Employment Of The U.S. Armed Forces And The War On Drugs CSC 1987 SUBJECT AREA National Military Strategy ABSTRACT Author: TRITCHLER, William K., Major, USMC Title: Employment of the U.S. Armed Forces and the War On Drugs Publisher: United States Marine Corps Command and Staff College Date: May 1987 Examines issues concerning the use of the U.S. military in the "war on drugs." Presents statistics on the size of America's drug problem. Examines the link between terrorists and drug traffickers, and the threat the drug trade poses to United States national security. Traces the evolution of both the national strategy to combat drug abuse, and the history of America's multi-agency approach to stemming the flow of illegal drugs. Several important drug-control agencies are discussed. Also presents a discussion of the Posse Comitatus Act and its implications with respect to military involvement in drug law enforcement. Traces the history of DOD and Coast Guard participation in the drug interdiction effort. Provides specific examples of the types of DOD support provided. DOD support of anti-drug operations in Bolivia and the Bahamas is discussed in detail. Studies the development of the Anti-Drug Abuse Act of 1986. Presents the most often heard arguments for and against military involvement in drug law enforcement. Offers comments concerning the propriety of military involvement. Makes observations for improving drug interdiction results. Concludes with a prediction of future drug-related legislative activity in the Congress. UNITED STATES MARINE CORPS COMMAND AND STAFF COLLEGE EMPLOYMENT OF THE U.S. ARMED FORCES AND THE WAR ON DRUGS BY William K. Tritchler Major USMC A RESEARCH REPORT SUBMITTED IN FULFILLMENT OF THE RESEARCH REQUIREMENT FOR THE WAR IN THE MODERN ERA SYMPOSIUM Research Supervisor: LtCol Donald F. Bittner, USMCR 6 MAY 1987 BIOGRAPHICAL SKETCH William K. Tritchler, Major, United States Marine Corps; BS in Geology, University of Wisconsin, Madison, WI, 1975; MS in Electrical Engineering, U.S. Naval Postgraduate School, Monterey, CA, 1983. Major Tritchler is a communications officer and has served tours of duty in the Fleet Marine Force with both a Marine Division and Marine Air Wing. TABLE OF CONTENTS CHAPTER PAGE I INTRODUCTION 1 GENERAL 1 BACKGROUND 4 THE SIZE OF THE PROBLEM 6 II ILLEGAL DRUGS--A THREAT TO NATIONAL SECURITY? 11 GENERAL 11 TERRORISTS AND TRAFFICKERS 12 III CONTROLLING THE FLOW--WHO'S IN CHARGE? 16 GENERAL 16 HISTORY OF MULTI-AGENCY INVOLVEMENT 16 Drug Enforcement Administration (DEA) 18 Federal Bureau of Investigation (FBI) 19 Narcotic and Dangerous Drug Section 20 Office of Drug Abuse Policy 21 National Institute on Drug Abuse 22 Alcohol, Drug Abuse, and Mental Health Administration 23 U.S. Customs Service 23 OTHER AGENCIES INVOLVED IN DRUG INTERDICTION 24 El Paso Intelligence Center (EPIC) 25 South Florida Task Force (SFTF) 25 National Narcotics Border Interdiction System (NNBIS) 26 WHO'S IN CHARGE? 27 IV NATIONAL STRATEGY TO COMBAT ILLEGAL DRUGS 29 V DEPARTMENT OF DEFENSE INVOLVEMENT 32 POSSE COMITATUS ACT 32 DOD DIRECTIVE 5525.5 37 DOD ASSISTANCE PROVIDED 38 U.S. Marine Corps 39 U.S. Navy 40 U.S. Air Force 41 U.S. Army and National Guard 42 OPERATIONS ON FOREIGN SOIL 43 Operations in the Bahamas 44 Operations in Bolivia 45 U.S. COAST GUARD EXPERIENCES 48 VI RECENT ACTIONS IN CONGRESS--THE OMNIBUS DRUG BILL 52 BACKGROUND 52 H.R. 5484 53 S. 2787 55 HOUSE AND SENATE NEGOTIATIONS ON H.R. 5484 56 ANTI-DRUG ABUSE ACT OF 1986 58 PROS AND CONS OF MILITARY INVOLVEMENT 59 Is Military Participation Proper? 59 Is Military Participation Necessary? 61 Does The Military Possess The Equipment To Do The Job? 62 Does The Drug Interdiction Mission Provide Good Training? 64 Will Using The Military For Drug Interdiction Work? 65 Should The Military Be Used For Drug Law Enforcement In Foreign Countries? 66 VII CONCLUSION 69 FOOTNOTES 74 ANNOTATED BIBLIOGRAPHY 85 CHAPTER I INTRODUCTION "The war against drugs is as important as any this Nation has ever fought, and who better to fight a war than the U.S. military." The Honorable Mario Biaggi U.S. Representative from N.Y. 11 September 1986 GENERAL Employment of the U.S. Armed Forces and the War on Drugs was selected as a research topic for several reasons. The issue of using the military to fight the "war" on drugs was in the news on almost a daily basis in the autumn of 1986 when a research topic was being sought, and the measures being proposed in the Congress at that time would have had significant and far reaching implications to all of the Department of Defense (DOD). The subject was interesting and provided an opportunity to learn about something previously unfamiliar to the author but potentially useful. Also, this was a subject that had not been studied before in the Marine Corps Command and Staff College's "War in the Modern Era" research program. During several days of preliminary research the author discovered that a significant amount of material had been written about various aspects of this subject; certainly enough source material could be obtained to support a comprehensive study. After discussing the topic with the program instructor/advisor, other possible topics were discarded and research began in earnest. Reference material was relatively easy to obtain. In addition to recent newspaper reports and relevant articles that had appeared in most of the professional military magazines and journals during the last few years, several useful documents were obtained from the Defense Technical Information Center (DTIC) at Cameron Station in Alexandria, Virginia. The Congressional Research Service (CRS) provided many pertinent documents, and the Marine Corps Liaison Officer at the White House supplied copies of a few of President Reagan's most recent speeches on drug abuse. Information was also obtained directly from the Drug Enforcement Administration (DEA), and telephone interviews were conducted with Action Officers at Headquarters, U.S. Marine Corps. The research materials rarely contradicated one another. For the most part, the references reinforced and complemented each other. However, estimates of the size and dollar cost of America's drug problem sometimes varied widely between sources. Most of the source material presented an objective point of view; however, a few of the references were written with an obvious bias or presented information in a way that was somewhat sensational. For example, some of the articles from professional military periodicals projected a predictable "can do" attitude with an enthusiastic "look at what a great job we're doing" flavor, and the weekly news magazines (i.e. Time and Newsweek) carried several articles that were loaded with information calculated to elicit strong emotions from the reader. THE PRIMARY PURPOSE OF THIS STUDY IS TO DETERMINE IF IT IS PROPER, NECESSARY, DESIRABLE OR PRUDENT TO USE THE U.S. ARMED FORCES FOR DRUG LAW ENFORCEMENT. The author sought answers to the following questions: (1) What are the side effects and costs associated with imposing the drug interdiction mission upon the military? (2) What does the military stand to gain or lose by participating in the anti-drug effort? (3) How could the overall drug interdiction effort be improved? Answers to these and other questions will be developed and presented in later Chapters. As the research progressed it became apparent that no meaningful discussion of possible military roles and missions would be possible without first presenting a rather broad review of the size of America's drug problem and the history of the nation's anti-drug efforts. The remainder of this Chapter briefly traces how the U.S. became involved in the "war" on drugs, and presents statistics on the size of the drug problem in America. Chapter II is an analysis of the threat posed by illegal drugs, while Chapter III contains descriptions of a few of the more important government agencies used to control the flow of illegal drugs. The "national strategy" against drug abuse is discussed in Chapter IV, and the legal implications and history of DOD involvement in the area of drug law enforcement are examined in Chapter V. The legislative activity which led to the development of the Anti-Drug Abuse Act of 1986 is traced in Chapter VI, along with a comprehensive discussion of the pros and cons of military involvement in the anti-drug effort. Chapter VII contains conclusions. BACKGROUND The United States is at "war," but a different type of conflict than that connotated by the word "war." We are engaged in a "war" against illegal drugs. President Reagan announced the national war on drug abuse in October 1982.1 It has not been uncommon for Presidents of the United States to refer to efforts against domestic social and economic problems as "wars." President Johnson declared "war on poverty," President Nixon declared "war on street crime," and President Carter declared the "moral equivalent of war" on oil dependency.2 What is new about this "war" is the relatively recent and ever increasing participation of the U.S. Armed Forces in the effort to control the flow of illegal drugs. The employment of the military in this area, which is viewed by many people as a law enforcement function, would seem to violate the long-standing traditional prohibition against using the Armed Forces for routine domestic law enforcement. This issue affects all of the military services and is a worthy topic for research. The United States has long had a drug problem. A century ago, on 23 February 1887, Congress passed the first federal law explicitly intended to discourage the nontherapeutic use of a dangerous, dependency-producing drug. This law prohibited the importation of opium into the United States by subjects of the emperor of China and made it a crime for U.S. citizens to traffic in opium in China.3 Since that time, Congress has continued to enact legislation to deter drug abuse by Americans. Drug abuse is a recognized threat to both individual citizens and the American society as a whole. Public concern about drug abuse has resulted in laws and initiatives at the state and local level. However, the federal government has traditionally assumed a major part of the responsibility for the control of illegal drugs by enforcing laws created to control the importation, sale, use and possession of illegal drugs. Federal efforts in this area have increased since the early 1930's when the government stepped-up efforts to control the use of illegal drugs, and began to both conduct research into the nature of drug abuse and to provide treatment and rehabilitation services. Public alarm about increasing drug abuse during the past 25 years has been reflected in Congress by an ever increasing level of drug-related legislative activity. During the last quarter century, Congress has enacted more than 75 laws that, in one way or another, are connected with the illicit drug problem.4 Congress has sought a variety of remedies to this problem, primarily in the areas of treatment, education, primary prevention, research, establishment of international accords, increased punishments, law enforcement, and support of overseas eradication and drug control efforts. THE SIZE OF THE PROBLEM During the last few decades, the United States has experienced increased volumes of drug smuggling. Our drug problem has continued to grow in spite of increased federal efforts directed at controlling the supply of, and demand for, illegal drugs. The effects of illicit drug use now touch every segment of our society. The available statistics regarding the size of the American drug problem are controversial. The estimates of the size and cost of the drug problem vary greatly. A document called the Narcotics Intelligence Estimate contains the most frequently cited statistics concerning the production, distribution and use of illicit drugs. The Narcotics Intelligence Estimate is the product of the National Narcotics Intelligence Consumers Committee (NNICC), an organization administered by the Drug Enforcement Administration. NNICC membership consists of the U.S. Coast Guard, U.S. Customs Service, Department of Defense, Drug Enforcement Administration, Federal Bureau of Investigation, Imigration and Naturalization Service, Internal Revenue Service, National Institute on Drug Abuse, Department of State, Department of the Treasury, and the White House Drug Abuse Policy Office. The Deputy Assistant Administrator for Intelligence of the Drug Enforcement Administration serves as the Chairman of the NNICC, and the Central Intelligence Agency and National Security Agency participate as observers.5 The NNICC has a membership capable of collecting statistics that should be fairly accurate. The most recent (1984) Narcotics Intelligence Estimate is the source for the figures presented in the discussion that follows. The NNICC classifies drugs by four categories: cannabis, cocaine, opiates, and dangerous drugs. Here then are some of the significant 1984 statistics for each drug category. CANNABIS - Consumption: The U.S. consumed between 7,800 and 9,200 metric tons of marijuana. (1 metric ton - 2,205 lbs.) Forty percent of high school seniors reported using marijuana or hashish within the last year, and 5% reported using it daily. Sources for U.S. consumption: 12% produced in the U.S. 42% Colombia 20% Mexico 14% Jamaica 8% Belize 4% other (Indonesia, Nigeria, Costa Rica, Panama, Venezuela, Brazil, Thailand) Mode of transportation to the U.S.: Most of the marijuana smuggled into the U.S. arrived by sea. Amount seized: 1,760 metric tons of marijuana were seized at U.S. ports of entry. U.S. seizures by mode of transport: 84% non-commercial vessels 7% general aviation aircraft 5% land transportation 3% commercial vessels 1% commercial aircraft COCAINE - Consumption: The U.S. consumed between 55 and 76 metric tons of cocaine, an 11% increase over 1983. Cocaine-related deaths rose 77% over the same period. About 5.8% of high school seniors reported using cocaine within the last 30 days. Sources for U.S. consumption: 75% Colombia 15% Bolivia 5% Peru 5% Other (Ecuador, Venezuela, Brazil, Chile) Mode of transportation to the U.S.: The majority of the cocaine reaching the U.S. was shipped by general aviation and commercial aircraft. Significant quantities were also smuggled by sea. Amount seized: 39 metric tons of cocaine were seized worldwide. The U.S. seized 21 cocaine conversion conversion laboratories in 1984, up from 11 in 1983. Eighteen of the 21 labs seized were located in south Florida. U.S. seizures by mode of transport: 62% general aviation aircraft 18% commercial aircraft 11% non-commercial vessels 8% commercial vessels 1% land transportation OPIATES - Consumption: America's 490,000 heroin addicts consumed 6 metric tons of heroin in 1984. Consumption has been relatively constant for several years, but heroin-related deaths increased 31% in 1984. Sources for U.S. consumption: 51% Southwest Asia (SWA) 32% Mexico 17% Southeast Asia (SEA) Mode of transportation to the U.S.: Seventy-nine percent of the heroin from SWA and SEA arrived in the U.S. by air, while Mexican heroin reached the U.S. predominantly by land transportation. U.S. seizures by mode of transport: 79% commercial aircraft 18% land transportation 3% commercial vessels DANGEROUS DRUGS - This term refers to substances, both licit and illicit, which include the following: stimulants other than cocaine; narcotics/analgesics other than heroin and opium; psychomimetics/hallucinogens other than cannabis products; and all depressants and