The AV-8 Harrier: Two Meanings For Air Support CSC 1986 SUBJECT AREA Aviation EXECUTIVE SUMMARY TITLE: THE AV-8 HARRIER: TWO MEANINGS FOR AIR SUPPORT I. Purpose: To provide information on the steps which have been established to support the AV-8B Harrier in the various sites it is likely to operate from in support of the ground combat troops. II. PROBLEM: The Marine Corps has undertaken a commitment in its selection of the AV-8B Harrier as its light attack close air support aircraft. Not only will the AV-8B replace its predecessor, the AV-8A/C, it will also replace the A-4 in five squadrons, an eventual total of eight operational Harrier squadrons. For the logisticians responsible for the support of the AV-8, this commitment also represents a challenge that they be keenly aware of the role and mission of a V/STOL aircraft. It will be necessary to adapt and devise policies and practices to ensure that the support for the Harrier will be continuous, regardless of the remoteness of the operating site. Conventional means of support are not alwas applicable when arranging for support of an aircraft operating in close proximity to the ground units. The Harrier's ability to go anywhere the infantry can go will require that support be available anywhere the Harrier can go. III. DATA: During its early years, the Harrier faced a great deal of criticism, largely due to the limitations which V/STOL brought forth. However, the first Harriers were introduced to the Marine Corps largely due to those unique characteristics of V/STOL. The flexibility in basing options, possible through the V/STOL ability of the Harrier, presents the challenge to the logisticians. For close air support to be responsive, timely, and effective, the support for the Harrier must also be responsive, timely, and effective. To ensure the aircraft are able to achieve their maximum combat effectiveness in the most economical manner, the support criteria for forward deployed/employed Harriers has been defined for each of the basing sites which may be established. In an amphibious assault, Harriers could be phased ashore as the battle progressed and receive more than adequate support from sea bases, forward sites, facilities, and finally from the main base ashore. Supply is but one of the many elements which must be considered in the support of various basing sites. The initial source of that supply support is a Contingency Support Package (CSP). A CSP could be used to support the Harriers in any sized Marine Air Ground Task Force operation. IV. Conclusion: The success of the Harrier and the future of V/STOL for all the services partially depends upon how well the aircraft is supported in the many possible forward deployed sites it may utilize in performing its role of close air support. V. Recommendation: That those responsible for support of the Harrier become thoroughly knowledgeable in the operational capabilities of the Harrier, as well as the corresponding support required at each of the Harriers' basing sites. Conversely, the operations personnel who are tasked with employment of the Harrier should know that good logistic support does not just happen--somebody must plan for that support well in advance. THE AV-8B HARRIER: TWO MEANINGS FOR AIR SUPPORT OUTLINE Thesis statement: The Harrier's ability to go anywhere the infantry can go will require that support be available anywhere the Harrier can go. I. Introduction of aircraft A. Critics 1. High cost 2. Non-US design and manufacture 3. Long lead time 4. Other services' criticisms 5. Forward basing support difficulties B. Proponents 1. Close proximity 2. Detailed integration 3. Flexible basing II. Logistical support of bases A. Sea base B. Forward site C. Facility D. Main base III. Phases of AV-8 employment A. Phase I 1. CAS from sea base 2. Forward sites established B. Phase II 1. Facilities established 2. New forward sites established 3. Continued reliance on sea base C. Phase III 1. Main base established ashore 2. Continued use of forward sites/facilities IV. Contingency Support Package A. Marine Amphibious Unit B. Marine Amphibious Brigade 1. MPS 2. Amphibious C. Marine Amphibious Force THE AV-8 HARRIER: TWO MEANINGS FOR AIR SUPPORT In its investment in the AV-8B Harrier II, the Marine Corps has committed itself to a close air support aircraft specifically designed "from the keel up" with the ability to operate in close proximity to the Marine rifleman. It is an aircraft that can and should be included in every type of exercise involving a Marine Air Ground Task Force (MAGTF), to include operations with the forward deployed Marine Amphibious Units (MAUs). For various reasons, the Harrier has attracted more than its share of critics. However, successes enjoyed by the Royal Air Force (RAF) in the Falkland Islands Campaign are convincing more of those critics that the Vertical Short Take-Off and Landing (V/STOL) concept is a viable tactic. It is not only here to stay, but it will continue to evolve as it has for the past 30 years. No matter how good the Harrier is at providing close air support, if it does not receive the necessary logistic support, those critics might as well be right about the limitations of V/STOL. "'...