MAGTF TACAIR In Joint Sustained Land Operations: USMC Versus USAF CSC 1985 SUBJECT AREA Aviation MAFTF TACAIR in JOINT SUSTAINED LAND OPERATIONS: USMC VERSUS USAF FEBRUARY 1985 BY JAMES S. MENDELSON MAJOR USMC THE CONTENTS OF THIS PAPER REFLECT THE PERSONAL VIEWS OF THE AUTHOR AND ARE NOT NECESSARILY ENDORSED BY THE MARINE CORPS COMMAND AND STAFF COLLEGE OR THE UNITED STATES MARINE CORPS. Abstract of MAGTF TACAIR IN JOINT SUSTAINED LAND OPERATION: USMC versus USAF The U. S. Marine Corps has a history of combat employment in joint sustained land operations. Currently, various contingen- cies exist around the world which envision employment of a MAGTF as part of a joint force in sustained land operations. The MAGTF is unique among all armed forces by virtue of its existence as the only truly integrated air-ground team. This is a bone of contention for one of our sister Services and a matter of envy to another. Amphibious doctrine is not at issue! The issue centers around the command relationships of the MAGTF during sustained joint operations ashore. Click here to view image At stake is the continued integrity of Marine TACAIR as a constituent element of the MAGTF and retention of control over Marine TACAIR by the MAGTF commander during joint operations ashore. The Air Force has repeatedly argued for single manage- ment of all theater TACAIR. Failing realization of such, USAF efforts have been redirected towards revamping current doctrine affecting joint force organization. Utilizing combined force doctrine as a precedent, along with a narrow interpretation of military history, they have attempted to align joint force organization on a trilateral, functional basis. Potentially affected is the structure of joint force organizations in several theaters, scenarios, and OPLANS ranging from NATO to the Middle East and Korea. Additionally, the Air Force and army have agreed upon joint doctrine for the battlefield interdiction effort (air and surface) which alters traditional battlefield structuring and responsibilities, thus posing serious and far reaching consequen- ces to any MAGTF employed ashore in a joint arena. The issue is complex. All Marine officers need to under- stand much more than the basic precepts of the JCS Omnibus Agreement (CMC White Letter 7-61) which established current doctrine for the employment of the MAGTF in sustained joint land operations. They need to understand both the background as well as the Air Force perspective of this issue, so that it may be assured that while the doctrinal issue is addressed at the JCS level, at the operational levels, the MAGTF is properly employed. Only through the education of Marines; insuring that all commanders, joint planners, staff officers, and liaison officers are thoroughly conversant in this issue, may we make certain that the best possible support is provided to our Marine riflemen, while simultaneously providing the optimum combat force for the joint force. While this paper presupposes a knowledge of the MAGTF and amphibious doctrine, it provides an extensive insight into aviation functions, joint force organization, and the history of aviation command and control, as the framework is established for an indepth analysis of the subject issue in a contemporary perspective. Following this analysis, the discussion centers upon the implications of the subject issue to the Marine Corps, and the responsibility of all Marines in order to meet the challenges posed. There were ample sources of information available on this subject, with classification comprising the only constraint. Some of the most enlightening sources consisted of a series of three Air Force Doctrinal Information Publications which all focus primarily upon the Air Force's position on the command and control of MAGTF TACAIR in sustained joint land operations. It is mandatory that all professional Marine officers, aviation or ground, be knowledgeable and articulate in all aspects of this issue. TABLE OF CONTENTS CHAPTER PAGE ABSTRACT ii I INTRODUCTION 1 PART I - BACKGROUND II FUNCTIONS OF AVIATION 5 III JOINT FORCE ORGANIZATION 18 IV HISTORICAL PERSPECTIVE 24 PART II - CONTEMPORARY ANALYSIS V THE OMNIBUS AGREEMENT 55 VI FUNCTIONALISM VS MAGTF INTEGRITY VII IMPLICATION FOR MARINES 79 VIII RESPONSIBILITY OF MARINES 94 CONCLUSION 98 BIBLIOGRAPHY 101 Chapter I Introduction All Marines should clearly understand the structure of the Marine Corps, and how the Marine Corps organizes for combat- specifically MAGTFs. Our amphibious mission and role within the Department of the Navy should be universally understood and acknowledged. A historical analysis of past employments of Marine Corps forces, along with a study of possible future contingencies and current national strategy make it intuitively obvious to all concerned that future employment of the Marine Corps is certain to involve joint or combined operations, as Bell as the likely utilization of Marines in sustained operations ashore. The employment of Marines in this manner raises many old and new questions, of interest to both Marines and our sister Services. While simple logic combined with lessons from the past seem to dictate solutions to these questions, and current guidance appears to answer the mail, this is not entirely true at all levels of the chain of command, and particularly in the case of certain of our sister Services. The purpose of this paper is not to fuel interService rivalries of petty fighting over dogmatic or doctrinal issues, but rather to make the Marine Officer at the lower operational levels aware of the lost contentious issue, its background, and the ramifications surrounding ongoing deliberations now occuring at the highest echelons in the joint arena. The Marine Corps is best served by having all its professional officers educated and conversant in this issue. Our sister Services certainly are familiarizing their officers with the Marine Corps and how it relates to them. For example, the US Air Force has published a Doctrinal Informa- tion Publication entitled Command Relationships, the Marine Air/Ground Task Forced and What They Mean to an Airman! At this point, suffice it to say that this publication goes well beyond merely describing the organization and mission of the Marine Corps in a manner similar to our Education Center publications on the Department of the Air Force. What implication does all this have for the individual Marine rifleman? If logic prevails, none. However, taking the less naive approach, there currently remain serious external challenges to MAGTF integrity under certain scenarios. It is not an understatement to declare that there are threats to USMC retention of operational control of aircraft and airspace on the joint battlefield, with a possible severe loss of responsiveness in providing support to the Marine rifleman on the ground. The purpose of this paper is to highlight these issues and provide a working knowledge for all Marine officers. While the scope of this paper will remain unclassified, and must skirt many sensitive, closely held issues which are addressed at higher levels, there is a considerable amount of substantive information which can and should be understood by all professional Marines. This paper presupposes a knowledge of the MAGTF and how the MAGTF is employed in its amphibious mission, to include the command relationships therin.1 Since classic amphibious opera- tions and the command and control of Marine aviation therein is not a contested issue, this subject will not be addressed, Two specific means of MAGTF employment are relevant to the focus of this paper. First of all, as previously addressed, the employment of the MAGTF in protracted land campaigns. Secondly, the situation in which the ACE, or elements of the ACE are foward deployed to a theater of operations well in advance of the GCE. This is a very plausible scenario today, possibly associated with an amphibious operation or the marrying up with NTPS or MPS. Before specifically addressing these issues, a thorough insight into the structures and missions of aviation in all the Services is necessary, along with an analysis of joint force organization, and study of the history of air command and control. Only with an indepth understanding of this peripheral background, can the stage be set for homing in on the topic of this paper: functionalism vs. MAGTF integrity. This subject is the crux of the issue at stake, and perhaps a better title for this dissertation, failing selection for such only because of its inability to motivate towards readership. The effectiveness of the MAGTF in the employment of its 1For a through discussion of this subject, see LFM 01, AFM 2-53, Doctrine for Amphibious Operations, 1 August 1967. air and ground elements in combat can only be realized by adherence to the basic precepts of MAGTF employment, in our training and in the preparation of operation plans. It is not enough that we understand the subtleties of the distinctions within the policy statement; I expect all officers who are involved in joint/combined planning activities to be able to articulate these precepts and secure recognition of them in operation plans. This, too, may require some educating... General R. H. BARROW Commandant of the Marine Corps WHITE LETTER NO. 7-81 If a Marine Corps Officer does not understand the rationale of the argument of Service component vs. functional componency or the implication of "air component commander" as opposed to "Air Force component commander" he is ill prepared to comply with the direction provided him by the Commandant of the Marine Corps. The issue is complex. There are many who say that the US Air Force possesses an ultimate goal of obtaining centralized Air Force control of all theater TACAIR assets. Is this a true observation? Only through a thorough insight into the basic issue may one judge. Whatever the determination, the fact remains, the Marine Corps must always insure the sound, logical, effective employment of its forces in all arenas. PART ONE *** BACKGROUND Chapter II Functions of Aviation Each of the four major Services in the