Soviet Politico-Military Initiative In The Pacific And Indian Oceans And Its Ramifications On Southwest Asia CSC 1987 SUBJECT AREA History Author Major Low Hian Tiong SOVIET POLITICO-MILITARY INITIATIVE IN THE PACIFIC AND INDIAN OCEANS AND ITS RAMIFICATIONS ON SOUTHEAST ASIA EXECUTIVE SUMMARY Since the fall of Vietnam in 1975, the Soviet Union has supported Vietnam with the aim of using it as both a political and military counterweight to China. On a global scale, it aims to maintain Vietnam as a forward base to challenge US supremacy and influence in East and Southeast Asia. During the past 10 years, the Russians have made significant progress in gaining a firm foothold in IndoChina in terms of the establishment of permanent military bases notably, Danang, Bien Hoa, Cam Ranh and Kompong Son. Its naval presence in the area ie., Pacific and Indian Oceans, has been significantly strengthened. Though its presence is considered benign in its current status, it is a growing menace and has caused ripples of concern amongst non-communist countries in Southeast Asia, particularly ASEAN. Given that the threat perceptions amongst the ASEAN countries vary, there has been re-evaluation as a result of the current expansion of Soviet presence in the area. Needless to say, a general consensus on the issue will reflect one important regional objective -- ASEAN solidarity and committment towards regional stability. There is no doubt that the Soviets will continue with the build-up of their forces in the Asian region. A viable framework for US policies in Southeast Asia should emphasize a balance between military strength and alliance relation- ship, on the one hand, and efforts to establish and reinforce economic and political relationships particularly with potential adversaries. The establishment of a relationship between the United States and Vietnam could stabilize the situation, making it less likely that Moscow will be able to gain further military, economic and political expansion in IndoChina. The most significant result of this "rappochment" could mean greater military and political stability in Southeast Asia, a major foreign policy objective which all governments of ASEAN would look forward to in the foreseeable future. OUTLINE THESIS STATEMENT The aim of this paper is to examine the current Soviet politico-military initiative in the Pacific and Indian Oceans and its ramifications on Southeast Asia. I Soviet Interests in Southeast Asia a. Strategic importance of the Pacific and Indian Oceans to the Soviet Union. b. Importance of IndoChina to the Soviet Union. II Soviet Military Build-up in IndoChina viz a viz Pacific and Indian Ocean a. Establishment of permanent military bases and facilities in IndoChina. Its current military strength in IndoChina. b. Importance of the build-up in support of Soviet influence and interests in Southeast Asia. III Effects of Soviet presence on Southeast Asia a. Capability of Soviet forces in Southeast Asia to respond to any threat or show of force. b. Threat perceptions of Soviet presence by ASEAN. c. Future US policy for Southeast Asia. SOVIET POLITICO-MILITARY INITIATIVE IN THE PACIFIC AND INDIAN OCEANS AND ITS RAMIFICATIONS ON SOUTHEAST ASIA INTRODUCTION Soviet interest in Southeast Asia, the Pacific and Indian Oceans dates back to the latter half of the 19th century when the Czars expanded their territorial possessions into the Far East. By what the present Chinese government termed "unequal treaties," China abrogated large tracts of its territories to USSR. The interest in the Indian and Pacific Oceans stemmed from the poor land communication system between European Russia and her possession in the Far East. Even up to the 195Os, land communication was re- stricted to the single Trans-Siberian Railway line. The importance of Southeast Asia, the Indian and the Pacific Oceans to the USSR was amply illustrated by the 1904-05 Russo Japanese War. Her Pacific fleet having been blockaded or destroyed by Japan at Port Arthur, Russian prestige rested upon averting defeat by reinforcing the First Pacific Squadron. She was obliged to send part of her Baltic fleet named Second Pacific Squadron from Europe some 18,000 miles away (Fig 