Marine Integrated Fire And Air Support System (MIFASS) 150 Million Dollar Failure AUTHOR Major G. F. Brady CSC 1988 SUBJECT AREA C4 EXECUTIVE SUMMARY MARINE INTEGRATED FIRE AND AIR SUPPORT SYSTEM (MIFASS) 150 MILLION DOLLAR FAILURE In the mid 1960's the Marine Corps recognized that in the battlefield of the 80's and beyond, rapid mobility of friend and foe plus the accuracy and lethality of weapons would be far beyond the capability of the then present manual command and control systems. Studies defined and quantified the requirement of future tactical command and control systems and the approach required to develop them. The result was the approval of MTACCS -- Marine Tactical Command and Control Systems. The MTACCS concept called for separate but coordinated definition and development of seven command and control systems. The first MTACC system to undergo development was the Marine Integrated Fire and Air Support System (MIFASS). MIFASS was conceived as a way of better integrating the commanders supporting arms at all levels, thus achieving a greater volume of support in a shorter period of time. In 1979, United Technologies' Norden Systems was awarded a 39 million dollar contract to build a MIFASS engineering development model (EDM) to be tested in 1982. If successful, a production contract would be awarded and the Marine Corps would start receiving operational MIFASS systems by 1986. In 1987, five years behind schedule, having failed the EDM operational assessment test, and now at a cost of over 150 million dollars, MIFASS was canceled. What went wrong? Many factors contributed to the failure and eventual cancellation of MIFASS; Marine Corps changing requirements after contract award, Norden Systems not having a strong development team, reliance on an outdated computer and finally a system that grew too big to be mobile. The hope in the 60's was to field MIFASS by fiscal year 1976 and to complete MTACCS by fiscal year 1981. However, 20 years and millions of dollars later, MIFASS is canceled and not one MTACCS system is fielded. The battlefield of the future is here, but not one automated command and control system has been fielded for Marines to use to control this battlefield. MARINE INTEGRATED FIRE AND AIR SUPPORT SYSTEM(MIFASS) 150 MILLION DOLLAR FAILURE THESIS STATEMENT: In 1979 United Technologies' Norden Systems was awarded a 39 million dollar contract to build a MIFASS engineering development model (EDM) to be tested in 1982. If successful, a production contract would be awarded and the Marine Corps would start receiving operational systems in 1986. In 1987, five years behind schedule, having failed the EDM operational assessment test and now at a cost of over 150 million dollars, MIFASS was canceled. What went wrong? I. BACKGROUND A. Present Manual System B. Concept for Marine Tactical Command and Control Systems (MTACCS) II. MIFASS Development A. MIFASS Test Bed B. Contract Award III. MIFASS Development A. Delays in Schedule B. DT and Operational Assessment Test IV. Why Did MIFASS Fail A. Concept Failures B. Contractor Failures C. Marine Corps Failures MARINE INTEGRATED FIRE AND AIR SUPPORT SYSTEM(MIFASS) 150 MILLION DOLLAR FAILURE The Marine Tactical Command and Control System (MTACCS) was a coneptual association of various computerized command and control systems designed to provide the Marine Commander with the tools required to survive on the battlefield of the future. The first MTACCS system to be developed was the Marine Integrated Fire and Air Support System (MIFASS). In 1979, United Technologies' Norden Systems was awarded a 39 million dollar contract to build an engineering development model (EDM) to be tested in 1982. If successful, a production contract would be awarded and the Marine Corps would start receiving operational MIFASS sysems by 1986. In 1987, five years behind schedule, having failed the EDM operational assessmenttest and now at a cost of over 150 million dollars, MIFAS was canceled.(4) What went wrong? The picture of tomorrows battlefield has emerged as the current generation of armaments and equipment has been fielded and new doctrine developed. It is clear that the already impressive accuracy and lethality of today's weapons will only increase with the passage of time. Programmed advances in electronics and communications equipment herald an unprecedented capability for acquiring intelligence and quickly exploiting it with precisely located and controlled friendly forces. In short, the battlefield of the future is here. In the mid 1960's, the Marine Corps recognized the need for reviewing the adequacy of its command and control capabilities for the battlefiled of the 80's and beyond. The method of command and control at that time and until future systems were developed was the cumbersome