The Internal Enemy: Insurgency In Brazil CSC 1986 SUBJECT AREA History ABSTRACT Author: Craig, Alan S. Major USMC Title: The Internal Enemy: Insurgency in Brazil Date: 8 March 1985 Between 1965 and 1972, the Brazilian government faced a violent communist insurgency. This paper is a study of the Brazilian insurgency, from its historical roots to the winning tactics employed by the government. The winning is important. While there was never a period of time when there was any question about the ability of the government to overcome the revolt, that should not be taken as an indication that the insurgents were not serious or capable. The insurgency in Brazil was unique, particularly in its philosophy and tactical direction. In order to understand this insurgency, it is necessary to understand some of the history of Brazil and the special situation facing the military leaders that were in power when the insurgency took place. The first chapter provides this background. The next sections look at the support for the insurgency, the philosophy of the insurgents, and the actions taken by the revolutionaries. These three chapters are followed by a chapter on government actions. Included in this chapter are personal observations on urban tactics in Porto Alegre in 1969. These four chapters are the why and the how of the insurgency and the counterinsurgency. The question "Could it happen again?" takes up the next chapter. The current situation in Brazil is discussed to determine if there is a serious threat of another insurgency. The final chapter evaluates the the study of this insurgency, not just as a historical event, but in the context of the Marine Corps Command and Staff College. Research for this paper included a wide range of books and articles on the insurgency. Information on the government view was much harder to find than on the insurgent viewpoint. Much of the information on the government side comes from interviews and from manuals on the course on Internal Security from the Brazilian Army Command and General Staff College. In addition, there are personal observation from the two years that I spent in Brazil from 1967 to 1969. TABLE OF CONTENTS Introduction ii Chapter 1 -- Understanding the Background 1 Chapter 2 -- Support for an Insurgency 12 Chapter 3 -- Insurgent Philosophy and Tactics 25 Chapter 4 -- The Insurgency 36 Chapter 5 -- Government Actions 47 Chapter 6 -- Could It Happen Again? 64 Chapter 7 - - Were the Brazilian Students Right? 74 Bibliography 82 INTRODUCTION As a part of the curriculum at the Marine Corps Command and Staff College, students spend time studying insurgency. There is nothing out of the ordinary in that, but over the years it has led to a repeated question by students from Brazil: "Why not study insurgency in Brazil?" The argument for studying this particular insurgency is simple -- the Brazilians won. That is not often the case. These students argued that winning was a good reason to add their country's counterinsurgency to the list of things studied at Quantico. They approached the college historian, LtCol Bittner, about the idea. For the first time this year, the topic joins the list of possible topics for the "War Since 1945" Seminar. I spent two years in Brazil from 1967 to 1969; I have a continuing interest in the country. Since a unique opportunity existed to make a contribution to the seminar through personal background, I began the research expecting that information about the insurgency actions would mostly be found in untranslated documents and that the desire of Brazilian students to have it studied might be reflected in a comparable desire among other Brazilians to write about the things that occurred. I was surprise to find that little has been written from the government's point of view. The information that I have been able to find does not discuss the jungle actions that, because of their similarity to actions in Vietnam, would be of greatest interest to most students of this school. At the time of these actions, there was a period of heavy censorship in Brazil. The easing of restrictions over the last several years has not led to an open discussion of the jungle actions. Those who have written about the insurgency mostly have written in support of the insurgents. For the most part, these writings have been confined to urban situations. All of the information that I can obtain indicates that the urban action was the most important; however, and that defeating the urban movement was the key problem for Brazilian forces. This paper, therefore, is mostly about the urban insurgency and as much about the how of the insurgency as the how of the counterinsurgency. I have tried to include as much information on tactics of counterinsurgency as I could, even though I have slim information addressing successful tactics. I am indebted to two people for information on the Amazon actions: Captain Joao Mauricio Tenorio of the Brazilian Navy, and Lieutenant Colonel Licinio C. Dias of the Brazilian Marine Corps. Their help and views, even when in disagreement, have been most useful. I do not feel that this paper is what the Brazilian students envisioned when they asked for a study of the topic, nor is it what I had expected when I asked to undertake the project. None the less, it makes a very interesting examination of the situation leading up to an important insurgency and the solution of that insurgency. While the study provided no definitive tactical lessons on counterinsurgency, it does provide for an interesting comparison with other insurgencies and raise some questions about how insurgencies must be approached if they are to be overcome. CHAPTER ONE Understanding the Background Brazil is different. To understand the causes of the insurgency there and to discover the reasons for the success of the counter-insurgency operations, one must see the communist threat as a Brazilian. One must view the military role in a democracy from a new view point, and try to appreciate the revolutionary from that unique vantage point. To really understand and learn from this situation, one thinks like a Brazilian. As Americans, we share enough common roots with many European countries to make that shift of focus less difficult. In many cases we have studied their history, and we understand the impact of the past on current events. For most Americans, this is not true for Brazil. This paper will start with explaining the roots of the military institution as well as communism in Brazil. Peter Kellemen explains in his chapter on politics that Brazil has a history of people switching from side to side and from being on the "good" and then on the "bad" side.1 This chapter is history designed to explain the personalities involved and also an introduction to some of the situations. Wilson Martin refers to these differences as "Brazilian contradictions, specially designed to baffle foreigners." He goes on to explain his understanding of the need to try to shift viewpoints: "The explanation and a real understanding of Brazilian politics cannot be drawn exclusively from the apparent facts and from the declared motives; and they cannot be interpreted either if we take not into account . . . Brazilian historical time and space."2 There is a traditional form to revolution in Brazil. The existence of this tradition had an impact on the latest series of events. Following this traditional form requires that the insurgency starts in the cities, and that, when it becomes large enough, or when the opposition becomes strong enough, the action moves into the undeveloped hinterland areas. This is in strong contrast to the traditional form in many other countries where the problems come from the undeveloped regions and move into the cities only when the insurgent forces become strong enough to take on the government forces. This traditional form can be seen in almost all of the insurgent actions in Brazil. It is important to understand that there is another form of revolt in Brazil that does not follow the form; that is a revolt from within the government. That type of change fits the standard pattern of internal change seen around the world, with those who desire to change the government obtaining a military following and overthrowing those currently in power. Successful revolutions in Brazil have all been of the second type, which may say something about the value of the other traditional form or may indicate a truer picture of how a revolt takes place in a country like Brazil. Revolutionary attempts without support of a major portion of the military must try to find support in another manner. An alternate view of the tradition would be that a revolution must start where people who are capable of supporting it, and when pressed, it will move to isolate itself for preservation. Most of the revolutionaries would not like that format and their views will be covered later. However, for Brazil, that may be the most accurate description of how a revolt progresses. Early revolts in Brazil were typically slave revolts. Some of the Brazilian revolts were much more than just local actions with a few slaves running away into the jungle. These revolts establish a pattern. In order for there to be enough slaves to be successful as an uprising, they had to start in populated areas. The unusual geography of Brazil, with its coastal escarpment and few navigable rivers, kept populated areas close to the coast and allowed any revolutionary group a huge backlands area to move into when a revolt became large enough to be self- supporting. Colonies of escaped slaves were established in the jungle in 1632, 1636, 1646, 1650, 1731, 1758, and 1796. Most of these colonies, called quilombos, lasted for only a short time, but several lasted much longer than the average two-year span. One at Palmares, in Pernambuco, was established in 1597 and lasted until 1694. This was not a small group of slaves existing as runaways hidden in the jungle, but a "state" of its own, with a king, several towns and almost 10,000 men. About 20 Brazilian expeditions were sent against this quilombo from 1672 to 1694 before the insurgents were defeated. The last of these expeditions involved 6,000 troops.3 It is difficult to separate the revolt in Baia, in 1896 and 1897, from the book, Os Sertoes, written by Euclides da Cunha. Still read and studies as a literary classic, it presents strong support of a revolution. Da Cunha called it a "cry of protest," over the "major scandal in our history."4 Os Sertoes describes in flowery terms another example of a revolt in the backlands and gives a detailed description not only of the people, but the area, and the manner in which they were destroyed by government forces. This description of the revolutionary forces seems to continue the tradition about revolt. Here is an impassioned portrayal of a people fighting for a way of life. The same kind of writing shows up in the 1960's in descriptions of urban guerrilla experiences. The next historical example of a revolution that moves from the cities into the jungle is perhaps the most important. It is important not just because of the pattern it follows, but because of the people involved in the revolt, and because of the example it gives of the differences that have gone on in Brazilian politics. As part of our cultural background, we have developed a view of the "good guys" and the "bad guys." While we would all admit that such divisions are simplistic, we expect our government to divide people into such groups. Depending on the year, and the current state of events, people do switch sides in Brazil. One of the best examples of this ability to be part of the "good team" for a while and then shift to the "bad team" is Luis Carlos Prestes. Luis Carlos Prestes was one of the early leaders in the Communist Party in Brazil. The communist party started in Brazil in the 1920's, in much the same manner that it started in most democratic countries of the day. It did not start as a revolutionary movement but as an intellectual movement. Those who believed in the doctrine felt that there was a change underway leading inevitably to a communist state. As in all countries, and in all parts of the communist party, Brazil would experience the conflict between those that wanted to wait for the revolt to take place on its own and those that wanted to give it a strong helping hand. Prestes gained fame for his part in the first attempt to help things along. In July of 1924 there was an abortive attempt at a coup in Sao Paulo. The coup itself was of little consequence. It lasted only a few weeks and collapsed. But it led to one of the most interesting retreats into the jungle. Under the direction of Juarez Tavora, 3,000 men retreated from Sao Paulo into the interior of Parana. After reaching the Iguacu Falls near the Argentine-Paraguay border, Tavara left the men encamped and went south to Rio Grande do Sul to help ignite an uprising there. Both revolts might have had better success had they started together. But the second revolt gave the insurgents their new leader, Luiz Carlos Prestes.5 Prestes, with about 2,000 men, retreated toward Argentina, and, in March of 1925, with just half the force he started with, he joined the others in Parana. For almost two years, covering a distance of about 16,000 miles, this Prestes Column marched across Paraguay, up Brazil as far as the north-east state of Paraiba, and returned criss-crossing the whole interior of the country. The intent of the move was not just a retreat from superior forces but an attempt to rouse the common people into a general revolt.6 While they raised a lot of sympathy and focused attention on the situation in the interior, they did not find people there ready for revolt. They tried to spread the news of the uprising, and even at times put out a news letter, "O Libertador" (The Liberator). Their attempts to print a news-sheet were thwarted as much by the illiteracy of the people as by the difficulties of production while being chased by government troops or by the Cangaceiros, hired gunmen who formed a counter-guerrilla force in the north-east.7 Prestes was never totally defeated. In February of 1927 he escaped into Bolivia with 620 of his men. The importance of the march is not as much what it did, but the impression that it made on Prestes. He returned during the Vargus years and had a solid position in the government besides spending many years as the secretary general of the communist party. He is one of the main forces in turning the focus of the revolution from the countryside to the cities.6 While it may be difficult to view him as a pivotal figure, it