Comabat Engineers And The MAGTF CSC 1989 SUBJECT AREA - Operations Author Major Bruce Bissett EXECUTIVE SUMMARY TITLE: COMBAT ENGINEERS AND THE MAGTF I. Purpose: To investigate the employment of combat engineer units in support of the MAGTF with specific attention to their role in providing close combat support to maneuver units. II. Problem: The Combat Engineer Battalion (CEB) is responsible for both combat support and deliberate engineering tasks. In combination with the fact that staff cognizance for engineer efforts rests with the G/S-4, the focus of CEB units over the years has been oriented on combat service support vice combat support tasks. The end result is that duplication of effort between engineer units has occurred and the overall quality of engineer support has been degraded. III. Data: In the Fleet Marine Force (FMF), there are three units responsible for providing engineer support. These are the Combat Engineer Battalion of the Marine Division, the Engineer Support Battalion (ESB) of the Force Service Support Group, and the Engineer Operations Division of the Marine Aircraft Wing. Although some of the tasks performed by these units are similar (e.g., production of potable water), the mission, employment, organization, and focus of each unit is different. CurrentLy, the CEB and the ESB are both responsible for performing CS tasks. All three units are responsible for accomplishing deliberate engineering tasks of a CSS nature. During training exercises it is common for mobility, countermobility, and survivability tasks to be performed "constructively." As a result, we are not training the way we intend to fight and valuable combat engineer assets are not being effectively employed. IV. Conclusions: Effective employment of engineer assets is critical to the success of the MAGTF as a combined arms team. In order to be successful on the next battlefield, we need to train the way we intend to fight. The most effective way of accomplishing this is to assign engineer tasks based on the capabilities and responsiveness of each engineer unit. This can best be accomplished by allowtng the CEB to focus on combat support tasks under the staff cognizance of the G/S-3. V. Recommendations: That the personnel and equipment within the CEB dedicated to deliberate engineering tasks be transferred to other units. The CEB should concentrate on mobility, countermobility, and survivability tasks which directly support maneuver units. In order to maximize the contribution of combat engineer units, staff cognizance for combat engineer efforts should be transferred to the G/S-3. COMBAT ENGINEERS AND THE MAGTF OUTLINE Thesis: In order to more effectively employ combat engineers, the Marine Corps needs to focus the efforts of the combat engineer battalion on combat support tasks, transfer existing combat service support responsibilities to other units, and reassign staff cognizance for combat engineer efforts to the G/S-3. I. Units responsible for performing engineer tasks within the MAGTF A. Combat Engineer Battalion B. Engineer Support Battalion C. Engineer Operation Division II. Engineer tasks A. Mobility B. Countermobility C. Survivability D. General engineering III. Employment of engineer units A. Combat support versus combat service support B. Staff cognizance for engineer efforts COMBAT ENGINEERS AND THE MAGTF The mission and employment of combat engineers is often misunderstood and frequently overlooked. Many Marines think of combat engineers as construction troops "in the rear" building roads, bridges, and airfields. While these tasks are performed by engineer units, they are not the primary focus of the Combat Engineer Battalion (CEB). The primary mission of the CEB is to "increase the combat effectiveness of the Marine division by rendering close combat engineer support."(1O:15) The secondary mission is to provide limited deliberate engineering support (e.g., essential temporary construction, utilities support). As a result of these dual missions, the CEB is responsible for performing both combat support (CS) and combat service support (CSS) tasks. Since the Vietnam War, a disproportionate amount of effort has been expended by combat engineer units on deliberate engineering tasks of a CSS nature, at the expense of their primary mission of providing combat support to maneuver units. In addition, a significant portion of the equipment possessed by the CEB is not capable of supporting CS tasks in the forward areas. Rather, this equipment is essentially commercial construction equipment designed for use in rear areas in support of CSS tasks. Another factor which has caused the focus on CSS tasks is the fact that staff cognizance for engineer efforts rests with the G/S-4 (who is CSS oriented) instead of the G/S-3 (who focuses on operations and CS). The cumulative result has been a less than optimal employment of combat engineer assets. In order to more effectively employ combat engineers, the Marine Corps needs to focus the efforts of the combat engineer battalion on combat support tasks, transfer existing combat service support responsibilities to other units, and reassign staff cognizance for combat engineer efforts to the G/S-3. Effective employment of engineer assets is critical to the success of the MAGTF as a combined arms team. "Among the hard lessons learned in what the Soviets call the `Great Patriotic War' was the critical role played by engineer troops in large combined arms operations."