The MPS Reception--An Analysis CSC 1985 SUBJECT AREA Logistics The MPS Reception--An Analysis by Major James N. Strock U.S. Marine Corps Marine Corps Command and Staff College Quantico, Virginia 22134 1 April, 1985 THE MPS RECEPTION--AN ANALYSIS ABSTRACT The purpose of this study is to conduct a time and space analysis of the MPS arrival and assembly process as it rel- lates to container throughput, general space requirements, and host nation support considerations. Basic assumptions are developed in order to create a MPS offload scenario. These assumptions include the employ- ment of MPS-1, the use of a benign port/airfield complex secured by host nation or combat force action, little or no host nation support available during the equipment offload, simultaneous port and beach offload operations, and a 50 mile maximum distance between the port/beach area and the arrival air field. Detailed analyses are provided for port operations, beach operations, and combat service support area operations. Port operations focus on the pierside discharge of contain- erized cargo and linehaul transportation capacities. Beach operations center on in-stream container discharge, ship-to- shore lighterage capacities, and beach offload capabilities. Combat service support area operations discuss time and space requirements relative to warehousing, ammunition storage, bulk fuel and water facilities, health services operations, and maintenance/administration/C3 operations. This study does not address arrival airfield operations. Additional research into aircraft arrival rates, offload rates, ramp space requirements, and associated support activities is recommended. Two critical paths emerge during the analysis. The first is linehaul transportation capacities relative to various distances between the port/beach complex and the CSSA. The second relates to over-the-beach throughput rates for container offload operations. The potential impact of these paths is compared with the current MPS arrival and assembly timeline. Based on the study's findings, recommendations are made regarding modifications to organic MPS material handling equipment and linehaul transportation assets in an effort to minimize potential offload chokepoints. THE MPS RECEPTION--AN ANALYSIS TABLE OF CONTENTS Page Introduction 1 Chapter 1, MPS Arrival and Assembly Concept of Operations 5 Chapter 2, Port Operations 9 Chapter 3, Beach Operations 23 Chapter 4, Combat Service Support Area Operations 39 Chapter 5, Conclusions 48 Notes 54 Bibliography 57 Distribution 59 LIST OF TABLES Table Page 2-1 Equipment Availability (MPS-1) 18 2-2 MPS-1 Container Distribution 19 2-3 Container Hauler Transit Time 20 2-4 Trips Per Day Per Carrier 20 2-5 Containers Moved Per 20 Hour Day 21 2-6 Days Required to Move Containers From Pier to CSSA 22 3-1 MPS-1 Lighterage 37 3-2 Lighterage Loading Times 37 3-3 Lighterage Mix 37 3-4 RTCH Offload Times 37 3-5 Lighterage Cycle Times 38 4-1 CSSA Space Requirements 47 LIST OF FIGURES Figure Page 1-1 Sample Security Area 8 2-1 Sample Port Area 17 3-1 Sample Beach Area 36 4-1 Sample Combat Service Support Area 46 5-1 MPS Timeline 53 INTRODUCTION The ships, supplies, and equipment comprising the Maritime Prepositioning Ships (MPS) program are approaching reality. Designated Marine Amphibious Brigades will soon possess the operational capability to link up with prepositioned supplies and equipment at predetermined arrival and assembly areas. Operational Handbook (OH) 4-11 (Maritime Prepositioned Deployment) provides a detailed outline of the various arrival and assembly requirements, to include port operations, beach operations, arrival airfield operations, throughput control, and preparation for deployment. More recent publications by Fleet Marine Force, Atlantic, units address the detailed planning requirements relative to the arrival and assembly of the Maritime Prepositioning Ships Task Force (MPSTF) with prepositioned supplies and equip- ment.1 While the detailed policies and procedures for the employment of MPS equipment are under development, a requirement exists to examine certain aspects of the arrival and assembly process. Accordingly, this study examines the arrival and assembly process and conducts time and space analyses relative to port operations, beach operations, and combat service support area operations. Port operation requirements center on total equipment square and cubic feet dimensions, material handling equipment (MHE), personnel support requirements, and throughput timeframes. Beach operations address the same areas as port operations plus the capabilities, equipment, and throughput timeframes of the Naval Support Element (NSE) relative to in-stream offloads. The throughput of containerized supplies and equipment is the primary focus of this study's analysis of port and beach operations. Combat Service Support Area (CSSA) operations deal with the establishment of a CSSA to support the arrival and assembly process as well as initial MPSTF combat operations. Specific CSS functions include water, POL, and ammunition storage/issue as well as container marshalling and health service operations. This study does not address arrival airfield operations. Additional research is recommended in the areas of aircraft arrival rates, offload rates, ramp space requirements for aircraft and associated support activities, and personnel support requirements. Such research should focus on throughput capacities of both personnel and materiel. The arrival airfield is addressed in those instances where it is necessary to establish relationships between the arrival airfield and port/beach/CSSA operations. Once appropriate analyses and conclusions are conducted and drawn, the total port, beach, and CSSA arrival and assembly time and space requirements are compared with current Marine Corps projected offload timeframes to support the employment of the MPS MAB. The results of this comparison can be used by MPS planners to anticipate suitable locations that will realistically support the MPS MAB concept, to determine the level of Host Nation Support (HNS) required, and to validate current planning timeframes associated with the arrival and assembly process. ASSUMPTIONS While the general scope of MPS operations is well known in Marine Corps circles ("benign" port and suitable port/beach/airfield arrangements), certain specific assumptions must be made so that the methodology and results of this study are in proper perspective. The underlying premise in this study is that the MPSTF will conduct the arrival and assembly process with little or no outside assistance in the form of host nation support. Although it is recognized that some degree of HNS will be available in almost any scenario, this study will address organic CSS assets available to accomplish the arrival and assembly in a self-contained environment. In so doing, the study results may be of value in determining HNS requirements above and beyond organic MPSTF CSS capabilities, or determine HNS needed if and when only partial organic combat service support assets are available. The first assumption is that the ship and equipment mix scheduled for MPS-1 is used in the conduct of this study. The MPS-1 ship mix consists of four ships carrying approximately 2170 containers.2 The second assumption is that the arrival and assembly area, to include the port(s), beach(es), and arrival airfield(s), is already secured either by host nation action or by the prior insertion of combat forces, e.g., a MAU or MAB.3 The third assumption is that a full MPS equipment offload will be conducted to support a given scenario. It is understood that partial offloads may be conducted to support the accomplishment of limited objectives; however, for the purposes of this study, a complete offload is assumed in order to examine the full scope of the arrival and assembly process. The fourth assumption is that simultaneous port and beach operations will be conducted. This assumption requires the NSE to concurrently conduct port and beach off- loads.4 The fifth assumption is that the