1). Click here to view image She made her way through the Indian Ocean, the Straits of Malacca, the South China Sea and the Pacific Ocean only to be destroyed at the hands of the Japanese fleet under Admiral Togo Heliachiro in the Tsushima Straits.1 Though Soviet interest in the Pacific and the Indian Oceans dates back to about a century, her ability to trans- form this "interest" into a physical presence has been very recent. Having established herself as a land superpower by the 1950s, and in response to her naval weakness which was aptly reflected during the Cuban missile crisis, Russia embarked on a policy of maritime expansion in the 1960s and 1970s. SOVIET INTEREST IN SOUTHEAST ASIA AND THE PACIFIC AND THE INDIAN OCEANS Soviet perception of the importance of Southeast Asia and the Straits of Malacca can aptly be summed up. Firstly, Soviet Union's interest in umimpeded passage through the Straits of Malacca and Singapore stemmed from her desire to 1 Captain Peter G. Tsouras, USAR, "The Voyage of the Damned," Proceedings, US Naval Institute, Oct 1982, p.75. engage in competitive naval deployment with the United States.2 This is largely in response to the presence of the US Seventh Fleet in the Indian Ocean. With the radical political change in Iran and Soviet intervention in Afghanistan and Ethopia, it has shown for the first time that access into the Indian Ocean will be critical in any future global contingency or confrontation with the US in the Asian arena. Secondly, Soviet interest in the containment of China's regional influence. Their fear of China is the result of a complex series of ethnic, cultural and ideological factors. Hence, the use of Vietnam both as a political as well as military counterweight to China is among the primary options for Soviet policy in Asia.3 The naval facilities in Vietnam are of paramount importance as they offer the Soviet Union the opportunity to achieve strategic encirclement of China as well as to outflank China's navy -- lacking both in technology and capability.4 The presence of Vietnamese troops in 2 Michael Leifer, "Security of Sea lanes in Southeast Asia," Survival, Jan - Feb 1983, p.21. 3 Commander David M. Fitzgerald, USNR, "The Soviets in Southeast Asia," Proceedings, US Naval Institutes, Feb 1986, p.52. 4 Fitzgerald, p.53. Kampuchea as well as Soviet naval presence at Cam Ranh Bay is only one aspect of Moscow's approach. Politically, their fear of an anti-Soviet, Sino-American coalition in Southeast Asia has led them to pursue normalization talks with Beijing since 1982, which has so far met with luke-warm success. Thirdly, Soviet interest in the Indian Ocean is an ex- tension of her interest in the Pacific Ocean. In the long term, they seem to be interested in the acquisition of warm water port facilities in both the Indian and Pacific Oceans. The Cuban Missile Crisis was a humiliation for the USSR and clearly brought home to Soviet leaders the need for a true "blue-water" navy with global power projection capabilities. Since embarking on her naval expansion programme in the 196Os, the USSR has adopted a 'forward deployment' policy of her naval forces to overcome the distances and vulnerabilities of her naval bases in the Far East which limit her ability to respond to conflicts and safeguard her global interests in the Indian and Pacific Oceans. The problem of distance is shown by the fact that it takes Soviet ships anywhere between 10 days to 2 weeks to respond to any crisis in the Indian Ocean from its main base at Vladivostok. The vulnerability of the Far Eastern fleet is that it could be bottled up and denied access into the Pacific Ocean via the five main routes through the Tsugaru, Shimonoseki, Tsushima, Soya and Tatar Straits if they are blockaded or mined. Now for the first time, the Soviet Union has a properly balanced and organized task force in the Indian Ocean with true 'warfighting' capabilities.5 Its naval presence in the Indian Ocean has increased dramatically to some 30 ships through 1982. The presence of the Soviet Indian Ocean Squadron (SOVINDRON) has demonstrated a capability to employ its naval power in support of regional objectives. Though support facilities are maintained in Ethopia and Aden, con- siderable effort is being made to broaden naval access throughout the area in strategic islands and littoral countries including Mozambique, Seychelles and India.6 A concurrent development has been the unprecedented regular deployment of a Soviet naval presence in the South China Sea since Vietnam's invasion of Kampuchea. With the sighting of the 'Kiev' class carrier MINSK in the Gulf of Thailand in October 1980, the Soviet Pacific Fleet has 5 Leifer, p.20. 