On Terror Combatting A Violent Foreign Policy CSC 1987 SUBJECT AREA General On Terror Combatting a Violent Foreign Policy War in the Modern Era Research Paper LCDR S. W. Deutermann, U.S. Navy May, 1987 Introduction Terrorism is rampant in our world. So it seems to anyone opening a daily paper or viewing the nightly televised news broadcasts. Bombs in Beirut, Paris, London, any major airport; skyjackings, kidnapings, assassinations; all seem to occur with numbing frequency and with glaring exposure. The annual toll of this violent activity in terms of lives lost and property destroyed has grown over time into the hundreds for lives and billions of dollars for property worldwide. The modern terrorist represents a movement, cause or ideology often foreign to the American mind, and employs means repugnant to our concepts of civilized behavior. He or she may represent the displaced, the discontented, or the outraged whose motivations disappear into the murk of shadow politics and underground criminal entities. Yet terror is certainly nothing new. Its practice has continued from the beginnings of written history and its methods have paralleled the development of weapons and technologies which may be of use to the practitioner. The purpose of this paper is to examine terrorism today from the perspective of the armed forces of the United States. Specifically, this paper will review the subject of terrorism in its historical setting, the development of selected terrorist movements that exist today as potential threats to U.S. national security, and those aspects of terrorism that are unique today in contrast to history. Finally, it will examine policy options available to the U.S. to combat this insidious threat. The scope of the problem of modern terrorism is vast. As a result, this effort will be limited in its depth and somewhat parochial in its point of view. The armed forces of the U.S. are in a unique position to confront terrorism, for we are targets worldwide and are, at the same time, severely restricted in our response to the threat of terrorism. As an instrument of foreign policy, the American military now stands against another, and growing, instrument of the foreign policy of others, and that instrument is terrorism. The spectrum of violence encompassed by modern terrorism spans a wide range - from manipulation of the media to wholesale slaughter of innocent victims. The spectrum of actions to counter terror is therefore also wide. What this paper will address are those actions in the realm of military responsibility most useful against the anticipated threat. This paper will attempt to answer the following questions: 1. What has been the historical function of the terrorist? 2. What is the modern function, and what gave rise to modern terrorist movements? 3. What is the validity of the notion of "State sponsored" terrorism? 4. What can be done about the problem, from the perspective of a national pqolicy formulation? Before examining the issues stated above, it is useful to begin with a common understanding of what some terms mean. Some key definitions follow: Terrorism is the use or threat of violence to effect political, social, or economic change. It is a phenomenon occurring outside the law of war, and may be motivated by a wide variety of idealogical, political, and/or religious beliefs. At the same time, it is not a subset of conventional or even of guerilla warfare. Its occurrence rarely, if ever, reflects the accomplishment of a military objective. Revolutionary is the term applied to indicate an individual espousing a cause which seeks fundamental and significant change within a given society or region. Generally indicative of someone seeking destruction of a particular social order in order to bring forth a new order; for the purposes of this work, revolutionaries are considered in their most violent form. Terrorists are those individuals willing, and sometimes strongly desiring to violate law in order to further their aims. These may be from virtually any political or idealogical orientation; right, left, marxist, or religious fanatic. While some are also revolutionaries, many are simply those who have no use for the rule of law, and have opted for violence as the means to accomplish their ends. State sponsored terrorism is terrorism which is funded or otherwise aided by the government of a sovereign state. Such sponsorship is generally covert activity that is internationally condemned. It is hoped that these definitions may clarify very easily confused and overlapping terms for the reader as he progresses through the paper. Chapter I Terror in Historical Perspective Origins The typical view of "terrorists" held by many Americans of the late 1980's is one of urban guerrillas or heavily armed criminals run amok in airports and other crowded places, wreaking indiscriminate violence upon innocent passers by. Their cause is often obscure and confusing, their movements named for dates and little known figures from the third world. There is a perception that the phenomenon of terrorism is new, having evolved during the turbulent years of the 1960's and 1970's out of the actions of a relatively few unbalanced deviants. This is not, however, the case. We will examine the phenomenon of terrorism in several guises. In antiquitythere was no parallel to what we know today as terrorism. There were motivations for violence, however, that perhaps lie at the roots of what the world is experiencing today. It is possible to examine terrorism from ancient times, from at least as far back as the classic Greek and Roman philosophers. Plato and Aristotle both addressed "tyrannicide"- the elimination of a tyrant- as an enobling act. There are men who regard the killing of a tyrant as simply an extraordinary action which will make them famous in the world... He who would kill a tyrant must be pre- pared to lose his life if he fail. But this is a temper to which few can attain...(1) Plutarch, Cicero, John of Salisbury, Thomas Aquinas and a host of others, all have written of the fundamental wrong of tyranny and of the justification, to varying degrees, of its elimination by extreme means. Classical terror involved a variety of motives and targets more limited than those addressed by the terrorists of today, for both obvious and somewhat more obscure reasons. For one thing, symbols of the state were more limited in number than they are today; the symbol was embodied by the ruler and his principal governors in ancient times. There were no media to lionize the acts of those who might have been categorized as "terrorists",therefore their notoriety was short lived. Also, the motives for tyrrannicide were more limited, involving retribution, fear, and contempt. Those are all certainly alive and thriving in the modern scenario, but the most noteworthy of these, and that which received the greatest press was hatred of tyranny itself. A tyrant was representative of the source of crisis, almost a criminal who abused the sanctity of high office. Despotism was something morally foul, and those involved in it elimination were heroes. Cicero noted that tyrants for the most part all came to violent ends, and that Romans honored those who killed them. This view of the honorable nature of tyrrannicide persisted from the fall of Rome in A.D. 496 into the 17th century. Edward Saxby wrote in 1646: Let every man to whom God has given the spirit of wisdom and courage be persuaded by his honor, his safety, his own good and his country's and indeed the duty he owes to his generation and to mankind to endeavor by all means to rid the world of this pest. (2) Insurrection, rebellion, even social revolution in historical contexts before the emergence of modern Western society may not always have included any form of what would today be recognized as terrorism. There were occurrences of terror, however, inflicted by both those who sought to effect change and those who sought strongly to resist. Beyond tyrannicide, the concept of terror "from below" was first exemplified to the determination of historians by the Judean Zealot sect known as the Sicarii (Jerusalem A.D. 66-73), whose methods went beyond assassination, although this technique remained in the forefront. They used crowded streets to conceal their killers in the commission of their crimes, they burned public archives in Jerusalem to affront the moneylenders, sabotaged the city's water supply, and sacked granaries. They were a political entity, violent, nationalistic and anti-Roman whose victims were moderate citizens and whose inclination towards martyrdom lent a frenzied edge to their acts. They were suppressed and eventually exterminated by the Romans, as the remainder of Jewish culture dispersed into the diaspora. (3) Another sect was the Assassins of Persia who first appeared in the eleventh century. These were also political and religious fanatics who regarded murder as a sacramental act. Their founder and leader, Hassan Sidai (hence the name) determined that a prolonged, deliberate campaign of systematic terror would prove more effective than direct confrontation against a numerically superior foe. His enemies, the ruling Seljuqs, the invading European crusaders and, finally the Mongol horde out of central Asia, were victimized for approximately a century until the Mongols destroyed the sect in the late twelfth century.(3) Terror is, then, classically speaking, a technique of violence applied within the framework of wreaking political change. Its foundations lie in the perception by a segment of or an individual within a population that there is not reasonable recourse to achieve justice or redress wrongs afflicted on them by a ruler or ruling class. Desperate means then surface, and desperate acts then occur. Some of the precepts behind this classical definition remain true throughout history to the present time. What has changed has been the nature, structure, and institutions of governments and societies, which have grown ever more complex, liberal and bureaucratic. What has remained constant has been the sense of desperation, the fanatic motivator within the human spirit that gives rise to the phenomenon we call terrorism. Impact of the French Revolution The event which many historians identify as the beginning of the "Modern Era" is equally recognized by scholars of terror as the first manifestation of modern terrorism. The French Revolution of 1789 is a historical watershed in many ways and for many reasons, but its significance in relation to modern terrorism is especially noteworthy and bears close examination; not of the details of its chronology, nor of its main cast of characters, far beyond the scope of this work. The focus of the succeeding paragraphs will be on the formulation of a historical model, a framework for the study of terrorism within this vast event that will yield both an updated definition of terrorism and an useful framework for the study of terrorism in more recent times. If one examines pre- revolutionary France in the period 1700-1750, the following facts emerge: -The society was largely agrarian. Urban populations were small and consisted largely of merchants, craftsmen (guildsmen) and