The Challenge Of The Post-World War II Era: The Marine Corps, 1945-1957 CSC 1989 SUBJECT AREA - History ABSTRACT Author: BEAUCHAMP, Bill R., Major, USMC Title: The Challenge of the Post-World War II Era: The Marine Corps, 1945-1957 Date: 15 May 1989 The purpose of this paper is to examine the events immediately following World War II that influenced changes in Marine Corps doctrine and organization. The paper goes into detail in two areas: first, the Marine Corps' role in the unification fight between the services and, secondly, its evaluation of, and response to, the effects of the atomic bomb. Unification of the armed forces was a frightening thought to Marine Corps' leaders after World War II. Despite words of assurance from Army leaders, Marines felt that unification on the Army's terms would mean the end of the Marine Corps. The paper looks at the concerted effort by a group of dedicated Marines and some friendly members of Congress that led to legislation establishing a Marine Corps of three divisions and wings. The existence of the atomic bomb was another threat to the Marine Corps. Amphibious operations such as Iwo Jima and Okinawa would not be successful against an enemy with the bomb. The paper examines the process the Marine Corps used in analyzing and then developing an amphibious doctrine and organization that could survive in the next war. This portion of Marine Corps history has been written about many times before in magazines and books. I attempted to use primary sources when possible but in some cases had to rely on secondary ones. When secondary sources were used I tried to find more than one for confirmation of the facts. Many of the books and magazine articles were written by people that actually participated in the events and, thus, proved to be very good sources. Final conclusion: the Marine Corps saw a very bleak future for itself after World War II so its leaders took the offensive and adapted themselves for the new age of warfare; any other course of action may have resulted in a very different Marine Corps today. WAR IN THE MODERN ERA SEMINAR THE CHALLENGE OF THE POST-WORLD WAR II ERA: THE MARINE CORPS, 1945-1957 Major Bill R. Beauchamp, USMC May, 1989 Marine Corps Command and Staff College Marine Corps Combat Development Center Quantico, Virginia 22134 TABLE OF CONTENTS I. INTRODUCTION A. GENERAL 1 B. OBJECTIVES OF RESEARCH 1 C. SCOPE 1 D. RESEARCH METHODOLOGY 2 E. ORGANIZATION OF STUDY 3 II. THE PEACETIME STRUGGLE FOR SURVIVAL A. INTRODUCTION 4 B. THE POSTWAR WAR 4 C. THE FIGHT CONTINUES 16 D. ONE LAST LOOSE END 28 E. SUMMARY 30 III. WARFARE IN THE ATOMIC AGE A. INTRODUCTION 34 B. DEFINING THE PROBLEM 34 C. DEVELOPING THE CONCEPT 40 D. KOREA 44 E. DOCTRINE 47 F. ATOMIC EXERCISES 57 G. REORGANIZATION 61 H. SUMMARY 68 IV. CONCLUSION A. TYING IT ALL TOGETHER 75 B. WEAPON OF OPPORTUNITY 76 ANNOTATED BIBLIOGRAPHY 78 (Note: Endnotes follow each chapter) I. INTRODUCTION A. GENERAL This paper concentrates on a particular time in history that saw the Marine Corps undergo significant change. My research centered on two series of events that are the foundation for the contemporary Marine Corps. The two are the post-Wor1d War II effort at unification of the armed forces and the development of a concept of amphibious operations for the Atomic Age. While the two seem unrelated, this paper will show that they were indeed connected. B. OBJECTIVES OF RESEARCH My objective in pursuing this subject is to detail events in the history of the Marine Corps that are sometimes overshadowed by wars and other international affairs of the period 1945 to 1957. I wanted to concentrate on the Marine Corps' ability to "rally around its flag" in a time of peril and not only defeat its foes but also come out of the fight stronger than ever before. C. SCOPE This paper covers a period of twelve very significant years in Marine Corps history: 1945 to 1957. 1957 was chosen as the cutoff year because that was when the Marine Corps was reorganized to reflect the changes necessary to implement the new doctrine for atomic warfare. My area of study within that period, however, is limited to two general subjects: the unification fight and the Marine Corps' adjustment to the era of atomic warfare. Other events and changes to the Marine Corps during the twelve year period are not discussed except in relation to the two areas listed above. The Korean War, for example, is cited only with respect to the contribution it made towards affecting unification legislation and the development of the doctrine of vertical envelopment. The subject areas are presented almost entirely from the Marine Corps' perspective. The majority of my sources are Marine Corps or Marine originated and therefore, although factual, are somewhat prone to presenting the Marine Corps' side in its best light. In many cases during the unification fight, for example, the other services saw events with a different point of view. D. RESEARCH METHODOLOGY My research began by reading about the Marine Corps' activities during the period after World War II. That included books on general Marine Corps history, as well as periodical articles of the time that presented the perspective that existed then. These sources not only provided a good background on the period but also included excellent reference sections that provided information on primary sources that were available for further research. Primary sources were then consulted, but in some cases I had to rely on secondary ones because of the lack of research time available. Whenever I did have to go to secondary sources, more than one was checked and if they were in agreement on the facts I felt satisfied that they accurately portrayed the actual events. The bulk of my sources were found in Breckinridge Library at Command and Staff College and the Marine Corps Historical Center at the Navy Yard in Washington, D.C. E. ORGANIZATION OF STUDY The paper is divided into four chapters and an annotated bibliography. This introductory chapter precedes chapters covering the unification struggle, the development of new doctrine for operations in the atomic age, and the conclusion. The two middle chapters are each organized chronologically. II. THE PEACETIME STRUGGLE FOR SURVIVAL A. INTRODUCTION For over two hundred years the Marine Corps has proved itself as a fighting force in every clime and place. This fact has earned for Marines a well justified reputation for ability, courage, and discipline. But perhaps the Marines toughest struggles, ones that threatened their very being, have not been fought on some distant battlefield but within the halls of the United States Congress. The methods and reasons have varied, but throughout its history the Corps has had to justify the need for a military force with its unique capabilities. The unification hearings that followed World War II, although potentially the beginning of the end of the Marine Corps, were used by it to secure legislative protection from forces that wanted an end to the Marine Corps as a viable fighting force. The discussion that follows is admittedly told from the Marine Corps point of view, and an Army or Air Force perspective could probably defend their service's intentions as also being solely for the good of the country. B. THE POSTWAR WAR On the morning of 23 February 1945, as Secretary of the Navy James Forrestal and Lieutenant General Holland M. Smith watched the flag raising on Mt. Suribachi, Forrestal said that "The raising of that flag on Suribachi means a Marine Corps for the next five hundred years."1 That statement may eventually prove to be true but, at the time it was made, efforts were already underway back in Washington, D.C. to emasculate the Marine Corps and revert it to its pre-World War II role. General Smith realized the reality of the situation when, shortly after Forrestal's remark, he said "When the war is over and money is short they will be after the Marines again, and a dozen Iwo Jimas would make no difference."2 The Marine Corps had established a new role for itself in World War II, one that set it apart from other Marine in the world, and decided to fight to keep it. It was a fight that it would eventually win. In November 1943, the Chief of Staff of the Army, General George C. Marshall, submitted a memorandum to the Joint Chiefs of Staff recommending a unification of the land, air, and sea components of the military under a single Department of War. The Marshall memorandum proved to be the initial salvo in a bitter debate that eventually lead to the National Security Act of 1947; it also resulted in the near elimination of the Marine Corps.3 The Marine Corps' fight for survival against enemies from within was nothing new. In 1954 Marine Corps Lieutenant Colonel R. D. Heinl, Jr. outlined ten attempts from within the U. S. Government to "legislate, administer, or remodel the Marine Corps out of existence." Heinl also pointed out that there were two common threads that were consistent in almost all of the attempts: (l) the justification for the attacks was to "get rid of needless duplication" and (2) the Marine Corps' white knight was the U. S. Congress (or in other words, the will of the people) .4 After General Marshall's recommendation, hearings and reports were initiated to study the idea of unification and, as a result, battle lines were soon drawn that clearly defined the different factions on the issue. All of the top military leaders stated their feelings on unification, as did President Truman and many Congressmen. The Woodrum Committee hearings in 1944, the Richardson Committee report, the Eberstadt report (1945), and Senate Military Affairs Committee hearings all contributed to the wealth of discussion on the subject. By the beginning of 1946 two coalitions had developed: the War Department coalition consisted of the Secretary of War, the senior Army generals (both ground and air), and President Truman; their opponents, the Navy Department coalition had the Secretary of the Navy, senior admirals, and the Marines.5 The basic premise of unification was to create a single department of defense under a civilian secretary and a single military chief of the armed forces. The benefits of such a plan included better coordination of the military establishment and elimination of their redundancies. The part that worried the Navy and Marine Corps is that the new secretary and military chief would have considerable power to decide service roles and missions.6 While the War Department coalition maintained publicly that it desired to eliminate needless duplication within the military, privately (at least until it was released to the public by pro Marine Corps sources) it made it clear that a desired one consequence of unification to be the relegation of the Marine Corps to its pre-War status. In 1945, during Congressional hearings, the Army Chief of Staff (General D. D. Eisenhower) and Commanding General of the Army Air Force (General C. H. Spaatz) disclosed their plan for the Marine Corps to revert to its 19th and early 20th Century roles and missions. General Eisenhower testified "that the Marines should hereafter be allowed to fight only in minor shore combat operations in which the Navy alone is interested." He also predicted that "major amphibious operations in the future will be undertaken by the Army, and consequently the Marine Corps will not be appreciably expanded in time of war..." General Spaatz suggested "that the size of the Marine Corps be limited to small...lightly armed units, no larger than a regiment, to protect U. S. interests ashore in foreign countries, and to provide interior guard of naval ships and shore establishments." The effect of their proposals would be to eliminate the Marine Corps Reserve and all need for aviation and other supporting arms.7 One of the Marine Corps Commandant's many concerns was that under the proposed unified Department of Defense, the Marine Corps would lose the protection of its greatest ally: the United States Congress. In his testimony on 24 October 1945, during Congressional hearings, General A. A. Vandegrift said the following: Perhaps the greatest advantage of the current organization from a national point of view is that it is responsive to the control of Congress and the people. ... This is a part of the democratic process of government which insists that effective control of the military remains in the hands of the people. Under the proposed system, the Congress, depending for military advise on a single responsible individual, would soon lose its intimate sense of association with and responsibility for military affairs because in large part it would be dealing not with the services themselves, but with an intervening agency, charged with all matters pertaining to national security. He concluded his remarks with the following: I hope that Congress will consider the real effect and meaning of unification. It means that absolute control of the armed services may, at some time in the future, pass into the hands of a small, highly organized and politically acute group of officers representing only one shade of political opinion. It means that there would then ensue a leveling process under the name of coordination in the course of which valuable branches might first be curbed and then be eliminated altogether. For example, the Marines, the Seabees and our splendid naval air arm may not be here in another war to render their unique and priceless services. Free from any element of healthy competition and under the sedative effect of a throttling and arbitrary regime the remaining services might well lapse into lethargy. Thus, if war comes again we mad have no one to show the way and set the pace.8 Upset at the lack of progress being made on the unification legislation, President Truman intervened at the end of the 1945 Senate hearings on unification. On 19 December 1945, he sent a message to Congress that outlined his views on the subject and also attempted to reassure Congress that the Navy would keep its carrier-based aviation and the Marine Corps would continue "as an integral part of the Navy." While this statement may have calmed some members of Congress, it did nothing to ease the concern within the Navy and Marine Corps.9 The 1946 version of the "Common Defense Act", as the unification bill was called at that time, was essentially a rewrite of President Truman's December 1945 message to Congress. The bill, S. 2044, established a single Department of Common Defense, a single civilian secretary, and a single military chief of staff. The Army, Navy, and newly created Air Force would become agencies within the new department while the functions, duties, and responsibilities of the War and Navy Departments would be transferred to the Secretary of Common Defense.10 While the bill was being drafted during the early part of 1946, the Joint Chiefs of Staff were busy studying what the missions of the services should be after unification. The results of their studies, classified Top Secret so they would not become public, were the Joint Chiefs of Staff (JCS) 1478 Papers. The planned mission for the Marine Corps in the JCS 1478 papers was "...the execution of minor operations in war and in peace, and to supply requisite minor garrisons and naval guard services afloat and ashore." The study, and the subsequent written comments by the Army, Navy, and Marine Corps, provided a detailed look at what the Army really had in mind for the Marine Corps. In a response to the Marine Corps' defense of its role in our country's national security, the Army denied the significance of the Marine Corps' amphibious training and development prior to the war as well as challenging the importance of Marine Corps close air support. The Marine Corps' ensuing comment was that "Had the Marines never fired a shot in this war, had they never sent a man overseas, their existence would have been more than justified by their original and unparalleled contribution to the field of prospective military theory in the development of the amphibious art."11 The exchange between the services in the JCS 1478 Papers was finally ended on 30 March 1946 when the parties realized that no positions would be changed, with further discussion futile. 