The Struggle For Survival AUTHOR Major James P. O'Donnell, USMC CSC 1985 SUBJECT AREA General EXECUTIVE SUMMARY In the period between 1943 and 1947 the United States Marine Corps was involved in a struggle for its institutional life. For almost 150 years the question of armed forces unification was mute. As the United States emerged as a world power, increased calls for reorganization of the armed forces began to be heard. With the beginning of the Second World War, it became obvious from our nation's dismal lack of preparedness that some form of reorganization of the military was necessary in the post-war period. Sides began to form on the unification question even before the successful completion of the war. Each service had strong allied and distinct positions to defend. After several abortive attempts a unification bill was finally passed by the Senate in 1947. The bill did not provide statutory safeguards for Marine Corps missions. If passed by the House of Representatives the bill would spell the deathblow for the Marine Corps as a viable combat military organization. In the debate between the Army and the Navy, the Marine Corps had become an incidental pawn. In the face of almost overwhelming obstacles, a group of some twelve Marine officers maneuvered to preserve the Marine Corps. These officers, collectively known as the Chowder Society, helped defeat the proposed legislation. Some of these officers helped draft the National Security Act of 1947, the legislation that spells out Marine Corps roles and missions even today. This paper sets the background for this struggle; develops the struggle in terms of the individuals involved; and finally outlines the resolution of the unification struggle. THE STRUGGLE FOR SURVIVAL Thesis Statement: In the period between 1943 and 1947 the United States Marine Corps was involved in a struggle for its survival as a viable military organization. I. The Background of the Struggle A. Unification of the Armed Forces B. General Marshall's 1943 JCS proposal C. Inter-Service Rivalry II. The Struggle Develops A. The War Department position B. The Navy Department position C. The Marine Corps position D. Truman's Role III. Resolution of the Struggle A. The Chowder Society B. The Battle is Joined C. The National Security Act of 1947 THE STRUGGLE FOR SURVIVAL On the morning of 23 February 1945, Secretary of the Navy James Forrestal and Marine Lieutenant General H.M. Smith observed the raising of the American flag atop Mount Suribachi. This proved to be a very moving experience for Forrestal. Turning to Gen. Smith, he said,"The raising of that flag on Suribachi means a Marine Corps for the next five hundred years."1 Fifteen months after Forrestal's moving tribute, the United States Marine Corps was involved in a struggle for its survival as a vivable military organization. One would think that the Marine Corps had assured its continued existence with its performance in the Second World War. Comprising less than five percent of the 16.3 million Americans who had served during the war, 19,733 Marines were killed in action. Another 67,207 were wounded. The Marine Corps had suffered nearly ten percent of all the nation's battlefield casualties.2 What had happened to place this elite fighting force in jeopardy? The answer can be summed up in one word--unification. The purpose of this paper is to examine the Marine Corps' struggle for survival in the post World War II armed forces unification controversy. I will review those events and the armed forces relationships that brought about unification. The main focus of this paper will be the identification of the principal individuals who made up the "Chowder Society", and the contribution they made to the adoption of the National Security Act of 1947. For almost 150 years Army/Navy operations were conducted under the principle of "mutual cooperation." Mutual cooperation held that Army and Navy commanders would reach friendly agreements on how to coordinate their forces in battle.3 This police presented both services with little problem, since for most of the period, the Army was off fighting Indians, while the Navy was busily showing the flag overseas. In those areas where mutual cooperation was needed its implementation depended greatly on the attitudes of the Secretary of War or the Secretary of the Navy. Lindley Garrison, Secretary of War under Wilson, captured the prevailing attitude in a letter he forwarded to Navy Secretary Josephus Daniels: Joe, I don't care a damn about the Navy, and you don't care a damn about the Army. You run your machine and I will run mine. I am glad if anyone can convince me I am wrong, but I