Armored Vehicle Identification: The Key To Survival AUTHOR Major Charles R. Sherrill, USMC CSC 1985 SUBJECT AREA Warfighting EXECUTIVE SUMMARY TITLE: ARMORED VEHICLE IDENTIFICATION: THE KEY TO SURVIVAL I. Purpose: To determine training measures and evaluation procedures that will enable individual Marines and anti-armor crews to correctly differentiate between friendly and hostile armored vehicles. II. Problem: Although the Marine Corps possesses modern armor and anti-armor weapons, Marines are not properly trained in armored vehicle identification. The Marine Corps' training and evaluation program for armored vehicle identification is grossly deficient and virtually non-existent. III. Data: With the world-wide proliferation of armored vehicles, identification of friend or foe will be exceedingly difficult. The lethality or today's tank and anti-armor weapons make it essential that Marines be formally and frequently evaluated in the employment of these weapons and their ability to distinguish between friendly and enemy vehicles. The US Army has conducted extensive research on the organization and equipment of both friendly and hostile forces throughout the world. As a result, the US Army has developed an excellent and comprehensive program for armored vehicle identification that is available to the Marine Corps. Guidance and instructional assistance must be provided to institute this program within the Marine Divisions and in our MOS producing schools. MCI courses dealing with tanks and anti-armor weapons must be updated and expanded to reflect current data found in the Army's program. TAVSCs must be able to readily support the training needs of requesting units. In turn, officers must be aware of the services available from these centers. MCCRES must emphasize armored vehicle identification by integrating training standards and evaluation procedures into pertinent sections of Volume II and V. This would allow commanders to use MCCRES as both a formal and informal evaluation tool and as a means of selecting meaningful training objectives for inclusion into unit training plans. IV. Conclusion: A requirement exists for a comprehensive armored vehicle identification training and evaluation program to improve the individual's and crew's ability to rapidly distinguish between who is friend or foe, maximize survivability of friendly forces, and produce long range distructive fire on the enemy. V. Recommendations: The US Army's armored vehicle identification program should be incorporated into the training plans of Marine units and into the course curriculms of all Marine Corps MOS producing schools. Volume's II and V of MCCRES, that address tanks and anti-armor weapons, should be revised to provide commanders with a valid evaluation program and a means to select meaning training objectives for inclusion into unit training plans. MCI programs concerning this subject must be up-dated and expanded. Officers and staff noncommissioned officers must be made aware of existing training aid materials and services available to them through their local TAVSC. ARMORED VEHICLE IDENTIFICATION: THE KEY TO SURVIVAL OUTLINE Thesis: The Marine Corps must increase the individual's and crew's ability to rapidly distinguish between friend or foe by adopting or developing a comprehensive training and evaluation program for armored vehicle identification. I. Modern Armor Warfare A. High velocity guns and missiles 1. Dominate the battlefield 2. Destroy both enemy and friendly B. Mixed-Breed vehicles 1. Possessed by nations throughout world 2. Possessed by both enemy and friendly C. Modernization by U.S.M.C. 1. M1A1 Abrams tank 2. TOW II 3. Dragon 4. AT-4 II. Armored Vehicle Identification A. Little emphasis 1. Low priority item 2. No specific requirement 3. No program B. Schools 1. Lack of emphasis 2. No instructional guidance 3. Lack of training aids and materials C. Marine Corps Institute(MCI) 1. Deficient program 2. Outdated materials 3. Incomplete data D. MCCRES 1. Vehicle identification unaddressed 2. Lack of training goals 3. Lack of evaluation standards III. Courses Of Action A. U.S. Army Program 1. U.S. armor warfare expert 2. Program readily available to U.S.M.C. 3. Numerous instructional materials/references 4. ARTEP/Soldier's Manual emphasize vehicle I.D. 5. ARTEP is Army's version of MCCRES B. U.S.M.C. Program 1. Duplication of Army's program 2. Requires development 3. Continuous updating required 4. Costly IV. Solution A. U.S. Army's vehicle identification program 1. Established 2. Inexpensive B. Schools 1. Incorporate Army's program 2. Provide initial training 3. TAVSC support C. Marine Corps Institute (MCI) 1. Update vehicle identification course 2. Expand tank and anti-armor courses D. MCCRES 1. Revise tank and anti-armor courses 2. Incorporate ARTEP 3. Incorporate Soldier's Manual of Tasks-Skills ARMORED VEHICLE IDENTIFICATION: THE KEY TO SURVIVAL The Soviet Union, all Soviet surrogate armies, and most third world countries have continued to build large armored forces. Additionally, vast technical improvements in armor and anti-armor weapons have been made over the last twenty years. As our nation's foremost "force-in-readiness", capable of immediate deployment throughout the world, Marines must be prepared to fight a highly mobile and technically skilled enemy. With the worldwide proliferation of armored vehicles, identification of friend or foe will be extremely difficult. As seen from the 1973 Arab-Israeli