US Armed Forces possesses its own aviation force which employs aircraft in varying roles and missions. Is there a homology among the functions of these different Service aviation arms which could facilitate uniting the efforts of each arm into a centralized air organization for the prosecution of warfare? To address this question, "functions" must be defined in a matter suitable for application to the joint arena. JCS Pub 1, Department of Defense Dictionary of Military and Associated Terms defines functions as: The appropriate or assigned duties, responsibilities, missions, or tasks of an individual, office, or organization. As defined in the National Security Act of 1947, as amended, the term "function" includes functions, powers, and duties, (5 United States Code 171n (a).) Each of the military departments is assigned certain common functions. These include the requirement to "organize, train, and equip forces for assignment to unified and specified commands".2 Additionally, JCS Pub 2 states, during its discussion of the functions of the various military departments: The forces developed and trained to perform the primary functions set forth hereinafter shall be employed to support and supplement the other Services in carrying out their primary functions, where and whenever such participation will result in increased effectiveness and will contribute to the accomplishment of the overall military objectives. As for collateral functions, while the assignient of such functions may establish further justification for stated force requirements, such assignment shall not be used as the basis for establishing additional force requirements. The Air Force defines primary functions as "those assigned actions for which a particular Service is mainly responsible, and collateral functions are those assigned actions where one Service performs a primary function of another service".3 JCS Pub 1 does not contain any definition and/or distinction of primary as opposed to collateral functions. The Air Force interpretation of these two "function" discriminators becomes suspect when an analysis of various Services primary and collateral functions 2Jcs Pub 2, Unified Action Armed Forces, October 1974, p. 16. 3AFM 1-1, Functions and Basic Doctrine of the United States Air Force, March 1984, p. 3-1. (JCS Pub 2) is performed. 1) A primary function of the Army is to organize, equip, and provide forces for joint amphibious operations while the collat- eral function of the Army is to interdict enemy sea and air power and communications through operations on or from land. 2) A collateral function of the Navy and Marine Corps is to interdict enemy land and air power and communications through operations at sea.4 While the Air Force's interpretation of the difference between primary and collateral functions may be valid for the Air Force's assigned primary and collateral functions, it is clearly not applicable to the other Services' functions. Is there any significance to this disparity? Taken alone, no; however in the overall context of a doctrinal argument over the wording of JCS Pub 2, perhaps it might become relevant. The primary functions of the Air Force are: 1) To organize, train, and equip Air Force Forces for the conduct of prompt and sustained combat operations in the air. 2) Provide forces for strategic air warfare. 3) Furnish close combat and logistic air support to the Army to include: ..airlift, support, and resupply of airborne operations. ..aerial photography and tactical reconnaissance. ..interdiction of enemy land power and communications. 4) To provide air transport for the Armed Forces. 4JCS Pub 2, sections 2,3,4. 5) To develop in coordination with the other services: ..doctrines and procedures for the unified defense of the United States against air attack. ..doctrine, procedures and equipment for air defense from land areas. ..tactics, techniques and equipient for amphibious and airborne operations. ..to organize and equip Air Force forces for joint amphib- ious and airborne operations. 6) Provide Air Force intelligence. 7) Aerial photography for cartographic purposes. 9) Doctrine and procedures for organizing, equipping, train- ing, and employing the Air Force. The collateral functions of the Air Force are to train forces: 1) To interdict enemy sea power through air operations. 2) To conduct antisubmarine warfare and to protect shipping. 3) To conduct aerial minelaying operations5. The latest revision of AFM 1-1 deleted the previous edition's listing of primary functions of the Air Force. This basic doctrinal "bible" now states "the fundamental role of the Air Force is to prepare aerospace forces to accomplish nine different missions:" 1) Strategic Aerospace Offense - to neutralize or destroy an enemy's war-sustaining capabilities or will to fight. 5JCS Pub 2, section 4. 2) Strategic Aerospace Defense - to integrate aerospace warning, control, and intercept forces to detect, identify, intercept, and destroy enemy forces (in any medium) attacking our nation's war sustaining capabilities or will to fight. 3) Counter Air - to gain control of the aerospace environment. ..Offensive Counter Air (OCA) - to destroy or neutralize enemy aerospace forces at a time and place of choice. ..Suppression of Enemy Air Defenses (SEAD) - aerospace operations directed against enemy air defense systems. ..Defensive Counter Air (DCA) - against enemy aerospace forces that are attempting to attack friendly forces or penetrate friendly airspace. 4) Air interdiction (AI) - to delay, disrupt, divert, or destroy an enemy's military potential before it can be brought to bear effectively against friendly forces. "Air interdiction attacks are normally executed by an air commander as part of a systematic and persistent campaign. Although an air interdiction campaign can be an independent air effort, an air commander normally coordinates an interdiction campaign with a surface force commander... Air interdiction attacks against targets which are in position to have a near term effect on friendly land forces are referred to as battlefield air interdiction" (BAI). "The primary difference between battlefield air interdiction and the remainder of the air interdiction effort is the level of interest and emphasis the land commander places on the process of identifying, selecting, and attacking certain targets. Therefore, battlefield air interdiction requires joint coordina- tion at the component level during planning, but once planned, battlefield air interdiction is controlled and executed by the air commander as an integral part of a total air interdiciton campaign." (note BAI for as the basis of various contested issues. BAI missions are flown in the ground commanders area of influence without any coordination below the component level fair component commander - ground component commander). This issue leads into a discussion of which commander controls fires beyond the FEBA, violates Marine Corps doctrine, and will be the subject of further discussion in this paper). 5) Close Air Support (CAS) - to support surface operations by attacking targets in close proximity to friendly surface forces. CAS can be preplanned or immediate, and in all cases requires coordination and integration with the fire and maneuver of the surface force. 6) Special Operations - involve the conduct of low visibility, covert, or clandestine military actions. 7) Airlift - both strategic (inter theater ) and tactical (intra- theater). 8) Aerospace surveillance and Reconnaissance - to collect information from airborne, orbital, and surface based sensors. 9) Aerospace Maritime Operations - to neutralize or destroy enemy naval forces and to protect friendly naval forces and shipping. (note - it is interesting to notice how one of the "collateral functions" of the Air Force has become translated into one of the "fundamental role missions"). AFM 1-1 goes on to list seven "specialized tasks- which the Air Force perfroms to enhance the execution and successful completion of Air Force missions, as well as often supporting other services as well: Aerial Refueling; Electronic Combat; Warning, Command, Control, and Communications; intelligence; Aerospace Rescue and Recovery; Psychological Operations; and Weather Service. The Tactical Air Command Manual (TACM) 2-1, Tactical Air Operations, lists six "tactical air operations": Counter Air, Air interdiction, Close Air Support, Tactical Airlift, Air Reconnais- sance, and Special Air Operations. This manual states that the following "capabilities" are required for successful tactical air operations: electronic warfare, search and rescue, airspace control, aerial refueling, and defense suppression. Defense suppression, which was a form of Counter Air when talking missions, not a specialized task, is now listed as a capability. Under the subject, "Functions of Theater Air Forces" the Air Force lists the following missions and tasks as "required for friendly forces to drive enemy air from the field of battle":6 Counter Air, Defense Suppression, Electromagnetic Warfare, Tactical Reconnaissance, CAS, BAI, AI, Airlift (strategic and tactical), UN, Air Refueling, AWACS, SAR, and ABCCC. 6Department of the Air Force, Doctrine Information Publication No. 10, Background Information on Air Force Perspective for Coherent Plans (Command and Control of TACAIR), April 1981, attachient 9, tab 3. What is at issue here is not the obvious fact that there appears to be disjointed overlap and vagueness in Air Force doctrine, but rather the fact that there is a question as to what would be the functions when viewed in the sphere of the joint arena? The Army possesses aviation units which fight as part of a combined arms team. The objectives of these units are:7 1) To augment the Army's capability to conduct sustained land combat. 2) To provide the ground commander with the mobility, fire- power, and staying power needed to win the first battle, and 3) To help the ground forces win while outnumbered. The principles of employment of Army aviation units are:8 1) Fight integrated on the combined arms team. 2) Exploit capabilities of other Services (i.e. CAS). 