is clear that Prestes at least is a good example of the changeability of Brazilian politics. He had a profound effect on the communist party in Brazil. As a direct result of the lack of support that the column received, Prestes seemed to have become convinced that the masses of people in the country were not ready for revolution. Communist party members were warned to move slowly in trying to get a revolt started. He became a moderate in a revolutionary party. The remainder of Prestes' life serves as a good example of the complex nature of Brazilian political relationships. After escaping with the remainder of his column, Prestes stayed out of the country for several years. In 1930 he was approached to take part in the revolt that led to Getulio Vargus' first try at running the country. He declined, but he returned in 1934, when Vargus got the new constitution passed, to take part in the now legal communist movement. As president of the Alianca National Libertadora (National Liberation Alliance), or ANL as it was known, Prestes represented the Partido Comunista do Brasil (Brazilian Communist Party), or PCdoB in a broad antifascist movement. The ALN did not last long as a legal organization. In July of 1935, Vargus used newly passed national security laws to raid the headquarters of the ALN and obtain documents showing that the organization was supported by the international communist movement. Arrests from this raid led to a revolt in November by the more extreme members of the movement. Though he was not personally involved, as head of the organization Prestes was sentenced to 17 years in prison. Prestes did not serve the entire time. At the end of the Second World War he was released by Vargus and, in 1945, was elected to the Senate as a representative of the now again legal PCdoB. (Those desiring another example of how people can shift in Brazilian politics should read about Vargus, who was both a dictator for 15 years and the elected president later.) Prestes was removed from the government in 1948 along with the other communists and, during the military takeover in 1964, was finally deported. The Prestes revolution is important in another way; it is the first problem of the military with the communists. The revolt started in the military; however, it did not start at the typical level. The whole movement is called "tenentismo" for the lieutenants that started the process. Though it is hard for us to understand, this was a very serious attack on the military structure in Brazil and was the start of a very strong abhorance of communism by the military. Distrust became hatred in 1935. As a part of the revolt that led to Prestes imprisonment, several senior military officers were killed. While it might seem unreasonable to get so upset about the death of some military officers, this is very much in keeping with the Brazilian view of the position of the military in the society. For an organization that had itself started so many revolts to be so uneasy when it was impacted in a revolt seems out of character, but it fits in Brazil. The Brazilian military views its role in the democratic process quite differently from traditional roles for the military in democratic countries. Rather than seeing the public as the group with the ultimate responsibility for insuring that the government performs as it should, the military in Brazil has traditionally seen that role as their own. The willingness of the military to step into the political sphere and adjust things to where they think they should be, is clearly visible throughout most of Brazil's history. If it were only the military that saw this as appropriate, then it might lead to serious fighting whenever the military stepped in to correct the situation; however, the view that the military holds that ultimate responsibility is as firmly fixed in the general political view, and even was written into the constitution in 1891, 1934, and 1946.9 The political crisis that led up to the removal of Vargas as president in 1954 is a good example of how the general population felt about the military's position in getting the government back on track. For example, the "Diario de Noticias," a moderate newspaper, editorialized: "The armed forces are invited to mediate as the sentinels of law and the guardians of the constitution, of tranquility and the progress of the country."10 While understanding that the power to remove a government did not imply power to govern, the military saw revolts as their proper role. That others would take over that role and kill senior officers in the process was unforgivable. NOTES FOR CHAPTER 1 1 Peter Kellemen, BRASIL Para Principiantes, (Rio de Janeiro: Editora Civilizacao Brasileira S. A., 1962), pp. 98-112 2 Wilson Martins, "The Incompetence of the Left," in Political Power in Latin America: Seven Confrontations, ed. Richard R. Fagen and Wayne A Cornelius, Jr., (Englewood Cliffs: Prentice - Hall, Inc. 1970), pp. 211-212 3 John Ellis, A Short History of Guerrilla Warfare, (New York: St. Martin's Press, 1976), p. 48 4 Euclides da Cunha, Rebellion in the Backlands, trans. Samuel Putnam, (Chicago: The University of Chicago Press, 1944), p. v 5 Peter Flynn, Brazil: a Political Analysis, (London: Ernest Benn Limited, 1978), pp. 46-47 6 Walter Laqueur, Guerrilla: a historical and critical study, (Boston: Little, Brown, 1976), p. 194 7 Ibid. 8 Flynn, p. 47 9 See for example, Article 14 in the Constitution of 1891; Article 162 in the Constitution of 1934; and Articles 176 through 178 in the 1946 one. For a detailed discussion of the issues involved in this military view, see the chapter on Traditional Roles and Self-Images in Einaudi and Stepan. 10 Dirio di Noticias, 20 August 1954, quoted in Einaudi and Stepan Latin American Institutional Development, (Santa Monica: Rand, 1971), p. 74 CHAPTER TWO Support for an Insurgency There were several things that supported insurgency in Brazil. The first was communism; the feelings and motivations of the communists are primary guides to their actions. The Brazilian government was another. Its actions and positions had a great impact on those that might consider radical action. A third was groups outside of Brazil that might strengthen or support a move to violent revolution. The final one was the social and economic situation in Brazil. In each of these things one would expect to find indications of why there was an insurgency in Brazil. It is much easier to explain where the insurgency comes from if one takes the point of view of the insurgents. To them, Marxism is clear -- revolution springs from the relentless "progressive" march of history. The rising of masses to overthrow oppression warrants no explanation. Though, perhaps for them, there is as much difficulty in explaining why a revolt has not yet taken place, as there is for non-Marxists in explaining why one has started. As the primary movers in the Brazilian insurgency, the Brazilian communists present a strange picture. One would expect to find a highly organized communist structure, perhaps without obvious linkage due to the need for protection from compromised individuals, but with a carefully developed control system and a strong central command. That is far from what exists in Brazil when the insurgency starts. Perhaps one can blame part of the situation on Prestes. Along with the others that followed him, he preached the need to wait for the inevitable uprising of the masses. This pure version of Marxism was not being taught for purely political reasons, but was also the product of the years in the jungle without creating a following, and the few years working in the government trying to act as part of a legitimate force for change. Certainly there is support for the view that things were afoot that could be taken for non-violent revolt during the time that Janio Quadros and Joao Goulart were ruling in Brazil. This was not the first time that the legal government had tilted strongly to the left, but it was perhaps the strongest movement ever. As Wilson Martins puts it, "The truth is that the Left, or something very close to it, was in power in Brazil at least from 1960, from the Quadros administration up to the overthrow of Goulart in 1964."1 This type of real political power certainly supported a position within the communist party for just waiting for things to swing back. Progress toward the communist goal was possible without violence; current history supported that position. Regardless of the reason, the history of the communist party in Brazil is not the history of a monolithic group. The first group organized was the Partido Communista Brasileiro , the Brazilian Communist Party, or PCB.2 This party was headed by Luis Carlos Prestes. It was the conservative faction of the party. In 1934 the Alianca National Libertadora, or ANL, was formed as the legal arm of the party for support of antifascism. (It is mentioned here to try to prevent confusion with the later ALN.) The first of the splinter groups, and the most important one historically, was the Partido Comiunista do Brazil, the Communist Party of Brazil, or PCdoB. This was a Maoist group organized in 1962 by those in the PCB that felt the need for action to push forward the revolution. This then was the action group of the communist party. If those were the only groups, then there would still be the single organization in control of revolutionary violence, the PCdoB, but it was not that way. There were five other major groups dedicated to armed action: The Acao Livertadora Nacional, National Liberation Action, or ALN, was the most important of the five and the only one of the groups closely tied to Cuba. The Vanguarda Popular Revolucionara, Popular Revolutionary Vanguard, or VPR, was a second revolutionary group active in Sao Paulo. The Movimento Revolucionario Tiradentes, Tiradentes Revolutionary Movement, or MRT, was the action team of the Red Wing of the PCdoB. It was named for a national hero of Brazil. The Movimento Revolucionario do Outubro 8, Revolutionary Movement of October 8, or MR-8, named in commemoration of Che Guevara's death, was the only group that started with rural action. The last of these groups was the Partido Communista Brasileiro Revolcionario, Revolutionary Brazilian Communist Party, or PCBR, this group started the armed struggle in Rio.3 While those with strong Marxist views take the position that nothing more is required to start a revolution than a party itself, there are other things that will be considered here. One of the strong forces toward an insurgency in Brazil was the military rule of the country. As has been previously noted, the overthrow of the government by the military was part of an accepted military role. What was not expected or accepted was the long, continued control of the government by military personnel. Even among those that were happy with the overthrow of Joao Goulart in 1964 there were many who did not want the continued military rule. Also the government of General Costelo Branco was clearly anti-communist, perhaps even more strongly than the government of Goulart was pro-communist. While it was not difficult for the military to justify the steps that it took to overthrow the government, due to the historical precedence, it did feel a need to justify its continued rule. One of the ways that it justified staying was by pointing out how communist the previous government had been. "Truely, in no other country of the planet did the Communist promoters of an assault on power enjoy such advantages as were peacefully given to them by the government of Goulart."4 This statement, made by a military apologist as part of a justification for staying in power, is a good example of the type of change that the new government undertook. Obviously this change was a powerful force in favor of those that wished to push the revolution. Waiting for a non-violent social change had suddenly taken a back seat, because anyone who looked at the status of the passive movement could see that it had not only stopped progressing, it had just suffered a massive setback. As expressed by Ladislaw Dobor, "In the first years after the coup, we had many discussions and splits. By 1967 only a few small groups had taken up arms....But then in 1968...the mass movements practically disappeared...Since the government had closed off the peaceful forms, they came into the armed organizations."5 Though the government would not agree with the way this is stated, in the minds of many people, the continued military government had cut off one peaceful method of change. The military government also used political power to create laws preventing opposition. The first of these, The Institutional Act of April 9, 1964 is a good example of the kind of broad powers involved in this legalization of the coup. This act gave military personnel the right to run for both president and vice president, and set the election for the 11th. It also provided the government with the right to revoke the political rights of an individual (cassation) for 10 years. This formalized the purges of the government and even the military that were occurring. Within two months the government had "cassated" 378 people. Included were the last two presidents and six state governors. With people at this level being denied any participation in politics, it is no wonder that the members of the communist party did not expect their quick return to legal access to the political system. The student unrest and political activism that were common in the United States during the 1960's were not confined just to this country. The same situation existed in Brazil, just as it did in many other countries. These students were coming into political awareness just at the time that their options were being removed. Student unrest, whether it was with the political situation or not, caused many to become bitter about the political situation and the move into the activist communist groups continued. "Students were, of course, the strongest element in most guerrilla movements but guerrilla strategists usually felt self- conscious about his fact and preferred not to mention it."6 This statement of Walter Laqueur fits in with the response by Fernando Nagle Gabeira (of MR-8) when asked about recruits, "With few exceptions, the members are under 30, some as young as 16. There are many students from sociology, the letters and arts, and law, fields with few prospects on the job market."7 It is interesting that the reason given by a guerrilla for recruiting others is not ideology, but lack of job prospects. Another force in Brazil during the late 1960s was the Catholic