distance between the port/beach area and the arrival airfield is no greater than 50 miles. The establishment of a maximum distance between these areas will assist the MPS planner in identifying suitable port/airfield combinations and in computing transit times for equipment transported from the offload areas to assembly areas and CSSA's. Additional assumptions designed to establish a scenario for offload and CSS operations are addressed in subsequent chapters. CHAPTER 1 MPS ARRIVAL AND ASSEMBLY CONCEPT OF OPERATIONS The special measures necessary to coordinate the flow of airlifted personnel and equipment with prepositioned equipment provide the foundation for organizational and technical differences between CSS designed for maritime propositioning operations and traditional amphibious operations.5 Maritime prepositioning operations call for five principal phases: planning, marshalling, movement, reception, and employment.6 This study focuses on the reception phase which includes the arrival and assembly process. This phase involves the initial preparation of the marriage site and the coordinated arrival and offload of equipment and supplies from the MPS and the fly-in echelon. The final element of the reception phase involves the integration of personnel, equipment, and supplies into employable Marine Air Ground Task Force elements. Combat service support for the arrival and assembly process is provided by a Landing Force Support Party (LFSP) drawn from the MPS MAB's Brigade Service Support Group (BSSG).7 The LFSP is task organized to support reception and to provide initial CSS to the MPSTF until the ship offload and equipment issue phases are complete. The LFSP is organized into specific functional areas and organizations: Logistics Operations Center (LOC), Offload Preparation Party (OPP), Port/Beach Operations Groups (POG/BOG), Arrival Airfield Control Group (AACG), Marriage Traffic Control Group (MTCG), and the Combat Service Support Area.8 The area required for equipment arrival, offload, issue, and preparation for employment is called the security area and is comprised of the port/beach, arrival airfield, CSSA, and unit assembly areas. The security area may be located in a geographical setting ranging from a heavily populated urban environment with well developed commercial port/airfield facilities to an austere remote facility in the third world. A sample security area is shown in Figure 1-1.9 During the reception phase, the MPSTF's activities are divided into the initial preparation, advance party arrival, and offload/marriage. Initial preparation consists of the introduction of the Reconnaissance and Liaison Party (RLP) into the security area to survey the port/beach/arrival airfield capabilities and limitations, identify critical CSS/facility-related shortfalls, and to negotiate appropriate host nation support (HNS) agreements, when available. Concurrently, the OPP moves to the ships and initiates equipment preparation for offload. Such preparation includes depreservation, battery installation, fueling, and other checks and services designed to ensure that debarked equipment is combat ready. Shortly after the RLP and OPP commence assigned tasks, the advance party arrives in the security area. The advance party's mission is to establish the CSS functional areas discussed above and to prepare for the arrival of the MPSTF main body at the port, beach, and arrival airfield. Once the advance party is in place and LFSP agencies are established and functional, the offload and marriage phase begins. The successful completion of the offload and marriage phase is the "bottom lined of the MPS concept. A task force of 16,500 men and equipment embarked in a 250 sortie fly-in- echelon is linked up with prepositioned equipment and supplies to provide a fully combat capable Marine Amphibious Brigade. Click here to view image CHAPTER 2 PORT OPERATIONS Port operations center on the pierside offload of the MPS equipment and supplies. In this study, the assumed port consists of two pierside berths capable of the simultaneous offload of two ships with adequate staging areas ashore. A sample port area diagram is shown in figure 2-1.10 Ships service cranes and MPSTF organic MHE and transportation equipment are required to conduct the offload. The pierside offload begins with critical, high priority cargo necessary to permit the POG to establish itself ashore and begin to move discharged cargo away from the pier area to the nearby surge area, unit assembly areas, or to the CSSA. Material handling and transportation equipment includes the rough terrain container handler (RTCH), the 30 ton rough terrain crane, the M-127 semi-trailer with prime mover, the MK-14 logistics vehicle system container hauler, and the towable container chassis. Various quantities of each of the above MHE/trans- portation equipment items are scheduled for embarkation on MPS. Since this study's MPS offload consists of simultaneous port and beach operations, only a portion of the net available MHE/transportation equipment is available to support port operations. The equipment discussed above can not be one hundred percent dedicated to supporting ships' offloads since a portion of the equipment is required to support combat service support operations at the arrival airfield, the CSSA, and unit assembly areas. Moreover, normal equipment maintenance downtime further reduces MHE/transportation equipment availability during offload operations. The priority of equipment prepared by the OPP is ships cargo handling systems, lighterage (boats, landing craft, causeways, etc.), and MHE.11 Also, motor transport, engineer, and tracked vehicle assets must be prepared in order to ensure timely and orderly equipment offload in the port area. The MPS equipment/supplies offload is divided into the initial and general periods. The initial offload period includes equipment and unit sets that are critical to the LFSP as well as Class I, III, and V supplies to support local security and initial combat operations. The general offload period covers the offload of non-critical cargo and bulk supplies.12 Using ships service cranes, it is estimated that each ship will require 54 working hours to discharge all of its cargo (approximately 540 containers). This estimate is based on a sustained container discharge rate of 10 per hour for 20 hours per day.13 Since it is assumed that a simultaneous offload is conducted (both pierside and in the stream), this study further assumes that one half of the MPS containers are offloaded at each location. Prior to any equipment offload, the ships and Naval Support Element will require approximately 12 hours to prepare for pierside operations and 24 hours for in-stream operations.14 With two pierside berths to conduct the offload, one half of the containers on MPS-1 (1085) can be discharged from the ships in 2.7 days. The 1085 figure is based on the assumption that the other half of the containers are offloaded in the stream. Provided that LFSP equipment is readily available at the beginning of the offload, subsequent offload operations should not be interrupted due to the lack of LFSP assets. As noted in Figure 2-1, the port area includes a con- tainer surge area. This area is designed to absorb the over- flow of supplies and equipment that are offloaded but not transported out of the port area due to the lack of suitable transportation. This transportation deficiency can be caused by either a paucity of MHE and transportation assets due to overcommitment or equipment deadlines, or it can be caused by extended distances or reduced container transportation speeds between the port, unit assembly areas, and the CSSA. Prior to conducting any analyses of container trans- portation capabilities, the types and quantities of container handling and transportation equipment must be reviewed. The current mix of container handling and transportation equip- ment for MPS-1 is shown in Table 2-1.15 As noted earlier, not all of the listed assets will be available to support pierside operations. Certain equipment limitations