War and noting the current state-of-the-art of armor and anti-armor weapons, the armored battlefield of the future will be extremely violent, rapid, and engagements will be conducted at long ranges. The acquisition of additional anti-armor assets and advances in the organization and employment of armor and anti-armor weapons have significantly improved the Marine Corps' capability to fight armored forces.2 Although the Marine Corps possesses modern armor and anti-armor weapons, Marines are not properly trained in armored vehicle identification. The Marine Corps must increase the indiviual's and crew's ability to rapidly distinguish between friend or foe by adopting or developing a comprehensive training and evaluation program for armored vehicle identification. Our high velocity guns and missiles are capable of destroying the enemy, yet can just as easily destroy friendly forces because of improper vehicle identification. This was illustrated during the 1982 Israeli invasion into Lebanon. Despite the professional abilities of the Israeli armored forces, two Israeli tank battalions mistakenly engaged each other in the Baka Valley. A three hour tank battle was fought, in which, the Israeli's lost six tanks and had a number of crewmen killed or wounded.3 Today litterly hundreds of different types and models of tanks and armored personnel carriers comprise armored vehicle assets of forces throughout the world. These numerous, "mixed-breed" forces, possessed by both friendly and hostile countries, make armored vehicle identification even more difficult and complex. Vehicle sales to developing nations between 1974-1982 totaled over 12,000 tanks and nearly 20,000 armored personnel carriers. The leading exporters were the Soviet Union, other Warsaw Pact countries, the United States, France, the United Kingdom, other NATO countries, and China.4 Over the last several years the sale and build-up of armored assets have continued to grow.5 Two clear examples of countries possessing a "mixed-breed" of armored vehicles are Israel and Yugoslavia. The small state of Israel possesses over 2,000 tanks. These tanks are the American built M-48 and M-60, the Soviet built T-54, T-55, T-62 and PT-76, the French built AMX-13, the British built Centurion, and the Israeli built Makava. Yugoslavia, a Soviet ally, possesses over 1,500 tanks. These are the Soviet built T-34, T-54 and PT-76, the American built M-24 and M-47, and the French built AMX-13.6 The Marine Corps' modernization program is placing current state-of-the-art anti-armor weaponry within the Marine Division. This is essential to engage and defeat armored forces, yet it also places the implied requirement on the Marine Corps of ensuring that individual Marines can correctly distinguish between friend and foe. A recent Headquarters Marine Corps decision will soon place the new M1A1 Abrams tank in the tank battalion.7 Under testing and development for over ten years, the M1A1 is the most modern tank in the world. Its 120mm fin-stabilized kinetic energy round will destroy any known tank, to include, the Soviet T-80. The M1A1 can fire accurately on the move at speeds in excess of 20 miles per hour. This is due to its stabilized gun system and a technically advanced track suspension. Its thermal sight permits target acquisition and engagement at night, through fog, smoke, and dust.8 The Marine Corps is in the process of up-grading all 144 TOW launchers within each division with the new TOW II.9 The TOW II has a six inch warhead and is capable of destroying any known tank. It is equipped with a thermal sight that allows target engagement at ranges up to 3,750 meters under day, night, and inclimate weather conditions. The 10836 infantry T/O places 288 Dragons within the Marine Division.11 Organic to the infantry battalion, the Dragon can effectively engage and destroy most armored targets out to 1000 meters. The Dragon is undergoing an extensive product improvement and testing program that will increase warhead penetration and permit day and night tracking.12 A new light anti-tank weapon, the Swedish AT-4, is being tested as a replacement for the M-72 LAW.13 Theoretically, every infantryman can carry one or two of these weapons into combat. The point is that a Marine Division will soon have a combined total of 430 tanks and medium-to-heavy anti-armor weapons with ranges varying from 1,000 to 3,750 meters. Additionally, if each member of a 150 man infantry company carried a LAW or AT-4, a Marine Division could easily have over 4,000 men carrying this light anti-armor weapon. These capabilities are encouraging if one could be assured that all weapons would be fired at hostile forces, but the ability of our Marines to correctly distinguish between friendly and enemy armored vehicles is questionable. There is little emphasis in the Marine Corps concerning armored vehicle identification training and evaluation. In fact, no formal Marine Corps program even exists.14 The same is found to be true within the Marine Divisions. No specific requirements are levied by the divisions on the regiments or separate battalions with regard to this subject. Staff officers note the importance of armored vehicle recognition but state that other training priorities and operational commitments take precedence.15,16 Although company and battalion level instruction is given in vehicle, equipment, and weapons identification, it is not a high priority item. With the exception of the tank