Combat Suport Versus Combat Services Support: The Combat Engineer Dilemma
AUTHOR Major J. L. Sweeny, USMC
CSC 1988
SUBJECT AREA Logistics
EXECUTIVE SUMMARY
TITLE: COMBAT SUPPORT VERSUS COMBAT SERVICE SUPPORT:
THE COMBAT ENGINEER DILEMMA
The combat engineer battalion of the Marine Division
provides combat support and combat service support to the Ground
Combat Element (GCE) to the Marine Air Ground Task Force (MAGTF).
Current division staff alignment places the engineer officer
under the cognizance of the G-4. This staff alignment is the
fundamental cause of the combat engineer dilemma. The dilemma is
magnified by doctrinal incongruences and the unique dual
missions assigned to the combat engineer battalion. As a result,
the viable combat multiplier of the combat engineer battalion
-combat support- is not exploited to its fullest extent.
A basic understanding of the combat engineer battalion's
combat support and combat service support missions will clearly
identify which staff officer can better exploit their
capabilities. The combat support mission is comprised of
mobility, countermobility and survivability tasks and provides
direct combat support to the maneuver forces of the GCE. The
combat service support mission is comprised of general
engineering tasks and provides sustainability to the GCE.
There are three reasons why the engineer dilemma must be
resolved. The first reason is that the combat engineer's combat
support mission plays a vital role in a wide range of military
operations. The first reason is that the combat engineers are
used throughout the spectrum of conflict. The final reason is
that the vital combat support mission is frequently overlooked
because the engineers do not directly engage enemy forces.
Doctrinal incongruences and the assignment of dual missions
magnify the engineer dilemma. Doctrinal inconsistencies cause
and the combat service support mission. The dual missions cause
a complication because the combat service support mission
assigned to the combat engineer battalion is duplicated by the
engineer support battalion. Both problems directly contribute to
the degradation of the combat engineer battalion's combat
support mission.
The U.S. Army and the Soviet Army provide an excellent
foundation for developing a solution to the engineer dilemma.
The doctrine for both forces is clear and consistent. The
engineer officer is not under the cognizance of the G-4. The
combat engineer unit's predominate mission is combat support.
Both forces clearly understand and address the vital
contribution the combat support mission makes to the maneuver
force.
To resolve the engineer dilemma the engineer officer must be
placed under the cognizance of the GCE's G-3. Doctrinal
inconsistencies must be resolved, and the combat service support
capabilities must be reassigned to the engineer support
battalion. The result to these changes will be a resurgence of
the combat support mission of the combat engineer battalion. The
maneuver force will receive the full combat support and combat
multiplying capabilities of the combat engineers. The combat
engineers will be back in combat.
COMBAT SUPPORT VERSUS COMBAT SERVICE SUPPORT:
THE COMBAT ENGINEER DILEMMA
OUTLINE
Thesis Statement. To correct the neglect of the combat
engineer's combat support mission caused by the G-4's
cognizance of the engineer officer, a realignment of the
division staff which places the engineer officer under the
G-3 will insure a resurgence and a fuller exploitation of the
combat engineer's combat support capabilities.
I. Dilimma definition
A. G-4 cognizance of the engineer officer
B. Factors compounding the dilemma
II. Combat support versus combat service support
A. Combat support
1. Mobility
2. Countermobility
3. Survivability
B. Combat service support (General engineering)
III. Role of the combat engineers
A. Range of military operations
B. Spectrum of conflict
C. Lack of combat power
IV. Detail review of compounding factors
A. Doctrinal incongruences
B. Dual mission role assignment
V. Solution to the dilemma used by other forces
A. U.S. Army
B. Soviet Army
VI. Solution to the engineer dilemma
A. G-3 cognizance of the engineer officer
B. Resolution of doctrinal incongruences
C. Reassignment of combat service support capabilities
COMBAT SUPPORT VERSUS COMBAT SERVICE SUPPORT:
THE COMBAT ENGINEER DILEMMA
Let's put the combat engineers back into combat! One of
the most effective combat multipliers available to the
Ground Combat Element (GCE) commander is his combat engineer
unit. The combat engineer battalion provides combat support
and combat service support to the GCE. The combat
engineer's combat support mission provides a viable and
significant combat multiplier to the GCE. It is this combat
support mission which is frequently neglected because of
the overemphasis placed ont he combat service support
mission. The dilemma facing the combat engineers is
balancing their combat support mission with their combat
service support mission. The rudimentary cause of this
dilemma rests directly on the division staff organization
which places the engineer officer under the cognizance of
the G-4. This staff alignment clearly emphasizes the combat
engineer battalion's combat service support mission rather
than its combat support mission. The overemphasis placed on
combat service support directly correlates to a degradation
in the combat support the combat engineers can provide to
the maneuver forces.