must be taken into account. The first limitation is equipment non-availability due to maintenance deadlines. Although the MK-14 container hauler and M-127 semitrailer have virtually 100 percent availability, their prime movers do not. Accepting a 90 percent availability of prime movers, 54 of 60 MK-14's and 34 of 38 M-127's are available at any one time. This limitation also extends to the towed container chassis. The other equipment limitation is non-pierside commitments. Container transportation assets are also required at the beach as well as the combat service support area. Accordingly, the net availability of pierside container transportation assets is also shown in Table 2-1. After equipment availability has been determined, the next area that must be explored is the final destinations of all of the containers. There are four primary container destinations from either the port or the beach: the CSSA, the arrival airfield, unit assembly areas, and the port/beach area itself. Table 2-2 provides an overview of MPS-1 con- tainer distribution.16 Since over 90 percent of all MPS-1 containers are slated for delivery to the CSSA, the port/beach-CSSA line of communication appears to be a critical path for container throughput. Out of the 1085 containers unloaded pierside, approximately 980 containers are scheduled for delivery to the CSSA. A transportation analysis of container movement from the port to the CSSA requires the computation of several factors: round trip transit time between the port and the CSSA, the number of trips per day per container hauler, the number of containers moved per day at a given average hauler speed, and the number of days required to offload a given number of containers. All of these factors are affected by the number of container haulers available, the average speeds of the container haulers under various conditions, and round trip distances between the port and the CSSA. The estimated round trip transit time of a container hauler is computed by adding a 20 minute load/offload time to the time required to transit a given round trip distance at a given speed. Table 2-3 shows estimated transit times for a container hauler traveling between 20 and 50 kilometers per hour (kmh) over round trip distances between 10 and 80 kilometers (km). The 80 kilometer maximum distance is used because it represents a 40 km (25 mile) one-way distance between the port and the CSSA. This maximum distance is used based on the likelihood that the CSSA will be centrally located between the port and the arrival airfield. Since one of the basic assumptions in this study is that the port and airfield will be no more that 50 miles apart, the 25 mile port-CSSA distance is considered a realistic maximum planning distance. The number of trips per day per carrier is computed by dividing the particular round trip time into a 20 hour operating day. The 20 hour day is used since approximately four hours per day are required for carrier maintenance, crew rest, etc.. Table 2-4 contains the estimated number of round trips per day per carrier between the port and the CSSA. These estimates are also based on average speeds between 20 and 50 kmh over round trip distances ranging from 10 to 80 km. Additionally, these estimates are the same for all types of carriers since the primary limiting factor of a carrier's speed is related to terrain, trafficability, and/or traffic congestion. Accordingly, all types of carriers are rated the same in this study. Table 2-5 shows the total number of containers that can be moved per day based on 20 kmh and 40 kmh average speeds, various distances, and different mixes of available container haulers. The various mixes of container haulers are taken into account to show the linehaul capacities of the MHE items currently programed for MPS-1. The MK-14 LVS will not be immediately available for MPS-1; however, the MK-14 is taken into full consideration during this study so that its impact on linehaul capacities can be determined. Once the total number of containers moved per day is computed for various speeds and distances, then the number of days required to offload all of the CSSA-bound containers can be determined. Table 2-7 shows the number of days required to move containers at 20 kmh and 40 kmh average speeds. These calculations do not include the 12 hour preparation time required prior to the beginning of offload operations. The numbers of containers moved per day at the various speeds and distances are divided into the 980 containers that are offloaded pierside and moved to the CSSA. At the sustained container discharge rate of 2000 containers per ship per day, the pierside offloaded ships can discharge their CSSA-bound containers in 2.45 days plus the 12 hour ship preparation time. Using the calculations shown in Tables 2-5 and 2-6, the planner can estimate offload throughput rates and determine at what point the MPS organic MHE and linehaul transportation capabilities will fall behind the ships' sustained discharge rates. Also, the planner can make estimates relative to external support required to maintain container throughput comparable to the sustained discharge rates. In other words, if the CSSA is a sizeable distance from the port or if the average container hauler speed is low due to marginal trafficability and/or traffic congestion, then additional MHE and/or container hauler support may be required. An additional issue that can be addressed using the calculations in Table 2-6 is the LFSP's organic ability to meet the ship offload criteria of three days pierside once the ships are alongside and have completed preparations for offload. These criteria were based on the sustained container discharge rate discussed earlier. Reviewing the calculations shown in Table 2-6, it appears that all of the LVS's, trailers, and container chassis are required to complete the CSSA-bound container movement if the average hauler speed is 20 kmh. Such an average speed is not an unreasonable assumption for equipment operating over unimproved roads in a remote area. Conversely, if the average speed is 40 kmh, the three day offload requirement can be met with relative ease using fewer MHE assets. The final item that can be considered is whether or not a container surge area is required. As shown in Figure 2-1, the surge area is designed to absorb the overflow of containers and rolling stock that cannot be moved away from the pier area due to the lack of linehaul assets. Table 2-5 provides an indication as to whether or not a surge area will have to be established for containers and how many containers will have to be stored there at any one time. Judging from the figures shown, it appears that if the average speed is 20 kmh, all af the available LVS's, trailers, and container chassis will be hard pressed to keep up with the sustained discharge of 400 containers per day unless the CSSA is less that a 40 km round trip from the pier area. In this case, if the CSSA is greater than 40 km from the pier, MPSTF planners may have to coordinate host nation support to compensate for the shortfall in linehaul capacity and/or establish a container purge area. Click here to view image CHAPTER 3 BEACH OPERATIONS Beach operations center on the in-stream offload of the Maritime Prepositioning Ships. The advantages that beach operations afford over port operations are derived primarily from the ability to disperse offload activities into small working areas, thus reducing the overall vulnerability of logistical support operations at the shoreline. Conversely, however, beach operations pose significant disadvantages as well. Such operations are hazardous when any of a number of weather and/or terrain conditions become unfavorable. Severe weather and heavy seas may force the complete suspension of operations. Even under ideal climatic conditions, a beach operation cannot attain the efficiency level of fixed port operations due to additional materiel handling requirements associated with across-the-beach operations. In this study, the notional beach consists of two ship anchorages