Notional Mindset vs Flexible Response: Selective Rapid Reinforcement For The Committed MAGTF CSC 1986 SUBJECT AREA Strategic Issues EXECUTIVE SUMMARY TITLE: NOTIONAL MINDSET vs FLEXIBLE RESPONSE: SELECTIVE RAPID REINFORCEMENT FOR THE COMMITTED MAGTF Although the Marine Corps espouses a doctrine of mission dependent task organization, more often than not composition of committed forces is primarily determined by standardization devices designed to improve efficiency in ship space utilization, logistical support, planning, etc. These notional models have solved many valid problems, but model dependence has also led to a notional mindset among many Marines which potentially impedes effective organization for combat and stifles innovative thinking. The most likely scenarios for Marine Corps commitment involve limited contingencies which will probably be unanticipated and will require swift, decisive action. The nature of the limited contingency will necessitate particularly effective action in order to prevent escalation to general warfare. Forward deployed MAGTFs (primarily MAUs) are the immediate action force most likely to initially deal with limited contingencies. Restricted by the structure limitations of a national MAU and by the time restraints of amphibious reinforcement, the MAU commander has few, if any, task organization options with which to influence the action. The Selective Rapid Reinforcement concept advocates use of chosen MPS assets to quickly reinforce committed MAGTFs. Two hypothetical examples are presented. In the first, a MAU is reinforced by an MPS tank company and TOW section prior to a short notice forced entry landing on the Mediterranean coast. In the second, after a week of acting as a security force, an Indian Ocean MAU is reinforced by an MPS AAV platoon. In both cases the MAU commander requests the assets he requires to better handle his mission. The MPS squadron steams toward the action area and offloads selected equipment at either an appropriate shore location or in-stream; airlifted troops are married with equipment. Amphibious shipping then shuttles units into the objective area to participate as the MAU commander directs. The author addresses anticipated concept criticism in the following areas: difficulty in sorting gear, degradation to primary MPS mission, possible use of larger reinforcing units, MPS vulnerabilities, unit integrity, and joint planning considerations. The Selective Rapid Reinforcement concept is a workable method of adding a deployment option which currently does not exist. It effectively overcomes the notional mindset problem and, more importantly, provides a valuable enhancement to the Marine Corps' flexible response capability. NOTIONAL MINDSET vs FLEXIBLE RESPONSE: SELECTIVE RAPID REINFORCEMENT FOR THE COMMITTED MAGTF OUTLINE Thesis Statement. Although the Marine Corps espouses a doctrine of mission dependent task organization, more often than not composition of committed forces is primarily determined by notional models designed to improve efficiency in ship space utilization, logistical support, planning, etc. The result has been a "notional mindset" among many Marines which may potentially stifle effective organization for combat and innovative thinking. Notional thinking trends are particularly hazardous in today's strategic environment which demands an extremely flexibly responsive Marine Corps. The proposed Selective Rapid Reinforcement concept advocates creative use of MPS assets to offer both an enhancement option for the Marine flexible response capability and a possible remedy for notional mindset. I. Notional mindset A. Task organization as the foundation of USMC flexibility B. Strategic mobility as a limiting factor 1. Airlift 2. Sealift C. Deployment as a precursor to employment D. Standardization to facilitate deployment and planning E. Standardization dominates task organization 1. Notional mindset reality 2. Necessity to reverse trend II. Flexible Response Requirement A. USMC as primary force for limited contingencies B. Ideal strategic force-to-mission allocation c. USMC role in realistic strategic plans III. Selective Rapid Reinforcement Option A. Flexible response as a required USMC capability B. Effect of notional mindset on foward deployed MAGTF commander C. Selective Rapid Reinforcement proposal 1. Scenario A--MAU with forced entry mission 2. Scenario B--MAU with security mission D. Address anticipated criticism 1. Difficulty in sorting equipment a. MPS Decision Support System (MDSS) b. Reconfigure loading 2. Degradation of MPS brigade a. Insignificant degradation b. A way, not the way c CINC's call 3. Why not larger reinforcement units? a. Possible, but not necessarily desirable b. Limited by amphibious ship availability c. Large units preclude in-stream offload 4. Port requirement and vulnerability to enemy interdiction a. MPS limitations regardless of form b. In-stream transfer negates need for port c. Easier equipment transfer than full MPS brigade offload 5. Unit integrity disruption; a trade off 6. Joint considerations a. JOPS will support b. TUCHA refinement E. Testing of the Selective Rapid Reinforcement concept a. Difficult but not impossible b. Combine with equipment tests F. Further possibilities 1. Creative innovation 2. New hardware NOTIONAL MINDSET vs FLEXIBLE RESPONSE: SELECTIVE RAPID REINFORCEMENT FOR THE COMMITTED MAGTF How many tanks are there in a Marine Amphibious Unit? A survey of over 100 Marine officers during the past 12 months yielded the following results to that seemingly innocuous question: 92 percent replied with a specific figure (usually five); one percent would not, or could not, answer; seven percent responded more or less with what FMFM 0-1 (Marine Air-Ground Task Force Doctrine) indicates is the correct answer, i.e., a Marine Amphibious Unit (MAU) is a task organized force and will contain the number of tanks determined necessary to accomplish the mission at hand. Several of the seven percent suffixed their answers with valid qualifiers such as "consistent with forces available" and "within the constraints of amphibious lift assigned."1 What do the results indicate? To begin with, it will be argued by some that the survey was invalid because it did not adequately present the question. According to FMFM 0-1, Marine Air-Ground Task Forces (MAGTFs) can be generally 1F.G. Sanford, Jr. Informal survey conducted between 16 April 1985 and 4 March 1986 concerning Marine officer perceptions of MAGTF task organization. The sample included 117 officers ranging in grade from Warrant Officer to Colonel. Questioning was integrated into related conversation in such a manner as to avoid announcing intent or alerting the queried subject. classified as belonging to one of two categories. Forward deployed MAGTFs are contingency forces usually deployed with the fleet. A forward deployed MAGTF is not task organized in the classic sense, since its structure is not oriented for the accomplishment of any given mision. Rather, it is configured based upon available forces and shipping, with consideration given to a variety of potential mission requirements.2 The other category of MAGTF, which is built from the ground up to accomplish a specific mission,3 I will refer to as the prescribed mission MAGTF. Survey critics will point out that most of the 92 percent were probably oriented on forward deployed MAGTFs, which more often than not satisfy the notional MAU formula. They will charge that during questioning, if I had carefully explained the two categories of MAGTFs and that I was talking about the classically task organized, prescribed mission variety, then many more than seven percent would have correctly answered the question. No doubt, but the objective of the survey was to gather unprepared, snap responses. The point is that the immediate image that popped into the great majority of Marine minds when confronted with the 2MCDEC, USMC, Marine Air-Ground Task Force Doctrine, FMFM 0-1(Quantico, 1979), p. 1-5. 3Ibid., pp. 1-5 and 4-5. word "MAU" was a neat one-ninth slice of a Division-Wing- FSSG team--the notional 2000 man MAU with one tank platoon of five tanks. Surveyed officers demonstrated knowledge of notional planning figures, but are the results indicative of a possibly pernicious trend? I believe so. The trend is "notional mindset." What is the danger? Notional mindset presents a potential inhibitor, if not a barrier, to flexible response, the Marine Corps' bread and butter capability. The following argument will address the phenomenon of notional mindset in more detail, explore the Marine Corps' most likely flexible response requirements, and then propose a new look at the Maritime Prepositioned Ships (MPS) as an enhancement for MAGTF flexibility and a possible remedy for at least part of the notional mindset malady. Notional Mindset Today's MAGTF doctrine, as articulated in FMFM 0-1 reinforces repeatedly the absolute requirement for maximum flexibility in the projection and application of combat power. Although FMFM 0-1 points out that "existing similarities among types of MAGTFs allow a standard approach to activation, organization, planning, and operations,"4 the MAGTF bible is replete with pronouncements of 4Ibid., p. 1-1. flexibility in order to "perform missions which range across the spectrum of conflict and crisis situations."5 Flexibility, in turn, is irrevocably dependent on the ability to tailor force composition commensurate with the mission assigned.6 Measured application of the many facets of power through task organization of available assets becomes then, it would seem, the very foundation of Marine Corps flexible response. To a great extent, reality dictates otherwise. Innovative task organization notwithstanding, unless the mission capable force can be projected in a timely manner from initial location to the objective area, the conceptually flexible response is completely negated in practical application.7 For global response there are essentially two forms of projection transportation, or strategic lift: strategic airlift and surface shipping.8 Strategic airlift, because of its speed, fits very much into Marine Corps projection concepts, but it lacks ability to rapidly mass and sustain anything save relatively light 5Ibid., p. 1-1. 6Ibid., pp. 1-1, 1-2, 1-5, 2-4, and 4-6. 7Robert W. Komer, "Strategy and Military Reform," in The Defense Reform Debate, eds Asa A. Clark, Peter W. Chiarelli, Jeffery S. McKitrick, and James W. Reed (Baltimore: The Johns Hopkins University Press, 1984), p. 9. 8U.S. DOD, Annual Report to Congress: Fiscal Year 1987, p. 52. units or troops from heavy units when unaccompanied by principal end items.9 Since a sustainable, forced entry capability requires units normally heavier than those which can feasibly be transported solely by airlift and because forced entry normally means for Marines an ampnibious operation, amphibious shipping has long been correctly viewed as the mainstay strategic mobility option for at least the assault echelon (AE) of MAGTFs contemplating potentially hostile intrusion actions.10 From the Marine Corps' perspective, amphibious shipping is anything but overly plentiful, and even though great strides have been made in "gator" ship design,11 the lift capacity is finite and forever confining 9"William Lind, "Mission and Force Structure," Marine Corps Gazette, 59 (December 1975), p. 16; Ross Heib, "MPS--A Concept of Deployment, Not Employment," Marine Corps Gazette, 67 (August 1983), p 53; and, Stuart L. Perkins, Global Demands: Limited Forces (Washington, 1984), pp. 45- 50. 