those tied to the aristocracy, either in its service or in its administration. - There was no organized middle class. Those citizens of the period who would today be categorized as being in the "middle class", civil servants, educators, administrators and merchants were a small portion of the population. -From 1700-1730, the source of national financing, while limited, was generally adequate. An internal taxation system, the salt tax (gabelle), a local customs tax (traites) and excise duties (aides), as well as a direct tax on landowners (taille) were sufficient to support France at home abroad. (4) In 1730, French society began a subtle but significant movement toward the conditions which would set the stage for revolution. Between 1733 and 1783, France waged four wars, among them the Seven Years war and the war of American Independence. Besides being a serious drain on the population in terms of resources and manpower, these proved disastrous to the limited and rigid financial system and proved eventually to be a major source of revolutionary discontent. The structure of the society itself also began to change. This is reflected by the growth of a middle class, a change in the role of the clergy, and rising discontent on the part of the peasantry. The rise of a middle class was a natural outgrowth of the increase in basic industrialization and trade. Finally, there was growing agrarian distress in the countryside. Because of significant improvements in agriculture brought about by the English physiocrats and their concepts of scientific agriculture, the very way of life of the peasant population of France was threatened. The people wanted land. These societal changes, crumbling financial structure, changing societal roles of the citizens of the country, and the birth of a middle class, occurred almost simultaneously and therefore set the stage for revolutionary change on a scale never before seen in history. In 1789, the revolution came. It was a revolution far different from that in America, a revolt initiated not by the "proletariat", but by the nobility. It was carried out in four phases: revolt of the aristocracy, followed by revolt of the bourgeoisie, followed revolt of the urban populace, follower by revolt of the peasantry. It was precipitated by the convening of the "Estates General", the representative body composed of the aristocracy, clergy and bourgeoisie. Its convocation was the first in three hundred years, and it was called by Louis XVI due to that monarch's inability to solve the growing financial crisis that had drained the national coffers. Disorder grew into chaos as the revolt of the urban populace blossomed into the events most thoroughly chronicled in our history texts: the storming of the bastille, the barricades, the guillotine, and the Reign of Terror. Terror of the French Revolution is not the phenomenon we associate with the term "terrorism" today, but there are parallels, and there is a point to be examined in a discussion of the Terror. It was initially the systematic use of violence and mayhem to put into final effect the revolution of the Paris mobs. One of its most vivid and grisly manifestations was the brutal massacre of thousands of prisoners in September of 1792. The infamous September massacres were a result of mob violence aimed at the symbols of the vanquished monarchy. Unfortunately, the revolutionary Tribunals, led by such figures as Jean Paul Marat, which incited the mobs to their atrocities, accounted for very few aristocratic victims in this incident. The prisons of Paris at that time were filled with many types, most ordinary criminals. The clergy and aristocrats within the prisons were targeted for mob violence by the Tribunals, and the mob, acting on such incitement, emptied several prisons and, citing the authority of the Tribunals, bludgeoned, disembowelled and beheaded their victims in an orgy of violence lasting four days. Nearly two thousand prisoners were killed, among them, some thirty or so of the blue-blooded aristocracy, about two hundred priests and clergy, and the rest ordinary prisoners, guilty and innocent alike massacres is that they appear to have been the result, at least to some extent, of a well thought out and quite deliberate plan. An English traveler, Dr. John Moore, writing in his hotel room in Paris on the first night of the massacres recorded: Is this the work of a furious and deluded mob? How is it that the citizens of this populous metropolis remain passive spectators of so dreadful an outrage? Is it possible that this is the accomplishment of a plan con- certed two or three weeks ago, that those arbitrary arrests were ordered with this view, that rumours of treason and intended insurrections and massacres were spread about to exasperate the people, and that orders have been issued for sounding the tocsin to increase the alarm and terrify the populace into acquiescence; while a band of selected ruffians were hired to massacre those whom hatred, revenge or fear had destined to destruction, but whom law and justice could not destroy? (5) And so we see one of the predominant effects of terror in this chapter of history. It was terror "from above" in a sense; the leaders of a progressively more violent revolution employed a fearsome technique to eradicate any possibility of a resurgence of monarchic loyalty in France. Thousands died in the Terror, many by virtue of title placing them in too close a proximity to the deposed monarch. Many were innocents, many were non-political but representative of the ancient regime. But the revolution was sustained, and only after the death of Marat and the overthrow of the bloody Robespierre and his cohorts in summer of 1794 would the Great Terror come to an end. What has this all to do with the study of Terrorism today? What possible relationship to the events we are witnessing today is there to the overthrow of a monarchy in Europe nearly two hundred years ago? The answer lies in the fact that for the first time in Western history,a revolutionary movement had employed indiscriminate and wholesale violence to achieve its political ends. A tradition of violence beyond tyrannicide was established. This is important in building a model of revolution in which terror is an ingredient,and also brings us to a second definition of terrorism, one which will serve to describe terror in the revolutionary sense: The application of indiscriminate and public violence by leaders and members of a revolutionary cause to effect the revolution. This definition, when coupled with a descriptive model of revolution will serve to illuminate the role of terrorism in revolutions throughout modern history. The intent of this will be to provide consistency of method for the study of terrorism through history and into modern times. Revolutionary Historical Model of Terror We may now proceed to the description of a historical model of revolutionary terrorism derived from the example of the French revolution and amplified by the experience of several revolutions in Europe and elsewhere since. If one views the sequence of a revolution as something akin to the carrying out of a complex chemical reaction within a society, a progression driven by a variety of factors and catalysts which move a society from one composition to another, it can be seen that this process can be put into a model. This model is a descriptive one, flowing from an initial situation representing an "ancient regime" to a post- revolutionary status. There are five stages in the model which proceed as follow: 1. Pre-revolutionary social order, comprised of a political structure (such as a monarchy), economy (agrarian), demographic structure (nobility to peasantry stratification), that is impacted by: 2.Economic or political change, such as an increase in urban mass or industrialization, (the rise of a middle class), or the collapse of the financial basis of an economy, which leads to: 3. Upheaval, manifested by civil disturbance, rioting, and terror, to include the collapse of the ruling body. This leads to: 4. Revolution, manifested by disappearance of the old order and emergence, accompanied by more and possibly more violent terror, of a radical new order, which, with time and moderating influences evolves into: 5. Post-revolutionary social order, comprised of a new political structure, economy, and demographic structure. (6) What this model does is place terrorism in the perspective of its role in revolution; that is , a catalyst in the process of revolutionary change. Like thermal energy applied to a chemical reaction, the amount of influence of terror in a political revolution is related to the degree of change in a society to be wrought by the revolution. If that change is great, such as the elimination of an entire political structure in favor of a completely different one, then the role of our catalyst may be great indeed. This was true in France, in Russia, Germany, and throughout Europe both in successful and failed revolutions over the period 1789 - 1938. It was also true in revolutionary events occurring in the anti-colonial movements from 1882 to the present. Again, it is the progression of the model that is important in placing terror in a framework for analysis: Old Order, Economic or Political Change, Upheaval, Revolution, and New Order. (8) The usefulness of a model to study historical change lies in its adaptability to current situations in the world, to societies in one of the stages of social change represented by phases 2,3, or 4 of the model. The Third World, where urbanization, economic chaos, political discontent and rapid growth of a discontented middle class are plentiful provides a variety of scenarios for application of the model. Consider the nations with recent petroleum wealth. Consider the nations posessing technological opportunity with an exploited labor class, or nations of a combination of both with out of control urbanization. These are the regions of instability today, and hopes of maintenance of a status quo are not firmly based in historical example. The next section of this work will focus on the rise of modern terrorist movements in the post World War II era. In these examples we will see the applicability of the model to some degree in each case, and from these, in subsequent sections, we will attempt to apply policy options to these situations. Chapter Notes 1. Aristotle, "Tyrrannicide", quoted from The Terrorism Reader, W. Laquer,ed., Little, Brown Co., N.Y.1976. 2. Edward Saxby, "Killing No Murder", n.p., London, 1646. 3. The summary of the origins of terrorism in antiquity is taken largely from the "Origins" chapter of W. Laquer "Terrorism", Little, Brown, Boston, 1977 4. Chronology of events in the French revolution are taken from George LeFebvre "The Coming of the French Revoltion",Hutchinson University Press, London, 1965. 5. From S. Loomis, "Paris in the Terror", Lippencott Press, Philadelphia, 1964, p 247. 