battalions, no specific guidance exists for the type of training requirements, techniques of instructions, or materials available to assist in such instruction. The task of instructing Marines in the proper recognition of armored vehicles appears to be the function of the Battalion S-2 and interested company grade officers.17 Officers and Staff NCO's have difficulty in obtaining adequate quantities of up-to-date training materials. They generally do not know the wide variety of materials available or how to acquire them. The most frequently used reference materials at the battalion and company level are Defense Intelligence Agency publications and U. S. Army How to Fight Manuals. The Army manuals are usually acquired by students of U. S. Army schools, such as, the U. S. Armor School at Fort Knox, Kentucky or the U. S. Infantry School at Fort Benning, Georgia. Officers and staff noncommissioned officers generally acquire their materials through the "Old-Boy" network and not through official Marine Corps or Army channels.18 The adoption of the Marine Air-Ground Task Force (MAGTF) concept of combined arms and the continuing weapons modernization program reflect the Marine Corps emphasis on armored warfare. Although tanks and various types of anti-armor weapons have been in the Marine Corps since prior to World War II, Marines are relatively new to the armored battlefield. Only after the Vietnam War did Marines start actively training for armored operations. Today, Marine Amphibious Brigades (MABs) frequently deploy to the NATO arena for intensive training with NATO forces. An armored battlefield scenario is used for much of this training which exposes Marines to virtually every type of tank and armored personnel carrier in the NATO inventory.19 Additionally, in 1977 the Marine Corps Air-Ground Combat Center at Twenty-Nine Palms, California, consisting of 932 square miles, was opened for mechanized training. At Twenty-Nine Palms, mechanized task forces, of battalion and brigade size, receive realistic and extensive "live-fire" training in a simulated combat environment. Also at Twenty-Nine Palms, the Multiple Integrated Laser Engagement System (MILES) allows a "non-fire" training exercise to be conducted where mechanized units engage each other and receive an accurate score of kills, etc.20 Both training scenarios are as realistic as one can get without actually being in combat. However, improper target identification is noted to be a problem. 21,22 After graduation from recruit training, Marines are sent to Marine Corps or other service schools to acquire their basic MOS skills. Tank crewmen (1811) are sent to the U.S. Army Armor School at Fort Knox, Kentucky where they receive extensive classes on armored vehicle identification.23 Marines assigned an infantry MOS (03) attend Infantry Training School at Camp Lejeune, North Carolina or Camp Pendleton, California. TOW (0352) and Dragon (0351) crewmen receive three weeks of training in their primary MOS of which only two hours are devoted to armored vehicle identification. This training, which was developed by the schools, is basic and devotes much of the instruction to armor vulnerabilities. Basic infantrymen (0311) receive six weeks of training in their various MOS skills. Each infantryman receives extensive training in firing the LAW and fires seven practice sub-caliber 35mm rounds and one "live" HEAT round. However, the basic infantryman receives no training in target identification.24 The point is that all Marines are not receiving the necessary training in armored vehicle identification. Little or no guidance or training materials are provided to the Marine Corps schools. This same situation exists in the training of our officers and staff noncommissioned officers.25 Not only do the officers and staff noncommissioned officers need to be able to identify armored vehicles, but they must know where to find readily available references and materials to conduct meaningful training programs within the regular Marine Corps ground units. The Marine Corps Institute (MCI) has a course of instruction for armor identification. However, the course is out-dated and uses a 12 year old Army manual (ST 193 FY73) as its basic reference.26 Although using Army training extension courses (TECs) as study guides, the course text needs to be expanded to offer a greater number of armored vehicles. Colored pictures would also be appropriate and add a greater degree of realism to an essentially dull and lackluster course of instruction. MCI also provides courses for the tank and anti-armor weapons (Dragon, LAW, TOW). The Dragon course devotes 17 pages to armored vehicle identification, providing students with an adequate introduction into this subject.27 However, the LAW and TOW courses provide only a basic knowledge of the weapon system and places little emphasis on firing procedures or target identification. 