12 Then, on 30 April 1946 hearings were undertaken by the Senate Committee on Naval Affairs to consider S. 2044, "a bill to promote the common defense by unifying the departments and agencies of the Government relating to the common defense."13 These hearings were highlighted for the Marine Corps by the appearance before the Committee on 6 May by the Commandant of the Marine Corps, General Vandegrift. General Vandegrift referred to the Army's plan for the Marine Corps as outlined in the JCS 1478 Papers and, with the help of some friendly questioning by members of the Committee, clearly stated to everyone, in his view, the real intention of the War Department: the elimination of the Marine Corps as a competitor of the Army for budget dollars, recruits, and publicity.14 The following is an example of the concern General Vandegrift expressed in his appearance: For some time I have been aware that the very existence of the Marine Corps stood as a continuing affront to the War Department General Staff, but had hoped that this attitude would end with the recent war as a result of its dramatic demonstration of the complementary and nonconflicting roles of land power, naval power, and air power. But following a careful study of circumstances as they have developed in the past six months I am convinced that my hopes were groundless, that the War Department's intentions regarding the Marines are quite unchanged, and that even in advance of this proposed legislation it is seeking to reduce the sphere of the Marine Corps to ceremonial functions and to the provision of small ineffective combat formations and labor troops for service on the landing beaches. Consequently I now feel increased concern regarding the merger measure, not only because of the ignominious fate which it holds for a valuable corps, but because of the tremendous loss to the Nation which it entails.15 General Vandegrift continued with a brief history of the Marine Corps' development of amphibious operations and their successes in World War II. He also clearly noted where the Army stood on 7 December 1941 with respect to amphibious capability: its doctrine was the one developed by the Marine Corps and their training was conducted by Marines. 16 When General Vandegrift concluded his prepared remarks with the following text he ensured that the Congress knew that the future of the Marine Corps was solely in their hands: The Congress has always been the Nation's traditional safeguard against any precipitate action calculated to lead the country into trouble. In its capacity as a balance wheel this Congress has on five occasions since the year 1829 reflected the voice of the people in examining and casting aside a motion which would damage or destroy the United States Marine Corps. In each instance, on the basis of its demonstrated value and usefulness alone Congress has perpetuated the Marine Corps as a purely American investment in continued security. Now I believe that the cycle has again repeated itself, and that the fate of the Marine Corps lies solely and entirely with the President and the Congress. In placing its case in your hands the Marine Corps remembers that it was this same Congress which, in 1798, called it into a long and useful service to the Nation. The Marine Corps feels that the question of its continued existence is likewise a matter for determination by the Congress and not one to be resolved by departmental legerdemain or a quasi-legislative process enforced by the War Department General Staff. The Marine Corps, then, believes that it has earned this right--to have its future decided by the legislative body which created it--nothing more. Sentiment is not a valid consideration in determining questions of national security. We have pride in ourselves and in our past but we do not rest our case on any presumed ground of gratitude owing us from the Nation. The bended knee is not a tradition of our Corps. If the Marine as a fighting man has not made a case for himself after 170 years of service, he must go. But I think you will agree with me that he has earned the right to depart with dignity and honor, not by subjugation to the status of uselessness and servility planned for him by the War Department. 17 The "bended knee" speech had accomplished its goal; the reaction by Congress, the press, and the public was swift and clear: no legislation that threatened the existence of the Marine Corps and the authority of Congress was going to become law. President Truman's reaction was also swift. Convinced by leaders in the Senate and House that the bill would not pass in its present form, he directed the Secretaries of War and Navy to resolve their differences and submit a new bill. In his guidance, he included his desire for them to spell out the role and missions of the Marine Corps as the Nation's ready amphibious force. Hearings continued on 2 July on a new version of the bill but even that attempt at compromise was not acceptable to the Navy and it died when, on l7 July, President Truman decided, knowing that it wouldn't pass, to pull it back and try again during the next Congress.18 The compromise version of the bill was very vague and still left the Secretary of National Defense the power to change missions and roles of the services as he deemed appropriate. It reached the new Senate Armed Services Committee** during March 1947, and the House Expenditures Committee began hearings shortly thereafter on 2 April. In both of the Committees there were two overriding issues: the power of the new Secretary of National Defense and the status of the Marine Corps. The Senate hearings did not go well for the Marines. The Corps did not have the support there that it enjoyed in the House and the War Department and President Truman were able to get their version through without much trouble. In the House, where War Department supporters had hoped that the Chairman, Clare Hoffman, would just give the bill superficial treatment, the Marines got a break. Chairman Hoffman was a friend of Marine Lieutenant Colonel J. D. Hittle who happened to be very active in the Marine Corps' effort to defeat the bill in its present form. Through Hittle the Marine Corps' side was presented to Hoffman, as was the secret intentions of the War Department as outlined in the JCS 1478 Papers. Hoffman began to press for release of the Papers, and after several rebuffs, stated that his final position would not be determined until he had a chance to see them. 19 The bill finally made it through the Expenditures Committee and entire House, but not before significant ** The Military and Naval Affairs Committees were merged under congressional reorganization into Armed Services Committees in both Houses. changes were made. Besides protecting the Marine Corps by providing rolls and missions for all the services, the amended bill gave the Secretary of National Defense the power to eliminate unnecessary duplication in logistics and support areas but not the authority to determine military budget estimates, thus somewhat curbing his power. The House version also prohibited anyone who had ever held a regular military commission from becoming the new Secretary. In conference, the Senate, succumbing to outside pressures from pro Marine sources, agreed to the clause protecting the Marine Corps and accepted most of the House version with the main exception being that the regular military commission prohibition for the Secretary was changed to exclude eligibility only for those with active service within the last ten years. The bill passed the House and Senate and was signed by President Truman on 26 July 1947.20 The National Security Act of 1947, as the unification act was labelled, gave the Marine Corps most of what it had fought so hard to achieve: statutory protection for the entire Marine Corps air and ground team plus the reserves. In the Act's Declaration of Policy the Congress expressed its intent as, in part: To provide three military departments for the operation and administration of the Army, the Navy (including naval aviation and the United States Marine Corps), the Air Force, with their assigned combat and service components; to provide for their authoritative coordination and unified direction under civilian control but not to merge them;...21 Sec. 206. (c) of the Act defined the rolls and missions of the Marine Corps as follows: The United States Marine Corps, within the Department of the Navy, shall include land combat and services forces and such aviation as may be organic therein. The Marine Corps shall be organized, trained, and equipped to provide fleet marine forces of combined arms, together with supporting air components, for service with the fleet in the seizure or defense of advanced naval bases and for the conduct of such land operations as may be essential to the prosecution of a naval campaign. It shall be the duty of the Marine Corps to develop, in coordination with the Army and the Air Force, those phases of amphibious operations which pertain to the tactics, technique, and equipment employed by landing forces. In addition, the Marine Corps shall provide detachments and organizations for service on armed vessels of the Navy, shall provide security detachments for the protection of naval property at naval stations and bases, and shall perform such other duties as the President may direct: provided, that such additional duties shall not detract from or interfere with the operations for which the Marine Corps is primarily organized. The Marine Corps shall be responsible, in accordance with integrated joint mobilization plans, for the expansion of peacetime components of the Marine Corps to meet the needs of war.22 C. THE FIGHT CONTINUES Although the Marine Corps succeeded in getting the Marine Corps recognized as a separate service within the Department of the Navy and keeping their combined arms capability and reserves, there were two very important exclusions to the Act: the addition of the Commandant to the Joint Chiefs of Staff and the establishment of a minimum strength for the Marine Corps. The absence of legislative protection in those two areas was to be a significant problem for the new Commandant, General Clifton B. Cates, during the first two and a half years of his term. The lack of representation on the Joint Chiefs of Staff gave the Marine Corps no say in determining war plans in which they were to take part. It also excluded them from a March 1948 meeting in Key West, Florida of the Joint Chiefs of Staff and other senior military members to add details to the broad roles and missions in the National Security Act of 1947. With the Chief of Naval Operations "representing" the interests of the Marine Corps, the "Key West Agreement" dimmed the prospects for the Marine Corps' future. Basically the Agreement stated what the Marine Corps would not be able to do: they could not expand beyond four divisions and wings in the event of war (there were six divisions at the end of World War II but, as General Eisenhower had stated in the 1945 Congressional hearings, large amphibious operations were made obsolete by the atomic bomb and thus the Marines should "not be appreciably expanded in time of war..."), they could not exercise command above the Corps level (presumably to avoid having a Marine command large Army units as happened in World War II), and they could not create another land army (these are the same words General Eisenhower had used in the aforementioned JCS 1478 Papers). The Marine Corps was not given the opportunity to participate in determining the missions and roles with which they would have to live and with their absence the Army and Air Force had laid the ground work for getting what they had originally sought with unification: the relegation of the Marine Corps to a small ineffective force that would not be able to compete for the vital resources, dollars and people, that were always in short supply.23 The exclusion of personnel strength protection became a problem for the Marine Corps when the Secretary of Defense and the Joint Chiefs of Staff used the power of the budget to squeeze them. General Cates addressed the problem during testimony before the House Armed Services Committee on l7 October 1949. He elaborated how the reduction of the peacetime strength of the Fleet Marine Force to units too small to meet the Marine Corps' mission "would lower its effectiveness and striking power out of all proportion to any compensating economy of money or manpower." He noted that since the National Security Act of 1947 was passed the Marine Corps strength had been reduced progressively, and by the end of fiscal year 1950 would have been cut by a third. They had, up until then, been absorbing the cuts by drawing from the supporting establishment but they were now cutting "bone and muscle".24 General Cates continued outlining the problems his Marine Corps confronted, and concluded by declaring that the Marine Corps has no ambition beyond the performance of its duty to its country. Its sole honor stems from that recognition which cannot be denied to a Corps of men who have sought for themselves little more than a life of hardship and the most hazardous assignments in battle. As in the earlier congressional hearings on the unification issue, Congress proved a strong ally for the Marine Corps and the House Armed Services Committee went on record as unanimously in favor of giving the Marine Corps a place on the Joint Chiefs of Staff. Committee member W. Sterling Cole of New York summed up their view by pointing out that "If it is sheer economy that is going to guide our military establishment as against security, then we had better economize by expanding the Marine Corps, because there is where you get fighting with economy."25 To underscore the desperate situation in which many Marines viewed their Corps, there is a 1949 Marine Corps Board report (Marine Corps Board Report 1-49) commissioned by General Cates and supervised by Colonel Merrill B. Twining that graphically details a plan for institutional survival. The report was so controversial that when shown to the Assistant Commandant, Major General O. P. Smith, "read the paper with something like horror, for it offended profoundly his entire sense of professional proprieties which in his pre-Korea days were so important to him. His reaction was to order Twining to surrender all copies, upgrade the paper to SECRET (then a more consequential classification than later), and personally supervise destruction of the lot." Colonel R. D. Heinl, a member of the Board, described the report as a "blunt analysis, apocalyptic in places as to the Marine Corps position and prospects, and equally blunt recommendations for future policy..."26 The report provides a brief history of the unification efforts and then launches a scathing attack on the Army General Staff. The text explains some of the legislative and administrative methods used in an effort to destroy the Marine Corps and the Board's thoughts on the reasons behind the plan. They contended that The real reasons are a combination of envy, animus, and intolerance toward an independent and obviously successful military organization existing outside the orbit of General Staff influence. As a matter of historical record the dynamics of general staff evolution have, in every country affected, required ascendency and control over all other military forces before undertaking the challenge to civil authority.27 The report indirectly accused the Army General Staff of having higher plans for itself than just the elimination of the Marine Corps. After this introduction to the causes of the Marine Corps' problems the report comes to this somewhat startling conclusion: The Marine Corps must reorient its policy or perish. The Fleet Marine Force concept, entirely valid from 1934-1945, no longer suffices because its basis, the balanced fleet concept, is being destroyed. Furthermore, the Navy has taken a grasping advantage of their position and has imposed upon us unacceptable conditions of service which lessen our desire to continue the present relationship. A recognized status as a National Force in Readiness would give us a broader mission less subject to the indirect form of General Staff attack and would release us in large part from Navy command pressure. It would permit us to make our own case in our own defense and ultimately put us within reach of the policy making levels of the Department of National Defense.28 The report's plan for saving the Marine Corps was centered around the following five points: (l) dollar for dollar the Marine Corps gave the Nation greater return for its defense investment, (2) the Marine Corps was the only actual force in readiness as well as the most progressive, versatile, and useful force, (3) a force such as the Marine Corps will always be required for prompt response to events beyond those normally expected, (4) the Marine Corps was the only integrated air-ground team, and was unique and all powerful in a modern war, and (5) the Marine Corps possessed morale, discipline, and spirit of service that were distinctly American.29 Beyond stressing the above five points in every possible forum, the Board members came up with specific steps that should be taken to change the situation. First, all of the Marine Corps hierarchy had to speak the same language. This entailed orienting all Marine general officers, plus those other officers stationed near Washington, D.C., to the Commandant's concept and the legal status of the Marine Corps gained in the National Security Act of 1947. Next, further actions were to contest all efforts to lump the Marine Corps with the Navy, take exception to all findings from boards where the Marine Corps was not invited to participate, indict the other services for failure to undertake responsibilities in preparing for the next war (several specific charges were listed for each service), improve training to show the Marine Corps as a force in readiness, and deemphasize amphibious characteristics of the Marine Corps because they are a "capability [and] not a mission." In conjunction with the force in readiness theme, the Board called for intensifying the program to adopt the helicopter into Marine Corps doctrine. 