(5:56O) In order to maximize the contribution of engineer units in support of the MAGTF, engineer tasks need to be assigned based on the capabilities and responsiveness of each engineer unit. In the Fleet Marine Force (FMF), there are three units responsible for providing engineer support. These are the Combat Engineer Battalion of the Marine Division, the Engineer Support Battalion (ESB) of the Force Service Support Group (FSSG), and the Engineer Operations Division of the Marine Wing Support Squadron, Marine Wing Support Group, Marine Aircraft Wing. Although some of the tasks performed by these units are similar (e.g., production of potable water), the mission, employment, organization, and focus of each unit is different. The CEB is organized and equipped to perform both CS and CSS tasks. As discussed above, the primary mission of the CEB is to render close combat engineer support to elements of a division. The CEB consists of a headquarters and service (H&S) company, an engineer support company, and four combat engineer companies. Typically, one combat engineer company, reinforced with elements of the H&S and engineer support companies, supports each of the infantry regiments within a division. These engineer companies operate in close proximity to the forward areas and focus their efforts on combat support tasks (i.e., mobility, countermobllity, and survivability) which are expeditionary or temporary in nature. Although the fourth combat engineer company (reinforced) can be used to augment one of the other combat engineer companies, its principal function is to accomplish engineer tasks in support of the division as a whole. Examples include assisting division rear units in the construction of protective positions and conducting engineer reconnaissance tasks. The mission of the Engineer Support Battalion is to "increase the effectiveness of the landing force by accomplishing general engineering missions of a deliberate nature."(1O:35) These tasks typically include the construction and operation of fixed and floating bridges, the installation and operation of bulk fuel facilities, the maintenance and repair of roads, and the construction of expeditionary airfields. The primary focus is on CSS tasks although the battalion does have the capability to perform limited CS tasks. The ESB consists of a H&S company, a support company, a bridge company, three engineer companies, and two bulk fuel companies. Normally, the engineer companies operate under centralized control of the ESB. In certain situations, however, the engineer companies may be attached to or placed in direct support of division or wing elements. In the combat support role, the ESB is capable of performing many of the tasks primarily assigned to the CEB. This is because of the similarities in equipment and personnel skills. Due to the number of deliberate engineering tasks to be accomplished in support of the MAGTF, however, the ESB will rarely have the resources to perform CS tasks. The Engineer Operations Division is responsible for providing engineer support of a deliberate nature in support of the Marine Aircraft Wing (MAW). Tasks performed include the construction and maintenance of mission essential base camps, utilities support, and material handling support. The Engineer Operations Division is tasked with providing "the full range of engineer support for the Air Combat Element."(14:1-23) The support provided by the Engineer Operations Division is exclusively CSS in nature. Of the three engineer units discussed above, only the CEB and ESB are capable of providing close combat engineer support. Due to the number of deliberate engineering tasks to be performed, however, the ESB will rarely be available to perform CS tasks. All three of the engineer units are responsible for and capable of performing engineer tasks of a deliberate nature. Although the CEB and ESB are similar in some respects, the principal difference is that the efforts of the ESB are more equipment intensive and permanent. For example, a combat trail constructed by the CEB would be improved into a main supply route by the ESB. Close combat engineer support has three principal tasks: mobility, countermobility, and survivability. The primary task of the CEB is to enhance the mobility of maneuver elements. This is accomplished by reducing obstacles, both natural (existing) and man-made (reinforcing). Mobility enhancement focuses on reducing the effects that obstacles have on the employment of weapons systems and equipment. "Mobility, combined with firepower, is the principal ingredient in maneuver, whereby a force gains positional advantage over the enemy."(15:2-l3) U.S. forces in South Vietnam and Soviet forces in Afghanistan both experienced the debilitating effect that relatively unsophisticated opposing forces can have on the mobility of combat forces. Although both countries enjoyed significant firepower and mobility advantages over their opponents, guerrilla forces were able to severely restrict operations by the effective employment of mines and other obstacles. In Afghanistan, the mujahedin mine warfare campaign was "successful in slowing and halting Soviet columns, isolating Soviet garrisons, and limiting counterinsurgency operations."