28,29 A need for basic and advanced skill training in these courses of instruction does exist. The Marine Corps Combat Readiness Evaluation System (MCCRES) establishes..."within the Marine Corps a standardized evaluation system designed to provide for the timely and accurate determination of the combat readiness of Fleet Marine Forces, including those of the Marine Corps Reserve, to accomplish assigned missions."30 It is divided into ten volumes of Mission Performance Standards (MPSs) and Standard Performance Tests (SPTs) that allow both formal and informal evaluation of infantry, combat support, combat service support, and air support units. All Marine Air-Ground Task Forces are required to successfully complete a formal evaluation prior to being deployed as a contingency task force. MCCRES is usually administered to infantry battalions, with combat support elements attached, once every one-to-two years.31 Volume II, Infantry Units, and Volume V, Combat Support Units, address mechanized operations, tank-infantry teams, and employment of anti-armor assets. Although MCCRES is recognized as an excellent means of evaluating the combat readiness of infantry units, particularly straight-legged infantry, it does not adequately address the training proficiency of tank and anti-armor crews.32,33 Volume II, Infantry Units, addresses tank-infantry and mechanized operations as part of the Mission Performance Standards. This evaluates the interaction between the tank unit and the infantry organization they are supporting. Besides being grossly out-dated, in terms of modern armored warfare, the MPSs do not address employment of the tanks' weapon system. The Standard Performance Tests are designed to determine whether or not the tested Marines can accomplish their primary combat functions. The SPTs provide for the proper evaluation of the Dragon and LAW weapons employment, but identification of potential targets is not even mentioned.34 TOW is not addressed in this manual. Volume V, Combat Support Units, addresses all combat support units within a Marine Division, to include, artillery, combat engineer, assault amphibian, reconnaissance, tank, and TOW units. Elements of these units are attached to infantry battalions or regiments for contingency deployments at which time they are administered the MCCRES. Tanks and TOWs are required to pass both the Mission Performance Standards and Standard Performance Tests. Again, the MPSs evaluate the interaction between elements of the combat support units and the infantry battalion or regiment to which they are attached but does not address weapons employment. MCCRES lists 18 SPTs for the tank crewman with only one task requiring a firing engagement. Of the eight SPTs required for the TOW crewman, none require evaluation of firing engagement. Neither the tank or TOW crewman are required to identify armored vehicles. The tank and TOW sections of MCCRES are seriously deficient, not only in terms of armored vehicle recognition but in the training and evaluation of tactical employment and gunnery procedures. MCCRES is recognized as the primary means for commanders to determine the combat readiness of all units, but it is generally accepted that it provides a proper and accurate evaluation of only infantry and possibly artillery units.36,37 With substantial revisions and additions, the tank and TOW sections of MCCRES could become a more meaningful training and evaluation tool. For this reason and accepting the assumption that major modifications will be made, several additional deficiencies warrant mentioning. First, as with all combat support units, only tank platoons and TOW sections attached to deploying infantry units are ever evaluated. The majority of tank and TOW crewmen never receive a formal MCCRES evaluation in their primary MOS skill! Secondly, MCCRES directs that the Standard Performance Tests be administered by personnel of the parent command. This is almost never done.38,39,40 The Marine Corps' training and evaluation program for armored vehicle identification is grossly deficient and virtually non-existent. Officers and staff noncommissioned officers are essentially left to their own initiative and resourcefulness as to what should be taught to their Marines. Commanders must quickly come to the realization that to defeat threat armored forces and to survive on the modern armored battlefield, the individual Marine must be able to detect, acquire, identify, and engage the right targets. Other priorities cannot continue to take precedence over this vital subject area. Two courses of action have been identified as possible alternatives or solutions to this problem. First, the Marine Corps could adopt, with modifications, the U.S. Army's methods and materials for vehicle identification. Secondly, the Marine Corps could develop its own program. As we examine the two courses of action, we must be aware of the fact that a standardized and realistic program is essential. This program must be readily available and in sufficient quantities for the training of all Marines armed with an anti-armor weapon and complete with references, lesson plans, films, tapes, etc. Secondly, emphasis must be placed on developing training goals and course criteria that will both aid or force, if necessary, commanders to emphasize armored vehicle identification in their training plans. Lastly, methods must be made available or developed that allows commanders to evaluate either formally or informally the combat readiness of their Marines and units. Certainly with the modern weapons of today and with the numerous armored assets found throughout the world, proper identification of friend or foe is a vital factor in determining combat readiness. The U.S. Army is recognized as the United States' expert in armored warfare. Today's Army has over 12,500 tanks and 20,000 armored personnel carriers in addition to other armor related assets, such as, self-propelled artillery and anti-tank helicopters, etc. The active Army forces maintain four armored divisions