In addition, the G-4's cognizance of the engineer
officer at the division level is reflected at the regiment
and battalion level; the combat engineer officer is usually
under the cognizance of the S-4. This mirroring of the
division staff alignment at the regiment and battalion level
has the same result; the combat engineer's combat service
support mission is reinforced and overshadows its combat
support mission. This alignment further compounds the
degradation of the combat support mission because frequently
during exercise the engineer officer is usually assigned to
the "B" command group with the S-4. When the engineer
officer is located with the "B" command group, it precludes
him from being intimately involved in the planning process
or available to provide vital engineer combat support input
to the GCE commander necessary to influence the scheme of
maneuver.
Doctrinal incongruences covering the employment of the
combat engineer battalion and its dual missions of combat
support and combat service support compound the degrading
effects on the combat support mission caused by G-4
cognizance of the engineer officer. Doctrinal publications
are inconsistent and are not mutually supportive which
contributes to the engineer's dilemma. The dual missions
assigned to the combat engineer battalion cause mission
relationship confusion and directly reduces the impact of
their combat support capability.
The fundamental problem causing the engineer dilemma is
G-4 cognizance of the engineer officer. This problem is
compounded by doctrinal incongruences and the dual missions
of the combat engineer battalion. To correct the neglect of
the combat engineer's combat support capabilities. It is
the exceptional commander who can fully exploit the
tremendous combat support capabilities of the combat
engineers which is currently being overshadowed by their
combat service support capabilities.
A basic understanding of the concepts of combat support
and combat service support will clearly demonstrate the
uniqueness of each mission. More importantly the
understanding will develop an appreciation for combat
support's impact on the scheme of maneuver. And most
importantly, the understanding will highlight which staff
officer can most effectively control the combat engineers to
insure their combat support capabilities are fully utilized
to influence the scheme of maneuver. A more detailed
analysis of each mission in terms of the four major tasks
assigned to the combat engineer battalion and a closer
review of its combat service support capabilities will
assist to clear the fog of the engineer's dilemma and bring
into focus the critical combat support provided by the
combat engineers to the GCE.
Combat support is composed of those functions which
directly provide assistance to combat forces. The combat
support mission includes mobility, countermobility and
survivability tasks. These tasks provide direct assistance
to the maneuver forces and require close coordination
between the operation officer and the engineer officer. The
engineer officer must be involved in the development of an
operation from its inception to insure the combat
multiplying capabilities of the combat support mission are
maximized. The combat support tasks are critical to the
success of any operation; however, current staff alignment
can cause the combat support mission to be neglected.
Mobility tasks are those tasks which are designed to
improve the movement of friendly forces and critical
supplies. Mobility must be provided to insure the forward
momentum of the maneuver force of the GCE is unimpeded by
obstacles. This combat support task requires the engineer
officer to be intimately involved in the planning process
and execution of the operation. It is important to realize
that mobility provided to insure uninterrupted and rapid
logistic support of forces, such as MSR maintenance, is a
general engineer task and should not be confused with the
combat support task of mobility. Time and effort expended on
general engineering mobility tasks is time and effort not
available to support maneuver forces. Unimpeded movement of
maneuver forces is the mission of the combat engineer
battalion and should be their primary concern.
Countermobility is the most important combat engineer
combat support task becasue it is the best combat multiplier
provided to the GCE by the combat engineer battalion.