10Lind, pp. 12-13 and 16; M.K. Sheridan, "Global Flexibility," Marine Corps Gazette, 66 (September 1982), pp. 53-54; G.D. Batcheller, "Analyzing the RDF," Marine Corps Gazette," 64 (June 1980), p. 17; and, Perkins, p. 50. 11P.X. Kelley and Hugh O'Donnell, "The Amphibious Warfare Strategy," The Maritime Strategy, (January 1986), p. 27; DOD, "annual Report," pp. 179, and 182-184; At present 62 amphibious ships are distributed between the Atlantic and Pacific Fleets. Current plans envision 76 amphibious ships by 1996; however, fiscal pressures have already accounted for delays. Even with 76 ships, lift capacity is limited to the assault echelon (AE) of one MAF and one MAB. with respect to the MAGF commander's desires for an extensive kit of weapons and CSS assets. The reality then is that deployment, more often than not, drives employment in the arena of non-prepositioned rapid response capability.12 Deployment limitations impede flexibility and, in turn, have led to an understandable dependency on systematic predictability of ship loads in order to effect optimum utilization of transportation means.13 When the aforementioned is considered in tandem with steaming time limitations, an appreciation develops for the efficacy of positioning standardized, forward deployed MAGTFs with the fleet in strategically critical geographical areas. It becomes apparent that MAGTF standardization efforts have not been the result of a blindly fanatical crusade. In actuality, the movement has been fueled by four solid, real 12Although many military theorists and practitioners have advocated or attacked the concept of deployment driving employment, the most succinct and lucid exposition of the subject from a practical level is contained in the second half of S.L.A. Marshall's classic work The Soldier's Load and the Mobility of a Nation, reprinted ed. (Quantico: Marine Corps Association, 1980), pp. 79-120; a related and War (New York: Cambridge University Press, 1977), a short summary is provided on pp. 231-237. 13Jim Schindler, Major, USMC, Instructor for logistics and the Joint Operations Planning System (JOPS), MCDEC, personal interview concerning logistic and JOPS flexibility with respect to MAGTF task organization . Quantico, Va., March 14, 1986. world requirements: optimum use must be made of premium ship space; fleet operational planning is facilitated by the rotation of forward deployed MAGTFs which are structurally interchangeable; component units of deployed MAGTFs are integrated into the systematic training schedules of parent commands; and, there is a certifiable need for a variety of standardized empirical planning factors to address both near and long term logistical ramifications of MAGTF deployment and sustainability.14 Because MAGTF standardization was never meant to imply organizational rigidity, the word "notional" has gained favor as a term embodying the concept of prototype utility while also connoting structural malleability. Exemplified in its simplest form within quick reference publications such as NAVMC 2710 (Marine Air-Ground Task Forces)15 and in its most complex form in the voluminous readout of a definitive MAGTF lift model, the notional concept provides 14Ibid.; John E. Greenwood, Colonel USMC (ret), Editor Marine Corps Gazette, personal interview concerning MAGTF task organization, Quantico, Va., January 29,1986; J.J. O'Brien, Colonel USMC (ret), telephone interview concerning MAGTF task organization, Santa Barbara, Ca., March 3, 1986; R.W. Hodory, Lieutenant Colonel USMC, personal interview concerning MAGTF task organization, Quantico, Va., February 25, 1986; and, Paul Pugh, Major USMC, personal interview concerning MAGTF task organization, Quantico, Va., March 19, 1986; the material in this paragraph is essentially a synthesis of the five personal interviews. 15HQMC, USMC, Marine Air-Ground Task Forces (MAGTFs), NAVMC 2710 (Washington, 1985), pp. 6-15. mountains of valuable data, ostensibly for use as a point of departure in MAGTF design and planning.16 Intended from inception to simply support, rather than to propel, MAGTF task organization, the notional concept has at any rate taken on a life of its own and now constitutes the established nerve center of the formidable standardization movement.17 Momentum has carried the notional concept far past the confines of merely support of forward deployed MAGTFs. For many of the very valid reasons stated above, the notional phenomenon has consumed every conceivable item on the amphibious warfare menu--both forward deployed and mission prescribed flavors. And, even though the incredibly complex nature of amphibious operations, training, supportability, and sustainability demands standardization devices such as the lift model, there is a limit to the amount of notional efficiency a MAGTF can withstand before flexibility is strangled. Is it any wonder that for the last 15 years or so notional paradigms have permeated our amphibious vocabulary and philosophical perspective? No. Is it any wonder that we have begun to think a little too unconsciously in notional terms? No. Is the unavoidable conclusion then 16Schindler, interview; and, MCDEC, FMFM 0-1, p. 4-6. 