am damn sure nobody lives who can do it. I am an individualist and not cut out for cooperative effort. I will let you go your way, and I will go my way.4 The drive for unification of the services first took form after World War I. The Institute for Government Research (later to become the Brookings Institute) began a series of reform movements to reshape the Executive Department. A congressional committee picked up on this and sought to reorganize the executive branch in line with the so called "single purpose"priniciple. President Harding's representative, Walter Brown, recommended that the Army and Navy Departments follow the single purpose principle. He proposed that the two cabinet posts be unified under a single secretary in a Department of Defense. Brown further recommended that all functions not related to national defense be transferred out of the new department. Subsequent hearings focused on this aspect of the bill, and when the legislation was finally defeated military unification was hardly mentioned.5 The movement for an autonomous air force was another key factor which figured into early armed forces unification attempts. The need for unification was championed by Billy Mitchell. In 1925 Mitchell publicly blamed two serious air mishaps on the splintering of air assets between the Army and the Navy. These charges led to the now famous court martial and Mitchell's resignation from the Army. It also led to the formation of a blue ribbon panel to study unification and the establishment of a separate air force. The Morrow Board, as the panel was known, recommended against both unification and separate air force. The board did recommend the formation of the Army Air Corps. As a result the Air Corps Act of 1926 was passed.6 The last measure to seriously address the unification. process prior to the war was the Economy Measure of 1932. This measure was defeated primarily by the opposition of Army Chief of Staff, Douglas MacArthur. The Air Corps officers changed their tactics from advocating all out unification to a policy of consolidating their gains within the Army. These events plus the Depression effectively quieted the drive for unification. The unification process began again on 2 November 1943. Army Chief of Staff General George C. Marshall made a proposal for post-war unification before the Joint Chiefs of Staff. Citing the need for unity of command and economy, Marshall proposed a single department to be headed by a civilian secretary. The department would be made up of ground, naval and air components. The proposal included a separate supply service, a strong chief of staffs and a United States General Staff. Marshall's plan stressed unhindered access to the president coupled with improved execution of military policy.7 General Marshall had been appalled by his nation's lack of preparedness prior to the Second World War. He wrote: As sick as any (nation) was the United States of America. We had no field army. There were the bare skeletons of three and one half divisions scattered in small pieces throughout the United States. It was impossible to train even those few troops as divisions because motor transport and other facilities were lacking and funds for adequate maneuvers were not appropriated. The Air Force consisted of a few partially equipped squadrons serving continental United States, Panama, Hawaii and the Philippines; their planes were largely obsolecent and could have hardly have survived a single day aerial combat. We lacked mordern arms and equipment. When President Roosevelt proclaimed on 8 September 1939 that a limited emergency for the United States we were in terms of available strength, not even a third rate military power. Marshall did not desire a return to the pre-World War II status quo. In 1939 the U.S. Navy was the third largest navy in the world. The Navy spent more on one battleship than the Army spent on its entire budget. In 1939 the U.S. Army rated seventeenth in size, right behind Yugoslavia. Marshall saw the inequality of budget process as a signifiant cause of the cost in lives suffered as the Army was forced to build up for mobilization.9 With the submission of the Marshall unification plan the lines wre being drawn for the inter-service struggles. The struggle would soon place Army against Navy, Army against Marines, and even Navy against Marines. But why a struggle at all? The armed forces had the same ultimate mission-- the defense of the nation. Lt. Gen. Victor Krulak, a key participant in the struggle, gives the answer quite succinctly: In time of peace the armed services compete for dollars, in time of war they compete for military tasks and