with adequate separation to permit the simul- taneous offload of both ships, and three beach landing points--two designed for causeway unloading and the other designed for LCM offload--in order to permit the simultaneous ship-to-shore movement via two modes of transportation. The distance between the anchorages and the beach is one nautical mile (2000 yards). A sample beach area diagram is shown in Figure 3-1.17 Ships service cranes, organic lighterage, and MPSTF MHE are used to conduct the offload. Direct lighterage to line- haul transportation is the preferred throughput method; however, trafficability and distance from the high water mark to inland lines of communication may require surge storage and staging areas larger than those needed at the port area. As discussed in Chapter Two, one half of this study's MPS ships are offloaded in the stream. The factors discussed below are considered to be the critical elements affecting the throughput capacity of an in-stream offload. The first factor is the ships' over-the-side discharge rate of containers and equipment. Current MPS offload cri- teria call for the ability to offload in the stream in five days in a sea condition up to sea state three.18 Whereas port operations enjoy a relatively stable environment that facilitates optimum over-the-side discharge rates, in-stream operations do not due to weather and lighterage performance considerations. The second factor is the ship-to-shore transit time of the various pieces of lighterage (primarily powered cause- ways, unpowered causeways and landing craft) The most likely offload scenario consists of containers and other cargo offloaded on to lighterage for subsequent movement to the beach while rolling stock is offloaded by either lift on/lift off (LO/LO) or roll on/roll off (RO/RO) operations. The third factor is the time required to remove a container or equipment item from the lighterage, move it across the beach to a loading area, and load it on to a carrier as required for subsequent movement to an inland destination. The final factor is the transit time between the beach and inland destinations, principally the CSSA. This factor remains the same as discussed in Chapter Two. Accordingly, the calculations shown in Tables 2-3 through 2-6 should be included while computing in-stream offload and transit times. Currently, the MPS-1 flotilla is slated to be equipped with eight LCM-8 landing craft, 40 21x90 foot causeway sections (16 powered and 24 unpowered), and four side-loading warping tugs (SLWT).19 The most likely configuration of the 40 causeway sections is eight powered sections coupled to one unpowered section each, and eight powered sections coupled to two unpowered sections each. The powered sections are abbreviated as CSP (causeway section, powered). Using that abbreviation, the lighterage mixes for MPS-1 are shown in Table 3-1. The CSP + 1 amounts to a 21x180 foot powered barge arrangement, and the CSP + 2 barge measures 21x270 feet.20 As discussed above, this study's in-stream offload operation assumes that containers as well as rolling stock are offloaded simultaneously. Accordingly, the total lighterage mixes discussed above must be allocated to both container and rolling stock offload operations. Although rolling stock and container over-the-side discharge rates are similar, total throughput requirements from the ship to the CSSA are likely to be longer for containers since they, as opposed to rolling stock, require different modes of transportation from start to finish; thus the resulting changes in transportation modes increase processing times. Rolling stock, on the other hand, is primarily self-propelled and/or towable all the way from the beach to the CSSA. Accordingly, this Chapter focuses on container throughput timeframes in the examination of beach operations. As noted at the beginning of this Chapter, the first factor relative to beach operations is over-the-side discharge rates for containers. These rates vary depending on the type of lighterage mix available alongside to receive the containers. Based on previous tests, estimated container discharge rates per day for various lighterage mixes are shown in Table 3-2.21 The times cited in Table 3-2 relate only to discharge operations alongside the ships. In order to compute total lighterage cycle times and associated container movement rates, beach offload cycle times must also be addressed. Two primary MHE items are available for beach offloads-- the Rough Terrain Container Handler (RTCH) and the Lightweight Amphibious Container Handler (LACH). The RTCH is used to transfer containers directly from beached causeway ferries to container haulers. Two RTCH's can service one causeway ferry landing point on a full time basis. The RTCH is designed to handle standard commercial and military containers weighing up to 50,000 pounds. It is able to side shift, forward and back tilt, and oscillate the carriage to provide precise and efficient control of the container. As a result, the RTCH is well suited to a beach environment and is able to ford up to five feet of water and traverse soft, uneven terrain. Additionally, it is able to stack containers two high if required and has an effective turning radius of 50 feet. Overall, the RTCH has considerable advantage over other types of MHE in that it does not require any beach preparation, equipment installation, or special surface preparation to conduct operations. However, the RTCH cannot be used to offload LCU's or LCM-8's.22 The RTCH must approach its container load in a direction perpendicular to the long axis of the container. Since a container is spotted on the LCU or LCM-8 parallel to the craft's keel, the RTCH is unable to approach the container and make necessary connections. The other over-the-beach container handler available to MPS-1 is the LACH. The LACH is a two-wheeled straddle lifter device that is hydraulically operated and maneuvered by a separate prime mover, normally a bulldozer. The LACH is capable of lifting and extracting 20 foot containers from beached lighters. Recent LACH testing has involved the removal of containers from the LCU. Maneuverability of the LACH inside LCU's appeared to be very limited, requiring containers to be specifically spotted in the landing craft.23 Although not recently tested, the use of LACH's in LCM-8's appears to be extremely limited for the reasons cited above. Based on the RTCH's inability to unload containers from LCM's and LCU's, and the LACH's limited maneuverability inside landing craft, the MPS LCM-8's appear to be better suited to support the offload of rolling stock and general cargo. Accordingly, the lighterage mix that appears to best support this study's in-stream offload is shown in Table 3-3. In addition, RTCH offload times for the causeway ferries dis- cussed above are shown in Table 3-4.24 Now that the lighterage mix and estimated ship and beach offload times are determined, lighterage cycle times can be computed. Computations for the CSP + 1 and CSP + 2 ferries are shown in Table 3-5 and are offered as a method to determine lighterage cycle times for in-stream operations. At first glance, it seems reasonable to assume that by dividing the lighterage cycle times into 1200 minute (20 hour) days, the total number of containers moved per day per causeway ferry can be computed. However, two limitations must be taken into account when such calculations are made. The first limitation is the number of containers that can be offloaded over the beach in a 20 hour day. Since this study's scenario calls for the simultaneous operation of two beach landing points, the maximum number of containers offloaded at the beach can be computed as follows: CSP + 1 offload time = 46 minutes CSP + 2 offload time = 74 minutes A 1200 minute day divided by the CSP + 1 offload time of 48 minutes equals 25 CSP + 1's offloaded over one beach in one day. A 1200 minute day divided by the CSP + 2 offload time of 74 minutes equals 16 CSP + 2's offloaded over one beach in one day. Twenty-five CSP + 1 loads times nine containers per