and six mechanized divisions, with the National Guard and Reserves maintaining two armored divisions and one mechanized division. In the active component, two armored divisions, two mechanized divisions, one armored brigade, and two mechanized brigades are stationed in Germany as part of the NATO Defense Force.41 The U.S. Army has conducted extensive research of recent armored battles and has continously conducted studies on the organization and equipment of both friendly and hostile forces throughout the world. As a result, the U.S. Army has developed an excellent and comprehensive training and evaluation program for armored vehicle identification that is available to the Marine Corps.42 The program is more than merely a "threat" program. In addition to vehicles employed by Warsaw Pact nations, the program includes U.S. vehicles, as well as, vehicles considered to be allied with the United States. The program, Combat Vehicle Identification Training, contains nine individually bound booklets. The first booklet tells the instructor what the program is and how it operates. The second contains answer sheets. The next six, each with a tray of 35mm slides, are individual training packages which can be used independently. This permits several different units to train at the same time, if desired. When each unit learns the vehicles in one package it can be exchanged for another until all six have been learned. The ninth booklet is a final test package, again, accompanied by a tray of 35mm slides, which includes all vehicles in this training program. In essence, the instructor has all the materials, lesson plans, and related information in one self-contained package.43 The Army is already in the process of up-grading this program with training packages reflecting vehicle identification under degraded conditions, vehicle identification through thermal sights, etc.44 This is the best armored vehicle identification program in existence. The U.S. Army's Training and Evaluation Program (ARTEP) and Soldiers Manual of Common Tasks-Skills are similar to MCCRES but are in much greater detail. The ARTEP is designed to evaluate the ability of a Battalion Task Force to perform specific missions under simulated combat conditions.45 The Soldier's Manual is used for training and evaluation of the individual soldier in his particular MOS.46 Obviously, these two manuals are different in that a task force is addressed in one manual and the individual soldier in the other. However, each manual establishes training objectives with specified tasks, conditions, and standards of performance for combat critical conditions. Further, the Army encourages using the training objectives and tasks found in these manuals in developing unit training plans. The point is that the Army has designed a building block concept of training that interfaces the Soldier's Manual of Common Tasks-Skills with ARTEP. The ARTEP and Soldier's Manual both emphasize armored vehicle identification as a common skill that every soldier should know. Additionally, each manual tasks tank and anti-armor crewmen to correctly identify armored vehicles as part of their training and evaluation.47,48 Because the format and concept of evaluating these tasks are essentially the same, the Army's training objectives with specified tasks, conditions, and standards of performance could easily be incorporated into MCCRES. A second possible solution to this problem is for the Marine Corps to develop its own training and evaluation program for armored vehicle identification. The advantage to this course of action would be development of a formal training and evaluation program which would increase the combat readiness of individual anti-armor crewmen. The major disadvantage is that an already existing and proven Army program is available that meets all Marine Corps requirements. Additionally, development of a realistic and viable program by the Marine Corps would require extensive research and continuous up-dating that would be costly, time consuming, and unnecessary. The most viable solution to this problem is for the Marine Corps to adopt the U.S. Army's program for armored vehicle identification. There are several advantages for adopting this course of action. First, the Army's program is an already existing and proven program that is readily available to the Marine Corps. Secondly, the U.S. Army will maintain the responsibility for continously up-dating the program as new vehicles and equipment are developed or acquired by various nations around the world. This would be at no cost or burden to the Marine Corps. Third, and most importantly, the program meets all U.S. Marine Corps training requirements.49 Efforts should also be made to incorporate this program within the curriculms of the Basic School, the SNCO and NCO Academies, and the Infantry Training Schools. Training and Audiovisual Support Centers (TAVSCs) are located throughout the Marine Corps to support the training needs of Marine units.50 These centers have various assortments of training aids on-hand for off-the-shelf issue. Items found in these centers include audiovisual products, graphic training aids (GTAs), training publications and manuals, locally fabricated aids and devices, and training extension courses (TECs), etc. Justifiable items, not found in the local TAVSC, can be ordered using catalogs that list all training aids and devices held by each military service and the Department of Defense.51 Chapter