(5:563) U.S. forces in South Vietnam experienced the same difficulties. Frequently, during training exercises, natural obstacles (e.g., rivers, gaps) and enemy emplaced obstacles (e.g., minefields and craters) are successfully breached "constructively." As a result, the obstacle only exists on paper and the personnel and equipment needed to conduct an actual breach are not employed. Obviously, maneuver elements and engineer units gain little training value from this type of exercise scenario. Given the critical need for mobility on the modern battlefield, realistic training opportunities need to be pursued in peacetime exercises. One of the key MAGTF capabilities to be emphasized cited in the MAGTF Master Plan is the "capability to breach obstacles, including minefields, under fire, with no significant reduction in momentum."(11:6-3) Also noted was the lack, in training exercises, of "realistic breaching events"(11:7-69) In order to be successful, our forces need to be able to quickly employ obstacles to delay, disrupt, and kill the enemy. The use of obstacles enhances the effectiveness of our weapons systems and increases the time available for target acquisition by slowing or stopping the enemy. "The inherent mobility of enemy mechanized and motorized forces must be countered by extensive and coordinated use of obstacles."(15:2-17) Combat engineer units are ideally suited to assist units in the accomplishment countermobility tasks. Engineers can reinforce natural obstacles by emplacing antitank and antipersonnel minefields as well as constructing antitank ditches. These efforts will disrupt an enemy attack by restricting and channelizing his movement. The emplacement of man-made obstacles, however, is slow, labor and equipment intensive, and requires significant logistics support. "Whereas maneuver units cover tank ditches with guns whose rounds are clocked in kilometers per second, the tank ditches themselves are installed at rates measured by meters per hour."(1:38) The result is that the construction of obstacles may not match the tempo of combat operations unless we train extensively during peacetime. During training exercises, combat engineers can emplace minefields using inert mines, create craters and other vehicle obstacles, and employ wire obstacles to restrict the movement of personnel. All of these obstacles can be removed later with little, if any, environmental damage and can significantly improve the realism of our training exercises. Too often, however, these countermobility events are not included in training exercises. As a result, many commanders have grown up "without appreciating the importance of the proper application of engineer resources on the battlefield."(4:176) The final combat support task of combat engineer units is to assist in survivability enhancement measures. "Survivability measures are subdivided into two categories: fighting positions for protection of personnel and equipment directly involved in combat; and protective positions for protection of personnel and equipment not directly involved with fighting the enemy." (9:1-6) These positions can be quickly constructed depending on the time and type of terrain available and, again, can be covered over once these positions are vacated. Too often during our training exercises, however, unnecessary environmental and time constraints preclude the construction of these positions. At the very least, a sampling of positions should be constructed to enhance the training provided to all personnel. The result of not including mobility, countermobility and survivability events in training exercises is that units are not training the way they intend to fight. The first firefight is not the time to learn how to perform these tasks. In addition, since close combat engineer tasks are not routinely included in training exercises, problems with existing doctrine and equipment are not highlighted. The result has been a stagnation in the development of doctrine, tactics, and equipment suited for mobility, countermobility, and survivability tasks on the modern battlefield. To be sure, the accomplishment of deliberate engineering tasks of a CSS nature are critical to the success of the MAGTF. These tasks support the operations of the entire MAGTF and contribute to the sustainability of the force. Deliberate engineering tasks typically include mobile electric power services, construction of temporary camps and storage facilities, production of potable water, hygiene services (e.g., laundry, shower facilities), construction, maintenance, and repair of roads and expeditionary airfields, and material handling support. As noted earlier, the accomplishment of deliberate engineering tasks is the primary responsibility of the Engineer Support Battalion of the FSSG and the Engineer Operations Division of the MAW. Also requiring the CEB to perform these tasks causes duplication and does not result in the efficient use of engineer assets. Since the CEB is principally tasked with providing close combat engineer support, any efforts expended on deliberate engineering tasks detracts from the primary mission. Although some duplication is expected, the dual missions assigned to the CEB cause a dilution of effort. A solution to the combat support versus deliberate engineering dilemma is to transfer the responsibility for deliberate engineering tasks from the CEB to other units. As an example, the water purification equipment and personnel could be transferred to the Headquarters Battalion of the Marine Division since these assets would normally be employed in the division rear area. A second example would be to transfer the equipment and personnel used for road construction and repair to the ESB of the FSSG. Since the ESB is already tasked with road construction and repair, the impact would be minimal. These changes would