Church. The vast majority of Brazilians are Catholic. Even among the youth, that are famous for inactivity, the church was still a powerful force. It is not the purpose of this paper to go into the doctrinal conflict within the Catholic faith, but it is important to point out that during this period many priests were active in the communist movement. This makes for an odd factor, but, it is part of the South American equation. Father Gustava Gutierrez of Peru later wrote the book that gave this aberrant theology its name -- Liberation Theology, but in Brazil as early as 1960 there were others teaching the same variant ideas that bolstered the concept. The idea of Liberation Theology grew out of the desire of those in the Catholic Church to improve the lives of the people aroung them. Concerned with the poverty and inequality that they saw in Brazil, many priests and nuns decided that there was no lawful way to provide for the needs of the poor. They became revolutionists not because they wanted to overthrow the government and replace it with a communist one, but because they wanted to change the government and saw no way short of revolt to do that. Here then was another large group of people dissatisfied with the current govenment policies, providing another source of support for the revolution. What about external support for the revolution? Clearly there was ideological support from Cuba. Members of the communist party had been part of various meetings in Cuba, and there was a tie to parties in both Russia and China, but there is no indication in any of the writings that there was anything other than training and indoctrination available. None of the Brazilian insurgents seemed to expect arms or money from Cuba or any other communist group external to the country. At least in the Brazilian situation, the plan seems to have been to produce the insurrection totally within the country with the exception of a few who would be sent elsewhere for training. It is unclear what type of coordination took place or was planned, but it seems to be clear that the Bolivian foco was planned as only one piece of a total continental insurrection. Argentina, Brazil, Peru and Chile were all to rise up in mass. While there is no indication that any direct support was planned between these actions, the intent was at least to limit the ability of the governments to assist each other in putting down a revolution. "On the premise that no country could carry forward a successful revolution without outside aid, Che based political support for the guerrillas on the common anti-imperialist struggle of the Latin American peoples. Since the internationalization of the struggle was the best chance of a revolution in any single country, he hoped that the struggle would spill over national boundaries."8 Even if there was no plan for direct support, there was support for the radicals that wanted to press forward. Others willing to sustain direct action were ready to move forward in their own countries. The economic and social conditions existing in Brazil during this period of time would seem to be a classic case of the downtrodden masses. There was a small middle class, though it was growing, and a large group of lower class people. In some areas, such as the Northeast, there still existed a situation close to the type of conditions that existed under slavery, when one compared those that had and those that did not. The fifth largest country in the world, Brazil then ranked number eight in population with eighty two million people. Large portions of the country had population densities under one person per square kilometer. While over fifty percent of the people were literate, only one hundred and ten per thousand finished grade school, and only fifteen per thousand finished a secondary school.9 While I came into contact with Brazilians that were very well educated, the vast majority had stopped before finishing a secondary school. Many children could be found on the streets all the time, even during school hours. There were always boys in any park ready to shine your shoes, and in many cities young boys (12 to 14) worked on every bus taking fares. The population was moving into the cities, and by the end of the 1960's the rural population would be smaller than the urban one. Industrial production had doubled in the period from 1954 to 1962,10 but the availability of jobs in the cities had not kept up with the number of people wanting them. Many of the cities developed slum areas, with the most famous one in Rio, the Favela, giving its name to shantytowms. While I certainly understand that Brazil had no special corner on poverty at this time, I first saw real poverty in Brazil. I had seen some situations among indians in the American southwest that I had always considered poverty, but I will never forget wandering off a main road in Ponta Grossa to take a shortcut to another road and finding a hut. When I first saw it, I thought it was something that a group of kids had made. It was about three feet high and eight feet on a side. It was constructed of cardboard, a few boards, and some flattened tin cans. It was the type of thing that I and my friends had built in the field behind our homes many times in our youth. This one had a family of at least five living in it, five being the number that came out to see why the dog was barking. That was only the first example of many, but it gave a new meaning to poverty. Brazil also had some of the easiest places for the have-nots to see what they were missing. Rio then had some of the worst slums in the world right next to some of the most expensive hotels. Television was expensive in this period, but I remember several places with no internal plumbing where people watched what others had. Not only did they see what people had in Brazil, but they saw what was available in the United States. I know that they did not always understand, but it was a source of unrest I am sure. People could never understand that the picture I had of my parents home did not make me rich. With a car in the driveway and two parked out front it was obvious that I came from a very rich family. How do you explain to someone that having a 1950 Ford and a 1952 Studebaker parked in front of your house in 1967 did not make you one of the American rich? High inflation was one of the causes for the 1964 coup, and the actions taken by the Castelo Branco government to try to bring prices under control have resulted in declining real wages and a law against cost of living increases. With buying power down twenty two percent in 1966, the number of poor was growing rather than shrinking. These social and political factors would seem to provide the necessary mass support for the overthrow of the government. As becomes clear, the economic and social pressures do not provide the eighty percent support from the population that communist leaders felt was needed for a revolution.11 However, it is clearly understandable that the more action oriented portion of the communist party thought that all of the ingredients for a successful revolt were in place: The government was oppressive and not representative. The church was becoming active in anti- government ways. Students were clearly ready for and seeking change. Economic conditions were bad. The necessary oppressed masses were available. And lastly, all one had to do was follow the example of the Cubans, and the revolution would sweep out of the hills to establish a communist state. The only thing left to do was to make a plan that fit the Brazilian situation and then start the revolution. NOTES TO CHAPTER 2 1 All of the sources except one agree on the PCB as being the first communist party organized in Brazil. That source is the Area Handbook on Brazil. Because of the high reliability of this series, I point out that other sources do not agree. In particular the paper on Atualizacao do MCB clearly notes the PCB as the first party and the PCdoB as the offshoot. The Area Handbook gives the first party the name of the PCdoB and on page 268 talks about a pre-1960 and a post-1962 PCdoB. 2 While many sources exist for a history of the communist movement in Brazil, I recommend Kohl and Litt's summary, pp. 167- 170, for anyone wishing further information. 3 James Kohl and John Litt, Urban Guerrilla Warfare in Latin America, (Cambridge: MIT Press, 1974), p. 168 4 Colonel Ferdinando De Carvalho, "The Communist Revolutionary War in Brazil," in Fagen and Cornelius, p. 197 5 Andy Truskier, "The Politics of Violence: The Urban Guerrilla in Brazil," in Kohl and Litt, pp 141-142 6 Laqueur, p. 345 7 Truskier, p. 143 8 Donald C. Hodges, The Latin American Revolution, (New York: William Morrow and Company, Inc. 1974), p. 186 9 Antonio Perdo de Souza Campos, Atlas Historico e Geografico Brasileiro, (Rio: Campanha Nacional de Material de Ensino, 1966), p. 57 10 Ibid, p. 61 11 Laqueur, p. 345 CHAPTER THREE Insurgent Philosophy and Tactics Much of the philosophy and tactics seen in other South American countries share common roots, but in Brazil there is a twist to them that makes them uniquely different. Not that all of the other ideas were rejected, just that Brazilians often changed them to fit what they saw as a unique environment. Che Gevera is largely responsible for the name given to the standard plan for starting a revolt in South America. The concept of a foco grows out of his writings, and those of Regis Debray. This codification of the Cuban experience stresses starting a revolution through a small band of guerrillas acting in the countryside. This band, or focus, would be a "small motor which moves the large motor of revolution."1 While this theory seems applicable to what happened in Cuba, there are problems in applying this idea to other places. As is often the case, a generalization made from a single experience seems to be wrong.2 It was tried; at least four are identified in Brazil from 1962 to 1969 -- all failures.3 These four are only a few of the seventeen listed for South America by Kohl and Litt; a fact which is important in understanding what was going on in the communist party in Brazil during this period. Luiz Carlos Prestes was the living example for all of the old guard that the concept of a foco had not worked in the past. For the young, Guevara was a hero whose ideas needed only to be followed carefully to obtain success. When the PCB would not support such actions, splinter groups were formed to establish that focus of revolt. Many of these groups rejected the idea of centralized control. Action was considered more important than structure. This rejection of the basic principle of unity of command seems strange to the student of military history, but it clearly was the driving force in starting many of the small groups in Brazil. Carlos Marighella pushed this same idea when he said "coordination must cease when it obstructs action."4 Marighella is the most important Brazilian communist theorist, not so much for the success of his theories, but for the number of people whom he influenced. His major impact was made through writings. His short work, Minimanual of the Urban Guerrilla, on what a urban guerrilla needs to be is still one of the models for development of an urban revolution. And yet, Marighella did not always follow such a direct line, and demand action before anything else. He was a realist that had worked within the government as well as outside. He knew that at times he should wait. This earlier statement shows that different view: Brazil is a country occupied by the present military entreguista5 dictatorship and United States ruling circles, in whose service are the traitors that have seized power. In these siege conditions, the Brazilian guerrilla band, with its clearly political significance can do no more than register a protest, act as an instigatory force behind the popular struggle. It would be unpardonable if it were to be deprived of its continuity, of its necessary life span, through exposure to risks of a superior concentration of enemy forces, through being allowed to venture into battle or take part in crucial engagements with the forces of reaction. No one expects guerrilla warfare to be the signal for a popular uprising or the immediate proliferation of insurrectional bases. Nothing of the kind. Guerrilla warfare will stimulate the resistance struggle everywhere.6 Much like Prestes, Marighella's history needs to be studied to understand the basis for his doctrine. He follows a typical Brazilian mold, having been considered both "good" and "bad" as conditions changed. Born in Bahia in 1911, he was a member of the PCB from 1927 to 1967. His involvement with the ANL in 1935 resulted in his imprisonment, as it did for Prestes. He was a member of the Central Committee of the PCB in 1943, and also a federal deputy for Bahia during the 1945 period when Prestes was a senator. Thrown out of Congress in 1947 when the communists were made illegal again, he worked as editor of the communist journal Problemas (Problems) in Sao Paulo and served as a member of the PCB Executive Committee and Secretariat.7 He spent a year in China from 1953 to 1954, but remained a Stalinist rather than following Mao. In 1964 while still a member of the PCB Central Committee he was wounded in an early clash with military forces. He remained in the PCB until 1967. He was an agitator for more forceful action, and in 1966 resigned from the Executive Committee with strong feelings that the party was not doing enough. In his letter of resignation he said: "All its [the Executive Committee's] activities consist in organizing meetings and publishing policies and information. No action is planned, the struggle has been abandoned. And in moments of crisis, the party has no grasp on reality. . ."8 Even though the PCB had decided to to send no delegation to the conference of the Organization of Latin American Solidarity in 1967, Marighella went to Havana for the meetings. For this action, and his continued complaints about the PCB, he was expelled from the PCB in December of 1967. Marighella is one of the few critics of Guevara's theories during this period that offered another possible way to start the revolution. He is the major supporter of an urban movement. "The Organizational Role in Revolutionary Violence" establishes the urban movement and its logistical base as the starting point for the insurgency rather than the foco working in isolation in the rural area. This is not to imply that Marighella was convinced that urban action would win the revolt, he saw it as only the first step in the revolution. He expected to win through