3) Capitalize on intelligence gathering capabilities. 4) Suppress enemy weapons and acquisition means. 5) Exploit firepower and mobility. 6) Integrate fire and maneuver. 7) Employ suprise. 8) Mass forces. 9) Utilize terrain for survivability. 10) Displace foward elements frequently. 7FM 1-2, Aircraft Battlefield Countermeasures and Survivability, July 1978, p. 2. 8FM 1-2, pp. 2-3. 11) Maintain flexibility. 12) Exercise staying power. The Army's air defense, which consists of anti-aircraft guns, missiles, and the related command and control resources are separate of the aviation branch in the air defense artillery. Army aviation does not possess "functions". All tactical fixed-wing jet aircraft support comes from the Air Force. The Navy accomplishes its functions of sea control and power projection through three warfare branches; surface, submarine, and aviation. The Navy's "fundamental warfare tasks" are:9 1) Antiair warfare 2) Antisubmarine warfare 3) Anti-surface (ship) warfare 4) Strike warfare 5) Amphibious warfare 6) Mine warfare The Navy's "supporting warfare tasks" are:10 1) Special warfare 2) Ocean surveillance 3) Intelligence 4) Command, control, and communications 5) Electronic warfare 9NWP 1 (Rev A), Startegic Concepts of the United States Navy, May 1978, p. I-1-3. 10NWP 1, P. I-1-3. 6) Logistics The Navy forms task forces to perform various fundamental and supporting warfare tasks. These task forces include a mix of organic aviation tailored to the mission of the task force. The following specific function is assigned to the Marine Corps:11 To provide Fleet Marine Forces of combined arms, together with supporting air components, for service with the fleet in the seizure or defense of advanced naval bases and for the conduct of such land operations as may be essential to the prosecution of a naval campaign. These functions do not contemplate the creation of a second land army. Title 10 of the U.S. Code states that the Marine Corps should be so organized as "to include not less than three combat divisions and three air wings..." A collateral function assigned to the Navy and Marine Corps is "to train forces to be prepared to participate in the overall air effort, as directed."12 Marine Corps aviation is organized and equipped as a completely expeditionary air arm. This expeditionary 11JCS Pub 2, section 3, p. 22. 12JCS Pub 2, section 3, p. 23. aspect sets Marine Corps aviation apart from other aviation organizations. Marine Corps doctrine envis- ions that Marine Corps aviation will support the landing forces throughout an assault landing and subsequent operations. Marine Corps aviation must be prepared to provide the support by operating tactical aircraft squadrons from carriers as part of carrier air groups or from airfields within striking distance of an aimphibious objective area. It must be prepared to operate after raid establishment ashore, from minimal airfields within the objective area during the assault phase of an amphibious operation... The FMFs are highly specialized amphibious assualt troops. Their ground and air elements constitute a single weapon system -- the Marine air-ground task force (MAGTF); while the task forces are capable of sustained combat, they are primarily for use in amphibious aasualt operations and are the principal means of projecting naval power ashore.13 The multitude of tasks to support the Marine aviation mission have been categorized into six separate functions:14 1) Air Reconnaissance - photographic/multisensor, electronic, and visual 2) Antiair warfare - air defense (active and passive); and 13FMFM 5-1, Marine Avaition, August 1979, pp. 1-2. 14FMFM 5-1, pp. 5-8. offensive antiair warfare - aircraft and missiles - the destruc- tion of the enemy aircraft or missile threat both before and after it is launched 3) Assault support - vertical assault support, air delivery, inflight refueling, and air evacuation 4) Offensive air support - CAS (preplanned {scheduled and on calls and immediate); and Deep Air Support (DAS) (excluding those air operations designed to reduce the enemy air capability) 5) Electronic warfare (EW) - electronic warfare support measures, electronic countermeasures, and electronic counter- countermeasures 6) Control of aircraft and missiles These lengthy lists, which in the absence of providing a listing of functions which equate to a common denominator of aviation tasks among the Services, present at a minimum the doctrinal approach of the Services to the employment of their aviation resources. It would be incongruent to attempt to unite all aviation resources together on a functional basis. In addition to defining individual Service functions, JCS Pub 2 lists responsibilities for each of the Services with regard to four different areas: air defense, amphibious opera- tions, airborne operations, and close combat air support of ground forces. All Services share responsibility for training and coordina- tion with other Services in developing equipment, tactics and techniques for close combat air support of ground forces. The Navy and Marine Corps have unique responsibilities for close air support of amphibious operations, in addition to a collateral function of training forces to conduct close air support for land operations. The Air Force has the responsibility of providing Air Force forces for close combat air support of ground forces. While close air support is defined in JCS Pub 1, there is no definition of close combat air support. Attempted development of joint doctrine for planning and conducting CAS for ground forces has served to highlight differ- ences among the various Services along with the issue of airspace control above the combat zone. A series of joint studies and tests have been conducted since 1971.15 Out of these studies often arises the issue of command and control of Marine Corps TACAIR.16 Before firmly addressing this issue it is germane to look briefly at the organization of joint forces. 15USMC Operational Handbook (OH) 5-1.1, Command and Control of USMC TACAIR, September 1982, p. 1-1. 16There is not a JCS Pub 1 definition of "TACAIR". The commonly accepted usage conveys tactical fixed wing aircraft; excluding those aircraft of a support nature with solely a transport or training role (i.e. TC4C, C-9, C-12, and T-39). Chapter 11I Joint Force Organization JCS Pub 2 provides guidance for the unification of forces when two or more services are employed together in a joint command structure. Historical practice, along with current contingency planning makes it probable that the joint employment of forces can be expected in future military operations. "The term 'joint force' refers equally to unified commands, subordinate unified commands, and joint task forces composed of significant elements of two or more Services, operating under a single commander authorized to exercise unified command or operational control over such joint forces, through the Service component commanders."17 JCS Pub 2 in its definition of operational command, states that "operational command" is synonymous with "operational control" and that it is uniquely applied to the operational control of unified and specified commands over assigned forces in accordance with the National Security Act of 1947 as amended and revised (10 U.S.C. 124) A unified command is established by the President through the Secretary of Defense with the advice of the Joint Chiefs of Staff. It is a command with a broad continuing mission, under a single commander, and composed of significant assigned components of two or more Services.18 17JCS Pub 12, Volume 1, Tactical Command and Control Planning Guidance and Procedures for Joint Operations, 1 April 1974,p. 3. 18JCS Pub 1, p. 384. JCS Pub 2 states that in unified commands operational command is exercised through Service component commander or through subordinate unified commander except in certain circua- stances when the unified commander deals directly with a specific operational force because of the mission or urgency (requires approval by the Joint Chiefs of Staff and the Secretary of Defense). The purpose of joint force command organization is to provide for: 1) Centralized direction - to coordinate the effort of the forces commanded 2) Decentralized execution - because of the limitation of one commander's span of control 3) Common doctrine - so that appropriate action will be taken by all concerned in the absence of specific instructions. The nature of the responsibilities, missions, and tasks assigned to a unified command will determine whether it is organized on an area basis (geographic area) (most commonly used method) or a functional basis.19 In addressing the principles of unified direction of Armed Forces, under "Service functions" JCS Pub 2 states: To achieve stability, continuity, and economy and to facilitate long-range planning, each of the services has the responsibility for organizing, training and 19JCS Pub 2, pp. 40-43. equipping, and providing forces to fulfill certain combatant functions and for administering and support- ing the forces so provided (except as may otherwise be directed by the Secretary of Defense in the case of support of such forces). The functions involved in a military operation determine the Service identity of the forces to be assigned and usually the Service identity of the overall commander. Because the exact role of each Service and weapon in future war cannot be delimited, the assignments of primary functions contained in Chapter II are not in tended to be rigidly prescriptive in time of war with respect to command structure or relationships; however, due consideration must be given to such Service functions. It continues: "organizational integrity of Service compon- ents should be maintained insofar as practicable to exploit fully their inherent capabilities."20 A joint task force "is a force composed of assigned or attached elements of the Army, the Navy or Marine Corps, and the Air Force or two or more of these Services, which is constituted and so designated by the Secretary of Defense or by the Commander of a unified command, a specified command, or an existing joint task force."21 A joint task force is established for a limited objective 20JCS Pub 2, p. 43. 