load equals 225 containers offloaded per day. Sixteen CSP + 2 loads times 16 containers per load equals 256 containers offloaded per day. The total number of containers that can be offloaded over two beaches per day is 481. This figure assumes that offload operations are continuous and that two RTCH's per beach are used. Working seaward from the beach, the next limitation that must be considered is the in-stream over-the-side discharge capacities of the ships. The number of containers discharged over the side can be computed as follows: CSP + 1 load time = 68 minutes CSP + 2 load time = 82 minutes A 1200 minute day divided by the CSP + 1 load time of 68 minutes equals 17 loads per day. A 1200 minute day divided by the CSP + 2 load time of 82 minutes equals 14 loads per day. Seventeen CSP + 1 loads times nine containers per load equals 153 containers loaded per day. Fourteen CSP + 2 loads times 16 containers per load equals 224 containers loaded per day. The total number of containers that can be loaded at two discharge stations is 377. With three discharge stations used, 565 containers per day can theoretically be discharged. Again, these discharge rates are mathematical and are dependent upon zero dead time alongside the ships. Now that the beach offload capacities and ship discharge capacities have been estimated, an analysis can be conducted in order to make a comparison between beach offload capacities, ships discharge capacities, and lighterage cycle times. Please note that the beach offload and ship discharge computations shown above do not take into account lighterage transit times or the numbers of lighters needed to ensure simultaneous operations at the beach, the ships, and transit legs between the two. Therefore, a final comparison between beach offload times, ship discharge times, and lighterage cycle times can provide the MPS planner some indicators relative to the critical path or paths associated with in- stream offload operations. Causeway ferry throughput capacities can be determined as follows: CSP + 1 cycle time = 156 minutes CSP + 2 cycle time = 198 minutes A 1200 minute day divided by the CSP + 1 cycle time of 156 minutes equals eight trips per day. A 1200 minute day divided by the CSP + 2 cycle time of 198 minutes equals six trips per day. Eight CSP + 1 trips times nine containers per trip equals a 72 container throughput capacity for one CSP + 1. Six CSP + 2 trips times 16 containers per trip equals a 96 container per day throughput capacity for one CSP + 2. Since each discharge station can handle at least two causeway ferries (one at the ship and one at the beach), a total of at least six causeway ferries can be used in conjunction with three discharge stations for an in-stream offload. If three CSP + 1's and three CSP + 2's are used in this study's scenario, the total throughput capacity can be calculated by multiplying the number of ferries used by the daily throughput capacity of each type, as follows: CSP + 1 daily throughput (three sets) = 216 containers CSP + 2 daily throughput (three sets) = 288 containers Total daily throughput = 504 containers Up to this point, three sets of throughput computations have been discussed as shown below: Beach Offload Rate Ship Discharge Rate Causeway Cycle Rate (two beaches) (three stations) (six ferries) 481 containers 565 containers 504 containers A review of the above rates suggests that the slowest station in the ship-to-shore movement cycle is the beach. This observation is further reinforced by the fact that the RTCH allocation discussed in Chapter Two for beach operations is a total of three. The above beach offload rates assume the use of four RTCH's with the possible requirement for a fifth RTCH to handle containers in the surge storage area if one is established. Moreover, the 481 containers per day over-the-beach throughput rate is RTCH dependent since the addition of a third or fourth landing beach would require additional RTCH's at the expense of RTCH availability at the CSSA, arrival airfield, and unit assembly areas. Additionally, the 481 containers per day rate is a purely mathematical calculation that does not take into account the myriad of environmental factors that tend to reduce actual throughput, such as lighterage crew proficiency, lighterage scheduling and traffic control, queuing times, and weather. Based on recent container throughput tests, and given the environmental factors discussed above, the CURRENT BEST ESTIMATE of MPS in-stream container throughput is around 350 containers per day25 which represents nearly 73 percent of the best theoretical throughput of 481 containers per day. A 27 percent throughput reduction due to environmental factors is not unreasonable. In comparison, the U.S. Army Transportation Terminal Service Company (Container) is capable of discharging or backloading 300 containers per day in a logistics over-the- shore (LOTS) environment.26 This processing rate is based on a 20 hour day and 75 percent equipment availability. Major equipment items include 12 50,000 pound container handlers, four mobile cranes, eight low mast 2500/4000 pound forklifts, and 28 34 ton semitrailers with prime movers.27 When compared with the Transportation Terminal Service Company's equipment mix and advertised container processing capabilities, it appears that the current MPS MHE and container hauler allowances may be overcommitted when supporting a five day in-stream offload. While the above discussion centers on a two ship in- stream offload, the container throughput capacity for a four ship in-stream offload does not significantly increase due to limited RTCH availability. With the use of a third fully operational (two RTCH) beach, the best estimate container offload rate increases to 525 containers per day (350 containers per day times 1.5). As well, the corresponding ship discharge rate and lighterage cycle rates increase due to the increased number of ship discharge stations. At this point, however, the MPS offload critical path seems to shift to inland transportation capacities as discussed in Chapter Two. Even with the increased availability of container hauler assets at the beach (due to the absence of a pierside offload), lines of communication between the beach and inland destinations may saturate early due to all of the MPS assets moving over one offload site. As well, with six RTCH's dedicated to landing beaches and a seventh used in the surge area, only two remain available to support the arrival airfield and the CSSA. With RTCH availability surfacing as a potential chokepoint within the in-stream offload cycle, some alternative MHE uses should be considered. First, the 30 ton rough terrain crane can be used to assist in container loading and marshalling, particularly in surge storage areas. The use of the 30 ton crane in the surge storage area, CSSA, and/or arrival airfield may release enough RTCH's to service additional beaches during a four ship in-stream offload. Additionally, the LACH can be used to ferry containers between the high water mark and the surge area and/or inland transportation loading area. Although the LACH is not performing its primary role while in this mode, it can provide some degree of assistance. In-stream offload throughput capacities have been examined thus far in an attempt to determine potential critical paths. It appears that with the 350 container per day throughput rate, a two ship in-stream offload (1085 containers) can be accomplished in just over three days, plus the one day preparation time. With a four ship offload, over six days will be required to move 2170 containers ashore, plus the one day preparation time. With the addition of a third fully operational landing beach, the four ship offload time can be cut to four days plus preparation time. At this point, however, inland linehaul transportation and RTCH capacities begin to become saturated. In any event, the total lighterage mix shown in Table 3- 1 appears to be sufficient to support in-stream offload operations. With beach offload throughput surfacing as the slowest link in