6. The classical historical revolutionary model of terror and revolution is an approximation of a model of revolutionary actions that was developed as part of a graduate course in National Security Affairs taught at the Naval Postgraduate School in Monterey, California entitled "Modern Political Revolution and Terrorism". The course was taught by Professor R.H. Stolfi of the NPS NSA faculty. Chapter II II Foundations of Modern Terrorism Politics of Imposition: Palestine One great value of clear hindsight in the study of history lies in its contribution to the understanding of the present. We must remember that terrorism is not a free-standing phenomenon; it is a symptom, the manifestation of a deeper and fundamental problem arising out of a grievance with often no apparent solution. A problem with "models" such as the one developed in the preceding section is that they tend to be used too rigidly; if the situation does not fit the model, we tend to throw the model out or reach erroneous conclusions based on intellectual situations make to conform. However, if the general conditions of the model fit a situation, understanding of the situation may be enhanced by applying the model to determine cause and/or effect of unrest, upheaval, or terrorism. The situation which faces the Western world, and particularly the United States today is the result of both simple and complex events occurring in the post- World War II era. Unfortunately, recent history for most Americans is largely unknown beyond the chronology of events within our borders as presented by national mass media. We seem to be traditionally isolationist or, at the very least parochial in our outlook and this clouds our historical hindsight, so that when an American sailor on a hijacked airliner is singled out, tortured, shot and thrown to the tarmac in a distant, troubled land we are shocked and surprised.(1) Who are these criminals? What did we ever do to them? What do they want? If we examine certain global situations in recent history, we may find some answers. The situation of the Palestinian Arab people is one which has resulted in some considerable grief and political turmoil for Western Europe and the United States. It had arisen out of a dispute over a homeland for the Palestinians which is viewed by many Palestinian and other Arabs as having been illegally usurped by the partitioning of Palestine and the creation of the State of Israel in 1948. This was the watershed event which has since seen visited upon the Middle East and the world at large a tragic succession of war, terrorism, and unrest. Palestine has never existed as a nation in the traditional sense; there has never been a Palestinian national political body, or foreign policy, or identity. An Arab region, it has been a land of transitory occupations and imperial domains. In the late nineteenth and early twentieth centuries, Palestine was occupied by the Turkish Ottoman empire (as were Syria, Lebanon, and the Transjordan). After World War I, the region was ceded to British rule under a League of Nations Mandate, which continued through World War II and until the United Nations directed partitioning to create a Jewish state. Though never a part of the British empire, Palestinian Arabs came to regard the British presence in their land much the same as did the Egyptians, that is, as an occupying military power.(2) Between the Turkish occupation and the creation of Israel, there was a growing sense of Arab nationalism and movements were begun to create a Palestinian Arab state. (Interestingly, there was a provision in the U.N. mandate for the partition of Palestine for creation of just such a state. It was thwarted, as shall be discussed.) A combination of factors served to combine and defeat these movements early. First, there was the very transitory nature of the region itself. Palestine was (and is ) a homeland to many a different type of people from a variety of cultures and regions. Prior to the outbreak of the Second World War, there was the steady, but not significantly large influx of Jews into the region, many displaced by Russian pogroms and increasing European hostility toward their insular lifestyle and culture. There was also a substantial number of Asian and Middle Eastern displaced groups in the region. After the nazi holocaust of World War II, the Jewish migration into Palestine increased dramatically. Despite the strict British attempts to restrict this movement by blockades of the coast and establishment of displaced persons internment camps on Cyprus and elsewhere, there was widespread international support for the establishment of a sanctuary for the Jews in Palestine. There was also a growing Zionist movement that had the impetus of centuries of mistreatment behind it. The British had long officially supported the establishment of a Jewish state in the region as well. As early as 1917, Britain had stated in the Balfour declaration: His Majesty's Government view with favour the establishment in Palestine of a national homes for the Jewish people, and will use their best endeavors to facilitate the achievement of this object, it being clearly understood that nothing shall be done to prejudice the civil and religious rights of existing now-Jewish communities in Palestine.(3) This was quite contrary to the growing sense of nationalism in the region, inarticulate though it was. The Jewish claim to the ancient homeland was well received internationally, and its articulation was quite well done, as exemplified by the founder of the Zionist movement, Theodore Hertzl who stated in 1896 that founding a Jewish state in Palestine would fulfill a dream of "transporting a people without a nation to a nation without a people." (4) The indigenous population had no such spokesman. They lived obscurely and quietly, for the most part unknown in the grand scheme of international relations. The burgeoning Jewish population in Palestine in the early post-war years was not peaceably received. Their influx was from Europe, for the most part, and this was a culture with which the Arabs were not comfortable. It was a European culture, not a semi-nomadic one, and an urban, vice rural lifestyle. The creation of Israel, when it came, was accompanied with violence and terror. In the first place, there was the terrorist campaign waged by the Zionist groups against the British, culminating in the bombing of the King David hotel in Jerusalem in May, 1948.(5) There was also terror waged against the Zionists by Arab nationalist groups and neighboring Arab states which blossomed into the first Arab - Israeli war. During its conduct, the roots of "the Palestinian problem" were established. The indigenous Arab population began a large- scale exodus from all urban areas and townships. They left from Jaffa, Tel Aviv, Haifa, even Jerusalem, not yet within Israeli borders. They left for a number of reasons, some of which are disputed by the belligerent parties. Some point to the fact that it is quite normal for unarmed civilians to leave a battle area. The Israeli position is thatthese people left on the exhortation or Arab leaders to get out of the way of advancing Arab forces to avoid hindrance of the total annihilation if the new Jewish state.(6) The Palestinian Arab version of the exodus is that the Palestinian inhabitants of the region were subjected to brutal terrorist acts on the part of Israeli armed forces and fled in order to prevent their own massacre.(7) There is substantive factual documentation for all three causal effects of 1948. It is indisputable that the Palestinians did leave, and left en masse, with estimates ranging between one-half and one and one-half millions fleeing to the cities of Transjordan, Lebanon and Syria. The Israelis, largely for their own protection and survival, established tough border security and movement control of Arabs within the borders of Israel. Whole families of Palestinian Arabs were separated and unable to re-establish contact. The Palestinians who had left found themselves cast adrift as refugees in countries which did not want them, as they were an economic burden. Expelled from Jordan into Lebanon because of negative Jordanian reaction to militant Palestinian factions, they became a deprived and desperate class of urban poor. Those that remained in Israel, over the course of two more Arab - Israeli wars, found themselves as a conquered and subjugated people in their own land. Fawaz Turki was one of these refugees and became an eloquent speaker for the Palestinian Arab cause. He writes: I am aware that I have been stateless for nearly all my 29 years;I have lived in refugee camps on the edge of the desert; that except for those...bureaucrats in the West who from time to time endorsed a shipment of food and warm blankets to me, I did not, (for all men and for all they knew) exist on the face of this globe; that I was robbed of my sense of purpose and my sense of worth as a human being... (8) The rage toward Israel felt by many Palestinian Arabs expanded to include the whole Western world, this primarily because of the sense of continued abandonment of their people, and continued and increasing support for Israel. Turki explains: My generation of Palestinians, growing up alienated excluded and forgotten, rejected this legacy, yet when we looked around us we could see either the desert to shed our tears in or the whole world to hit back at. Having nothing and with nothing to lose, we proceeded to do the latter." (9) The situation fermented for decades, and while most of the Western world moved through the late 1950's and into the 1960' with problems of its own (such as Indochina, Algeria, Berlin and the growing threat of Communism), there was little awareness of the "Palestinian problem", other than the understanding that Israel faced a terrorist threat, which it seemed able to deal with. The Palestinians were waiting for their Arab brothers to rectify the problem through some form of unified regional action to restore their homeland. Such action was not forthcoming. What was occurring was the continuing growth of Arab nationalism, as witnesses by such events as nationalization of the Suez canal by Egypt in 1956, the Lebanon crisis of 1958, and the growing and increasingly hostile Arab rhetoric in favor of the notion of exterminating Israel. The focus of European and American action during this time was on stabilization of the region, prevention of Soviet advances in the region, and , most visible to the Palestinian people, the overriding concern of the United States to guarantee the security of Israel, apparently at any cost. This gave rise to the foundation of a number of "revolutionary" movements in the Palestinian cause in the early 1960's, which are with us to this day, and which have become regular and notorious visitors to morning headlines. These include the Palestinian Liberation Organization (PLO), the Popular Front for the Liberation of Palestine (PFLP), Fatah, and Black September. One of the founders of the PFLP, Bassam Abu Sharif, explains the origins of his group, and how it evolved: The armed struggle began in 1965, but the Palestinian people have not stopped fighting since 1948. That was when we were first driven out. You can say there have been three stages since then: armed fighting in small groups-commando style attacks on Israelis in Palestine. The pan-Arab campaign of the fifties and first half of the sixties, (which the Palestine supported, believing it would take them back to Palestine). Then, latterly the realization of the Palestinians in 1964-65, that the program of the nationalist Arab regimes fell short meeting the necessities of their struggle,... when the Palestinians put into effect new conditions. 