[N]othing cuts the effectiveness of...aircraft by 100 percent except being unable to take off.'"1 Although that statement obviously holds true for any aircraft, the rules have been changed somewhat for the support concept of the Harrier. While Conventional Take-Off and Landing (CTOL) aircraft are being supported by conventional means, the V/STOL aircraft needs a new set of guidelines to allow continued support of the Harrier as it continues its support to the forward ground elements. The Harrier's ability to go anywhere the infantry can go requires support to be available anywhere the Harrier can go. In 1956 a French engineer, Michel Wibault, proposed the idea of a gyropter, essentially a short take off and landing aircraft in which the thrust could be moved through a ninety degree arc.2 Although Wibault's gyropter was unusable, the British found the idea of vectored thrust exciting. One year later the first drawings of an aircraft appeared that would later be recognizable as today's Harrier. However, it was not for ten more years that the name Harrier was given to the aircraft, before it entered service with the Royal Air Force.3 Even in 1967, little was known about the capabilities and limitations of a V/STOL aircraft such as the Harrier. The AV-8 was the first U. S. military employment of a non-helo V/STOL aircraft. Acceptance of the AV-8 was not easy, but neither was that of the first helicopter introduced by the Marine Corps in the 1940's. The AV-8's acceptance was met with both the criticism of many and the enthusiasm of a few. Early critics of the AV-8A centered their arguments on the high cost of research and development inherent in such a bold step. The high initial costs of developing a V/STOL aircraft suited for a close air support role would, of course, raise the cost of each aircraft delivered to the fleet. The initial procurement of AV-8As for the Marine Corps was further thwarted by the non-U.S. design and manufacture.4 Also of concern to many was the higher acquisition cost and longer procurement lead time than existed for CTOL aircraft. Those costs were high because of the small quantity of aircraft under consideration, a result of limited application to the Marines and lack of acceptance by either the air force or the Navy.5 The MAGTF concept of employment, unique to the Marines, allowed considerable independence in the employment of weapon systems. Operating differently than the air force and the Navy, the Marine Corps required a different weapon system to accomplish its mission. This is one reason for the other services' criticism of the Harrier and for the Marines' insistence on it. However, no matter what advantages the Marine Corps saw in the Harrier, there were many who would view forward basing itself as a disadvantage and not an advantage. The aircraft's ability to be forward based because of its V/STOL characteristic might possibly create a resupply problem significant enough to hamper acceptance of the aircraft. A study was conducted by two researchers which utilized mathematical calculations to determine the optimum choice between V/STOL and CTOL.6 The model yielded the expected results: V/STOL aicraft show a relative advantage in effectiveness when there is a high probability that a main airbase will be destroyed as in a total nuclear war. ..However, VSTOLs show a relative disadvantage when there are large numbers of main airbases....7 The model penalized V/STOL with an added cost of logistics support by charging them a fleet of helicopters for refueling aircraft, providing ordnance, and conducting repairs. "VSTOL aircraft which operate from a remote forward site were assumed to have a decreasing ability that would naturally be attained by conventional fighter aircraft."8 The introduction of V/STOL for military missions would depend on mission needs that placed a great deal of emphasis and high operational value on the special capabilities of V/STOL. The Harrier was an undistinguished aircraft in all respects except for its ability to land vertically.9 That was the one distinguishing characteristic which provided the emphasis and value great enough to offset its high cost and long development. In 1957, the year the British first came up with a design of the future "Harrier', the Commandant of the Marine Corps, General Randolph Pate, wrote the Chief of Naval Operations that "'vertical takeoff and landing characteristics are an ultimate requirement for all Marine aviation