process of voice radio, other manual modes of transmission and notetaking that is error-prone. Future complicating the commanders job was the necessity of updating cumbersome maps and overlays which increases inefficiency and paperwork that much more. Additionally, when controlling three different support arms simultaneously, the commander did not have a real time situation display to enable maximum efficiency in utilizing these support arms. In 1966 the Standord Research Institute and Informatics, Incorporated , conducted stuides that defined and quantified the requriement of future tactical command and control systems and the approach required to develop them. The result was the approval of MTACCS -- Marine Tactical Command and Control Systems. The MTACCS concept called for separate but coordinated definition and development of seven command and control systems.(8.26) The first MTACCS system to undergo development was the Marine Integrated Fire and Air Support System (MIFASS). MIFASS was conceived as a way of better integrating the commanders supporting arms at all levels, thus achieving a greater volume of support in a shorter period of time. The development program correctly tackled problems of coordination between separated fire support coordination centers (FSCC), fire direction centers (FDC), and the direct air support center (DASC); lack of real time friendly unit location data with the resultant use of excessive safety margins; slowness in the fire support planning process; inability to cope with the current rate of data flow; and the frequent errors combined in fire support requests. Previous to 1970 all services had been involved in projects which attempted a simultaneous development of new equipment, computer programs, and operational procedures. In some of these cases, insufficient development and testing in one or more of the areas resulted in either an inferior or extremely costly system. In 1970 the Department of Defense instituted the "fly-before-you-buy" policy for major military procurements. This policy called for a careful objective determination of a new system's requirements and capabilities before a production decision is made.(8.27) In other words, build an experimental system and thoroughly test it before making the decision on a production contract of multiple systems. After thorough consideration of the alternative means by which to determine MTACCS design requirements, the test bed approach was selected, consistent with the DOD policy of "fly-before-you-buy." The test bed approach begins with a deliberate, complete, and objective determination of system requirements through a series of CPX-like tests and exercises. Only then are the writing of system specifications and finally, production pursued.(8:28) In 1972 MIFASS started its test bed development. In 1975 the concepts from the test bed were defined in the specific operational requirement (SOR) document for MIFASS. Following review by the Marine Corps Development and Education Center (MCDEC) and Headquarters Marine Corps approval, the SOR became the baseline document used to write the specifications for production of the operational version of MIFASS.(8:29) Over the next couple of years the system description document (SDD), detailed requirements document (DRD), and the MIFASS specification document (ELEX-M296) were developed. Some of the operational concepts developed during the MIFASS test bed represented significant departures from the present, essentially manual fire and air support control system.(8:29) Although these concepts appeared to offer the potential for more effective application of supporting arms and were written into the specification requirements documents, they would be the cause of controversy and eventually play a large role in the failure of MIFASS. The most innovative concept from the test bed was the integration of the FSCC and DASC into a single fire and air support center (FASC). Studies conducted in support of this concept also indicated reduction of personnel in some artillery regiments and possibly eliminating the requirement for a Marine Air Support Squadron which under the manual system provides the DASC. Bold and later controversial the FASC concept in the future of automation appeared to be the answer for facilitating decision making at all command levels. The FASC concept would not only enable commanders to respond more quickly to requests for fire support, but also help them to coordinate the fires in their areas of responsibility.