21JCS Pub 2, p. 51. and is dissolved once that objective is achieved. A joint task force is organized of component commands. A component command consists of the component commander and all those individuals, units, detachments, organizations, or installations under his military command which have been assigned to the operational command of the commander of the unified command (to include subordinate unified commands and joint task forces). Other individuals, units, detachments, organizations, or installations may operate directly under the component commander in his Service role and should contribute to the mission of the unified commander as appropriate.22 In its guide to terminology, JCS Pub 2 states that a component command is also called a "component" or a "Service component". While this appears to be a moot point, it takes on considerable relevance in current day arguments concerning unified command structuring. Presented herein are the basic tennants of unified command as they presently are written. There is much current focus upon the subject of component commanders. The Air Force Tactical Air Operations Manual (TACM 2-1), published in April 1978, states that joint task force commanders exercise operational control of their force through the commanders of the Service forces comprising the joint task force 22JCS Pub 2, p. 48. (the component commanders). This is in keeping with JCS Pub 2. JCS Pub 12 further substantiates this position in a series of tactical information flow diagrams which represent the flow of information in joint force organization. In these diagrams the component commands of the joint task force are entitled "Army component", "Marine Corps component", "Air Force component", and or "Navy component"; clearly depicting components established along Service lines. In a reversal of this documented previous position, the Air Force is now proposing a change to JCS Pub 2, to organize joint forces along a functional vice Service basis.23 The Air Force is now proposing that joint forces be organ- ized on a trilateral basis, with three functional components: land component, naval component, and air component. The implica- tions of this proposal are far reaching. The question arises: where does the Marine Corps fit in this equation? While this proposal still awaits Joint Chiefs of Staff action, JCS Pub 2 stands as written. Yet, in the latest revision of AFM 1-1 Functions and Basic Doctrine of the United States Air Force (16 March 1984), there is no longer mention of a "Marine Corps component" and "Air Force component" has become "Air component". The implication being that all air has been func- tionally assembled under the air component. As this issue is alive it must be remembered that while 23Chief of Staff of the Air Force Memorandum (CSAFM) 07-82 Proposal to Change JCS Pub 2, dated 19 April 1982. there are far reaching impacts in regard to MAGTF TACAIR, there is no assault on amphibious operations. The situation in question deals with Marine forces ashore in a joint force, and not as part of an amphibious task force. Having examined joint force organization as mandated by current directives and as addressed by a current change proposal; a review of the historical record of joint force organization, in particular, aviation command and control, will provide a closer insight into the rationale behind many of the arguments advanced on both sides concerning this vital organizational issue. Chapter IV Historical Perspective Many of the arguments which are put forth on the issue of command and control of Marine TACAIR during sustained joint operations utilize historical perspective as a main premise. There are three doctrinal publications, dating from 1981 through 1984 in which the Air Force has internally promulgated its stance on this particular issue. Each is replete with historical justifications.24 The entire issue of historical precedent with regards to command and control and how it relates to the Marine Corps and aviation forces is a broad deep reaching issue, presenting great opportunity for most liberal interpretation. Numerous points can be made, often in a simplistic analysis of the situation, thereby taken out of context. This becomes obvious through close examination of the various positions and counterarguments. The historical precedents which are put forth in support of centralized control of all theater air assets by the Air Force can be divided into three areas: the North Africa experience, joint force organization from World War II through Vietnam, and the role of Marine aviation in Korea and Vietnam. it is clearly 24Department of the Air Force, Doctrinal Information Publication (DIP) No. 10, Background Information on Air Force Perspective For Coherent Plans (Command and Control of TACAIR), April 1981; DIP No. 11, Command Relationships, The Marine Air/Ground Task Force, and What They Mean to an Airman, 1981; DIP No. 12, Command Relationships, January 1984; These Doctrinal Information Publications are disseminated to Air Force commands, schools, and officers in key billets. beyond the scope of this paper to conduct a thoroughly rigorous analysis of the historical record; so discussion will be limited to those points which have been put forth in support of various positions on the basic issue. An attempt will be made to explore each from the perspective of both sides, in an unbiased manner. To state that air power , its application, strategy, and tactics were greatly refined during World War II is an under- statement. The North Africa experiences of 1942-1943 served as a focal point for the evolution of Air Force doctrine for the control of air power. There was no centralized control of air power during the invasion of North Africa; tactical air units were tied to individual Army units. Because the main focus of air effort was applied to the support of ground forces without achieving air superiority, the results were disastrous for both the British and the Americans. The doctrine at the time, as specified in Army Field Manual 1-5, consisted of an air support command attached to an Army unit, with direction for air opera- tions coming from the ground commander. It was felt that this failed to provide direction, priority, and coordination to the overall air effort, hence the poor showing. As a result, at the Casablanca Conference of January 1943, both President Roosevelt and Prime Minister Churchill approved a force reorgani- zation.25 (figs. 1&2). This restructuring provided a means 25General William W. Momyer USAF(Ret), Air Power in Three Wars (WWII, Korea, Vietnam), (Washington D.C.: GPO, 1978), pp. 40, 257. Click here to view image for the centralized direction of the air effort. General Momyer (an experienced and respected Air Force commander and tactician as well as prominent spokesman on the subject of centralized control of theater air assets) highlights the North African experience in his many writings on this subject. He traces the air organization in Vietnam to the North Africa experience.26 Studying the North African experience, one certainly can not dispute the fact that centralized coordination of the air effort, in this case a coordinated achievement of air superiority, was essential. The question is, was a centralized air command structure the only way to accomplish this aim? Why was General Eisenhower as Commander in Chief Armed Forces Northwest Africa (CICAFNWA) (the joint force commander) with his staff unable to accomplish this coordination and direction? He had two armies and two corps working for him, yet he was unable to direct, and apportion their focus of effort in employing one of their organic assets and mass them in pursuit of a theater goal. Just what did he create in the reorganization? Note that a traditional pairing of ground and supporting air units was maintained. The reorganization resulted in a command organization as depicted in fig. 3 for the invasion of Sicily.27 Here there were new problems with the integration of the Air Force operations into the needs of the force as a whole.28 The Air Force 26Momyer, p. 256. 27E. Morison, The Two-Ocean War: A Short History of the United States Navy in the Second World War, (Boston, Toronto: Atlantic Monthly Press, 1963), p. 246. 28Morison, p. 255. Click here to view image commander, General Spaatz, focused largely the entirety of his effort on counter air operations. This resulted in little or no tactical air support being provided for the amphibious landings. The US force (Western Naval Task Force) landed opposed by almost total enemy air control of the beachhead. In a similar manner, the airborne operation received no tactical air support. While the reorganization at Casablanca allowed for an air commander who could mass his air effort in the strategic and counter air roles, the organization clearly was not responsive to the needs of the ground force commanders.29 It is interesting to note that Naval aviation, when operating against targets assigned to the tactical or strategic forces, also came under the control of the theater air component commander.30 During the invasion of Sicily, carrier forces, not directly involved in air defense of the fleet, or ships of the amphibious force enroute to the landing area, were under the "operational control" of Air Marshall Tedder, the Mediterranean Air Commander who controlled all air power flown in support of the landing force.31 This is contrary to joint doctrine for amphibious operations where the Commander of the Amphibious Task Force maintains the responsibility for command authority of all air operations within the objective 29Morison, p. 255. 30Momyer, pp. 44-45; while there was not by definition "component" commanders at this time, General Momyer has elected to refer to centralized theater commands (ground, naval, and air) during this time frame as component commands, hence the adoption of this term herein. 