6 Department of Defence, "Soviet Naval Deployment," Soviet Military Power, 1985, p.106. demonstrated the ability to maintain a permanent presence in the Indian and Pacific Oceans. The ability is further en- hanced by the acquisition of extensive naval and air facilities in Vietnam and Kampuchea. With these development, it is apparent that the potential threat to Southeast Asia is of grave concern to the principal states in the region. This change in US-Soviet balance in the Indian and Pacific Oceans could seriously affect vital western sea lanes in these waters On current strength, the Soviet Pacific Fleet can boast of some 700 to 800 naval vessels with gross tonnage of 11/2 million. The principal vessels of the fleet are 2 'Kiev' class carriers, 15 cruisers, 66 destroyers and frigates, 150 amphibious ships and 134 submarines.7 In addition, the Soviets maintain about 15 'Delta' and 'Typhoon' class missile firing submarines (Fig 2). With 30% of its SSBN fleet stationed in the Pacific Fleet, it reflects Soviet strategic assessment of the importance of its Pacific Fleet.8 With a 7,000 men naval infantry division supported by some 500 aircraft spearheaded by two regiments of 'Backfire' bombers, the Soviet Pacific 7 Ulrich-Joachim-Schulz-Torge, "The Soviet Navy in 1985," Military Technology, Nov 1985, p.123 - 126. 8 Edward J. Walsh, "The Challenge of the East," National Defense, Dec 1984, p.62. Click here to view image Fleet is the largest of its 4 major fleets.9 Within a period of 2 decades, the Soviet Union has not only achieved world power status but has become a major sea- power as well. As perceived by Admiral Sergei Gorshkov in his book 'Sea Power of the State' where he categorically stated, It is reasonable to consider that the totality of the means of harnessing the World Ocean and the means of defending the interest of the state when rationally determines the capacity of a particular country to use the military-economic possibilities of the ocean for its own purposes----(This power comprises) its components ----- military, merchant, fishing, scientific research fleet, etc.,10 SOVIET PRESENCE IN INDOCHINA Prior to 1979, Soviet naval units appeared irregularly in the South China Sea. This was primarily due to Hanoi's reluctance to commit itself to total dependence on the Soviet Union. However, deterioriating Sino-Vietnamese relations and mounting Vietnamese-Kampuchean border tensions created closer 9 Department of Defence, "Soviet Global Amibitions," Soviet Military Power, 1985, p.107. 10 S Gorshkov, Adm., Soviet Navy, The Seapower of the State, Naval Institute Press, 1979, Introduction IX. security ties between Hanoi and Moscow. Moreover, the power equilibrum tilted in favour of the USSR after its support of Vietnam in the invasion of Kampuchea in Dec 1978. Since then, there has been a dramatic increase in the presence of Soviet air and naval forces in Vietnam. It is apparent that they have access to not only Cam Ranh Bay naval facilities but also Danang airbase and Kompong Som in Kampuchea. Military assistance has been the most effective instru- ment of Soviet foreign policy. This was clearly demonstrated in Vietnam where from 1978 through 1984, military assistance to support its occupation of Kampuchea and counter Chinese military pressure along the Sino-Vietnamese border amounted to over $5 billion in arms aid along with 2,500 Soviet military advisers to support the programmes.11 On the economic front, more than $7 billion in Soviet economic aid has been received by Vietnam. It is estimated that the Soviets have been giving Vietnam more than $3 million per day in assistance. In addition, Vietnam received 90% of its food imports, 90% of its cotton, 80% of its metal and 70% of its fertilizers from the USSR. Vietnamese dependence on Soviet petroleum products is near total.12 11 Soviet Military Power, 1986, p.131. 