in support of amphibious operations in the future.'"10 The Marine Corps' proponents of V/STOL, responsible for the eventual formation of its first squadron in 1971, were Marines with combat experience who convinced the Congress that the AV-8 was the right close air support aircraft for the Marine Corps, despite the critics and the analysts. Close air support (CAS) is defined as the air action against hostile targets which are in close proximity to friendly forces and which require detailed integration of each air mission with the fire and movement of those forces.11 "Close proximity" and "detailed interaction" are the key elements providing that emphasis and high operational value needed to offset the high costs and long lead time. It is close air support which distinguishes Marine air from that of the Air Force and Navy. Dr. George Salamon, senior editor of Defense Systems Review, stated, "CAS is the core of Marine aviation, the reason for its existence."12 In spite of continued arguments against the AV-8 relative to its cost and the other services' institutional interests, the persistence of a few individuals was able to gain final approval in 1970 for an initial purchase of 12 Harriers.13 That approval was linked directly to the unique characteristics of the AV-8 and the resultant enhancement in CAS that would be provided to the Marines' lightly equipped amphibious forces. The AV-8's continued importance to the Marine Corps hinges on the flexible basing that V/STOL provides. Quick reaction air support remains the primary factor behind the Marine Corps' commitment to the follow-on AV-8B. Based just outside of opposing forces' artillery range, the AV-8B can operate at forward sites located anywhere the supported infantry can go. At these forward sites, the AV-8B can operate free of concrete runways, catapults, arresting gear, and precious carried deck space. CTOL will normally operate from approximately 200 miles distance outside of the Amphibious Objective Area (AOA), dependent upon the availability of prepared fields and/or carrier space.14 Both in 1970 with the AV-8A, and again in 1977 with the AV-8B, the Marine Corps has shown its commitment to V/STOL. This has been due to the potential to combine the speed and firepower of a jet aircraft with the unique basing flexibility of a V/STOL aircraft. As expressed by Frank Uhlig,Jr., editor of Naval Institute Proceedings, in a 1976 article appearing in the Marine Corps Gazette: The scarcity of carriers, the heavy demand for their services, and the small likelihood of having friendly air based near where Marines would wish to make an assault landing suggest how important it would be to have VSTOL attack and fighter planes in the assault force. Such aircraft could be based on amphibious ships, many of which have small flight decks.15 Too often in planning it is merely assumed that an airfield is going to be available from which to initiate the CAS required during the assault. Often, however, it is the airfield itself which is designated as one of the early objectives of an amphibious assault. The flexibility in basing options which the AV-8 gives to the Marine Corps does present a significant challenge for those responsible for supporting the Harrier in those varied and remotely located sites throughout the AOA. Indeed, all areas of support must be carefully analyzed for each potential location from which it may be necessary to support the Harrier. In order for the close air support to be responsive, timely, and effective -- the vital elements in success of V/STOL -- then the support of those CAS aircraft must be responsive, timely, and effective. Preparations for that support must always be directed toward ensuring the aircraft are able to achieve their maximum combat effectiveness in the most economical manner.16 Toward that end, the plans for the establishment of a sea base, forward site, facility, or main base should consider the following criteria: (a) Meet day-to-day requirements continually. (b) Expand readily and rapidly to satisfy requirements during peak operating periods. (c) Be economical. (d) Be deployable with the landing force. (e) Not adversely effect landing force operations or AV-8 effectiveness. (f) Be compatible with Marine Corps logistics doctrine.17 The sea base concept encompasses 86 current and planned naval vessels to include aviation ships (CV), amphibious aviation ships (LPH, LHA, LHD), and air capable ships.18 The majority of vessels to operate as a sea base would be capable of providing both organizational maintenance activity (OMA) and intermediate maintenance activity (IMA) level support to the AV-8. The work at the organizational level is mostly centered around work to be done directly on the aircraft. Intermediate level work generally consists of the repair of the components that have