(10:439) In 1977 the Marine System and Acquisition Requirements Committee (MSARC) directed that a full scale Engineering Development Model (EDM) be built and tested. The Marine Corps solicited from the defense industry proposals on the approach to develop MIFASS. In September 1978, Hughes Aircraft and Norden Systems were awarded parallel one year contracts to further define the approach to develop MIFASS. (10:439) In September 1979, the Norden proposal was retained and the company was awarded an appropriate 39 million dollar contract to proceed with engineering development and testing. The EDM would be tested following the contracts' 36 month development schedule. Beginning in September 1982, if the EDM test was successful, Norden could be expected to receive the production contract. The Marine Corps was expected to receive operational systems in 1986 with one MIFASS system being deployed to each USMC amphibious force. (10:439) The contract between the government and Norden Systems was a cost plus contract as opposed to a fixed price contract. Norden had sweetened their proposal by not only providing a low bid but they would also pay toward the development cost 17 cents on every dollar. Norden would lose money on developing MIFASS, however, with follow-on MTACCS systems being proposed to use MIFASS developed equipment and computer programs, Norden expected to be the front runner in getting these contracts recovering any losses occurring during the original development of MIFASS. Under a cost plus contract there is an incentive bonus. Under cost plus the government pays even if the cost exceeds the contract bid. However, as the cost exceeds the bid then the incentive bonus shrinks. It benefits the contractor to try and stay within the bid he submits. Of course as the cost continues to grow past the original contract, the government can look to cancel the contract. The results of this is having nothing for money spent and probably a law suit from the contractor. (3)(6) It was not long before the first problems surfaced. In mid 1980, Norden, at an in-progress-review (IPR) meeting, announced that they had underestimated the specification requirements and not only would they be unable to meet the 36-month development schedule but they were estimating the cost to be 50 million dollars. (6) The Marine Corps was not faced with what seems to be the norm when working with defense contractors; after the contract is awarded then the problems of over cost and over schedule begins. However since Norden had only asked for a 6-month slip and the extra cost would be taken out of the incentive bonus, the Marine Corps agreed to a 42-month EDM development schedule. (6) In 1981 with Norden once again forecasting schedule delays and increased cost the assistant commandant created a working group comprised of Marines with various MOS backgrounds to validate the requirements of MIFASS and make recommendations on the direction MIFASS should take. The working group validated the concept of MIFASS with one exception, the Fire and Air Support Center or FASC concept. The FASC concept was taking the separate FSCC and DASC Centers that exist under the manual system and combining them into one center, the FASC. The working group declared the FASC concept was not present Marine Corps doctrine and development of a system should not change doctrine. The recommendation was made to continue MIFASS but the development should follow separate centers for the FSCC and DASC instead of the FASC concept.(6) Norden systems for two years had been developing MIFASS under the FASC concept. The computer program coding and system development was along the FASC structure and it would be a massive effort to change the direction of the effort. Norden declared this was change to the system requirement and was not what they had originally bid on and the contract would have to be renegotiated with a new monetary and time schedule adjustment. Both sides appeared to be losers at this point. If the Marine Corps canceled MIFASS, the Marine Corps would have spent millions of dollars to date and have nothing to show for it except probably a lawsuit from Norden Systems. Norden on the other hand, with the cancellation of MIFASS would be out a lucrative market for follow-on systems and since this was the first efort of Norden to develop a total system vice compenents of systems reputations would be blemished. The Marine Corps and Norden Systems reached a compromise. The EDM schedule would be increased to 54 months and cost would again be increased. Norden would take what it had produced up to this time under the FASC concept, create work arounds, and continue EDM development under the separate center concept. This was to create problems for Norden for the rest of the EDM development period and was one of the critical factors in the eventual failure of the EDM test and resultant cancellation of MIFASS.(6) In 1982, the ACMC Committee overseeing MIFASS was briefed on further development problems and approved a schedule increase of 60 months. The cost of MIFASS had now gone past 70 million dollars. The date to test the EDM had now slipped two years.