12 Fitzgerald, p.53. By Jan 1980, Tu-95 "Bear-Ds" and Tu-142 "Bear-Fs" were operating from Cam Ranh airfield for reconnaissance missions over the South China Sea. The period 1981 to 1984 saw a rapid expansion of Soviet naval and air forces in Vietnam. Within 5 years, the Soviets have transformed Cam Ranh Bay into the largest Soviet naval forward deployment base outside the Warsaw Pact (Fig 3). By 1984, up to 24 Soviet naval vessels were anchored at Cam Ranh Bay on any given day (Fig 4). In addition, by late 1984, 10 Tu-16 "Badgers" were deployed at Cam Ranh airfield. The number of Tu-95 and Tu-142 "Bears" operating from Cam Ranh were increased to 8.13 Permanent facilities to support a squadron of "Badgers" strike and re- connaissance aircrafts are under expansion and this eventually could support a regimental-size force of up to 30 aircrafts (Fig 5). Along with these developments, a squadron of Soviet MIG-23 fighters has been deployed at Cam Ranh which will primarily be employed for air defence and strike escort for Soviet "Badgers" operating in the region.14 Of greater significance is the fact that in April 1984, the carrier MINSK along with the IVAN-ROGOV class (LPD) amphibious warship operated with Vietnamese units in carrying out the Soviet 13 Soviet Military Power, 1986, p.138. 14 Soviet Military Power, 1985, p.106. Click here to view image Navy's first amphibious landing on the Vietnamese coast.15 This unprecedented build-up of Soviet military power in Southeast Asia is a stark reality which will invariably influence the threat perceptions of countries in the region, that is ASEAN. Today, Cam Ranh Bay has evolved from an irregular support facility into a major naval/air complex for the Soviet Pacific Fleet. Together with Danang airbase, it has the capability to provide the following facilities: Naval Support Facilities: a. Maintenance workshops for ship repairs (includes an 8,500 ton floating dry dock).16 b. Nuclear submarine pens. c. Refuelling and Replenishment. Air Support Facilities: a. Squadron of MIG-23/FLOGGERS. b. 16 Tu-16 "Badgers" bomber aircrafts. c. 8 Tu-95 and Tu-142 "Bears reconnaissance and ASW planes. 15 Donald C. Daniel and Gael D. Tarleton, "The Soviet Navy in 1984," Proceedings, US Naval Institute, May 1985, p. 361. 16 Fitzgerald, p.51. Electronic and Communication Facilities for monitoring: a. Regional communications for the Soviet Navy and Airforce. b. Chinese military activities. c. Movement of US 7th fleet in the area. Soviet ships and planes are now in a position to threaten not only China, but also all of ASEAN's capital; the Malacca, Lombok and Makassar Straits; US bases in the Philippines; and northern Australia. Geographically, the acquisition of bases in Vietnam has extended the Soviet Pacific Fleet's operational range by some 2,000 nautical miles.17 RAMIFICATIONS ON SOUTHEAST ASIA While they concede that the bases in IndoChina, notably Vietnam and Kampuchea, offer certain advantages to the USSR, eminent scholars like Michael Leifer and Frank B. Weinstein contend that the USSR does not pose a threat to Southeast Asia. Their views were based upon the following analysis. Firstly, the Soviet has been traditionally a land power. Secondly, even with the increase in Soviet naval forces, the 17 Fitzgerald, p.50. US still maintains superiority in overall navy and air capabilities in East and Southeast Asia. This superiority is further reinforced by US naval and air support facilities in Japan, Philippines, S. Korea and Guam. In times of crisis, possible support could also be obtained from Singapore and Thailand. Thirdly, the principal Soviet bases for the Pacific Fleet are vulnerable to blockade, and Cam Ranh Bay is vulnerable to mining and lacks seaward defences. Lastly, the Soviet Navy is particularly weak in anti-submarine warfare (ASW) capability while their carrier borne air power is rather limited. From the global point of view, these postulations are valid and acceptable. However, it is significant to note that for the first time in history, the USSR has a military presence in Southeast Asia. It