Lightweight Artillery---Procrastinating With The M101 Howitzer AUTHOR Major U. T. Gabar CSC 1988 SUBJECT AREA Artillery EXECUTIVE SUMMARY TITLE: LIGHTWEIGHT ARTILLERY---PROCRASTINATING WITH THE M101 HOWITZER I. Purpose: To review the operational and logistical considerations for use of the M101 howiter and to analyze the methodology for its use by combat forces in the future II. Problem: The Marine Corps currently employs three different howitzers in a direct support role. Much to the dismay of the field artillery community, no one singular weapon is able to satisfy the requirements of the Marine Corps in its likely threat scenarios. At the center of this dilemma are the M198 howitzer, which is too big and bulky, and the M101 howitzer whose usefulness seems to have been resurrected by capitalizing on the M198's limitation. III. Data: The employment of the direct support artillery is a controversial subject in the Marine Corps and its future appears to be as uncertain today as it was a decade ago. An overview of how the Marine Corps organizes its artillery battalions to respond to potential tactical situations provides a good understanding of the problems faced in the field. The M198 is not living up to its expectations in an amphibious role because it lacks mobility. Even after the many steps taken to enhance its effectiveness as a direct support weapon, considerations for its employment are viewed with caution. To counter these limitations the Marine Corps puts more emphasis on use of the M101 howitzer for missions requiring lightweight artillery. But continued use of this WW II vintage weapon is reluctantly accepted as an interim solution only. The M101 does not have the range, or the capability to fire modern ammunition and this could be a crucial disadvantage if it is employed against a force with any resemblance of modern artillery. IV. Conclusions: The state of affairs for direct support artillery is probably the best that can be expected with assets presently available. The employment of mix caliber batteries and emphasis on continued use of the M101 should be an interim solution only. The M198 is the wrong choice for direct support artillery. What the Marine Corps lacks is a lightweight 155mm howitzer that is mobile enough to support its amphibious mission. Recommendations: The Marine Corps must take active steps to procure a lightweight, 155mm howitzer that is adaptable to the amphibious mission and capable of being employed on the modern battlefield against a Warsaw Pact force. LIGHTWEIGHT ARTILLERY--PROCRASTINATING WITH THE M101 HOWITZER Thesis Statement: In meeting a compromise between employment of lightweight artillery and the M198 howitzer, the M101 is an overworked interim solution that is giving the Marine Corps a false sense of security. I. Marine Direct Support Artillery A. History of Weapon systems B. Organization of Artillery Regiments II. Operational Overview A. Mission of Direct Support Artillery B. Role of the M198 Howitzer C. Methodology for use of the M101 III. Analysis of the M101 A. History since the M198 Adopted B. Operational and Logistical Considerations LIGHTWEIGHT ARTILLERY--PROCRASTINATING WITH THE M101 HOWITZER From the beginning, the procurement of the M198 howitzer, as the Marine Corp's new direct support weapon, was met with mixed comments in and out of the artillery community.(1:23) Many veterans were inspired by the addition of this most modern weapon because it answered the long awaited call for extended range and lethality. Others were reluctant to readily accept such a drastic change and vocalized their loyalty for the days of the unsophisticated artillery systems. Today the Marine Corps feels much more confident with its direct support artillery chiefly because of the utility of the M101 howitzer in its role as a lightweight weapon. Mobile, flexible and adaptable to fast moving operations, the M101's usefulness has been resurrected by capitalizing on the limitations of its successor, the M198. The decision to adopt the M198 was brought about by the U.S. Army's decision to cease joint testing (with the Marine Corps) on a lightweight 105mm howitzer which could fire at extended ranges.(2:52) The Army's primary concern was the threat of having to dual with Warsaw pact forces as found in Europe. With the 155mm, M198 howitzer, U. S. forces felt the numerical advantages of the Warsaw Pact forces could be neutralized by increased range, greater lethality and state of the art ammunition. This had a significant impact on the future of artillery and the Marine Corps was left with two alternatives; (1) keep the M101 howitzer as a direct support weapon, and accept the disadvantages of battling in the future with limited range and ammunition, or (2) follow the trace of the Army and purchase the M19B. By virtue of its small size and limited budget, Marine Corps artillery depends on Army research and development of weapons, doctrine and equipment. (2:55-56) Accordingly, it was the decision of the Commandant to follow trace of the Army and buy the M198. Unbeknown to our leaders it was the beginning of turmoil and uncertainty in our artillery community, and this continues to this day. Eight years ago the M101 howitzer was the direct support weapon of the Marine Corps. Today three weapon systems fill that role. The M198 is fully accepted as the premier weapon of the Marine Corps and the one that demonstrates the most capability. Despite its limitations, it has and continues to deploy to every clime and place. Thus it is the preferred weapon for employment on the modern battlefield. The M114 is employed as a direct support weapon in selected battalions. It will be phased out of the inventory when the Marine Corps completes the M198 purchase.