an alliance of workers, peasants, students and clergy, all taking part in the armed struggle against the government. In the first stage of the revolt the action would be concentrated in the cities. There the preparation would take place with training and appropriation of materiel. The revolt would then move to the countryside as the principal effort. This would be the critical stage of the revolt and would lead to the final stage where a people's army would rise up and overthrow the regime. While the second stage is clearly the foco idea returning, and while Marighella was clear that the second stage was the decisive one, there is a first phase, starting in the city, added on to the standard theory of the day. While his strategy is important and was accepted by most of the urban groups, his organizational ideas were not so sound. He was obsessed with the idea of producing action. Better action that produced no movement towards the organizational goal than a lack of action. His most famous work is the short Minimanual of the Urban Guerrilla. Much of it reads like a military training manual, though the list of personal qualities reads like a wish list for the ideal soldier. The urban guerrilla is brave, decisive, a good tactician, a good shot, of great astuteness, imaginative, creative, must possess initiative, mobility, flexibility, versatility and command of any situation. Other important qualities include being a good walker, being resistant to fatigue, hunger, rain and heat, know how to hide, never to fear, and always be vigilant. Acting the same both day and night he never leaves a trail, gets discouraged, acts impetuously, and never loses his patience or his vigilance.9 Perhaps it is being unfair, but it seems that someone with all of those abilities directly conflicts with his statement that this person "must be careful not to appear strange and separated from ordinary city life."10 Under technical preparation he includes a long list of things this guerrilla is to learn to do: The urban guerrilla can have strong physical resistance only if he trains systematically. He cannot be a good fighter if he has not learned the art of fighting. For that reason the urban guerrilla must learn and practice various kinds of fighting, of attack, and of personal defense. Other useful forms of physical preparation are hiking, camping, the practice in survival in the woods, mountain climbing, rowing, swimming, skin diving, training as a frogman, fishing, harpooning, and the hunting of birds and of small and big game. It is very important to learn how to drive, pilot a plane, handle a motor boat and a sail boat, understand mechanics, radio telephone, electricity, and have some knowledge of electronic techniques. It is also important to have a knowledge of topographical information, to be able to locate one's position by instruments or other available resources, to calculate distances, make maps and plans, draw to scale, make timings, work with an angle protractor, a compass, etc. A knowledge of chemistry, of color combination, and of stamp-making, the domination of the techniques of calligraphy and the copying of letters, and other skills are part of the technical preparation of the urban guerrilla, who is obliged to falsify documents in order to live within a society that he seeks to destroy. In the area of auxiliary medicine he has the special role of being a doctor or understanding medicine, nursing, pharmacology, drugs, elemental surgery, and emergency first aid. The basic question in the technical preparation of the urban guerrilla is nevertheless to know how to handle arms such as the machine gun, revolver, automatic, FAL, various types of shotguns, carbines, mortars, bazookas, etc. A knowledge of various types of ammunition and explosives is another aspect to consider. Among the explosives, dynamite must be well understood. The use of incendiary bombs, smoke bombs, and other types are also indispensable prior knowledge. To know how to make and repair arms, prepare Molotov cocktails, grenades, mines, homemade destructive devices, how to blow up bridges, tear up and put out of service rails and sleepers, there are requisites in the technical preparation for the urban guerrilla that can never be considered unimportant.11 If such a person ever completes his training program, James Bond would certainly be out of a job! All of the manual is not at that level. Much of the rest of the manual is exactly what one would expect in something that has been dubbed "must reading for any aspiring terrorist."12 The very next section of the manual discusses arms that are to be used, and contains a rational discussion of the use of various weapons. (It does get a little carried away in discussing the guerrilla's role as a gunsmith.) The next section is titled "The Shot: the urban guerrilla's reason for existence." Thus demonstrating that Marighella had clearly in mind what was to be done with the weapons. The sections on logistics even contain some mnemonics to help remember the difference between traditional logistics, CCEM (C-comida {food}, C-combustivel {fuel}, E-equipment, and M- municoes {ammunition} ) and guerrilla logistics, MDAME, (M- mechanization, D-dinheiro {money}, A-arms, M-municoes, and E- explosives).13 As an example of the value of the manual, he lists and explains the following actions that could be carried out: 1. assaults; 2. raids and penetration; 3. occupations; 4. ambush; 5. street tactics; 6. strikes and work interruptions; 7. desertions, diversions, seizures, expropriations of arms, ammunition, explosives: 8. liberation of prisoners; 9. executions; 10. kidnappings; 11. sabotage; 12. terrorism; 13. armed propaganda; 14. war of nerves.14 There are clear instructions about how to carry out each of these fourteen items. What is meant by assault is explained, for example, followed by a discussion of when to assault at night and what things require assaults during the day. Nine groups of targets are listed, and special considerations are listed for moving vehicles. That is followed by a long discussion of the special situation involved in assaulting a bank. With some of the manual so clearly overstated, it is easy to dismiss the good portions of the document along with the bad. From the point of view of those that would use it, the manual served a very important purpose. It in effect was the doctrine of the urban revolution as well as the tactics. Much like a doctrinal publication of the U. S. Armed Forces, it had some explanations that could not be made to fit current needs; however, it also contained significant information of a general nature that was helpful in training people. One of the great problems of the Brazilian insurgency was its inability to train people. It would seem clear from the existence of the Mini- manual that some of those involved in the insurgency knew the importance of training, but there is also clear evidence that there were many who did not understand the need to train. Undoubtedly this problem was compounded by the large numbers involved in the insurgency. Not having firm central control made training more difficult. The impact on operations is therefor seen to considerably amplified. As a final note on the value of the manual, it should be pointed out that the Marine Corps published a large section of it in an Operational Overview devoted to terrorism, and gave instructions to units on how to get a copy of the entire work. The stated reason being, "To develop viable countermeasures against any terrorist attacks, we must know their tactics."15 It is very hard to determine if the losing side had good tactics, particularly in a revolt. In the case of a revolt there seems to be little that is consistent from one example to another, and this fact makes it difficult to know if the tactics were good even when they follow exactly the pattern of a previously successful revolution. In the case of new tactics like those tried in Brazil, the only course available is to try to look at alternatives that might have been used and try to determine if they might have done better. Even those that support insurgencies can not agree on the tactics that should be used. Abraham Guillen, another early urban warfare strategist, agreed with Marighella at first. Later he was to revise his position and take exception with the idea of the rural guerrillas being the strategic force. Laqueur points out the rapid urbanization of South America, and would seem to agree with Guillen that Carlos Lamarca (another important Brazilian urban terrorist) failed only when he left the city of Sao Paulo. He got killed in the countryside.16 The question would then seem not to be should the push have been to start somewhere other than in the cities, but, rather, should there have been any attempt to leave the city at all? This does not seem to have an answer. Moving to the countryside did not work, but staying in the cities was not working either. Remember, Marighella was killed in the city. NOTES FOR CHAPTER 3 1 Kohl and Litt, p. 6 2 For those interested in a discussion of the problems involved in exporting the Cuban experience I recommend the section in Kohl and Litt on "Foquismo and the Continental Revolution" pages 5 through 8. 3 Kohl and Litt, pp. 6-7 4 Ibid, p. 22 5 Entrequista -- someone who gives everything away. (In this case to foreign interests.) 6 Carlos Marighella, "A Crise Brasileira," in The Technique of the Counter-State, ed. Luis Mercier Vega, trTns. Daniel Weissbort, (London: Pall Mall Press), p. 61 7 Flynn, pp. 414-415 8 Ibid, p. 416 9 Marighella, p. 21 10 Ibid 11 Ibid, p. 22 12 LtCol T. E. Kline, "The Trouble with Terrorism," in Operational Overview, April - June 1984, (Quantico: MCDEC), p. 13 In fairness to LtCol Kline, the implication is that this is "must reading for counterterrorists" as well. 13 Marighella, p. 25 14 Ibid, p. 30. 15 Operational Overview, p. 26 16 Laqueur, p. 345 CHAPTER FOUR The Insurgency For the purposes of this paper, the insurgency can be thought of as starting in 1964 with the overthrow of the government that year. Clearly there had been previous activities, but, for the most part, these had been things that firmed the insurgency, and provided impetus for political indoctrination and training. It is perhaps best to start the reporting with Marighella's first direct action. On 9 May 1964, he led a mob assault on an officer's club in Sao Paulo. He was shot by police and seriously wounded, but later managed to escape from the hospital. The first blood of the insurgency had been drawn. In March 1965 a military barracks was raided in Rio Grande do Sul for the purpose of getting arms. A bomb found in the U. S. Embassy concluded the only direct insurgent actions for 1965. Neither produced much interest. Real action would start in the south. This is in keeping with the region's reputation for violent political acts. Over 200 people were arrested the year before for plotting insurection in conjunction with ousted political leaders. Porto Alegre, the capital of Rio Grande do Sul, continued that tradition in 1966 with the first of many bombings. 1966 was the year of the bomb. A U. S. consul's home; the USIS building; the Recife airport; and three ministers' homes were bombed that year. Bombings were popular and easy for the insurgents. In 1973 there were still insurgents setting off bombs, though this time in the north. This would seem to be in conflict with the statements of Dobor in response to a question on bombs. His claim is that the insurgents did not use bombs for fear that the government will blow up a movie house full of children and blame it on the insurgents. However, his statement that "We choose very selective targets...."2 seems to be true for most of the insurection. It must be remembered that this was an insurgency and not simply terrorists actions. In marked contrast to the kind of problems that occur in Northern Ireland, the insurgents seem to clearly understand that they need to get and keep the support of the general population. Symbolic acts were of great importance to the guerrillas, so much so that at times the symbolism was hidden from everyone except themselves. The first of the rural foco failed in April of 1967.3 More information than that is not available, but it indicates how fractionalized the communists were during this period. While no information is available on how many were involved, this was the one action of the Movilento Nacionalista Revolucionario (National Revolutionary Movement). Two other foco attempts were aborted before they really got started. 