A Case For Reorganization AUTHOR Major W.M. Bann CSC 1988 SUBJECT AREA General EXECUTIVE SUMMARY TITLE: A CASE FOR REORGANIZATION I. Purpose: To make a case to restructure the Marine Corps into permanent Marine-Air-Ground-Task/Forces (MAGTFs) versus the current division/wing organizations. Specifically, the recommendation is to build this restructuring around the Marine Expeditionary Brigade(MEB). II. Problem: The Marine Corps currently has two organizational structures: one is organized as divisions and wings; the other is task organized as MAGTFs. This situation unnecessarily creates personnel and organizational turmoil, degradation in training, and a decreased level in combat readiness. III. Discussion: The rationale for reorganization is convincing; besides, it just makes for good common sense. Indeed, if the Marine Corps plans to fight as MAGTFs, then it stands to reason that it should organize all of its peacetime forces accordingly. In addition, many other arguments are presented. Some, but not all are: amphibious shipping limitation, the already working Maritime Prepositioning Shipping-Marine Expeditionary Brigade (MPS-MEB) strategy, elimination of duplicate command bureaucracies, warfare specialization potential, and the enhanced training and increased combat readiness that would result from reorganization. A proposed reorganization is also presented to demonstrate its feasibility. Lastly, counter-arguments against the proposed reorganization are discussed. IV. Conclusions: If the MEB is the most likely form of employment in either low-intensity conflict (LIC) or in the early phases of general war, and the contingency plans and strategic lift are apportioned that way, then it makes good sense to reorganize the Marine Corps accordingly. A three Marine Expeditionary Force (MEF) Marine Corps, composed of nine MEBs ( 1 USMCR ) and two Marine Expeditionary Units (MEUs) is suggested. A CASE FOR REORGANIZATION OUTLINE Thesis Statement: If the Marine Corps plans to fight as MAGTFs, then it should organize all of its peacetime forces accordingly. I. PROBLEM A. Current organizational structure does not support mission B. Currently have two Marine Corps 1. Division/wings for peacetime administrative functioning 2. MAGTFs for warfighting C. Solution 1. Have only one organization-MAGTFs II. RATIONALE A. MEB is most likely form of employment B. Supports NATO, maritime and amphibious warfare strategy C. Supports unique Marine Corps role for now and in future D. Amphibious shipping limitation E. Airlift limitation F. Air-land MEB G. MPS-MEB H. Low-intensity conflict focus I. Elimination/reduction of duplicate command structures J. Training benefit/increased combat readiness K. Warfare specialization potential III. PROPOSED REORGANIZATION A. Three MEFs, nine MEBs(1 USMCR), and two MEUs IV. COUNTER-ARGUMENTS A. By-law Title 10 requirement B. Not flexible enough C. Too hard V. CONCLUSION A. Reorganization makes good tactical and common sense B. Rationale is convincing C. Now is ideal time D. Result will be increased combat readiness Clausewitz notes the difference between "organization," the peacetime structure, and "disposition," the wartime employment. In discussing order of battle, Clausewitz emphasizes the peacetime structure and training as building blocks for a successful wartime employment. "The army disposition starts from the basic tactics in which it has instructed and trained in time of peace-characteristics not susceptible to basic change once war breaks out" 1 Consequently, if the Marine Corps plans to fight as MAGTFs, then it should organize all its peacetime forces accordingly. Furthermore, the current organizational structure does not support the accomplishment of the Marine Corps' primary mission. That mission as defined in the National Security Act of 1947 is to seize and defend advanced naval bases, to conduct such land operations as may be essential to the prosecution of a naval campaign, and to be the Nation's force in readiness. Clearly, the emphasis of this mission statement is one of amphibious forcible entry and rapid deployment capability, not on protracted land warfare campaigns. However, because of the Marine Corps' historical experiences of land warfare(WWI, Korea & Vietnam) coupled with its fixation of the Title 10 requirement of maintaining three division/wings, the Marine Corps tries to be all things to all people. As a result, the Marine Corps has two organizational structures: one organized by division/wings for peacetime and administrative functions; another task organized by MAGTFs for warfighting. This practice, while perhaps on the surface, is impressive to Congress and other outside agencies for its supposed flexibility to fight in "every clime and place," does not lend itself to personnel/organizational stability, effective training or a high level of combat readiness. For example, if units must reorganize