(3) Little is written into doctrine however about the employment considerations of the M101, and there is little consensus among Marines on its long term use. The controversy centers on whether the M101 is being retained until we become more proficient at employing the M198? Or are we willing to accept the fact that the M101 will be with the Marine Corps until a lightweight 155mm weapon is adopted? The purpose of this study is twofold: first to review the operational and logistical considerations for past use of the M101 howitzer since the M198 came on the scene. Second, to analyze the methodology for use of this weapon system by combat forces in the near future. The M101 is a l05mm lightweight howitzer, introduced to U. S. forces just after WWII. It served as the Marine Corp's main direct support weapon in Korea and Vietnam. Its major advantages are its lightweight, mobility and rapid rate of fire. It is limited by range, firepower and lack of ability to use modern ammunition. Since being replaced by the M198, a designated number of the M101's have been retained in each artillery regiment for contingency purposes. The Corps no longer maintains a T/E (table of equipment) and T/O (table of organization) for the M101 howitzer battery. The M114 is a 155mm howitzer originally introduced to U. S. forces in the post WWII era. It was used as a general support weapon until replaced by the M198. Nicknamed the "Pig" because of its stubby profile and weight, its chief limitation is range. 24 M114 howitzers are used in direct support battalions of the 10th and 11th Marine Regiments as an interim until purchase of the M198 is completed. The M198 howitzer was originally developed as a general support weapon and successor to the M114 towed howitzer. When adopted by the Marine Corps in the early 1980's to fill the direct support and general support role it was viewed as the weapon of the future. Sophisticated yet simple to operate, the M198 clearly stands out above its predecessors in the area of range, lethality and ability to capitalize on modern ammunition. Its achilles' heel is it's lack of mobility and maneuverability caused by weight and bulkiness. It is presently the main direct support and towed general support weapon for the Marine Corps. Click here to view image The Marine Corps has three active duty artillery regiments with three direct support battalions each. Battalions are basically organized around the 3 by 8 gun concept (3 batteries of 8 guns each). The weapons mix in each battalion is dictated by mission. 10th Marine Regiment is organized with three 155mm direct support battalions in the 3 by 8 concept. The M114s in the Third battalion are retained until the Marine Corps completes its buy of the M198. Ten M101 howitzers are assigned to each battalion for maintenance and operations as determined by the commander. Click here to view image 11th Marine Regiment is organized with two battalions with the 3 by 8 concept and one battalion of 4 by 8 (includes battery "G" 3/12). The M114 howitzers are retained until the M198 buy is completed. First battalion is tasked with the West Pac deployment and organizes its batteries with four M198s and four M101s each. Eight M198s are divided between two batteries for maintenance. Eight M114s are stored in level pack A. Second and Third battalions are organized with two M198 battaries and one M114 battery each. M101 howitzers are divided between the batteries for maintenance. Click here to view image 12th Marines is organized with three battalions in the 3 by 8 concept. First battalion, located in Hawaii, has three M198 batteries. Eight M101 howitzers are tasked to the batteries for maintenance and operations as needed. Second and Third battalions have three and two batteries respectively, of eight guns each ("G" 3/12 is in the West Pac rotation with 1st battalion 11th Marines) Click here to view image The challenge for direct support artillery in a tactical scenario is to keep pace with it's maneuver element and answer calls for fire in a timely manner. It matters not to the Marine on the ground what unit is proving the support or what type of weapon it is being fired from. Today the artillery commander must task organize his units and weapons mix if he is to provide the maximum amount of fire support. In consideration of the potential battlefield environments the Marine Corps could be drawn into, the fire support must be flexible, mobile and most of all responsive if