Countermobility tasks are those tasks which are designed to
delay, disrupt and destroy the enemy. The use of obstacles
such as minefields and tank ditches are designed to disrupt
the enemy's time table and force the enemy to maneuver into
positions that dramatically increase the effectiveness of
our weapon systems. This combat support task demands the
close coordination between the engineer officer and the GCE
to insure the combat multiplying capabilities are utilized
to their fullest extent. Additionally, doctrine dictates
that the G/S-3 has staff cognizance of the engineer officer
for barrier planning. This staff alignment for control of
the engineer's countermobility effort highlights and
correctly indentifies the proper staff relationship for
control of the engineers. This staff alignment should be the
rule for engineer combat support and not the exception. G-3
cognizance of the engineer officer should be utilized
throughout the spectrum of combat support tasks in support
of the GCE and not be limited to coutermobility tasks.
Survivability tasks are protective measures taken to
reduce the lethality of enemy weapons systems. Digging-in
weapon systems is designed to improve their survivability
while simultaneously providing unencumbered fields of fire.
Obviously, close coordination between the engineer officer
and the ground commander is imperative to insure the
survivability positions are integrated in the scheme of
defense. Once again, the combat support mission manifests
itself as a critical combat multiplier which would be better
controlled by the G-3.
Combat service support is composed of those functions
which are performed to sustain and maintain the combat
effectiveness of the MAGTF.Combat service support is not a
combat multiplier, and it does not directly enhance the
weapon systems of the combat forces. Combat service support
is logistic in nature and properly belongs under the purview
of the G/S-4. Combat service support functions provided by
the combat engineer battalion are predominately general
engineering tasks.
The final engineer task is general engineering, and it
is the only combat service support task assigned to the
engineering tasks.
The final engineer task is general engineering, and it
is the only combat service support task assigned to the
engineers. General engineering tasks are usually performed
in the rear area. The tasks include MSR repair, airfield
repair, camp construction, water supply, POL supply,
hygienic services and mobile electric power. All of these
tasks are important to sustain the MAGTF in the Amphibious
Objective Area and are logistic in nature. These tasks are
properly placed under the cognizance of the MAGTF G/S-4 and
can be provided by the Combat Service Support Element(CSSE).
The combat engineer battalion has a very limited capability
to perform general engineering tasks when compared to the
engineer support battalion's capability. The GCE does not
orient on the rear area but on the destruction of the enemy.
The combat engineer battalion must orient on supporting the
maneuver forces of the GCE and not on rear area general
engineering tasks. The combat support provided to the GCE
must not be encumbered by an overemphasis of the combat
service support mission. Any effort expended by the combat
engineer battalion on general engineering tasks directly
reduces the combat support it can provide to the GCE.
The combat engineers provide a key ingredient to the
success of any military action - combat support. For the
combat support mission to be fully exploited, the full
integration of the combat engineer officer at the inception
of an operation and under the cognizance of the staff
officer who can best employ the combat engineer battalion's
capabilities is required. There are three reasons that will
illustrate the requirement for the combat engineer officer
to be aligned under the proper staff officer.
The first reason is that combat engineers provide a wide
range of combat support over the entire range of operations
- amphibious, offensive, defensive, mountain, desert,
mechanized, MOUT, rivercrossing and so on. Regardless of the
operation, there is a role, a significant role, for the
engineer's combat support capabilities. As a result of the
pervasiveness of the combat support mission, the engineer
must be an integral part of the planning process and it is
imperative that the engineer officer be in the operation
planning process from the beginning. To be fully effective
the combat support missions cannot be an after thought once
the concept of operations is determined. The combat
engineers can have a positive effect on the scheme of
maneuver and its success if the commander or his operation
officer will fully exploit the combat support capabilities
of the combat engineers.
The second reason for aligning the combat engineers
under the proper staff officer is that the engineers
combat support missions throughout the spectrum of war, from
the low intensity conflict through war on the modern
battlefield. At the low end of the spectrum, even the combat
service support tasks such as road improvement, bridge
building, and vertical construction are a vital link in
winning the hearts and minds of the indigenous population.
Their efforts should be at the forefront of any
counterinsurgency operation. The combat service support
tasks along with the combat support tasks must be an
integral part of the scheme of maneuver. The role of the
combat engineers is positively correlated and proportional
to the increase in intensity of the conflict at the high
intensity end of the spectrum. Their role on the modern
battlefield cannot be overlooked in the scheme of maneuver
because of staff cognizance. The combat engineer's combat
support missions cannot be overshadowed by their limited
combat service support capabilities. The combat support
tasks are essential to the success in the high threat
environment and any neglect of their role will prove
catastrophic. Regardless of the intensity of the conflict,
the combat support and, if appropriate, the combat service
support capabilities of the combat engineers must be fully
understood and considered by the GCE commander when he is
developing the schemem of maneuver.