(11) It might be noted that by 1982 and at 70 million dollars, the incentive bonus for Norden had now been eaten up by the cost increases. Norden was building MIFASS without profit because of its contract, however, since it was a cost plus contract the Marine Corps was paying all development cost. The thought crosses peoples minds that at this stage, why didn't the Marine Corps just canel the contract and get some other contractor to build MIFASS. It is not that simple. When a contract is awarded, especially for systems development, the losing contractors turn their effort to other things. This makes the contractor getting the contract sole source. Months down the road when over cost and over schedule is the norm it is difficult for the government to cancel the contract. First, no other contractor has continued with this system. If the government wants another contractor, the whole bidding process begins again. Political pressures get thrown in and what happens is the original contract continues with the government pouring in more money trying to salvage something. This is what faced the Marine Corps on MIFASS in 1982. Having spent millions of dollars up to that date, should the contract be canceled and the Marine Corps have nothing or continue on and salvage something. The Marine Corps chose to go forward. Beginning in 1982, to help keep development cost down, certain functions/requirements were being deferred by the Marine Corps from the EDM. The thought being that these requirements, such as the TADIL B interface, could bee added to a production contract. MIFASS was radically being changed from its original concept.(11) In 1984, the ADMC committee approves delay of delivery of the EDM for operational testing until 1986, four years behind schedule and now at a cost of over 120 million dollars.(11) In 1986, initial development testing (DT) of MIFASS begins at Norden Systems facility. All reports coming from Marines at the DT indicate that MIFASS is not capable and will never pass the operational testing. The Commandant of the Marine Corps decides that what is available must be tested, for he wants to make the decision on MIFASS before he retires 1 July 1987.(11) It is not possible to give an operational test to MIFASS. It is not capable of handling an exercise of live aircraft and artillery so an operational "assessment" is conducted in a CPX environment with one of the objectives being can anything be salvaged from the MIFASS project.(4) The MIFASS operational "assessment" was completed by May 1987. When General P.X. Kelly retired as Commandant 1 July 1987, MIFASS was canceled.(5:110) Seventeen years in development and over 150 million dollars spent during the EDM cycle, MIFASS is finished and nothing is salvaged for future use. What went wrong? Lets look at a number of factors that contributed to the downfall of MIFASS. 1. Concept of MIFASS The concept of MIFASS is valid. Automated command and control systems offer the potential to aid in the coordination and integration of our modern weapons, but in MIFASS did the Marine Corps try to do too much at one time. Should MIFASS have been developed in stages? Through the 60's, 70's, and 80's the Marine Corps tried to develop an automated DASC called the UYQ-4 built by Litton. After million of dollars and years of delay, the UYQ-4 was canceled. The question that sticks out is if the Marine Corps could not get the automated DASC developed was it too large a step to develop MIFASS all at once where not only the DASC functions were to be automated but also fire support, fire planning, target intelligence and reports generation. Did the Marine Corps want too much at one time? Additionally, did MIFASS, following the test bed development cycle, grow larger than the original concept. MIFASS was originally envisioned as being developed as a division level center. (2:69) Probably no more than a 8x8x20 shelter housing operators, computers and graphic displays. However as MIFASS went into EDM development the requirement was to have capability not only at division level but at regiments, battalions, separate DASC and at FDC's. The Marine Corps went from a building block approach of getting one center to work to requiring numerous centers operating with each other. 