would be realistic for us to assume that this permanent presence of Soviet forces in Southeast Asia will have long term security implications to ASEAN. An immediate concern is the fact that with the current force level in Southeast Asia, the Soviets are in a position to threaten the sealines of communications of Japan from Europe, Middle East and Australia. They could interdict the access of the US 7th Fleet to the Indian Ocean via the Straits of Malacca as well as augment the SOVINDRON in crisis in the Persian Gulf area.18 Given the fact that the Soviet Navy has been inferior to the US Navy in many respects, the USSR has made significant improvements in the last two decades in terms of force structure and expansion. With its current build-up in Indo- China, it has projected itself as a Pacific power that cannot be ignored. Marked improvements have been made by the Soviet Navy in its ASW capability. The arrival of 2 IVAN ROGOV (Fig 6) large amphibious warships, increased 'Alligator' LSTs from 3 to 5, and 5 'Ropucha' units have significantly enhanced her amphibious capability.19 Finally, the USSR is on the threshold of acquiring a true carrier borne air capability. Today, her 'Kiev' class carriers are equipped with 'YAK-38' VTOL fighters for fleet defence.20 Even more significantly, they have commenced the construction of attack carriers. Approximately 300m long with a displacement of more than 65,000 tons; it is likely 18 Soviet Military Power, 1985, p.106. 19 Lt-Comdr Gerry S. Thomas, US Navy, "Their Pacific Fleet," Proceedings, US Naval Institute, Oct 1982, p.83. 20 Walsh, p.62. Click here to view image that it will be equipped with the capability to operate CTOL aircrafts at sea. The Soviets are conducting tests and evaluation programmes in the Black Sea region for the air- craft that will be launched on the new carriers. The latest generation of Soviet fighter/interceptor aircrafts have been designated for the tests: notably, the Su-27 'Flanker', MIG-29 'Fulcrum'and Su-25 'Frogfoot'. It is expected that these carriers will be operational by 1990.21 Thus, it is only a matter of time before the Soviets will have a carrier borne air capability that may pose a potential challenge to the US. The USSR will continue to expand her presence in South- East Asia, Pacific and Indian Oceans. In the long term however, the volatile political climate in Southeast Asia has the potential for regional rivalry. The Soviet Union may exploit these rivalries to expand her influence and presence in the region. The reactivation and initiation of an additional 142 ships will bring the US Navy to a 600-ship force. Out of 142, about half of these will be based on the Pacific Fleet.22 These actions by the Reagan Administration 21 Ulrich-Joachim-Schulz-Torge, p.121-122. 22 Fitzgerald, p.56. were initiated largely in response to the growing Soviet naval capabilities. Though it is doubtful that the Soviets have any perceived long term plan regarding Southeast Asia, they are more likely in the near future, to take advantage of opportunities that may emerge or more importantly that they may create.23 Having dealt with the effects on Southeast Asia in general, it is pertinent at this point to focus our attention on ASEAN. The threat perceptions of these countries are weighted as much by domestic factors and regional politics as by objective assessments of the relative long term dangers from Moscow, Beijing or Hanoi.24 In more specific terms, what, in fact, are the long term threat perceptions in ASEAN? Although an ASEAN consensus did emerge in respect to the appropriate diplomatic and political measures to be taken on the question of Cambodia, this did not signify a broader consensus on the nature and imminence of threat perceptions of external powers. There are clearly varying degrees in the 23 Fitzgerald, p.5l. 24 Donald E. Weatherbee, "The View from ASEAN's Southern Flank," Strategic Review, Vol XI; Spring 1983, United States Strategic Institute, Washington D.C. p.54. threat perception of Soviet presence in IndoChina. Singapore and Thailand certainly see the presence as a threat, particularly because of Soviet support to the Vietnamese occupation of Kampuchea. The apprehensions