it is to satisfy the needs of the supported unit. There is little doubt the M198 is a devastating weapon and can meet the challenges required of the modern day artillery cannon. If the weapon has any distinct tactical limitations, it is its large size and weight. Its employment in the amphibious mode over the beach takes time and its air mobility is limited because the CH53E is the only helocopter in the Marine Corp's inventory capable of lifting it. The Marine Corps was aware of this when it adopted the M198 and it was prepared to make adjustments and live with its shortcomings. (5:53-59) A lot of those efforts paved the way for a new prime mover for the howitzer to aid in mobility, a forklift for intra-battery maneuverability and special modifications for deployment onboard Military Airlift Command (MAC) aircraft. In spite of the above special considerations the M198 continues to be viewed with caution. From an operational standpoint the artillery is characterized as a burden during the initial stages of amphibious operations, and for the first time Marines have difficulty employing its towed direct support artillery in other than ideal conditions. The Marine Corps has toyed with countering the limitations of the M198 for many years, and almost without exception it sees the solution to its dilemma as a lightweight howitzer capable of firing 155mm ammunition at extended ranges. Consequently, when faced with a task not compatible to the M198, range and firepower are sacrificed and eventually, the Marine Corps succumbs to employing the lightweight l05mm, M101 howitzer. When the M101 lost its role as the Marine Corp's direct support weapon, many were unclear about how to retire the weapon. Some saw it being completely phased out of the inventory as soon as the M198 was fielded. Others wanted to keep a battalion of M10l's mainly for amphibious purposes. Still others wanted to keep them in an inactive pool to be drawn out and employed as the tactical mission would dictate. What exists today are the fruits of many changing philosophies from the top, and trial and error by Marines in the field. It is becoming clearer to the artillery community and to our infantry counterparts that the considerations for employing the M101 are taking on a greater tactical significance than anticipated years ago. (6:44) Those employment considerations will differ in each Marine regiment; however, a few variables appear to remain constant: Fleet Commanders now require a standard artillery weapon package for all Special Operations Capable Marine Expeditionary Units (SOCMEU); the M101 is given favorable consideration for helicopter employment because of its lightweight and the Corps paucity of CH53Es to lift the M198; and in other than SOCMEU deployments, the artillery mix is catered to provide the best support for the expected mission or contingency. (3) Today the M101 howitzer is the utility weapon of the Marine Corps. With limited range and lethality notwithstanding, its lightweight, maneuverability and rapid rate of fire increases its appeal as a weapon system adaptable to any type of conflict. In the amphibious mode, Marines attempt to get artillery over the beach early to provide a rapid buildup of firepower for the maneuver units. The effectiveness of the M198 in the direct support role is severely restricted in this arena because a greater effort is needed to transport a battery ashore in the landing craft presently available. Once ashore an auxiliary mover is necessary to provide area mobility for the howitzer in the absence of its prime mover. (7:27) Consequently, these limitations are clear reasons the maneuver commander is retaining the option to use the M101 howitzer. Numerous studies have been done on the M198's amphibious adaptability and emphasis continues to be placed on ways to get it over the beach in a more expeditious manner. The bottom line; however, is that the M101 remains a valid and quick-fix alternative. The versatility of helicopter transportable artillery adds depth to the battlefield and enhances the ability to support fast moving situations. The artillery fires are curtailed during this period however, because they cannot fire just prior to moving, while on the move and for a short while after arriving at the new destination. Therefore, this concept requires coordination and significant helicopter assets to move the personnel, howitzers, ammunition and miscellaneous equipment in an expeditious manner. In an air transportable scenario, the M101 is relied upon heavily because of its lightweight and ability to be transported internally or externally by the CH53 series helocopter. Because it weights one-third of the M198 it can be inserted and extracted in a fraction of the time. SOCMEU units put emphasis on the M101 for consideration in non-combatant evacution operations (NEO) and artillery raids. Current practices in an amphibious assault recognize the M101 as the most likely helo transportable entity, with the M198 platoon coming into action across the beach as time permits and the situation develops. (8) Ground mobility is probably