1964 was the year organized Palestinian resistance began... both the PFLP and Fatah began then. (10) This brings us to the situation confronting the world today. The Palestinian groups, "terrorist" in our perceptions because of their violence and the sordid nature of their crimes, are, in their own eyes, revolutionary vanguards in the struggle to right an egregious historical wrong. We can apply our model here, and examine its usefulness in determining the status of this situation. The old order has been described: old Palestine, occupied, nomadic, rural, and non- belligerent. The change element was the sudden partitioning of the region and the imposition of a new state with an unfamiliar and unwelcome cultural, religious and political composition. The upheaval is prolonged and ongoing, apparently the state of things as of this time. As this paper is in its final stage of generation, the PLO is reasserting itself in Lebanon, with Syrian backing. Israel is poised for another incursion into Lebanon, should conditions appear threatening. The last two stages of the model have not yet occurred, Revolution and the imposition of a new or post-revolutionary order, in this case regional. What appears to be needed for the resolution of the situation is solution for the problem of a permanent homeland of the Palestinian people. The United States has proposed various options for this involving the west bank of the Jordan river, once the territory of Jordan and now occupied by Israel. Without a solution, we appear to be caught in the dilemma for the short term at the very least. There are several schools of thought on the eventual resolution of the Palestinian situation in the Middle East. One view is expressed by Soraya Antonius, daughter of a Palestinian nationalist and leader of an Arab women's revolutionary movement: I think things will get worse. The struggle has to be resolved by violence because in twenty five formative years of the so-called state of Israel non-violence has only bred violence. Until it started, nobody could have accused the Palestinians of having even a stick in their hands. Now they know that resistance has to be fought for. I have never heard of a country being given its independence without a struggle." (11) There is one other aspect of the Palestinian situation that is unique and bears examining, and that is the incredible degree of international exportation of their terrorism. While there have been a number of examples of revolutionary causes being exported from the scene of the revolution to foreign shores in history, in no other case until this one has there been such a wide dispersion of terrorist acts. To date, Palestinian terrorists have claimed responsibility for various actions, including bombings, airline hijackings, kidnapings, and assassinations in some fourteen countries on four continents. This reflects an appreciation for applying the instrument of terrorism as a means of bringing awareness of the cause to the world. They do this because it can be done, and because it brings their cause to the forum of world public attention and a position of influence in international decision making. Each time a Palestinian terrorist is apprehended by the authorities of a state, prosecution of the case is influenced by the consideration of repercussions and retaliation by increased terrorist acts. This is an insidious aspect of the problem and confronts the world with the dilemma of how to deal with this group of "criminals" without increasing the hazard to public safety they pose. The recent delay of the extradition of one of the members of the notorious Abu Nidal sect from West Germany to the U.S. to face murder charges in the Achille Lauro hijacking is but one example. The threat made by terrorist cells in thew Middle East is that German interests worlwide are at risk should the German government extradite the terrorist. The fact of the delay proves the credibility of the terrorist threat beyond any doubt. Politics of Repression: Northern Ireland One of the most vivid examples of ongoing terrorist activity today is the situation in Northern Ireland. This area is the scene of such continuous violence that it has driven scars into the psyche of entire generations and left a legacy of hatred and bitterness that no reconciliation seems possible. It is a regional issue, yet it has, like Palestine, a global impact, for many of the same techniques are being employed as are seen in the Middle East. It has a longer historical tradition, some seven hundred years. In fact, history is the framework for this situation more so than any other. A patch of graffitti on an Ulster wall sums it up: To hell with the future and long live the past, May God in His Heaven look down on Belfast (12) The history of "the Irish Question" is perhaps the most depressing chronology an individual might choose to pursue. It is a story of ancient hatred and bitter disputes, with the full spectrum of violence having been exercised, from civil unrest to sectarian warfare. For the student of terrorism, Northern Ireland represents the full fruition of the practitioners art. Ireland was first invaded by Britain in the twelfth century, during the rei9gn of Henry II. It was finally conquered in 1603, with the surrender of the O'Neill and the dissolution of the ancient system of Celtic tribal rule. The conquest of Ireland and subsequent occupation by Britain resulted in the seeds of violence being sown. The British, in a policy eventually termed "making Ireland pay for itself", siezed Irish lands and sold them to private parties of Scots and Englishmen to pay for the garrisoning of troops to subdue repeated Irish uprisings. Hostilities began in the 1600's and continue to this day. It is nearly impossible to establish a sound perspective on the situation as pertains to terrorism in Northern Ireland today because of the complexity of the historical background and the great fragmentation between and among the warring groups. In fact, if our model is employed here, it can be effectively argued that Northern Ireland represents a case of "arrested development" in a revolutionary situation. There has been no victory for those attempting to evict the British, neither has there been effective dissolution of the separist movements. Although the southern half of Ireland did achieve independence from Britain after a relatively violent revolution, it took four hundred years, and the British hold on Ulster is not strictly colonial, it is strongly supported by the indiginous Protestant population, who consider themselves British subjects and true Irishmen. Perhaps the best indication of the depth and complexity of the problem is to be found in the attitudes of the children. A Catholic children's poem: On Saint Patrick's day, jolly and gay We'll kick every Protestant out of the way And if that won't do, we'll cut them in two And send them to hell with their red, white and blue A Protestant children's poem: Sleuter, slaughter, holy water Harry the Papishers, every one Drive them under and bate them asunder The Protestant boys will carry the drum (13) This legacy of backward looking warfare promises nothing but continued violence and decline of a region. The role of terrorism here is one typically carried out in a revolution, that of de- stabilization, of ensuring the establishment that it cannot rest. It also ensures that the British authorities are seen in the worst light possible. In a recent analysis of "The Troubles", Paul Warwick notes: The British... are accoutered in flak jackets and armed as if for the D-day landings,and the only hearts and minds one can imagine them winnigng would have to belong to members of the National Rifle Association. There have been 1500 civilian deaths during what the British call "the Emergency", and one has to wonder how many of these people were killed by promiscuous firing from soldiers armed with automatic rifles.(14) Although there is no significant threat posed to U.S. national security by the problem of Northern Ireland, there are aspects of this long tragedy that do impact this country. A gro- wing portion of the separatist movement is marxist , and the damage to British prestige is a small victory for Marxist terrorism; and, since Britain is one of out oldest and strongest European allies, it serves to damage U.S. image as well. In sum, the problem of the unrest in northern Ireland is long term, serious, and fits into the global scheme of international terrorism in its own way. It contributes to those movements advocating worldwide application of the technique of revolutionary terrorism by providing a fertile ground for the harvest of anarchy. The Current of Discontentment The two examples of terrorist foundations examined above, Palestine and Northern Ireland, are not the only situations of violent upheaval in the world today, although they are arguably the most visible and recognizable to Americans. There are many others, some of which, like those flourishing in Central and South America, arguably pose more direct threats to our interests and to American forces in the region. There are splinter groups of Marxists and anarchists in Central Europe and on the northern Mediterranean coast, in Italy and in Greece, which take advantage of any opportunity to strike at targets of NATO and American interest. But in each case, there is a common thread, the element of violent action to draw attention to an internationally weak cause of opposition to Western or American ideas, institutions, or alliance and to attack in the name of revolution. There is also the common element of the spectacular; the idea that while in the aggregate sense there is no major impact or significant damage done to the owners of the targets, the unease created in the minds of the larger populace and the precautions that are taken to prevent recurrence of their acts make the existence of the terrorists a fait accompli, they are now players on the world stage. The motivations for these disparate groups are as varied as are their circumstances. We may read in the papers of massacres of innocent villagers in Central America by right wing death squads in order to convince the agrarian populace of the inadvisability of providing any support, however unwilling it may be, to a rebel movement. Similarly, we may learn of the assasination of a prominent politician or businessman of the same country by a rebel group whose declared motivation for the murder is one of swaying the populace away from the social goals of the status quo. Generation of fear is the tactical objective in each case. The presence of United States military bases, facilities, and personnel in the many parts of the world troubled by unrest and subject to the ministrations of terrorists offers a new twist to the problem altogether. The United States' military presence in most cases around the globe is a result of alliance or treaty agreement. Such presence is therefore generally low key, at the very least it is an aim of the U.S. to maintain positive relations with the populations of host countries. The military presence becomes an attractive target for terrorism because of the symbol it represents of the host nation's ties to a superpower. Although most terrorist attacks overseas to date have been against non- military targets; largely corporate facilities and civilian interests, the propaganda value of an attack on a base or other military facility is great. What better way to show the vulnerability of the "paper tiger" ally of the incumbent government than to bomb or sabotage a U.S. military facility? The tactic most frequently employed against a military facility so far has been one of exploiting any feature of the facility that is not accompanied by some form of security: the bus carrying servicemen to or from work, the unguarded access to an "open" base, the night spot frequented by American servicemen. In an attempt to tighten security, many bases overseas now curtail the access to and from the installations, and have reduced the activities of servicemembers that would normally occur off-base. The next section of this work will examine some attempts at control of terrorist activity, both successful and unsuccessful examples from history,and proposals brought forth in the current scene. Chapter Notes 1. This is a reference to the infamous hijacking of TWA airlines flight 847 which occurred in 1985. The sailor referred to was Petty Officer David Steadham, killed by the hijackers because of his status as a serviceman. 