30 Finally, the Board stressed that ensuring the Marine Corps' survival involved legislation: make the Commandant a permanent member of the Joint Chiefs of Staff and provide for a minimum strength for the Marine Corps. While they discussed several possible methods of accomplishing this goal, the Board members concluded that the best chance of success lay in amending the National Security Act of 1947 rather than advocating a separate and new Marine Corps bill. They wrote proposed changes to the Act that were to be delivered to the Chairman of the House Armed Services Committee, along with the suggestion that he appoint a committee to inquire into and make recommendations concerning the status of the United States Marine Corps. Although the committee was not appointed, the Board members planned that the committee would be staffed by civilian and Congressional friends of the Marine Corps and a competent group of Marine Corps officers would be provided as a secretariat to assist the committee in reaching recommendations of a type desired by the Marine Corps.31 Marine Corps Board Report 1-49 didn't get past the desk of the Assistant Commandant because of its candid and caustic assessment of the Marine Corps' situation but as Colonel Heinl said in his cover letter to the report: This paper, regardless of the validity of specific or individual forecasts or recommendations, represents an unmatched picture of how the Corps' best minds perceived the Corps' situation at a time when the Marine Corps, institutionally speaking, was closer to the brink than at any time in the 20th century.32 The Marine Corps' desire for legislative protection finally occurred in 1952 with an amendment to the National Security Act of 1947. This looked very similar to that suggested by the Marine Corps Board Report 1-49. There were two significant events that finally led to the passage of Public Law 416 which is also known as the "Douglas-Mansfield Act" or the "Marine Corps' Bill". The first and foremost was the Korean War and the second was President Truman's "private" statement of what he thought of the Marine Corps. At a time when the United States military was at one of its lowest states of readiness because of extensive budget cuts, traditional post-war demobilizations, and a feeling among many that the next war would consist of long range bombing, a conventional ground war suddenly commenced that required infantrymen with rifles. The Marine Corps' ability to rapidly put together an air-ground team that helped stop the North Koreans at the Pusan perimeter and then their conduct of the Inchon amphibious operation convinced most doubters of the accuracy of the Marine Corps' contention that their kind of skills were still needed. President Truman was still against the idea of protecting the Marine Corps or elevating the Commandant to Joint Chief status. He continually stated "diplomatically" that, although, he thought there was a place for the Marine Corps and amphibious operations, the Marines were taken care of by the Navy and required no extra protection. However, he hurt his image as a fair and impartial player in the unification process when responding to a letter from Representative Gordon L. McDonough of California. On 21 August 1950, after reports of the victory by the 1st Marine Brigade at the First Battle of the Naktong on the Pusan perimeter, Congressman McDonough wrote a letter to President Truman praising the Marine Corps' performance in Korea, stressing their importance to the country, and suggesting that there should be a place for the Commandant on the Joint Chiefs of Staff. President Truman then proceeded to give the Marine supporters plenty of ammunition to press for legislative protection with his reply: I read with a lot of interest your letter in regard to the Marine Corps. For your information the Marine Corps is the Navy's police force and as long as I am President that is what they will remain. They have a propaganda machine that is almost equal to Stalin's. Nobody desires to belittle the efforts of the Marine Corps but when the Marine Corps goes into the Army it works with and for the Army and that is the way it should be. I am more than happy to have your expression of interest in this naval military organization. The Chief of Naval Operations is the Chief of Staff of the Navy of which the Marines are a part. 33 The supposedly private correspondence was inserted into the Congressional Record by McDonough and released to the press. The public uproar that followed was so great that Truman was forced to publicly apologize and Marine Corps friends in Congress soon introduced an amendment to the National Security Act of 1947. Congress was finally fed up with the Administration's attempts to belittle the Marine Corps and Senator Paul Douglas, a Marine during World War II, summed up that feeling when he introduced the bill in the Senate: Events over the past years show clearly that notwithstanding the clear intent of Congress that this nation have at its disposal an adequate combatant Marine Corps, there are nevertheless forces at work within the Executive Department which have attempted, with considerable success, to destroy the combat effectiveness of the Marine Corps. It would be excellent if this issue could be left to administrative action, but both the past and present experience has shown that this is inadequate if we are to carry out the intent of Congress insofar as the Marine Corps is concerned. The reasons for this situation are obvious to all. While the Joint Chiefs of Staff are men of fine character and are sincere patriots, the majority of them are fundamentally...opposed to the Marine Corps as a combatant organization. Notwithstanding their many expressions of goodwill toward the Marine Corps they have nevertheless tried to destroy its capability to function on any appreciable scale in combat... We have in the past attempted to provide for this combatant Marine Corps by expressions of Congressional intent. It is clear that expressions of intent are ineffective. We must have direct Congressional action in the form of law.34 Even with all of the public and Congressional support for the Marine Corps the passage of a Marine Corps bill would take more than a year. The strongest opposition came from the Department of Defense and specifically the Chief of Naval Operations, Admiral Forrest C. Sherman. It was his contention that the Marine Corps belonged to him and he would take care of its interests. That contention remained to be resolved until after the passage of the Marine Corps' Bill, but it didn't deter Congress from overwhelmingly passing Public Law 416 on 28 June 1952. This amended the National Security Act of 1947 as follows: Section 206(c) -- The United States Marine Corps, within the Department of the Navy, shall be organized to include not less than three combat divisions and three air wings, and such other land combat, aviation, and other services as may be organic therein, and except in time of war or national emergency hereafter declared by the Congress the personnel strength of the Regular Marine Corps shall be maintained at not more than four hundred thousand. Sec. 2. Section 211(a) (added to the end) -- The Commandant of the Marine Corps shall indicate to the Chairman of the Joint Chiefs of Staff any matter scheduled for consideration by the Joint Chiefs of Staff which directly concerns the United States Marine Corps. ... the Commandant of the Marine Corps shall meet with the Joint Chiefs of Staff when such matter is under consideration by them and on such occasion and with respect to such matter the Commandant of the Marine Corps shall have coequal status with the members of the Joint Chiefs of Staff.35 Following the signing of Public Law 416, on 5 July 1952, the Commandant of the Marine Corps, Lemuel C. Shepherd, a letter to all General Officers giving his view of what effect these changes would have on the Marine Corps. Besides the obvious size and representation implications, the Commandant discussed the broader aspects of the law and the intent behind it. General Shepherd stated that the law "firmly fixes" the Marine Corps as one of the armed forces of the nation that, although part of the naval establishment, is separate from the Navy. The law also clearly implies that the Marine Corps is a "ready fighting force prepared to move promptly in time of peace or war to areas of trouble". General Shepherd then stressed the heavy burden that the law placed on the Marine Corps. Congress and the American people had demonstrated their confidence in them and the Commandant challenged all Marines to overcome the numerous obstacles they would face while attempting to maintain their Marines in a state of readiness. 36 D. ONE LAST LOOSE END One final issue remained before the Marine Corps could clearly declare its independence as a separate service: the status of the Marine Corps within the Department of the Navy. Some Chiefs of Naval Operations felt that the Marine Corps was just another arm of the Navy and responsible to them. In an effort to clarify the relationship between the Commandant of the Marine Corps and the Chief of Naval Operations, the Secretary of the Navy, on the recommendation of a 1954 report on the organization of the Department of the Navy, asked for recommendations. The Chief of Naval Operations, Admiral Robert B. Carney, offered the following positions regarding the relationship: - the Marine Corps doesn't possess operating forces since they are a part of the Navy's operating forces, - the Chief of Naval Operations should exercise general and direct supervision over the Headquarters of the Marine Corps, - the Chief of Naval Operations has naval command of the naval establishment which includes the Marine Corps, and - the Chief of Naval Operations should establish the personnel and material requirements of the Marine Corps. The Marine Corps naturally rejected the above positions. Five months of Navy and Marine Corps negotiation resulted in the Secretary of the Navy publishing General Order No. 5 of 20 November 1954. This contained the following description of the duties of the Commandant of the Marine Corps: The Commandant of the Marine Corps is the senior officer of the United States Marine Corps. He commands the Marine Corps and is directly responsible to the Secretary of the Navy for its administration, discipline, internal organization, unit training, requirements, efficiency, and readiness, and for the total performance of the Marine Corps. When performing these functions, the Commandant of the Marine Corps is not a part of the permanent command structure of the Chief of Naval Operations.37 The codification of the Commandant's place within the Department of the Navy was a triumph for the Marine Corps. However, General Shepherd attempted to downplay its significance when he reported the contents of General Order No. 5 to his General Officers in a letter dated 2 December 1954. He told them that "...it will be clear that the current decisions - while of great importance - should still not be viewed as some form of administrative or organizational triumph by the Marine Corps nor as an acquisition of stature not hitherto enjoyed; but rather as a simple restatement, in clear terms, of a relationship which has existed in fact for many years".38 E. SUMMARY Whether or not the Marine Corps' "right to fight" has been protected by the legislative process remains to be seen: Congress, obviously, can always change the law. But whatever the future may hold for the Marine Corps, the National Security Act of 1947 as amended in 1952 by Public Law 416 is a testimony to dedicated Marines, a friendly Congress, and a public which didn't forget the contribution of the Marine Corps during World War II and the Korean War. Placing the Commandant on the Joint Chiefs of Staff ensured Marine Corps participation in the planning and organizing for the future. Being "in" on the development of war plans and the establishment of the budget gave them a chance to keep their doctrine and organization up to date. With the permanency of the Marine Corps assured, a mission assigned, and a minimum strength legislated, the Marine Corps could reorganize and plan for the future. The process allowed the Marine Corps to continue to march forward without looking over its shoulder. Chapter II Notes 1Col. R. D. Heinl, Jr., "The Right to Fight", U. S. Naval Institute Proceedings, September, 1962, p.23; Gen. A. A. Vandegrift, Once a Marine, (New York: Ballantine Books, 1964), p.283. 2Victor H. Krulak, First to Fight, (Annapolis, Maryland: Naval Institute Press, 1984), p. 15. 3Gordon W. Keiser, The US Marine Corps and Defense Unification 1944-47, (Washington, DC: National Defense University Press, 1982), pp. 5-6; Demetrious Caraley, The Politics of Military Unification, (New York and London: Columbia University Press, 1966), pp. 23-24; Heinl, "The Right to Fight", p. 24. 4Lt. Col. R. D. Heinl, Jr., "The Cat With More Than Nine Lives", U. S. Naval Institute Proceedings, June, 1954, p.65. 5Caraley, The Politics of Military Unification, p.57. 6Allan R. Millett, Semper Fidelis, (New York: Macmillan Publishing Co., Inc., 1980), p.457. 7Heinl, "The Right to Fight", pp. 25-26. 8Vandegrift, Once a Marine, pp. 302-306. 9Keiser, The US Marine Corps and Defense Unification 1944-47, pp. 38-40; Caraley, The Politics of Military Unification, pp. 55-56. 10Caraley, The Politics of Military Unification, pp. 127-128; Unification of the Armed Forces: Hearings Before the Committee on Naval Affairs, United States Senate, (Washington, D. C.: United States Government Printing Office, 1946), pp. 1-9. 11Krulak, First to Fight, pp. 33-36; Keiser, The US Marine Corps and Defense Unification 1944-47, pp. 49-51; Millett, Semper Fidelis, pp. 458-459. 12Keiser, The US Marine Corps and Defense Unification 1944-47, p. 51. 13Unification of the Armed Forces: Hearings Before the Committee on Naval Affairs, United States Senate, p. 1. 14Keiser, The US Marine Corps and Defense Unification 1944-47, pp. 55-56; Caraley, The Politics of Military Unification, pp. 132-135; Krulak, First to Fight, pp. 37-38; Vandegrift, Once a Marine, pp. 315-318; Millett, Semper Fidelis, pp. 459-460. 