previously been removed and replaced by the organizational level maintenance personnel. On a sea base, a squadron or a detachment of a squadron will augment the ship's IMA with squadron personnel, providing the skills unique for repair of AV-8 components. The squadron will retain its own maintenance personnel for OMA level work. Air capable ships are in actuality only sea platforms for the AV-8 and would not have an OMA or an IMA on board. However, as demonstrated during the Falklands campaign, the Harrier can, if necessary, transit to the objective area on the back of a container ship. A forward site is any location ashore which is suitable for take-off and landing operations. A minimum 72 foot by 72 foot pad is required if a satisfactory surface is not available.19 It is planned that no maintenance will be done at a forward site, although under certain situations it may be warranted to assign a minimum number of personnel to perform tasks crucial to the mission. Therefore, the degree of support to be placed at a forward site is very limited; it may be totally acceptable to have no external support placed at a forward site. Any maintenance which must be accomplished will require sending forward the necessary personnel, support equipment, and repair parts from either the sea base or the main base. If necessary and practical, any damaged aircraft could be heli-lifted out of the forward site for requisite repairs at a more suitable and better prepared location. A forward site is a highly mobile, readily established, and quickly redeployed basing option.20 A facility will provide limited support for a number of Harriers, requiring considerable augmentation beyond that organic to an AV-8 squadron. Detachments of both the Headquarters and Maintenance Squadron (H&MS) and the Marine Air Base Squadron (MABS) will be providing support in many functional areas to include administration, ordnance, refueling, utilities, messing, base maintenance, communication, and supply requisitioning, stowage, issue and accounting. This is by no means a complete list of the support areas required in basing aircraft at a facility.21 Limited OMA, or squadron level maintenance, is to be performed at a facility, including tasks such as changing tires, replacing Line Replacement Units (LRU), performing system checks, conducting quick engine changes, making adjustments and minor repairs.22 Extensive OMA and all IMA level repair for the aircraft located at a facility will be accomplished either at a sea base or a main base. A facility requires approximately 248 short tons of materials and equipment and 100 personnel to establish.23 From this estimation, it becomes apparent that the build-up of a facility would only be undertaken if the tactical situation envisioned Harrier operations to be conducted for more than a few days at the minimum. A main base is a location ashore which can provide all of the support required for extended operations. This support includes both OMA and IMA level maintenance for those aircraft operating from the main base, in addition to those aircraft operating from the facilities and forward sites which had previously been established. Because of its critical role in the conduct of all AV-8 operations ashore, the main base should be located in an area that can be supported readily via surface means. Fuel and ordnance requirements represent the bulk of supplies which must be transported into the Beach Support area for transfer to the main base. Equipment and vehicle support required to build a main base would be approximately 779 short tons.24 To further explain Harrier support requirements when forward deployed, discussion follows concerning the establishment of sea bases, forward sites, facilities, and main bases as part of the three phases of AV-8 employment during an amphibious assault. In Phase I, the Harriers conduct CAS operations from a sea base such as an LHA. The LHA is capable of providing. the Harrier with both OMA and IMA assistance, as well as the needed fuel and ordnance support. As the beachhead expands, multiple forward sites may be established ashore to provide increased fexibility, dispersion, and responsiveness to the landing force commander. Normally situated some 20 miles from the forward edge of the battle area (FEBA), the Harriers at a forward site are on call for immediate CAS when needed.25 Following completion of a mission from a forward site, the aircraft would return to the sea base for rearming, refueling, and any necessary maintenance. Phase II is characterized by movement of the battle inland. Facilities are established about 40 miles from the FEBA, possibly through the expansion of one or more forward sites.26 The facilities allow for rearming, refueling, and squadron level maintenance of the aircraft, negating the requirement to return to the