2. The description of the evolution of the Palestinian situation is drawn from S Katz, "Battleground, Fact and Fantasy in Palestine", and the British Office of Naval Intelligence study of Palestine and Transjordan published as a special study in 1937; references in bibliography. 3. The Balfour Declaration quote is included in the British ONI study, p.17. 4. Katz, "Battleground...", p.7. 5. Katz, "Battleground...", p.107. 6. Katz, "Battleground...", p.112. 7. The account of the departure of Palestinian refugees from their homes is taken from F. Turki "The Disinhereted" , published by the Monthly Review Press, included in the bibliography. 8. Turki, "The Disinhereted",p.3. 9. Turki "The Disinhereted", p. 9. 10. The evolution of the various PLO organizations and sub-units is described by Bassam Abu Sharif in the work by G. McKnight "The Terrorist Mind", published by Bobbs-Merrill Co., included in bibliography. 11. Mcknight "The Terrorist Mind", p.78. 12, 13, 14. All information on "the Irish Question" and "The Troubles" are taken from the collection "Northern Ireland", a study included in volume 54 of The Reference Shelf, edited by J. Bartlett, H.W. Wilson Co., included in bibliography. Chapter III Ways, Means, and Counteractions Ways and Means - Enter State Sponsorship In May, 1972, there occured a particularly grisly event in the annals of modern terrorism, the attack on Lod airport in Israel. This attack was unique in that it highlighted the international nature of modern terrorism. In this incident, members of a Marxist movement, the Japanese United Red Army, opened fire on a crowd of mostly Puerto Rican tourists in the central terminal of the airport. Twenty-seven civilian travelers were killed, forty-two were injured. Two of thethree terrorists were also killed in the attack, one by Israeli security forces, the other by the blast of a grenade which he had detonated. The lone survivor remains incarcerated and incoherent in an Israeli prison. What makes this incident unique was the genuinely international nature of the well planned effort that put this deranged group in Tel Aviv.Openly Marxist, the United Red Army heretofore had been a problem primarily to the Japanese government. What could possibly motivate this senseless attack against a state against whom the perpetrators held no stated greivance? What emerges in the search for an answer to this disturbing question is the more disturbing conclusion that terrorism has become a more well articulated effort on the part of a network of states and movements and had grown accordingly. Terrorism has become recognized, and as an instrument of the furtherance of selected national aims, it has proven itself valuable. There has also entered into the arena an increase in the degree of sophistication of modern terrorist movements, which are able to take advantage of readily available improvements in communications, transportation, and weapons and munitions availability that have occurred in recent years. In the case of the Lod airport massacre, and in the case of the Munich massacre of Israeli athletes in the 1972 Munich Olympic games, two of the most widely recognized instances of terrorism in the decade, the acts were commissioned by a terrorist group for accomplishment in an international arena. The intent was to inflict spectacular damage with wide press coverage in furtherance of the cause of Palestinian establishment of a state on the ruins of the "illegitemate" state of Israel. What these occurrences and others like them represent is a trend that appeared in the 1970's of forcing regional disputes into the international arena. By employing Japanese fanatics, by desecrating the Olympics, and by other acts such as the Entebbe hostage drama and the OPEC hostage drama, the radical sects of the PLO are the aknowledged masters of "transnational" terrorist tactics. But the technique may easily be employed in a variety of disputes, such as Puerto Rican nationalist bombings in New York, or Molluccan train hijac4kings in the Netherlands. Why not elsewhere? Because of the relationship of instability in certain Western governments to the furtherance of the aims of the Soviet Union toward world socialism and the ultimate destruction of America capitalism, the tool of "state sponsored" terrorism is most attractive. It is also cost effective, when compared to the much greater cost of payments in arms, consumer goods and tools of production for regimes that the soviets support, notably Cuba, Nicaragua, and Libya. In fact it may be argued quite effectively that all terrorism is "state sponsored", particularly since stateless movements employing terrorism, such as the Palestinian Arabs, are attempting to attain a state. Even so strange an act as the attempted assasination of the Roman Catholic Pope by a vagrant Turkish malcontent; trained, armed and bought by Bulgarian officials, fits into the scheme of furtherance of a state supported aim. Though not obvious to the reader at first, there is a method to this act that defines the logic of employing terrorism to further national objectives. The Pope is, after all, a significant threat to the stability of the Jaruszelski regime in Poland. This regime is vital to the overall stability of the East European security belt of the Soviet Union; therefore any threat posed by the leader of the Catholic Church represents a direct threat to Soviet security interests, and is therefore targetted for elimination. Ridiculous? Possibly, but the fact of the gunfire in St. Peter's square must give pause to thoughts of dismissal of the linkage of this act to the Soviet Union. The Bulgarian connection of Mehmet Ali Agca (1) was proved, and though emphatically denied by the Bulgarian regime, no explanation was offered to solve the riddle of why this gunman held Bulgarian passports and had met with Bulgarian diplomats. There is no reasonable threat posed by the Pope to Bulgaria, after all... Incidents such as the Lod massacre and the assasination attempt on the Pope are not isolated. A disturbing trend is emerging as the litany of terrorism progresses. While recent examples abound in the periodicals, it may be useful to examine a hypothetical instance of the terror linkage which terminates in the western sphere. A terrorist group, targetting the west in furtherance of a revolutionary cause, finds a sympathetic sponsor in an East European embassy in a Middle Eastern capital. The groups 'terrorist faction is trained and given documents in the sympathizer's homeland. They are armed from a third country's arsenal with funding from the sympathizer. They are employed in a terror attack against a Western target, such as an airliner or a train in yet another third country to confuse the jurisdiction of the event and, upon its completion, are ferried from the scene on still another country's airplane to disappear at some destination not disclosed to authorities. The connections are numerous, the network is large, the acts are expanding. This confused scenario itself serves to enhance the agenda of terrorists; while there can be no quick determination of ultimate responsibility for the act, there can be no international outcry or prosecution of the perpetrators. The net result is a sense of unease among the population of the victim nations,( a terrorist objective), and a glaring press incident in the west (another objective achieved). The gain to the sponsor state, assuming an affiliation with Marxist interests, is threefold. First, credibility within the third world is enhanced. Those movements/states espousing Marxist doctrine and the demise of Western values find solidarity with their supporters through the enactment of terrorism (2). Second, there is enhanced justification for the providing of arms and advisors to a supporting state, as is frequently found in Nicaragua, Cuba and Libya (3). Such support is intended to bolster these regimes against the perceived threat of retaliation by the U.S. and its allies in response to terrorist acts by military means. The retaliatory raid against Libya by U.S. naval and air forces in the spring of 1986 lends credence to the need for increased security for these states. They are sympathetically perceived as being the victims of imperialist aggression of the armed forces of the U.S. Finally, sponsorship of "revolutionary" terrorism enlarges the role that an otherwise third- or fourth- rate power plays in international affairs. After all, who can argue that Libya or Nicaragua are really minor sores on the face of the earth after they have been publicly identified by a superpower state as being a threat to hemispheric stability? The medium of terrorism is their means to being in the "major leagues" of international affairs. This, then is the crux of the problem which has resulted in terrorism becoming an internationally institutionalized tool of foreign policy. Lacking economic leverage through natural resources or geographic position, and lacking genuine military power, a Marxist state may turn to the sponsorship of terrorism as a method of conducting its affairs. If the U.S. or its allies are able to prove conclusively that such sponsorship exists, then actions to counter terrorism may be employed effectively, including the use of military force. This was largely the case in the April 1986 raid on Libya, although the conclusiveness of the proof of Libyan sponsorship of terrorist acts has been called into question in Europe and elsewhere. Lacking this proof places a burden of doubt on a nation responding to terrorism through military means. Such response may then