The third reason to address the area of staff cognizance
of the combat engineers is their lack of firepower. Combat
engineers can not bring firepower to bear on the enemy; they
do not have indirect weapons like artillery; they do not
have shock like tanks; they do not shoot and move like LAVs
and they do not haul troops like AAVs. It is easy for the
GCE commander to overlook the combat engineers as a result
of their lack of firepower. The combat support missions of
mobility, countermobility and survivability are tremedous
combat multipliers that cannot be ignored because they do
not shoot or move. This capability which is as critical to
success as any other combat support unit cannot be
overlooked because the combat engineers are not aligned
under the proper staff officer.
As previously discussed, there are two factors which
compound and contibute to the engineer's dilemma. They are
doctrinal incongruences and the assignment of dual missions
to the combat engineer battalion. These areas are
interrelated and each reflects and magnifies the fundamental
problem caused by G-4 cognizance of the engineer officer. An
examination of these secondary factors is warranted if the
engineer dilemma is going to be satisfactorily solved.
FMFM 3-1, Command and Staff Action, establishes doctrine
for divisional staff functioning to include which staff
officers are assigned to the principal staff officers for
guidance and control. In paragraph 1207.a(1), the G-3 is
tasked with "... planning, coordinating, and supervising the
tactical employment of units." Further in the paragraph,
tactical engineer operations are listed as one of the plans
the G-3 is tasked to prepare or review. The G-3 is assigned
supervision of specific engineer tasks but does not have
cognizance of the engineer officer. G-4 responsibilities are
described in paragraph 1208:
The G-4 is the principal staff assistant
in logistic matters and combat service
support functions of supply, maintenance,
transportation, medical/dental, passenger
and freight, engineer support, landing
support, material handling, and food
services.
Unlike the specific engineer responsibilities assigned to
the G-3, G-4 responsibilities do not include specific
engineer functions. It is evident because of staff
alignment that the engineer's combat support mission is not
a fully integrated part of the G-3, even though combat
support tasks are specifically addressed in paragraph 1207
as a G-3 tasks. Additionally, paragraph 1208, which when
looked at in detail, is a listing of the battalions located
in the FSSG. It appears as though the engineer officer is
placed under the G-4 because there is an engineer support
function listed as a function provided by the FSSG. FMFM
3-1 clearly illustrates that the G-3 has a specified and
substantiated requirement for cognizance of the engineer
officer. The end result of FMFM 3-1's lack of incisive
doctrinal perspective is an overemphasis placed on the
combat engineer's combat service support mission.
An analysis of FMFM 6-1, Marine Division, provides a
more revealing reason why doctrinal inconsistencies
contribute to the engineer's dilemma. In paragraph 401.a,
when listing the combat support elements organic to the
division, it does not inlude the combat engineer battalion.
Further, in paragraph 401.c the combat engineer battalion is
listed as an organic combat service support unit to the
division. Later, in paragraph 407.b the combat engineer
battalion is recognized as providing close combat engineer
support to division units, and in the next paragraph, 407.c,
states that it is the engineer support battalion which is
organized and equipped to provide general engineer support
to the MAGTF. Paragraphs 407.b and paragraph 401.a are not
mutually supporting and exemplifies the magnification of the
engineer's dilemma caused by doctrinal inconsistencies.
Paragraphs 407.b and 407.c clearly state the true mission of
each type of engineer battalion and illustrate the
inconsistency that exists in doctrine. The lack of
recognition of the combat engineer battalion as a combat
support unit unjustifiable enhances its combat service
support mission.
A review of FMFM 9-1, Tank Employment/ Countermechanized
Operations, reveals in the last paragraph of Section VII,
Offensive Operations, that engineer support in the offense
is described as:
The primary role of the engineers in
offensive operations is to perform such
construction and destruction operations as
necessary to facilitate movement of
freindly forces and to impede enemy
movement...
Although not specifically stated as engineer tasks of
mobility and countermobility, the doctrine clearly
indicates the primary mission of the combat engineer