the in-stream offload operation, the 16 causeway sets appear able to support up to five discharge stations and as many landing beaches, provided that one third of the ferries are loading alongside, one third are unloading at the beach, and one third are in transit. Click here to view image CHAPTER 4 COMBAT SERVICE SUPPORT AREA OPERATIONS The Combat Service Support Area is task organized to provide direct maintenance support, intermediate supply support, and health services support to the LFSP as well as the MPSTF.28 The composition of the MPSTF CSSA is temporary in nature and remains established until all equipment and supplies have been offloaded, transported to appropriate destinations, and issued to respective combat, combat support, and combat service support elements.29 A sample MPSTF CSSA is shown in Figure 4-1.30 The actual layout of a given CSSA naturally depends on the geography of the security area, available lines of communication to and from the port, beach, and airfield, and anticipated subsequent operational requirements of the BSSG. It should be noted that the MPSTF CSSA is not designed to provide a significant amount of supply point distribution of table of equipment ready for issue equipment. As noted in Chapter Two, the primary types of supplies and equipment that are to be transported to the CSSA are ammunition and general supplies, to include medical equipment/supplies as well as bulk fuel and water. Accordingly, all MPS containers that have not been previously issued to the various functional areas (Naval Support Element equipment, aviation equipment, and habitability sets) are delivered to the CSSA. The CSSA is divided into two areas for storage. The first area is general storage. This area is designed to accomodate general supplies and it should allow sufficient space for approximately 700 containers that are slated to be processed during the offload period. Colocated with the general storage area is the field warehouse site and the empty container storage area. The field warehouse site is designed to hold container contents arranged by classes of supply for future issue to operational units. The empty container storage area is a temporary holding site for containers slated for return to parent ships. The second area is the ammunition storage site. This site is situated well away from other CSSA storage areas-- particularly bulk fuel and health services areas. The ammunition storage site is organized by ammunition compatability groups, with separate compatability group storage points dispersed over a wide area to permit adequate safety separation. As in the general storage area, the ammunition storage site has an empty container storage area. Additionally, a helicopter landing zone is situated nearby to facilitate rapid ammunition resupply. In addition to the general storage area and the ammunition storage site is the health services area. The health services area consists of a hospital company, a medical company, a headquarters and service company, a dental company, and a medical logistics comapny. Associated with the health services area is a helicopter landing zone designed for medical evacuations. Rounding out the MPSTF CSSA are the maintenance area, the command and control center, and the bulk fuel and water storage sites. The maintenance area is organized along normal commodity lines (engineer, motor transport, electronics maintenance, ordnance, and general support), to include holding areas for incoming and outgoing equipment. The command and control center provides internal communications within the CSSA, traffic control, and operational oversight of all CSSA functions. The bulk fuel and water sites are designed to provide supply point distribution for refuelers and water tankers tasked with unit distribution responsibilities. The bulk fuel site is estab- lished with up to eight 600,000 gallon Amphibious Assault Fuel Sytems (AAFS's) and the water site has the Reverse Osmosis Water Purification Unit (ROWPU) along with 16 50,000 gallon storage containers.31 The primary focus of this study relative to CSSA operations is on spatial requirements of the CSSA itself and time requirements associated with container unstuffing operations. Spatial requirements for the CSSA are important to the MPS planner in that advance party personnel need to know how much acreage is required to establish the CSSA. Additionally, planners can negotiate for adequate CSSA space while keeping in mind container movement capacities between the port/beach area and the CSSA. Chapters Two and Three identify and quantify container discharge rates and transit times to the CSSA. Given that information, particularly the anticipated arrival rate of containers at the storage sites and estimated times required to unstuff various containerized classes of supplies, reasonable estimates of times required to unload a container and prepare its contents for issue can be made. Moreover, the total time required to receive, unstuff, and warehouse all MPSTF containers designated for the CSSA can be established. In so doing, the anticipated container delivery rates discussed in Chapters Two and Three can be compared with estimated container processing rates within the CSSA to identify potential shortfalls in meeting the current MPSTF operationally ready timeline criteria. Table 4-1 contains estimated acreage requirements for the various CSSA storage areas discussed above. The estimates are for the individual functional areas only and do not take into account additional acreage needed to provide minimum administrative dispersion and routes of ingress and egress. Given the initial space estimates shown in Table 4-1, additional acreage must be added to these estimates in order to provide a realistic picture of how large a fully deployed MPSTF CSSA may be. One of this study's basic assumptions is that the MPSTF will arrive and assemble in an area secured by either host nation action or by prior insertion of combat forced. The MPSTF CSSA is thus temporary in nature and remains established only until all equipment and supplies have been offloaded and delivered to appropriate users and/or destinations. Accordingly, some form of administrative vice tactical layout of the CSSA may be considered. Given the raw space requirement of nearly 1200 acres, it is estimated that an ADDITIONAL 600 ACRES will be needed to provide adequate room for ingress/egress routes, helicopter landing zones, associated safety zones, and dispersion areas between ammunition sites, bulk fuel sites, and other CSSA functional areas. Adding 600 acres to the 1200 acre initial requirement reveals that a fully deployed MPSTF CSSA will require approximately 1800 acres. Given such a large requirement, the MPS planner may consider splitting the CSSA into two or three geographically separated areas for the ammunition storage area, the general storage/maintenance/ health services areas, and the bulk fuel storage area. This arrangement may eliminate the requirement for large amounts of clear land (a premium in built up areas) and may facilitate ship-to-shore offload systems, especially bulk fuel and water. Once pierside and in-stream offload operations have commenced, the CSSA begins to receive containers at rates discussed in Chapters Two and Three. The CSSA container reception rate can be computed by examining pierside and in- stream throughput rates as they relate to time-distance factors between the port/beach area and the CSSA. In this study, it is assumed that the CSSA is located 40 km round trip from the port/beach area and that container haulers are capable of a 20 kmh average speed. This distance and speed combination is used so that the maximum throughput rates for container transportation closely match pierside ship discharge capabilities. Likewise, the 350 container per day over-the-beach throughput rate also approximates inland transportation capacities. Given the above conditions, the pierside discharged container reception rate at the CSSA is 388 containers per day for 2.5 days. Concurrently, the in-stream reception rate is 350 