170 people were arrested in Mato Grosso, and the band in Amazonas only grew to five before they were arrested. Money became the critical issue for the insurgents in 1968. Four robberies each netted over 100,000 NCr$.4 Money was not stolen; it was expropriated for financing the revolution. Marighella was convinced that this issue marks one of the key factors of any urban movement. The rural movement would need to be financed, or it would end up having to take what it needed from those that it was trying to get to join the cause. One of the responsibilities of the urban guerrilla was to provide money. As Hodges states: With respect to expropriations, he [Marighella] diverged from the practice subsequently followed by the Argentine ERP by advising against direct distributions to the people. Such distributions, he contended, create the false impression that the liberation of the exploited depends on the enterprise and exploits of the guerrillas alone, thereby reinforcing the passivity of the masses when their active participation is most needed. Thus, bank expropriations should be used mainly for tactical or logistical purposes such as providing arms, ammunition, etc. The best example of the problem with symbolic acts occurred on October 27, 1968: Bombing the Sears store in Sao Paulo. (It is tempting, though unfair, to leave the explanation of the symbolism of this attack for a note, and let the reader try to figure out for himself what the reasoning was.) The attack on the store was a protest against United States involvement in Vietnam and the presence in Brazil of the U. S. Secretary of Defense. To understand the symbolism, it is necessary to know that Robert McNamara owned shares in Sears. This rather obscure fact was the subject of a manifesto left at the site of the bombing, but its contents were never really published.6 The first action of 1969 was more important for who it involves rather than for what it accomplished. The VPR organizes an attack on the IV Army Quitauna barracks in an attempt to gain several hundred weapons. The items were to include heavier weapons such as machines guns and flame throwers as well as smaller automatic weapons and grenades. The rational for the attack was based on the existence of a VPR cell within the Fourth Infantry Regiment. If for no other reason than the number of weapons involved, it was a complex operation with detailed logistical requirements.7 It is unclear exactly how the authorities first heard of the plan, but one cell was discovered painting a truck to resemble an army vehicle, and the remainder of the plan fell apart.8 The cell in the Fourth Regiment did escape, taking 70 automatic weapons with them. This cell was led by Captain Carlos Lamarca. In many ways, the defection of Captain Lamarca was more serious than the loss of the weapons. Indications are that he did not leave the army for ideological reasons, but because of a lover.9 He was a superb shot, and a knowledgeable tactical leader. He represented all that was bad in the armed forces, and caused considerable problems due to his understanding of counterguerrilla tactics. Under his leadership VPR became one of the two major Insurgent groups. The attack on the Fourth Infantry Regiment was a tactical disaster. The four arrested painting the truck were questioned and many others were arrested. Joao Quartim, a member of the group, claims that there was savage torture and that one member of the cell even collaborated with officials. Regardless of the exact tactics used, they led to another group of conspirators. The final results included arrests of thirty more militants.10 Kidnapping was the next step in the escalation of the urban action. On September 4, 1969 the U. S. Ambassador, Burke Elbrick, was kidnapped. This kidnapping is very important because it demonstrates the true state of the insurection. The immediate value to the insurgents was huge. The action put the insurgency on front pages all around the world. The release of fifteen prisoners was important to the morale of those fighting, and demonstrated that the government could be forced to release those it held. In addition, the safe release of the ambassador kept world opinion from turning totally against the insurgents. On the other hand, the net result of the kidnapping was a major blow by the counterinsurgent forces. MR-8 first developed the idea for the kidnapping, but had to go to the ALN and Marighella for armed support. The kidnapping was smoothly done, but the house where they held Elbrick was rented in the real name of one of the insurgents.11 As a direct result of the kidnapping, between 1800 and 2000 people were arrested. One set of those arrests led to the locating of Marighella. He was killed in a police trap on November 4, 1969. "On balance, the Elbrick kidnapping had provoked brutal repression against a movement insufficiently developed to withstand it; the revolutionaries lost control over the level of violence as the regime escalated to a level they were unable to match."12 There were three more diplomatic kidnappings in 1970. The symbolic nature of these attacks was again much too subtle for most of the Brazilians. The four major kidnappings were done in order of the amount of money that the foreign government had invested in Brazil. Following the United States came Japan, Germany and Switzerland. It is interesting to note that not even the police figured out the significance of the order of the kidnappings until the insurgents pointed it out. The overall effect of these kidnappings was much the same as it had been in the case of the kidnapping of Ambassador Elbrick, they were initial successes for the insurgents, but the end result was the loss of more people than were released, and those released were exiled outside the country and not able to directly support the insurgency. None of these actions were leading to the type of mass uprising that the guerrillas needed. Urban actions continued into 1974, but the effect continues to be much the same. It was easy to rob banks, kidnappings drop off, and bombs continued to be used. Kohl and Litt have a long list of actions covering eleven pages. But most of these were of little consequence at the national level.13 Rural actions continued to be tried throughout the entire insurgency. None of them had the desired effect of bringing about the involvement of the masses, and most of them were small and relatively easy for the army to locate and overcome. Two notable exceptions are worth mentioning as separate items; one at the VPR training camp in Sao Paulo; another at the Xambia enclaves. The VPR had established a training area in the southern part of the state of Sao Paulo known as the Vale de Rebeira. This is a poor region, relatively hilly, and covered with trees. It was mostly inhabited by immigrants from Japan. In this region the VPR had set up a support network and was conducting training. Information about the area came to light as a result of arrests following the kidnapping of the Japanese consul. The military reaction was swift and massive. Thousands of troops were involved in a cordon around the area, and air support was used, to include the dropping of napalm. The reaction of the government upset the guerrilla leaders because of what it meant for their future plans. Joao Quartim comments: The rapidity and ferocity of the armed forces' intervention shows yet again that present conditions in Brazil do not permit the survival of isolated bases of "red power" in the countryside and that consequently the formation of mobile strategic detachments is more than ever dependent on the overall situation of class struggle and revolutionary war. Second the claim that a foco will serve as a tactical instrument inspiring the urban masses to struggle has also been disproved.14 In April 1972, the government located a large guerrilla base at Xambia in the region near the Araguaia River. Unlike the VPR base that was only 300 kilometers from the city of Sao Paulo, this was a true jungle base, in an area near the border of the states of Goias, Mato Grosso, and Para. There are indications that the guerrillas had come the closest they would ever come to establishing a foco. This area is very poor and there were powerful landlords whose actions could easily be exploited to gain support. The "Command of the Partisan Forces of Araguaia" was of great concern to the government because of the possibility of attacks on the Trans-Amazon highway.15 The government used over 5,000 troops in their actions against the guerrilla force. What few details are available will be discussed in the following chapter on government actions, but from the insurgent point of view, the government again was able to easily raise the level of violent response well above anything that the guerrillas were able to match. Even in this place where they had had time to build a support structure and where there was some local support, the insurgents could not gain enough support to hold against the government forces. One of the most difficult questions to answer is how many were really involved in the insurection. Raymond Estep gives a number of four hundred active guerrillas during the height of actions during 1969 and 1970.16 However, Kohl and Litt indicate that in Operation Birdcage, launched to preempt actions in commemoration of Marighella's death, that between five and ten thousand people were detained.17 Even taking the smaller number and allowing for only one in ten as really involved in active support of the insurgency, still gives five hundred arrests of valid insurgents. Regardless of how many there were, the one thing that is sure is that there were never anywhere close to enough. Professor Bard O'Neil has done a large amount of work on the analysis of insurgencies.18 As a final comment on the nature of the insurgent actions in Brazil, I would like to apply his framework to the insurgency there and show how it falls in the various categories. First as to type, this insurgency is clearly revolutionary. As to form, it is guerrilla warfare. In a few cases it is only terrorism, but for the most part it is guerrilla actions. It never becomes conventional warfare. Looking at O'Neil's major analytical variables, one sees a lack of popular support, a lack of organization, and a great lack of cohesion. External support is lacking in anything other than moral support. If there is political support in the form that O'Neil defines it, it is only from Cuba, and is rather limited and non-specific. (Cuban support is mostly general support for all actions in Latin America.) There is no indication of material assistance. Looking at the physical environment, the insurgents have large areas of rural populations in which to base themselves, but they never really control any portion of the land in such a way as to provide a safe haven for themselves. The social environment would seem to provide the necessary division between the haves and the have-nots to allow for a rebellion, but the Brazilian insurgents cannot seem to exploit it. Lastly, the strength of the government falls clearly in favor of the status quo. It is interesting to note that the Brazilians development of strategy is listed by O'Neil as a wholly separate category. If they did nothing else, the Brazilians effected another way to approach development of an insurgency. NOTES FOR CHAPTER 4 1 Kohl and Litt, p. 46 and 62, and also Flynn, p. 412 2 Truskier, p. 140 3 Kohl and Litt, p. 63 4 Ibid, pp. 64-65 5 Hodges, p. 192 6 Joao Quartim, "Leninism or Militarism," in Kohl and Litt, p. 151 7 Ibid, p. 158 8 Ibid, p. 159 9 This was reported by LtCol Dias during a conversation at Quantico on 1 Feb. 1985. His indicated that Lamarca left a wife and family behind when he defected. 10 Quartim, p. 159 11 Kohl and Litt, p. 49 12 Ibid 13 Ibid, pp. 62 - 72. This Chronology includes not only the actions by the insurgents, but includes key events in the government and key political changes. It is a valuable quick reference on the actions of both sides. The only problem with the list is the lack of references to further information. In many cases, a one line entry in this list was the only information on an action that I could locate. 14 Quartim, pp. 164-165 15 Kohl and Litt, p. 51 16 Raymond Estep, Guerrilla Warfare in Latin America 1963- 1975, Air University Documentary Research Study (AU-202-75-IPD), 1975, p. 51 (no reference is given for the number sited) 17 Kohl and Litt, pp. 50 and 69 18 Bard E. O'Neil, "The Analysis of Insurgency," in The Art and Practice of Military Strategy, ed. George Thibault, (Washington: National Defense University, 1984), pp. 800-827. CHAPTER FIVE Government Actions One of the more difficult things to resolve in the insurgent actions in Brazil is who escalated things from a given level first. The government could not be expected to agree with Ferdanado Nagle Gabeira of MR-8 who said, "We did not choose this way of fighting; it was chosen by the dictatorship and by its ally, the United States."1 However, it is clear that the coup by the military did change the rules for those that did not agree. It was not just a change in government, but also a change in the attitude of the government toward all kinds of dissent. If one looks at the first three Institutional Acts as a form of escalation, then it is clear that the government was moving against those that disagreed with its policies in increasing levels. As previously noted, the first of these acts allowed for the removal of the rights of an individual to participate in the political process for ten years, and gave the president rights that had previously been the purview of the judiciary and legislature. The second dissolved all political parties, instituted indirect elections for the president and vice- president, and allowed the military courts to try people accused of subverting the state. The third act ruled out direct elections for governors and mayors of the capital cities. This was obviously a continuing reduction in democratic rights.2 It is clear that the military did two things to insure power: First, it changed the rules. Second, it got rid of the players that did not like the new rules. While there is an argument for stating that these actions forced those who disagreed to become revolutionaries, it must also be seen as a clear case of getting the government into a position where it could combat an insurgency. These acts gave the government such strong powers that there were few if any restraints on their actions against the guerrilla forces. Later when the government wanted stronger powers, there were more Institutional Acts. Number five and number fourteen were both very important. Five gave dictatorial powers to the president, at the time Costa e Silva, and fourteen brought back the death penalty for subversive acts. Brian M. Jenkins contends that, "In almost all cases, government forces have resorted to extra-legal methods to deal with urban guerrillas."3 He also notes that in most cases they get away with doing it.4 He is referring to the ability of the repressive acts of the government to influence the masses to revolt, not the legal ability to do whatever the government officials wish, but in the case of Brazil there were laws passed that insure that the government could call almost anything it wished legal. It is interesting that this position seems to be the exact opposite of what he states in his article on urban strategy where he talks about repression as a goal of the insurgent. "Violence generated by guerrillas is aimed at compelling the government to assume dictatorial powers, declare martial law, suspend civil liberties, resort to mass arrests."5 Clearly the Brazilian government did all of these; many even before the guerrillas got started. However, the government managed to keep most of the repression localized and did not generate mass revolt. Of course, not all of the actions taken by the government were repressive even when they were not what might be expected in the United States. Different systems of police organization allow other options to the government than do those currently in use in the United States. With its ability to bring all of the police actions within a state under the control of the military commander for the state, without declaring a state of martial law, Brazil has a very useful mid-line reaction to urban problems.6 There is a certain level of escalation in the United States when the National Guard is called on to contain a riot or to prevent a situation, that is not felt in Brazil when the police forces in an area mass together to prevent the same type of problem. In some of our states, the state highway patrol can be used in that manner, but