the single most significant limitation that plaques the M198 and enhances the use of the M101. Mobility considers movement over terrain and the maneuverability of the weapon in the battery position. Though these factors have not demonstrated a reason not to employ the M198, when speed and time are critical the M101 appears to retain its position as being readily available for employment in scenarios not conducive to a heavy towed weapon. Tailoring the M101 to fit the mission does not come without problems. There is no T/O or T/E for the M101 battery. Consequently the maintenance requirements and personal to support their upkeep are absorbed from some other function. What each Marine regiment has today with its M101 compliment averages an extra battalion of artillery weapons. Realizing that there are only three direct support battalions per regiment, the extra M10ls equate to almost 35% more weapons to support without structure. The regimental commander is able to balance the allocation of weapons between the battalions as needed, however the logistic, operational and training requirements are added burdens to an already demanding profession. Recent guidance by the Fleet Commanders have directed SOCMEU's to deploy with (4) M101 and (4) M198 howitzers.(3) This is another form of complicating the issue. The eight gun battery concept in the 3 by 8 battalions was adopted to capitalize on the advantages of the M198 and employ the battery autonomously in two, four gun platoons. With the directed weapons mix for SOCMEU units, the 8 gun battery loses its effectiveness when employed as a cohesive unit because it utilizes weapons of different calibers and ranges.(3) A second concern is the ability to maintain parts and collateral material for the supply support of the mix caliber batteries. The M101 has proven very dependable and trouble free in the past, but it is also very old, and all weapons will evidentually require repair, especially optics which are not interchangeable between the two weapons. A major concern for the amphibious force is the maintenance of artillery ammunition ships carry for contingencies. There are dozens of different shell, fuze, primer and powder combinations that can be made of the artillery lform (landing force operations readiness material) ammunition. None except selected fuzes are interchangeable between the semi-fixed 105mm and the 155mm rounds. It is naive to think the ships Combat Cargo Officer or First Lieutenant will be able to get the right combination out of the ships ammunition storage holes and provide distribution for the designated weapon in a timely manner. Additionally what we practice as 15 days of basic ammo allowance will either be reduced, or the lform capacity increased to double its current load and carry 15 days each for the 105mm and 155mm Either way, we have further complicated an already difficult task. The technical fire direction requirements for the mix caliber battery increase insurmmountably with the howitzer mix, commensurate with the degree to which both weapons are employed at the same time. It matters not whether they fire at the same target; because the tools used to compute fire direction data for 105mm and 155mm ammunition are not interchangable. Accordingly, what is needed to support this evolution is the equivalent of a second fire direction center. Maintaining training proficiency with three different direct support weapons presents some unique problems for our Marines in the field. The current organization of each regiment and considerations for operational commitments provides sufficient opportunity to cause most batteries to train as a unit on these weapon systems. It is readily accepted that all cannoneers in the field are, by now, familiar with the M198. Officers and enlisted personnel new to the field are introduced to the basics at Fort Sill, OK., and this training is built upon after arriving at their first command. In the case of the M114 and M101 howitzers the orientation and training for their use is either the responsibility of the direct support battalion they fall under or the regiment will provide some form of organized schooling. (3) In all three regiments, the most valuable familiarization training with the M101 is gained while supporting administrative requirements such as aerial observer shoots, tactical air coordination packages(TACP) and fire support coordination exercises. The state of Marine artillery today revolves around optimizing the employment of direct support howitzers in support of infantry units. With proper credit to commanders in the field, we have unequivocally maximized our current assets to respond to most potential threat scenarios. Because the Marine Corps is a small service it has traditional been forced to do the best with what is available. In looking at lightweight artillery from the context of the progress made in the last decade and some definitive direction for the future it would appear we are merely marking time. It is readily recognized that the M101 howitzer presents more validity and concern now than it did eight ago when