sedatives. Consumption: The U.S. consumed 3 billion dosage units, an increase of 15% over 1983. Sources for U.S. consumption: All the PCP, almost all the methamphetamine, and 8O% of the injectable methamphetamine consumed in the U.S. is also produced here. Amount seized: About 4.8 million dosage units were interdicted at U.S. borders. A total of 291 domestic clandestine dangerous drug processing labs were seized, up from 215 in 1983. The figures indicate that America has a significant drug problem that is getting worse. Cocaine and cocaine products have seen the greatest increase in usage over the last few years. Recent data compiled by the President's Commission on Organized Crime showed that in 1985 there were five million regular cocaine users in the U.S., and that between 20 and 24 million Americans had tried cocaine.6 The 1986 statistics will undoubtedly indicate that the drug problem is getting bigger. A new smokable cocaine product called "crack" or "rock" hit the streets a couple of years ago and its use has reached epidemic proportions. This highly addictive form of cocaine is relatively inexpensive and is easy to manufacture. The "crack" epidemic is partly responsible for motivating the President to declare war on drugs. The estimated cost of the drug habit of the United States is staggering. The government estimates that Americans currently spend an unbelievable $120 billion annually on illicit drugs. That's more than Americans spend for food, clothing and shelter.7 Various current estimates put the total annual cost of drug abuse to the nation, to the user, and to society at between $200 and $230 billion.8 These are enormous sums that reflect an enormous problem. Government efforts to deal with this problem are discussed in Chapter III. CHAPTER II ILLEGAL DRUGS--A THREAT TO NATIONAL SECURITY? "Ninety percent of the drugs consumed in the United States are produced abroad--this vicious white and green and brown tide poses a clear and present national security threat to America." The Honorable Paula Hawkins U.S. Senator from Florida 27 September 1986 "Drugs are a law enforcement problem, not a national security problem." The Honorable Don Edwards U.S. Representative from N.Y. 11 September 1986 GENERAL Does the illicit drug trade pose a serious threat to the national security of the United States? Recent debate in Congress indicates that our lawmakers cannot agree on this issue, but the fact that drug abuse has had a debilitating effect on the moral, social and economic well-being of the country is undeniable. But how is national security to be defined? The April 1984 issue of the JCS Pub 1 contains the following definition: NATIONAL SECURITY - A collective term encompassing both national defense and foreign relations of the United States. Specifically, the condition provided by: a. a military or defense advantage over any foreign nation or group of nations, or b. a favorable foreign relations position, or c. a defense posture, capable of successfully resisting hostile or destructive action from within or without, overt or covert. On 8 April 1986, President Reagan reportedly signed a secret National Security Decision Directive that designated the international drug trade as a threat to our national security because of its ability to destabilize democratic institutions.1 Thus, a national security threat is not necessarily a military threat in the conventional definition of that phrase. The President's directive provided the policy framework for an expanded role for U.S. military forces in combatting the illegal drug trade abroad and opened the door for the expansion of overseas operations to implement such a policy. TERRORISTS AND DRUG TRAFFICKERS The large amount of money to be made by trafficking in illegal drugs has attracted the interest and participation of terrorist and insurgent groups. The Drug Enforcement Administration reports that several terrorist and insurgent organizations have formed ties with the international drug trade in recent years. Terrorists and traffickers operate together for the mutual benefit of both, rather than because they share common idealogies. Terrorists have reportedly been used to protect coca fields in Central and South America, and to produce heroin in Southeast Asia. In return, the traffickers have provided the terrorists/insurgents with money ("narco-dollars") and arms.2 In his FY88 Annual Report to the Congress, Secretary of Defense Caspar W. Weinberger noted the connection between terrorism and drug trafficking, and the threat these ambiguous and non-traditional forms of aggression pose for the United States. Speaking of terrorism and the flow of illegal drugs he wrote: We have come to recognize that these threats are not merely isolated occurrences. Terrorism is increaingly transnational and state-supported. Drug trafficking is increasingly sophisticated and politically motivated. In both cases, there is an element of exploitation by the Soviets and their surrogates.3 The Drug Enforcement Administration has documented several cases where terrorists or insurgents and drug traffickers have cooperated. According to the Drug Enforcement Administration: a. The Burmese Communist Party (BCP) and the legitimate Burmese government have been fighting since Burma achieved independence from British colonial rule in 1948. The BCP's insurgency and drug operations are conducted largely in the Shan State, which is the leading opium production region of what is known in the narcotics trade as the "Golden Triangle." The BCP funds its operations through several drug-related activities. For example, they have collected "taxes" from opium poppy growing farmers, supplied opium and morphine to refineries on the Burma- Thailand border, and are now producing heroin in their own refineries. 4 b. The Revolutionary Armed Forces of Colombia (FARC) have developed a symbiotic relationship with drug traffickers. In addition to cultivating some coca of its own, FARC guerrillas collect protection money from other growers; and they have arranged to protect drug traffickers' airfields in exchange for arms. The insurgents and traffickers are also known to share information about police activities and military patrols.5 Finally, Colombian trafficers support coca cultivation in Brazil, Ecuador, Panama and Venezuela.6 c. The 19th of April Movement, also known as "M-19," is a Colombian terrorist organization which partially funds its operations by cultivating both coca and marijuana. The M-19 is composed of leftist guerrillas who also extort money from traffickers and other growers.7 It has also been reported that Colombian drug traffickers have paid Cuba for protection and for refueling and safe haven in Cuban ports as they smuggle drugs to the United States. Although there is no hard evidence that cocaine is being produced or refined in Cuba, there is evidence that Cuba regularly gives safe passage to aircraft of Jamaican registry, and that drug runners have used Cuban waters to avoid U.S. sea patrols.8 If true, Castro has logically also reportedly used his connection with drug smugglers to send hundreds of tons of weapons and supplies to Marxist insurgents in Colombia, El Salvador and Guatemala.9 It is clear that a link exists between drug trafficking and terrorist/insurgent groups. The connection is well established. Drug trafficking has been used to fund terrorist and insurgent activities, and, therefore, is a threat to legitimate governments. This, as the President has correctly concluded, is a threat to our own national security. CHAPTER III CONTROLLING THE FLOW--WHO'S IN CHARGE? GENERAL While conducting the research for this report, it quickly became apparent that many federal agencies are directly involved in establishing policy, conducting research, gathering intelligence, and trying to curb the flow and use of illegal drugs. There are, in fact, 11 cabinet departments and not less than 37 federal agencies/offices participating in one way or another in the anti-drug effort.1 HISTORY OF MULTI-AGENCY INVOLVEMENT Before providing a discussion of who is in charge of America's anti-drug effort, a brief chronology of significant anti-drug events would be useful. Most of the agencies/events listed below will be discussed in greater detail later in this report. This is a partial list, weighted toward events taking place during the last five years. 1930 - Narcotics Division of the Bureau of Prohibition became the Federal Bureau of Narcotics (FBN) under the Treasury Department. 1965 - Bureau of Drug Abuse Control (BDAC) established under the Department of Health, Education, and Welfare. 1968 - FBN and BDAC combined to form the Bureau of Narcotics and Dangerous Drugs (BNDD). July 1973 - BNDD and three other Federal agencies merged to form the Drug Enforcement Administration (DEA). 1977 - El Paso Intelligence Center (EPIC) established. December 1981 - P.L. 97-86 added a new chapter to Title 10 U.S.C. clarifying the relationship between the military and civilian law enforcement officials. December 1981 - Executive Order 12333 authorized the use of U.S. intelligence assets to produce intelligence on drug trafficking. January 1982 - Cabinet Council on Legal Policy established. February 1982 - South Florida Task Force (SFTF) established. October 1982 - President Reagan officially announced his war on drugs. October 1982 - Twelve Organized Crime Drug Enforcement Task Forces (OCDETFs) established. March 1983 - National Narcotics Border Interdiction System (NNBIS) established. May 1983 - Six NNBIS regional centers became operational. July 1983 - President's Commission on Organized Crime established. January 1984 - 1984 National Strategy for the Prevention of Drug Abuse and Drug Trafficking promulgated. October 1984 - P.L. 98-473, Comprehensive Crime Control Act of 1984 signed. January 1985 - National Narcotics Drug Enforcement Policy Board (NNDEPB) established. July 1985 - DOD Task Force on Drug Law Enforcement established. April 1986 - President Reagan signed a National Security Decision Directive making illegal drugs a threat to national security. October 1986 - P.L. 99-570, Anti-Drug Abuse Act of 1986 signed. Following now are descriptions of the missions, responsibilities and organization of seven major federal agencies currently involved in combatting illegal drugs. The information is quoted from offical publications.2 Drug Enforcement Administration (DEA) The Drug Enforcement Administration (DEA) is the lead federal agency in enforcing narcotics and controlled substances laws and regulations. DEA was created in July 1973, merging four separate drug law enforcement agencies. The primary responsibilities of DEA include: investigation of major narcotic violators who operate at interstate and international levels; enforcement of regulations governing the legal manufacture, distribution, and dispensing of controlled substances; management of a national narcotics intelligence system; coordination with federal, state, and local law enforcement authoritites and cooperation with counterpart agencies aboroad; and training, scientific research, and information exchange in support of drug traffic prevention and control. The DEA concentrates its efforts on high-level narcotics smuggling and distribution organizations in the United States and abroad. The DEA works closely with other agencies such as the Customs Service, the Internal Revenue Service, and the Coast Guard. DEA's priority mission is the long-term immobilization of major trafficking organizations through the removal of the leaders and assets upon which these organizations depend. On 21 January 1982, the Attorney General announced a major reorganization affecting DEA and the entire federal drug law enforcement effort. The FBI was given concurrent jurisdiction with DEA over drug offenses. DEA's Administrator now reports to the Director of the FBI, who was given general supervision of drug enforcement effort. A high-level Justice Department committee was created to oversee the development of drug enforcement policies and to attune the Department's other components to DEA-FBI priorities. DEA agents work side by side with FBI agents throughout the country in major drug cases--a significant change in narcotics law enforcement. In addition to narcotics enforcement, nearly 200 DEA compliance investigators enforce regulation of the legal manufacture and distribution of prescription drugs. DEA also maintains an active training program for narcotics officers in other federal, state, and local agencies--as well as foreign police. In an average year, some 8,000 federal, state, and local officers receive special DEA training--plus some 1,500 foreign law enforcement officers. DEA has offices throughout the United States and in 37 foreign countries. Federal Bureau of Investigation (FBI) The Federal Bureau of Investigation (FBI) is the principal investigative arm of the U.S. Department of Justice. It is charged with gathering and reporting facts, locating witnesses, and compiling evidence in matters in which the federal government is, or may be, a party in interest. The FBI was established in 1908 by the Attorney General who directed that Department of Justice investigations be handled by a group of special investigators. The FBI's jurisdiction includes a wide range of responsibilities in the criminal, civil, and security fields. Among these are espionage, sabotage, and other domestic security matters; kidnapping, extortion, bank robbery, interstate transportation of stolen property, civil rights matters, interstate gambling violations, narcotics violations, fraud against the government, and assault or killing the President or a federal officer. In addition to FBI headquarters, there are 60 field divisions that carry out the investigative responsibility of the FBI. Narcotic and Dangerous Drug Section The mission of the Narcotic and Dangerous Drug Section of the Criminal Division, U.S. Department of Justice, is the prosecution and conviction of high-level drug traffickers and members of criminal organizations involved in the importation, manufacture, shipment, and distribution of illicit narcotics and dangerous drugs; the forfeiture of assets illegally obtained as a result of illicit drug trafficking; the analysis and execution of the Criminal Division's drug prosecution policies; the training of agents and prosecutors in development of major drug litigation; and the general support of narcotic litigation in the United States attorneys' offices. In carrying out its mission the Section maintains a litigation staff to prosecute, nationwide, complex cases against major drug trafficking organizations. It supports or maintains task force operations in the Southern District of Florida and Puerto Rico, for the purpose of investigating and prosecuting money launderers who are facilitating the operations of major drug trafficking organizations. It also conducts the litigating needs concerning the regulatory functions of DEA. In additon to litigation, the Section also drafts and evaluates all drug-related proposed legislation and provides legal support to the offices of the United States attorneys by reviewing the feasibility of all electronic surveillance requests, by securing witnesses from foreign jurisidictions, and by coordinating and assisting in the prosecution of multidistrict cases. Office of Drug Abuse Policy The Office of Drug Abuse Policy is a part of the Office of Policy Development of the Executive Office of the President. The Office assists the President in the formulation, coordination, and implementation of