sea base. In this phase, new forward sites are established to ensure CAS remains responsive to the ground combat element. Harriers are staged to forward sites from a facility, not strictly from the sea base as was done in Phase I. The sea base would, however, continue to provide full IMA level support as required to maintain continued AV-8 operations. Phase III commences if the tactical situation and the mission dictate that a main base be established ashore to support subsequent land operations. Otherwise, the necessary support will continue from the sea base, or it will be provided from a nearby friendly airfield. The establishment of a main base, ideally 100 miles from the FEBA, could either be through expansion of a facility previously formed, or through the development of a captured airfield.27 Phase III is completed when the sea base has been fully transitioned to the main base.28 Timely and responsive CAS will require continued reliance on the establishment of new facilities and forward sites as the battle continues inland. Although logistically difficult, it is desirable to conduct rearming and refueling at the forward site. "Sorties cannot be expended returning to facility/main base for anything but essential maintenance repairs."29 Conversely, for support to be economical , one of the stated criteria, dispersion of aircraft should be limited only to the extent needed to meet operational requirements. It will be necessary to fully consider all the factors in order to make the logistic support plan best fit the operational requirement. Supply support is one element of the logistic challenge crucial in providing the necessary level of support to the AV-8 which will enable it to conduct the close air support for which it was designed. The means whereby supply support for the AV-8 is to be accomplished is the Contingency Support Package (CSP).30 The CSP is a collection of aviation supply and maintenance related parts and equipment which provide or satisfy the AV-8's peculiar support requirements. The common support requirements are not to be contained in the CSP; they are to be provided by a designated host IMA during the time that the AV-8 is away from its parent Marine aircraft Group (MAG). The CSP concept requires that an IMA be available to provide the common support. The idea of a CSP is not unique to the AV-8; it applies to many of the aircraft within the Marine Corps which have a contingency to operate away from their parent organization. Neither was the CSP initially designed for support of AV-8 detachments and deployed squadrons. The program originally devised to support Harrier detachments was the Independently Deployable Unit Detachment (IDUD).31 The Harrier II, or AV-8B, first used the name Detachment Support Package (DSP); the term CSP was reserved for the support of an entire squadron. The exact term to be used is of little significance. What really matters is how the aircraft are supported when they are away from home base. A CSP is applicable to all kinds of MAGTF operations, and in all the various phases of the AV-8 scenario of an amphibious assault. Because a CSP contains the repair parts to support maintenance at both OMA and IMA sites, the entire CSP or portions of it may be used either at a sea base, forward site, facility, or at a main base.32 The most common use of the CSP for the AV-8 is in support of the six-aircraft detachment operating with a composite helicopter squadron in a MAU. In that situation, the CSP is provided from the parent MAG to the LHA. It contains the peculiar supply and maintenance support that is not contained with the common support materials organic to the ship. The common support is contained on the LHA almost entirely for the support of the squadron's helicopters. Due to limited commonality with helocopters, the CSP by necessity will be relatively large in relation to the small number of AV-8s involved. A MAU-sized unit would ordinarilly maintain all of its operations from the sea base provided by the LHA. Under some circumstances a MAU may be required to establish a forward site on a temporary basis. A MAU would not ordinarily have the capability to set up either a facility or a main base. A Marine Amphibious Brigade (MAB), capable of amphibious operations and subsequent operations ashore, has a Marine Aircraft Group (MAG) as its aviation combat element. The MAG's AV-8s are capable of operating afloat, from sea bases and ashore, or from adjacent airfields. The deployment of a MAB could require that an AV-8 CSP be transferred from the parent MAG to the MAG designated as the aviation combat element (ACE) of that MAB. This scenario would mostly involve a MAB designated as one of the Maritime Prepositioning Ships (MPS) brigades. A CSP for an MPS MAB would have to be of sufficient range and depth to adequately support