even that involves using forces that would not normally be assigned in a town. Brazil has made good use of its ability to control multiple police units. These units have been trained in riot control and prevention, and can be quickly combined to provide a large force if required. They all wear the same uniforms, and so in a large town, unless you watched them arrive, you would have no way to know that it was not just the local police. Of all of the tactics and actions that this paper discusses, this is the only area where I can claim to have personal experience. In June of 1968 I was involved in a student protest in Porto Alegre. My involvement was not as a participant, but as an observer. Going back to my journal, I can not imagine what precipitated the protest. I had known a few of the students involved. We ate at the same boarding house. But I really was not too concerned with their expressed grievances. I can only reconstruct. What it came down to was wanting to hold a rally at the university and then marching into the center of town to present the governor with a protest. For one reason or another their request for a permit to hold the march was turned down. They resolved to hold it anyway, and the government acted to stop them. I realize now that my description may not mesh with the way that either the students or the city government might recollect events, but as best I can determine it really had little more significance than that. What was important for me at the time, and what I think is significant for this paper, was the way that the march was stopped. I first became aware of the government actions while returning to where I lived after lunch one day. While we waited to cross a busy street leading into the city, we saw dozens of trucks and busses from neighboring towns arriving with loads of "Guarda Civil." These civil guards were the standard police that directed traffic, and patrolled the city. At the time I did not understand what legal actions that had brought them together, and was very surprised at how many there were. I rode a bus all the way back to the main depot that evening, and as I got ready to leave the area, I noted that it was cordoned off. Enough police were in the area to prevent anyone starting anything by riding in on buses. The whole area was cordoned by a ring of police. They were standing in line with sufficient strength that their batons touched end to end. They had a tight ring around a four block square area where the governor's office stood. Then they closed off the two main streets that someone might march upon from the university to the main square. Looking back, I am not sure why we went home the way we did, nor am I sure why it was allowed, but I ended up walking back along the two closed off streets rather than trying to get through the police lines and get home the shortest way. At the intersection of Borges and Rua da Pria, there was a strong point, a group of mounted police, and a small armored car. Rather than have a show of force, the choice had been to display only minimal weapons and capabilities around the perimeter. Support capabilities were available in the center where they could move quickly if needed. One of the most interesting things about the police lines was the manner in which they were keeping the students from a direct confrontation. Rather than have the situation that seemed to be normal, where the police were on a line with shouting students directly in front of them, these police had closed off a street. Students could only approach by coming down a cross- street, and they were not being allowed to do so. As the student crowds started to move down one of the side streets, the police would only allow them to come about two thirds of the way down the side street. At that point, the police would leave their position, and rush quickly up the side street, swinging clubs as they went, and force the students back to the end of the block. Then the police would retreat back to the main street that they were holding. For the most part, the students were kept a block away from the police, and were never allowed to get close enough to work up courage, or even push forward into an accidental confrontation. I have taken the time to include all of this information because I feel that it demonstrates a very important point. It was not just the passage of a public law that allowed uniformity of control for police in such a situation, it was planned tactics, and practice. Having seen some riot control tactics and training since that time, I am more impressed now than I was then with the capabilities of the Brazilians. We often have a tendency to assume that government forces in other countries are not particularly well trained, or that they do not produce good planning in the face of violent insurgent attacks. My personal observation is limited to a single example, but it was a convincing one. The problem in Brazil was clearly not a result of poorly trained police, or a lack of preparation. It would be unfair to imply that every action taken by the government matched the excellence of this police action. Many of the actions of the government directly conflicted with the ideas and standards that our own government would be expected to uphold. A most compelling instance is censorship. In marked contrast to the kind of information that was available to the public about Vietnam, one of the deliberate actions of the Brazilian government was to censor the reporting of both insurgent and counterinsurgent activities. As with the other actions taken by government that seem in conflict with our country's principles, I offer no justification or value judgement. The censorship is very interesting because of the two different views I have been given as to why it was done. The government has made no attempt that I could find to justify the censorship, nor may it feel that such justification is necessary. Obviously, a censored press does not spend much time protesting that censorship if it wishes to remain in existence. As a researcher of historical information, I have been frustrated in determining that information about the insurgency that was of most initial interest to me by this censorship. I would like to know the details of the actions that took place in the jungle, and know that the majority of my readers would find that information interesting. My research has shown me that the consequence of the actions in the interior are small, and that the lack of information is not critical to the study of the situation; however, the lack of information has made me think about, and question the worth to the government of not having the information made public. The first answer I received was from LtCol Licinio Dias, who stated that the government kept people from talking about the fighting in an attempt to heal the internal rift that the insurgency caused. The use of this type of diplomatic forgetting fits much better with the nature of the Brazilian people than it does with what one could expect in the United States. Perhaps, it is a better reason for continued censorship than it is for imposing the ban in the first place. Taking that into account, then Capt. Joao Tenorio's reason is perhaps the initial rational. He states that the censorship was done to isolate the action. Without the information flow, there was no way for those involved in the urban movement to provide significant support to the rural fight. The government removes by censorship the propaganda value of the fight. Rather than dying as a symbol of the fight to overthrow the government and establish a socialist state, the people in the jungle just die. It clearly gave the government the advantage of hiding any problems that they were experiencing. In contrast to this situation in Brazil, think of the situation in the United States when the Tet Offensive took place in Vietnam. Many writers feel that the way in which that offensive was reported in the United States was most critical to the war effort. The reporting of the problem was more important than the problem. In the reporting, a military failure was turned into a propaganda success.7 It also seems clear that the inability of the communist forces in Brazil to start any kind of a major coordinated action, in support of the dying insurgents, was partly a result of limited information about the situation. Particularly when their forces had no common leadership and no formal communications capabilities, the communists suffered with the loss of information. When one thinks of the difficulty in providing effective censorship of a large battle in the interior of the country, it must be remembered that this is in Brazil, not in the center of the United States. No phone connections would be available, and few TV news crews would have been on site even if allowed. These actions took place in remote areas where little or no contact would be expected as a part of the normal course of events. While this might seem like a simple thing, it foils one of the main desires of the insurgents. Publicity for the guerrillas is the objective of the first stage. the whole world is watching. Urban Guerrillas can make them watch. Cities are centers of communication. They have radio stations, television studios, newspapers, reporters, and an audience. Who cares about a guerrilla movement in some remote highlands? Who even knows? few pay attention to what the government does about it. But a single guerrilla attack in a major city captures headlines immediately.8 These comments of Brian Jenkins should be compared with those of Donald Hodges, who said, "In functioning as a detonator or catalyst, the foco must frequently act at a distance; failing to organize the masses directly, it must instruct by example and rely heavily on the news media to make its actions known."9 While the press in this country would certainly find it totally unacceptable, censorship certainly solves the problem pointed out by Lt Col Jake Hensman RM of the terrorist getting the best press.10 Even in the cities, censorship prevented the guerrillas from getting their point of view to the people. As cited in chapter 4, there was an explanation about the bombing of the Sears store, but it never really got to the people. Think about the situation in the United States, it would have been a matter of discussion for days, and various people would have been interviewed for their feelings on the validity of the action. In Brazil it just did not get reported. This does lead to a unique type of guerrilla action. Several times during the fighting, small groups take over radio stations to transmit a message that they wish to reach the people. Somehow the thing that would seem more likely in this country is a "secret interview" with one of the guerrillas, with reporters ready to go to jail to protect their sources. Of all of the tactics used in Brazil, the one that is most often condemned by both internal guerrillas and interested external groups is torture. Methods of torture are not the subject of this paper. Anyone wishing to find out what had been done can easily research the situation and get all of the details wanted.12 For purposes of this paper, it is important to note that it worked. While the most crude form of intelligence gathering, it did provide the government with the information needed to strike decisive blows against the guerrillas. As an example consider the situation with Marighella. There is disagreement between the revolutionists and the government as to who really gave the government the information that led to him, but it seems clear that torture was involved in getting the information.13 This is a tactic that the guerrillas can do little about, when the level of conflict is as low as it was in Brazil, there is nothing that the government knows that the guerrillas can find out through torture of officials, and so again there is a situation where the government can apply force at a level the guerrilla finds difficult to match. The efforts of the government to destroy the guerrilla movement (which peaked in 1970) really began to bear fruit when it was able to strike at the "brains" of the terrorist groups. The decline of guerrilla effectiveness began on 4 November 1969 when Marighella, the ALN chief, was killed in a shootout with police in Sao Paulo. Ten months later (October 1970), Marighella's successor, Joaquim Camara Ferreira, died of a "heart attack" after his capture in Sa Paulo.14 If Estep is correct, then the turning point for the government is a direct result of torture. Not all of the actions taken by the government to overcome the guerrillas are things that our government would not be able to do. One of the most impressive areas is in the training of the army for operations in a city. The manual on Urban Operations written in 1969 is as good a manual as I have seen. It contains general principles and specific guidance. It describes urban operations as "a large political operation whose objectives are: 1) population control. 2) Isolation of the population from the guerrillas. 