economic and domestic policy. National Institute on Drug Abuse The National Institute on Drug Abuse, a part of the Public Health Service of the Department of Health and Human Services, provides a national focus for the federal effort to increase knowledge and promote effective strategies to deal with health problems and issues associated with drug abuse. In implementing these responsibilities, the Institute conducts and supports research on the biological, psychological, psychosocial, and epidemiological aspects of narcotic addiction and drug abuse; supports research training of individuals and institutions who are training individuals in the biological and psychological sciences and epidemiological aspects of narcotic addiction and drug abuse to enable them to pursue careers in research; collaborates with, and provides technical assistance to state drug abuse authorities, and encourages state and community efforts in planning, establishing, maintaining, coordinating, and evaluating more effective narcotic addiction and drug abuse programs; collaborates with other federal agencies, national, foreign, state and local organizations, hospitals, and volunteer groups to enable them to facilitate and extend programs for the prevention of narcotic addiction and drug abuse, and for the care, treatment, and rehabilitation of drug abusers; and carries out administrative and financial management, policy and program development, planning and evaluation, and public information functions which are required to implement such programs. Alcohol, Drug Abuse, and Mental Health Adminstration The mission of the Alcohol, Drug Abuse, and Mental Health Administration (ADAMHA) of the U.S. Department of Health and Human Services, is to provide a national focus for the federal effort to increase knowledge and promote effective strategies to deal with health problems and issues associated with the use and abuse of alcohol and drugs, and with mental illness and mental health. This includes federal programs to: expand knowledge of etiology, diagnosis, treatment and prevention; train researchers and other personnel; gather data on extent of, and national response to, alcohol, drug abuse, and mental health problems; provide assistance to other federal agencies, state and other public and private organizations in their efforts to facilitate and expand programs for prevention and treatment of these problems; and provide information to the public and to scientists and other professionals about alcohol, drug abuse, and mental health problems. U.S. Customs Service The U.S. Customs Service collects the revenue from imports and enforces customs and related laws. Some of the responsibilities which Customs is specifically charged with are interdicting and seizing contraband, including narcotics and illegal drugs; and detecting and apprehending persons engaged in fraudulent practices designed to circumvent customs and related laws. Customs cooperates with and assists numerous government agencies in administering and enforcing over 400 statutory or regulatory requirements relating to international trade. It includes cooperation with the DEA and working with foreign governments in suppressing the traffic in illegal narcotics through training in tactical interdiction. Customs is extensively involved with outside commercial and policy organizations and trade associations, and with international organizations and foreign customs services. Customs is a member of the multinational Customs Cooperation Council, the Cabinet Committee to Combat Terrorism, and the International Narcotics Control Program. In addition, Customs participates in and supports the activities and programs of various international organizations and agreements. Headquarters of the U.S. Customs Service is located in Washington, D.C. The 50 states, plus the Virgin Islands and Puerto Rico, are divided into seven customs regions. Contained within these regions are 46 subordinate district or area offices under which there are approximately 300 ports of entry. OTHER AGENCIES INVOLVED IN DRUG INTERDICTION In addition to the agencies listed above, several other federally sponsored organizations have been created during the last decade to help control the flow of illegal drugs into the United States. The ever increasing participation of elements of the Department of Defense should be apparent. El Paso Intelligence Center (EPIC) Established in 1977, the El Paso Intelligence Center (EPIC) integrates all drug information available from all agencies involved in efforts against drug trafficking. EPIC shares the intelligence it produces with all interested federal and state agencies. EPIC is operated by the DEA and is staffed by several agencies to include: DEA, FBI, U.S. Customs Service, U.S. Coast Guard, Immigration and Naturalization Service (INS), Federal Aviation Administration (FAA), Internal Revenue Service (IRS), U.S. Marshalls and the Bureau of Alcohol, Tobacco and Firearms.3 South Florida Task Force (SFTF) The South Florida Task Force (SFTF) was created in February 1982 at the direction of President Reagan. It was established in order to counter the activities of drug traffickers who had run rampant in the Miami area for years. The SFTF membership was comprised of representatives from 19 federal, state and local law enforcement and drug control agencies.4 The President appointed Vice President Bush as the Chairman of the SFTF. Support was requested from the DOD, and the Army, Navy, Air Force, and Marine Corps all provided assets.5 The SFTF was so successful that during October 1982, 12 additional task forces were created throughout the United States. These new Organized Crime Drug Enforcement Task Forces (OCDETFs) were similar to the SFTF except for one major difference: their purpose was to investigate rather than to interdict drug smugglers.6 National Narcotics Border Interdiction System (NNBIS) The National Narcotics Border Interdiction System (NNBIS) was also created at the direction of President Reagan. Established in March 1983, Vice President Bush was also placed in charge of the NNBIS. The purpose of the NNBIS is to interdict the flow of illicit drugs entering the United States. Creation of the NNBIS was precipitated by the success of the SFTF. It seems that SFTF activities forced many of the drug traffickers to move their operations to other states along the eastern seaboard and gulf coast.7 The NNBIS became operational in June 1983 with the establishment of six regional centers located in Miami, New Orleans, El Paso, Long Beach, Chicago and New York. The DOD is very active in the NNBIS. Marine Corps, Navy, Air Force and Army personnel are assigned full time duty to each of the six regional center "to provide expert advice on resources capable of supporting civil law enforcement agencies incidental to normal operations and training."8 The Marine Corps currently has four staff sergeants permanently assigned to the NNBIS; one is stationed at each of the following centers: Miami, New Orleans, El Paso and Long Beach.9 The NNBIS has used a wide variety of DOD capabilities and equipment. Too numerous to detail here, the types of DOD support which has been provided is discussed in Chapter V. WHO'S IN CHARGE? Thus several agencies share the responsibility and authority for drug interdiction. The three primary agencies are located in different federal departments: the Drug Enforcement Administration is in the Justice Department, the U.S. Coast Guard is in the Department of Transportation, and the U.S. Customs Service is in the Treasury Department. All the agencies compete for funding. They cite statistics on how well they have performed their drug interdiction mission in order to justify their budgets. This has, in the past, caused keen competition and fostered a lack of cooperation between agencies that share a common goal.10 Rivalries and "turf guarding" by both federal and state agencies charged with drug law enforcement have sometimes produced greater individual rather than coordinated effort, has promoted secrecy rather than shared intelligence, and has fueled petty inter-agency jealousies.11 The spirit of competition and mistrust between agencies detracts from the total effort. It is not clear whether this problem is getting batter or worse. Several articles used during the research for this report presented examples from actual interdiction operations that indicate a high degree of inter-agency cooperation and coordination.12 However, several authorities who have studied this issue have also highlighted instances of bickering and petty inter-agency squabbling. A 29 September 1986 article in The Washington Post carried the headline "Turf Battle Escalates in Antidrug War" and presented details on three current feuds (DEA vs. Customs; Customs vs. Coast Guard; and the State Department and DEA vs. Customs) precipitated by the scramble for increased FY87 funds.13 Who is in charge of the United States' anti-drug effort? Is it the DEA, Customs Service, or Coast Guard? The answer is that nobody is in charge. There is no single person, or any one agency, with the overall responsibility for managing all aspects of either the drug interdiction or total national anti-drug effort. There is no one person, office or agency responsible for developing a comprehensive national policy on drugs. Vice President Bush is the senior member and Chairman of both the SFTF and NNBIS, but he is not in charge of the total national effort. The notion of putting one person in charge is not new. Creation or establishment of a "drug czar" to direct and control all the anti-drug effort has been proposed by others.14 An early version of H.R. 5484, the "Omnibus Drug Enforcement, Education, and Control Act of 1986," contained a proposal for the establishment of a drug-control "czar." However, this initiative was not contained in the the final bill.15 CHAPTER IV NATIONAL STRATEGY TO COMBAT ILLEGAL DRUGS The first federal stategy to counter the threat posed by illegal drugs was released in 1982. It was revised by the White House Drug Abuse Policy Office in 1984. The revised federal strategy was then adopted by the National Narcotics Drug Enforcement Policy Board as the "1984 National Strategy for the Prevention of Drug Abuse and Drug Trafficking."1 A passage in the 1984 strategy explained the difference between it and the 1982 strategy. It stated: The 1984 strategy goes beyond the Federal responsibilities and established a comprehensive national strategy where all individuals, and all agencies, departments and activities within each level of government are called upon to lead, direct, sponsor and support efforts to eliminate drug abuse in families, business and communities.2 Our "National Strategy" is composed of five principal elements, each directed at one part of the overall drug problem. The elements of the National Strategy call for actions aimed at: 1. Reducing the quantity of illegal drugs entering the the U.S. by bringing political and economic pressure to bear on drug producing countries. 2. Increasing the resources available to domestic law enforcement agencies to improve coordination and cooperation. 3. Increasing basic research concerning the nature of drug abuse, and towards improving intelligence gathering and drug eradication techniques. 4. Improving medical detoxification and treatment programs. 5. Assisting in drug abuse prevention through greater drug education efforts.3 The National Strategy remains the principal document guiding the war on drugs. However, in August 1986 President Reagan announced "six major goals of what we hope will be the final stage in out national strategy to eradicate drug abuse."4 The six goals in what he called "a national crusade against drugs" included: 1. "...to seek a drug-free workplace for all Americans." 2. "...drug-free schools from grade schools through universities." 3. "...ensuring the public is protected and those involved in drugs are treated." 4. "...international cooperation.... our goal is nothing less than the full and active support and cooperation of every country with which the United States must work to defeat international drug trafficking." 5. "...strengthening law enforcement." 6. Efforts to "expand public awareness and prevention."5 In elaborating upon the fourth goal listed above, President Reagan said: Earlier this year I raised the priority of drug abuse by declaring it a threat to our national security. ... we can take additonal steps to expand our joint efforts in affecting or attacking drug and narcotic traffickers at the source; continue Vice President Bush's initiatives to increase the support given by the United States military to drug law enforcement operations whenever it's appropriate....6 The goals and initiatives enunciated by the President during 1986 mesh closely with the existing 1984 National Strategy. Therefore, a new or revised National Strategy on drug abuse is not expected. CHAPTER V DEPARTMENT OF DEFENSE INVOLVEMENT POSSE COMITATUS ACT The U.S. Armed Forces have traditionally and legally been restricted from participating in civilian law enforcement by a long-standing legal statute known as the Posse Comitatus Act. The concept of posse comitatus, which literally means "power of the country," is derived from English common law. It was a concept whereby the sheriff could call upon all persons aged 15 years and older to assist him in the prevention of civil unrest.1 After the American Civil War, Army generals commanded the five military districts into which the South had been divided. In so doing, the occupying Federal troops assumed full responsibility for maintaining law and order. The amount of force used to enforce laws and suppress labor strife was sometimes excessive. As soon as the southern states reacquired representation in Congress, their representatives and senators acted to prevent such practices in the future. In 1878 Congress passed an amendment to an Army appropriations bill which prohibited the use of the Army or other federal armed force as a "posse comitatus" to enforce civilian laws. The Posse Comitatus Act was subsequently codified into law, becoming Section 1385 of Title 18 (Crimes and Criminal Procedure) United States Code. The Posse Comitatus Act has been amended only twice since its enactment on 18 June 1878. In 1956 a reference to the Air Force was added to reflect the separation of the Air Force from the Army. The Act was again amended in 1959 to eliminate provisions which made it inapplicable in Alaska. The Act is brief and the wording is straightforward. It reads as follows: Whoever, except in cases and under circumstances expressly authorized by the Constitution or Act of Congress, willfully uses any part of the Army or the Air Force as a posse comitatus or otherwise to execute the laws shall be fined not more than $10,000 or imprisoned not more than two years, or both. Title 18 U.S.C. Sec. 1385 The Act makes no mention of the Navy or Marine Corps, and the reason for their exclusion is unclear.2 Perhaps the fact that the original Act was part of an Army appropriations bill, and was primarily enacted as a result of Army abuses during reconstruction, helps to explain the omission of refernce to the naval service. The Navy officially recognized the implicit applicability of the Posse Comitatus Act to itself in 1974 when it promulgated SECNAVINST 5820.7. This instruction contained a caveat stating that the Act did not apply specifically to the Navy, which is, of course, technically correct. It permitted the Navy to employ its forces in civilian law