15Unification of the Armed Forces: Hearings Before the Committee on Naval Affairs, United States Senate, p. 106; Vandegrift, Once a Marine, p. 316. 16Unification of the Armed Forces: Hearings Before the Committee on Naval Affairs. United States Senate, pp. 107-118. 17Keiser, The US Marine Corps and Defense Unification 1944-47, pp. 55-56; Caraley, The Politics of Military Unification, pp. 134-135; Krulak, First to Fight, pp. 37; Vandegrift, Once a Marine, pp. 317-318; Millett, Semper Fidelis, pp. 460; Unification of the Armed Forces: Hearings Before the Committee on Naval Affairs. United States Senate, pp. 118-119. 18Vandegrift, Once a Marine, p. 318; Krulak, First to Fight, p. 38; Keiser, The US Marine Corps and Defense Unification 1944-47, p. 56; Caraley, The Politics of Military Unification, pp. 135-143. 19Krulak, First to Fight, p. 46; Keiser, The US Marine Corps and Defense Unification 1944-47, p. 98-100; Caraley, The Politics of Military Unification, pp. 158, 170-171. 20Krulak, First to Fight, p. 49-51; Keiser, The US Marine Corps and Defense Unification 1944-47, p. 105-112; Caraley, The Politics of Military Unification, pp. 230-233. 21Public Law 253, "National Security Act of 1947", sec. 2. 22Public Law 253, "National Security Act of 1947", sec. 206. (c). 23Heinl, "The Right to Fight", p. 30: Forrestal, The Forrestal Diaries, pp. 390-392: Krulak, First to Fight, p. 54: Millett, Semper Fidelis, p. 470. 24,,Complete Texts of Statements in Defense Dispute", U. S. News & World Report, October 28, 1948, p. 55. 25,,Marine Corps' Fight for Life", U. S. News & World Report, September 15, 1950, pp. 20-21; "Complete Texts of Statements in Defense Dispute", U. S. News & World Report, October 28, 1948, p. 57. 26Col. R. D. Heinl, cover letter to Marine Corps Board Report 1-49, undated. Col. Heinl stated in his letter explaining the existence of the report that he did not know if there were any other copies that "escaped destruction" but this one had been kept under seal in closest confidence for many years. Although the cover letter is undated, it was obviously sent some time after the Korean War since he referred to Gen. Smith's pre-Korean days. Although General Smith did not refer specifically to the report in his Oral History he did mention that he "Didn't like impugning motives of people we were fighting in unification" (pp. 181-182). It should further be noted that the report was written by the famous "Chowder Society" that also did most of the legwork through the entire unification process. The Chowder Society was a group of Marine Corps activist formed at Quantico in 1945 specifically to fight the Army's version of unification. Members included BGen. Gerald Thomas, BGen. Merritt Edson, Cols. Merrill Twining, Robert Hogaboom, James Kerr, LtCols. James Murray, James Hittle, Victor Krulak, DeWolf Schatzel, Samuel Shaw, Robert Heinl, E.H. Hurst, and a few others. 27Marine Corps Board Report 1-49, pp.15-16. 28Marine Corps Board Report 1-49, pp.65-66. 29Marine Corps Board Report 1-49, pp. 68-69. 30Marine Corps Board Report 1-49, pp.86-92. 31Marine Corps Board Report 1-49, pp. 110-112. 32Col. R. D. Heinl, cover letter to Marine Corps Board Report 1-49, undated. 33Heinl, "The Right to Fight", p. 36; Krulak, First to Fight, pp. 55-56. 34Heinl, "The Right to Fight", p.37. 35Public Law 416. 36Lemuel C. Shepherd, "Letter to all General Officers on Public Law 416", 5 July 1952. 37General Order No. 5 dated 20 November 1954; Krulak, First to Fight, pp. 59-61; Millett, Semper Fidelis, p. 507. 38Lemuel C. Shepherd, "Letter to all General Officers on Department of the Navy General Order No. 5 dated 2 December 1954. III. WARFARE IN THE ATOMIC AGE A. INTRODUCTION The August 1945 explosions over Hiroshima and Nagasaki did more than end World War II, they marked the beginning of a new era in warfare. Not everyone agreed on the immensity of the changes that would follow, but there was no doubt that major change would occur. The diversity of thought ranged from those who felt that the atomic bomb was a deterrent and had made war obsolete, to others who felt that the atomic bomb was just another weapon that, like the machine gun, would require the development of new tactics but essentially things would remain the same. As history has shown, neither extreme was correct. This chapter will look at how the Marine Corps dealt with warfare in the Atomic Age. B. DEFINING THE PROBLEM In his book, The Second World War, J. F. C. Fuller cited American amphibious techniques as probably "the most far-reaching tactical innovation of the war."1 The method used to end the war, however, presented the possibility that the continued use of amphibious tactics as practiced during the war was no longer viable.2 Perhaps the best statement of the problem came in a report (discussed in its entirety later in this Chapter) written by an Advanced Research Group in 1954. They made the following general statement: The atomic weapon with its tremendous destruction effects has opened a new era of warfare. No longer is it possible with safety to employ the relatively slow, deliberate concentration of forces so necessary in the past for the reduction of the enemy. As long as the enemy has the weapon and the high speed means of delivery, he has the capability to inflict serious losses on any such concentration of our forces or equipment. Fortunately the use of atomic weapon support has reduced the extent of the need for mass tactics as we know them today. However, if we are to defeat the enemy, a relative concentration of forces must be achieved at point of contact with minimum vulnerability to enemy atomic attack. To achieve this concentration without undue risks will require among other things surprise and speed of execution. To examine the effects an atomic bomb would have on ships at sea, the Navy supervised two tests in the Bikini Lagoon in the western Marshall Islands during July 1946. Two atomic bombs, one an air burst and the other under the water, were exploded among 70-lOO ships to study the effects. The air burst caused physical damage to over 80% of the vessels and, according to a radiology officer, would have incapacitated the majority of the topside crew members. The underwater explosion caused similar damage, including the sinking of the carrier Saratoga, the American Battleship Arkansas, and the Japanese Battleship Nagato.3 Lieutenant General Roy S. Geiger, Commanding General, Fleet Marine Force Pacific, was the senior Marine present at the Bikini Lagoon and he immediately wrote to the Commandant of the Marine Corps, General Vandegrift, to express his view of the tests' implications for the future of amphibious operations. Geiger wrote "that a complete review and study of our concept of amphibious operations" was necessary because a future enemy would likely be equipped with large quantities of atomic bombs. He added that the tests made it "quite evident that even a small number of atomic bombs could destroy an expeditionary force as now organized, embarked and landed. " Summarizing his views, Geiger continued: It is my opinion that future amphibious operations will be undertaken by much smaller expeditionary forces, which will be highly trained and lightly equipped, and transported by air or submarine, and movement accomplished with a greater degree of surprise and speed than has ever been heretofore visualized. Or that large forces must be dispersed over a much wider front than used in past operations. With an enemy in possession of atomic bombs, I cannot visualize another landing such as was executed at Normandy or Okinawa. The letter finished with a prophetic plea from Geiger that set the entire Marine Corps into motion: "It is trusted that Marine Corps Headquarters will consider this a very serious and urgent matter and will use its most competent officers in finding a solution to develop the technique of conducting amphibious operations in the atomic age."4 General Vandegrift stated in his autobiography, Once A Marine, that he "refused to share the atomic hysteria familiar to some ranking officers." He felt that the employment of a tactical atomic bomb was years away and "did not feel obliged to make a sudden, sharp change in our organizational profile." He did, however, "feel obliged to study the problem in all its complexity."5 (The urgency that must have been felt by Marine Corps' leaders during this period was undoubtedly due in part to the Army's use of this issue as a reason to reduce greatly, if not completely, the Marine Corps' newly adopted missions and roles during the unification fight.) Shortly after receipt of the Geiger letter, General Vandegrift appointed a special board headed by Major General Lemuel C. Shepherd, Jr., Assistant Commandant, and two other members, Major General Field Harris, Director of Aviation, and Brigadier General O. P. Smith, Commandant of the Marine Corps Schools, to make a thorough examination of the relationship between atomic weapons and amphibious operations. The Secretariat of the Board (those who would do the actual research) consisted of Colonels Merrill Twining and Edward C. Dyer and Lieutenant Colonel Clair W. Shisler (Shisler was later replaced by Colonel Samuel R. Shaw) 6 The problem faced by the Special Board centered around the principle of mass. The success of amphibious operations during World War II could be attributed greatly to our ability to concentrate forces, fires, and combat service support at a given point and time. The atomic tests at Bikini Lagoon had shown that concentration on that scale would put the entire landing force in peril. Dispersion was, of course, the logical answer to the problem; however, it created problems of its own. Dispersed assault shipping meant complex command and control, diffused security, and a coordination nightmare when it came time to concentrate for the assault landing. Perhaps the most vulnerable concentration of forces is during the assault phase when all the landing craft were on line and approaching the beach; however, dispersion during this phase would mean piecemealing the assault and making the forces susceptible to conventional weapons. Dispersion of the naval gunfire ships prevented the concentration of fires required to soften up the landing site. And, lastly, dispersion of the forces on land created command and control, security, and coordination problems as well as a slow reconcentration of forces when the opportunity arose to exploit an enemy weakness. So the Special Board had an answer to the problem of an enemy with atomic weapons; but the cure was almost as bad as the disease.7 The Special Board's task became that of determining "the broad concepts and principles which the Marine Corps should follow" to enable it to conduct successful amphibious operations in the future.8 In other words, how could they address all of the problems associated with dispersion in developing doctrine and equipment that can cope with an enemy capable of atomic warfare? The Board considered several means for solving the problem, including gliders, transport aircraft, parachutists, submarines, seaplanes, and the helicopter. The report of the Board obviously preferred the helicopter even though at the time, no helicopter existed that could meet their requirements.9 In 1946 there did not exist a troop-carrying helicopter that could lift more than a four or five men with their equipment. The Board's confidence in the helicopter's future capability to lift at least fifteen fully equipped Marines was based on long talks with helicopter developers and pilots who were pioneering helicopter flight. Colonels Twining and Dyer visited and corresponded frequently with the two foremost helicopter developers at the time: the Sikorsky Aircraft Company and the Piasecki Aircraft Corporation. Both developers were confident they could easily meet the Marine Corps' requirement for lift capabilities and were able to convince the Board members that such machines were either being built or at least on the drawing board.10 The Special Board's December 1946 report concluded that "...operations by land-plane transport, by parachute or by glider are not suitable for Marine Corps employment" and "Submarine transports will be useful but to a limited extent". The solution was the following: ... development of a combination of large flying boats and helicopters will overcome the limitations of a purely airborne method, keep the enterprise purely a naval one, and permit its rapid exploitation and support from widely dispersed and more economical surface vessels."11 Two recommendations from the Board that were later acted upon were, one, the establishment of an experimental Marine helicopter squadron to train pilots and mechanics as well as develop tactics and techniques of helicopter operations and, two, that the Marine Corps Schools be directed to develop a tentative doctrine for the employment of helicopters.12 General Vandegrift concurred with the Board's conclusions and recommendations within three days after receiving them. At the same time he notified the Chief of Naval Operations of the Marine Corps' intent to pursue the helicopter as the answer to amphibious operations in the age of atomic warfare.13 C. DEVELOPING THE CONCEPT The work began in earnest during 1947 with the Marine Corps and Navy agreeing basically with the concept of the helicopter assault, but differing somewhat on the budgeting and schedule for initial implementation. Initial doctrinal studies envisioned the need for a helicopter that would seat fifteen to twenty fully equipped infantrymen. More than twenty infantrymen in one helicopter was felt to be too dangerous considering the vulnerability of the slow moving aircraft. The ideal lift capacity was determined to be 5,000 pounds, which would allow the ship-to-shore movement of light artillery. In addition to the lift requirements, a range of 200 to 300 nautical miles, a cruise speed of 100 knots at altitudes of 4,000 to 15,000 feet, an external hook and hoist, and self-sealing fuel cells were also needed. A helicopter that met the above requirements would allow a dispersed fleet to launch an assault against a defended beach and still be able to concentrate forces ashore. 14 With the authorization of the Chief of Naval Operations, Marine Helicopter Experimental Squadron 1 (HMX-1) was commissioned on 1 December 1947. Headquarters Marine Corps published the primary mission of HMX-1: "develop techniques and tactics in connection with the movement of assault troops in amphibious operations". The tasks associated with that mission are listed below: 1. Develop a doctrine for the aviation tactics and techniques in the employment of the helicopter in amphibious operations as outlined in the general missions. 2. Assist the Marine Corps Schools in the development of the doctrine covering the tactics and techniques of the employment of helicopters in amphibious operations. 3. Study the operations and maintenance of assigned aircraft. 4. Develop the flight proficiency of pilots and crewmen. 5. Develop and maintain the technical proficiency of mechanics. 