material priority. We find ourselves in competition all the time. Add to this the leavening of pride in your uniform and your service and you can see at once that there are the ingredients of a constant conflict. Now this conflict need not take virulent form, but when dollars are hard to get or the tasks are subject of great competition it can become virulent as it has in the past.10 This virulent competition for the Marine Corps took the form of the War Department and the United States Army. The outward manifestation of this competition first took place in 1916. The Army General Staff sent a proposal to the joint Army--Navy Board requiring exclusive Army command of any mixed contingents of Army and Marine troops. The proposal was based on the Army's assumption that Marine officers were "ipso facto" less fitted for high commando.11 The proposal died an appropriate death; its effect on the morale of Marine officers need not be discussed. In World War I Marines made up a portion of the American Expeditionary Force. Many Army officers seethed at the one sided publicity which the Marines received at Belleau Wood. "OUR MARINES ATTACK--Gain Mile at Veiully" announced the New York Times. Another headline from the Chicago Daily Tribune said..."MARINES WIN HOT BATTLE--Sweep Enemy From Heights." The Marines were praised unceasingly. Everything accomplished was assumed to have been done by the Marines. Army troops in the same Division, and those in the 3rd Division, who were holding the Marne River line, received no recognition.12 George C. Marshall, General Pershing's operations officer during World War I, was a pivotal figure in the Army/Marine rivalry. General Marshall did not like Marines. He told wartime Chief of Naval Operation, Ernest J. King; "I am going to see that Marines never win another war."13 These feelings of bitterness were further exacerbated by the Smith vs. Smith controversy. The problem arose when Marine Major General Holland M. Smith, commander of ground forces in Saipan, recommended that Army Major General Ralph C. Smith, commander of the Army 27th Divisions be relieved of command. Holland M. Smith believed that Ralph Smith lacked aggressiveness. Adamiral Spruance effected the relief. Admiral Nimitz's senior Army commander in the Central Pacific, Lt.Gen. Robert C. Richardson, fueled an already volatile situation by convening an board to review the appropriateness of the relief. Richardson had publicly expressed his low opinion of Marine officers' ability to handle units above the Division level. It was rumored that when Marshall read Richardson's report, he angrily vowed that he would never permit another soldier to serve under Marine command.14 The struggle was not confined solely to Army/Marine matters. The Army Air Corps/Air Force and Naval Aviation were locked in a bitter struggle over missions. This struggle became so intense that it culminated in the resignation of the Secretary of the Navy and the relief of the CNO in 1949. Also, many Naval aviators would certainly have sacrificed the Marine Corps to ensure the future of Naval Aviation.15 After the Marshall 1943 unification plan the forces for armed forces unification began the drive that four years later culminated in the National Security Act of 1947. In April 1944 House committee hearings began on the subject. Chaired by Representative Clifton A. Woodrum, the Woodrum hearings gave new momentum to the Army's unification plan. The unification advocates were beginning to line up and take sides. No legislation was reported out. President Roosevelt told all involved, "...knock it off, we're in a war now add this is no time to have the services fighting between themselves."16 The Army plan gained added momentum with the Richardson committee report presented in May 1945. The report reflected the Army view particularly with respect to a strong chief of staff. Secretary of the Navy Forrestal sensed that both public and congressional opinion were shifting to the idea of a single defense department. To counter, as he called it, "this Army steam roller"; Forrestal commissioned the Eberstadt Report outling the Navy position on the unification question. Ferdinand Eberstadt was a lifelong friend of Forrestal, and former head of the Army/Navy Munitions Board. The report broadened the focus of unification from strictly military matters. It called for institutionalized procedures for the integration of military policy with all aspects of high level foreign policy.17 As the unification process proceeded towards the legisla- tive stage, the positions of the services could be summarized as follows. The Army desired a strong Chief of Staff, a single