into MAGTFs before deployment, during deployment, at sea or on the battlefield, combat readiness and warfighting effectiveness clearly will suffer. Thus, the purpose of this paper is to make a case to restructure the Marine Corps into permanent MEFs, MEBs and MEUs. Specifically, the recommendation is to build this restructuring around the MEB, the most likely form of employment in either low-intensity conflict or in the early phases of general war. II RATIONALE MEB is most likely form of employment MEUs provide a rapidly available visible presence and can react to sudden unforeseen crisis involving U.S. interests; however, their scope and sustainability are extremely limited. On the other hand, MEBs have the necessary combat power and sustainability to make a difference. They have the ground and air striking force to suppress or contain international disturbance short of large- scale war. In addition, they also would form the nucleus unit for follow-on forces in the event the conflict escalates to general war. Of course, MEFs also have these capabilities and then some; however, they would, as already indicated, not be committed unless the U.S. was involved in a large scale general war. Supports NATO, maritime and amphibious warfare strategy The employment of the 4th MEB on NATO's northern flank in Norway is an excellent example of a MEB being employed as an integral part of NATO's overall strategy. The amphibious warfare strategy which is a sub-element of the U.S. Navy maritime strategy is depicted as follows: Amphibious Warfare Strategy Phase I Deterrence: - Forward deployed MEUs - MPSs - Readiness - LIC operations(MEU/MEB) Transition to war: - MEBs - MPS MEBs (Southwest Asia, Norway, Northeast Asia) - "Prepo" MEBs (South Korea, Norway) - Amphibious MEBs (Atlantic and Pacific) - U.S. Marine Corps Reserve mobilized Phase II Seize the initiative: - MEBs employed - Seize advanced naval bases - MEB raids on Soviet Rimlands - MEF - Composite from amphibious, MPS, and "Prepo" MEBs - Position for MEF operations Phase III Carry the fight to the enemy: - MEF assaults on the Soviet Rimlands 2 Clearly, employment of the MEB is the cornerstone of this maritime/amphibious warfare strategy. Moreover, divisions/wings with their associated land warfare are neither mentioned nor considered for employment within this strategy. In fact, General P.X. Kelley makes some specific comments regarding how Marine units should be employed: Those who seek to put Marines on the front in Central Europe or in other sustained inland roles as land force division equivalents not only demonstrate their total lack of appreciation for the effectiveness of our Marine air-ground team; they also convey the most profound misunderstanding of the proper use of maritime power, the depth of our naval heritage, and the pride with which bear the title of "Soldiers of the Sea." 3 One must then ask the question. Why is the Marine Corps presently organized into three divisions/wings? Supports unique Marine Corps role for now and in future Six times between the years 1829 and 1947, the U.S. Congress was asked to disband or severely cut back the Marine Corps, or to make it a part of the U.S. Army. Petitioners included Andrew Jackson, Theodore Rooselvelt and Harry S. Truman. Most recently, the prestigious Brookings Institution also recommended the possible dissolution of the Corps. There will always be those that see the Marine Corps as another land army and another air force that should be incorporated into the existing U.S. forces. Unfortunately, the current division/wing structure provides ammunition to those who seek this course of action. Reorganization to permanent MAGTFs, on the other hand, will make it obvious to Congress and their staffers that the Marine Corps plans to fight as MEFs/MEBs, and not as divisions and wings. Therefore, one of the best arguments for securing the Marine Corps' unique role as an instrument of U.S. foreign policy for today and especially for the future is to reorganize accordingly. Amphibious shipping limitation The U.S. Navy currently has sixty deployable amphibious ships organized into Pacific and Atlantic fleets, available for amphibious operations. This configuration is depicted as follows: Click here to view image Since it takes approximately 20-25 amphibious ships to lift a MEB, the Navy in its current configuration and for the foreseeable future could only realistically deploy two simultaneous MEBs, one per fleet. Of course, this scenario also assumes that the U.S. Navy would not commit its amphibious ships elsewhere in time of crisis. Meanwhile, the prospect of attaining additional amphibious ships for increased lift capability is now highly unlikely with the recent demise of the 600 ship Navy. Airlift limitation and planning The Air force is also limited in the number of aircraft it can dedicate to lift Marines and their equipment. These