6. Submit recommendations for tables of organization, equipment allowances, and related data for future helicopter squardons.15 The initial test for HMX-1 and the helicopter concept came in May 1948 during Packard II, the amphibious command post exercise conducted by the Marine Corps Schools for the students in the Junior and Senior Schools. The objectives given HMX-1 for the exercise basically were to gain experience and develop doctrine. Sixty-six Marines and a considerable amount of equipment were transported ashore at Camp Lejeune during 28.6 hours of flying with three men per helicopter. The scale of the exercise was small, but the helicopter supporters had made their point and were ready to move onward.16 Packard II provided a valuable laboratory to test the developing doctrine of the helicopter amphibious assault. Officers at the Marine Corps Schools were able to use the exercise to gather new data on the subject as well as modify the doctrine they had already developed. The publication of the first manual on the subject of amphibious operations centered around the helicopter occurred in November 1949. It didn't matter that the equipment to execute the doctrine didn't exist because the authors believed in their concept and felt their manual would drive the equipment's development, just as the Tentative Manual for Landing Operations had done several years before.17 The manual was entitled Amphibious Operations -- Employment of Helicopters (Tentative). The thirty-first in a series of publications on amphibious operations, it was better known as Phib-31 and had the following purpose: The advent of the troop carrying helicopter and its establishment as standard equipment within the Marine Corps gives rise to a variety of questions related to the employment of such conveyances in the conduct of amphibious operations. It is the purpose of this pamphlet to explore the various aspects of helicopter employment, discerning the manner in which the characteristics of the vehicle can best be exploited to enhance the effectiveness of the amphibious attack, and providing thereby the basis for a body of doctrine governing helicopter landing operations.18 Phib-31 accomplished its purpose and like, its predecessor on amphibious operations, was copied almost entirely by the United States Army when they later published their first helicopter manual. The Army had investigated the use of helicopters in the years following World War II and found several capabilities that would assist a unit logistically. The lift capabilities of the helicopters at that time, however, convinced the Army that there was no tactical troop carrying role for them. The Director of Requirements for the newly formed Air Force, the procurement authority for Army aviation, told them that "The helicopter is aerodynamically unsound" and that "No matter what the Army says, I know that it does not need any."19 1949 and the early part of 1950 consisted of extensive training and experimentation for HMX-1. They conducted cold weather operations in Newfoundland and tropical operations in Puerto Rico while still participating in the Marine Corps Schools' Packard exercises at Camp Lejeune. Doctrine and techniques for the helicopter were continually updated to reflect any new knowledge gained from the experiences. As part of the Marine Corps' effort to build support for their new doctrine and therefore the necessary equipment, President Truman and members of Congress accepted invitations to witness demonstrations of the helicopter's capabilities in May 1949. James E. VanZandt, the Representative from Pennsylvania, after viewing a May 9th demonstration at Quantico entered the following statement into the Congressional Record: It is no secret that the atomic bomb has introduced a new and deadly threat to the success of landing amphibious forces across a defended beach. To circumvent and perhaps overcome this threat, the Marine Corps has been experimenting with helicopter-borne invasion, landing amphibious troops over and behind enemy lines. These experiments are not just being talked about; they are being carried out in fact. I believe the development of the use of helicopters in amphibious operations is the most revolutionary concept in battle method to emerge since the end of the war. The full impact of its complete development will be of a magnitude that few conceive today.20 D. KOREA The Korean War did much for the Marine Corps' reputation as the nation's force in readiness. It also dispelled any doubts there may have been about the utility of the helicopter in combat. President Truman sent U. S. Army Major General Frank E. Lowe to Korea to evaluate the combat effectiveness of our fighting forces. His report indicated that Army doctrine and leadership was woefully unprepared for that kind of war, while the Marine Corps was not only prepared mentally and physically but also doctrinally. He contended that "The First Marine Division is the most efficient and courageous combat unit I have ever seen or heard of." He went on to recommend the expansion of the Marine Corps to three divisions and wings, as well as assigning them "the mission of readiness for aggression against the United States."21 General O. P. Smith, Commanding General of the First Division, stated that Lowe told him "that he had written to the President and recommended that never again after the Chosin Reservoir should the Marines ever be put under command of the Army. He told me that, because he knew what happened."22 Helicopters were used during the first year of the Korean War, but they did not show their ability to complete their mission under the new amphibious operations concept of transporting troops and equipment. Early operations in Korea consisted primarily of command and control, reconnaissance, wire laying, rescue missions of downed pilots behind enemy lines, and medical evacuation. The first transport helicopters capable of lifting four to six Marines with combat equipment, 700 to 1,500 pounds of cargo, or three to five casualties in litters didn't arrive in Korea until the end of August 1951.23 On 13 September 1951, Marine Transport Helicopter Squadron 161 (HMR-161) flew Operation Windmill I, which was able to accomplish the following feats: 14.1 hours total flight time, 18,848 pounds of supplies and personnel transported to front-line troops, and 74 casualties evacuated. Six days later Operation Windmill II was also successful in completing a similar mission.24 The first tactical employment of the helicopter came just two days later when HMR-161 inserted a Reconnaissance Company to Hill 884 to relieve Korean troops. Operation Summit was able to lift 224 fully equipped troops, plus 17,772 pounds of cargo in a total of 65 flights, in four hours elapsed time. It was heralded in the official report as an example of "the great contribution to tactical and logistical flexibility that the assault helicopter offers".25 Helicopter operations continued in Korea, while many of the returning pilots were going back to HMX-1 to impart their experience in the perfecting of doctrine as well as refining the requirements for new helicopters. Much had been learned in both areas during the Korean War and while the equipment and doctrine had performed well, there was room for much improvement. E. DOCTRINE The 1950's was a busy decade for Marine Corps doctrinal writers. A series of Landing Force Manuals (LFM's) and Bulletins (LFB's) were written to reflect the effects of the atomic bomb and the helicopter on Marine Corps tactics and techniques. Special Boards and Advanced Research Groups were also formed to study the future direction of the Marine Corps. LFM-4, Ship-to-Shore Movement, was published in 1952 with a separate section for helicopter operations. It noted that "The ability of the helicopter to rise and descend vertically, to hover, and to move at a moderate speed at varying altitudes, qualifies it in certain circumstances to land a sizable proportion of a landing force in any desired formation." The manual, however, was aware of the limitations in capabilities, for it included the following rather candid assessment of the helicopter of the time: it was very lacking in "...load carrying ability, range, speed, and mechanical reliability".26 Four years later an updated LFM-4 was published that added atomic defense considerations in planning for ship-to-shore movement. It admitted that while the development of atomic warfare had not made the general concept of ship-to-shore movement invalid, there were some new considerations: (1) the conflicting requirement for the maximum separation of forces laterally and in depth to minimize effects of atomic attack and the concentration of forces for initial shock and continued pressure on the enemy, (2) the increased possibility of the total destruction of entire units, and (3) the increased problems with air, mine, and anti-submarine defense with widely dispersed ship formations. Passive protective measures against atomic attack were listed as the use of helicopters for dispersion, surprise, and speed, standing operating procedures for continuity when communications fail or dispersed units are unable to unite, and adequate replacement plans in case of mass casualties.27 LFM-4 also had a helicopter operations section that was much more extensive and it no longer listed the limitations of the helicopter that were included in the 1952 release of the manual.28 In an effort to analyze the total issue, General Shepherd, Commandant of the Marine Corps, formed in 1953 an Advanced Research Group consisting of Colonels who would meet for nine months to consider matters relating to Marine Corps issues. The first project of the Group, as stated in their report, was to "Develop a concept which presents the landing force aspects of future (within the next 10 years) amphibious operations that will result in the most effective utilization of the Fleet Marine Force as a mobile force in readiness. Based on this concept determine the validity and adequacy of the current tactical doctrines, organization, equipment development policies and training programs within the Marine Corps."29 The Group contended in their report that new policies, equipment, and changing world conditions (the "era of atomic plenty") required an update to old concepts that would "exploit to the utmost the benefits of shock and surprise." They felt the solution to the problem must be "soundly based upon the realities of the day and such pertinent developments as may be reasonably expected to take place during the next ten-year period."30 The Group felt that a concept that included tactical atomic weapons and assault waves transported by helicopters provided the following benefits: (1) accessibility of all coastlines, (2) shock effect of the speed and great depth of the initial penetration, (3) ability to land the entire tactical and logistical formation in the objective area, (4) flexibility of changing landing sites, (5) increased depth of the assault, (6) capability of pursuing the enemy, (7) surprise, (8) greater dispersion capability during the ship-to-shore movement, (9) greater dispersion capability of the naval forces, (10) reduction of the significance of enemy static defenses, (11) ability to better support dispersed units logistically, (12) enemy cannot safely mass their forces, (13) ability to avoid roads and bridges, (14) ability to land under adverse sea conditions, and (15) further integration of Marine air and ground team to the point they will be more likely employed as a team.31 The Group then described the scenario of an amphibious operation they felt would take place in the event of an atomic war. They described the operation as being "proceeded by extensive preparatory atomic operations principally designed for the purpose of neutralizing enemy capabilities to launch atomic attacks from installations within a wide area" and basically gain air superiority. "The enemy losses in operating air units and air base facilities must be so extensive as to cause him to engage in major re-orientation and re-organization of his air effort, and to possibly subject his subsequent air reinforcing effort to piecemeal destruction." Landing of the assault forces by helicopter would follow the successful preparatory fires by the shortest practical time so the enemy would still be disorganized. Domination of the air by friendly forces would make the enemy reluctant to offer massed targets and they would be more likely to infiltrate dispersed bodies of troops causing violent patrol and ambush actions. Massed targets that may be found would be hit with atomic weapons as near as possible to the forward units.32 The Group concluded that the concept described was not at that time within the limits of practice, but equipment and weapons of that time would permit a much earlier implementation than was generally accepted. They felt that adopting their concept as soon as possible would allow early adjustments in equipment and organizational decisions that would be necessary under the tight budget restrictions of the time. The major organizational change would be in the ground element. They would have to rid themselves of the equipment too heavy for helicopters to lift, such as tanks, heavy artillery, and heavy service support items. Those items would still be available for attachment but would not be part of the initial assault wave. The Group stressed an interesting point in the area of changes to training that parallels today's maneuver warfare: the need for small unit commanders to be better prepared for independent employment and rapidly changing situations caused by the wider dispersion and more rapid movement of forces.33 General Shepherd gave his approval to the "all helicopter assault" concept proposed by the Advanced Research Group in April 1954, and received assurances from the Navy Department at that time that they would support it. The formal approval from the Chief of Naval Operations, however, did not come until December 1955 when, although agreeing with the concept, he stated the obvious problems of financing new shipbuilding and conversion projects that would provide ships designed for helicopter operations.34 As was customary, however, the Marine Corps did not wait for formal approval before moving forward with development and doctrine. On 21 February 1955 General Shepherd made an address to the Naval War College that essentially restated the report from the Advanced Research Group as the future direction of the Marine Corps. He stressed that the "answer to the atomic threat to the amphibious attack must be found in the element of maneuver." The Marine Corps "...realized that it was necessary to accelerate the movement of troops and material from ship-to-shore. The landing attack had to be made more flexible. And that is where the assault helicopter was conceived." General Shepherd also used the occasion to make one of the first recorded uses of the term "vertical envelopment" .35 Just five days after the Chief of Naval Operations gave his formal acceptance of the Marine Corps' new concept, the Marine Corps Schools published LFB-17, Concept of Future Amphibious Operations. The Bulletin outlined the concept that the Marine Corps had established as a goal and was working toward. It reiterated much of the Advanced Research Group's proposal as the central features of the new concept. It also listed the following essential requirements for the the concept to be successful: a. Lighter, smaller, and more efficient weapons and equipment. b. Greater self-sufficiency of small units. c. Greater decentralization of authority, and greater exercise of initiative by small unit commanders. d. Improved intelligence and reconnaissance agencies and methods. e. Improved communications.36 LFB-17 clearly conveyed that its concept was equally applicable in either a nuclear or conventional war since the maneuverability and rapid response capability it envisioned could be effective in either scenario. But our own capability to use atomic munitions is what makes the concept feasible against an enemy using them. It was important that the authority to use atomic weapons be held at least by the landing force commander. The Bulletin ended with the following summary of the new concept of future amphibious operations: This concept has as its ultimate goal an all-helicopter assault which will endow the amphibious attack with maximum impact and maximum freedom of action. We have already progressed to a point at which our doctrine embraces a powerful two-pronged attack, one prong a vertical envelopment by helicopter, the other a surface assault across the beach by conventional means, with the latter constituting the main effort. In the future, while improving our still-essential beach-assault ability, we must adapt our organization and equipment, and our tactics, techniques, and training, so as to place major stress on the helicopter assault. Later, as new amphibious ships join the fleet, and as helicopters with greater load capacity become available in quantity, the beach assault can be reduced still further. Eventually, when the concept is fully realized, the beach assault can be eliminated