17Schindler, interview. that notional inertia is an irresistible force? Let us hope not. Even though the notional concept has served us well in the development of new and better methods of mechanizing loading operations, capitalizing on ship lift, and automating planning systems, it is time to retard the notional impetus inasmuch as it affects decisions concerning the best mix of combat, combat support, and combat service support assets which are designated to float with a forward deployment or to accomplish a prescribed mission. When the MAGTF commander is sorting through his bag of possibilities, constraints must be kept to a restrictive minimum. Well and good the skeptic says, but how do we propose to overcome irritating limitations like paucity of amphibious lift? The truth of the matter is that we will never have enough amphibious lift.18 Similarly, a revolutionary new method of rapid strategic transport of men and heavy materiel is not likely to proffer a simple solution to deployment problems in the foreseeable future. Overcoming the manifold limitations to free play projection of combat power will for the most part require circumnavigation, 18Enough, of course, is a relative term. When we consider that one MAF plus one MAB (AE only) capability is our optimistic 1996 goal, I believe the obvious conclusion is that for the next 20 years a 1 1/3 MAF lift is the very best we will see. I contend "enough" ships to float the AE of all active FMF forces would number about 170--an extremely expensive and unlikely acquisition. (see note 11) rather than breaching, of problem obstacles. Innovation with the assets at hand is the only feasible answer. Ironically, an asset that is ripe for the twisting, turning, and manipulation of further creative development thinking is MPS. This is especially so in light of the most likely circumstances for commitment of the Marine Corps combat forces. The Flexible Response Requirement During the past 20 years national strategic planning has incorporated numerous catchy phrases and "buzz words" to colorfully describe the method of allocation of forces against possible threats. Not too many years ago we talked in terms of the half wars, i.e., the 1 1/2 or 2 1/2 scenarios which forecast one or two major wars against sophisticated adversaries (the 1 and 2 respectively) plus simultaneous engagement with a more primitive, but undefined, foe in a less predictable location (the 1/2). Lately, the terms in vogue for the unexpected altercations are limited contingency or low-intensity conflict.19 Because of the ubiquitous Soviet geographical presence and political influence, the strategic assumption is that limited and sophisticated warfare may occur separately or 19Robert P. Haffa, Jr., The Half War (Boulder: Westview Press, 1984), pp. 3-7. simultaneously but more likely will develop sequentially from lowest to highest intensity, if there is any progression at all.20 The Navy-Marine Corps team, because of its well advertised and demonstrated flexibility, has established itself as the primary national asset to deal with limited contingencies even though it remains prepared for simultaneous commitment against the more sophisticated threats.21 It is well recognized that the manner in which the limited contingency is militarily addressed may well have a critical impact on whether or not it boils over and becomes a precipitant for more general, unlimited, global action.22 Many planners and theorists also believe that the forces dedicated to the limited contingency mission will not necessarily be able to redeploy to other developing theaters.23 Ideally, from a strategic planning perspective, forces would be specifically tagged for the more sophisticated 20Ibid., 4-7; and, Perkins, pp. 5 and 26. 21Kelley and O'Donnell, p. 29; Casper Weinberger, "The Defense Policy of the Reagan Administration," Officer Review, 21 (September, 1981), p. 4; and, Perkins, pp. 26 and 69. 22Haffa, pp. 2-6; M.K. Sheridan, "Global Flexibility," Marine Corps Gazette, 66 (September 1982), p. 53; and, Perkins, p. 26. 23Haffa, p. 5. threats (e.g., Soviet European invasion) and never diverted for anything else. Since, by their very nature, the limited contingencies cannot be fingered precisely, the best method of force allocation is to dedicate general purpose units to well defined regions (the smaller the better). These forces also would be fenced, never to stray outside their regional pasture and left alone to devote themselves to studying all possible commitment permutations in the quest for total readiness.24 Unfortunately for the national security, but fortunately from an American taxpayer perspective, the force structure necessary to support the best of all possible national strategic plans has little, if any, chance of squeezing through the congressional fiscal filter.25 As is always the case, all bases will have to be covered with the few players at hand. The Marine Corps will be expected to exert its inherent flexibility and versatility to be prepared to deal with all of the almost infinite possibilities on the limited contingency program. Additionally, swift and effective action will not only be expected, it will be demanded. Only through expert application of power will we minimize the possibility of allowing the limited contingency to ignite an unlimited 24Haffa, pp. 4-5 and 228-251. 