containers per day for 2.8 days. At these rates, the CSSA can potentially receive a total of up to 738 containers per day for nearly three days. As noted in Table 2-1, the MPSTF has a total of 39 4000 pound rough terrain forklifts (RT 4000) available to support all facets of the MPSTF offload. Current container unstuffing estimates using the RT 4000 are one container unstuffed per hour per forklift.32 Container unstuffing includes container unloading, content depreservation, and movement to a colocated field warehouse site. In order to process a maximum of 738 containers per 20 hour day, up to 37 forklifts are required in the CSSA alone. Certainly, this maximum requirement decreases if only a portion of the containers require immediate unstuffing. Using the container processing rates discussed above, the MPS planner can estimate CSSA MHE and container handler requirements. In the event that a 100 percent in-stream offload is conducted, the total daily CSSA container reception rate drops to 350 containers per day, the maximum over-the-beach throughput rate. In that case, container unstuffing operations do not appear to be hindered due to overworked forklift assets. In any event, however, CSSA container processing operations require continuous RTCH availability. Since there are simultaneous container deliveries to both the general storage and ammunition storage areas, at least two RTCH's are required within the CSSA to service inbound container haulers. Additionally, at least one RTCH or rough terrain crane is required to support the empty container storage area. The MPS planner may wish to consider additional RTCH's or rough terrain cranes within the CSSA so that inbound and outbound container haulers do not queue up. While there appears to be sufficient container linehaul assets to support the MPS offload in any form, the CSSA may be in strong competition with the port and beach areas over limited container handling assets. Once container queuing starts at any point between the port, beach, and CSSA, the throughput rates discussed in Chapter Two decrease and cause corresponding increases in offload time requirements. Click here to view image CHAPTER 5 CONCLUSIONS Prior to discussing any conclusions associated with this study, some qualifications are in order. The basic assumptions listed in the introduction provide a foundation upon which to build a specific MPS employment scenario. Obviously, many different scenarios are possible in the employment of the MPSTF. This study isolates one possible scenario, develops statistical offload and movement capabilities, and offers considerations for planning the MPSTF arrival and assembly. This study's efforts gravitate to two issues-- methodologies for developing planning information, and the planning information itself. The particular planning information developed in this study is based on the scenario set in the introduction. Clearly, the scenario used in this study may never happen and, therefore, the planning infor- mation may not be directly applicable to any actual MPSTF employment. However, the methodologies used in the develop- pment of this study's planning information are probably valid in any MPSTF-related employment scenario, and they may prove to be useful tools for MPS planners to determine MPSTF closure capabilities and timeframes. During the course of this study's research, the term "partial offload" was often encountered. The general consensus is that the MPSTF equipment and supplies may not be entirely offloaded if only a partial or initial combat capability is needed in a particular situation. In the event that a partial offload is conducted, the data contained in this study again may not be directly applicable to such a scenario. Although such information may not be directly applicable, it can still be used as a baseline to estimate comparable reductions of offload requirements. As well, the methodologies used to determine the baseline data remain valid in developing time and space requirements for any degree of partial offload. As a matter of caution, however, partial offloads may require that a significantly greater amount of equipment than is actually required will need to be offloaded. Since the MPSTF is essentially administratively loaded, it is possible that some critical cargo may be stowed in hard-to-access locations. This situation is particularly likely relative to ammunition which is normally stowed in accordance with U.S. Coast Guard regulation compatability groups. As a result, a certain portion of each type of the MPSTF's ammunition may be located at or near the bottom of each ship. Assuming that a portion of each type of ammunition is required for any size MPSTF, the offload will have to be extensive enough to uncover all types of ammunition to include that stowed in lower cargo holds. This same situation most likely holds true for other types of cargo as well. During the course of this study, certain MPSTF offload critical paths emerge. The first is the ship-to-shore movement during in-stream offloads. The time required to conduct this movement is very sensitive to available container MHE as well as sea conditions. The computations developed in Chapter Three indicate that even with all available MHE, a four ship in-stream offload may not be able to meet the five day offload criteria due to the potential throughput chokepoint at the beach during container unloading operations. The second critical path is the movement of cargo between the port/beach and the CSSA. The time requirements to conduct such movements are dependent on container hauler availability and speed, and the distance to the CSSA. It seems that a paradox surfaces at this juncture. At a highly urbanized and well-developed port facility, host nation support may be readily available to assist in the offload; however, sufficient acreage to house the CSSA will most likely be situated a considerable distance away from the port, and linehaul transit times through urbanized areas will be restricted and slow. Conversely, remote ports with austere offload facilities may have plenty of space for a nearby CSSA; however, host nation support may be limited, and the arrival airfield may be situated at the outer limits of acceptable linehaul distances. The final issue is the MPS "timeline." As illustrated in Figure 5-1, each significant MPSTF arrival and assembly event is assigned a position on the timeline. This timeline incorporates the pierside and in-stream time constraints of three and five days, respectively.39 While this study has addressed the MPSTF's organic ability to meet the timeline constraints under varying conditions, it is not the study's purpose to support or refute the validity of any timeline or the MPSTF's designed capability to meet such time constraints. Rather, this study is designed to illustrate under what conditions the organically supported MPSTF can meet desired planning timeframes in an austere environment. Moreover, it is designed to provide MPSTF planners a set of indicators that will assist in determining the range and depth of host nation support required to augment MPSTF capabilities in the event that desired time constraints cannot be met using organic equipment. Conversely, if no host nation support is available, MPS planners may be able to develop estimates regarding additional time required to complete a given degree of MPSTF offload. While certain critical paths have emerged during this study, the impact of such paths can be reduced. The current mix of MPS MHE, container haulers, and lighterage is based on sound planning and judgement, particularly in view of the fact that the Navy-Marine Corps team skillfully navigated through uncharted waters during the development of the MPS program. With minor modifications, the MPS MHE mix can better minimize the impact of potential offload chokepoints. Accordingly, the following recommendations are offered as possible methods to reduce critical path impact during MPS offload operations. First, retain on a permanent basis the M-127 trailers and the towable container