serve to portray the state which is on the receiving end of a military action as being the victim of aggression, as is the claim of Muammar Khadaffy, the Libyan strongman. More will be discussed in this area in a later section. The ways and means of terrorism on a smaller scale than the international one are similar to those of any criminal activity. The primary difference between a terrorist network and an operation of a more conventional criminal nature lie in the objectives of the activity. The objectives of conventional criminal organizations are primarily profit motivated. The machinations of such organizations are familiar to most Americans. What differentiates the terrorist in his motives are the higher stakes placed on mission accomplishment for the terrorist. This is a very fine line, since often the results of both entities is violence and death. But the motivation for the terrorist is idealogical as opposed to profit motive, and this usually means that the risk such an organization will take is greater, the planning possibly better, and the results sometimes more spectacular. Historical Countermeasures There are several illustrative examples in the post - WW II era which are useful in the analysis of counteractions in response to the threat of terrorism. Two examples involve successful policies adopted to counter terrorism, although the terrorism in both instances originated from and was largely carried out within the borders of the victim state. The first example is Algeria. The second is Uruguay. These examples do not correspond to the current scenario except in a very general sense; both are revolutionary examples, however they are useful to examine the effects of terrorism and counter-terrorism in their most extreme manifestations. The nationalist movement in Algeria broke into a violent revolutionary pattern in 1945, with the massacre of French colonials in the town of Setif. For the next sixteen years Algeria was torn by violence which covered the entire available spectrum, from street demonstrations to full-scale guerilla war. The Setif massacre was a planned attack by local Berber villagers against the French police garrison and colonial residents of the town of Setif, near the Mediterranean coast of Algeria. Several dozens of the colonials were killed, and there were atrocities committed by the attackers. At the time of the outbreak of violence in the Algerian movement for independence from France in 1945, the colonial populace represented a distinct minority of the total population of the country, which was primarily Arab. The Setif massacre triggered a backlash on the part of the colonials which left many Arabs dead, and which drove the seed of revolutionary fervor deep into the Arab indigents. What followed was a campaign of bombings and retaliations, terrorism and fierce reaction from the French authorities; a period culminating in the famous "battle of Algiers" in the Autumn of 1957.(4) In this episode, French reaction to the growing waves of terror directed at the colonial population was marked by brutal military efficiency on the part of the French Army paratroopers in the district and city of Algiers under the command of then Col. Massu. Massu initiated a series of measures, including "guadrillage", the subdividing of territory down into block-sized units; rigid curfew, infiltration of rebel cells every level, and random and intensive interrogation tactics of the urban populace. These repressive measures effectively crushed the rebel resistance. The cells were compromised, rampant distrust was sown among the leaders of the revolutionary movement, and the mobility of the revolutionary terrorists was denied. Although the battle of Algiers is widely popularized in story and film as being a bright moment in the revolutionary struggle of the Algerian people to achieve independence, in reality the campaign itself was a total victory for the French. It was an extremely unconventional military campaign, however it was brilliantly effective. The unfortunate side of the battle for the French lies in the fact that the paras adopted tactics contrary to the ideals of their service. Along with the tactics of counter- revolutionary urban warfare, they resorted to the employment of torture and indiscriminate violation of the most basic civil and cultural rights of the Algerian people. It was this that eventually proved to be undoing of French efforts to hold on to the country, for the metropolitan population of continental France was revolted by the facts of the repression of the Algerian resistance movement. This example serves to support the idea that at its most rampant, an internal terrorist threat can be effectively defeated by a conventional military force operating unconventionally. It also serves to support the idea that the greater good may not be served no matter how effective, for the methods employed proven to be destructive in the long run. Another example of effective response to terrorism is the case of the Tupamaros of Uruguay in the period 1965-75. Uruguay at the beginning if the 1960's was regarded as one of the most politically enlightened states in South America, sometimes referred to as the "Switzerland of South America". She was governed by a democratically elected president, was largely self- sufficient economically, and was a favored tourist country of the continent. (5) The Tupamaros were a Marxist revolutionary sect that arose to prominence after the failed efforts of Che Guevara to create a revolution in Bolivia. Guevara was captured and executed by Bolivian authorities in 1968. The Tupamaros began as a labor movement in 1962 when their founder, Raul Sendic, began organizing sugarcane workers in Montevideo in order to strike against the corporate entity that controlled the workers lives. As in many revolutionary movements, the real roots were economic. Since the late 1950's, Uruguay's predominantly agricultural economy had begun to show signs of stagnation. Her exports of beef and other farm goods to neighboring nations had fallen off due to the emergence of more productive and efficient national economies. Inefficiencies in distribution within Uruguay, soaring inflation, popular agrarian labor unrest all contributed to the rise of a number of revolutionary movements, by far the most violent and openly terrorist were the Tupamaros. Exposure of growing corruption within the government, depiction of the U.S. as a sponsor of the worst elements in Uruguayan society, and furtherance of the notion that true prosperity for the workers could only be found in a Marxist state were all tactical aims of the Tupamaros. The tactics of the sect included assassination of government officials, bombing attacks on institutional facilities, murder of police officials to indicate powerlessness, and selected attacks on military officials to "dissuade" the autonomous military from becoming involved in counter terrorist actions. What evolved was indeed revolutionary in scope, thought it was nothing like what the Tupamaros had in mind. The military elite of the country consolidated its internal powers behind a set of "emergency measures" legislated by the Uruguayan government. These included suspension of the writ of habeus corpus, strict press censorship, and greatly expanded police powers for both civil and military authorities. The growing political crisis, enabled and facilitated by acts of terrorism on the part of the Tupamaros, became a full-scale guerilla war. Repression and torture, along with many other tactics employed in a similar manner as had been seen in Algeria resulted in two outcomes for the Uruguayan situation. First was the utter eradication of the Tupamaros. By 1972, no functioning revolutionary cells remained. All known rebel leaders, including the founder, Raul Sendic, were dead or imprisoned. Additionally, the established democratic tradition of the country had been destroyed. With the earlier exposure of official corruption and the weakened political position of the president and other elected leaders had come a void in leadership of the country. The military elite, with consolidated and highly effective powers, filled the void. The national assembly was dissolved in 1973, and all elected officials from then on were sponsored by the military. (6) The lessons from the example of Uruguay are twofold. First, as in the Algerian case, adoption of ruthless counter terrorist measures, while effective, may lead to destruction of basic social concepts and ideals. The dangers of this occurrence are obvious. Second, the catalytic effect of terrorism in a situation of economic and/or political instability are exponential to the same effects in a stable social environment. In this case there are some closer parallels to the present scenario in a number of regions, Southern Africa being most visible among them. Again, the growing power of internal and military authorities may bring forth a changed society unforseen by the principals in the current struggle. Chapter Notes 1. Mehmet Ali Agca was convicted by an Italian court of assault upon the Pope in a tumultuous trial in 1983. An account of the investigation and chronology of the incident was provided by P. Brinton's "Attack on thePope", Blackledge Press, London, 1984. 2. The application of terrorism in the furtherance of Soviet aims is discussed in E. Goodman's "The Soviet Design for a World State", Columbia University Press, N.Y. 1960. Lenin's writings quoted in this work endorse the notion of terrorism to weaken a capitalist society, although he renounced "indiscriminate" terror. 3. The connection of Libya, Cuba and Nicaragua to Soviet foreign policy and the advancement of Marxist ideaology is stated in the President's "National Security Policy of the United States", included in the bibliogranphy. 4. The history of the Algerian revolution istaken from the riveting book by Alistair Horne "A Savage War of Peace", Viking Press, N.Y., included *in the bibliography. 5. An analysis of the Uruguayan crisis is concisely told by E. Kaufman in "Uruguay in Transition, From Civilian to Military Rule", Transaction Books, New Brunswick, New Jersey, 1979. 