enforcement actions subject to the approval of the Secretary of the Navy. In so doing, the principle of civilian control over the military was maintained because the Secretary of the Navy, a civilian official, had to authorize any such use.3 It is interesting to note that no one has ever been charged or prosecuted under the Posse Comitatus Act.4 Note also that under the phrase--"... except in cases and under circumstances expressly authorized by the Constitution or Act of Congress..." of the Act, the military may be used "to execute the laws." Congress and the courts have generally recognized that the military may be used for specific actions involving civil disorders, disasters, and threats to federal property. The military has also, at times, been used to enforce civil laws in instances involving protection of federal and foreign officials, enforcement of U.S. Customs and neutrality laws, and in executing warrants relating to civil rights violations. In light of the very few exceptions traditionally permitted under the Posse Comitatus Act, it seemed that the military was clearly prohibited by the Act from daily or routine involvment in matters of civil law enforcement. President Reagan entered office in 1981 and instituted a "get tough" policy on drug law enforcement. National interest in drug abuse was high and Congress mobilized to develop new policies to fight the "war on drugs." The idea of using DOD resources to interdict smugglers was proposed and quickly became very popular with the politicians. The DOD objected to using military forces for day-to-day drug interdiction and law enforcement on grounds that use of military forces for that purpose was a violation of the Posse Comitatus Act. But Congress responded to requests from civilian law enforcement agencies who wanted more flexibility in the interpretation of the statute by proposing legislation to clarify the Act. In the end, and after considerable debate, the Posse Comitatus Act under Title 18 was not changed. However, new legislation was enacted under Title 10 (Armed Forces) U.S.C. to clarify the DOD's relationship and responsibilities for civil law enforcement. On 1 December 1981, President Reagan signed the Department of Defense Authorization Act of 1982. This Act was also known as Public Law 97-86 and has been frequently referred to incorrectly as the Revised Posse Comitatus Act. Section 908 of P.L. 97-86 did not change the Posse Comitatus Act. Rather it added a new chapter to Part I (Organization and General Military Powers) to Subtitle A (General Military Law) to Title 10 U.S.C. The new chapter, Chapter 18, was titled "Military Cooperation with Civilian Law Enforcement Officials," and it clarified the restrictions concerning military assistance to civilian law enforcement agencies imposed by the Posse Comitatus Act. Chapter 18 contained eight sections. A feel for the focus of the new chapter can be obtained by simply reviewing the eight section headings. These are: Sec. 371. Use of information collected during military operations. Sec. 372. Use of military equipment and facilities. Sec. 373. Training and advising civilian law enforcement officials. Sec. 374. Assistance by Department of Defense personnel. Sec. 375. Restriction on direct participation by military personnel. Sec. 376. Assistance not to affect adversely military preparedness. Sec. 377. Reimbursement. Sec. 378. Nonpreemption of other law. The new chapter filled a page and a half within Title 10 and greatly expanded the permitted level of military involvement in civil law enforcement activities. Without reproducing the entire chapter here, or citing specific sections, the most important provisions can be outlined as follows: 1. The Secretary of Defense: a. may: (1) provide to federal, state or local civilian law enforcement officials any information collected during the normal course of military operations that may be relevant to a violation of any federal or state law. (2) make available any equipment, base facility, or research facility of the Army, Navy, Air Force, or Marine Corps to any federal, state, or local civilian law enforcement official for law enforcement purposes. (3) assign members of the Army, Navy, Air Force and Marine Corps to provide expert advice and to train federal, state, and local civilian law enforcement officials in the operation and maintenance of the DOD equipment made available. (4) assign personnel to operate and maintain the DOD equipment made available only to the extent the equipment is used to monitor and communicate the movement of air and sea traffic. b. shall issue regulations: (1) to insure that the provision of any assistance (including the provision of any equipment or faciltiy or the assignment of any personnel) to any civilian law enforcement official does not include or permit direct participation by a member of the Army, Navy, Air Force, or Marine Corps in an interdiction of a vessel or aircraft, a search and seizure, arrest, or other similar activity. (2) to insure that the provision of any assistance does not adversely affect the military preparedness of the United States. (3) providing that reimbursement may be a condition of assistance to civilain law enforcement officials. 2. Nothing in the new chapter limits the authority of the executive branch in the use of military personnel or equipment for civilian law enforcement purposes beyond that provided for by existing law. It's clear that P.L. 97-86 put the DOD in the civilian law enforcement business. Although it reaffirmed the traditional prohibition against direct military involvement in law enforcement (i.e. arrests, searches, seizures or similar activity), it provided the Secretary of Defense with specific authority to use the Armed Forces for a variety of indirect assistance. DOD DIRECTIVE 5525.5 After the passage of P.L. 97-86, the DOD began to plan and formulate guidelines for increased military involvement in civilian law enforcement. The guidelines were formalized by the Assistant Secretary of Defense for Manpower, Reserve Affairs, and Logistics (ASD/MRA&L) and were issued by the Secretary of Defense on 22 March 1982 in the form of a DOD Directive.5 DOD Directive 5525.5 explained the requirements for employing DOD resources in support of law enforcement activity. The Directive stated that DOD would "cooperate with" civilian law enforcement officials to the "maximum extent possible."6 The Directive also required that the Secretary of Defense give prior approval before any Navy or Marine Corps personnel could participate in the interdiction of vessels or aircraft involved in illegal activity.7 Thus by 1982 the DOD had received a tremendous amount of legal and political pressure to increase its participation in civilian law enforcement. P.L. 97-86 cleared the way for active military involvement in the daily and routine enforcement of civil law, and civil drug laws in particular. The nature of support provided to civilian law enforcement agencies is discussed in the next section. DOD ASSISTANCE PROVIDED Much has been written about the types of DOD support provided in recent years to help stem the flow of illegal drugs entering the U.S. Research by others, and many articles in newspapers, magazines and professional military journals have documented the types of military support provided so thoroughly that much of this information is now common knowledge. Accordingly, in the discussion that follows, only support which is relatively recent or which has not been widely reported is provided with a reference. The purpose of this section is to highlight some of the support provided to civilian agencies for drug law enforcement in recent years. Though generally unclassified, details concerning some of the DOD's activities in this area, as well as plans and proposals for future anti-drug operations, are classified and cannot be discussed here. The U.S. Armed Forces' efforts have sometimes been interservice in nature. However, for clarity and ease of presentation, the following information is presented by service component. U.S. Marine Corps Marine Corps OV-10D Bronco aircraft have been used to identify, evaluate and track suspected drug smuggling aircraft both visually during daylight hours and with the forward looking infra-red (FLIR) detection system during hours of darkness. In 1984, OV-10s logged 1,354.6 hours on 391 sorties while performing this mission.8 Additionally, RF-4B aircraft have been used to provide aerial multisensor imagery of ground sites.9 It has been proposed that Marine Corps helicopters from the 4th Marine Air Wing could also be employed in the drug interdiction effort. 10 The Marine Corps has also provided ground radar surveillance equipment and the personnel for its operation. SCAMP assets have been used in southern California to detect smugglers crossing the U.S.-Mexico border.11 All Marine Corps support provided thus far has been within the continental United States.12 U.S. Navy U.S. Navy P-3C Orion, S-3A Viking and E-2C Hawkeye aircraft have all flown missions in support of the drug interdiction effort. Navy aircraft have been employed since 1982 to provide intelligence on suspected drug smuggling surface and aerial targets which is then passed to the SFTF and/or the NNBIS. Navy support has been considerable. In 1984, Navy E-2C and P-3C aircraft logged more than 4,800 hours on more than 900 sorties to search for smugglers.13 Surveillance flights have been flown off the east coast of Florida, throughout the Caribbean and Gulf of Mexico, and over the Pacific Ocean off the coasts of Mexico and California. Once seized by the Coast Guard, Navy ships have been used to tow or escort seized drug vessels and to transport prisoners to port, thus permitting Coast Guard cutters to remain on station longer. Navy ships in the Caribbean and Gulf of Mexico have frequently carried U.S. Coast Guard Tactical Law Enforcement Teams (TACLETs) who have search, seizure and arresting authority on the high seas. TACLETs are discussed later in the report. A Navy hydrofoil squadron composed of six ships has been particularly effective in interdiciting drug traffickers in the waters around the Florida Keys.14 Patrolling and interdicting smugglers' vessels is nearly a perfect match with the squadron's wartime mission. This is an example of how military support of the drug interdiction effort can sometimes present an opportunity for realistic training. U.S. Air Force The Air Force has provided a variety of support to the drug interdiction effort during the last several years. The Air Force has loaned more than 120 communications encryption devices to the Customs Service and has provided F-15 (AN/APG-63) radars to the Navy for installation in P-3A aircraft used to detect drug smugglers. Air Force E-3A Airborne Warning and Control System (AWACS) aircraft have flown aerial surveillance missions with Customs Service representatives on board. While training for anti-surface warfare strike operations over the Gulf of Mexico, B-52s have provided anti-drug maritime surveillance reports. Crews in C-130 Hercules aircraft have overflown suspect vessels for the Coast Guard during flights to and from Panama. Air Force RF-4Cs have provided aerial imagery of ships in the Gulf of Mexico, and the Military Airlift Command (MAC) has used C-141 Starlifters and WC-130 Hurricane Hunter aircraft to look for drug carrying aircraft. Air Force Civil Air Patrol members have patrolled known air smuggling corridors and have flown surveillance missions to look for possible drug smuggling vessels and potential remote airfields. Rotary-wing support has included the employment of UH-1N Huey helicopters in the Bahamas to quickly transport Bahamian police teams to remote sites used by traffickers. The Air Force has linked balloon-borne radars at Cape Canaveral and Cudjoe Key, Florida directly with the Customs Service command center in Miami. Additionally, information from 45 long-range ground-based radars located throughout the U.S. has been made available to other government agencies attempting to interdict smugglers. U.S. Army and National Guard The Army has loaned the Customs Service and the DEA a variety of both fixed-wing and rotary-wing aircraft. Loaned aircraft types include AH-1 Cobra, UH-1N Huey, OV-1D Mohawk, C-12D King Air and four of the Army's newest UH-60 Blackhawk helicopters. The Army has changed the way it trains some of its ground and airborne sensor operators at Fort Huachuca, Arizona. The new training takes advantage of the realistic challenge presented in trying to detect smugglers, and also provides valuable information to drug law enforcement officials. For example, aircrews training in the OV-1D Mohawk aircraft now make training flights along the U.S.-Mexico border where target areas are imaged with the Mohawk's sensor system. Information on possible contacts is passed to the Customs Service for action. Soldiers training at Fort Huachuca to become ground surveillance radar and sensor operators now participate in exercises on the border near Yuma, Arizona for a week at a time where they train in detecting intruders. The information they collect is passed to U.S. Border Patrol officers. In 1976 Hawaii became the first state to use the National Guard in the war on drugs. Since the National Guard comes under state control (i.e. its commander-in-chief in peacetime is the governor), the National Guard does not come under the restrictions of the Posse Comitatus Act and may be used to assist local police for civilian law enforcement problems.14 Therefore, during regular periods of state active duty for training, the National Guard has provided support to domestic law enforcement officials. The use of the National Guard for drug interdiction has become very popular. During 1985 National Guard units in 20 states were used in this way.15 The Army and National Guard have loaned civilian agencies night vision equipment, provided specialized training in the employment of ground surveillance radar, and given civilian drug enforcement personnel access to rifle and pistol ranges. Finally, and as a result of P.L. 97-86, the Army's Military Police School at Fort McClellan, Alabama has provided support not directly related to the anti-drug effort. The type of assistance provided has generally involved training civilian officials in polygraph operations, physical security and counter-terrorism planning.16 OPERATIONS ON FOREIGN SOIL There have been a few occasions when U.S. military forces have provided direct support to anti-drug operations in foreign countries, and such assistance has only been provided at the request of the foreign government. Only two instances of U.S. military support of foreign interdiction efforts have been widely reported and well documented. Both operations, one in the Bahamas and one in Bolivia, have been limited in scope or duration. Operations in the Bahamas The U.S. Armed Forces began providing support to the Bahamian police force in May 1983 after an agreement was reached between the Bahamian government and the U.S. State Department. Known as Operation BAT, unarmed U.S. Air Force helicopters and aircrews have been used to carry DEA agents and SWAT-type teams of the Royal Bahamian Police Strike Force to remote island sites used by drug traffickers.17 The Air Force merely provided rapid transportation, for it is the Bahamian authorities who do the actual searching, seizing and arresting. Seemingly unimportant, such assistance is in reality a major effort in the war on drugs. BAT is an acronym which comes from Bahamas, Antilles and