2. Norden Systems What about the contractor? Up to this time Norden's reputation had been known for making components of systems. MIFASS was their first attempt at building a system. It became apparent and by their own admission that they had not really understood the specification requirements. The document Norden created leading up to the contract award was in reality reiterating the specification documents that had already been created by the Marine Corps, and then throwing in a low bid. As Marines assigned to the MIFASS project at Marine Corps Tactical System Support Activity (MCTSSA) begin working with Norden personnel the weakness of Norden's team was evident. (3)(6) Norden did not have working on the MIFASS project anyone with prior Marine experience much less knowledgeable of DASC, fire support, fire planning, etc. and how all these areas interact with each other. As the MCTSSA personnel interacted with Norden's personnel and explained the specification requirements in more detail, Norden realized they had underestimated the requirement and cost. Did the Marine Corps fall for the cheapest bidder syndrome only to find out too late cheapest bid is not always the best? 3. Cost Plus Contracts By not insisting on fixed price contract the Marine Corps does not force a contractor to really scrutinize and give an accurate bid. Cost plus contract to a sole source leaves the door open for the contract to extend indefinitely. Although the Marine Corps received nothing from MIFASS, Norden was able to build several facilities, utilizing MIFASS funds, that will benefit them on other projects in the years to come. 4. Marine Corps Changing Requirements Nothing is probably more confusing to a contractor than having begun work on a project than for the Marine Corps to come to them and say they want to make changes to the requirements. This is wasted effort on both the Marine Corps and the contractor. It leads to confusion, charges and counter charges and does severe damage to the project. This changing of requirements problem happened as Marine personnel rotated in and out of positions at Headquarters and MCDEC during the development of MIFASS.(6) An individual would read something in the requirements document that he disagreed with, be able to get it on the agenda for one of the IPR's and then Norden would be given directions that the Marines were heading in another direction. 5. FASC vs FSCC/DASC Concept The changing from FASC to separate center concept two years after Norden had received the contract caused an upheaval that carried through until the cancellation of MIFASS. Because the Marine Corps did not want to renegotiate the contract and start over again Norden was forced to basterdize their development of MIFASS up to date. For two years Norden had been developing not only the software for the computer programs but the firmware resident in the hardware that makes the system function, All this development was for the FASC concept. To convert to separate center concept Norden had to create work arounds or in other words "jury-rigging." MIFASS goes to its operational test as a system developed under two concepts with jury-riggs making it function. Time and again during DT testing at Norden and during the operational assessment, problems and failure of the system could be traced back to the "work arounds."(11) This was the prime example of the Marine Corps changing requirements throughout the cycle of development. 6. AN/AYK-14 Computer The Marine Corps decision in 1979 to mandate use of the AYK-14 and the CMS-2 standard Navy software programming language for MIFASS proved to be the programs undoing. (5:110) The size of the system's software increased far beyond original estimates, resulting in program delays. More significant, the AYK-14 ultimately proved to be too slow in processing air and fire support missions and lacked sufficient processing capability and memory to handle a peak mission load. Norden had recognized that the AYK-14 computer was inadequate but kept trying to make it work, concerned that if they made an issue of the AYK-14 especially in the later years of the contract, the Marine Corps would cancel the project.(11) 7. Communications In the late 70's as MIFASS was ready to become reality there was a great emphasis on development of communications. The words on everyone's lips were LFICS -- Landing Force Integrated Communications System -- the communications of the future, able to support the upcoming automated data systems. However, LFICS did not materialize and the MIFASS test relied on the current of family of radios; radios adequate to support our current, manually-oriented command and control needs, but overwhelmed when required to support an automated, computerized, data-oriented command and control system. Unjustly or not MIFASS was perceived as a failure due to communications. The requirement for high powered radios for digital communications creates high vulnerability to electronic countermeasures and/or attack. Because of separate centers the requirement to have constant key radios reduced life expectancy of the radios, lowered reliability, and increased maintenance cost. One problem that was Norden's fault were the interface cables used to link MIFASS to the supporting communications equipment. Many were poorly engineered and had to be modified during field testing of the system.