6. Raul Sendic was released from prison in 1986, after almost 14 years in prison. When asked if he would attempt to resurrect the Tupamaros' revolutionary banner he stated: "Why should we go back? We were the marshalls of defeat. "Uruguay is currently undergoing a resurgence of democracy,as are Brazil and Argentina. Chapter IV Policy Options for the United States The Current Stance The present position of the United States with respect to the problem of international terrorsism is thought to be well know among the populace. Yet beyond the statement that "we will not deal with terrorists" there is a policy void wherein there exists a need for greater articulation of a national front against the threat. In his 1987 publication of National Security goals (1), President Reagan has restated and somewhat expanded the notion that we will not deal with or tolerate terrorists and their activities. His expansion lies mainly in the concept that the nation will pursue whatever legal means at its disposal to determine the origin of any terrorist act directed against U.S. citizens and/or property, and, having determined the source, will take appropriate action. The April 1986 attack on Libya is frequently cited as an appropriate response to terrorism. The difficulty with this posture as the entirety of the national policy on terrorism is that it does not adequately address the problem; there is not sufficient content to the statement of policy. A recently aired Public Broadcasting Service program entitled "In the Face of Terror" illustrates the difficulties of attaining and articulating a consensus policy to counter terrorism. The program was a panel discussion among a group of national security experts, military representatives, and media representatives wherein a hypothetical terrorist scenario was posed by the panel moderator and the responses of the group to each disclosure of the scenario was elicited. The scenario was set in the Middle East and involved a hostage incident in which U.S. citizens were a majority of the hostages. (2) One of the most interesting aspects of the broadcast was the diversity of responses emerging from each disclosure. A particularly enlightening example was the response by members of the press to the question of what action they would take should they receive knowledge of the location of the terrorist ringleaders as a result of terrorist attempts to broaden media coverage of the event. One well known network correspondent stated that he would most emphatically safeguard such information as a matter of priveleged information from a safeguarded source. Another correspondent stated that her decision about whether or not to pass on the location of the terrorists to the authorities would have to be made on the basis of whether or not lives were at stake. Still another stated that he would have no qualms about immediately notifying authorities as soon as he could. While such hypothetical responses may have been based upon professional considerations regarding journalistic credibility, thle example of the well known correspondents serves to illustrate an advantage held by terrorists in the commission of their acts; the advantage an underdog has over a divided foe. While the impact of public opinion in a free society is significant to say the least, the advantage held by the terrorist in the face of such variety of response is greater than that of mere manipulation of the media. There was another illustrative example of the impact of a lack of consensus in counter-terrorist strategy that emerged from the program. Included among the panel members was a former director of the Central Intelligence Agency, a State department legal adviser, a former Chief of Staff of the Army, and a former White House Chief of Staff. Each of these was asked a question about the response appropriate to the terrorist act assuming the situation had been resolved with some loss of life and that there had been a determination of sponsorship of the act attributed to a well known radical Middle Eastern state leader. Again, there was a diversity of response to the proposition. The CIA chief recommended assasination of the responsible dictator, terming it an "imposed change of leadership". The lawyer expressed concerns about international law and jurisdiction beyond our borders. The former Army Chief recommended the employment of special forces to extract the dictator and hand him over for prosecution. The former White House Chief of Staff recommended a retaliatory conventional military strike as was done against Libya. This again serves to illustrate the diversity of opinion within the high levels of our government when faced with the increasing threat of terrorism. Again, the terrorist perceives a divided foe and an advantageous position from which to direct his actions. The question of a consensus policy to counter an increasing terrorist threat is further complicated by other factors. One of these is the transitory nature of U.S. politics. Without a legislative or constitutional provision, counterterrorism as a foreign policy suffers the same vagaries as any other foreign policy. It is subject to immediate situational executive change; that is, policy is set as a funtion of the party in office at the time, it becomes a function of the political goals of individual office holders of a particular administration. Another complicating factor is the uniqueness of the United States situation as a target nation. There is no international historical precedent to draw upon. It is fundamentally difficult to adopt a policy within the framework of a constitutional democracy to address effective measures against a threat which appears to be increasingly an exported product.There is no specific threat posed in the United States of significant political violence from an internal revolutionary entity. Recent legislation enacted in Congress has increased the penalties for terrorist acts.(3) Among the increased powers of the federal government enacted since 1984 are: Prosecution of any person who commits an act of violence on any government or civilian aircraft. Prosecution of any person who commits an act of violence against the immediate family members of the President, Vice President, Members of Congress, all federal judges, the heads of executive agencies, the Director of the CIA and federal law enforcement officials. (State jurisdiction still supercedes federal unless the offense is committed on federal property.) Prosecution of anyone who travels or uses transportation or communications facilities in interstate or foreign commerce with the intent to murder for compensation. These enactments seem to recognize the need for a better and more coherent policy to counter terrorism, but they are not adequate to overcome the growing threat. A broader base of action and a greater effort is required. A Perspective for Policy Formulation There is a method of addressing terrorism that proceeds beyond the current framework of policy formulation. In order to advance into a more effective method of addressing this growing and insidious threat, there are four points which may assist in setting a new framework and a more effective strategy in the changing environment. The first of these points is acceptance. This means acceptance of the fact that intmernational terrorism is becoming a more normalized methodology for advancing a variety of idealogical causes and revolutionary aims. This means acceptance also of the notion that terrorism is becoming more widely distributed in the world as improvements in transportation and increases in the availability of arms and munitions expands. Acceptance does not mean accepting any portion of the notion that terror is legitimate. But, like any physiological epidemic, the expansion of terrorism as a means of accomplishing political ends must be recognized as a growing and virulent problem before it can be further treated. Additionally, acceptance in this context means increasing public awareness of the root causes of contemporary terrorism and the most likely vectors by which the problem may advance. Education in public schools is an example of how this particular definition of acceptance may be applied. The second point in developing a revised framework for policy formulation is in the concept of minimization. This means a concerted effort at presenting the events of terrorism in a less sensational and a more lucid method. Minimization is an orientation of the public coverage of these events which is intended to minimize the accomplishment of the terrorist objective of spectacular media coverage. This smacks of censorship, however what it really means is a concerted effort to have an informed press do their job with a more professional outlook and function. As was stated by a senior journalist, editor of a daily newspaper during a recent "media day" at the Marine Corps Command and Staff College: "I work for my editor, not the reading American public; he's the guy who writes my paycheck." (4) There is a precedent for attempting to define and enforce standards of press coverage. During the late 1970's, an American Editorial Review Board was established with senior, highly credentialed journalists of various media participating. The intent was specifically to reduce sensationalist reporting and to upgrade the priorities of current journalism practices. The effort failed, largely because of two factors. First, the board had no enforcement powers other than written censure of anyone whom it deemed to be under its influence. Second, the efforts of the board were usurped by the overpowering influence of ratings and ratings share of television news broadcasts. All network news organizations claim to exist as a public information arm of the networks themselves. Recent hearings before the Interstate Communications Commission into the budget practices of the three major networks in funding their news divisions revealed that, while the networks in funding their news divisions as a profit center for aodvertising revenue, they do depend heavily on the ratings to determine the "quality" of news production. This cannot but influence the format and content of televised news; what drives ratings is what some would argue attracts fans to the circus, they want to see the lions win. "Sensationalism" is an oft-abused term when applied to the media in general and the television media in particular. Military people tend to distrust the press, the reverse is also true. This distrust has evolved into an adversarial relationship harmful to all concerned, especially in the face of a terrorist threat. Minimization as an element of a policy formulating framework would include a publicly declared editorial policy which would be aimed at resticting visual media from the coverage of a terrorist event. Such restriction would include film, still photo, and television. Live coverage would be allowed, but only from a separate location, such as an operations center. If this policy were backed by force of law, and were couched in legal terminology that such editorial constraints were aimed at preservation of public interests, the media would still enjoy its traditional freedom to report whatever it saw fit, but without the added element of the live spectacle. The hijacking of TWA flight 847 in 1985 is a glaring example of television media run amok in the hands of a terrorist sponsored tragedy. One additional aspect of the concept of minimization is the adversarial relationship that now exists between press and military in American society. David Gergen, editor of U.S.News and World Report stated that "Too few govrnment-media relationships are built on trust, credibility and professionalism."