military budget, military control, adequate ground forces, restriction on the Marine Corps as a second land army, and economy. The Navy wanted status quo organizational integrity, separate service budgets, civilian control, and wider integration of the polictical, military and foreign policy spheres. The Marine Corps sought statutory protection for Marine Corps' roles and missions, including Marine Air.18 The term Chowder Society became the code name for the defense of the Marine Corps during the unification struggle.19 While some historians point to the formation of "Chowder" with the formation of the Thomas--Edson in March 1947, the efforts of the "Little Men's Marching and Chowder Society" (taken from a comic strip of the day because the main character, Barnaby, was extremely short and bore a striking resemblance to one Lt.Col. V.H. Krulak) began much earlier. According to Krulak the prime movers of "Chowder" were Col Merril B. Twinning and Gen. G.C. Thomas, and "the great mind was Twinning."20 Twinning first became involved in 1942. He visited his brother, BGen. Nathan F. Twinning, USA, at Noumea, New Caledonia in December. He was a house guest in quarters shared by Army generals Collins, Patch and Sebree his brother and others. Lt. Col. Twinning learned some "startling" revelations about Army military reorganization after the war. Twinning became so concerned for what these plans held for the future of the Marine Corps that the following day, "Ireported in detail to AAV." (Arthur A. Vandegrift, then commanding at Guadalcanal.)21 In April 1944 General Thomas was designated the Commandant's personal representative to the Woodrum Committee hearings. He did not miss a single hearing session. Working out of Headquarters in Washington, Thomas became the Commandant's coordinator for unification matters. Twinning was instructed to establish the Marine Corps Board at Marine Corps Schools, Quantico. In order to assist Twinning, Lt. Col. V.H. Krulak was assigned as the Chief of the newly formed Research Section of the Marine Corps Schools. The Research Section would provide Krulak sufficient cover to work almost exclusively on the unification matter. The full membership of the Chowder Society never exceeded more than twelve members. On 12 April 1945 Harry S. Truman became the thirty- third president of the United States. Truman came to office as no friend of the Marine Corps. He had served as an Army captain in the Field Artillery in World War I. He had risen to the rank of Colonel in the Reserves. As a Senator he had served on the senate appropriations and Military Affairs Committees. He had a strong desire for the military unification. As a Vice Presidential candidate he had written an article for Colliers magazine entitled, "Our Armed Forces Must Be Unified." His view of the Marine Corps was, "Then the Navy had its own "little army" that talks Navy and is known as the Marine Corps."22 Truman shared similar views of the Navy. "When Roosevelt was here," he reportedly said of the White House, "this place was like a wardroom. As long as I'm here the Admirals will never get in again."23 Truman's first opportunity for reorganization of the military cane when Secretary Forrestal suggested legislation increasing the permanent strength of the Marine Corps.24 This enabled Truman to send the issue to the Joint Chiefs for review. As a result, certain Army officers notably General Eisenhower and General Spaatz aired their views under the Series 1478 JCS papers. In papers 10 and 11 Eisenhower and Spaatz wrote at length on the ultimate role of the Marine Corps. The Marine Corps was not represented on the JCS and the 1478 papers were highly classified and not availabe to the Marines. The papers recommended that the Marine Corps be kept very small, and restricted to units no larger than a regiment. Among the duties envisioned were, "to protect United States citizens ashore in foreign countries and to provide interior guard of naval ships and naval shore establishments."25 Admiral Nimitz, CNO, responded to these papers on 30 March 1946. He said, "The basic and major issue considered in JCS 1478/10 and JCS 1478/11 comprise a proposal on the part of the Army: a) to eliminate the Marine Corps as an effective combat element, reducing it to the status of Naval police units."26 At this point another key figure of the Chowder Society emerged. BGen. M.A. Edson was a war hero and Medal of Honor winner. He was the senior Marine on the CNO's staff. According to Thomas,Edson provided the Marine Corps with a copy of the JCS 1478 papers. "Edson brought the whole volume with him. The most intensive study of these papers led to