25Komer, p. 11. conflagration.26 This is admittedly a tall order and especially so in the face of almost certain broad budget challenges stimulated by Gramm-Rudman parsimony fever; the bottom line is broader mission requirements and less money with which to do it all. The Secretary of Defense in both his fiscal year 1986 and 1987 reports to congress hammered away at the reality of unpredictability and the corresponding requirement for flexibility: Few illusions are more resilient, alluring, and dangerous than the idea that we can forecast with confidence all the threats we will face. Technicians seek certainty. But if the past is any guide to the future, it will be the unanticipated conflict in an unexpected place or form that poses the most difficult challenge. In structuring an adequate deterrent, we must prepare to cope with threats across the entire spectrum of conflict.27 In the final analysis, even though a toe-to-toe slugfest with the Soviets is the most potentially devastating possibility, the most likely conflict is one of the limited contingency variety.28 It will be neither expected nor convenient. The chances are that no specific contingency plan will exist. And, can there be much doubt who the 26Kelley and O'Donnell, pp. 23-25 and 29; and, R.C. Shreckengost, "Readiness--Ready for What?", Marine Corps Gazette, 57 (July 1973), p. 47. 27DOD, "Annual Report," p. 36. 28Kelly and O'Donnell, p. 24. Secretary has in mind as the primary force to handle this challenge? It is not by pure chance that the last sentence of Mr. Weinberger's words quoted above is almost a verbatim facsimile from page 1-2 of FMFM 0-1. The Selective Rapid Reinforcement Option The Marine Corps' position in national strategy is quite prominent as well as quite precarious. The global balance of power is exquisitely delicate. If a tilt in the mechanism occurs, it will most likely be instigated by an unannounced, unexpected, limited contingency which might spring up anywhere, at anytime; the chances are good that the Navy-Marine Corps team will be called to deal with it.29 Rapid deployment of the proper combat power mix will have to be followed by precise and decisive application of the perfect amount of requisite force coupled with acute understanding of political factors. Marines will necessarily be required to be extremely sensitive to myriad non-military factors while maintaining the wherewithal and spirit to violently apply fire and maneuver to accomplish stipulated goals. Saddled with this formidable challenge the forward deployed MAGTF commander deserves every option possible. Thus, it is on that commander's back that the notional 29Ibid., p. 29; and, Weinberger, p. 4. mindset monkey ultimately lands. After being summoned to the CATF's cabin and presented unceremoniously with the imminent mission, does the forward deployed MAGTF commander have any flexible task organization options with which to influence the action? His neat, one-ninth vertical slice MAGTF might very well lack a critical component, e.g., several more FAAD teams or a few more tanks or another section of TOWs or vital sustainability stores. "Can do" may do; but, then again, it may not. Obviously there is no panacea for what ails this hypothetical MAGTF commander. However I can suggest an asset flexibility initiative which will give him more viable options than he currently has. Although it may sound heretical, the initiative advocated is commitment of selective MPS components to reinforce/support MAGTFs of either the forward deployed or prescribed mission variety. For lack of a thematic revelation, I have arbitrarily assigned the concept the unimaginative label "Selective Rapid Reinforcement." Consider scenario A. A forward deployed MAU in the Mediterranean is hastily handed a mission to be prepared to conduct a landing to seize specified objectives in the vicinity of city W, which is located on the Mediterranean littoral. The MAU commander is told that he has approximately four days before D-day. After mission analysis the MAU commander determines that, although his present troop list gives him a reasonable capability, with 12 more tanks (bringing him to tank company strength) and another section of TOWs his chances of success are enhanced substantially. There is not enough time to float reinforcements to the objective area prior to the tentative D-day. Why not have the the local MPS squadron move to port X, which is also on the Mediterranean and less than 24 hours amphibious ship steaming time from W? Port X is both practically and politically benign. A tank company (-) and a TOW section of Marines are flown from CONUS to marry with equipment which MPS experts from FSSG begin working feverishly to sort out. The Amphibious Task Force (ATF) gray bottoms arrive and discharge cargo that the MAU commander determines he will not need close at hand during the initial assault and subsequent 36 hours. The tanks, Tows, and Marines are loaded, transported, and landed with the MAU the next day across the beach near W. Immediately after they land embarked units on D-day, two gray bottoms are shuttled back to X to reembark the remaining MAU assets and possibly pick up another piece or two of the MPS suite--in this case part of the sustainability package, a D-7 bulldozer, and corresponding troops--and ferry the assets back to W. The chosen gray bottoms continue the back and forth movement as necessary until either the operation terminates or senior forces/reinforcements from other sources arrive in the objective area. Consider scenario B. A forward deployed MAU is suddenly given an active security mission to land forces to protect American citizens and the legally constituted government at Y which is an Indian Ocean littoral city. The MAU commander is not yet certain what he needs, but just to be safe he requests that MPS hover over the horizon in close proximity. The political and geographical situation will not allow full-scale MPS brigade