer corps to undertake the study of the operational level of war and its adjunct, campaign planning, understand the concepts, accept their necessity, and finally, vigorously apply them. I believe the security of the United States will be the better for it. FOOTNOTES 1 David Jablonsky, "Strategy and the Operational Level of War: Part I," Parameters Vol. XVII, No. 1, (Spring 1987), p. 65. 2 Jablonsky, p.65. 3 L. D. Holder, "Operational Art in the US Army: A New Vigor," Essays on Strategy III, (Washington,D.C.: National Defense University Press, 1986), p.116. 4 U.S. Army, FM 100-5 Operations, (May 1986), p.9. 5 Michael J. Morin, Military Strategy and Unified Operations (Draft), (Carlisle, PA: U.S. Army War College, 1988), p.I-10. 6 FM 100-5 Operations, p.10. 7 Morin, p. I-10. 8 FM 100-5 Operations, p.10. 9 Morin, p.I-11. 10 Holder, p.117. 11 Morin, p.I-10. 12 Jablonsky, p.65. 13 Jablonsky, p.65. 14 John F. Meehan III, "The Operational Trilogy," Parameters Vol. XVI, No. 3, p.15. 15 Jablonsky, p.67. 16 Jablonsky, p.67. 17 Jablonsky, p.66. 18 Jablonsky, p.66. 19 Jablonsky, p.67. 20 Jablonsky, p.67. 21 Holder, p.118. 22 Holder, p.118. 23 Jablonsky, p.71. 24 Jablonsky, p.71. 25 Morin, pp.I-14-15. 26 Holder,p.118. 27 Jablonsky,p.68. 28 Jablonsky,p.69. 29 Jablonsky,p.69. 30 Jablonsky,p.69 31 Holder, p. 119. 32 Holder, p.119. 33 Jablonsky, p.71. 34 William W. Mendel and Floyd T. Banks, Jr., Campaign Planning, (Carlisle, PA: U.S. Army War College, 1988), p.6. 35 Mendel and Banks, Campaign Planning, p.6. 36 Mendel and Banks, Campaign Planning, p.6. 37 Mendel and Banks, Campaign Planning, p.6. 38 Mendel and Banks, Campaign Planning, p.6. 39 William W. Mendel and Floyd T. Banks, Jr., "Campaign Planning: Getting It Straight," Parameters, September 1988, p.43. 40 Mendel and Banks, "Campaign Planning," p.44. 41 Mendel and Banks, "Campaign Planning," pp.45-46. 42 Mendel and Banks, "Campaign Planning," p.46. 43 Mendel and Banks, "Campaign Planning," p.46. 44 John R. Galvin, "How Can We Nurture Military Strategists?," Defense 89, January/February 1989, p.28. BLIOGRAPHY Galvin, John R. Gen, USA. "How Can We Nurture Military Strategists?" Defense 89 (January/February 1989). Holder, L.D. LtCol, USA. "Operational Art in the US Army: A New Vigor." Essays on Strategy III. Washington, D.C.: National Defense University Press, 1986. Jablonsky, David Col, USA. "Strategy and the Operational Level of War: Part I." Parameters Vol. XVII, No. 1 Meehan, John F. III Col, USA. "The Operational Trilogy." Parameters Vol. XVI, No. 3. Mendel, William W. Col, USA and Banks, Floyd T. LtCol, USA. Campaign Planning. Carlisle, PA: U.S. Army War College, 1988. Mendel, William W. Col, USA and Banks, Floyd T. LtCol, USA. "Campaign Planning: Getting It Straight." Parameters (September 1988). Mendel, William W. Col, USA."Theater Strategy and the Theater Campaign Plan." Parameters (December 1988). Morin, Michael J. Col, USA. Military Strategy and Unified Operations (Draft). Carlisle, PA: U.S. Army War College, 1988. U.S. Army. FM 100-5 Operations. May, 1986.