the conclusion that the salvation of the Corps lay in having its roles and missions spelled out in legislation if it should be adopted."27 Col. Heinl, another "Chowder" member saw the JCS 1478 papers in historic perspective. "The Army plan embraced almost word for word, the missions of the British Royal Marines--the only thing left out was providing bands for the Navy."28 From this time on the Marine Corps would not trust any unification plan authored by the Army. A bill proposing military unification was introduced in 1946. S. 2044 embodied the entire Army unification plan. This bill produced the famous "bended knee" speech delivered by Gen. A.A. Vandegrift, Commandant of the Marine Corps. In a speech written by Twinning, Vandegrift said: ...placing its case in your hands the Marine Corps remembers that it was this same Congress which, in 1798, called it into long and useful service to the nation. The Marine Corps feels that the question of its continued existence is likewise a matter for determination by the Congress and not one to be resolved by departmental legermain or a quasi- legislative process enforced by the War Department General Staff. The Marine Corps, then, believes that it has earned this right--to have its future decided by the legislative body which created it--nothing more. Sentiment is not a valid consideration in determining questions of national security. We have pride in ourselves and in our past but we do not rest our case on any presumed ground of gratitude owing us from the nation. The bended knee is not a tradition of our Corps. If the Marine as a fighting man has not made a case for himself after 170 years of service he must go. But I think you will agree with me that he has earned the right to depart with dignity and honor, not by subjugation to the status of uselessness and servility planned for him by the War Department.29 General Vandegrift's speech met with immediate public acceptance. The dangers to the Marine Corps' existence were finally publicly voiced. As a result the Bill was tabled and died. Another result was Vandergrift's becoming the target of extreme pressure from both Truman and Forrestal. This would play a significant role in the later battle. The direct result of the defeat of S.2044 was the compromise worked out by Secretary of War Patterson and Secretary of the Navy Forrestal at Truman's insistence. The compromise did not call for statutory provisions of Marine roles and functions. The Marine Corps view of the compromise was voiced by Vandegrift, "the Navy sold out to the Army", by not insisting that all functions and duties be written into law. It was at this juncture that Vandegrift formed the Edson--Thomas Board. Working out of two groups, one from Washington and one from Quantico, this board formalized the struggle to counter the pending legislation. The group was hampered by many factors. The Marine Corps itself was not wholly united on the unification question. Krulak, speaking of the "Chowder"members relates: They did so in the face of some derision, much misunderstanding, and occasionally, unthinking hostility by their peers, and often their superiors which made it worse. It took a certain self- sacrificial, almost fearless attitude to do so in view of the fact that among your peers you could not talk freely about what you were doing.31 To further complicate matters Marine officers were placed under a "gag order" by Secretary Forrestal. On the day he reached agreement with Patterson, Forrestal published AlNav 21 which made it clear that support of the proposal before Congress was expected. To Marines this was extremely unfair. The War Department continued to lobby Congress, and the Marine Corps had not been represented at the Forrestal-- Patterson compromise. General Vandegrift was soon the man in the middle. As a result of the Patterson--Forrestal compromise a new bill, S.758 was submitted. It did not include statutory protection of Marine Corps' roles and functions. The bill passed the Senate with the concurrence of Vandegrift. Truman had informed Vandegrift that functions would not be included and that was final. Vandegrift was caught in the dilemma of acting aggresively enough to achieve Marine aims without giving Truman and Forrestal cause for his relief.32 S.758 was introduced in the House as HR2319. The bill was assigned to the House Committee on Expenditures. There were several reasons for the assignment. The committee was a non-controversial in the unification debate. Its Chairman Clare Hoffman was known as an extreme isolation- ist in foreign policy. Hoffman had little interest or knowledge of the military. Unification proponents