operations in the vicinity. After a week of patrolling in Y, the MAU commander determines that his capability to carry out his mission will be considerably enhanced with the addition of another platoon of Assault Amphibian Vehicles (AAVs). Just off nearby small island Z the FSSG experts (flown in a week ago) begin to sort out the AAVs. Gray bottoms and landing craft aid in the "in-steam" offload and ferrying operation. The AAV troops are flown to the island from Hawaii utilizing a combination of strategic airlift, carrier onboard delivery, and local helicopters. In scenarios A and B the MAU commander was given additional flexibility through the availability of the considerable array of MPS assets. The MAU commanders above routinely floated with the one-ninth notional slice packed tightly aboard Phibron shipping, but when mission execution time arrived, both commanders were not restrained by the limited quantities and capabilities of embarked resources. Deployment options were exercised which brought additional combat power to bear at the decisive place and time. Of course nothing is ever as simple as it may seem or entirely free of cost; the Selective Rapid Reinforcement concept is no exception. I will attempt to anticipate obvious criticism. Attention will focus initially on the difficulty in sorting out any particular module of end items (e.g., 12 tanks and associated equipment) from the tightly embarked MPS suite. Critics will say that the suite was designed and loaded to be employed en masse, and that the complications involved in locating and physically extracting the equipment of one or two small units is not worth the effort. Difficult? Undoubtedly. Impossible? Certainly not. As concerns the equipment location identification problem, I have personally witnessed the impressive ability of the portable MPS Decision Support System (MDSS) to electronically sort through the extensive files of MPS suite equipment and cull out any desired unit (e.g., a tank company) complete with a list of shipboard locations.30 If after experimenting with the selective offloading of specified units it is still evaluated as "too hard," I suggest reconfiguring the ship loads to position the most likely called equipment closest to the hatch. Another possible criticism of the selective Rapid Reinforcement concept which comes readily to mind is the fact that the scenarios above advocate moving around and chipping away at an asset which has a potentially terrific punch. Are we possibly wasting a full-blown MPS capability to simply provide a MAU with a few nice to have tanks, AAVs, etc.? Are we in effect jeopardizing a MAB capability by unwisely adopting an "only game in town"31 mentality with respect to the MAU mission? My answer is that if the assets taken from MPS are so insignificant, it is also very possible that the remainder of the suite would still support a substantially potent MAB capability. The remainder of the contributing MPS brigade might be employed elsewhere, it might follow the committed 30R.H. Blummel, Captain USMC. Instructor Computer Science Schools, personal interview concerning the MPS Decision Support System (MDSS), Quantico, Va., March 17, 1986; The MDSS appears to be an extremely flexible system. I do believe, however, that the addition of a field containing the equipment identification number from the ID Standards File will further facilitate precise matching of men and materiel by enabling the MDSS to determine the exact model of end items located. 31Perkins, p. 26. MAU once the beachhead has been secured, or it may not be employed at all. The point is that the Selective Rapid Reinforcement proposal is not intended to displace the established MPS brigade concept--only to increase the number of responsive deployment options. Admittedly, the MPS suite may be considered as unusable for other purposes while the squadron is moving around, on/off loading, and loitering in support of the Selective Rapid Reinforcement mission. A conscious decision by the applicable unified commander will have to be made relative to the wisdom of selective MPS suite degradation. As explained above, it may just be the case that success of the forward deployed MAGTF's mission is critical enough from a national strategic perspective to be the over riding factor--a matter of priorities. Along those same lines the question may be asked why send only platoons or companies? The airlift exists and the equipment is there; why not fly in a battalion? Selective Rapid Reinforcement is not conceptually relegated to supplying only small units to the bolstered MAGTF. Theoretically a battalion or more could be flown in to linkup with equipment. In most cases, however, two practical considerations will usually guide planning towards more conservative asset commitment. First, once men and equipment linkup, the unit must get to the objective area. In the Rapid Reinforcement concept this movement will normally be accomplished by some form of creative use of gray bottoms and their landing craft. The most likely reinforcement mission is in support of a MAU. With only four or five ships, ATF gray bottom flexibility is limited. Two companies are probably all that could be handled (depending on time-distance factors); certainly a battalion would be over taxing shipping assets. Second, the larger the unit, the more complex and time consuming the selective offload. If MPS loads are reconfigured to position the most likely to be called equipment in a ready to go posture, then the door is open for attempting in-stream transfer of equipment directly from MPS to gray bottoms--an extremely