the requisite number of Harriers to be included in the composition of the ACE. Notionally, there is a single squadron of 20 AV-8s in a MAB-sized unit, the actual number assigned dependent upon a careful analysis of the mission and the need for close air support. The contents of the CSP would be determined by the number of AV-8s to be supported, and also by the particular MAG selected to act as the host IMA providing the common support. Because of the varied MAGs which could potentially act as the host in an MPS MAB, a baseline level of support has been determined which defines "common" as those systems which are supported by each of those MAGs. Although this has simplified the process of composing the common supported systems, it does require continual updating as new systems come on line. Once the common support has been defined, it is a much simpler process to determine the peculiar support required for the AV-8. The only tailoring necessary should be in adjusting the depth of materials to be in the CSP. The quantity, or depth of an item, is largely dependent upon the number of aircraft to be supported and the duration of that support. When deployed with a MAB, present planning calls for the AV-8B to receive its common support through the MAG of the appropriate fixed-wing IMA.33 In such a situation the CSP provided by the AV-8's parent MAG would be transferred to that fixed-wing IMA. The actual employment of the AV-8 might be more closely related to that of the MAB's helicopter assets, operating in closer proximity to the ground manuever units. To tie the AV-8 support to the host IMA of a fixed-wing vice rotary-wing aircraft group requires staging the Harriers' main base with the other fixed-wing aircraft. Of course, the Harriers could, and most likely would, operate from the rotary-wing IMA site, capitalizing on their basing flexibility. However, development of a CSP based on commonality with fixed-wing aircraft would mean that some of the support for common systems exists with the fixed-wing and not necessarily with the rotary-wing aircraft. The deployment of Harriers with an amphibious MAB would by definition be on amphibious shipping, although the AV-8Bs would not necessarily be restricted to movement via amphibious shipping. A more likely method might be as part of the fly-in echelon with other fixed-wing aircraft. The support en route would be through a pre-identified ten-day pack-up kit. The remainder of OMA and IMA support would arrive in the AOA at the end of the ten-day period, possibly on one of the new aviation logistics support ships (T-AVB). A T-AVB will transport an IMA to the AOA, and it will permit partial repair processing during the transit.34 This program allows the aircraft to get to the AOA quickly and to commence operations with a degree of support on hand while the bulk of the assets are on the way. The procedure is identical to that which would be used by the Harriers and other fixed-wing aircraft of an MPS MAB. The AV-8 squadron could, however, deploy all or part of the aircraft to the AOA on board amphibious shipping, maximizing the flexibility which sea basing offers. The Marine Amphibious Force (MAF) is the largest and most powerful of the MAGTFs. It is generally said that Marines will deploy as a MAB but will fight as a MAF. This is true because the MAF is capable of a full range of amphibious operations and subsequent operations ashore. However, because of its size, a MAF may be forward based but it is not intended to be forward deployed. Notionally, a MAF would include 40 AV-8Bs, keeping in mind that, like any other MAGTF, a MAF is task organized to accomplish a specific mission. The concept of logistic support of the Harriers in a MAF is basically that of supporting them in a MAB, but on a much larger scale. The CSP concept is still appropriate, however, in a MAF-sized operation there may be more than one parent MAG involved. A MAB, whether it be an MPS MAB or an amphibious MAB, would be capable of establishing a forward site, Facility, or a main base if the operational requirement so dictated. A MAF, however, would be more likely to establish a main base ashore in order to adequately support a land campaign which its presence would probably signify. The responsiveness of the AV-8 is due mainly to its basing flexibility, giving it the ability to go anywhere the infantry can go. Responsiveness in providing close air support is the mission or role of the Harrier. It is the role of the logistician to support the mission of the Harrier, and to ensure its readiness while minimizing the use of support assets. Providing the means to do that is not a simple matter. It requires a great deal of planning and forethought to support an aircraft that, by its definition as a V/STOL aircraft, cannot be restricted to large concrete runways and sophisticated support facilities. A member of Julius Caeser's legion is alleged to have remarked, "Logisticians are a sad and embittered race of men who are very much in demand in war and who sink resentfully into obscurity in peace."35 If today's logisticians allow themselves to "sink resentfully into obscurity", then a challenge like that of supporting the forward deployed Harrier in war will never be possible. ENDNOTES 1George Salamon, "From Pilot to Grunt: The AV-8B Bridges the Gap in Marine Corps Close Air Support," Defense Systems Review, (April 1984), p. 18. 