six and Appendix G of Marine Corps Order P5290.1 specifies how to acquire training items for units not located in close proximity to a TAVSC. Many officers and staff noncommissioned officers are not aware of the functions of and the services available from the TAVSC and consequently do not benefit from available training aids or use sources outside the Marine Corps to acquire essential training aid materials. The local TAVSCs should make these materials available and in sufficient quantity to support all units requesting armor identification materials. Tank and anti-armor units should have these materials in their unit training libraries. The Marine Corps Institute (MCI) program for armored vehicle identification and courses dealing with tanks and anti-armor weapons should be updated and expanded. For example, Volume I of the TOW course could contain only basic information on the TOW, similar to what now exists. A Volume II could be developed to address advanced tactics, weapons employment techniques, target acquisition, target identification, and fire commands, etc. A second example, would be to have a comprehensive armored vehicle identification course as a prerequiste for completing courses dealing with tanks and anti-armor weapons. MCCRES must be modified to emphasize the importance of this subject and to properly evaluate the employment and gunnery skills of tank and anti-armor crewmen. Otherwise, commanders will continue to let other commitments take precedence over armored vehicle identification training, regardless of the type of program adopted. The sections addressing tanks and anti-armor weapons are deficient and do not provide a viable means to evaluate the combat readiness of these personnel. It is recommended that selected sections from the Army's ARTEP and Soldier's Manual of Common Tasks-Skills concerning tanks and anti-armor weapons be incorporated into a revised MCCRES. FM 17-12-2 also provides useful reference material that relates to this subject and is in MCCRES style format. These modifications would provide the commander with a valid evaluation program and a means to select meaningful training objectives for inclusion into unit training plans. Additionally, a requirement should be instituted that requires a formal annual evaluation of all tank and anti-armor crewmen. The development of a formal and well structured armored vehicle identification training and evaluation program is essential to increase the individual Marine's and unit's combat readiness. No one will get a second chance after he mistakenly fires and destroys his fellow Marines or allies. A requirement exists for a comprehensive armored vehicle identification training and evaluation program to improve the individual Marine's ability to rapidly distinguish who is friend or foe, maximize survivability of friendly forces, and produce long range destructive fire on the enemy. The adoption of the U.S. Army's program for armored vehicle identification is the most viable solution to this problem. It is an excellent and proven program that is available to the Marine Corps. Guidance and instructional assistance must be provided to institute this program within the Marine Divisions and in our basic MOS producing schools. MCI courses dealing with tanks and anti-armor weapons must be updated and expanded to reflect current data found in the Army's program. TAVSCs must be able to readily support the training needs of requesting units. In turn, officers and staff noncommissioned officers must be aware of the services available from these centers. MCCRES must emphasize armored vehicle identification by intergrating training standards and evaluation procedures into pertinent sections of Volume II and V. This would allow commanders to use MCCRES as both a formal and informal evaluation tool and as a means of selecting meaningful training objectives for inclusion into unit training plans. With the lethality of today's tank and anti-armor weapons, it is essential that Marines be formally and frequently evaluated in the employment of these weapons and their ability to distinguish between friendly and enemy vehicles. The Marine Corps has provided Marines with weapons capable of defeating all known enemy armored forces. Today's Marines are most proficient in maintaining and firing these volatile weapons of destruction. Let us waste no time in training and evaluating their skills in armored vehicle identification to ensure these weapons are correctly employed against hostile forces and not against our own forces or those of our allies. FOOTNOTES 1Department of the Army, USA, Army Training and Evaluation Program for Mechanized Infantry/Tank Task Forced ARTEP 71-2 (Washington, D.C, 1981), p. ii. 2John Paperone, Armor Instructor, Supporting Arms Division, Command and Staff College, personal interview about tank and anti-armor weapons and training and evaluation of tank and anti-armor crewmen, Quantico, Virginia, February 8, 1985. 3Richard Gabriel, "Lessons of War: The IDF in Lebanon," Military Review, August, 1984, p.53. 4US Arms Control and Disarmament Agency, "World Military Expenditures and Arms Transfers 1972-1982," Defense Program and Analysis Division, April, 1984, p.19. 5Department of the Army, USA, The Soviet Army: Troops, Organization and Equipment, FM 100-2-3 (Washington, D.C., 1984) pp. 1-5. 6Robert Sellers, ed., Armed Forces of the World: A Reference Handbook (New York: Praeger Publishers, 1977), pp. 109 and 250. 