we first announced the decision to replace it with the M198. However, that the M101 is still active in the fleet today is only for lack of a larger caliber lightweight weapon system. The 155mm is clearly the weapon of the future, but there are too many missed opportunities for its employment because our current version (the M198) is too big. For that reason the Marine Corps is lapsing to older days when employment of artillery was quick, simple and flexible. In fact we seem to stretch the limitations of the M101 and make it appear to be able to do almost anything. Unfortunately, its most notable contribution, neutralizing the limitations of the M198 howitzer, is starting to provide artillerymen a false sense of security. The M101 has performed admirably for combat units in the past, but it will be of limited value today aganist any type of sophisticated threat. It is likely the next commitment for Marines could involve a scenario where the M101 will go into action quickly. In an amphibious operation we would rely on it to provide that initial firepower ashore and buy time until the M198 can be bought into action. I submit that if we come up against any type of modern army we should be willing to accept the possible loss of that critical initial confrontation. In an era when Soviet and other surrogate forces are continually upgrading and increasing its artillery weapons systems, the Marine Corps is favoring a WWII vintage weapon with limited range and lethality. Increasing the utilization of the M198 will not provide relief to the situation. It was originally developed as a general support weapon and in that role it is a class act. But when employed in a direct support role it is not as versatile and just cannot satisfy our needs for mobility and flexibility. No amount of modifications, enhancements or argumentation by other weapons can correct this. It is a good land weapon and appears to be readily adaptable to the defense. But as an amphibious force in readiness--the mission of Marine combat troops is synonymous with offensive type actions. Accordingly, we should be fitted with a weapon that supports that concept. There is only one universally accepted solution to the dilemma faced in the artillery community and that is to procure a howitzer designed exclusively for Marine use. Oddly enough this is similar to the task we abandoned eight years ago when we were sucked into the purchase of the M198. The direction taken must lead to a lightweight (10-11,000lbs) 155mm weapon, capable of achieving ranges in excess of 18,000m (w/o rap) and be readily adaptable to an amphibious mission. We should work with, but not rely on the Army in the development of this weapon. The precedence has already been set in the purchase of the LAV (landing assault vehicle) and the AAV (amphibious assault vehicle) In his 1986 posture statement the Commandant of the Marine Corps gave praise to his modernization program and the plans to replace "every single weapon system within the Marine division--from pistol to the main battle tank--in a decade."(9:27) I would submit his replacement of the new general support weapon is already complete because the M198 is enjoying much success in that role. What we await is a sign that his intent included a new direct support weapon. BIBLIOGRAPHY 1. Hamilton, Robert E., Lieutenent Colonel, USMC. "155mm Howitzer Won't Do Job. " Marine Corps Gazette, (september 1979), 23-24. 2. Moore, Richard H., Lieutenant Colonel, USMC, Weeks, Larry L., Major, USMC and Morga, Dennis A., Captain, USMC. "Why The Marine Corps is Adopting a New Howitzer." Marine CorpsGazette, (April, 1979), 51-59. 3. Commanding Officer of 10th, 11th, and 12th Marine Regiments. Response to Questionaire on M101 and M114 Howitzer Utilization. (Febuary 1988). 4. Foss, Christopher F., et al., Janes's Armour and Artillery 1986-87, 7th ed. london: Jane's publishing company limited, 1986, pp673-680 5. Moore, Richard H., Lieutenant Colonel, USMC, Weeks, Larry L., Major, USMC and Morga, Dennis A., Captain, USMC. "Learning to Live with the M198 Howitzer. " Marine Corps Gazette, (july, 1980) 53-59. 6. Schwamberger, Carl W., First Lieutenant, USMC. "Light Artillery for the Corps." Marine Corps Gazette. (April, 1987),44-46. 7. Palm, Leslie M., Major, USMC. "The M198 Howitzer as a Direct Support Weapon During Amphibious Operations." thesis U.S. Army Command and General Staff College. Fort Levenworth, 1980. 8. Zinser Lawrence R. Lieutenant Colonel, USMC. Personal interview about employment of artillery in SOUMEU's, Quantico, March 11, 1988. 9. Kelly, Paul X., General, USMC "Statement on Posture, Plans, Programs for Fiscal Years 1988 Through 1992." Marine Corps Gazette (April 1987), 18-35 10. Funk, Robert C., Major, USMC. "M198: Good Weapon-Wrong Choice." Marine Corps Gazette, (june 1986) 25-26. 11. Galen, Colonel, nom de plume "In Matching Mobility and Firepower, the Marines Moved Out, the Army Moved Paper." Armed Forces Journal International, (May 1986) 32-33. 12. Glasgow Jr., J. P., Major, USMC. "Marine Artillery-A New Perspective." Marine Corps Gazette, (April 1981), 55-59