3) Elimination of the irregular forces through offensive action.15 It provides for "centralized command and decentralized execution"16 of an operation, and establishes who will be in control. It also contains specific information about how to divide the city up into sectors, how to establish patrol routes, how to man checkpoints, and special instructions on employment of weapons. It sets the city up into colored zones based on the probability of guerrilla action, and "determines the dosage of the methods" employed.17 There is little information about specific tactics used in the jungle. There is a companion manual on jungle operations that goes with the one on urban actions, but I was not able to obtain a copy. What information I do have has come from LtCol Dias. In particular he described two methods of working in the jungle. The first is a mass force method, and the second is a long term intelligence gathering operation.18 The first tactic has as its basis the necessity for the guerrillas to get food. Moving into an area, the army takes possession of all of the villages. In a densely populated area, this would not be possible, but in the Amazon basin this could easily be done for a huge area by taking only two or three towns. Each village would be occupied by a force larger than the total number of guerrillas suspected in the area. The units provide security for the towns, though the towns were never really a target. More importantly they provide civic action programs to support the people in the villages. Not only do the soldiers gain intelligence, but at some point the guerrillas will find it necessary to attack to get supplies. Having superior numbers, and supporting artillery and air support, the army has little difficulty in overcoming the insurgents. The other type of operation is the long term assignment of a small team to an area to gather intelligence. Often these operations are what we would call undercover operations. Knowing that these are long term assignments, the government has learned to wait until the team has positive information prior to moving troops into the area. The most important one of these was the assignment of two people to find Lamarca. It took three months, but it concluded with a simple ambush and a single shot. Early jungle operations were not as successful as those described above. Operations were often attempted without good intelligence, and resulted in many casualties for the army. Early operations assumed that things would not be very difficult, and turned out to be serious problems. Again, the government was able to raise the level of violence above that available to the insurgents. At the time that the government started "Operation Banderante" in June of 1969, the word went out to the troops to take no prisoners.19 One of the other things that the Brazilians did to support their jungle operations was to move some of the military. Since military service in Brazil is mandatory for all youth, there are ways to excape service, nevertheless, most part all serve. That service is in many cases different than that experienced in the United States. In Brazil, many youth in the larger towns do not leave their home town to perform all of their training. In many ways service resembles an extended reserve drill, or spending two years in a National Guard unit at one time. This means that there are local troops in many areas, but there were no local troops in the jungle areas where the problems were occurring. The establishment of jungle battalions that were assigned on a permanent basis into some of the less populated areas caused the involvement of the troops with the local population to become fixed. Not only were the sources of information available at all times, but insurgent operation could not grow to a significant size before being noticed as had occurred in the past. As Jenkins notes, "Technology has played a very minor role in campaigns against urban guerrillas. It appears even less important than it is in contests with rural insurgents."20 It would seem that this is an area where Brazil is not too different. While there are some things done to get intelligence that are not in keeping with normal democratic ideals, the battle is really won over intelligence. It is easy to say that the government over-reacted, and that its harsh reactions caused some of the problems, but it is also hard to argue with success. NOTES FOR CHAPTER 5 1 Kohl and Litt, p. 141 2 More information on the contents of the various Institutional acts can be found in Bradford's History pp. 508, 514-515, and 519-520. 3 Brian M. Jenkins, Soldiers Versus Gunman, (P-5182) March 1972, p. 5 4 Ibid 5 Brian M. Jenkins, An Urban Strategy for Guerrillas and Governments, (P-4670/1) August 1972, p. 6 6 The use of the police is authorised by the constitution. Specific articles are: Article 8, XVII,v,e, and article 13, section 4. Further information can be found in Concepcao Geral da Seguranca Interna, page 3. 7 Guenter Lewy, America in Vietnam, (New York: Oxford University Press), p. 76 8 Jenkins, Strategy, p. 4 9 Hodges, p. 190 10 This comment was made by Lt. Col. Jake Henseman, the Royal Marine Representative to the Education Center, in a class given at the Command and Staff College on the situation in Northern Ireland on 30 January 1985. 11 Kohl and Litt, p. 66 12 Those desiring a starting point could see Flynn, p. 435 or Kohl and Litt, p. 51. There are also articles in both New Republic (July 25) and Commenwealth (August 2) for 1969. Another point of view is in The Revolution That Never Was where the author, Joseph Page, talks about personal experiences and contacts. 13 Kohl and Litt have references to Marighella's death both from the point of view of the government and from the point of view of the terrorists. For the second view see the questions in the article by Truskier. 14 Estep, p. 52 15 Operacoes Urbanas de Defesa Interna, IP 31-17, Ministerio do Execito, 1969, pp. 1-2 16 Ibid, p. 4 17 Ibid, p. 3 18 From a conversation with Lt. Col. Dias on 1 February 1985 at Quantico. 19 From a conversation with Capt. Tenorio, at the Inter- American Defense Board on 2 November 1984. 20 Jenkins, Soldiers, p. 5 CHAPTER SIX Could It Happen Again? This chapter will consider the situation currently existing in Brazil and will weigh the forces that might act to precipitate a new insurrection. Obviously, another insurrection could happen at any time. The real question is can an insurrection start and will it have sufficient backing to cause the government of Brazil of collapse, or radically change? The order of this analysis will be the same as that used to look at the earlier problems. This chapter will cover the party situation, the external support for an insurgency, the social and economic conditions, the current Catholic Church position, and the political situation as it currently exists. The final point to be covered will be the military situation. The question of success would seem to ultimately rest on the ability to overcome the military forces. The current situation of the communist party is one of fewer splinter groups, and a more common focus. There are really only four groups left, the PCB, the PCdoB, MR-8, and the Organization of Trotskites. However, the only group with the requisite numbers to have any effect is the PCB. MR-8 and the PCdoB continue to be the revolutionary party groups, but there is no real agreement between them and the PCB. It must be noted that "the final objective of the Brazilian Communist Movement continues to be taking power and overthrowing the current government with the intent of first implementing a "popular dictatorship,' and then achieving communism."1 The current actions of the communist movement are mostly at the infiltration level. The union movement in Brazil has always had a strong communist element, and attempts are being made to increase their influence. Actions within the church and within student groups continue to involve communist infiltration. At present, there seems to be a primary push towards mass support actions, along with psychological operations. But it must also be remembered that they "would return to armed conflict, if the conditions for it turned favorable."2 There is little change in the revolutionary support that Brazil received from outside. As noted previously, there is little evidence of anything other than training. Certainly Cuba and Nicaragua would recognize an insurrection and provide ideological and perhaps even political support, but it seems unlikely at this point in time that either country would be able to provide active support. The revolution has failed in all of the countries that border on Brazil, so at least for the present there is no significant danger of some group attacking over a border. At present, the rhetoric is even quiet. Castro is now quoted as saying: It is impossible to export a revolution because revolutions are the results of a set of economic, social, historic, cultural factors that no one can export. Nor can they be avoided. We can't export revolutions in Latin America nor can the United States prevent social changes if the problems continue to pile up in Latin America.3 Political interviews given to foreign newspapers are always suspect, but this would not seem to be the strongly bombastic revolutionary doctrine that Castro has been famous for in the past. Admitting the United States ability to invade Grenada, he specifically mentions Brazil as a country that the United States could not really consider invading.4 It is possible to infer from this that there would be no way that Cuba could invade Brazil either. However, it does seem clear that Castro has not given up hope of there being a revolt in Brazil. One of the purposes of the Papal visit to Latin America in January and February of 1985 was to strongly teach against the doctrine of Liberation Theology. It is unclear at this time how much control the Pope continues to have over the views of the church in Latin America, but the strong position that he has taken on the matter will surely reduce the number of priests that openly teach the doctrine. Perhaps even more importantly for a country like Brazil, those that do continue to teach these doctrines will be classed as radicals. This will insure that the teaching of the liberation ideas will at least be offset by other church authorities speaking out against the ideas. Speaking in Ayacucho Peru on 3 February 1985, Pope John Paul II stated that "violence is not a means of construction" and declared that "Christianity recognizes the nobel and just fight for justice at all levels but invites its promotion through comprehension, dialogue, [and] generous and effective work. . . [while] excluding solutions by roads of hatred and death." He also continued his attacks on pro-Marxist portions of Liberation Theology saying, "A commitment to liberation that is not inspired in the aim of truth, justice and love without exclusions, that is not accompanied by action in favor of reconciliation and peace, is not Christian."5 The political change in Brazil is much like the change in the teaching of the Catholic Church. The difference will not matter to the hard-core communist, but the change in position will certainly make it more difficult to persuade people on the fringes to join the active revolt. On 16 January 1985, Tancredo de Alimeda Neves was elected as Brazil's first civilian president in 21 years. While the election was not a direct election by the people of the country, it had huge significance for democratic action in Brazil. Neves was not the candidate chosen by the outgoing military rulers. Clearly he was acceptable to them, or they would not have stepped aside, but he was not their speific choice. He quickly set a theme for his presidency, by stating, "I come in the name of conciliation. I came to promote change -- political change, economic change, social change . . . real, effective, courageous, irreversible change."6 He has also pledged that this will be the last indirect election in Brazil.7 The mood of the people is perhaps best expressed by a huge green and gold banner stretched outside Brasilia's Congress building that said: Bon Dia Deiocracia -- Good Morning Democracy.8 Many recognize that Neves will have a very hard time fulfilling all expectations, but there is an aroused hope for the first time in years. A political moderate, Neves served as prime minister under President Joao Goulart, but was not removed from politics during the military years, and served as governor of Minas Gerais. As an indication of his desire to continue a good relationship with the military, he has indicated he will not investigate corruption and human rights complaints about the military rulers.9 While the economic and social problems have not been solved in the last ten years, there have been major gains. For an example of the changing economic conditions, consider the total exports for the last few years: Click here to view image Not only has there been steady growth for the last three years, the comparison with 1972 shows almost four hundred percent growth over the seven years.10 Inflation continues to be a serious problem for Brazil. Though the period from 1968 to 1974 has often been referred to as Brazil's economic miracle, the sudden increases in oil prices caused its end. Inflation for 1981 was down fifteen percent over the year before to only ninety five percent. Discounting inflation on the dollar over the same period, Brazil has had a change in exchange rate from 1967 at $Cr2.27 to the dollar to the present rate of $Cr3,800.00 to the dollar. This works out to be a 167,400 percent change in 18 years. Twice in this century Brazil has needed to delete the trailing three zeroes from their currency to keep bookkeeping reasonable. They may well be close to doing it again, less than 20 years from the last time it was done. Education has undergone a major reform and restructuring. The results are not yet anywhere close to those desired, but the percentage of youth attending secondary schools has increased to twenty percent of the population. The literacy levels have also climbed to over seventy five percent, partly as a result of the efforts to keep children in school longer, and partly due to adult education efforts.11 Brazil's foreign debt, much as a result of the increased energy costs of the last few years, has the potential of stopping all of the economic progress. Whether it does is more dependent on the condition of the rest of the world financial state than it is on Brazil. The twelve billion owed in interest each year is almost more than the country can handle, let alone pay any on the one hundred billion owed.12 Current new articles on the international banking situation seem to agree, however, that there is no way that the international community could hold things together if Brazil, or any other major debtor, were forced into default. Brazil will continue to have economic problems. Half of the population that lives in poverty will continue to suffer as the inflation rate of two hundred and twenty percent continues to climb.13 The situation in the Northeast is so bad that Neves has stated that "the first, the most important and the most absolute of all the priorities" of his government would be to try to solve that region's problems.14 If these economic problems were to lead to another insurrection, what about the forces that would be available to stop it? The military forces of Brazil are not going to be easy to overcome. In 1982, the armed forces totaled about 273,000 -- army, 183,000; navy, 47,000; and air force, 43,000. In addition, there are about 185,000 federal police. These forces are undergoing modernization, and the local weapons industry is producing fine weapons and other equipment. Obviously, the capability to overcome anything other than a major revolt continues to exist.15 In early 1959, General Golbery do Couto e Silva, the "father" of the Escola Superior de Guerra (ESG), the highest military school in Brazil, stated: What is certain is that the greater probability today is limited warfare, localized conflict, and above all indirect Communist aggression, which capitalizes on local