7US Marine Corps, Acquisition Decision Memorandum (ADM) Approval on the M1A1 Main Battle Tank 5 February 1985, pp. 1-5. 8Jerry Varela, U.S. Marine Corps Program Manager, Tank Systems and Liaison Officer M60 Series/M1A1 Tank, Tank Automotive Command (TACOM) 1981-1984, personal interview about M1A1 Abrams Tank, Quantico, Virginia, February 13, 1985. 9Bill Cook, Commanding Officer, Anti-Tank (TOW) Company, Second Marine Division, personal interview about training and evaluation precedures for TOW crewmen, Camp Lejeune, North Carolina, February 9, 1985. 10TOW II (Canoga Park, California: Hughes Aircraft Company, 1981), pp.1-3. 11Gazette Staff, "More Changes to Infantry Battalion Structure," Marine Corps Gazette, January, 1982, pp. 24-25. 12W.E. Muzbeck, Development Project Officer, Firepower Division, Development Center, Marine Corps Development and Education Command, personal interview about anti-armor weapons, Quantico, Virginia, March 9, 1985. 13Ibid. 14G.J. Eschenfelder, Training Division, Headquarters Marine Corps, personal interview about tank and anti-armor training and evaluation programs, Quantico, Virginia, February 15, 1985. 15A.J. Schmidt, G-3 Training Officer, First Marine Division, telephone interview about armored vehicle identification programs, Quantico, Virginia to Camp Pendleton, California, February 10, 1985. 16P.R. Vogt, G-3 Training Section, Second Marine Division, telephone interview about armored vehicle identification programs, Quantico, Virginia to Camp Lejeune, North Carolina, February 10,1985. 17Anonymous Source, personal interview about armored vehicle identification training within the Second Marine Division, Camp Lejeune, North Carolina, October 15, 1984. 18Ibid. 19Herbert Steigleman, US Marine Corps Representative, US Army Armor School, telephone interview about armored warfare training and armored vehicle identification, Quantico, Virginia to Fort Knox, Kentucky, February 26, 1985. 20Ronald Richard, Command and Staff Faculty and previously Executive Officer, Seventh Marine Amphibious Brigade, personal interview about training and evaluation methods for combat and combat support units, Quantico, Virginia, February 23, 1985. 21Ibid. 22Steigleman, February 26, 1985 interview. 23Ibid. 24L.A. Summers, Officer-In-Charge, Weapons Division, Marine Corps Infantry Training School, telephone interview about armored vehicle identification training for anti-armor crewmen, Quantico, Virginia to Camp Lejeune, North Carolina, February 4, 1985. 41Tom Davis, Major, U.S. Army, assigned as student to Command and Staff College, personal interview about armored warfare training in the US Army, Quantico, Virginia, March 11, 1985. 42Allen Velo, Branch Chief Instructor, Gunnery Division and previously Command and Staff Advanced Tactics Instructor, US Army Armor School, telephone interview about US Army's Armored Vehicle identification program, Quantico, Virginia to Fort Knox, Kentucky, February 27, 1985. 43 Department of the Army, USA, Combat Vehicle Training Program (CVI), GTA 17-2-9-A (Washington, D.C., 1981), p.1 (instructor's guide). 44Department of the Army, USA, Thermal: An Interim Training Program (CVI), GTA 17-2-10 (Washington, D.C., 1982),p.8 (instructor's guide). 45ARTEP 71-2, p.1-1. 46Department of the Army, USA, M48-M60 Armor Crewman Soldier's Manual: Skill Level 1/2, FM 17-19E 1/2 (Washington, D.C., 1982), p.iii. 47ARTEP 71-2, p. A-351. 48FM 17-19E 1/2, pp. 2-5 and B-5. 49Velo, February 27, 1985 interview. 50MCO P5290.1, Marine Corps Training and Audiovisual Support Manual, dtd 20 Jan 83, pp.D-1 thru D-3 (Headquarters, US Marine Corps, Washington, D.C.). 51Jeffery Marlin, Training Support and Audiovisual Department MCDEC, personal interview about available training aids, Quantico, Virginia, February 26, 1985. BIBLIOGRAPHY Anonymous Source. Personal interview about armored vehicle identification training within the Second Marine Division. Camp Lejeune, North Carolina, October 15, 1984. Carnevelle, Steve, 5-3, First Tank Battalion, First Marine Division. Telephone interview about training and evaluation of tank and anti-armor crewmen. Quantico, Virginia to Camp Pendleton, California, March 7, 1985. Cook, Bill, Commanding Officer, Anti-Tank (TOW) Company, Second Marine Division. Persopal interview about training and evaluation procedures for TOW crewmen. Camp Lejeune, North Carolina, February 9, 1985. Davis, Tom, Major, US Army, assigned as student to Command and Staff College. Personal interview about armored warfare training in the US Army. Quantico, Virginia, March 11,1985. Eschenfelder, G.J., Training Divison, Headquarters Marine Corps. Personal interview about tank and anti-armor training and evaluation programs. Quantico, Virginia, February 15, 1985. Gabriel, Richard. "Lessons of War: The IDF in Lebanon." Military Reviews August 1984, p.53. International Institute for Stragetic Studies. "The Military Balance 1984-1985," Alden Press, Autumn 1984. Marlin, Jeffery, Training Support and Audiovisual Department, MCDEC. Personal interview about available training aids. Quantico, Virginia, February 26, 1985. Matthews, John, Command and Staff College Faculty and previously Executive Officer, Eighth Marines. Personal interview about training and evaluation methods for combat and combat support units. Quantico, Virginia, February 26, 1985. MCO P5290.1. Marine Corps Training and Audiovisual Support Manual. Headquarters. US Marine Corps. Washington, D.C., 1983 MCO 3501.1 w/chg 1. MCCRES. Headquarters. US