Turks--three Caribbean island chains which are used by drug traffickers as fueling and transshipment points. The U.S. Government estimates that in 1983 and 1984 approximately 70% of the cocaine entering the United States passed through the Bahamas!18 The Air Force has provided two UH-1N Huey helicopters and 12 to 22 associated aircrew and maintenance personnel in support of Operation BAT.19 The helicopters and crews are a special detachment from the 20th Special Operations Squadron regularly stationed at Hurlburt Field in Florida. The two Hueys supporting Operation BAT are stationed at Nassau in the Bahamas, and are reported to be specially equipped with long-range fuel tanks, high-frequency radios, special navigation equipment, and radar altimeters.20 The U.S. Army has also participated in Operation BAT. The Army has occasionally provided two UH-60 Blackhawk helicopters and crews.21 Operation BAT has been moderately successful. By August 1984, it had accounted for the arrest of more than 80 drug traffickers and for the seizure of 196,000 pounds of marijuana and 2,600 pounds of cocaine. The estimated street value of the seized drugs was about $1 billion.22 As of 31 October 1985, more than 3,110 hours had been flown in support of Operation BAT, and the operation had netted 260,687 pounds of marijuana and 9,012 pounds of cocaine, and 173 traffickers had been arrested.23 However, the success of the operation has not been without its costs. In January 1984 one of the helicopters crashed at sea killing three Air Force crew members, a DEA agent, and a Bahamian policeman.24 Operations in Bolivia On 14 July 1986 six U.S. Army UH-60 Blackhawk helicopters and about 160 supporting troops arrived in Bolivia at the request of the Bolivian government to help their police conduct raids on cocaine processing facilities. The U.S. support was initially expected to last between 60 and 90 days.25 In actuality, support was provided for about six months.26 As in Operation BAT, the U.S. helicopters were used to rapidly ferry specially trained Bolivian civilian anti-drug strike force personnel to sites from which raids were launched on suspected or known cocaine processing facilities. This was the first time that U.S. forces had been used in a narcotics control mission on foreign soil since President Reagan signed a National Security Decision Directive in April 1986 which designated the international drug trade as a threat to our national security.27 Known as Operation Blast Furnace, the Bolivian operation was substantially different from Operation BAT. The U.S. troops sent to Bolivia carried a full complement of weapons, including machine guns. However, the rules of engagement agreed upon with the Bolivian government only permitted the U.S. troops to use their weapons if fired upon first.28 The troops were well armed because the possibility of a hostile engagement was considered to be much higher than in the Bahamas. This was because the target of the Bolivian operation was cocaine processing labs rather than transshipment facilities, and processing facilities tend to require more personnel who may not have access to an immediate means of escape.29 No Americans were reported killed during the operation. Operation Blast Furnace also differed from the Bahamian operation in the quantity of support provided. The Bolivian operation involved three times as many helicopters and about ten times as many U.S. servicemen. Two processing labs had been seized by 28 July 1986.30 A total of 21 labs were seized before Operation Blast Furnace wound down in December 1986. There were so few processing labs in operation during the height of the operation that the coca growers' asking price dropped from $100 to about $15 per 100 pounds of coca leaf. The estimated cost of producing 100 pounds of leaf is $40.31 So the operation demonstrated that long-term interdiction of cocaine processing can make the price of coca leaf drop drastically to the point where its cultivation is no longer economical. The Blast Furnace effort was effective only as long as it was in operation. A 5 February 1987 article in The Washington Post carried the headline, "Bolivia's Coca Output Restored, Officials Say--Impact of U.S.-Aided Raids Found Fleeting." The article quoted a source identified only as "a drug intelligence specialist" who said that despite "180 days of seven-days-a-week work, everything is back to where it was the day we started."32 Some have suggested that cocaine production in Bolivia will only be reduced by the widespread eradication of coca crops, by continuing the raids on cocaine processing labs, and by using government sponsored incentives to encourage coca farmers to cultivate other crops.33 But this is a big task. The Bolivian coca crop is estimated to be approximately 50,000 metric tons annually. It generates about $450 million in revenue each year. That figure is approximately equal to the sum of Bolivia's legal exports.34 U.S. COAST GUARD EXPERIENCES The U.S. Coast Guard is organized under the Department of Transportation. It is not normally a military service under the Department of Defense in time of peace. However, this is an appropriate place to discuss the role of the Coast Guard in the overall drug interdiction effort. The Coast Guard has become the primary agency responsible for enforcing federal law at sea because the Armed Forces are prohibited from performing law enforcement functions by the Posse Comitatus Act. Section 2 of Title 14 U.S.C. outlines the Coast Guard's primary duties by stating in part: The Coast Guard shall enforce or assist in the enforcement of all applicable Federal laws on and under the high seas and waters subject to the jurisdiction of the United States. The Coast Guard is also tasked with promoting safety of life and property at sea, rescue, maritime navigation, icebreaking and maintaining a state of readiness so as to funciton in times of war as a specialized service of the U.S. Navy. Section 84 of Title 14 U.S.C. outlines the Coast Guard's law enforcement jurisdiction by stating in part: The Coast Guard may make inquires, examinations, inspections, searches, seizures and arrests upon the high seas and water over which the U.S. has jurisdiction, for the prevention, detection and suppression, of violations of laws of the United States. For such purposes, commissioned, warrant, and petty officers may at any time go on board any vessel subject to the jurisdiction, or to the operation of any law, of the United States, address inquiries to those on board, examine the ship's documents and papers, and examine, inspect, and search the vessel and use all necessary force to compel compliance. The Coast Guard began active drug interdiction effort in 1973. The quantity of drugs seized and arrests made was relatively small during the period from 1973 to 1975. Seizures took a dramatic jump in 1977 and have generally increased every year since.35 Increased Coast Guard effectiveness is due in part to the better combined effort and cooperation between all of the agencies working on the drug problem. In 1973, very little intelligence was shared by agencies responsible for drug law enforcement. These federal and state agencies frequently acted more like rivals rather than allies in the effort to stop the flow of illicit drugs. An October 1980 article in the United States Naval Institute Proceedings pointed out that the Coast Guard was poorly equipped to deal effectively with drug smuggling. They had insufficient personnel, inadequate resources, and much of their equipment was out of date. The article concluded that the obvious solution to improving Coast Guard effectiveness in the area of drug interdiction was to use the Navy to augment the Coast Guard's forces.36 In response to an April 1982 letter from Secretary of Transportation Drew Lewis, Jr., and a July 1982 memorandum from Secretary of the Navy John Lehman, Secretary of Defense Caspar Weinberger authorized the Navy to support the Coast Guard in four specific areas: (1) air and surface surveillance, (2) towing or escort of seized vessels and transportation of prisoners, (3) logistic support to Coast Guard units, and (4) embarkation of Coast Guard personnel on Navy ships to conduct law enforcement boardings of U.S.-flag and stateless vessels.37 A weakness in Coast Guard operations is that in order for the Coast Guard to board ships sailing under a foreign flag in international waters, the U.S. Government must first contact and obtain permission from the foreign government, a procedure that can take days. The last provision listed above resulted in the almost immediate creation of Tactical Law Enforcement Teams (TACLETs). The TACLETs are specially trained and heavily armed boarding parties composed of two officers and about 12 enlisted personnel. They are embarked on some Navy surface ships in the Caribbean and Gulf of Mexico for about 30 days at a time. Suspect vessels are approached and stopped by the Navy ship. The TACLET then boards and conducts a search. If drugs are found, the vessel is seized and the crew is arrested. The use of TACLETs has been a success. Now drug traffickers must be wary of any and all Navy vessels they encounter. The drug interdiction mission has been expensive for the Coast Guard. More than twenty percent of the Coast Guard's operating budget for FY81 was spent on drug interdiction, and the percentage has undoubtedly increased since then.38 P.L. 99-570 (discussed in the next Chapter) contains a hefty $188 million increased appropriation authorization in FY87 for direct and indirect support of Coast Guard drug interdiction efforts.39 CHAPTER VI RECENT ACTIONS IN CONGRESS--THE OMNIBUS DRUG BILL BACKGROUND The cocaine-related deaths of Len Bias, a University of Maryland basketball star, on 19 June 1986, and Don Rogers, a free safety for the Cleveland Browns football team, one week later touched off a national outpouring of concern about drug abuse. The deaths of these two star athletes became the catalyst for a flurry of legislative activity. In a few short weeks the issue of drug abuse had captured public attention. Aware of the pressure for a new drug law, politicians rushed to produce legislation in plenty of time to use it as a campaign issue during the fall 1986 general elections. House Speaker Thomas P. "Tip" O'Neill, Jr., announced that the House would, in his words, "wage a legislative war against drugs that is equal to the devastating battle being waged by those who make a living injecting poison into the bloodstream of our country."1 The Speaker directed the House committee chairmen to produce a package of anti-drug legislation for House action by 10 September 1986. H.R. 5484 On 8 September 1986, House Majority Leader Jim Wright introduced H.R. 5484 titled the "Omnibus Drug Enforcement, Education, and Control Act of 1936." The title page of the 365- page Act gives as its purpose: To strengthen Federal efforts to encourage foreign cooperation in eradicating illicit drug crops and in halting international drug traffic, to improve enforcement of Federal drug laws and enhance interdiction of illicit drug shipments, to provide strong Federal leadership in establishing effective drug abuse prevention and education programs, to expand Federal support for drug abuse treatment and rehabilitation efforts, and for other purposes. The Act was divided into 12 sections and then referred to following committees, according to their jurisdiction: 1. Foreign Affairs 2. Armed Services 3. Ways and Means 4. Merchant Marine and Fisheries 5. Banking, Finance and Urban Affairs 6. Judiciary 7. Public Works and Transportation 8. Education and Labor 9. Energy and Commerce 10. Post Office and Civil Service 11. Interior and Insular Affairs 12. Government Operations A quick glance at the large number of House committees that had a hand in drafting H.R. 5484 gives some indication as to just how broad based and far-reaching this legislation was. The provisions contained in this draft version of the Act would have had the most significant impact on drug law enforcement since the clarification of the Posse Comitatus statute in 1981, and, therefore, warrants additional analysis and discussion. H.R. 5484 was debated on the floor of the House on 10 and 11 September 1986. During the debates some 50 amendments were considered. Two controversial proposed amendments drew the most discussion and press coverage. Representative George W. Gekas (R-Pa.) offered an amendment to permit imposition of the death penalty in drug related murder cases. The amendment was approved by the House by a vote of 296 to 112.2 This amendment, however, fused the drug problem with the issue of capital punishment, thus further complicating an already complex issue. The other amendment was known as the "Hunter Amendment." Named after its author, Representative Duncan L. Hunter (R- Calif.), it would have authorized "the President to deploy sufficient military and National Guard personnel and equipment to halt the entry of vessels and aircraft carrying drugs." The amendment would have also authorized military personnel to make arrests.3 The amendment required the military to provide "continuous aerial radar coverage of the southern border of the United States" and to "pursue and seize intruding aircraft thought to be carrying illegal drugs." In the anything goes atmosphere of anti-drug excitement that swept the House, this proposal was also adopted, though by the somewhat narrower margin of 237 to 177.4 The final House vote on H.R. 5484, as amended, came on 11 September 1986 and it passed by the overwhelming vote of 392 to 16. Cost was apparently no object. The projected cost of implementing the House proposal was $1.7 billion in FY87 alone, and about $3 billion more over the next three years. S. 2787 Shortly after the House began drafting H.R. 5484, the Senate began work on their own equivalent version of H.R. 5484. The Senate bill, S. 2787, was introduced by Senate Majority Leader Robert J. Dole (R-Kan.) and Senate Minority Leader Robert C. Byrd (D-W.Va.) on 25 September 1986. At 250 pages, the Senate bill was a scaled-down version of the House anti-drug resolution. As drafted, S. 2787 did not contain a death penalty provision, and it provided only limited authority for military forces to assist civilian law enforcement agencies in drug interdiction activities. The section of the Senate bill that addressed DOD assistance permitted the DOD to loan personnel to civilian law enforcement agencies to operate and maintain equipment used by those agencies, and to assist foreign governments in drug interdiction activities. The bill also allowed military personnel to intercept vessels and aircraft for the purpose of identifying, monitoring, and communicating the location and movement of the vessel or aircraft until such time as federal, state, and local law enforcement officials could assume responsibility.5 The Senate reduced or eliminated many of the House supported provisions contained in H.R. 5484. A death penalty proposal was introduced but was not included in the Senate bill. Senator Alan J. Dixon (D-Ill.) introduced a military employment proposal, which he characterized as a scaled-back version of the proposal approved by the House. His proposal would have required the President to deploy military equipment and personnel to locate, pursue and seize drug-carrying vessels and aircraft, and to arrest suspected offenders in cases of hot pursuit. As an aside, the President was opposed to any bill which would mandate military involvement in drug interdiction. The Senate defeated the proposal to use the military directly in drug interdiction by a vote of 72 to 14.6 After three days of debate, during which time 47 amendments were considered, the Senate adopted, by voice vote, S. 2787 as a substitute amendment to H.R. 5484. H.R. 5484 was then adopted by a vote of 97 to 2. The FY87 cost of the Senate package was projected to be $1.4 billion (i.e. $300 million less than the bill passed by the House on 11 September 1986). HOUSE AND SENATE NEGOTIATIONS ON H.R. 5484 As the second session of the 99th Congress was coming to a close, the House and Senate spent much of their time working out the details of the anti-drug legislation. The Senate and House each insisted on their amendments and met in conference to negotiate a compromise bill. The death penalty provision was the main sticking point which held up Senate and House agreement on a final version of the bill. Here is what was happening--the House would put the death penalty provision back into H.R. 5484 and pass the bill as amended; then the Senate would take the death penalty provision out and pass the bill as amended, etc. The bill was finally agreed to by both Houses on 17 October 1987 after the Senate approved a provision for a mandatory life sentence without parole in the same type of drug related murder cases in which the House version of the bill had permitted the death penalty. The House approved the final version of the bill by a vote of 378 to 16. The Senate approved the measure by voice vote.7 Here then is a summary of the legislative activity which led to passage of H.R. 5484: 8 Sept 1986 - H.R. 5484 introduced. 