of Thailand have been somewhat alleviated with a tacit Chinese security assurance that 'should the Vietnamese authorities attempt to invade Thailand by force, the Chinese government and people will stand firmly by the side of Thailand and give all support to the Thai people in their just stand against opposing aggression'.25 From Singapore's perspective, the Soviet factor was the main concern for Mr Lee Kuan Yew's urging greater military co-operation among the ASEAN states. As he categorically stated, the main issue was whether the Soviet Union is to become a major power or influence in the region because of Vietnam.26 This expression of concern stemmed from 2 important factors: firstly, Singapore's vulnerability to any interruption in seaborne trade through the Straits of Malacca and secondly, its position with an ethnic Chinese majority 25 Weatherbee, p.56. 26 Weatherbee, p.59. population -- a sensitive issue that could be exploited politically and socially. Therefore, balance of power con- siderations clearly dominate Singapore's approach to regional security. Singapore has perceived that the Soviet Union is the principal threat to the current status quo, both in terms of increased Soviet naval capability and Vietnam -- their proxy. Singapore has established her credentials as a 'front-line' state seeking hard-line by ASEAN on Cambodia. Indonesia and Malaysia perceive the threat as less significant, rather, they see the Soviet presence in IndoChina as a counterweight to potential Chinese expansion in Southeast Asia. Indonesia's apprehension of PRC as a greater threat represents at least in part, a projection of concern related to domestic, social, and political problems: specifically, the nation's ethnic Chinese minority. The alleged Chinese involvement in the 1965 coup attempt tends to couch their apprehensions about the loyalties of Chinese residents in terms of a possible revival of the Indonesian Communist Party (PKI) that is pro-Beijing.27 27 Weatherbee, p.57. Malaysia shares Jakarta's strategic perspectives but has its own independent view of why China is perceived a greater threat than the Soviet Union. Malaysia's view of the PRC is conditioned by concerns about continuing Chinese sympathy and support for the Communist Party of Malaya. The chronic communist insurgency in Malaysia is managed by ethnic Chinese cadres and is still regarded by Malaysia as their primary security problem. Though both countries deemed the PRC a greater threat than the Soviet Union this does not mean that they ignore the latter. In fact, some second thoughts may now be perceived with the expansion of Soviet presence and influence in IndoChina. Lastly, with the current political instability in the Philippines, the Soviets would welcome domestic unrest there. A prolonged Philippines civil war would greatly benefit the Soviets. Given that the Soviet Union is viewed as a potential long term threat to Southeast Asia, it is prudent at this stage to identify where are the problem areas which the Soviets may exploit to expand their influence. Firstly, with the recent political development in the Philippines, the Soviets are poised to play a bigger role there. The current in-fighting amongst the leaders of the New People's Army (NPA) over the political settlement of the civil war has given the Soviets the excellent opportunity for intervention. The Soviets have reportedly made significant progress in their effort to exert greater influence on the fragile situation. Philippine intelligence sources have claimed that the KGB has taken the advantage of the recent 60-day ceasefire accord between the Aquino government and the NPA to infiltrate into communist strongholds and is now firmly entrenched in the southern provinces particularly Mindanao.28 Western military sources have indicated that Soviet operations have supplied arms to the rebels while Soviet planes and ships have been conducting daily reconnaissance missions near the Philippines from their advanced naval base at Cam Ranh Bay in Vietnam. Secondly, in the event of a superpower confrontation 28 Tom Breen, "Soviet Increasing their Involvement with Filipino Rebels," Washington Times, Mar 9, 1987, Section A, p. 1. with US, China