promising technique. Relatively extensive equipment transfers will severely tax the in-stream to gray bottom capability. A particularly conspicuous soft spot in the Selective Rapid Reinforcement proposal is dependability on a nearby port or staging area to marry men and materiel. That, together with vulnerability to enemy interdiction, is a major problem which renders MPS less than universally applicable regardless of form.32 However, in-stream offload capability and the relatively small amount of gear that has 32Batcheller, p. 19; and, Heib, pp. 56-57. to be extracted (depending, of course, on the peculiar offload profile complexity) make the concept feasible in certain circumstances. Time-distance factors may allow shuttling of amphibious ships and landing of the reinforcing MPS assets during the initial assault (scenario A). More likely is the shuttling of reinforcing MPS units sometime after the initial assault in support of post H-hour operations or in support of a remote security mission (scenario B). Unit integrity disruption is one more possible criticism. How well is the BLT commander in scenario A going to be able to work with a tank company commander who very likely was a total stranger less than 24 hours prior to H-hour? It is a trade off. Is having the additional 12 tanks worth the possible friction resulting from lack of familiarity? That is a commander's decision. My belief is that the commander deserves the decision; let's not institutionally deprive him of the opportunity to make it. As long as the unified commander blesses the plan, there should be no problems with the U.S. Air Force or the joint community in general. The Joint Operations Planning System (JOPS) is extremely flexible in the hands of a knowledgeable operator. If the Marine Corps keeps the Type Unit Data File (TUCHA) loaded with codes and associated data which allow units to be broken down to the lowest possible level of deployment, Time-Phased Force and Deployment Data (TPFDD) computer files can be rapidly modified or constructed from scratch as appropriate. Accordingly, data can be updated for both the MPS brigade (-) after Selective Rapid Reinforcement operations as well as the forces sent to fall in on the selectively offloaded MPS equipment. From the valid TPFDDs, Time Phased Transportation Requirements Lists (TPTRLs) and Time Phased Force and Deployment Lists (TPFDLs) can be extracted to support strategic deployment.33 Since money will always be scarce and time will always be at a premium, testing of the Selective Rapid Reinforcement concept's many facets will, like everything else, be difficult, but not impossible. There will be three MPS suites, several continuously floating forward deployed MAGTFs, and countless prescribed mission MAGTF exercises conducted each year. One way to ease the pain is to integrate exercises with the periodic unloading of selective equipment for routine tests and maintenance. If we want to make it work, we can, regardless of obstacles. The two scenarios described above are only very rudimentary examples which barely scratch the surface with respect to Selective Rapid Reinforcement potential. Wholesale brainstorming and creative innovation cannot help 33AFSC, NDU, Joint Officer's Planning Guide, AFSC Pub 1 (Norfolk, 1984), pp. 6-4 through 6-38; and, Schindler, interview. but stimulate countless other possibilities and refinements. Consider the depth and redundancy which can be added to the deployment-employment flexibility equation when we dial in factors such as use of the Air Alert BLT, rapid reinforcement by Marine tactical air (using the TAVB), the considerable range and lift of the MV-22 (Osprey), utilization of MPS vessels for shuttling, etc., etc. Conclusion A notional mindset has developed within the Marine Corps. The notion concept has evolved for very valid reasons and has served Marines well, but it is now time to shake off notional restraints. The most likely strategic scenarios place the onus on the Marine Corps to maintain a vigilant, ready, resilient, and infinitely flexible posture. Notional mindset is the bane of flexible response. Use of chosen MPS units in concert with amphibious forces in the Selective Rapid Reinforcement concept adds an element of flexibility to the Marine Corps' deployment arsenal which does not currently exist. It simply provides "a" way, not "the" way, to take advantage of deployment options. Deployment has always driven employment. The successful commander and the successful nation are not intimidated by deployment realities. Decisive employment of force, or threat of force, demands an appreciation of the deployment axiom that says it does absolutely no good to have a superiority in power unless that power can be applied to the proper place at the proper time.34 If we are not ready to exploit every conceivable deployment option, we open ourselves to the possibility of watching our antagonists stand on foreign shores and safely thumb their noses at our considerable, albeit immobile, capability. However, with multiple, redundant methods for massing combat power quickly in the objective areas we present our potential antagonist with more than the simple problem of determining if we will come--he now has to contend with when we will come, how will we come, and with what will we come. Friction has been reduced for us and increased for the enemy. All indications point to the imminent advent of "a renaissance period in the evolution of amphibious warfare"35 from the perspectives of strategic requirement, technical enhancements, and doctrinal innovation. The Selective Rapid Reinforcement concept is one method for obtaining mastery over the crucial deployment challenge. Can we afford not to give it a chance? 