11 Sept 1986 - Passed House, amended. 26 Sept 1986 - H.R. 5484 contents replaced by S. 2787. 30 Sept 1986 - Passed Senate, amended. 8 Oct 1986 - Senate amendment accepted by House, with an amendment. 15 Oct 1986 - Senate concurred in House amendment to the Senate amendment with another amendment. 17 Oct 1986 - House concurred in Senate amendments to House amendments, with amendments. Then the Senate agreed to the House amendment to the Senate amendment to the House amendments to the Senate amendments.8 In the end, the role of the military in drug interdiction efforts, as specified in the final version of the bill, was not significantly different from what was stated in the original version of S. 2787. ANTI-DRUG ABUSE ACT OF 1986 After passage by both Houses, H.R. 5484 became P.L. 99-570-- The Anti-Drug Abuse Act of 1986. President Reagan signed it into law on 27 October 1986. He called the Act a "major victory" in the war against drugs. P.L. 99-570 is 480 pages long and contains 15 titles. It also contains several amendments which are totally unrelated to drug control. Among them are provisions for determining elegibility of the homeless for welfare benefits, a national truck and bus driver licensing system, and establishment of new quality and purity safeguards for infant formula.9 P.L. 99-570 authorizes $1.7 billion for drug control in FY87. When this figure is added to the amount previously appropriated under other acts containing drug control legislation, federal drug control spending for FY87 now approaches a total of nearly $4 billion.10 PROs AND CONs OF MILITARY INVOLVEMENT As the flow of illegal drugs has continued to increase, and America's drug problem has gotten worse, our lawmakers have sought ways to improve the effectiveness of the anti-drug effort. The provisions of the Posse Comitatus statute were "clarified" to permit the employment of DOD resources for anti-drug operations. Various types of military support have been provided in this area, and recent events have led to a resurgence of interest in this issue during the last year. Last fall the time was right for lawmakers to try again to increase the role of the military in drug law enforcement. The employment of the Armed Forces in the anti-drug effort has always been a controversial issue, and feelings have run high among those who support or oppose it. Most of the pros and cons of military involvement in drug law enforcement were first enunciated during the debates concerning the revision of the Posse Comitatus statute in 1981 and have changed little since then. The following arguments, pro and con, have been grouped into general categories representing the aspects most frequently debated (e.g. Is military pariticpation proper? Is military participation necessary? etc.). Many of the specific pro and con arguments presented below have been drawn from the comments of our lawmakers as they debated the measures contained in H.R. 5484 last fall. However, the basic arguments have remained largely unchanged since 1981. Is Military Participation Proper? Pro - Yes, it is a proper role for the military. As former Senator Paula Hawkins (R-Fla.) has said, "The Congress did not go to the trouble of amending the Posse Comitatus just to have our wishes ignored."11 Indeed, a new chapter was added to Title 10 U.S.C. in 1981 specifically to permit the military to be used to support civilian law enforcement agencies for the purpose of reducing the flow of drugs. Con - Others have maintained that while it is legally permissible to use the military to support drug law enforcement, it may still not be a proper use of DOD assets. They point out that an identified but vague and indirect national security threat does not necessarily translate directly into a military mission.12 Some believe that from any perspective, using the military in what they believe is a civilian law enforcement matter violates the Posse Comitatus safeguard. Those that oppose military involvement in drug law enforcement maintain that it puts us on the road to becoming a "police state," or of turning us into a country with a form of government similar to that of a "banana republic." But the most common argument against military involvement in the war on drugs centers around the issue of military readiness or preparedness. In speaking against the Hunter Amendment to H.R. 5484, which would have greatly increased military participation in drug law enforcement and permitted the military to make searches, seizures and arrests within the United States, former Senator Barry Goldwater (R-Ariz.) said that expanded military involvement "would be devastating to military readiness . . . . "13 Echoing these sentiments, Representative Don Edwards (D-Calif.) said that "The impact on military preparedness has to be catastrophic. "14 Representative G. William Whitehurst (R- Va. ) , among others, has pointed out that as servicemen become more active in law enforcement there is an increased likelihood that military members could be called as witnesses in civilian courts, thus rendering them unavailable for training or deployments, and thereby hurting unit personnel readiness.15 In summary, it is generally argued that assigning the military a drug law enforcement mission would impose additional training requirements and would tie up DOD assets, all to the detriment of training and preparedness for the military's primary war-fighting missions. Is Military Participation Necessary? Pro - Many argue that the sheer size of the drug problem mandates drastic action. They say that tough times require tough measures, and that the nation should use every means available to interdict the traffickers. The vast amounts of money being made by the smugglers has allowed them to buy quantities of high-tech equipment that is no match for much of the Coast Guard or Customs Service equipment. The smugglers now have speed boats, many airplanes, automatic weapons, night vision devices, and sophisticated radars, navigation and communications equipment.16 Even with accurate intelligence, the Customs Service and Coast Guard lack the equipment necessary to detect, identify and track many of the drug-carrying ships and aircraft. The military has this capability, and proponents of greater military involvement argue that there is no reason why those assets should not be used for that purpose. Con - Many lawmakers feel that the other provisions added to the Anti-Drug Abuse Act of 1986 make changes in the role of the military unnecessary.17 The increased funding provided in the Act will do much to alleviate the chronic shortage of resources with which the civilian agencies have had to operate. Additionally, it is argued that civilian agencies (e.g. SFTF and NNBIS) are in place and all that is needed is to do a better job of organizing and coordinating their activities. Finally, they maintain that the NNBIS has been in operation about five years and already takes advantage of military capabilities. Does The Military Possess The Equipment To Do The Job? Pro - It is a fact that the DOD has the sophisticated equipment necessary to make a meaningful contribution to the drug interdiction effort. Proponents of increased military involvement are quick to point out that the military equipment that could be used is already paid for, in place, and, for the most part, readily available. The development and procurement costs have already been paid, and large quantities of state-of-the-art equipment and trained operators are available. Using the military for drug interdiction, they argue, is preferable to providing additional funding or new equipment to civilian agencies to upgrade their capabilities because the results of military participation would be immediate. Mr. John Lawn, the Administrator of the DEA, has estimated that he would need an additional 40,000 agents to effectively combat the current level of drug trafficking!18 Considering the $1 billion and amount of time required to recruit and train a large number of DEA agents, the immediate and less expensive results offered by greater military involvement make this option very attractive. Con - Most lawmakers agree that the military has the personnel and equipment necessary to essentially close our southern border to drug smugglers for some period of time. It would not be easy. It would require the commitment of a large amount of resources, but closing the border to smugglers is probably possible. Arguments against employing these assets fall into three general areas, each discussed in separate paragraphs below. It would be too expensive. Senator Goldwater estimates that using the military to close our southern border to drug traffickers would cost about $40 million a day.19 This action would require the dedicated support of a considerable amount of our military assets at a time when the DOD is being faced with budget cuts. A comprehensive plan is nonexistent for effectively employing the assets that would be required. It would be wasteful to use military resources without first developing a coherent plan for their employment. Some people doubt that even the DOD has enough personnel and equipment, not already committed elsewhere, to halt the flow of drugs into the United States. Again Senator Goldwater estimates that it would require more AWACS and E-2C Hawkeye aircraft than presently exist.20 Many of the AWACS and approximately thirty percent of the E-2C aircraft are deployed at any one time. Along this line, it is argued that increased military involvement would be a hardship for some military families. Many servicemen would spend more time deployed, and this, in turn, would hurt retention. Does The Drug Interdiction Mission Provide Good Training? Pro - Pilots must fly and aircrews must train. Proponents argue that searching for drug traffickers provides meaningful real- world training while also providing a valuable public service. Army initiatives in Arizona (discussed in Chapter V) show how slight modifications to existing training programs have served to both enhance training and assist law enforcement authorities. Con - Opponents argue that using the military for the direct interdiction, search, seizure and arrest of drug smugglers is not very good military training. Representative Whitehurst has pointed out that,"... persuing a drug aircraft gets a military pilot in the cockpit and provides very limited flight training, but in no way does it provide the kind of training in maneuverability, attack, and defense techniques that our pilots need to counter the Soviet threat."21 Will Using The Military For Drug Interdiction Work? Pro - Everyone agrees that the flow of illegal drugs can never be completely halted. However, many hold the opinion that committing the U.S. military to the effort is the single most powerful action that could be taken, and that military involvement is certain to produce results. Con - Opinions and arguments concerning the effectiveness of a military response is expressed no better than in the following quotes. We have found that throwing military resources at the problem by themselves results in no long-term benefit, and eventually does nothing but destroy the military readiness of the units without halting the drug flow. In essence, we have learned that we can use some of the capabilities of some military systems and units some of the time, to profitably support law enforcement operations. But if we try to substitute the military for adequate law enforcement, then it results in two negative effects. Military readiness to perform its wartime missions immediately suffers, and what we get is very expensive and not-very-successful interdiction for a short period of time.22 The Honorable Dan Daniels U.S. Representative From Va. 11 September 1986 Congress is now talking in terms of interdiction, of putting all of this money to blockade the borders. No. 1, that is impossible. And, No. 2, if we miraculously could put military people arm-to-arm to surround the United States to keep out cocaine and heroin, we would continue to have a substantial drug problem.23 Mr. John Lawn Administrator of the DEA September 1986 Should The Military Be Used For Drug Law Enforcement In Foreign Countries? Pro - Proponents of the employment of U.S. Armed Forces to aid civilian law enforcement authorities in foreign countries offer several arguments to support their position. They contend that the U.S. military is the only organization capable of countering powerful and well equipped multinational drug trafficking groups, many of whom have links with terrorist or insurgent organizations. The drug traffickers pose a threat to friendly foreign governments and, therefore, the drug interdiction mission on foreign soil is an appropriate U.S. military response, if invited by foreign governments. Drug interdiction operations could provide useful operational training. They argue that a U.S. military presence would add stability and an aura of incorruptability to drug law enforcement operations in a way that loaning equipment and supporting from a distance would not. They point out that corrupt foreign officials could misuse or hinder the effectiveness of loaned equipment. Finally, they believe that U.S. military support makes the host nation government stronger in the eyes of the people, and demonstrates America's commitment to drug control. It lets the traffickers know that the United States is serious and means business. Con - In addition to the arguments stated above (i.e. it detracts from readiness, violates Posse Comitatus provisions, and that it's really a civilian law enforcement function), critics of the employment of U.S. Armed Forces to aid civilian law enforcement authorities in foreign countries offer several additional reasons why this should not be done. Drug traffickers are known to be armed and dangerous. DEA agents and their families, and honest foreign judges, policemen and government leaders have been frequent targets