and Japan, the Soviets would attempt to deny the use of the Straits of Malacca and the Indonesian Archipelago to Japanese, Chinese and US shipping as well as the US Pacific Fleet access to the Indian Ocean.29 Thirdly, the Soviets could support Vietnam or other claimants in a conflict arising out of overlapping claims of sovereignty over Exclusive Economic Zone (EEZ) either in defence of territory or in response to exploration of oil. Lastly, USSR could also support Vietnam's incursion into Thailand in order to solve the Kampuchea resistance problem. This would certainly be resisted by Thailand with full support from members of ASEAN.30 CONCLUSION Barring any major shift in political alliance in Indo- China in the near future, Soviet interest and presence in Southeast Asia, the Pacific and the Indian Oceans is a stark 29 Michael Leifer, p.22. 30 Milan Vego, "Their Operations in the Third World," Proceedings, US Naval Institute, Jan 1984, p.56. reality that countries in the region have to live with. Though Soviet presence in the region appears benign today, her naval and air presence in Vietnam and Kampuchea have given her the capability to adopt a more ambitious and belligerent posture should the Soviet leadership choose to do so. There are potential problem areas in Southeast Asia which can be exploited to expand her presence or influence. They have confirmed our suspicion of their hegamonistic desire with their latest involvement in the Philippines civil war. In view of this potential threat, it is important for ASEAN to safeguard its solidarity and deny the Soviets any opportunity to expand its influence. The continued military presence of the United States in the Philippines and Western Pacific is vital in view of Soviet's military expansion in Southeast Asia. Increased US presence would be a very effective counterweight to Soviet expanionist tendencies. Last, and perhaps the most significant is that the US should move to normalize relations with Vietnam in order to reduce Vietnam's total reliance on Moscow. Though the Vietnamese will continue to rely on Soviet aid, the establishment of US diplomatic and economic relations -- especially economic aid -- would give Hanoi significantly greater latitude in its dealing with the Soviets.31 If the United States succeeds without disrupting its developing ties with PRC which the Japanese achieved, then it will be easier for the ASEAN countries to pursue their relations with Hanoi without jeopardizing their relations with China. 31 Franklin B. Weinstein, A US Foreign Policy for Asia: US Role in East and Southeast Asia. Hoover Institution Press; Stanford University, 1982, p.136 - 137. BIBLIOGRAPHY 1. Department of Defence. Soviet Military Power, 1985. 2. Department of Defence. Soviet Military Power, 1986. 3. Daniel, Donald and Tarleton, Gael. "The Soviet Navy in 1984." Proceedings, US Naval Institute (May 1985). 4. Fitzgerald, David M. Comdr. USNR. "The Soviets in Southeast Asia." Proceedings, US Naval Institute (February 1986). 5. Gorshkov, SG. Adm, Soviet Navy. The Sea Power of the State. Naval Institute Press (1979). 6. Leifer, Michael. "The Security of Sea-lanes in Southeast Asia." Survival (January/February 1983). 7. Thomas, Breen. "Soviet Increasing their Involvement with Filipino Rebels." The Washington Times (March 9, 1987) Section A, P1. 8. Thomas, Gerry S. LtComdr, USN. "Their Pacific Fleet." Proceedings, US Naval Institute (October 1982). 9. Tsouras, Peter G. Capt, USAR. "Their Voyage of the Damned." Proceedings, US Naval Institute (October 1982). 10. Ulrich-Joachim-Schulz-Torge. "The Soviet Navy in 1985." Military Technology (November 1985). 11. Vega, Milan. "Their Navy's Future: Their Operations in the Third World." Proceedings, US Naval Institute (January 1984). 12. Walsh, Edward J. "The Challenge of the East." National Defence, Journal of the American Defense Preparedness Association, Vol IXIX (December 1984). 13. Weatherbee, Donald E. "The View from ASEAN's Southern Flank." Strategic Review, US Strategic Institute, Washington, D.C. (Spring 1983). 14. Weinstein, Franklin B. A US Foreign Policy for Asia: The US Role in East and Southeast Asia. Hoover Institution Press, Stanford University (1982).