altogether, leaving only follow-up troops and supplies, exploitation forces, and base-development units and material to be landed over beaches or through ports in the beachhead area.37 Specifics of the concept that Marines in the field needed to develop training exercises were provided in several supporting manuals and bulletins, but perhaps the two most significant were LFM-24, Helicopter Operations, published on 4 April 1956, and LFB-2, Interim Doctrine for the Conduct of Tactical Atomic Warfare, published on 17 August 1955. LFM-24 first came out in the "tentative" form in November 1953, and then was submitted to the field for comments and suggestions from those who had dealt with helicopters in Korea. The Manual provided great detail on all aspects of helicopter operations with much of its doctrine having been tested in war. LFB-2 took the Advanced Research Group's general view of how an atomic war would proceed and provided the specifics necessary to flesh it out. It was published originally in February 1953, and was then updated with the experience gained during atomic tests in Nevada and then a revised version appeared in August 1955. The introductory section to LFB-2 explained the immensity of the problems that atomic weapons posed on military operations by including the following paragraph: The employment of, and defense against, atomic munitions must be planned with the utmost care. Tactical, economical, and psychological considerations will justify their use under many circumstances; conversely, these same considerations will often dictate against their use. In some situations non-atomic weapons will continue to be the only means appropriate to accomplish the mission. Consequently, reliance upon the atomic capability must not result in a deterioration of our ability to conduct effective operations without atomic fire support. The proper integration of non-atomic and atomic fires is one of the most challenging problems confronting a commander.38 Ground combat, according to the Bulletin, would no longer be linear or static. "Tactics will accentuate aggressive maneuver featuring speedy and surprise concentration of forces at the point of battle and equally speedy dispersion of forces after the issue has been decided." Other changes in ground combat would include the need for cover and concealment, as well as operations during dark or other periods of low visibility and, because of wide dispersion and the need for smaller units to be self-sustaining, all-around defenses would be required more often.39 LFB-2 continued the themes popularized by the Commandant of the Marine Corps, General Shepherd, and other doctrinal publications of the early 1950's by restating the value of the helicopter and the need for small unit commanders to be "prepared for semi-independent employment in which rapidly changing situations require initiative, ingenuity, and aggressive decision." The Bulletin, however, added much information on the tactical use of atomic weapons and what could be done to reduce the casualties when the enemy had atomic weapons.40 According to LFB-2, the principles of amphibious operations in atomic warfare would not be essentially different. Shock would still be important but mainly through the use of atomic weapons. The mass provided by atomic fire support would eliminate the need for the massing of troops during an amphibious landing with both quantity and technique of employment being the key to victory.41 LFB-2 is an amazing document to read in the 1980's. It very matter-of-factly tells commanders how to survive and win on the atomic battlefield. For example, it tells them that for close-in use of atomic fire they should use artillery because of its accuracy and also suggests the use of low yields "on the order of 5 to 15" kilotons. It discusses delaying the time of attack after atomic preparatory fire for a period of two to four hours to allow time for the radiation to affect the enemy's fighting capability.42 It provides a phenomenal amount of information considering the limited knowledge of atomic weapons and their effect that existed in the early 1950's. F. ATOMIC EXERCISES The authors of LFB-2 admitted that much of their technical content came from other sources, but the tactics and techniques came mainly from extensive training centered around, whenever possible, actual atomic explosions. As the Atomic Energy Commission conducted atomic tests (192 from 1946-1963), the military was allowed to use some of them for their purpose. The first large scale participation by the Marine Corps was on 18 April 1953 in Exercise Desert Rock V. 2,000 Marines and 39 helicopters comprised the 2d Marine Corps Provisional Atomic Exercise Brigade (2d MCPAEB) that participated in the Exercise at the Atomic Proving Ground in Nevada. Their mission was to (1) familiarize personnel with the effects of atomic weapons, (2) test and develop tactics and techniques for placing helicopter-borne forces on objectives in close proximity to ground zero, (3) provide staff and commanders with realistic training in planning and coordinating operations supported by atomic weapons, (4) provide actual training in radiological survey operations, and (5) familiarize personnel with methods of protecting themselves against atomic weapons.43 The exercise was successful in meeting the mission objectives listed above, but not without problems. A wind change caused one battalion to be exposed to a level of radiation well over the Atomic Energy Commission's allowable limit and they were immediately evacuated. Dust clouds also created visibility and radiation problems for the helicopter pilots causing them to find alternate routes to their landing zones. The quest for safety on the part of all concerned made the determination of realistic time frames impossible, thus making the exercise results questionable.44 The Exercise Desert Rock V after action report made several recommendations, including the following: there was a need to raise the maximum radiation exposure levels allowed in the exercises, LFB-2 needed updating, and atomic warfare experts should be incorporated in division staffs. It also made these two general comments about planning for atomic warfare: first, weather and wind conditions are vitally important when delivering atomic weapons and their effects must be totally understood and, secondly, 4,000 yards is the optimum distance from ground zero for exercises. Closer to ground zero means more dust an less visibility, thus affecting the personnel's ability to observe the phenomenon which is an important part of the indoctrination.45 A separate report was also filed by the 2d MCPAEB on the participation of helicopters in Exercise Desert Rock V. It listed the different experiments conducted by pilots during the Exercise, such as facing the blast, looking down at the instruments, wearing goggles, or totally facing away from the blast. The report concluded that tactics and techniques for helicopter operations in atomic warfare needed to be modified. The following specific points were made: (1) select routes of approach and withdrawal to avoid traversal of areas of dust or high radiation and have several alternates, (2) the conduct of approach must avoid subjecting helicopters to more than .5 pounds per square inch overpressure, (3) prevent flash blindness by wearing protective goggles or by looking away (at least 90 degrees), and (4) landing zones should be upwind from ground zero to avoid radiation and dust.46 Prior to Exercise Desert Rock VI during March 1955, the Marine Corps activated Marine Corps Test Unit No. 1 (MCTU #1) at Camp Pendleton, California. In General Shepherd's annual report to the Secretary of the Navy he stated that the mission of MCTU #1 was to "devote its full attention to field tests of new concepts on a substantial scale."47 In other words the reinforced battalion that made up MCTU #1 was to take the doctrine that was being newly developed for atomic warfare and see if it worked. The 3d MCPAEB (MCTU #1 and additional aviation elements) had the same mission at Exercise Desert Rock VI as had their predecessor at Exercise Desert Rock V. The Exercise differed slightly in that the troops were only 3,500 yards away from ground zero and they began their assault sooner than before. Close air support was also used this time, hitting the the helicopter landing zones just ninety seconds before the troops were set down.48 The Exercise also included a test on the effects of an atomic blast on Marine Corps equipment and personnel. Equipment and dummies representing Marines were placed at varying distances from ground zero and with different degrees of protection. The after action report included before and after phctographs that were very revealing. Tanks had their turrets blown off, amtracks were turned upside down, and dummies in the open were evaporated. The distance from ground zero and the level of protection did make a difference, though, and an estimate of survivability could be made from the demonstration. After the tactical exercise, the Marines were taken through the area and shown the effects on the equipment and dummies to give them some appreciation for the power of atomic weapons. The Marine Corps felt that all Marines should eventually participate in atomic blast exercises so that an atomic bomb's shock value for the enemy would be lessened.49 MCTU #1 continued their tests and evaluation until June 1957, when they were disestablished after successfully completing their mission.50 One month later the 4th MCPAEB participated in another atomic exercise that at the time boasted the most powerful atomic device ever detonated in the continental United States. The Marines were dug in three and a half miles from ground zero and uninjured by the blast, but the Joshua trees around them burst into flames from the heat of the explosion. The commanding officer of the Marines termed the exercise a success as "It showed the troops that if they are dug in at a reasonable distance, they will be safe."51 G. REORGANIZATION By 1956 the Marine Corps' new concept for amphibious operations was maturing into a well-studied, well-tested doctrine and it was time to align the organization of the Fleet Marine Force (FMF) with the new doctrine. On 30 April 1956 General Randolph McCall Pate, Commandant of the Marine Corps, appointed Major General Robert E. Hogaboom as president of a Board of officers to "conduct a thorough and comprehensive study of the Fleet Marine Force and make recommendations to the Commandant of the Marine Corps for the optimum organization, composition and equipping of the FMF in order to best perform its mission."52 In his letter announcing the Fleet Marine Force Organization and Composition Board, the Commandant stated that the Advanced Research Group's concept had been accepted, refined, and tested, and it was now time to put a structure in place that could best support it. 53 That structure was to be such that it was "organized, trained, and equipped as a balanced force of combined arms and services ready for combat either in a general or limited war, and against an enemy possessing the most modern weapons, tactics and techniques, and under conditions either authorizing or prohibiting the use of nuclear weapons."54 The new organization was to be implemented by the beginning of fiscal year 1958. The Board convened on 4 June 1956 at Quantico and had three documents that provided the doctrinal guidance necessary for their work: LFB-17, Concept of Future Amphibious Operations, LFM-24, Helicopter Operations, and LFB-2, Interim Doctrine for the Conduct of Tactical Atomic Warfare. They were told that the doctrine was sound and would be "considered by the Board in reaching its conclusions and recommendations."55 The FMF Organization and Composition Board (later known as the Hogaboom Board) reported out in late December 1956, and their recommendations were soon approved for staff planning purposes and forwarded to all major commands on 7 January 1957. In making their analysis, the Board tried to anticipate what warfare during the next ten years would look like. The following was their assessment: It is likely that the next ten years will be a period of consolidation of strength in both the Soviet camp and our own. Very active maneuvering in both camps can be expected. The Communists will continue their tactics of subversion, economic maneuvers designed to render local governments dependent on Moscow, local aggressions, and possibly even nuclear extortion or intimidation. Armed conflict in this time period, has a considerable probability-of being limited to the small-war type of action. General war is considered a possibility, however, if either of the two major powers grossly miscalculates his opponent, or if either is driven to desperation through critical diplomatic reverses, or loss to vital areas. The employment of nuclear weapons must be considered a capability of both sides in any armed conflict either large or small, local or general during the time period.56 The Board also wanted to clarify for any Marines who may have understood the "all helicopter assault" to be the "all helicopter concept" that "crossing the beach" operations were still very much a part of the new amphibious concept. In other words, helicopter operations would only be one aspect of an amphibious operation and Marines would still be landing across the beach when the situation permitted. Their intent was for the helicopterborne assault forces to uncover and secure the beaches and to seize critical terrain to enable additional combat and support forces to phase into the area by more traditional means.57 In reorganizing the Division, the Board stated that "every effort was made to keep from creeping into the Division the `in case' and `nice to have' type units and equipment that can so easily put unmanageable blubber on the muscles of a hard hitting entity."58 They began their work on reorganizing the Division by establishing five basic criteria which the new organization had to meet: 1. The Marine Division must be organized and equipped to conduct an amphibious assault against the most modern defenses. They felt that this was the overriding criteria and must not be obscured by other possible missions for a Marine Division. If the Division was organized and equipped for this purpose then it, along with a well-balanced Force Troops, could meet any other requirements for warfare. 2. The Division must have the greatest possible capability for executing an amphibious assault in accordance with the Marine Corps' modern concepts for amphibious operations and tactical atomic warfare. This criteria was to ensure that the new Division had the capability of dispersed deployment and semi-independent action as well as increased reconnaissance means. 3. The organization of the Division and its subordinate elements must facilitate the rapid organization and efficient operation of task groups. The formation of task forces specifically designed for certain missions would be very important under the new concept. 4. Combat elements must be relieved of maintenance and service functions to the greatest possible degree consistent with effectiveness in order to attain greater mobility. Tactical commanders should be freed from non-tactical functions and the Division given more logistic flexibility to better support combat units engaged in mobile combat. 