2John Godden, ed., Harrier: Ski Jump to Victory (Oxford Brassey's Defence Publishers, 1983), p. 109. 3Ibid., p. 114. 4Bruce Myles, Jump Jet, (London Bassey's Publishers Limited, 1978), p. 127. 5Frank Uhlig, Jr., "Assault by Sea," Marine Corps Gazette, 60 (June 1976), p. 20. 6Seymour Horowitz and Robert Shishko, A Model for Evaluating VSTOL Versus CTOL Combat Aircraft Systems (Santa Monica: Rand Corporation, 1971), p. 3. 7Ibid., p. 15. 6Ibid., p. 13. 9Russell Murray 2nd, "Rising Vertically Through the Air, Invulnerable to Runway Cuts," Armed Forces Journal International, 118 (April 1981), p. 50. 10Salamon, p. 13. 11IP 5-7 Fleet Marine Force Aviation (Education Center, MCDEC, Quantico, VA, 1984), p. 1. 12Salamon, p. 14. 13Godden, p. 116. 14Col. R. A. Gustafson, "The Marine Corps View," Armed Forces Journal Internatioal, 118 (April 1981), p. 58. 15Salamon, p. 20. 16U.S. Marine Corps, AV-8A Concept of Operations Study, May 1974, p. F-1. 17Ibid. 19Salamon, p. 15. 19AV-8A Concept of Operations Study, p. F-7. 20Ibid. 21Ibid., p. F-25. 22Ibid., p. F-14. 23Ibid., p. F-20. 24Ibid., p. F-7. 25MCDEC, USMC, Offensive Air Support. FMFM 5-4 (Quantico, 1979), p. 109. 26Ibid. 27Ibid. 28Salamon, p. 15. 29Ibid. 30Col. Donald Davis, ASL-31 HQMC, personal interview about Contingency Support Package, HQMC Washington, D.C., 2 Jan 1986. 31Col. Stanley P. Lewis, "V/STOL Close Air Support in the U.S. Marine Corps," U.S. Naval Institute Proceedings, 102 (October 1976), p. 115. 32Davis. 33Davis. 34Gen Paul X. Kelley, "One Telephone Call Gets it All," Sea Power, 27 (November 1984), p. 31. 35Thomas V. Jones, "Logistics and the Military End Game," Defense Management Journal, 19 (4Q1983), p. 13. BIBLIOGRAPHY "AV-8B Harrier II Moves into the Field with the Marines."Defense Electronics, 16 (December 1984), 84-87. Davis, Donald, Col, USMC. personal interview about Contingency Support Package. Washington, D. C. January 2, 1986. Gebman, J. R. and J. R. Nelson. Office of the Assistant Secretary of Defense. Future V/STOL Airplanes: Guidelines and Techniques for Acquisition Program Analysis and Evaluation-Executive Summary. Santa Monica: The Rand Corporation, 1980. Godden, John, ed. Harrier: Ski Jump to Victor. Oxford: Brassey's Defence Publishers, 1983. Gustafson, R. A. Col, USMC. "The Marine Corps View." Armed Forces Journal International, 118 (April 1981), 58-61. Holloway, James L. III, Adm, USN. "The Transition to V/STOL." U.S. Naval Institute Proceedings, 103 (September 1977), 18-24. Horowitz, Seymour and Robert Shishko. A Model for Evaluating VSTOL Versus CTOL Combat Aircraft Systems, Santa Monica: Rand Corporation, 1971. Jones, Thomas V. "Logistics and the Military End Game." Defense Management Journal, 19 (4Q 1983), 12-16. Kelley, Paul X., Gen, USMC. "One Telephone Call Gets it All." Sea Power, 27 (November 1984), 23-34. Korb, Lawrence J. "Logistics: The Long Pole in Warfare's Tent." Defense/84, (January), 24-27. Lehman, J. R. Maj, USMC. "Here Comes the AV-8B!" Marine Corps Gazette, 68 (May 1984), 64-68. Lewis, Stanley P. Col, USMC. "V/STOL Close Air Support in the U.S. Marine Corps." U.S. Naval Institute Proceedings, 102 (October 1976), 113-116. Mason, Francis K. Harrier. Annapolis: Naval Institute Press, 1983. Miller, John G. "Marines: Only the Motto is Exempt from Change." Sea Power, 27 (April 1984), 9-18. Murray, Russell, 2nd. "Rising Vertically Through the Air, Invulnerable to Runway Cuts." Armed Forces Journal International, 118 (April 1981), 50-58. Myles, Bruce. Jump Jet. London: Brassey's Publishers Limited, 1978. Naval Air Systems Command, AV-8B Fleet Support Management Team Review/ILSMT, held at Atlantic Beach, N.C., October 29-31, 1985. Salamon, George. "From Pilot to Grunt: The AV-8B Bridges the Gap in Marine Corps Close Air Support." Defense Systems Review, 2 (April 1984), 13-20. Uhlig, Frank, Jr. "Assault by Sea." Marine Corps Gazette, 60 (June 1976), 18-20. U.S. Marine Corps.AV-8A Concept of Operations Study. May 1974. U.S. Marine Corps. Education Center. MCDEC. Fleet Marine Force Aviation. IP 5-7. Quantico, 1984. U.S. Marine Corps. Marine Air-Ground Task Force Doctrine. FMFM 0-1. Quantico, 1979. U.S. Marine Corps. Marine Aviation. FMFM 5-1. Quantico, 1979. U.S. Marine Corps. Offensive Air Support. FMFM 5-4. Quantico, 1979.