of traffickers. U.S. servicemen participating in anti-drug operations would also become targets of the smugglers' violence. Some number of American servicemen would likely be killed or wounded. The presence of U.S. troops might help insurgents stir up anti-American sentiment among the people. U.S. support of host nation law enforcement agencies involved in human rights abuses would provide additional ammunition to the insurgents. It could also show the existing government as weak in having to request outside support. Critics point out that an active and successful U.S. military supported anti-drug offensive in one country would just cause the traffickers to relocate their operation in another country until such time as it was safe to return. Short-term efforts would be costly and ineffective. Finally, they argue that as U.S. military activity against the international drug trade is increased, some of the trafficking organizations might try to retaliate. U.S. servicemen or American citizens worldwide could become targets of "narco-terrorism." CHAPTER VII CONCLUSION America's drug problem developed over many years and it will require much time and sustained effort to substantially reduce this country's drug habit. Some progress is being made, particularly in the areas of improving coordination and intelligence sharing among the many federal, state, and local agencies participating in the drug interdiction effort. However, there is still room for improvement. There have been many anti-drug laws enacted in the United States in recent years. However the Anti-Drug Abuse Act of 1986 is the most comprehensive piece of legislation on drug control that the Congress has ever produced. The Anti-Drug Abuse Act of 1986 starts us on a new long-term effort to conquer drug abuse in America. This study has intentionally focused largely on a small part of the Act, that is, the provisions regarding U.S. military involvement in drug interdiction. However, the Act contains many other provisions which, when taken together, provide a comprehensive plan for combatting drug abuse. Interdiction is now recognized as but one aspect of drug control. The Act puts together, in one package, a collection of measures aimed at the three aspects of drug control necessary for effective treatment of the problem. Interdiction may be thought of as being in the middle of the problem, with foreign country illegal drug production and the American demand for illicit drugs being on either end. The Act contains measures designed to reduce both foreign production and American demand for drugs. Provisions in the Act will encourage foreign countries to increase their efforts against drug producers and traffickers. The Act provides funding for foreign narcotics control programs, and threatens the cut-off of U.S. assistance or denial of trade benefits for countries that do not make satisfactory progress in controlling their illicit drug problem. Provisions of the Act intended to reduce American demand include measures aimed at drug education, prevention, treatment and rehabilitation. The Act's three phase approach of: (1) eliminating drugs at the source, (2) interdicting drugs during shipment, and (3) reducing the American appetite for illegal drugs, establishes a plan which may eventually lead to effective drug control in America. But the plan will succeed only if the Congress continues to fund, and the President supports the provisions contained in the Act--a critical condition which may not be possible when one considers the serious budget deficit problem facing this nation. Actually, the nation needs a "drug czar." The author believes that someone should be placed in charge of the nation's overall anti-drug effort. Although inter-agency coordination and cooperation are improving, efforts are still sometimes duplicative and fragmented. What the interdiction effort needs now is better command, control, communications and intelligence (C3I). The "czar" should have a formal charter, and independent staff, and a separate budget. Vice President Bush is currently the senior member and Chairman of both the SFTF and NNBIS. He is very well informed on all aspects of current drug control activities and therefore would, in the author's opinion, make a fine "drug czar." But such a "czar" must have the authority to establish priorities and direct the effort. The "czar" would need three assistants. He would require someone: (1) from the State Department to coordinate and oversee efforts to reduce foreign drug production; (2) from either the DEA or Customs Service to control the interdiction efforts; and someone (3) with a Health and Human Services Administration background to coordinate domestic drug demand reduction efforts. Putting one person in charge of the interdiction mission would reduce inter-agency bickering, increase cooperation, and provide better overall results. Control could be improved through better inter-agency coordination, and by implementing standardized reporting and tracking procedures. Communications requires more discussion because there have been many problems in this area. Briefly stated, many of the agencies involved in interdiction do not have enough communications equipment, and much of the equipment found in one agency is frequently not compatible or interoperable with the equipment used by other agencies. When the equipment is compatible, radio discipline and security consciousness among the users is lacking and information is easily compromised. Communications security (i.e. encryption) equipment should be used on the voice radio nets used for interdiction. The traffickers have radios and know what frequencies are used for interdiction. For example, it has been reported that on four occasions, Operation BAT forces captured traffickers who had radios tuned to the primary drug interdiction frequencies. On two occasions, captured traffickers were found to have in their possession complete frequancy lists for radio nets of the SFTF.1 Intelligence offers great potential for increasing interdiction effectiveness. Human intelligence (HUMINT), defined by JCS Pub 1 as "A category of intelligence derived from information collected and provided by human sources," could be used both in foreign countries and here in the United States to determine who, when, where and how the traffickers are planning to transport a load of drugs. For obvious reasons, very little has been reported about how much drug-related HUMINT is being collected. This is a dangerous mission for the agents/informants providing this type of valuable information. It is certainly easier to catch a trafficker if you know when, where, and how he is going to enter the United States. After a careful consideration of all aspects of the issue, the author has concluded that it is proper for the military to play a supporting role in the drug interdiction effort. However, we must avoid overtaxing scarce DOD resources, and must ensure that the level of effort provided does not damage operational readiness. The U.S. military has provided a significant amount of support to the drug interdiction effort. Military assistance during the last few years has continued to increase and has made a difference. Seizures are up. Arrests are up. Yet American demand for drugs has continued to rise! Interdiction alone, even when supported by the military, cannot solve the problem. Our lawmakers must resist the temptation to mandate increased military involvement in the mistaken belief that increased use of the Armed Forces will either entirely solve the drug problem or seal off our borders to the impotation of drugs. In the author's opinion, the DOD will continue to receive pressure to increase its level of support to drug law enforcement agencies. The idea of giving the military a direct (rather than supporting) drug interdiction mission, with the power to search, seize and arrest, remains very popular with many of our lawmakers. The author predicts that the 100th Congress will revisit this issue. The same old arguments, pro and con, will be debated again, but it seems unlikely to the author that the military will be formally assigned a direct drug interdiction mission anytime soon. Congress will want to wait and see if their Anti-Drug Abuse Act of 1986 works, and the military should, for its own sake, hope that it does. NOTES ON CHAPTER I INTRODUCTION 1 Joseph F. Mudd, Colonel, USAF, Assigning DOD a Narcotics Interdiction Mission (National War College, Feb. 1986), 1. 2 Edwin M. Yoder, Jr., "We Know Who Will Lose The Drug War," The Washington Post, 18 Sept. 1986. 3 "Drug Control," Congressional Research Service Review, Jan. 1987, 29. 4 Harry L. Hogan, Federal Laws Relating to the Control of Narcotics and Other Dangerous Drugs, Enacted 1961-1985: Brief Summaries (Congressional Research Service, Rev. 15 Jan. 1986), pp. CRS-v to CRS-40. 5 National Narcotics Intelligence Consumers Committee (NNICC). Narcotics Intelligence Estimate 1984 (Drug Enforcement Administration, 1985), p. i. 6 Larry Martz, et al. "Trying to Say 'No,'" Newsweek, 11 Aug. 1986, 15. 7 Haynes Johnson, "Quick Fixes for the Drug Crisis," The Washington Post, 17 Sept. 1986. 8 John A. Barbour, "Drug Prevention Could Save U.S. $230 Billion Annually," Potomac News, 7 Jan 1987, 1. NOTES ON CHAPTER II ILLEGAL DRUGS--A THREAT TO NATIONAL SECURITY? 1 Raphael Perl, Policy Alert--Narcotics Control and the Use of U.S. Military Personnel: Operations in Bolivia and Issues for Congress (Congressional Research Service, 29 July 1986), p. CRS-3. 2 Norman G. Cooper, Colonel, USA, et al. The Pros and Cons of Military Intervention Into Drug Trafficking (Industrial College of the Armed Forces, Mar. 1986), 15. 3 Caspar W. Weinberger, Annual Report to the Congress for Fiscal Year 1988 [Executive Summary] (Department of Defense, 1987), 16. 4 Cooper, 16; National Narcotics Intelligence Consumers Committee (NNICC). Narcotics Intelligence Estimate 1984 (Drug Enforcement Administration, 1985), 58. 5 Cooper, 16. 6 NNICC, 9. 7 Cooper, 16. 8 Harry Anderson, et al. "The Evil Empire," Newsweek, 25 Feb. 1985, 18. 9 G. Thomas Morgan, Commander, USCG, The Search for a Successful Maritime Drug Interdiction Strategy (Air War College, May 1984), 12. NOTES ON CHAPTER III CONTROLLING THE FLOW--WHO'S IN CHARGE? 1 Joseph. T. Zadareky, Colonel, USAF, National Drug Policy: Fact or Fiction (National War College, Feb. 1986), 19. 2 "Federal Agencies Involved." The Congressional Digest, Nov. 1986, 261-2. 3 G. Thomas Morgan, Commander, USCG, The Search for a Successful Maritime Drug Interdiction Strategy (Air Command and Staff College, May 1984), 17. 4 Richard Ward Shurtleff, Major, USAF, The Air Force Involvement in Drug Interdiction--An Analysis (Air Command and Staff College, Apr. 1986), 13. 5 Joseph F. Mudd, Colonel, USAF, Assigning DOD a Narcotics Interdiction Mission (National War College, Feb. 1986), 3. 6 Morgan, 18. 7 Zadareky, 15. 8 Tony L. Wiggins, Major, USAF, U.S. Air Force Role in Drug Interdiction December 1981 to October 1985 (Air Command and Staff College, Apr. 1986), 13. 9 Rod Hughes, Major, USMC. Action Officer, Plans Division, Code PP&O, Headquarters, U.S. Marine Corps. Telephone interview. 6 Feb. 1987. 10 Thomas R. Friers, Major, USAF, DOD Involvement in the Interdiction of Illegal Drugs--A Staff Study (Air Command and Staff College, Apr. 1986), 17. 11 Morgan, 15. 12 R. Dean Tice, "Fighting the Drug Flow," Defense 86, May- June 1986, 14-17; Lawrence J. Korb, "Drug War Front," Defense 85, Feb. 1985, 17-20; Brian Hoey, "Fighting the Drug War," Airman, Aug. 1984, 8-11; Michael R. Adams, "Navy Narcs," Proceedings, U.S. Naval Institute, Sept. 1984, 35-37; Deborah G. Meyer, "The Scourge of Modern Pirates--The Military Battles a New Foe: The Drug Runner," Armed Forces Journal International, Apr. 1983, pp. 86, 88-89; William H. Taft, IV, "The Role of DOD in Civilian Law Enforcement," Defense 83, Mar. 1983, 6-9; and Charles N. Dragonette, "The Coast Guard and Drug Interdiction--A Kind of War," Sea Power, Aug. 1979, 16-18. 13 Jack Anderson, and Dale Van Atta, "Turf Battle Escalates in Antidrug War," The Washington Post, 29 Sept. 1986. 14 Norman G. Cooper, Colonel, USA, et al. The Pros and Cons of Military Intervention Into Drug Trafficking (Industrial College of the Armed Forces, Mar. 1986), 40. 15 Helen Dewar, "Senate Supports Antidrug Plan," The Washington Post, 19 Sept. 1986, p. A16. NOTES ON CHAPTER IV NATIONAL STRATEGY TO COMBAT ILLEGAL DRUGS 1 Joseph T. Zadareky, Colonel, USAF, National Drug Policy: Fact or Fiction (National War College, Feb. 1986), 18. 2 Ibid., 19. 3 Joseph F. Mudd, Colonel, USAF, Assigning DOD a Narcotics Interdiction Mission (National War College, Feb. 1986), 17. 4 United States. President. Administration of Ronald Reagan. (Washington, Aug. 1986), 1041. 5 Ibid., 1041-2. 6 Ibid. NOTES ON CHAPTER V DEPARTMENT OF DEFENSE INVOLVEMENT 1 Richard Ward Shurtleff, Major, USAF, The Air Force Involvement in Drug Interdiction--An Analysis (Air Command and Staff College, Apr. 1986), 3. 2 Michael R. Adams, "Navy Narcs," Proceedings, U.S. Naval Institute, Sept. 1984, 35. 3 Ibid. 4 Tony L. Wiggins, Major, USAF, U.S. Air Force Role in Drug Interdiction December 1981 to October 1983 (Air Command and Staff College, Apr. 1986), 3. 5 Shurtleff, 6. 6 Joseph F. Mudd, Colonel, USAF, Assigning DOD a Narcotics Interdiction Mission (National War College, Feb. 1986), 12. 7 Adams, 36. 8 Thomas R. Friers, Major, USAF, DOD Involvement in the Interdiction of Illegal Drugs--A Staff Analysis (Air Command and Staff College, Apr. 1986), 7. 9 Rod Hughes, Major, USMC. Action Officer, Plans Division, Code PP&O, Headquarters, U.S. Marine Corps. Telephone interview. 6 Feb. 1987. 10 R. Dean Tice, "Fighting the Drug Flow," Defense 86, May- June 1986, 17. 11 Hughes. Telephone interview. 6 Feb. 1987. 12 Ibid. 13 Friers, 7. 14 Jean Marie Brawders, "National Guard Fights War on Drugs," National Guard, June 1986, 25. 15 Ibid. 16 William H. Taft, IV, "The Role of DOD in Civilian Law Enforcement," Defense 83, Mar. 1983, 8. 17 Brian Hoey, "Fighting the Drug War," Airman, Aug. 1984, 10. 18 Ibid., pp. 10, 12. 19 Raphael Perl, Policy Alert--Narcotics Control and the Use of U.S. Military Personnel: Operations in Bolivia and Issues for Congress (Congressional Research Service, 29 July 1986), p. CRS-3; and Shurtleff, 16. 20 Hoey, 10. 21 Tice, 15. 22 Hoey, 13. 23 Friers, 11. 24 Hoey, 12. 25 Harry Hogan, Drug Traffic Control: Federal Efforts (Congressional Research Service, Updated 1 Feb. 1987), p. CRS-17. 26 Jay Mathews, "Bolivia's Coca Output Restored, Officials Say," The Washington Post, 6 Feb. 1987, p. A14. 27 Perl, p. CRS-3. 28 Ibid., p. CRS-1. 29 Ibid., p. CRS-3. 30 Ibid., p. CRS-2. 31 Mathews, p. A14. 32 Ibid. 33 Ibid. 34 Ibid. 35 G. Thomas Morgan, Commander, USCG, The Search for a Successful Maritime Drug Interdiction Strategy (Air Command and Staff College, May 1984), 23. 36 Adams, 35-36. 37 Ibid., 36. 38 Morgan, 24. 39 Harry Hogan, et al. Drug Control: Highlights of P.L. 99-570. Anti Drug Abuse Act of 1986 (Congressional Research Service, 31 Oct. 1986), p. CRS-9. NOTES ON CHAPTER VI RECENT ACTIONS IN CONGRESS--THE OMNIBUS DRUG BILL 1 Micheal Putzel, "Bias' Death Touches Off Stampede," Potomac News, 18 Sept. 1986. 2 Edward Walsh, "House Votes Antidrug Legislation," The Washington Post, 12 Sept. 1986, p. A8. 3 "Recent Action in the Congress." The Congressional Digest, Nov. 1986, 263. 4 Walsh, p. A8. 5 "Highlights of the Senate Bill." The Congressional Digest, Nov. 1986, 288. 6 Helen Dewar, "Senate Supports Antidrug Plan," The Washington Post, 29 Sept. 1986, p. A16. 