31Momyer, p. 45. area.32 For Operation Overlord, the invasion of Normandy in 1944, initially the Allied organization was as depicted in fig. 4.33 This organization provided for an Allied naval and assualt (landing force) component. However, air forces were divided into three separate commands: the Allied Expeditionary Air Force (subordinate to the Supreme Headquarters Allied Expeditionary Force (SHAEF) and two bomber commands (RAF and the United States Strategic Air Force). Air Chief Marshall Portal served as deputy on the Combined Chiefs of Staff for coordinating the British and American bomber forces (essentially serving as a coordinating authority) for the Combined Bomber Offensive.34 During the actual invasion, Air Marshall Tedder, the Deputy Supreme Command- er, coordinated the two bomber forces.35 After the invasion, with the establishment of the 12th Army Group under General Bradley, General Eisenhower was faced with the decision of whether or not to create a ground component command to provide coordination for the various Army Groups. This forced General Eisenhower to face the political implications of choosing either Field Marshall Montgomery or General Bradley as component commander. A previous precedent had been establish- ed in North Africa, where General Alexander had functioned as both the Deputy Theater Commander as well as a component 32For a thorough discussion see LFM 01 (AFM 2-53), p. 2-9. 33Momyer, p. 49. 34Momyer, p. 45. 35Homyer, p. 50. commander. This resulted in arguments over dual hatting. Reacting to the political sensitivities involved, in a since criticized, perhaps wise (considering the personalities involved) decision, General Eisenhower elected to act as both the theater commander, SHAEFA and the overall ground forces commander.36 At this time, the First Allied Airborne Army (which included organic aviation) served as a theater reserve forces it was later attached to Field Marshall Montgomery's Army Group.37 On 15 October 1944 the Allied Expeditionary Air Force was disestablished. This left an organization as depicted in fig. 5.38 This removed the "component command" and left three tactical air forces, each which coordinated directly with an Army Group, receiving centralized direction from the Supreme Command- er. In effect, this meant three tactical air forces without a centralized Air Force commander along with the First Allied Airborne Army's organic aviation. While this seems to belabor a lot of tedious command relationships, the point to be drawn is, simply, there was not a precedent established and maintained for theater force organization along functional component lines. The decision to disestablish the Allied Expeditionary Air Force (AEAF) has been described as a reaction to the fact that General Esienhower elected not to create a ground component commander (no ground component commander, no air component 36Momyer, p. 50. 37Forrest C. Pogue, The United States Army in World War II. The Supreme Command, (Washington D.C.: Department of the Army, 1954), pp. 269, 280. 38Pogue, p. 455. Click here to view image commander). General Momyer provides another insight into why American airmen pushed to disestablish the AEAF:39 They especially desired to eliminate the AEAF because it was an obstacle to returning the strategic air forces to the bombing campaign. As long as the AEAF existed, it would continue to exert pressure to employ bombers in extensive support of the ground campaign, allowing only an occasional use of the bombers for major strategic offensives. This quote certainly displays a predisposition towards strategic bombing at the expense of support of the ground commands. While North Africa served to establish Air Force precedent and doctrine for centralized air control; Sicily and the war in Europe appear to have established the overall aim of the air effort away from adequately supporting the ground campaign. During the World War II, the ground army commanders had to compete with strategic bombing, and often because of the aim of the centralized direction, they suffered. Today, does not the same situation exist, with the Army close air support needs competing with interdiction for a share of the overall air effort? Turning to the Pacific, a theater of World War II which 39Momyer, p. 51. General Momyer does not discuss at all in his book Airpower in Three Wars, airpower here also played an important role, and command relationships continued an evolutionary process towards our current unified doctrine. The war began without any unified command structure. Following the attack on Pearl Harbor, the Pacific forces were reorganized with both General MacArthur and Admiral Nimitz each having command of air, land, and naval forces. In the Philippines, during the defense of Bataan and Corregidor Island, General MacArthur had operational control of the Fourth Marine Regiment. In the two pronged offensive northward towards the Philli- pines and the islands of the central Pacific, all final decisions with regard to both General MacArthur's and Admiral Nimitz's forces (force composition, objectives, timing, etc.) rested with the Joint Chiefs of Staff in the absence of an overall theater commander.40 In the central Pacific, the Fleet Marine Forces under Admiral Nimitz served as integral type forces of the US fleet in accordance with the established amphibious doctrine, Navy FTP-167. This tentative manual for landing operations was refined to reflect what we now know as established doctrine for amphibious operations. In the southwest Pacific, various Marine squadrons were controlled by the Fifth Air Force under the overall command of 40DIP No. 11, p. 33. General MacArthur.41 On the subject of Marine aviation in the Pacific theater of World War II, the Air Force has said: "Even though Marine Air was conceived for CAS, historically it supported Marine ground operations only in Peleliu and Okinawa."42 Admittedly, "except for the landings at Bougainville, Peliliu was the only occasion in the Pacific War when none but Marine planes were employed to assist Marines crossing a beach."43 However Marines additionally flew in support of the beach phase of the assault at Iwo Jima (from fast carriers) as well as support from Henderson Field in Guadacanal where they flew in support of the First Marine Division which was ashore, along with missions in support of the rest of the Solomons campaign.44 There was a persistent effort on behalf of placing Marine pilots aboard escort carriers to fly solely in support of amphibious landings.45 In the central Pacific Marine air was largely utilized to keep bypassed islands nuetralized. Marine officers from the Commandant down had repeatedly recommended the assignment of escort carriers for the exclusive use of Marine aviators. Only thus, they maintained, could their ground troops be guaranteed 41Jeter A. Isley and Philip A. Crowl, The U.S. Marines and Amphib- ious War its Theory and Its Practice in the Pacific, (Princeton: Princeton University Press, 1951), p. 427. 42DIP No 11, p. .35. 43Isley and Crowl, p. 421. 44Isley and Crowl, pp. 135, 508. 45Isley and Crowl, p. 507. uninterruptrd and efficient close air support during the assualt phase of amphibious operations. Not until the very end of the war, and then too late for active employment, did the Navy designate escort carriers for the sole use of Marine aviation.46 Several points can be taken from this. First, it serves to reinforce the fact that Marine aviation was established to support the Marine infantryman. Secondly, assigning Marine aircraft missions away from this primary role degrades the Marine fighting team. Lastly, a problem which still exists is high- lighted. That is the physical constraints which serve to hamper Marine aviaiton's support of amphibious operations (lack of carrier deck space which can be devoted to exclusive support of an amphibious landing coupled with the possible shorfall of suitable land bases within range of an amphibious objective area).47 This last problem does not fall under the category of sustained land operations, and it is adequately addressed by current doctrine where Navy carrier air and possibly theater Air Force air will provide necessary support until such time as suitable air facilities for landing force aviation can be uncovered.48 This is an example of support which can be achieved 46Isley and Crowl, pp. 585-586. 47For excellent discussion on this issue in present day context, see: Lieutenant Colonel Charles R. Geiger USMC, Marine Corps TACAIR and Strategic Mobility, (Naval War College, March 1983). 48Current training to insure that this type of support can be adequately provided includes the deployment of a Navy attack squadron overseas as an integral member of a Marine Air Group. even without an "air component commander" by virtue of joint force doctrine, possibly highlighted by intiating directives. The Marine aviators who left the Solomons to work for General MacArthur in the invasion of the Philippines both amazed and delighted the Army troops with their close air support.4, They earned this praise largely because of their responsive- ness: Most of the complaints from ground troops in other operations arose from the fact that too much time elapsed between request for close air support and execution, that strikes were controlled by higher echelon rather than front line troops, that the procedure for obtaining air support by appealing through several links in the chain of command was too rigid, and that pilots were inadequately briefed in the front line situation. Much of this was avoided not only on Luzon but in the other Philippine operations where Marine air participated.50 The system in the Philippines worked because the Marine pilots were supporting no more than one division at a time.51 This speaks loud and clear as a testimonial to the established MAGTF team; and why it is vital that control of Marine aviation remain with the MAGTF commander. 49Isley and Crowl, p. 181. 50Isley and Crowl, p. 427. 