(4) While there is a perfectly natural human tendency to be distrustful of an entity which might expose the embarassing or the distorted about an agency or an individual, and while such a tendency is even healthy to protect journalistic independence, it would be helpful if this tendency were professionally molded. If aspiring journalists and junior military officers were trained to deal with each other on a professional basis, there might be a better product emerging from newsrooms and editorial offices than there is presently. For the armed forces, recognition of the press as a potentially valuable asset in the projection of the military image, as was done during World War II, would be helpful in the combat against a terrorist threat. For the press, realization of the growing dimension of the terrorist threat, and understanding of the unique position of the military in dealing with the threat would go a long way in getting a true story and a less hostile reception from the object of their inquiry. The third point in the construct of a framework for policy formulation, after acceptance and minimization, is articulation; that is, the articulation of a legislative agenda for the combat against terrorism. As was mentioned earlier, there have been sporadic attempts and recent successes at passing anti-terrorist legislation. However, there needs to be a greater effort at articulating a national posture to stand against this growing and difficult threat. As an example, we presently have serious gaps at standardizing and upgrading of security at airports and other points of entry. While measures have been approved to better enable the law enforcement efforts, no federal statutes currently mandate development of measures to protect ports, vessels, passengers, or crew. (6) In addition to a need to improve physical security in the face of a terrorist threat, potentially compromising information is available freely under the Freedom of Information Act to any who might ask. This could quite easily result in people and in facilities becoming targets of a terrorist attack. The FOIA has proven to be of great value in determining people, places and activities in the areas of law enforcement, military operations, and government proceedings. This is a windfall to potential and existing terrorist organizations. Other items worthy of articulation into policy include: Congressional oversight of proposed counter terrorist operations; currently this is the exclusive realm of the Executive branch, because of the employment of military options in hostage rescue and other situations. Jurisdiction over terrorist acts committed against federal officials and property as well as against foreign officials and facilities within the United State. Presently, unless such violations occur on federal property, or in conjunction with violations of otyer federal statutes, state jurisdiction prevails. Formation of a Joint Committee on Intelligence, an issue raised by the Report of the Vice President's Commission on Terrorism. This would serve to streamline procedures for intelligence oversight and reduce access of numbers of people to sensitive information. Revision of extradition treaties to permit a more efficient processing of perpetrators to and from the U.S. Recent decisions of the federal courts have blocked extradition of suspected terrorists to seeking countries on the grounds that their offenses were political crimes, therefore these people were protected against extradition. There should be revisions to extradition treaties to preclude exclusion of political offenses when the offenses include violent crime. American law sides heavily on the assumption of innocence, the protection of individual rights against anything remotely defined as unreasonable, and the protection of our constitutional freedoms. It is a magnificent tradition of law, however, revision a3t its loose seams would significantly enhance the prospects of reducing the ever more clear and present danger of terrorism. The final of the four points in building the framework is alliance. With the growing polarization of the terrorist threat against Western targets, the U.S., its European allies and its industrial trading partners, there is great value in alliance. One specific application of improving an alliance, the revision of extradition treaties, has been made. Others largely include the idea of articulation of international cooperation against terrorism. From the Vice President's Commission report: International cooperation offers the best hope for long term success. More and more states recognize that unilateral programs for combatting terrorism are not sufficient. ...terrorists will benefit from the uncoordinated actions of their victims. International cooperation can complicate the terrorists tasks, deter their efforts, and save lives. Numerous actual or planned attacks against U.S. or foreign targets have failed or were circumvented... The report goes on to highlight action agreed to by the "Summit Seven", (U.S.,U.K.,Canada, West Germany, France, Italy and Japan) that seems to recognize the value of such alliance in facing the threat. With activation of counterterrorist policies in existing international trade, transportation, and communications agencies, the results could be more positive still. This is the framework: acceptance, minimization, articulation, and alliance, within which may be built a foreign policy in response to the growing threat of the terrorist. The Model Revisited In the revolutionary historical model to terror we observed five distinct phase of revolution, and saw how terrorism, acting as a catalyst, was most prevalent in three of them. In each of the several situations of the world today that acts as a host and breeding ground for terrorism; from Northern Ireland to South Africa, from the Middle East to Central America can be found some stage of the historical model. Upheaval and revolution are permanent realities of political life in our time. As such, the catalyst of the terrorist will be ever present in their midst. What has served to exacerbate the problem of terrorism for the United States has been the increasing commitment that this country has economically to many countries worldwide, the unending requirement to maintain a military and political presence to support the commitment, and the increased use of the terrorist as an instrument of violent foreign policy. When these factors are combined with the growing lethality and availability of weapons and the ease of movement about a shrinking world, it is apparent that any attempt to forestall the terrorist threat must be made through the medium of foreign and internal policy formulation. As long as the terrorist threat is perceived as being disparate, random and inarticulate we have no means of effectively addressing the threat. Through acceptance, minimization, articulation and alliance we have the framework within which can be built a tough and effective policy to combat a dedicated, often fanatic foe. In a sense, the problem is a simple one, in that terrorism is like any other crime of violence. We have laws, we have deterrents to the commission of violence; all we need do is enforce them. But on the other hand, terrorism is a vastly more complex problem, in that what it attacks are -the foundations of a way of life, of our way of life. It is virtually impossible to retain a free society and at the same time enact measures to preclude occurrence of terrorist acts. We must formullate policies in conjunction with our allies and those states we recognize as being in favor of democratic ideals to educate our people, to minimize the effectiveness of the terrorist, and to use the best of our abilities to ensure continued progress in international and human affairs. Terrorism will not go away. We must ensure it is contained as much as possible. 1. Extracted from the Presidents "National Security Policy for the United States", Washington, D.C. 1987. 2. The program discussed, "In the Face of Terror", a production of WETA, Washington, D.C., 1987 3. Legislative initiatives with respect to terrorism were summarized in the "Report of the Vice President's Task Force on Terrorism", Washington D.C., 1986. 4. The remarks on military - press relationships were made at the U.S. Marine Corps Command and Staff College Media day, March, 1987, and were by Mr. Pat Fergurson, of the Washington bureau of "The Baltimore Sun". 5. Remarks made during an address by Mr. David Gergen durine an Erskine series lecture at Quantico, Va., March, 1987. 6. From the Report of the Vice President's Task Force. Bibliography 1. Anzovin,S. (ed.) "Terrorism", The Reference Shelf,vol. 58, #3, H.W.Wilson Co., New York,1986. 2. Bartlett, J. "Northern Ireland", The Reference Shelf, vol. 54, #6, H.W. Wilson Co., New York 3. Bass,G., and Jenkins, B.M., "A Review of Recent Trends in International Terrorism and Nuclear Incidents Abroad",A Rand Note: N-1979-SL, The Rand Corporation, Santa Monica, Ca. 1983. 4. Buckley, A., and Olson, D., (ed.), "International Terrorism", Avery Publishing, Wayne, N.J.,1980. 5. Goodman, E., "The Soviet Design for a World State", Columbia University Press,New York, 1960. 6. Hoffman, B., "Prevention of Terrorism and Rehabilitation of Terrorists", The Rand Corporation, Santa Monica, Ca., 1985. 7. Horne, A., "A Savage War of Peace: Algeria, 1954-1962", Viking Press, New York, 1977. 8. Jenkins, B.M., "Terrorism and Beyond, the Report of an International Conference", The Rand Corporation, Santa Monica, Ca. 9. Jenkins, B.M., "High Technology Terrorism and Surrogate War", The Rand Corporation, Santa Monica, Ca., 1975. 10. Johnson, C., "Perspectives on Terrorism" ,(n.p.) University of California, Berkely, Ca., 1976. (available through DTIC) 11. Katz, S., "Battleground, Fact and Fantasy in Palestine", Bantam Books, New York, 1976. 12. Kellen, K., "On Terrorists and Terrorism", A Rand Note (N- 1942-RC), The Rand Corporation, Santa Monica, Ca., 1982. 13. Kupperman, R., and Trent, D., "Terrorism; Threat, Reality, Response", Hoover Institution Press, Stanford, Ca., 1979. 14. Kupperman, R., "Low Intensity Conflict", U.S. Government Printing Office, Washington, D.C., 1984. 15. Laquer, W., "Terrorism", Little, Brown, and Company, Boston, Ma., 1977. 16. Laquer, W., (ed.), "The Terorism Reader", The New American Library, New York, 1978. 17. Lefebvre,G., "The French Revolution" Lexington Books, Lexington, Ma., 1962 18. Livingstone, N., "The War Against Terrorism", Lexington Books, Lexington, Ma., 1982 19. Lebret, L.J., "The Last Revolution", Sheed and Ward Company, New York, 1965. 20. McKnight, G., "The Terrorist Mind", Bobbs-Merril Company, New York, 1974. 21. Mickolus,E., "Transnational Terrorism, a Chronology of Events", Greenwood Press, Westport, Conn., 1980. 22. Miller, R.L., "The Law of War", Lexington Books, Lexington, Ma., 1975. 23. Sterling, C., "The Terror Network", Holt, Rinehart, Winston Company, New York, 1981. 24. Turki, F., "The Disinhereted", Monthly Review Press, London, U.K., 1972 25. United States Government, Office of the Vice President of the United States, "Public Report of the Vice President's Task Force on Combatting Terrorism", U.S. Government Printing Office, Washington, D.C., 1986. 26. United States Department of Justice, "Facing Tomorrow's Terrorist Incident Today", U.S. Government Printing Office, Washington, D.C., 1979. 27. Waites, M., "Communist Use of Terror in Insurgency", Air War College, U.S. Air Force Air University, Maxwell A.F.B, Alabama, 1967. 28. Weinberger, C., "Annual Report to the Congress, Fiscal Year 1987", U. S. Department of Defense, U.S. Government Printing Office, Washington, D.C., 1987. 29. 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