Low Intensity Conflict, Special Operations, And The Employment Of Reconnaissance
CSC 1988
SUBJECT AREA Warfighting
LOW INTENSITY CONFLICT, SPECIAL OPERATIONS,
AND THE EMPLOYMENT OF RECONNAISSANCE
Susan J. Flores
Major, U.S. Marine Corps
Command and Staff College
March 1988
TABLE OF CONTENTS
Page
Acknowledgements ii
Chapter 1 - Introduction 1
Chapter 2 - Reconnaissance Doctrine 7
Figure 2-1 Reconnaissance Organizations 15
Chapter 3 - Evolution 16
Figure 3-1 Special Operations 25
Capabilities Matrix
Chapter 4 - New MEU (SOC) Doctrine 26
Figure 4-1 Sample Chain of Command 38
Figure 4-2 Immediate Response 39
Capabilities
Chapter 5 - Maritime Special Purpose 42
Force (MSPF)
Figure 5-1 Notional MSPF Task 47
Organization
Chapter 6 - Impact 48
Figure 6-1 Support for Insurgencies 58
Chapter 7 - Short Term Solutions 60
Chapter 8 - Long Term Solutions 67
Figure 8-1 Spectrum of Conflict 76
Chapter 9 - Final Thoughts 77
Bibliography 81
ACKNOWLEDGEMENTS
Since MEU (SOC) is so new to the Marine Corps, most of
the material gathered for this paper came from interviews
with people who are intrinsically involved in the
evolutionary process. To those fine people who consented
to interviews - Bob Aldrich, LtCol Denny Blankenship, Col
Patty Collins, Major "Gator" Duncan, Major Gordy Jackson,
BGen Keys, LtCol Ray McCormick, LtCol Bill Tehan, Capt Tom
Western, and Major G.I. Wilson - I wish to give you all my
special thanks. Without your candor and patience I could
not have completed this project.
Special thanks also goes to Major Jack Farmer and
Major Tom O'Leary for your encouragement and moral support.
The background information you provided was really helpful
in getting me started.
Finally, special, special thanks to Major Joe Flores,
Jr. who not only provided me with background information
and a list of recommended people to interview (interviewees
can blame him), but also for the days that you spent as a
single parent so I could complete this project. You're the
GREATEST!
CHAPTER 1
INTRODUCTION
Today's Marine Corps is infused with a new sense of
meaning and determination. It is marching boldly forward,
preparing for, and participating in the low intensity
conflict and special operations arena. In 1985, General P.
X. Kelley, 28th Commandant of the Marine Corps, announced
that the Corps would prepare to conduct a new mission; that
is, the Marine Amphibious Unit (Special Operations Capable)
or MAU (SOC) mission. (This name has now been changed to
Marine Expeditionary Unit (Special Operations Capable), or
MEU (SOC).)1
Ever since then, arguments have ensued concerning the
appropriateness of this mission; whether it fits in with
the other Marine Corps missions, or whether it
substantially changes our role in national defense.
Professional publications like the Marine Corps Gazette are
inundated with such articles, and the range of opinions is
as diverse as the range of people writing them.
This phenomenon is very curious when one considers
that the Marine Corps has traditionally, throughout its
history, participated in low intensity conflicts and
special operations. The Marine Corps' first amphibious
_______________________
1 On 3 February 1988, General A. M. Gray, the current
Commandant of the Marine Corps, published ALMAR 023/88,
which stated that effectuive 5 February 1988, the Marine Air
Ground Task Force designation would change to Marine
Expeditionary Unit (MEU) viceMarine Amphibious Unit (MAU).
operation, conducted in Nassau, Bahamas in March 1776, was
a classic raid. Lieutenant Presley O'Bannon's activities
in Tripoli certainly fall under the category of special
operations. And Marine Corps operations, personified by
Chesty Puller's exploits in both Haiti and Nicaragua while
conducting counterinsurgency operations, can hardly be
considered mid intensity or high intensity conflict.
As a matter of fact, while the major wars are what
stand out the most in our national mind, they are but only
a part of the Marine Corps' history. Nobody forgets World
War I and World War II, but the Corps also participated in
many other campaigns in recent history. For example, from
1800 to 1934, Marines landed 180 times in 37 countries.2
Each landing was in support of some strategic goal in
behalf of the United States. .. .So it is ironic that there
would be so much ado concerning our new MEU (SOC) role.
How did this come about?
Two influences have created the environment in which
we operate today. First, since the advent of the nuclear
age, the conflict of choice has been low intensity. World
powers have carefully avoided conflict escalation that
would infringe upon the nuclear threshhold and embark them
in a war that Clausewitz calls, "pointless and devoid of
sense. They have been careful to weigh political goals
against the cost of the conflict, and so far, nuclear war
______________________
2R. Lynn Rylander, "The Future of the Marines in Small
Wars", a paper presented at the Center of Naval Analyses
1986 Sea Power Forum on the Marine Corps.
has not proven to be worth the cost
The second inf luence was the Vietnam War, and its
impact on the United States. Its prosecution without a
well defined strategic goal, and its subsequent
unpopularity with the people, have taken a toll in terms of
the health of the military in the years following the war.