contingency plans are also based on scenarios wherein the assumption is made that the Air Force is not being committed elsewhere. Regardless of the limitations, the planning is for lifting MEBs (Air-Land & MPS MEBs), not divisions and wings or for that matter MEFs. Thus, this factor also supports the case for reorganization The Air-Land MEB An excellent example of the MEB concept working is the Norway Air-Land 4th MEB. The significant impact this concept of employment has had on including the Marine Corps within the national and maritime strategies, and by giving it a unique and distinct mission clearly demonstrates the potential for reorganizing accordingly. MPS-MEB Another example of the MEB being implemented as the Marine Corps' basic warfighting unit is the MPS-MEB concept. This new and innovative development in the crisis response area has added a significant expansion to the Marine Corps response capability. The MPS-MEB provides another means of projecting American military power and resolve, whether employed preemptively into a friendly port or as a reinforcement for a MEU. Low-intensity conflict (LIC) focus The national military strategy recognizes the requirement for a Navy and Marine Corps capable of reacting quickly to a myriad of possible theaters across the entire spectrum of conflict. Current thinking, however, suggests that deployment of Marines in low-intensity conflicts is the most probable. Some comments on this issue came from General A.M. Gray in the September 1987 Marine Corps Gazette: It is the Third World, the so-called low-intensity conflict arena, where we are most likely to be committed in this decade.... You had better break out the manuals and books on how to fight in this arena.... 5 Moreover, if one reviews the history of LICs coupled with the current analysis of LIC contingencies, the conclusion is that they lend themselves to MEB size operations. For example, some of the Marine Corps' greatest successes in this arena took place in the early 1900s in the Nicaraqua/Haitian and Dominican Republic expeditionary campaigns. These operations were conducted by expeditionary brigade size units. In today's scenarios, LICs will most likely occur in Third World countries. MEB size units(MPS,Amphib & Air-land) with their sustainability and striking combat power seem most appropriate for these type of operations. Elimination/reduction of duplicate command structures At present, the Marine Corps has MEF and MEB war planning headquarters while their personnel and equipment remain in the care of a division/wing headquarters until embarkation or crisis response. When this happens, whether it be during a training exercise or a real crisis situation, entirely too much time and effort is spent just getting organized with a resultant degradation of combat effectiveness. Besides practicing good common sense, eliminating these duplicate headquarters would allow the Marine Corps to increase unit cohesion, to develop a better sense of teamwork, and to reduce personnel turmoil. Moreover, the corresponding reduction in manpower would free up personnel to fill vacant FMF billets and increasing joint billet requirements. Training benefit/increased combat readiness Nothing hones the warfighting edge of the Marine Corps better than effective training; therefore, it makes good sense then that one should train as one plans to fight. This is generally not the case in the Marine Corps. The majority of the training is conducted in the division/wing structures. In time of crisis, the net result would have to be a decrease in combat readiness, and this is not what the Marine Corps is all about. As General A.M. Gray so often states, "The American people demand that the U.S. Marine Corps be the best led, best trained, and the most combat ready unit within the U.S. armed forces." Unfortunately, the current organizational structures of divisions/wings may be hampering that effort. On the other hand, a reorganization to permanent MAGTFs would enhance training, combat readiness, and warfighting capability. Specialization potential Finally, and as already mentioned, the Marine Corps professes to be able to fight in "any clime or place." Although this may be true, the concern is the effectiveness of that fighting. Has the Marine Corps become a jack of all trades, but a master of none? Reorganization centered around MEBs offers the potential for developing some special expertise for designated MEBs. For example, the 4th MEB could be the cold weather warfare experts, while a MEB at Camp Pendleton/29 Palms could be the desert warfare experts and an Okinawan MEB could be the jungle warfare experts. The next part of this essay provides a depiction of how this idea might be incorporated into a restructured Marine Corps. III PROPOSED REORGANIZATION The foregoing depicts a three MEF Marine Corps with MEBs and MEUs for deterring aggression, operating in