believed that Hoffman would turn the chair of the committee over to former Senator, Representative James Wadsworth. Wadsworth was a recognized expert on military matters, and a staunch Army advocate. The Chowder Society intervened again. Chairman Hoffman was a life long friend of "Chowder" member Lt. Col. James B. Hittle's father. The elder Hittle and Hoffman were friends from past politics in Michigan. Col. Hittle convinced Hoffman to champion the Marine cause. The Hoffman Committee hearings produced a dramatic effect. Army anti-Marine hostility was clearly displayed. Hoffman forced release of the JCS 1478 papers. Army Chief of Staff Dwight Eisenhower's testimony that he meant the Marine Corps no harm was compromised. The resultant furor made any hopes for passage of a unification bill unlikely. Truman realized that if he did not have a bill that included the roles and functions of the Marine Corps he would have no bill at all. Representative Hoffman submitted a new bill(drafted by Twinning, Krulak and Hittle) H4214.33 The bill gave the Marines everything it wanted. The Marine Corps had won a significant legislative victory. The major credit for this victory must be given to Representative Hoffman. Hittle summed up the Hoffman contribution best: ...when I saw the completely exhausted condition Mr. Hoffman was in after fighting the cause of the Marine Corps, I could not help but think how regrettable it was that so few Marine officers will ever realize how close the Marine Corps had been to virtual extiction, and how very, very few ever knew or ever would know the extent to which the fate of the Marine Corps in the Unification Bill depended so completely upon the efforts of one man, Mr. Clare Hoffman, the Chairman of the House Committee on expenditures. Mr. Hoffman had never been a Marine, nor had any of his relatives been in the Marine Corps, yet candidness compels me to say that I know of no Marine officer who fought with more sincerity or more determination for the Marine Corps than did Mr. Hoffman.34 An additional act of personal integrity was displayed by "Chowder" member Edson. Faced with the presidential fiat to remain silent on the unification bill, Edson retired and testified as a civilian before the Hoffman committee. This dramatic step was part of the "Chowder" strategy to offset the compromised position of General Vandegrift. With Edson's retirement the Marine Corps lost one of its finest officers. On 26 July 1947 The National Security Act was signed into law by President Truman. The Marine Corps was organized to provide "fleet marine forces of combined armes, together with supporting air components, for service with the fleet in the seizure or defense of advanced naval bases, and for the conduct of such land operations as may be essential to the prosecution of a naval campaign."35 The view of the victory from the Chowder Society was summed up best by Lt. Gen. Krulak: There is something that needs saying...I will say it dognatically. The National Security Act of 1947 has turned out to be a substantial piece of legislation so far as the Marines are concerned. From 1947 until today, 23 years later, the law has preserved and sustained the Marines.36 A different view came from Eisenhower. He described the Marines as; "being so unsure of their value to their country that they insisted on writing into the law a complete set of rules and specifications for their future operations and duties. Such freezing of detail...is silly, even vicious."37 Given the nature of the struggle during the previous three years, vicious was indeed an appropriate term. To the members of the Chowder Society the saving of the Marine Corps was far from silly. Marine officers can learn many valuable lessons from this historic period. Never get complacent is one lesson. One researcher claimed that the Marine Corps has faced a challenge to its existence on the average of once every eleven years. As General Vandegrift told us we cannot rest our case on sentiment or national gratitude. If we do not make a case for ourselves, we must go. We must strive to be better. We must remain firmly rooted in our military values and proven traditions. We must also look to the future with intelligence and courage. We must learn from our "Chowder" brothers of forty years ago, and face all challenges to our existence with courage and tenacity. We must be aware of entangling political alliances. Our existence is tied is tied by law to the body that formed us--the Congress. On a practical level we owe no allegience to any political party or particular presidential administration save in their constitutional duties. A good reading of the