American frustration over Vietnam created a national desire
to avoid conflict of any kind. This desire was translated
into fewer defense dollars for readiness during the
mid-to-late 1970's. It was even manifested within the
military itself. Following the Vietnam War, most special
forces outfits were dismantled or severely cut back. By
the end of that decade, the United States was left with
very little low intensity conflict capability.
The Marine Corps' capabilities suffered through these
years, along with the other branches of the armed forces.
Lack of qualified Marines, ancient equipment, and few
prospects for better resources sapped the Corps' ability to
accomplish even its most basic missions. Our
reconnaissance organizations suffered along with the rest
of the fighting force, victims of our own internal
ostracism. Just as we pride ourselves in being an elite
force; so do we resent any of our members who claim to be
even more elitist than we are.
Following Vietnam, there was a lot of internal
animosity against reconnaissance Marines for what the
infantry organizations felt were failures in reconnaissance
operations during the war.3 Many infantry commanders
felt that they were constantly putting their Marines at
risk to save some reconnaissance team that had gotten into
trouble (the inference being that the they were in trouble
unnecessarily). These inferences often showed a lack of
understanding about the roles the reconnaissance assets
were playing in the overall prosecution of the war. The
animosity carried over into the post-Vietnam era, and so
Marine Corps reconnaissance organizations were allowed to
deteriorate from benign neglect during a time when there
were too few resources to go around anyway. For example,
while serving with the 2d Marine Division from 1976 to
1978, the author witnessed assignment policies to 2d
Reconnaissance Battalion which were primarily "fair share"
with no consideration of requirements and capabilities.
Many problem Marines were assigned to 2d Reconnaissance
Battalion because it was away from the main part of the
base, and they were then "out of the way.
The nation's low intensity conflict capabilities and
assets were largely underemphasized for over a decade after
the Vietnam War, including force allocations, doctrine,
training, and equipment. By the early 1980's, we were
unprepared to fight in the one conflict most likely to
arise - the low intensity conflict. And along with this
erosion in our capabilities was the loss of our ability to
____________________
3LtCol Ray M. McCormick, USMC, interview conducted with
the author at Command and Staff College on 13 November 1987.
handle unconventional or special operations.
Since the warfighting environment of the `80s is full
of discussions about low intensity conflict and special
operations, we need to establish their meaning in relation
to this essay. As of this writing, there is no universally
accepted definition of low intensity conflict. Its meaning
is still being discussed at the Department of Defense
level. However, for the purpose of this paper, the reader
need only use the definition in JCS Publication 1:
"A limited politico-military struggle to
achieve political, social, economic, or
psychological objectives. It is of ten protracted
and ranges from diplomatic, economic, and
psychosocial pressures through terrorism and
insurgency. Low intensity conflict is generally
confined to a geographic area and is often
characterized by constraints on the weaponry,
tactics, and the level of violence."
... And the JCS Publication 1 definition for special
operations will also be used:
"Operations conducted by specially trained, equipped,
and organized DoD forces against strategic or
tactical targets in pursuit of national military,
political, economic, or psychological objectives.
These operations may be conducted during periods of
peace or hostilities. They may support conventional
forces or they may be prosecuted independently when
the use of conventional forces is either
inappropriate or infeasible.
The reader can tell, from reading these definitions,
that these two terms, low intensity conflict and special
operations," are not mutually inclusive. Low intensity
conflicts are a type of conflict, while special operations
are a capability to be used in conflict. While special
operations are a frequent part of low intensity conflicts,
they are also a part of mid and high intensity conflicts.
Low intensity conflict and special operations are not
new ideas; they are an inherent element of conflict. It is
their renaissance during this decade to which the Corps
owes a "thank you" for bringing it back to those basic
missions it is designed to perform. With the
reconsideration of its capabilities to ensure it can
accomplish these missions, it has reaffirmed that it is an
expeditionary strike force for our nation, and not another
NATO army designed to fight armored battles over the plains
of Europe.
CHAPTER 2
RECONNAISSANCE DOCTRINE
In order to understand the implications the new MEU
(SOC) mission has on the Marine Corps in general, and on
its reconnaissance organizations specifically, one must
first understand what it is that doctrine requires of
reconnaissance. This doctrine is stated in FMFM 2-2.
Amphibious Reconnaissance.
In the Marine Corps, there are two types of
reconnaissance organizations. These are the force
reconnaissance company, which is a Fleet Marine Force
Headquarters asset; and the reconnaissance battalion, which
belongs to the Marine division. Both operate in stealth to
collect intelligence information about the enemy. But
there is a difference in the level of their operations.
The force reconnaissance company conducts preassault
and deep postassault reconnaissance operations in support
of a landing force and its subordinate elements. The
company is made up of a headquarters section, a supply and
service platoon, and six reconnaissance platoons. (See
figure 2-1.) Each reconnaissance platoon contains three
four-man reconnaissance teams. All members of the
reconnaissance platoons are trained as surface and
underwater (SCUBA) swimmers, and as parachutists.
Employment capabilities specifically discussed in FMFM 2-2
are:
-Observe, identify, and report enemy activity and
collect other information of military significance.