51Isley and Crowl, p. 580. At Okinawa, Admiral Turner commanded the Expeditionary Force as part of the Fifth Fleet. The landing force, the 10th Army, which included the III Marine Amphibious Corps, was commanded by an Army general and the Army Air Forces and Marine air were placed under the command of a Marine general.52 The Air Force has stated that the battle of Okinawa is "one prominent example of successful integration of multi-Service forces through functional components."53 The Air Force also contends that "the Marines actively supported commitment of their assets (and the AAF assets) under an air component commander."54 The joint force organization at Okinawa was developed for an amphibious operation. Amphibious doctrine calls for specific command relationships, when more than one Service provides tactical aviation (in the joint force) in support of the landing force:55 When the preponderance of tactical aviation is provided by the Air Force for the amphibious operation, an Air Force officer will be designated by the Air Force commander of the participating Air Force forces to direct the total air effort in the amphibious objective area. The Air Force quotes the preceeding passage in DIP 11, using it 52DIP No. 11, p. 35. 53DIP 12, p. 10. 54DIP 11, p. 35. 55LFM 01 (AFM 2-53), p. 2-7. as an argument for functional components in sustained land operations.56 The contested issue is sustained land operations, not amphibious operations. LFM 01 does not use the term "air component commander". The remainder of LFM 01's discussion provides a more complete picture: He will exercise such direction under the joint task force commander or when control of air operations is passed ashore, under the landing force commander or an appropriate commander ashore who has the capability to control such operations. When the perponderance of tactical aviation comes from the Navy or Marine Corps, the overall air effort in the objective area will be directed by a naval aviator under the amphibious task force commander until control is passed ashore. Additionally, LFM 01 states: When Air Force forces are assigned to the amphibious task force they will be organized as a separate force or component under the command of an Air Force officer. The Air Force commander, with respect to his own forces, exercises command similar to that exercised by the landing force commander and the ampibious task force commander, subject to the overall command authority of the amphibious task force commander.57 56DIP 11, p. 35. 57LFM 01 (AFM 2-53), p. 2-7. While this digresses from the subject of joint land operations, because of the Air Force attempt to include it as such in their DIPs, it is necessary to put the relationships of amphibious task force organization into proper perspective. Furthermore, analyizing amphibious force organization, it is clearly a Service force organization and is not along functional component lines. Following World War II, the National Security Act of 1947 established the Department of the Air Force as a separate Service, and provided a legal position for the Fleet Marine Force principles ("combined arms together with supporting air"). Additionally this act stated that the Marine Corps shall perform "other duties as the President may direct." With the outbreak of the Korean War, the stage was set for the Employment of Marines in sustained land operations and the ensuing issue concerning the control of Marine aviation in such operations. The initial organization for Korea contained three Service components (Air Force, ground and naval commands). Following the landing at inchon, the landing force came under control of the Army's X Corps which operated as a parallel command to the Eighth Army under the Far East Ground Force Command. The X Corps had Marine aviation assigned for close air support. in December 1950 X Corps was placed under Eighth Army, hence the First Marine Division was assigned to Eighth Army. At the same time The First Marine Aircraft Wing was assigned to the Fifth Air Force and was employed across the Eighth Army front or on interdiction depending upon the tactical situation.58 The Marine Corps wanted its air employed in direct support of Marine ground forces and General Almond (Commander of the X Corps) argued to have the First Marine Aircraft Wing assigned to the control of his Corps; however the Air Force gained operation- al control of all aircraft in the execution of the Far East Air Force (FEAF) mission as assigned by the Commander in Chief Far East (CINCFE) and the Far East Naval Commander had command or operational control of all aircraft in the execution of his mission as assigned by CINCFE. Coordination when both the Navy and Air Force were assigned missions was delegated by CINCFE to FEAF.59 Day to day working procedures were established between the various Services and the Air Force commander had centralized control of the air effort. With this relationship, an area of dispute surfaced concerning the division of labor between CAS and interdiction. General Momyer states: Also, with a stable front there were fewer requirements for close air support and consequently more need for the Marine air units in the interdiction campaign. As a result of the integration of Marine air operations with 5th Air Force operations, centralized control of all the air power assigned to the Far East theater of operation provided the flexibility that it did in the 58Momyer, p. 62. 59Momyer, p. 58. campaigns of World War II.60 The subject has been addressed from a different vantage by Marine Corps Lieutenant General M. A. Twining: The winning combination which had taken inchon and Seoul had been broken up. The surface ships, operating as a form of floating artillery, bombarded Wonsan and the northern ports for years with no discernable results; the carriers participated with the Air Force in operations against the enemy lines of communication- the 1st Marine Air Wing was separated from its team- mate, the 1st Marine Division, thereby destroying the most effective air-ground team the world had ever seen. The Wing was placed under Air Force command and operated as a component of the 5th Air Force... The fleet, which had performed so brillantly in September 1950 as a balanced instrument of sea power, had been dispersed by circumstances into relatively ineffective components- of land, sea, air.61 In the intervening years between Korea and Vietnam, the Marine Corps was deployed to both Lebanon and the Dominican Republic, where it was assigned as a component of a joint force. 60Momyer, p. 62. 61Colonel R. D. Heinl Jr. USMC (Ret), Soldiers of the Sea, (Annapolis: U. S. Naval Institute, 1962), pp. 588-589. In each of these two instances, Marine forces were employed under a land force component commander, maintaining their complete integrity.62 A Marine helicopter squadron, HMM-362, in 1962 became the first Marine unit to deploy to Vietnam. By 11 May 1965 a Marine air-ground team, III Marine Amphibious Force (MAF) (Third Marine Division and the First Marine Aircraft Wing) was in place in Vietnam.63 In September 1963, CINCPAC convened a board to examine how TACAIR should be coordinated in a future conflict. This action was largely prompted by the lessons of the Korean War. The board included representatives from all the Services. The board in its findings, acknowledged that each Service utilizes organic aircraft to carry out tactical missions, and recommended compon- ent commanders should be appointed by a joint force commander to serve as a coordinating authority for tactical air operations.64 JCS Pub 1 provides the following definition for "coordinat- ing authority": A commander or individual assigned responsibility for 62Major Jack K. Ringler USMC and Henry I. Shaw Jr., U.S. Marine Corps Operations in the Dominican Republic April-June 1965 (U), (Washington D.C.: HQMC Historical Division, 1970), pp. 43-44; and HQMC Point Paper # 718-82, subj. Functional Components, 1 November 1982. 63Lieutenant General Kieth B. McCutcheon USMC, "Marine Aviation in Vietnam, 1962-1970" United States Naval Institute Proceedings, May 1971, pp. 124,127. 64McCuthcheon, p. 135. coordinating specific functions or activities involving forces of two or more Services or two or more forces of the same Service. The commander or individual has the authority to require consultation between the agencies involved, but does not have the authority to compel agreement. In the event that essential agreement cannot be obtained, the matter shall be referred to the appointing authority.65 CINCPAC utilized a coordinating authority during photo missions flown in Laos in 1964.66 With the introduction of Marines into Vietnam in 1965, CINCPAC issued the following guidance to the Commander U.S. Military Assistance Command Vietnam (COMUSMACV): a. The Commanding General of the MEB (Marine Expedi- tionary Brigade) would report to COMUSMACV as Naval Component Commander.* b. COMUSMACV would exercise operational control of the MEB through the CG of the MEB. c. Commander, 2d Air Division, in his capacity as Air Force Component Commander of MACV would act as coordinating authority for matters pertaining to tactical air support and air traffic control in MACV's area of responsibility.67 65JCS Pub 1, p. 92. 66McCuthcheon, p. 135. 67McCutcheon, p. 135. * note: In April 1966, III MAF became a uni-Service component. COMUSMACV protested to CINCPAC that the Marine Corps fixed-wing squadron in the MEB should be under "operational control" of his Air Force component commander. CINCPAC replied, reemphasizing his previous guidance, that "operational control of the squadron would be exercised through the MEB and not the 2d Air Division."68 In an April 1965 directive, CINCPAC stated that close air support was the priority mission in Vietnam along with reiterat- ing the previous guidance that COMUSMACV's Air Force component commander was the coordinating authority in matters pertaining to tactical air support and air traffic control.69 A later directive from CINCPAC stated that the Air Force component commander (now designated Commander Seventh Air Force) was the "coordinating authority" for all U.S. and Free World Military Air Force air operations and Vietnamese Air Force activities in the MACV area of operations.70 The same directive stated that the Commanding General of III MAF exercised opera- tional control over all Marine aviation. The one exception was when COMUSMACV directed the Air Force component commander in the event of a "major emergency or disaster" to take operational control of Marine aviation. Furthermore, excess Marine sorties were to be identified to the air coordinating authority 68McCutcheon, p. 135. 