34Komer, p. 9. 35Kelley and O'Donnell, p.29. A SELECTED BIBLIOGRAPHY PRIMARY SOURCES U.S. GOVERNMENT DOCUMENTS U.S. Department of Defense. Annual Report to Congress: Fiscal Year 1986. Washington: Government Printing Office, 1985. U.S. Department of Defense. Annual Report to Congress: Fiscal Year 1987. Washington: Government Printing Office, 1986. DOCTRINAL PUBLICATIONS U.S. Marine Corps, Marine Corps Development and Education Command. Command and Staff Action, FMFM 3-1. Washington, 1979. U.S. Marine Corps, Marine Corps Development and Education Command. Marine Air-Ground Task Force Doctrine, FMFM 0-1. Washington, 1979. OTHER OFFICIAL MILITARY PUBLICATIONS Joint Chiefs of Staff. Dictionary of Military and Associated Terms. JCS Pub. 1. Washington: Government Printing Office, 1984. U.S. Marine Corps, Headquarters Marine Corps. Marine Air- Ground Task Forces (MAGTFs.), NAVMC 2710. Washington, 1985. U.S. Marine Corps, Marine Corps Development and Education Command. Comparison of Power Projection Options, IP 0-4. Quantico, Va., 1984. U.S. Marine Corps, Marine Corps Development and Education Command. Maritime Prepositioned Deployment, OH 4-11. Quantico, Va., 1984. National Defense University, Armed Forces Staff College. Joint Officer's Planning Guide, AFSC Pub 1. Norfolk, 1984. INTERVIEWS Blumel, R.H., Captain USMC, Instructor Computer Science Schools and action officer assigned responsibility for the Maritime Prepostioned Ships (MPS) Decision Support System (MDSS). Personal interview concerning MDSS. Quantico, Va., March 17, 1986. Greenwood, John E., Colonel USMC (ret), Editor Marine Corps Gazette and former MAB and regimental commander Personal interview concerning experiences and observations relative to MAGTF task organization. Quantico, Va., January 29, 1986. Hodory, R.W., Lieutenant Colonel USMC, Member advanced Amphibious Study Group and former battalion commander. Personal interview concerning experiences and observations relative to MAGTF task organization. Quantico, Va., February 25, 1986. O'Brien, J.J., Colonel USMC (ret), Former head Ground Requirements Branch, HQMC and MAU, regimental, and battalion commander. Telephone interview concerning experiences and observations relative to MAGTF task organization. Santa Barbara, Calif., March 3, 1986. Pugh, Paul, Major USMC, Instructor amphibious Warfare School and former MAF, MAU, and regimental staff officer. Personal interview concerning experiences and observations relative to MAGTF task organization. Quantico, Va., March 19, 1986. Schindler, J.W., Major USMC, Instructor for logistics and the Joint Operations Planning System (JOPS), Amphibious Instruction Department, Marine Corps Development and Education Command. Personal interview concerning logistics factors and JOPS flexibility with respect to MAGTF task organization. Quantico, Va., March 14, 1986. SURVEY Sanford, F.G., Jr. Informal survey conducted between 16 April 1985 and 4 March 1986 concerning Marine officer perception of MAGTF task organization. Survey sample included 117 Marine officers ranging in grade from Warrant Officer to Colonel. SECONDARY SOURCES BOOKS Haffa, Robert P., Jr. The Half War; Planning Rapid Deployment Forces to Meet a Limited Contingency, 1960- 1983. Boulder Colorado: Westview Press, 1984. Marshall, S.L.A. The Soldier's Load and the Mobility of a Nation. Reprint edition. Quantico: Marine Corps Association, 1980. Perkins, Stuart L. Global Demands: Limited Forces. Washington: National University Press, 1984. Van Creveld, Martin. Supplying War: Logistics from Wallenstein to Patton. New York: Cambridge University Press, 1977. DEPARTMENT OF DEFENSE AND U.S. MARINE CORPS PERIODICALS Dodd, Fred. "MPS-2 Loads Up." Marines (January 1986), 15- 16. Grimes, G.S. "Maritime Prepositioning: A New Dimension." Operational Overview: MCDEC Newsletter (Apr-Sep 1985), 57-60. Kelley, P.X. "CMC Reports on Corps' Readiness Through Quality." Marines (March 1986), 10-15. Lowery, J.S., Jr. "Maritime Prepositioning Operations." Operational Overview: MCDEC Newsletter (Apr-Sep 1985), 70-75. Weinberger, Casper W. "What Is Our Defense Strategy." Defense 85 (December 1985), 2-10. PROFESSIONAL JOURNALS AND ANTHOLOGIES Batcheller. G.D. "Analyzing the RDF." Marine Corps Gazette, 64 (June 1980), 16-18. Batcheller, G.D., "Let's Watch Where We Are Going." Marine Corps Gazette, 65 (June 1981), 18-19. Clarkson, E. J. "Ideas for Future Concepts." Marine Corps Gazette, 58 (October 1974), 48. Heib, Ross J. "MPS--A Concept of Deployment, Not Employment." Marine Corps Gazette, 67 (August 1983), 47-56. Kelley, P.X. and Hugh K. O'Donnell, Jr. "The Amphibious Warfare Strategy." The Maritime Strategy (January 1986), 18-29. Komer, Robert W. "Stategy and Military Reform," in The Defense Reform Debate: Issues and Analysis. Ed. Asa A. Clark, Peter W. Chiarelli, Jeffery S. McKitrick, and James W. Reed. Baltimore: The Johns Hopkins University Press, 1984. Lehman, John F., "Amphibious Capabilities and Maritime Strategy." Marine Corps Gazette, 65 (October 1981), 38-43. Lind, William S. "Mission and Force Structure." Marine Corps Gazette, 59 (December 1975), 12-16. O'Donnell, Hugh K., Jr. "Northern Flank Maritime Offensive." Proceedings, 111 (September 1985), 42-57. Sheridan, M.K., "Global Flexibility." Marine Corps Gazette, 66 (September 1982), 50-54. Shreckengost, R.C. "Readiness--Ready for What?" Marine Corps Gazette, 57 (July 1973), 45-47. Weinberger, Casper W. "The Defense Policy of the Reagan Administration," Officer Review, 21 (September 1981), 2-4.