-Engage the enemy in supporting arms, when so directed
or authorized by higher headquaarters.
-Implant sensors.
-Capture selected prisoners.
-Conduct specialized terrain reconnaissance including
beach, route, and helicopter landing zones/drop zones
reconnaissance missions.
-Conduct initial terminal guidance operations.
-Conduct special missions requiring the use of entry
capabilities unique to a force reconnaissance company.
The FMFM 2-2 specifically mentions a special mission
that can be assigned:
"A special mission requiring underwater or parachute
entry is occasionally assigned to a force reconnaissance
company. Missions of this type are not normally
reconnaissance oriented, and any commander who orders the
execution of such a mission must consider the impact of
diverting his reconnaissance capability to accomplish the
task. Additional preparation time will have to be allotted
before the task can be initiated. "1
Reconnaissance battalion conducts ground
reconnaissance and surveillance in support of a Marine
_______________
1Department of the Navy, Headquarters, U.S. Marine Corps,
Fleet Marine Force Manual (FMFM) 2-2. Amphibious
Reconnaissance (Washington, D.C., U.S. Government Printing
Office, 19 March 1976), Para. 204.c(5), p. 8.
division or its subordinate elements. The battalion is
made up of a headquarters and service company and four
reconnaissance companies. (One of these companies has been
cadred for over a decade.) (See figure 2-1.) Each of
these companies is broken down into a company headquarters
and three reconnaissance platoons. Each platoon is then
further broken down into a headquarters and two
reconnaissance squads. And these are finally broken down
into two four-man scout teams. One platoon in each company
has a four-man team qualified in underwater swimming,
providing a limited underwater swimming entry capability to
the battalion.
The capabilities which the FMFM 2-2 identifies for
reconnaissance battalion include the following:
-Collect information on the enemy.
-Engage the enemy by supporting arms, when so directed
or authorized by the division commander.
-Implant sensors.
-Capture selected prisoners.
-Conduct specialized terrain reconnaissance including
beach, road, route, and helicopter landing zone/drop zone
reconnaissance missions.
-Conduct initial terminal guidance operations.
An analysis of both the force reconnaissance company
and the reconnaissance battalion missions reveals few
differences. The overall divergence is in scope. The use
of force reconnaissance company is more strategic in nature
than the use of reconnaissance battalion.
Force reconnaissance company is designed, trained, and
equipped to handle both pre- and postassault deep
reconnaissance for the entire Marine Air Ground Task Force
(MAGTF). Its personnel are intended to be inserted beyond
the forward edge of the battle area (FEBA) in the commander
landing force's (CLF) area of interest, and are parachute
trained as one means of insertion. They are also
designated as the organization to handle the previously
defined "special missions" within the MAGTF.
Reconnaissance battalion, on the other hand, is
designed, trained, and equipped to handle reconnaissance
missions which are "closer in." They are the eyes and ears
of the ground combat element, and so their training is
primarily for surface and SCUBA insertion. Doctrinally,
they are not the parachutist; force reconnaissance company
reconnaissance platoon members are. Finally, their
missions do not include "special missions," as the force
reconnaissance missions do. They are intended for
reconnaissance tasks only.
Assignment to both force reconnaissance company and
reconnaissance battalion is not driven by any stringent,
centralized standards. There is a reconnaissance sponsor
in the Ground Combat Requirements Branch, Operations
Division at Headquarters, US Marine Corps who keeps track
of end strength, training quotas, and related issues. This
sponsor has only limited control over the assignment of
Marines to these units. He gives the assignment branch at
Headquarters information regarding the number of Marines
that need to be assigned, and then orders are issued to
send Marines to the major supporting command.
Marines do not normally receive reconnaissance
training until after they have joined a reconnaissance
organization, so the parent command receives basic Marines
with the appropriate infantry, communications, logistics,
etc., military occupational specialty (MOS). These Marines
are then further assigned within the large command based on
its needs. The number of qualified, trainable candidates
that actually join the reconnaissance organization is
dependent upon the priorities of the major command from
whom it derives its support. For example, the infantry
assignment monitor may assign orders to five additional
infantry Marines in a given month, and those Marines will
arrive at 2d Marine Division. The division will further
assign them based on its priorities. If it is building up
an infantry battalion for deployment and has had some
difficulty doing so, those additional five infantry Marines
could be assigned to that battalion in lieu of
Reconnaissance Battalion. The reconnaissance sponsor at
Headquarters does not have the authority to direct Marines
through that parent command into the reconnaissance
organization. He does, however, have the ability to
influence the action by close liaison with command manpower
staffs and personnel officers.
Command qualifications for assignment into the
reconnaissance organizations can also vary considerably,
depending once again on the supporting commanders'
priorities. One commander may feel that his reconnaissance
organization requires Marines with special qualifications,
in healthy numbers; while another may feel that
reconnaissance Marines are infantry Marines with some extra
training, and therefore do not need any special assignment
considerations, either in individual Marine qualifications
or in the reconnaissance organization's unit strengths.
Reconnaissance organizations generally have some kind
of screening process to determine whether the Marines they