69McCutcheon, p. 136. 70McCutcheon, p. 136. (Commander Seventh Air Force) for use in support of other forces or missions.71 In August 1965 an agreement was reached between the Command- er of the Seventh Air Force and III MAF concerning air defense. The Air Force wanted operational control of air defense assets, while the Marine Corps had been concerned because their air defense fighter, the F-4, was a multi-mission aircraft equally suitable for direct support of Marine ground forces. The agreement retained operational control of Marine air under III MAF while the Marines conceded the necessity of having a single commander responsible for air defense, hence "requisite author- ity for purposes of air defense was passed to the Air Force."72 Such was the framework for the pre-1969 policy for the command, control, and coordination of Marine aviation in Vietnam, an "entirely adequate system" as far as III MAF was concerned.73 This system as it then existed, was very similar to the current JCS guidance on the command and control of Marine TACAIR in sustained joint land operations. However, 1968 saw certain events transpire which served to alter this arrangement. Looking at the pre-1968 arrangement from the Air Force perspective, the Air Force had attempted unsuccessfully to obtain control of both Marine TACAIR as well as Army helicopters.74 in his book General Momyer addresses the directives which provided 71McCutcheon, pg. 136 72McCutcheon, p. 136. 72McCutcheon, p. 136. 74Momyer, pp. 81-82. for III MAF retention of operational control of all Marine air, however he fails to mention the Air Force's role as coordinating authority. In explanation of the many attempts on the part of the Air Force to obtain operational control of Marine air, General Momyer provides some interesting observations on his part. It should be noted that General Momyer was the Commander of the Seventh Air Force from July 1966 to August 1969. On the subject of how Marine air responded to the tasking of III MAF, he states: III MAF did not evaluate the requests for the air support, nor determine what the priority for support would be. Instead, the Marine tactical air control system scheduled all in-commission aircraft into each of the division areas on a planned flow, a costly way to manage air resources for sustained operations of an air-ground campaign. The Marine system was designed for amphibious operations, where the lack of artillery required air power overhead at all times. In this operation where obtaining a beachhead is critical, the use of air power in this manner can be justified. However, it is highly expensive to keep aircraft overhead at all times throughout the day and critical periods at night when there are no targets.75 This quote certainly appears to be a major overstatement of 75Momyer, p. 285. the fundamental ideological differences between the Air Force and the Marine Corps, while it casts justified doubt on General Momyer's personal comprehension of what the Marines were doing. The Air Force felt that "preplanned strikes were more economical than on-station sorties, and that directed strikes would deter- mine ground operations."76 The Marine Corps doctrine calls for air operations in support of the ground effort and the Marine Corps argued against "single management" on two counts: 1) it would increase response time, and 2) it was not necessary.77 General Momyer paints an almost slanderous picture of Marine air, stating: "the 1st Marine Air Wing divided its aircraft between the two Marine divisions and, irrespective of the ground situation, scheduled these aircraft into their areas in a steady stream."78 Anyone even vaguely familiar with the doctrine, procedures, and functioning in question, of Marine Corps tactical air command and control, can immediately recognize the fallacy of this representation! As events unfolded during the seige of Khe Sanh and with the Tet offensive providing a back drop for the argument for central- ized control of air, Generals Westmoreland and Momyer won a split decision from the U.S. national military command authority. The result was a single management system in which U.S. Army and Marine forces were placed under one commander, MACV foward, and Marine TACAIR was placed under the "operational direction" 76DIP No. 12, p. 36. 77McCutcheon, p. 137. 78Momyer, p. 286. authority of Seventh Air Force (the Air Force component commander- General Momyer).79 What evolved, appears to be a precarious system interdepend- ent upon the personalities of the individuals involved in the application of a directive void of detailed procedures. The Air Force describes the outcome of the implementation of this policy when it quotes from Lieutenant General McCutcheon's article on Marine aviation in Vietnam (misidentifying the author as "Lieutenant Colonel" McCutcheon): There was no doubt whether single management was an overall improvement as far as MACV as a whole was concerned. It was.80 This is another example, where in historical examination of the basic issue, quotes have been taken out of context by the USAF to serve as a dramatic means of justifying their position. In his article, Lieutenant General McCutcheon goes on to describe how through cooperation between on scene commanders and cooper- ation at the operational level, "for all practical purposes, the system worked around to just about where it was in the pre-single management days as far as identification or fragging of Marine sorties."81 One factor which affected the working of the new policy was the fact that "operational direction" was not a defined term. it appears that in the actual working execution of 79DIP No. 12, p. 14, and McCutcheon, p. 137. 80DIP No. 11, p. 6. 81McCutcheon, p. 137. the single management directive, the Marine Corps never relin- quished operational control of its aircraft. The following excerpt contains testimony of Major General H.S. Hill USMC (DCS-Air when questioned by Mr. Kendall, Chief counsel to U.S. Senate, Special Close Air Support Subcommittee hearing on Close Air Support, 1 November 1971, on the subject of control of Marine air in Vietnam,82 Mr. Kendall. General, isn't it true that ultimately the control of all the Marine air assets in South Vietnam were placed under the control of the 7th Air Force? General Hill. No, sir, that is not correct, Mr. Kendall. The arrangement initially in South Vietnam prescribed in MACV Directive 95-4 was that Marine air assets were primarily in support of the III MAF and III MAF would augment daily the U.S. Air Force effort with resources not required to support opera- tions of prime concern to III MAF. Those assets that were not required or could be made available were made available to the joint task force commander and he could frag them and utilize them wherever he desired. There was a change to that directive in which all preplanned requests for aircraft, including Marine 82U.S. Cong., Senate, Special Subcommittee on Close Air Support, Close Air Support, 92nd Cong., 1st Sess., (Washington D.C.: GPO, 1972), pp. 291-292. aircraft, were processed by the MACV Tactical Air Support Element (TASE) for assignment of priorities. The Marines retained sorties necessary to support USMC peculiar operations, but the other remaining sorties were allocated through the TASE in Saigon. The commander 7th Air Force, being the commander, coordina- ted the fragging of these aircraft with the 1st Marine Aircraft Wing. Mr. Kendall. Are you familiar with the fact that General Momyer testified that he insisted that all of the in-country assets be placed under his control, and particularly at the time of Khe Sanh? General Hill. Yes, sir; I am aware of that. The way it turned out, the control of those air assets were under the joint force commander, Mr. Kendall. Mr. Kendall. Isn't General Momyer the joint force commander? General Hill. No; he was the Air Force component commander. The joint force commander was MACV. Mr. Kendall. So then to that extent General Momyer's testimony was inaccurate; is that your statement? General Hill. I would say that it just lacked further detailed explanation, sir, because the assign- ment of priorities actually came through the TASE which was underneath the joint force commander General Westmoreland, and later, General Abrams. From the Marine Corps vantage, there is an important distinction between having the joint force commander, not the Air Force component commander assign priorities. This subject will be examined in the next chapter. In 1970 there was a revision of MACV's guidance, which basically stated that CG III MAF had operational control over all his air assets and that 7th Air Force was the coordinating authority.83 Embroiled in the many conflicting accounts are few common threads. Vietnam did not provide a precedent for functional components; it was a mixture of uni-Service, area, and functional commands. Additionally, depending upon the perspective of the author, the command relationships between the various Service air arms gas either one of intense inter-Service rivalry or great cooperation. Valid arguments for centralized direction of the air effort existed, but the question arises, at what level was the centralized direction to take place? The advantages of centralized direction were demonstratively offset by degraded responsiveness to the needs of the supported ground commander. Centralized control of air power is of great benefit to the theater Air Force component commander but at potential great cost to the MAGTF. It can be argued that the theater air component commander 83McCutcheon, p. 137, and DIP No. 11, p. 36. was gaining air resources to fulfill his responsibilities in executing an interdiction campaign and to support the Army forces. This hypothesis can be examined through the CAS issue. Colonel Robert E. Buhrow USAF in his research paper, Close Air Support Requirements: A Study of Interservice Rivalry sheds light upon this issue. He begins with a quote from a 1966 House Armed Services Committee hearing on close air support:".... we feel that in its [the Air Force] magnificent accomplishments in the wild blue yonder it has tended to ignore the foot soldier in the dirty brown under."84 Colonel Buhrow states that at the begining of U.S. involvement in Vietnam the Air Force did not have a suitable attack aircraft. He describes how members of the House Committee made the statement that the Air Force failed in its assigned mission of providing close air support to the Army in Vietnam. After examining the Air Force and Army reactions to this state- ment, Colonel Buhrow concludes that "the House Armed Services Committee was correct--the Air Force entered the Vietnam conflict with little or no close air support capability." He finishes his study by recommending that the Air Force operate aircraft dedicated to Army support and that the Army have "complete command and control of these assets."85 Viewing the CAS issue from another perspective, General Momyer testified: "the U.S. Air Force is proud of its tradition 84Colonel Robert E. Buhrow USAF, Close Air Support Requirements: A Study in Interservice Rivalry, (U.S. Army War College, 1 March 1971), p. 1. 