5. The Marine Division must be capable of making rapid strategic movements by limited air, sea or land transportation means. The Board recognized that in time of war transportation resources would be limited and the new organization must be capable having a significant fighting force moved by those limited resources with the ability of sustaining themselves until follow-on forces can be employed.59 The reorganization of the Marine Division led to a reduction of almost 2,000 personnel per Division by making, among others, the following changes: transferring the Tank Battalion to Force Troops, adding a fourth rifle company to each infantry battalion, expanding the Reconnaissance Company to a Battalion, and adding an Antitank Battalion equipped with 45 Ontos.60 Perhaps the most controversial of the changes to the Division was the removal of the Tank Battalion. It was obvious that tanks would not fit in a fast moving, air-transportable concept. There was still a time and place for them and they could be attached from Force Troops if needed, but tanks would lose some of their effectiveness on the atomic battlefield. High mobility through the use of the helicopter and extensive night operations were a part of the new concept, but the tanks bulk and poor performance during periods of low visibility permitted their departure from the Division. Not only did this decision remove the tanks from the Division, but also the considerable support equipment that went along with them. The fact that the tank was no longer the only weapon that could stop another tank was another aspect of the debate that was considered. Antitank weapons such as the 3.5 rocket and the 106mm recoil less rifle were capable of defeating a tank and fit better into the new concept.61 The addition of the fourth rifle company was partly expedited by the deletion of the Weapons Company. Battalion weapons were to be carried in the Battalion Headquarters and Service Company. The purpose of the fourth rifle company was five fold: 1. It would increase the reconnaissance and security requirements of atomic warfare. 2. It would increase the shock power of the Battalion by providing more tactical units. 3. It would permit the commander to retain a sizable reserve while committing a powerful initial attack. 4. It would increase the staying power of the Battalion by reducing fatigue with the frequent passage of lines by fresh units. 5. It would allow the commander enough forces to provide security for units not helicopter transportable or units awaits subsequent lifts.62 FMF aviation was not drastically changed by the Board, although there was a personnel savings by reducing support personnel and the pilot/seat ratio in combat squadrons. The Board felt the following: capability for combat elements of Marine Corps Aviation to be established ashore early in an amphibious assault operation for the conduct of tactical air operations in support of the landing force is a vital requirement and developmental efforts must be designed to give us aviation organizations, tactics, techniques and equipment which are suited to rapid deployment overseas and the earliest practicable displacement ashore in the objective area. 63 The Board concluded that the FMF "must be a highly mobile and effective fighting force and must be maintained at all times in a state of immediate readiness for prompt maneuver with the fleet to any part of the world to support national policies." They continued by stating that FMF units "must be so organized as to facilitate the task forcing of units of appropriate size which can be rapidly moved to furnish atomic fire support to friendly indigenous forces."64 In 1959 General Pate remarked about the FMF Organization and Composition Board's work that since the helicopterborne assault had been talked about and tested since 1946 "we knew the concept was valid. Our responsibility, then, was to put it to work -- to develop the ability for applying the theory to practical situations." He continued that reorganizing the FMF "was a long step forward, and an important one. Taking it broke a log jam of resistance based on the traditions of earlier days. I am not unmindful of the trauma the change visited upon some of our people -- but it was something that had to be done."65 H. SUMMARY Just as they had done between the World Wars, the Marines began the post World War II era attempting to change its amphibious doctrine. They started from scratch, with only the knowledge that their current doctrine would not survive against an enemy willing to use atomic weapons. To add to its problem, the Corps wanted to develop a doctrine that would serve in either an atomic or a conventional conflict. Again paralleling the between-War effort, the Marine Corps called on the Marine Corps Schools to address the problem. They proceeded to define the problem, analyze the possible solutions, develop "tentative" doctrine, test it, refine it, test it again, refine it again, and finally, reorganize forces to optimize the use of the new doctrine. The final product of twelve years of dedicated effort stood the Marine Corps in good stead for years. Its flexibility prepared the Marine Corps for the decades of the sixties and seventies. Chapter III Notes 1J. F. C. Fuller, The Second World War, p.207. 2Lynn Montross, Cavalry of the Sky, (New York: Harper & Brothers, 1954), p.5. 3Lt. Col. Kenneth J. Clifford, Progress and Purpose: A Developmental History of the United States Marine Corps 1900-1970, (Washington, D.C.: History and Museums Division, Headquarters, USMC, 1973), p.71; Montross, Cavalry of the Sky, pp. 44-46; Millett, Semper Fidelis, pp. 452-453. 4Clifford, Progress and Purpose, p.71; Montross, Cavalry of the Sky, pp. 46-47; Millett, Semper Fidelis, p. 453; Lt. Col. Eugene W. Rawlins, Marines and Helicopters 1946-1962, (Washington, D.C.: History and Museums Division, Headquarters, USMC, 1976), p. 11. 5Vandegrift, Once a Marine, p. 322. 6Clifford, Progress and Purpose, p.71; Montross, Cavalry of the Sky, pp. 49-50; Millett, Semper Fidelis, p. 453; Rawlins, Marines and Helicopters 1946-1962, p. 11-12. 7Clifford, Progress and Purpose, pp. 71-72; Rawlins, Marines and Helicopters, p. 13; Millett, Semper Fidelis, pp.453-454. 8Montross, Cavalry of the Sky, p.50; Rawlins, Marines and Helicopters, p. 12. 9Montross, Cavalry of the Sky, p. 62-63; Rawlins, Marines and Helicopters, p. 13; Millett, Semper Fidelis, p. 453-454. 10Rawlins, Marines and Helicopters, p. 13; Brigadier General Edward C. Dyer, Oral History, (Washington, D.C.: Historical Division, HQMC, 1973), p. 199. 11Montross, Cavalry of the Sky, p. 63. 12Montross, Cavalry of the Sky, p. 65-66; Rawlins, Marines and Helicopters, p. 14. 13Montross, Cavalry of the Sky, p. 66; Rawlins, Marines and Helicopters, p. 14. 14Montross, Calvary of the Sky, pp. 73-78; Rawlins, Marines and Helicopters, pp. 15-16; Millett, Semper Fidelis, p. 455. 15Rawlins, Marines and Helicopters, pp. 20-21; Clifford, Progress and Purpose, p. 74. 16Lynn Montross, "Flying Windmills in Korea", Marine Corps Gazette, September, 1953, p. 18; Montross, Cavalry of the Sky, pp. 83-87; Rawlins, Marines and Helicopters, pp. 24-25; Millett, Semper Fidelis, pp. 455-456; Clifford, Progress and Purpose, p. 75. 17Lynn Montross, "Flying Windmills in Korea", Marine Corps Gazette, September, 1953, p. 18; Montross, Cavalry of the Sky, pp. 91; Rawlins, Marines and Helicopters 1946-1962, pp. 25; Millett, Semper Fidelis, pp. 456; Clifford, Progress and Purpose, p. 77. 18Montross, Cavalry of the Sky, pp. 91-92; Rawlins, Marines and Helicopters 1946-1962, pp. 26; Clifford, Progress and Purpose, p. 77. 19Major Robert A. Doughty, "The Evolution of US Army Tactical Doctrine, 1946-76", Leavenworth Papers, August, 1979, p. 4; Clifford, Progress and Purpose, p. 77. 20James E. VanZandt, Congressional Record, 16 May 1949. 21Millett, Semper Fidelis, p. 498. 22General O. P. Smith, Oral History, (Washington D.C.: Historical Division, HQMC, 1973), p. 186. 23Montross, Cavalry of the Sky, pp. 156-157. 24Montross, Cavalry of the Sky, pp. 161-162; Montross, Flying Windmills in Korea", p. 23. 25Montross, Cavalry of the Sky, pp. 164-165; Montross, "Flying Windmills in Korea", pp. 23-24. 26LFM-4, Ship-to-Shore Movement, (1952), p. 13-1. 27LFM-4, Ship-to-Shore Movement, (1956), pp. 1-5 - 1-6. 28LFM-4, Ship-to-Shore Movement, (1956), p. 13-1. 29Advanced Research Group Project I, Landing Force Aspects of Future Amphibious Operations, (1953-1954), p. 1; Rawlins, Marines and Helicopters, p. 62. 30Advanced Research Group Project I, Landing Force Aspects of Future Amphibious Operations, (1953-1954), pp. 2-3,5-7. 31Advanced Research Group Project I, Landing Force Aspects of Future Amphibious Operations, (1953-1954), pp. 10-11. 32Advanced Research Group Project I, Landing Force Aspects of Future Amphibious Operations, (1953-1954), pp. 27-32. 33Advanced Research Group Project I, Landing Force Aspects of Future Amphibious Operations, (1953-1954), pp. 33-35,50-56. 34Rawlins, Marines and Helicopters, pp. 65-66. 35General Lemuel C. Shepherd, Jr., "Address by CMC before Naval War College", 21 February 1955, p. 21-22. 36LFB-17, Concept of Future Operations, p. 3. 37LFB-17, Concept of Future Operations, p. 3-4. 38LFB-2, Interim Doctrine for the Conduct of Tactical Atomic Warfare, p. 1-1. 39LFB-2, p. 1-2. 40LFB-2, p. 1-3. 41LFB-2, p. 4-1. 42LFB-2, pp. 5-1,5-4. 43"Report on Exercise Desert Rock V by 2d MCPAEB", 19 May 1953, p. 2. 44"Report on Exercise Desert Rock V by 2d MCPAEB", 19 May 1953, p. 6. 45"Report on Exercise Desert Rock V by 2d MCPAEB", 19 May 1953, pp. 9-11. 46"Report of Helicopter Participation in Exercise Desert Rock V", 18 June 1953, p. 8. 47"Annual Report of the Commandant of the Marine Corps to the Secretary of the Navy for FY 1955", 15 August 1955, pp. 8-9. 48"Annual Report of the Commandant of the Marine Corps to the Secretary of the Navy for FY 1955", 15 August 1955, sec. VI, p. 2. 49"Annual Report of the Commandant of the Marine Corps to the Secretary of the Navy for FY 1955", 15 August 1955, enclosure 2. 50"Annual Report of the Commandant of the Marine Corps to the Secretary of the Navy for FY 1957", 5 August 1957, pp. 8. 51"Atom on the Attack", Newsweek, 15 July 1957, p. 30. 52"Fleet Marine Force Organization and Composition Board Appointment Letter", 30 April 1956, p. 2.; Clifford, Progress and Purpose, p. 86. 53"FMF Organization and Composition Board Appointment Letter", p. 1. 54"FMF Organization and Composition Board Appointment Letter", p. 1 of enclosure 1. 55"FMF Organization and Composition Board Appointment Letter", p. l of enclosure 1. 56"FMF Organization and Composition Board Report", 7 January 1957, p. II-2. 57"FMF Organization and Composition Board Report", p. II-14. 58"The Division", Marine Corps Gazette, April, 1957, p. 26. Board members published the new organization as well as much of the thinking behind their decisions in a series of articles in the Marine Corps Gazette beginning in April, 1957. These articles provide an excellent opportunity to get into the heads of the people responsible for this very significant organizational change. 59"FMF Organization and Composition Board Report", p. II-15; "The Division", p. 26. 60Rawlins, Marines and Helicopters, p. 74. 61"The Division", p. 27. 62"The Division", p. 29. 63"FMF Organization and Composition Board Report", p. II-17. 64"FMF Organization and Composition Board Report", p. II-21. 65Rawlins, Marines and Helicopters, p. 78. IV. CONCLUSION A. TYING IT ALL TOGETHER Why should we have a Navy at all? The Russians have little or no Navy; the Japanese Navy has been sunk, the navies of the rest of the world are negligible; the Germans never did have much of a Navy. The point I am getting at is who is the big Navy being planned to fight. There are no enemies for it to fight...1 Those words were spoken by General Spaatz of the Army Air Force in early 1946. His views were typical of the time and although he specifically mentioned the Navy he must have also included the Marine Corps. Whether Marines of that time agreed with General Spaatz or not didn't matter; they realized that they must adapt their doctrine and equipment to the Atomic Age or perish. General Vandegrift resented the fact that he had to dedicate so much of his efforts during the critical time following World War II to fighting our own Army when he should have been devoting them to developing a new amphibious concept. In fact, many of the officers instrumental in the search for a new doctrine were intimately involved in the unification struggle. Their ability to fight and win both battles is a testimony to their drive, dedication, and vision. The atomic bomb was a common thread between the unification struggle and the need for a new amphibious doctrine. It made amphibious landings impractical in some people's minds and that meant that the Marine Corps that was so successful in World War II would not be necessary in the next conflict. The Marine Corps had to prove to the Congress that there was a place for them in modern warfare, and they had to do it quickly. I feel that it was due in part to the fervor created by their struggle for survival that drove the Marines to the development of the vertical envelopment even though there were no helicopters at the time that were capable of meeting the concept's requirements. B. WEAPON OF OPPORTUNITY The events during the period of 1946-1958 indicated the confidence the American people had in the Marine Corps as well as that the Marines had in themselves. The Marines did not choose to believe the popular prediction that the next war would be nuclear. They espoused, instead, the theory that limited wars were more likely and the country was in need of a force in readiness to handle them. It isn't clear to me whether the Marines were men of great vision in that regard or just wishful thinkers. Whatever the case, they were doctrinally ready for Korea and used that experience to refine a concept that would preserve their traditional capability as an amphibious force in readiness or, as General Shepherd described it, a "weapon of opportunity."2 CHAPTER IV NOTES 1Vandegrift, Once a Marine, pp. 314-315. 2Shepherd, "Address by CMC before Naval War College", 21 February 1955, p.11. BIBLIOGRAPHY BOOKS NOTE: Call Numbers are for Breckinridge Library, Marine Corps Air-Ground Training and Education Center, Quantico, Virginia. Anonymous, A History of Marine Corps Roles and Missions 1775-1962, Washington D.C.: Historical Branch, G-3 Division, HQMC, 1962. CALL NUMBER: VE23.R58 1962 COMMENTS: Just as the title suggests, this book provides a background of the Marine Corps' roles and missions. It explores how and why they came about and and legislation that may have codified them. Anonymous, National Defense Establishment (Unification of the Armed Forces), Washington, D.C.: United States Government Printing Office, 1947. CALL NUMBER: KF26.A7 1947d COMMENTS: Contains actual text of hearings on unification before the Senate Committee on Armed Services during March, April, and May of 1947. Anonymous, Unification of the Armed Forces, Washington, D.C.: United States Government Printing Office, 1946. CALL NUMBER: UA23.A4 1946j COMMENTS: Contains text of hearings before Senate Committee on Naval Affairs during April, May, and July of 1946. Caraley, Demetrios, The Politics of Military Unification, New York and London: Columbia University Press, 1966. CALL NUMBER: UA23.C24 C.2 COMMENTS: Provides good analysis of the unification fight from a non-Marine Corps perspective. The purpose of the book as restated from its preface is "...to describe and analyze that particular conflict in terms of the different actors involved, their goals and perceptions, and their strategies and tactics of influence..." Clifford, LtCol. Kenneth J., Progress and Purpose: A Developmental History of the United States Marine Corps 1900-1970, Washington D.C.: History and Museums Division, HQMC, 1973. CALL NUMBER: VE23.C53 C.7 COMMENTS: Excellent reference. Provides a survey history of Marine Corps' events during the post-War period. A very good source for starting research on Marine Corps history at that time. Donnelly, Ralph W., Gabrielle M. Neufeld, and Carolyn A. Tyson, A Chronology of the United States Marine Corps, 1947-1964 Volume III, Washington D.C.: Historical Division, HQMC, 1971. CALL NUMBER: VE23.A1 M54 COMMENTS: A good starting place for identifying significant events in Marine Corps history. Limited to very short statement of event. Doughty, Major Robert A., "The Evolution of U.S. Army Tactical Doctrine, 1946-76", Leavenworth Papers, No. 1:1-53, August 1979. COMMENTS: As the title of this paper indicates, it provides a detailed look at Army doctrine. It does, however, touch on some aspects that are of interest to the Marine Corps such as helicopters and general atomic warfare topics. Fuller, Major-General J.F.C., The Second World War, New York: Duell, Sloan and Pearce, 1949. CALL NUMBER: D743.F85 1949 COMMENTS: Good for World War II but nothing after it. Used