chassis (or similar container transport equipment) on all MPS T/E's in order to provide the capacity to move containers throughout the security area within desired timeframes. Judging from the throughput capacities calculated in Chapter Two, all container haulers presently shown on the MPS T/E, to include the container chassis, appear necessary to meet linehaul transportation timeline requirements. Second, delete the Lightweight Amphibious Container Handler from the MPS T/E. While the LACH is capable of limited container movement throughout the security area, it is unable to adequately perform its primary designed mission while in support of MPS offload operations due to its cumbersome causeway offload characteristics and the lack of LCU's in the MPS lighterage mix. Third, replace the deleted LACH's with a like number of RTCH's. Four additional RTCH's can provide the necessary flexibility to support multiple beach offload points, container surge storage areas, and/or dispersed CSSA's. With their high degree of mobility and flexibility, additional RTCH's can significantly enhance MPS offload operations. Click here to view image Notes 1Brigade Service Support Group-6 USMC, Maritime Prepositioning Ships Reception Standing Operating Procedures (Draft II), (Camp LeJeune, North Carolina, February, 1985). 2Personal interview with LtCol A.A. Wood USMC, G-4 PlansO, 6th MAB, Camp LeJeune, North Carolina, December, 1984. 3Commandant of the Marine Corps Message 300131Z June 1984, "Maritime Prepositioning Ships (MPS) Marine Amphibious Brigade (MAB) Fly in Echelon (FIE) and Table of Equipment (T/E) Refinement Conference. 4Ibid 5BSSG-6 Reception SOP (Draft II), para 7000. 6Ibid, para 1000.2. 7Ibid, para 1002.1. 8Ibid, para 1002.2. 9Ibid, figure 1-2. 10Ibid, figure 4-5. 11Ibid, para 3003.2. 12Ibid, para 3010.1. 13CMC Msg 300131Z June 1984. 14Ibid 15MPS Table of Equipment (T/E), 13 November, 1984. 16Commandant of the Marine Corps Letter 3000/3 LPP-4/5 of 25 January, 1985, "Container Plan in Support of the MPS Ships Loadout." 17BSSG-6 Reception SOP (Draft II), figure 4-6. 18CMC Msg 300131Z June 1984. 19Telephonic interview with Cdr R.O. Worthington, USN, Office of the Chief of Naval Operations (OP-422C), 27 February, 1985. 20Personal interviews with LtCol D.E. Mears, USMC and Capt R.L. Walker, USMC, Joint Logistics Over The Shore II (JLOTS II) Test Directorate, Naval Amphibious Base, Little Creek, Virginia, February, 1985. 21Ibid 22Ibid 23Ibid 24Ibid 25Ibid 26U.S. Army, Army Transportation Container Operations. FM 55-70, (Washington, D.C., May, 1977), pp. 5-1 - 5-4. 27Ibid 28BSSG-6 Reception SOP (Draft II), para 7000. 29Ibid 30Ibid, figure 7-1. 31Personal interview with Maj J.R. Daymude, USMC, Combat Service Support Instruction Division, Amphibious Instruction Department, Education Center, Marine Corps Development and Education Command, Quantico, Virginia, February, 1985. 32Telephonic interview with LtCol W.H. Harris, USMC, Head, Prepositioning Programs Branch, Marine Corps Logistics Base, Albany, Georgia, 22 March, 1985. 33P. S. Springston and C. I. Skaalen, "Container Marshalling within a Combat Service Support Area," Report by the Naval Civil Engineering Laboratory (Port Hueneme, California, November, 1983), p. 36. 34Personal interview with Maj J.R. Westbrook, USMC, Plans Officer, BSSG-6, Camp LeJeune, North Carolina, December 1984. 35Personal interview with LCdr P.J. Bauer, USN, Combat Service Support Instruction Division, Amphibious Instruction Department, Education Center, Marine Corps Development and Education Command, Quantico, Virginia, February, 1985. 36Springston and Skaalen, p. 36. 37Maj Daymude interviews, February, 1985. 38Ibid 39CMC Msg 300113Z June 1984. Bibliography Bauer, P.J. LCdr, USN, Medical Operations Instructor, Combat Service Support Instruction Division, Amphibious Instruction Department, Education Center, Marine Corps Development and Education Command. Personal interviews about health services operations. Quantico, Virginia, February, 1985. Daymude, J.R. Maj, USMC, Engineer Operations Instructor, Combat Service Support Instruction Division, Amphibious Instruction Department, Education Center, Marine Corps Development and Education Command. Personal interviews about bulk fuel and water operations. Quantico, Virginia, February, 1985. Harris, W.H. LtCol, USMC, Head, Prepositioning Programs Branch, Marine Corps Logistics Base, Albany, Georgia. Telephonic interview about container processing operations. Albany, Georgia, 22 March, 1985. Looney Jr., E.P. BGen, USMC, Commanding General, 6th Marine Amphibious Brigade. Personal interviews about MPS operations. Camp LeJeune, North Carolina, 18 December, 1984. Marks, D.E. Col, USMC, Head, Joint Matters/Strategic Mobility Branch (LPJ), Installations and Logistics Department, Headquarters, U.S. Marine Corps. Personal interviews about MPS operations. Washington, D.C., December 1984 - March 1985. Mears, D.E. LtCol, USMC, Deputy Director, U.S. Marine Corps, Joint Logistics Over the Shore II Test Directorate. Personal interviews about MPS ship-to-shore offload operations. Little Creek, Virginia, February - March, 1985. Pankey, P.A. LtCol, USMC, Head, Plans Section, Logistics Plans and Policies Branch (LPP), Installations and Logistics Department, Headquarters, U.S. Marine Corps. Personal interviews about MPS operations. Washington, D.C., December 1984 - March 1985. Springston, P.S. and Skaalen, C.I., "Container Marshalling Within a Combat Service Support Area," Report by the Naval Civil Engineering Laboratory. Port Hueneme, California, November, 1983. Toth, J.E. Col, USMC, Deputy Commander for Doctrine, Marine Corps Development and Education Command. Personal interviews about MPS operations. Quantico, Virginia, September 1984 - March 1985. U.S. Army. Headquarters, Department of the Army. Army Transportation Container Operations, FM 55-70. Washington, D.C., May, 1977. U.S. Marine Corps. Brigade Service Support Group-Six, Maritime Prepositioning Ships Reception Standing Operating Procedures (Draft II). Camp LeJeune, North Carolina, February, 1985. U.S. Marine Corps. Headquarters, U.S. Marine Corps. Commandant of the Marine Corps Letter 3000/3 LPP-4/5 of 25 January, 1985, "Container Plan in Support of the MPS Ships Loadout." U.S. Marine Corps. Headquarters U.S. Marine Corps. Commandant of the Marine Corps Message 300131Z June 1984, "Maritime Prepositioning Ships (MPS) Marine Amphibious Brigade (MAB) Fly in Echelon (FIE) and Table of Equipment (T/E) Refinement Conference." U.S. Marine Corps. Marine Corps Development and Education Command. Operational Handbook (OH) 4-11, Maritime Pre- positioned Deployment. Quantico, Virginia, June, 1984. U.S. Marine Corps. Headquarters, U.S. Marine Corps. Maritime Prepositioning Ships Table of Equipment. Washington, D.C., 13 November, 1984. U.S. Marine Corps. Headquarters U.S. Marine Corps. Motor Transport, Engineer, and General Supply Branch (LME), Materiel Division, Installations and Logistics Department, Memorandum for the Record LME-1/RKR/edb/m 4120 of 30 November, 1983, "MPS Container Offload." Walker, R.L. Capt, USMC, Operations Officer, U.S. Marine Corps, Joint Logistics Over the Shore II Test Directorate. Personal interviews about MPS ship-to- shore offload operations. Little Creek, Virginia, February-March, 1985. Westbrook, J.R. Maj, USMC, Plans Officer, Brigade Service Support Group-6. Personal interviews about MPS operations. Camp LeJeune, North Carolina, 18-19 December, 1984. Wood, A.A. LtCol, USMC, G-4 Plans Officer, 6th Marine Amphibious Brigade. Personal interviews about MPS operations. Camp LeJeune, North Carolina, 18-19 December, 1984. Worthington, R.O. Cdr, USN, Office of the Chief of Naval Operations (OP-422C). Telephonic interview about MPS lighterage allowances. Washington, D.C., 27 February, 1985. Distribution Organization Copies CMC DC/S, PP&O (SAAPM) 3 DC/S, I&L LPJ 3 LPP 1 LME 1 LMM 1 CG, FMFLANT 3 CG, FMFPAC 3 CG, MCDEC DepCdr, Doctrine 1 EdCtr (CSSID) 1 DevCtr (M&L Div) 1 AASG 1 C&SC 200 CG, MCLB, ALBANY, GA 3 JLOTS II Test Directorate 1 CG, 6TH MAB 3 CG, 7TH MAB 3 BSSG-6 1