allow the CEB to focus on combat support tasks and be more responsive to the needs of the maneuver commander. By transferring the equipment and personnel associated with CSS tasks, the CEB would become more mobile and could concentrate solely on combat support tasks. The end result of realigning responsibilities between the three engineer units would be a tailored approach to engineer support of the MAGTF as a whole. The CEB would focus solely on combat support tasks in direct support of the maneuver elements. Deliberate engineering support would be provided by the ESB in support of the entire MAGTF to include the division, wing, and FSSG. The mission of the Engineer Operations Division would remain essentially unchanged. This realignment of efforts would allow each unit to concentrate on a more narrowly defined mission and eliminate unnecessary duplication. Equipment, doctrine, and tactics needed to support the combat support mission could then be evaluated to determine if deficiencies exist. A second reason why a disproportionate amount of engineer effort has been expended on CSS tasks over the years is that staff cognizance for engineer efforts rests with the G/S-4. This relationship has caused a tendency to orient combat engineer efforts on deliberate engineering tasks. Since the responsibility for combat support and tactical issues rests with the G/S-3, the combat engineer officer is frequently not a part of the planning process and as a result, the maneuver commander does not receive the full benefit of his engineer assets. The idea of transferring staff cognizance to the G/S-3 is not a new idea. Rather, this recommendation has been made repeatedly over the years. For example, the Marine Corps Mine Warfare Conference held in 1983 recommended that the engineer officer be assigned as "a special staff officer under the cognizance of the G/S-3."(17:1-A-3) More recently, the MAGTF Master Plan has recommended that the engineer officer be placed "under the responsibility of the G/3."(11:85) The solution is to assign staff cognizance for combat engineer efforts to the G/S-3. This relationship will more closely support combat operations and focus the efforts of combat engineers on mobility, countermobility, and survivability tasks. The G/S-4 would continue to maintain staff cognizance over deliberate engineering tasks. These tasks would be performed by elements of the ESB as part of a combat service support element (CSSE) providing direct support to the division. The employment of combat engineer units to accomplish mobility, countermobility, and survivability tasks is not a new idea. These types of tasks have been accomplished by combat forces for hundreds of years. However, in order to maximize the contribution of combat engineer units on the next battlefield, the Marine Corps needs to train the way it intends to fight. This can be accomplished by assigning mobility, countermobility, and survivability tasks to CEB units during our training exercises. General engineering tasks of a CSS nature would be assigned to the ESB and the Engineer Operations Division in order to focus the efforts of the CEB. In order to focus on combat support tasks, the existing equipment and personnel dedicated to deliberate engineering tacks would be transferred froin the CEB to other unite. The result would be engineer units tailored to support selected mission areas. The CEB would concentrate on combat support tasks while the ESB and the Engineer Operations Division concentrated on deliberate engineering tasks. Finally, staff cognizance for combat engineer efforts would be transferred from the G/S-4 to the G/S-3. This transfer will result in more responsive combat engineer support and will focus the efforts of combat engineer units on combat support tasks. This will also provide the supported commander an engineer staff officer who is focused on the combat support tasks of mobility, countermobility, and survivability. Deliberate engineering tasks performed in support of the division would be accomplished by ESB units under the staff cognizance of the G/S-4. The end result of the changes recommended would be a CEB exclusively focused on the combat support tasks of mobility, countermobillty, and survivability. By expanding the capabilities of the ESB and the Engineer Operations Division, no degradation in deliberate engineering support would occur. Rather, since deliberate engineering effort would be concentrated, economies of scale and efficiencies would result. With the reassignment of deliberate engineering responsibility and the associated personnel and equipment, the transfer of staff cognizance for combat engineer efforts to the G/S-3 should be adopted. BIBLIOGRAPHY 1. Fastabend, David A., Maj, USA and Graves, Ralph H., Maj, USA. "Maneuver, Synchronization and Obstacle Opera- tions." Military Review,LXVI(February 1986),36-48. 2. Joint Chiefs of Staff. Department of Defense Dictionary of Military and Associated Terms, JCS Publication 1. Washington,D.C.,1 June 1987. 3. Marapoti, James A., LtCol, USMC. "Battlefield Mobility and Survivability of the MAGTF." Marine Corps Gazette,68(March 1984) ,52-62. 4. Saage, Leroy L., LtCol, USA and Harris, Phillip R., LtCol, USA. "Combat Engineer Training:A Case Study." The Military Engineer,77(May-June 1985),176-181. 5. Turbiville, Graham H. "Soviet Combat Engineers in Afghanistan:Old Lessons and Future Wars." The Military Engineer,80(September-October 1988),560- 565. 6. U.S. Army. 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