LICs, having specialization capability, and conducting operations during general war. Click here to view image IV COUNTER-ARGUMENTS By-law Title 10 requirement Yes, Title 10 of the National Security Act of 1947 does require the Marine Corps to maintain three divisions/wings; thus, the Marine Corps must be prepared to answer the question-why three MEFs? Certainly, three MEFs equal three divisions/wings; it's really a matter of semantics. Moreover, it is already obvious to Congress that the Marine Corps plans to fight as MAGTFs, not as divisions/wings. Congress knows that the United States needs amphibious forcible entry and rapid deployment capability in the regions of the world where it does not have the luxury of permanent based land forces. A three MEF Marine Corps, composed of amphibious, MPS, and air-land MEBs, can provide these capabilities either in low-intensity conflicts or general war.6 Consequently, the Marine Corps would be on solid ground if it had to defend a three MEF Marine Corps versus a three division/wing Corps. Not flexible enough Detractors will point out that the Marine Corps needs to be flexible enough to participate in large scale land wars. Much of the Marine Corps' history supports this position (WWI, Korea & Vietnam), and the future may require it again. This argument has validity. On the other hand, maybe the Marine Corps has become too flexible. Does the Marine Corps want to be all things to all people? If so, will the cost be a decrease in overall combat readiness? Or should the Marine Corps, instead, concentrate on refining its skills in accomplishing its primary missions of amphibious forcible entry and rapid response capability? Too hard, will require a massive effort This is a valid argument also. It would require not only a redistribution of people, equipment and possibly bases/facilities, but a change in thinking as well. This would require a monumental effort over a long period of time. The short term costs are bound to be high, but the many benefits should be more than worth it in the long term. 7 Utimately, the net result should be a more combat ready Marine Corps. V CONCLUSION In short, if the MEB is the most likely form of employment in either low-intensity conflict or in the early phases of general war, and the contingency plans and strategic lift are apportioned that way, then why not reorganize the Marine Corps accordingly? 8 Secondly, the rationale as evidenced in this essay is convincing; besides, it's just makes for good common sense. It would not be easy, but it can be done, and in the long run, the benefits would far outweigh the difficulties involved. Now is the ideal time to reorganize. The Marine Corps is in the process of equipment modernization, reviewing the current force structure, and changing over to the expeditionary mode of thinking. In addition, it has a new Commandant who is receptive to new ideas and change if the result is a better trained and more combat ready Marine Corps. NOTES 1Karl von Clausewitz, On War, edited and translated by Michael Howard and Peter Paret (Princeton, N.J.: Princeton University Press, 1984), p. 292. 2Captain M.H. Decker, USMC, "Three MAFs for the Corps," Proceedings, U.S. Naval Institute, November 1987, p. 76. 3General P.X. Kelley, USMC(Ret.) and Major H.K. O'Donnell Jr., USMC, "Amphibious Warfare Strategy," The Maritime Strategy Supplement, U.S. Naval Institute, January 1986, p. 26. 4Captain M.H. Decker, USMC, "Three MAFs for the Corps," Proceedings, U.S. Naval Institute, November 1987, p. 76. 5General A.M. Gray, USMC, "29th Commandant Speaks to the Corps," Marine Corps Gazette, September 1987, p. 18. 6Captain M.H. Decker, U~MC, "Three MAFs for the Corps," Proceedings, U.S. Naval Institute, November 1987, p. 81. 7Captain J.L. Kreinbring, USMC, "Let's Organize for the Mission," Marine Corps Gazette, October 1987, p. 66. 8Captain M.H. Decker, USMC, "Brigading the Marine Corps," Proceedings, U.S. Naval Institute, November 1987, p. 8O. BIBLIOGRAPHY Bartlett, Merrill L., USMC(Ret.). Assault From the Sea. Naval Institute Press, 1983. Crowl, Philip A. and Isley, Jeter A. The U.S. Marines and Amphibious War. Princeton University Press, 1951. Decker, Michael H., Captain, USMC. "Brigading the Marine Corps." Proceedings, (November 1987), 80. Decker, Michael H., Captain, USMC. "Three MAFs for the Corps." Proceedings, (November 1987), 74-81. Kreinbring, Jeffrey L., Captain, USMC. "Let's Organize for the Mission." Marine Corps Gazette, (October 1987) 65-66. Lowery, John S., Colonel USMC, Scharfen, John C., Colonel, USMC(Ret.) and Stewart. James J., Colonel USMC. "Maritime Prepositioning, Flying Brigades and Flying Arsenals." Amphibious Warfare Review, (November 1984), 9-25. Pomfret, John J., Colonel, USMC. "MPS: Can One Get it All?" Marine Corps Gazette, (August 1986), 29-32. U.S. Naval Institute. The Maritime Strategy Supplement. Naval Institute Press, 1986.