7 Edward Walsh, "$1.7 Billion Drug Bill Sweeps House, Senate," The Washington Post, 18 Oct. 1986, p. A4. 8 Harry Hogan, Drug Traffic Control: Federal Efforts (Congressional Research Service, Updated 1 Feb. 1987), p. CRS-4. 9 Judith Havemann, "Reagan Signs Antidrug Bill," The Washington Post, 28 Oct. 1986, A3. 10 "Drug Control," Congressional Research Service Review, Jan. 1987, 29. 11 "Should U.S. Armed Forces Play A Major Role In Interdicting Drug Traffic Into The United States?" Transcripts of comments made by U.S. Senators and U.S. Representatives during the debates in the Senate on 27 Sept. 1986 and in the House on 11 Sept. 1986. The Congressional Digest, Nov. 1986, 272. 12 Norman G. Cooper, Colonel, USA, et al. The Pros and Cons of Military Intervention Into Drug Trafficking (Industrial College of the Armed Forces, Mar. 1986), 39-40. 13 The Congressional Digest, Nov. 1986, 267. 14 Ibid., 271. 15 Ibid., 277; and Cooper, 39. 16 Brian Hoey, "Fighting the Drug War," Airman, Aug. 1984, 13. 17 The Congressional Digest, Nov. 1986, 269, and 277. 18 Ibid., 276. 19 Ibid., 267. 20 Ibid. 21 Ibid., 277. 22 Ibid., 274. 23 "Senate Republicans Add Their $1.3 Billion Plan to Anti- Drug Campaign." Milwaukee Journal, 21 Sept. 1986, p. 2J. NOTES ON CHAPTER VII CONCLUSION 1 Richard Ward Shurtleff, Major, USAF, The Air Force Involvement in Drug Interdiction--An Analysis (Air Command and Staff College, Apr. 1986), 29. ANNOTATED BIBLIOGRAPHY Primary Sources "Controversy Over Omnibus Drug Legislation." Congressional Digest. Nov. 1986. A very useful reference. Contains a discussion of the evolution of current drug legislation, the Federal agencies involved, recent actions in the Congress, highlights of the House and Senate bills, and comments of lawmakers concerning the use of the U.S. military to interdict drug traffickers. "Drug Control." Congressional Research Service Review. Jan. 1987. Briefly summarizes the important measures contained in the legislation produced by the 99th Congress and offers predictions about other actions the 100th Congress might take. Hogan, Harry L., Federal Laws Relating to the Control of Narcotics and Other Dangerous Drugs Enacted 1961-1985: Brief Summaries, Washington, D.C.: Congressional Research Service, 1986. This is a recent report which contains summaries of laws, treaties, and reorganization plans that all have something to do with drug control. ---. et al. Highlights of P.L. 99-570, Anti Drug Abuse Act of 1986, Washington, D.C.: Congressional Research Service, 1986. A very useful source. Lists the drug-related provisions of the Anti Drug Abuse Act of 1986. ---. Drug Traffic Control: Federal Efforts. Washington, D.C.: Congressional Research Service, 1987. A comprehensive summary of the 1986 House and Senate anti- drug bills. Lists hearings that were conducted and provides a chronology of drug-related events for the period 1968 to 1986. Hughes, Rod, Major, USMC. Action Officer, Plans Division, Code PP&O, Headquarters, U.S. Marine Corps. Telephone interview. 6 Feb. 1987. The Marine Corps support to the drug interdiction effort was discussed. Major Hughes provided much useful information. Narcotics Trafficking and U.S. Law Enforcement Policies: Bibliography-in-Brief, 1984-1986, Washington D.C.: Congressional Research Service, 1986. A very useful listing of 33 anti-drug publications available directly from the Congressional Research Service or other government agencies. National Narcotics Intelligence Consumers Committee (NNICC). Narcotics Intelligence Estimate 1984, Washington, D.C.: Drug Enforcement Administration, 1985. The single most important and reliable source of statistics available on the supply of illicit drugs available in the U.S. from foreign and domestic sources in 1984. An essential reference. Perl, Raphael. Policy Alert--Narcotics Control and the Use of U.S. Military Personnel: Operations in Bolivia and Issues for Congress, Washington, D.C.: Congressional Research Service, 1986. An unbiased presentation of the facts and issues concerning the employment of U.S. military forces in Bolivia in support of Bolivian anti-drug operations. The Joint Chiefs of Staff. Department of Defense Dictionary of Military and Associated Terms, JCS Pub 1. Washington, D.C.: Government Printing Office (GPO), 1986. Always a useful reference. Titles 10, 14 and 18 U.S. Code. 1982. Legal statutes governing the employment of the U.S. military forces (Title 10) and the Coast Guard (Title 14). The Posse Comitatus Act is contained in Title 18. United States. Cong. Omnibus Drug Enforcement, Education. and Control Act of 1986. 99th Cong., 2d sess. H.R. 5484. Washington: GPO, 1986. This is the original 1986 omnibus drug bill passed by the House on 15 Sept. 1986. It is the primary reference for information concerning the content of the original House bill. United States. President. Administration of Ronald Reagan, Washington: GPO, 1986. Transcripts of the President's comments made: (1) during an interview with Johanna Neuman and Karen de Witt of USA Today on 2 July 1986, (2) during a news conference announcing the goals and objectives of his National Campaign Against Drug Abuse on 4 Aug. 1986, and (3) at the National Conference on Alcohol and Drug Abuse Prevention on 6 Aug. 1986. Weinberger, Caspar W. Annual Report to the Congress for Fiscal Year 1988 [Executive Summary], Washington, D.C.: Department of Defense, 1987. Contains a section that addresses the link between terrorism, insurgent low intensity conflicts (LIC) and the illegal drug trade. Secondary Sources Adams, Michael R. "Navy Narcs." U.S. Naval Institute Proceedings Sept. 1984: 35-37. An excellent article providing valuable information on the Posse Comitatus Act and Coast Guard TACLETs. Anderson, Harry, et al. "The Evil Empire." Newsweek 25 Feb. 1985: 14-18. Contains interesting and useful background information on the wealth and power of the Latin American drug lords. The article reports details on several acts of violence recently sponsored by wealthy traffickers. Beck, Melinda. "Feeding America's Habit." Newsweek 25 Feb. 1985: 22-23. Provides statistics on the size of America's drug problem. An article worth reading. Brawders, Jean Maris. "National Guard Fights War On Drugs." National Guard June 1986: 24-28. An article highlighting past and present National Guard involvement in the anti-drug effort. Brokenik, James Alan, Lieutenant, USCG. An Analysis Of The Effectiveness Evaluation Measurements For Coast Guard General Law Enforcement Helicopters. Monterey, CA: Naval Postgraduate School, 1979. Contains a good history of the Coast Guard's role in law enforcement, but otherwise, this reference was not very useful. Brown, Cynthia, Ed. "Peru" and "Colombia." With Friends Like These--The Americas Watch On Human Rights & U.S. Policy In Latin America. New York: Pantheon, 1985. pp. 208-209, 226-227, 230-231. Discusses briefly the connection between drug traffickers and Latin American terrorist/insurgent groups. Cooper, Norman G., Colonel, USA, et al. The Pros And Cons Of Military Intervention Into Drug Trafficking. Washington, D.C.: Industrial College of the Armed Forces, 1986. A very good reference presenting information on a wide range of drug-related topics. Discusses such things as the threat posed by illegal drugs, the need for a "drug czar," military support provided, the National Narcotics Border Interdiction System, U.S. Coast Guard Tactical Law Enforcement Teams, and the connection between drug traffickers and terrorists. Dragonette, Charles N. "The Coast Guard and Drug Interdiction--A Kind of War." Sea Power Aug. 1979: 16-18. Traces the increasing involvement of the Coast Guard in the 1970's in the interdiction effort. Explains the Coast Guard's interdiction mission and provides some statistics on quantities of drugs seized. Friers, Thomas R., Major, USAF. DOD Involvement In The Interdiction Of Illegal Drugs--A Staff Study. Maxwell AFB, AL: Air Command and Staff College, 1986. This is an unclassified study of the type of support the DOD was providing (as of early 1986) to the national anti-drug effort. The study contains facts and figures. Hoey, Brian. "Fighting the Drug War." Airman Aug. 1984: 8-16. Summarizes the support that the DOD has provided to the drug interdiction effort, with special emphasis on Air Force operations. Contains a thorough discussion of Operation BAT. Korb, Lawrence J. "DOD on the Drug War Front." Defense 85 Feb. 1985: 17-20. Summarizes the support that the DOD has provided to the drug interdiction effort. Operation BAT and Tactical Law Enforcement Teams are discussed. Lamar, Jr., Jacob V. "Crack" Time 2 June 1986: 16-18. An article about the surging popularity of the highly addictive form of cocaine known as "crack." Lang, Richard Ernest, Lieutenant, USCG. Measuring And Enhancing The Effectiveness Of Coast Guard Law Enforcement. Monterey, CA: Naval Postgraduate School, 1980. A statistical analysis of Coast Guard effectiveness in the area of drug law enforcement. The material is dated and not very useful. Martz, Larry, et al. "Trying to Say 'No.'" Newsweek 11 Aug. 1986: 14-19. An interesting article about America's drug problem. Contains recent statistics and provides good background information. "Crack" is discussed. There is no mention of military support of interdiction efforts but this article is still valuable for the general information it contains. Mitchell, Thaddeus R., and Robert S. Bell. Drug Interdiction Operations By The Coast Guard: Summary. Alexandria, VA: Center For Naval Analyses, 1980. This reference was not very useful. The information and statistics presented therein were old and of little value. Meyer, Deborah G. "The Military Battles a New Foe: The Drug Runner." Armed Forces Journal International Apr. 1983: 86- 89. Explains how the military got involved in the drug war. Lists the types of DOD support being provided in 1983. A good article. Morgan, G. Thomas, Commander, USCG. The Search For A Successful Maritime Drug Interdiction Strategy. Maxwell AFB, AL: Air War College, 1984. Useful for the information it contains on Coast Guard drug interdiction activities. The Posse Comitatus Act, National Narcotics Border Interdiction System, and inter-agency rivalries are also discussed. Morganthau, Tom, et al. "Crack and Crimes." Newsweek 16 June 1986: 16-22. The title of the article is self-explanatory. DEA interdiction efforts are discussed. The article cites many statistics. Not of much use for this report, but an interesting article nonetheless. Mudd, Joseph F., Colonel, USAF. Assigning DOD A Narcotics Interdiction Mission. Washington, D.C.: National War College, 1986. Another fine reference for information on the National Narcotics Border Interdiction System, the South Florida Task Force, and the national strategy against drug abuse. Provides an interesting discussion of the political and legal realities of why the DOD is involved in the anti-drug effort. Newspapers. Approximately 50 drug-related articles were clipped from The Washington Post during the period from Sept. 1986 to date. Similarly, about 10 useful articles were taken from the Potomac News, and about 10 more from the Milwaukee Journal. Norland, Rod, Mark Miller, and David G. Gonzales. "Snaring the King of Coke." Newsweek 16 Feb. 1987: 16-18. An interesting article detailing how a major drug trafficker, Carlos Lehder Rivas, was captured in Colombia and extradited to the United States. The article also provides useful information about corruption in the Colombian government and police force. Philpott, Robert J., Commander, USCG. C3 in Joint Interdiction Operations. Newport, RI: Naval War College, 1986. The author discusses his personal experiences with regard to communications compatibility and interoperability of equipment used by the agencies involved in the drug interdiction effort. Severe communications problems and shortfalls are highlighted and recommended solutions are offered. It is an interesting report, but it was of little value to this paper. Reagan, Senate Republicans Join Drug War. Washington, D.C.: Congressional Quarterly, Inc., vol. 44, no. 38, 20 Sept. 1986. Presents a thorough description of the provisions contained in the Senate's 1986 anti-drug bill. Seidenman, Paul. "SES Joins the Search." National Defense Dec. 1983: 44-46. An article about the Coast Guard's new surface effect ships (SES). Contains much more information about the SES's characteristics than about drug interdiction. Not useful for this research. Shurtleff, Richard Ward, Major, USAF. The Air Force Involvement In Drug Interdiction--An Analysis. Maxwell AFB, AL: Air Command and Staff College, 1986. Contains an excellent history of the Posse Comitatus Act. It is also a good source of information on the El Paso Information Center, South Florida Task Force, and the National Narcotics Border Interdiction System. Smith, Richard M. "The Plague Among Us." Newsweek 16 June 1986: 15. An editorial by the Editor-In-Chief of Newsweek. Interesting comments but of no use to this study. Straub, Alice, and Jon A. Wiant. "Burma." 1985 Yearbook on International Communist Affairs. Ed. Richard F. Staar. Area Ed. Ramon H. Meyers. Stanford, CA: Hoover Institution Press, 1985. 161-164. Details the Burmese Communist Party's drug trafficking activities in 1983 and 1984. Taft, IV; William H. "The Role of DOD in Civilian Law Enforcement." Defense 83 Mar. 1983: 6-10. Provides good information on the history and legal implications of the Posse Comitatus Act. Lists the types of support the DOD has provided to civilian law enforcement agencies. Tegtmeyer, Glenn H., Major, USAF. Call For A Posse--The Air Force Response. Maxwell AFB, AL: Air Command and Staff College, 1984. Provides a summary of Air Force support provided to civilian law enforcement agencies during 1982 and 1983. Also discusses the Posse Comitatus Act, the National Narcotics Border Interdiction System, and the South Florida Task Force. Tice, R. Dean. "Fighting The Drug Flow." Defense 86 May-June 1986: 14-17. Summarizes the support that DOD has provided to the drug interdiction effort during the last few years. Operation BAT is discussed. Vail, W.A., et al. Threat Assessment: Methodology And Analysis. Menlo Park, CA: SRI International, 1980. A report of research sponsored by the U.S. Customs Service. This is a 1980 report based on data collected during 1976 to 1978. The report contains many statistics and only studies drugs entering the U.S. across the southern border. The information is old and of little use. Whitaker, Mark, Elaine Shannon, and Ron Moreau. "Colombia's King of Coke." Newsweek 25 Feb. 1985: 19-22. Intentifies Colombia's drug kingpins. The article is good background reading. Wiggins, Tony L., Major, USAF. U.S. Air Force Role In Drug Interdiction December 1981 To October 1985. Maxwell AFB, AL: Air Command and Staff College, 1986. Summarizes Air Force involvement in drug interdiction activites. Also discusses the Posse Comitatus Act and the organization and functioning of the El Paso Intelligence Center, the National Narcotics Border Interdiction System, and the South Florida Task Force. Zadareky, Joseph T., Colonel, USAF. National Drug Policy: Fact or Fiction. Washington, D.C.: National War College, 1986. Provides an interesting analysis of the threat illicit drugs pose to national security. Provides information on narco- terrorists, and discusses the 1984 National Strategy to combat drug abuse. The history and activities of many government agencies are also discussed. This is a good reference.
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