Constitution should be required of all officers assigned to such duties as the White House staff, National Security Council, or any such political post. As the "Chowder" experience confirmed, the constitutional system of checks and balances is a most useful tool. Finally, all Marines should be inspired by the personal courage of the men who made up the Chowder Society. Reading the accounts of these men I could see the deep animosities and petty jealousy they endured from their own brother in the Corps. Some Marine officers declined participation in the unification struggle because they felt the duty beneath them. They didn't want to get dirty or risk their careers. The sheer drive of men like Twinning and Thomas and the tenacity of men like Krulak and Hittle should inspire us all to a deeper love of our Corps. As long as one Marine breathes life in this Republic, the names of these brave men should never be forgotten. FOOTNOTES 1Robert D. Heinl, Jr. "The Right to Fight." United States Naval Institute Proceedings, 88 (September 1962),p.23. 2Allan R. Millet. Semper Fidelis.(New York: Macmillan Publishing Co. Inc. 1980) p. 439. 3Demetrios Caraley. The Politics of Military Unification (New York: Columbia University Press, 1966), p. 5. 4Ibid. p. 4 5Ibid. p. 10 6Ibid. 7Gordon W. Keiser. The U.S. Marine Corps and Defense Unification 1944-1947 (Washington, D.C.: National Defense University Press, 1982) p. 5. 8George C. Marshall, H.H. Arnold and Ernest J. King. Wartime Papers (Philedelphia: J.B. Lippencott Co., 1947) p. 290. 9James A. Bowden. The National Security Act of 1947 and the Commander in Chief (Unpublished Thesis paper, Dec. 1982) p. 15. 10Victor H. Krulak. Oral History Transcript (Washington D.C.: Historical Division, HQMC, 1973) pp. 113-114. 11Keiser, p. 3. 12John Tolland. No Man's Land (Garden City, N.Y.: Doubleday and Sons, 1980), p. 272. 13Thomas B. Buell. Master of Seapower (Boston: Little, Brown and Co.,1980), p. 340. 14Forrest C. Pogue. George Marshall: Organizer of Victory (New York: The Viking Press, 1973), p. 448. 15Caraley, p. 333. 16G.C. Thomas. Oral History Transcript (Washington, D.C.: Historical Division, HQMC, 1966), p. 771. 17Frank Marutollo. "A Good Bowl of Chowder Saved the Marine Corps." Marine Corps Gazette, 62 (December 1978), pp.22-33. 18Ibid. 19Thomas, p. 773 20Krulak, p. 112. 21Keiser, p.4. 22Harry S. Truman. Memoirs Vol. II Years of Trial and Hope. (Garden City, N.Y.: Doubleday and Co., 1956) p. 47. 23Heinl, p. 25. 24Truman, p. 48 25Marutollo, p. 26. 26Ibid. 27Thomas, p. 808. 28Ibid., p. 788. 29Alexander A. Vandegrift. Once A Marine (New York: W.W. Norton and Co., 1964), p. 314. 30Ibid., pp.321--322. 31Krulak, pp. 112--113. 32Keiser, pp. 94--95. 33Millett, p. 463. 34Marutollo, p. 27. 35Keiser, p. 113. 36Krulak, p. 112 37Robert H. Ferrel. The Eisenhower Diaries (New York: W.W. Norton and Co., 1981), p. 142. BIBLIOGRAPHY Bowden, James A. The National Security Act of 1947 and the Commander in Chief. Unpublished Thesis. December 1982. Buell, Thomas B. Master of Seapower. Boston: Little Brown and Co. 1980. Caraley, Demetrios. The Politics of Military Unification. New York: Columbia University Press, 1966. Heinl, Robert D. Jr. Soldiers of the Sea. Annapolis: U.S. Naval Institue Press, 1962. Heinl, Robert D. Jr. "The Right to Fight." United States Naval Institute Proceedings, 88 (September 1962) 23-39. Ferrel, Robert H. The Eisenhower Diaries. New. York: W.W. Norton and Co., 1981. Keiser, Gordon W. The U.S. Marine Corps and Defense Unification 1944-1947. Washington, D.C.: National Defense University Press, 1982. Krulak, Victor H. Organization for National Security. Cambridge, Ma.: United States Strategic Institute, 1983. Krulak, Victor H. Oral Htstory Transcript. Washington, D.C.: Historical Division, HQMC, 1973. Marshall, George C. Arnold, H.H., King, Ernest J. Wartime Papers. Philedelphia: J.B. Lippencott Co., 1947 Marutollo, Frank. "A Good Bowl of Chowder Saved the Marine Corps." Marine Corps Gazette, 62 (December 1978) 22-33. Millett, Allan R. Semper Fidelis. New York: Macmillan Publishing Co. Inc, 1980 Millis, Walter. The Forrestal Diaries. New York: The Viking Press, 1973. Moskin, Robert J. The U.S. Marine Corps Story. New York: McGraw Hill Book Co., 1977. Pogue, Forrest C. George Marshall: Organizer of Victory. New York: The Viking Press, 1973. Thomas, G.C. Oral History Transcript. Washington, D.C.: Historical Division, HQMC, 1966. Tolland, John. No Man's Land. Garden City, N.Y.: Doubleday and Sons, 1980. Truman, Harry S. Memoirs Vol. II Years of Trial and Hope. Garden City, N.Y.: Doubleday and Co., 1956. Vandegrift, A.A. Once A Marine. New York: W.W. Norton and Co., 1964.