here only for the quote on amphibious operations. Hubler, Richard G., Straight Up: The Story of Vertical Flight, New York: Duell, Sloan and Pearce, 1961. CALL NUMBER: TL716.H77 25142 COMMENTS: Has a very short section on the Marine Corps' role in developing the helicopter but nothing that isn't in the books by Montross or Rawlins. Isely, Jeter A. and Crowl, Philip A., The U.S. Marines and Amphibious War, Princeton, New Jersey; Princeton University Press, 1951. CALL NUMBER: D769.45.I7 COMMENTS: Limited to amphibious operations in World War II. Keiser, Gordon W., The U.S. Marine Corps and Defense Unification 1944-47, Fort Lesley J. McNair Washington, D.C.: National Defense University Press, 1982. CALL NUMBER: VE23.K43 COMMENTS: Provides a good source of details on actual events leading up to the passage of the National Security Act of 1947 but does not include a lot of background on why they happened. Kinnard, Douglas, President Eisenhower and Strategy Management: A Study in Defense Politics, Lexington, Kentucky: The University Press of Kentucky, 1977. CALL NUMBER: UA23.K482 COMMENTS: Includes Eisenhower's policy of "massive retaliation" and his plan for the different services during the 1950's. Krulak, LtGen. Victor H., First to Fight, Annapolis, Maryland: Naval Institute Press, 1984. CALL NUMBER: VE23.K78 1984 COMMENTS: Outstanding inside view of someone who was intimately involved in both the unification fight and the development of the vertical envelopment doctrine. Lindsay, Robert, This High Name: Public Relations and the U.S. Marine Corps, Madison, Wisconsin: The University of Wisconsin Press, 1956. CALL NUMBER: VE23.L5 COMMENTS: Not pertinent for this paper, but has extensive examples of Marine Corps advertising and publicity issues. Millett, Allan R., Semper Fidelis: The History of the United States Marine Corps, New York: Macmillan Publishing Co., Inc., 1980. CALL NUMBER: VE23.1154 COMMENTS: The standard history of the Marine Corps. Its bibliography was invaluable for my research and would be a good place to start for research on any Marine Corps historical subject. Millis, Walter (Editor), The Forrestal Diaries, New York: The Viking Press, 1951. CALL NUMBER: E813.F6 COMMENTS: Good for understanding the significant role James Forrestal played in the Marine Corps' struggle during the unification hearings. Montross, Lynn, Cavalry of the Sky, New York: Harper & Brothers, 1954. CALL NUMBER: UG703.M6 COMMENTS: An outstanding analysis of the Marine Corps' development of the helicopter and the reasons behind it. Written during the time of the helicopter's evolution, it includes the insight of the Marines most deeply involved in the process. Rawlins, LtCol. Eugene W., Marines and Helicopters 1946-1962, Washington D.C.: History and Museums Division, HQMC, 1976. CALL NUMBER: VG93.R38 COMMENTS: Provides excellent review of helicopter development as well as good detail on Marine Corps Boards of the time that provided input into the new doctrine of vertical envelopment. Reinhardt, Col. G.C. and LtCol. W.R. Kintner, Atomic Weapons in Land Combat, Harrisburg, Pa.: The Military Service Publishing Company, 1954. CALL NUMBER: UF767.R4 1954 COMMENTS: This book explores the problems which atomic warfare poses to division, regimental, and battalion commanders. It discusses tactics in all kinds of possible situations, plus the type of training required. There are no specific references to the Marine Corps but some good general comments on the impact in 1954 of the atomic bomb on how wars might be fought in the future. Snyder, Glenn H., Deterrence and Defense: Toward a Theory of National Security, Princeton, New Jersey: Princeton University Press, 1961. CALL NUMBER: UA11.S56 COMMENTS: Not pertinent to my subject. Vandegrift, A. A., Once a Marine, New York: Ballantine Books, 1964. CALL NUMBER: VE25.V3 A3 1982 COMMENTS: Contains some good insight into unification fight but it is not comprehensive. It also has a brief look at the Marine Corps' actions at the beginning of the age of atomic warfare. PERIODICALS Asprey, Robert B., "The New Fleet Marine Force", U. S. Naval Proceedings, 678:41-48, August 1959. COMMENTS: An excellent description of the "FMF Organization and Composition Board" changes to the FMF's structure. Also discussed the new doctrine and potential problems with it. "Atom on the Attack", Newsweek, 50:30, 15 July 1957. COMMENTS: Discusses Marines involved in an atomic exercise in 1957. Just a news report with no background information. "Attempt to Reduce Marine Corps: Army's Desire for its Functions", The United States News, 20:26-27, 31 May 1946. COMMENTS: A good article dealing with the early unification hearings. It provided good background and a view from each side of the argument. Bressoud, Jr., Marius L., "Health to the Regiment", Marine Corps Gazette, 39:32-37, June 1955. COMMENTS: Bressoud defends the regiment as a fighting force in atomic warfare. He states that atomic weapons can be used tactically and that tests have demonstrated ground troops and helicopters could attack ground zero immediately after the blast. He also talked about the prospect for non-atomic warfare. Canzona, Capt. Nicholas A., "Shape-up for `A' War", Marine Corps Gazette, 38:17-21, February 1954. COMMENTS: Good discussion on possible trimming of fat from maneuver units to allow for the rapid movement necessary on atomic battlefield. Clapp, Major A. J., "Rotary Aircraft's Role", Marine Corps Gazette, 39:14-17, October 1955. COMMENTS: Analyzes the helicopter's role in amphibious operations in the age of atomic weapons. It also discussed the advantages and disadvantages of the helicopter. "Complete Texts of Statements in Defense Dispute", U. S. News & World Report, 27:53-79, 28 October 1949. COMMENTS: Excellent unedited source for the views of the service chiefs on unification in 1949. Cushman, Jr., Col. Robert E., "Amphibious Warfare Tomorrow", Marine Corps Gazette, 39:30-34, April 1955. COMMENTS: A look into the future of amphibious warfare by a future Commandant of the Marine Corps. The article looks at the strategic, operational, and tactical level of war and proved to be very accurate in its predictions. "Danger: `Little Wars' - But U.S. is Ready", U. S. News & World Report, 44:50-54, 10 January 1958. COMMENTS: An interview with Commandant of the Marine Corps General Randolph McC. Pate about the status of the Marine Corps and the Soviet threat. General Pate expresses his feelings on possible limited wars with Soviet satellites. "Floating Bases Show Their Value", U. S. News & World Report, 29:16-17, 8 September 1950. COMMENTS: Described how the Korean War boosted the Navy and Marine Corps by disproving Army's contention that they were obsolete in the atomic era. "FMF Organization and Composition Board Report: Aviation", Marine Corps Gazette, 41:10-12, May 1957. COMMENTS: This article and the next three were written by members of the Board and consequently provide an excellent chance to acquire insight into the thinking behind the decisions that were made. "FMF Organization and Composition Board Report: Fire Support", Marine Corps Gazette, 41:8-12, June 1957. COMMENTS: Same as entry above. "FMF Organization and Composition Board Report: Service Elements", Marine Corps Gazette, 41:20-24, July 1957. COMMENTS: Same as entry two above. "FMF Organization and Composition Board Report: The Division", Marine Corps Gazette, 41:26-30, April 1957. COMMENTS: Same as entry three above. Provides an excellent breakdown of what the new Division organization will be, how it compares to the current Division organization, and why changes were made. "General Cates, Guadalcanal Veteran, Leads Marines Back to Fighting Strength After Narrow Escape From Extinction", U. S. News & World Report, 29:33-35, 18 August 1950. COMMENTS: Deals primarily with General Cates' role in the unification fight and specifically his ability to overcome the Army and Department of Defense's attempts to eliminate the Marine Corps. Also discussion on Marine Corps early operations in Korea. Hart, Capt. B. H. Liddell, "New Warfare - New Tactics", Marine Corps Gazette, 39:10-13, October 1955. COMMENTS: Provides a general discussion on warfare in the Atomic Age. Described many ideas adopted by the Marine Corps in developing their doctrine. Heinl, LtCol. R. D., Jr., "The Cat With More Than Nine Lives", U. S. Naval Proceedings, 616:659-671, June 1954. COMMENTS: Heinl provided a detailed account of the Marine Corps' fight for survival against American enemies throughout its existence. Heinl, LtCol. R. D., Jr., "The Marine Corps - Here to Stay", U. S. Naval Proceedings, 572:1085-1093, October 1950. COMMENTS: Heinl addressed the issue of why we need a Marine Corps. Heinl, Col. R. D., Jr., "The Right to Fight", U. S. Naval Proceedinas, 715:23-39, September 1962. COMMENTS: A historical perspective of the entire unification struggle written by one of the major participants. Hittle, Col. J. D., "20th Century Amphibious Warfare", Marine Corps Gazette, 38:14-21, June 1954. COMMENTS: Takes amphibious warfare from beginning of 20th Century up through the helicopter and Korea. It was written by a Marine who played an important role in the Marine Corps' effort to modernize its doctrine during the post World War II unification hearings. "Marine Corps' Fight For Life", U. S. News & World Report, 29:20-21, 15 September 1950. COMMENTS: Official testimony given on 17 October 1949 by General Cates before the House Armed Services Committee on the plight of the Marine Corps at that time. McCutcheon, Col. Keith B., "Equitatus Caeli", Marine Corps Gazette, 38:25-27, February 1954. COMMENTS: Discusses the Marine Corps' development of helicopter doctrine and the initial implementation of it in Korea. Montross, Lynn, "Flying Windmills in Korea", Marine Corps Gazette, 37:16-25, September 1953. COMMENTS: Excellent explanation of the missions Marine Corps helicopters completed in Korea. Clearly states their importance to Marines on the ground. Reinhardt, Col. George C., USA, "Tomorrow's Atomic Battlefield", Marine Corps Gazette, 38:16-23, March 1954. COMMENTS: A look at the employment of tactical atomic weapons and the need to train for their use. Reinhardt stresses the importance of preparing for the next war with the idea that atomic weapons will be used and he continues that we must incorporate their use in all our doctrine and planning. Reinhardt, Col. George C., USA, "Who Said...Impossible", Marine Corps Gazette, 39:10-16, January 1955. COMMENTS: Reinhardt builds a case for amphibious operations in an atomic war and, in fact, feels that their role in American strategy will increase in the atomic age. Shepherd, LtGen. Lemuel C., Jr., "As the President May Direct", U. S. Naval Institute Proceedings, 585:1149-1155, November 1951. COMMENTS: Discusses Marine Corps' history and role as the Nation's force in readiness. MARINE CORPS' DOCUMENTATION "Annual Report of the Commandant of the Marine Corps to the Secretary of the Navy for Fiscal Year 1954", Marine Corps Historical Center, 11 August 1954. CALL NUMBER: VA52.A2 CMC 1954-56 COMMENTS: This report and the ones below good sources for a synopsis of the years events and the direction the Corps was taking at that time. The CMC provided the SecNav with a look at the goals and direction of the Corps. "Annual Report of the Commandant of the Marine Corps to the Secretary of the Navy for Fiscal Year 1955", Marine Corps Historical Center, 15 August 1955. CALL NUMBER: VA52.A2 CMC 1954-56 COMMENTS: See comment on Fiscal Year 1954 Report. "Annual Report of the Commandant of the Marine Corps to the Secretary of the Navy for Fiscal Year 1956", Marine Corps Historical Center, 21 August 1956. CALL NUMBER: VA52.A2 CMC 1954-56 COMMENTS: See comment on Fiscal Year 1954 Report. "Annual Report of the Commandant of the Marine Corps to the Secretary of the Navy for Fiscal Year 1957", Marine Corps Historical Center, 5 August 1957. CALL NUMBER: VA52.A2 CMC 1957-58 COMMENTS: See comment on Fiscal Year 1954 Report. "Annual Report of the Commandant of the Marine Corps to the Secretary of the Navy for Fiscal Year 1958", Marine Corps Historical Center, 21 August 1958. CALL NUMBER: VA52.A2 CMC 1957-58 COMMENTS: See comment on Fiscal Year 1954 Report. Cates, General Clifton B., Oral History Transcript, Washington, D.C.: Historical Division, HQMC, 1973. CALL NUMBER: VE25.C35 A35 COMMENTS: Provides a good insight into General Cates thoughts during the unification fight. "CMC Address before Naval War College", Breckinridge Library, 21 February 1955. CALL NUMBER: VE23.A5 1955 COMMENTS: Excellent synopsis of Marine Corps position at the time. Dyer, Brigadier General Edward C., Oral History Transcript, Washington, D.C.: Historical Division, HQMC, 1973. COMMENTS: Excellent discussion on early helicopter studies in which he was deeply involved. Hogaboom, Major General Robert E., Oral History Transcript, Washington, D.C.: Historical Division, HQMC, 1972. CALL NUMBER: VE23.2.I5H61 COMMENTS: Unfortunately this document had almost no discussion on the FMF Organization and Composition Board and its role in reorganizing the Marine Corps. "Landing Force Aspects of Future Amphibious Operations", Advanced Research Group Project I, Marine Corps Historical Center, 26 March 1954. CALL NUMBER: VE23.2.N121737 COMMENTS: This report was the basis for future Marine Corps doctrine and should be read to understand direction the Marine Corps took in the mid 1950's. "Landing Force Bulletin No. 2", Interim Doctrine for the Conduct of Tactical Atomic Warfare, HQMC, Marine Corps Historical Center, 17 August 1955. COMMENTS: An in-depth look at warfare in the Atomic Age. This document details the Marine Corps' plan for fighting an atomic war. Excellent source on the subject. "Landing Force Bulletin No. 17", Concept of Future Amphibious Operations, Breckinridge Library, 13 December 1955. CALL NUMBER: VE153.A39 No. 17 COMMENTS: A comprehensive review of the new Marine Corps doctrine developed for the Atomic Age. It refines the Advanced Research Groups' report. The first doctrinal explanation of the vertical envelopment. "Landing Force Manual No. 1", Training, Breckinridge Library, 4 June 1956. CALL NUMBER: VE153.A4 LFM-1 1956 COMMENTS: Discusses the need to conduct realistic training for atomic warfare. "Landing Force Manual No. 4", Ship-to-Shore Movement", Breckinridge Library, 1952. CALL NUMBER: VEI53.A4 LFM-4 1952 COMMENTS: Briefly discusses capabilities of the helicopter but also highlights its limitations. "Landing Force Manual No. 4", Ship-to-Shore Movement", Breckinridge Library, 8 June 1956. CALL NUMBER: VE153.A4 LFM-4 1956 COMMENTS: Adds atomic considerations to earlier version as well as increasing the section on helicopter capabilities. Deletes limitations of helicopter "Marine Corps Board Report 1-49", Marine Corps Historical Center, date unknown. CALL NUMBER: none COMMENTS: Outstanding source of insight into what Marines were thinking at the time. It shows the paranoia that was felt and the possible solutions that were going to be taken to solve the problem. "Report of the Fleet Marine Force Organization and Composition Board", Breckinridge Library, 7 January 1955. CALL NUMBER: VE23.A5 1956 COMMENTS: Complete report on changes to Marine Corps structure and many of the reasons behind them. "Report on Exercise Desert Rock V", Marine Corps Historical Center (Reference Section in Operations drawer, Desert Rock V folder), 19 May 1953. COMMENTS: After action report written by 2d Marine Corps Provisional Atomic Exercise Brigade. "Report on Exercise Desert Rock VI", Marine Corps Historical Center (Reference Section in Operations drawer, Desert Rock VI folder), March 1955. COMMENTS: After action report written by 3rd Marine Corps Provisional Atomic Exercise Brigade. Shepherd, Jr., General Lemuel C., Oral History Transcript, Washington, D.C.: Historical Division, HQMC, 1967. COMMENTS: General Shepherd discusses the subject areas and gives most of the credit to his staff. Smith, General Oliver P., Oral History Transcript, Washington, D.C.: Historical Division, HQMC, 1973. CALL NUMBER: VE23.2.I555 COMMENTS: Limited discussion on subject areas.
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