discontents, the frustrations of misery and hunger, and just nationalist anxieties. . . Latin America now faces threats more real than at any other time, threats which could result in insurrection, outbursts attempting (though not openly) to implant . . . a government favorable to the Communist ideology, and constituting a grave a urgent danger to unity and security of the Americas and the Western world. At this school, high-level civilians and military leaders studied such things as inflation, agrarian reform, banking reform, and education as well as traditional subjects such as conventional and guerrilla warfare. The impact of this on the next lower level of schooling was most impressive. The need to have a strategy to combat internal problems led to the addition of 222 hours on internal security, 129 hours on irregular warfare, and a reduction of the topic of territorial defense to 21 hours.17 These figures are for the 1968 curriculum at the Escola do Coiando e Estado Naio do Exercito, the Army Command and General Staff School. While I do not have exact figures for the current amount of time spent on these studies, the amount of time is relatively close. Current studies include work on urban and jungle operations and a careful study of the motivation and methods of the communist party. These are not just lectures, but include practical exercises in laying out an urban operation in a major Brazilian city, and the writing of operation plans for both urban and jungle operations. Included with the practical exercises are extensive study of the operations and battles that both succeeded and failed in combating previous insurrections. Forces have also been moved to insure that the entire country is well covered. There are currently three jungle battalions assigned to the interior on a permanent basis with the single primary mission of counterguerrilla operations. In keeping with previous practice, there are large military units in close proximity to the major cities. In some cases, there have been major roads built to allow easy access to the cities from military bases. The country has trained and deployed its forces to insure that it is ready to fight the next insurgency. It is my opinion that the Brazilian government is in position to resist any communist insurrection in the near future. Obviously there are problems that may cause serious unrest in their country, but the ability of the communist party to cause a strong enough revolt to overcome the military strength of the country seems slim. The movement of the government away from its current democratic position toward a strong leftist government would only cause the military to take over the government again. As long as the military stays strongly anti-communist, the future success of an insurgency seems very doubtful. NOTES FOR CHAPTER 6 1 Atualizacao do MCB, (Rio:ECEME),p. 31 [Translation by author] 2 Ibid 3 Leonard Downie Jr. and Karen DeYoung, "Castro After Hours (And Hours): Exhaustion and Economics," Washington Post, 3 February 1985, Sec. A, p.1 4 Ibid, Sec. A, pp. 1 & 24 5 Jackson Diehl, "Pope Exhorts Both Sides in Peru -- Injustices Invite Revolution, He Warns in Visit to Rebel Area," Washington Post, 4 February 1985, Sec. A, pp. 1 & 15 6 Jackson Diehl, "Civilian Is Elected in Brazil," Washington Post, 16 January 1985, Sec. A, p. 1 7 Anastasia Toufexis, "Victory for the 'Great Conciliator," Time, 28 January 1985, p. 52 8 Angus Deming et al., "The Generals Step Aside," Newsweek, 28 January 1985, p. 36 9 Toufexis, p. 52 10 Richard F. Nyrop, Brazil a country study, (Washington, D. C.: U. S. Government Printing Office), p. 354 11 Ibid, pp. 149-151 12 Deming et al., p. 36 13 Ibid 14 Toufexis, p. 52 15 Nyrop, p. xvii 16 Einaudi and Stepan, p. 83 17 Ibid, p. 84 CHAPTER SEEEN Were the Brazilian Students Right? This topic was added to the list of possible subjects for the "War Since 1945" Seminar because of a question raised by Brazilian students; "Why not include Brazil in your study of insurgencies?" This final chapter will try to address the question of whether there is value for others in studying this particular insurgency, and make some comparisons with other more commonly studied actions. Obviously, this area is mostly opinion, and in this case, mostly the opinion of the author. The question of value, however, cannot be left unanswered if this paper is to serve as anything more than a summary of historical events. First, it would seem that the question of the importance of the insurgency itself needs to be raised. Is this an important insurgency? The answer seems clearly no. Any insurgency is important for the insurgents, and there is no question that this was the attempted start of an important insurgency, but from all the information that is available there seems to be nothing that would indicate that there was any chance of long term success by the insurgents. If one looks at the planned pattern for the insurgency, they quickly realize that the hoped for support of the masses did not exist. In the same way that Prestes' Column never was able to get the people to rally to their cause, this insurgency never enjoyed any widespread support. Raymond Estep takes a very strong position on the impact of the insurgency: Regardless of the measurement one uses to estimate their significance (whether it is numbers involved, scope of operations, or threat to the established government), Brazilian guerrilla groups have exercised a minimal influence on national politics and have not been in the same league with their counterparts in Guatemala, Uruguay, Argentina, Colombia, or Venezuela. Although various guerrilla bands from time to time have captured international headlines with bank robberies and kidnappings of diplomats, they have never won the support of significant numbers of followers and have never constituted more than minor irritations to tee military governments that have ruled Brazil since 1964.1 Though this position may be too strong, it does point out the relative lack of effectiveness of the insurgency in Brazil. A good case can be made that the government reactions to the insurgent movement had national influence, but it is difficult to determine if the insurgents or those in power should get credit for the extremely harsh measures employed by the government. If the insurgency is not important as an insurgency, are there counterinsurgency answers that make this study valuable, or is the value an internal one, and should the study be left to the Brazilian officers, rather than this school? If there are no answers, are there perhaps questions? Questions may be as important as answers to students. Or is this insurgency unique in some way that prevents us from seeing something of universal value from it? Perhaps a place to start is with what the Brazilians I have talked to feel that their armed forces learned about insurgency from this set of actions. The sample is small, and so there may be major disagreement with these points by others. There would seem to be one major idea: intelligence is of utmost importance; and a corollary: to gain intelligence, the forces need to be part of the community. There is a great deal of stress in the Brazilian manuals on the need for intelligence.2 It is also clear from the historical record that many of the major successes of the counterinsurgency were driven by intelligence. The methods used to gather that information were not always those that our forces might use, but one can clearly see the value of the information. Koll and Litt discuss the importance of the information gained by the government in pointing out that all of the most spectacular kidnappings were really failures.3 The loss of the prisoners who were set free was in no way equivalent to the information that was gained from the capture of some of the people involved in the kidnappings. While there is no question of the value of infiltration of the organization in defeating the urban guerrilla, the corollary mentioned above becomes most important when the action moves from the city to the country. In a rural environment, the guerrilla maintains control through a combination of presence, fear of repressive action, and mistrust of the central government forces. The Brazilians learned that in order to overcome the insurgents they needed to be a part of the local structure. This led to a situation that is very familiar to those who have studied actions in Vietnam. Brazilian forces were broken down into small units and sent into the communities to live as a part of the villages. They provided protection against attack, and also performed community action services. Only after sufficient integration with the local populace had been accomplished did they gain the information necessary to defeat the insurgents. While there were large forces involved in some of the operations, they were only employed successfully after intelligence gathering operations by small units. This easily seen similarity with the actions in Vietnam gives one reason for the study of the urban insurgency and raises an interesting question for United States forces. There are still many questions as to how the United States should have acted in Vietnam. The Brazilian lesson seems to indicate that the proper course was the small unit course. The protection of individual villages, and the integration of the troops into the local structure would seem to be supported by the Brazilian success. However, there is a very important and unanswerable question that arises from this study. Can a force from another nation, hindered by language barrier, philosophical differences, and differing racial appearance, ever integrate itself sufficiently at the small community level to accomplish its desires? One of the most difficult questions for the United States is the question of what actions can be justified to obtain information. The Brazilian experience with torture points out the difficulty of keeping extreme measures for extreme situations, but also points out the effectiveness of the process for the gathering of information. Perhaps the important thing to learn from this is: under pressure to do a job they feel is important, people are willing to relax standards that they would normally uphold, and once a country makes the relaxing of standards an official policy, it will have difficulty controlling how far some people slip. The clear difficulty in fighting a group that does not choose to abide by the norms of the community, and the extreme pressure of fighting an internal enemy are clearly pointed out by this insurgency. The Brazilian reaction to the problem, both legally, and militarily, is not necessarily the reaction that the United States would hope to have in a similar situation; however, it is of value to study the pressures involved and plan how to insure different reactions. Brazil is different. That is critical to the study of this insurgency. The reasons for the insurgency, the way the insurgency developed, the tactics chosen by the insurgents, and the methods used to stop it are all different. That is the most important lesson of this study. There will never be another Viet Nam for the United States because those conditions will never exist again. The next time will be different. Some basic principles will be the same. Each student must learn to see through the differences to learn basic concepts, and to look at different ways that these concepts can be applied. If it teaches nothing else, the Brazilian experience should teach the importance of training. Having figured out a way to defeat the uprising was not sufficient for the Brazilian forces. They continue to train officers on the control and conduct of urban operations in the non-conventional mode. Is the Marine Corps ready to fight in New York, or San Francisco? Perhaps here is the lesson we should learn? There is no single reason, nor even a set of military reasons that tell why Brazil defeated the insurgent movement. Factors not only inside Brazil, but in the world economy, effected the progress of the insurgency and led to its defeat. But it was defeated, indicating that there is hope for all of those other countries that are, or will be, the subject of an insurgent movement. For those who would look, there are also guides to the military steps that need to be part of the total plan to defeat an insurgency. Even in Brazil there will never be another one quite like this one, but there will clearly be others. As an example of the complex nature of insurgency, and of the convoluted actions needed for solving one, this study has its place along with the study of many similar problems. Perhaps, if we pay attention, it may make the next one easier to solve. NOTES FOR CHAPTER 7 1 Estep, p. 50 2 The following are given as examples of the concern for gathering intelligence: (all are from "Urban Operations of Internal Defense") a. A section on the use of movie and still cameras. p. 22 b. "The search for informers" given as one of the four principal reasons for "Political Operations." p. 24 c. "Equally meticulous must be the information about agents, supporters, and propagators of revolutionary movements." p.30 3 Kohl and Litt, p. 50 BIBLIOGRAPHY Atualizacao do MCB. Rio: ECEME, 1983 This document is a part of the internal enemy subcourse at the Brazilian Army Command and Staff College. It discusses the history and current status of the communist movement in Brazil. Burns, E. Bradford, A History of Brazil. Second Edition, New York: Columbia University Press, 1980 A general history of Brazil. It covers well the political situation during the time covered in this paper. Recommended for general information on Brazilian History. 579 pages with suggestions for additional reading and an index. Campos, Antonio Perdo de Souza, Atlas Historico e Geografico Brasileiro. Rio: Campanha Nacional de Material de Ensino, 1966 A school text book on geography and history published through the Ministerio da Educacao e Cultura (Ministry of Education and Culture) for secondary school use. 63 pages. Chaliand, Gerard ed. Guerrilla Strategies: An Historical Anthology from the Long March to Afghanistan. Berkeley: University of California Press, 1982 Contains Abraham Guillen's article on "Urban Guerrilla Strategy. Concepcao Geral da Seguranca Interna. Rio: ECEME, 1983 This is a lesson plan outline and text for the "General Concept of Internal Security" as taught at ECEME. Costa, Jose Luiz Savio, Movimentos Revolucionarios. Rio: ECEME, 1983 This book on revolutionary movements is used in the internal security subcourse at ECEME. da Cunha, Euclides, Rebellion in the Backlands. trans, Samuel Putman, Chicago: The