Marine Corps. Washington, D.C., 1977. MCO 3501.3A. MCCRES. Vol. II: Infantry Units. Headquarters. US Marine Corps. Washington, D.C., 1983. MCO 3501.6. MCCRES. Volume V: Combat Support Elements. Headquarters. US Marine Corps. Washington, D.C., 1977. Muzbeck, W.E., Development Project Officer, Firepower Division, Development Center, MCDEC. Personal interview about anti-armor weapons. Quantico, Virginia, March 9, 1985. Paperone, John, Armor Instructor, Supporting Arms Division, Command and Staff College. Personal interview about tank and anti-armor weapons and training and evaluation of tank and anti-armor crewmen. Quantico, Virginia, February 8, 1985. Richard, Ronald, Command and Staff College Faculty and previously Executive Officer, Seventh Marine Amphibious Brigade. Personal about training and evaluation methods for combat and combat support units. Quantico, Virginia, February 23, 1985. Schmidt, A.J., G-3 Training Officer, First Marine Division. Telephone interview about armored vehicle identification programs. Quantico, Virginia to Camp Pendleton, California, February 10,1985. Sellers, Robert, ed. Armed Forces of the World: A Reference Handbook. New York: Praeger Publishers, 1977. Staff (Gazette). "More Changes to Infantry Battalion Structure." Marine Corps Gazette, January 1982, pp. 24-25. Steigleman, Herbert, US Marine Corps Representative, US Army Armor School. Telephone interview about armored warfare training and armored vehicle identification. Quantico, Virginia to Fort Knox, Kentucky, February 26, 1985. Stenner, Peter, Command and Staff College Faculty and previously Executive Officer, Battalion Landing Team 1/8. Personal interview about combat and combat support training and evaluation of Marine units. Quantico, Virginia, February 23, 1985. Summers, L.A., Officer-In-Charge, Weapons Division, Marine Corps Infantry Training School. Telephone interview about armored vehicle identification training for anti-armor crewmen. Quantico, Virginia to Camp Lejeune, North Carolina, February 4, 1985. TOW II. Canoga Park, California: Hughes Aircraft Company, 1981. TOW 2. St. Louis, Missouri: Emerson Electric Company, Electronics and Space Division, 1983. US Arms Control and Disarmament Agency. "World Military Expenditures and Arms Transfers 1972-1982," Defense Program and Analysis Division, April, 1984. US Army. Department of the Army. Headquarters. Army Training and Evaluation Program for Mechanized Infantry/Tank Task Forced ARTEP 71-2. Washington, D.C., 1981. US Army. Headquarters. Combat Vehicle Identification Training Program (Instructor's Guide), GTA 17-2-9-A. Washington, D.C. 1981. US Army. Department, of the Army. Headquarters. M48-M60 Armor Crewman Soldier's. Manual: Skill Level 1/2, FM 17-19E 1/2. Washington, D.C., 1982. US Army. Department of the Army. Headquarters. M48-M60 Armor Crewman Soldier's Manual: Skill Level 3g FM 17-19E3. Washington, D.C., 1982. US Army. Department of the Army. Headquarters. Soldier's Manual of Common Tasks: Skill Level 1, FM 21-2. Washington, D.C., 1983. US Army. Department of the Army. Headquarters. The Soviet Army: Troops, Organizations and Equipment, FM 100-2-3. Washington, D.C., 1984. US Army. Department of the Army. Headquarters. Tank Platoon ARTEP Mission Training Plan, FC 17-15-1. Fort Knox, Kentucky, 1984. US Army. Headquarters. Thermal: An Interim Training Program (CVI), GTA 17-2-10. Washington, D.C., 1982. US Defense Department. "Soviet Military Power 1984." U.S. Government Printing Office, April 1984. US Marine Corps. Acquisition Decision Memorandum (ADM) Approval on the M1A1 Battle Tank, February 5, 1985. US Marine Corps. Marine Corps Institute. Armor Identification, MCI 03.63T. Washington, D.C., undated. US Marine Corps. Marine Corps Institute. Dragon Weapon System Crewman, MCI 03.56c. Washington, D.C., 1984. US Marine Corps. Marine Corps Institute. The MPFW and LAW Crewman, MCI 0357a. Washington, D.C., 1977. US Marine Corps. Marine Corps Institute. The 105-mm Gun Tanks M60A1 (Rise Passive), MCI 18.32a. Washington, D.C., undated. US Marine Corps. Marine Corps Institute. TOW Weapon System Crewman, MCI 03.55A. Washington, D.C., 1983. Van Dusen, Dyrck, Operational Test Project Officer, Marine Corps Operational Test Evaluation Activity. Personal interview about current and projected tank and anti-armor weapons. Quantico, Virginia, March 8, 1985. Varela, Jerry, US Marine Corps Project Manager, Tank System and Liaison Officer M60 Series/M1A1 Tank, Tank Automotive Command (TACOM) 1981-1984. Personal interview about M1A1 Abrams Tank. Quantico, Virginia, February 13, 1985. Vaughn, Thomas, S-3, Second Tank Battalion, Second Marine Division. Telephone interview about training and evaluation of tank and anti-armor crewmen. Quantico, Virginia to Camp Lejeune, North Carolina, March 7, 1985. Velo, Allen, Branch Chief Instructor, Gunnery Division, and previously Command and Staff Advanced Tactics Instructor, US Army Armor School. Telephone interview about US Army's armored vehicle identification program. Quantico, Virginia to Fort Knox, Kentucky, February 27, 1985. Vogt, P.R., G-3 Training Section, Second Marine Division. Telephone interview about armored vehicle identification program. Quantico, Virginia to Camp Lejeune, North Carolina, February 10, 1985. Willard, Alice, Administrative Assistant, Recruit Training Regiment. Telephone interview about MOS qualification and service schools. Quantico, Virginia to Parris Island, South Carolina, March 7, 1985.