(4) 8. Size MIFASS during its formative stage was visualized as being small, rugged and no component weighing more than 50 pounds. Not only did the weight of components increase but as development progressed Norden created more components than the Marine Corps had originally anticipated. The early publicity on MIFASS bragged that at the battalion level MIFASS could be operated out of a bunker or a foxhole. However, during development, MIFASS grew. The result was that at the battalion level the MIFASS system consists of more than 10 components, weighs over 500 pounds and could not be operated from inside an assault amphibian vehicle. The regiment and division command post do not more often but for a battalion command post that does move after the MIFASS equipment was too much to handle. (5:110) 9. Reliance on other systems MIFASS dependence on being a successful system would rely on the support or input of other systems that were also being developed. The problem of LFICS has previously been discussed. An important feature of MIFASS was the real-time display and dissemination of position location information (PLI) of friendly units and enemy units. This PLI was to be received via the Position Location Reporting System (PLRS) and a Tactical Digital Information Link (TADIL) to Marine radars. As the development cycle progressed and cost escalated, the TADIL interface was one of items deferred until a production contract. When it came time to test MIFASS, PLRS was not at the development stage where it could reliably interface with the MIFASS. MIFASS went through its testing cycles unable to demonstrate reliabily one of its major features, that of graphically displaying real time unit locations. 10. Congress It can be said that a lot of the problems happening to Norden and MIFASS was something that they could not have foreseen. The Marine Corps changing requirements, government furnished communicatins equipment was inadequate, other developing systems needed to supplement MIFASS fell by the wayside. The final blow to MIFASS was the fact that both the Senate and House versions of the Fiscal Year 1988 DoD Authorization Bill zeroed MIFASS funding. Congress had had enough! (5:110) The Marine Corps did not have the time or the funds to go through another development cycle to fix MIFASS. Thus it was decided to terminate the program, redefine its requirements based on lessons learned, and to pursue a more evolutionary acquisition approach using newer technology. A requirements group has been reconvened at Marine Corps Headquarters to review the automated fire control requirements and a project team has been formed at Quantico to assess systems that might be procured in place of MIFASS. What about MTACCS? What was the plan for MTACCS during development in the 60's? The hope was to field MIFASS by fiscal year 1976 and the complete MTACCS by fiscal year 1981. (2:70) Twenty years and millions of dollars later MIFASS is canceled and not one MTACCS system has been fielded. The battlefield of the future as envisioned in the 60's is here, but not one automated command and control system has been developed for Marines to use to control this battlefield. BIBLIOGRAPHY 1. After-Action Report on the Operational Assessment of the MIFASS Engineering Development Model (EDM) Direct Air Support Center (DASC). 2. Armed Forces Management. "MTACCS Touted as Solution to Marine Corps' Command and Control Problems." (July 1969) 3. Brady, G. F., Maj, USMC, MIFASS Project Officer, Marine Corps Tactical Systems Support Activity, 1979-1982. (Personal Notes) 4. Gemar, R. L., Maj, USMC, Operational Test Officer for MIFASS, Marine Corps Operational Test and Evaluation Agency, 1986-1987. Personal Interview (26 February 1988). 5. Goodman, Glenn W., "Marines Cancel MIFASS but move ahead on other C3 Fronts." Armed Forces Journal (August 1987). 6. Miller, C. M., Maj, USMC. MIFASS Project Officer, Marine Corps Tactical Systems Support Activity, 1979- 1982. Personal Interview (15 February 1988). 7. Seidenman, Paul. "Marine Integrated Fire and Air Support System." National Defenese (October 1982). 8. Stewart, James J., Maj, USMC, and Bartlett, Merrill L., Capt, USMC. "Test Bed for MTACCS." Marine Corps Gazette (January 1973). 9. Sullivan, A. P., Maj, USMC. "TCOS" Boon or Bust?" Marine Corps Gazette (January 1987). 10. Sundaram, Gowri S. "MIFASS, Key to Automated Fire Support." International Defense Review (1987). 11. Wallace, A. W., Capt, USMC. Air Control Officer Assigned to MIFASS Test Directorate (FMF), 1984-1987. Personal Interview (4 March 1988). 12. Wallace, A. W., Capt, USMC. "Marine Integrated Fire and Air Support System (MIFASS) History File." Memorandum (June 1987)