85Buhrow, pp. 9, 39, 50. in providing close air support to ground forces; this is one of the most important missions conducted by tactical air power."86 Fundamentally it boils down to the fact that Marine aviation is tailored to one mission, support of the Marine ground action, while the Air Force has the divided responsibility for both support of the Army ground action as well as the theater air effort. History has raised the possibility that the Air Force may not have been adequately equipped or prepared for the two tasks at hand; which leads to conjecture that in the centralized direction of TACAIR assets the Air Force is attempting to offset its own shortfalls. Regardless of the degree of validity of this presumption, the mere fact that it is conceivable weakens arguments for centralized control of theater TACAIR. This couples with the documented fact that, in actuality, the Air Force component commander in Vietnam never really served as more than a coordinating authority for air; to set the stage for the post Vietnam controversy concerning the subject of control of Marine air in sustained land operations. These deliberations culminated in the JCS Omnibus Agreement, which today, almost four years after its inception is still often obscured by attempts to organize into trilateral functional components on the basis of a fallacious historical precedent which is not borne out by the record. 86U.S. COng., Senate, Close Air Support, p. 174. PART TWO *** CONTEMPORARY ANALYSIS Chapter V The Omnibus Agreement With the end of U.S. military involvement in Vietnam, the issue of centralized control of all theater TACAIR assets to include Marine Corps aviation (when Marines are involved in sustained joint land operations) remained unresolved, largely because of the inability of the various Services to reach agreement. Starting in 1971, at the direction of the Secretary of Defense, a series of tests centering around close air support were conducted. They were multi-phased, involving the Air Force, Marine Corps, and theater commanders. One issue which was raised was response time in terms of support of ground troops. Discus- ions between Headquarters Marine Corps (HQMC) and the USAF Air Staff were unproductive. During this same time frame the basic issue surfaced frequently at the FMF operating level.87 In November 1979 the USAF brought the issue before the Joint Chiefs of Staff.88 In March 1980 the issue was at the forefront as a result of the review of CINCNORTH's OPLAN "Brawny Gambit" in which the policy concerning the employment of a MAGTF participating as part of a joint task force was contested. The Air Force took 87OH 5-1.1, p. 1-1. 88Commandant of the Marine Corps, White Letter No. 7-81, Encl (2), p. 1. exception to the employment of the MAGTF as an entity, insisting that it be broken up with its air and ground elements placed under separate NATO component commanders. By December 1980 there were four additional plans awaiting review. The review process was held up for over a year because of continued intransigence on the part of the Air Force concerning the issue of control of Marine TACAIR.89 The Marine Corps position had remained stead- fast: that even in joint operations, the MAGTF commander always maintains integrity of the MAGTF, he always retains operational control of his organic air assets, that MAGTF aviation is employed in support of Marine ground forces and that the Marine Corps would provide those sorties in excess of MAGTF direct support requirements to other components of the joint force, or the joint force as a whole.90 The Marine Corps positon at this time was very much identical to the pre-1968 arrangement for the command and control of Marine air in Vietnam as directed by CINCPAC and implemented by MACV (see chapter IV) even to the point of acknowledging relinquishment of operational control when the joint force commander (JFC) declared a major emergency. In March 1981 the Joint Chiefs of Staff agreed and published a policy for the employment of the MAGTF as a part of a Joint task force in sustained operations ashore. This policy statement 89Memorandum by CMC for JCS #6-80, subj: Command and Control of TACAIR, 22 December 1980, pp. 1-2. 90Memorandum by J-3 for the JCS 2521/384-8, subj: Command and Control of TACAIR DECISION, revised 27 March 1981, p. 15. is commonly referred to as the "Omnibus Agreement" and it reads in whole: The Marine Air-Ground Task Force (MAGTF) commander will retain operational control of his organic air assets. The primary mission of the MAGTF air combat element is the support of the MAGTF ground element. During joint operations, the MAGTF air assets will normally be in support of the MAGTF mission. The MAGTF commander will make sorties available to the joint force commander, for tasking through his air component commander, for air defense, long-range interdiction, and long-range reconnaissance. Sorties in excess of MAGTF direct support requirements will be provided to the joint force commander for tasking through the air component commander for the support of other components of the JTF, or the JTF as a whole. Nothing herein shall infringe on the authority of the Theater or joint force commander, in the exercise of operational control, to assign missions, redirect efforts, and direct coordination among his subordinate commanders to insure unity of effort in accomplishment of his overall mission, or to maintain integrity of the force, as prescribed in JCS Pub II, "Unified Action Armed Forces (UNAAF)."91 91CMC, White Letter 7-81 encl (1), p. 1. This agreement has since been written into JCS Pub 12, Tactical Command and Control Planning Guidance and Procedures for Joint Operations. Analyzing the agreement, it is very similar to the position the Marine Corps had been maintaining. Of foremost import is the retention of operational control by the MAGTF commander of his organic air assets. Of additional importance is the affirmation of the primary mission of Marine air being the support of Marine ground forces. In this agreement the Marines provide sorties to the JFC in the areas of air defense and long-range interdiction and long-range reconnaissance. This is, in essence, a concession by the Marines that the Air Force component commander can best support the joint force as a whole (to include the MAGTF) by centralized management of these particular mission areas. It is also inherent in this provision that, by accepting these sorties, the Air Force component commander agrees to manage and fulfill the requirements of the entire joint task force in these three mission areas. One problem which immediately surfaces is: what is the definition of "long-range"? The answer is no where to be found. It is not contained in the text of the agreement, any JCS Pubs, Air Force or Marine Corps directives! In addition to the sorties in those three specified mission areas, sorties in excess of Marine direct support requirements (read support of Marine ground element) will be provided to the JFC. inherent in this is the responsibility for the Air Force component commander to be prepared to provide support to the MAGTF when the tactical situation so warrants. The final paragraph of the agreement reaffirms the command prerogative of the JFC and basically is a rewording of his authority to assume control of Marine TACAIR in the event of a major emergency. While the Omnibus Agreement is fairly straight foward and succinct, it contains leeway for misunderstanding and confusion in its implementaion. The Omnibus Agreement was disseminated to the Marine Corps in a White Letter from the Commandant of the Marine Corps, which contained an enclosure providing guidance for its interpreta- tion.92 This guidance centers upon joint land operations, since as it states, amphibious operations were not at issue in the JCS decision which led to the Omnibus Agreement. In addition to defining terms, the guidance contains some other salient points. Under explanation of the sorties to be provided the JFC in air defense, long-range interdiction, and long-range reconnais- sance, when the Air Force component commander assumes responsi- bilities of these functions for the joint force as a whole, dual mission aircraft are addressed. Current Marine VMFA (fighter attack squadrons) possess aircraft which are capable of perform- ing either air defense, close air support, or interdiction missions (Marine functions of AAW, CAS, DAS). The important point here is that the MAGTF commander provides sorties, not 92Additonally, OH 5.1-1, Command and Control of USMC TACAIR has been promulgated to aid Marines in understanding the agreement along with related Marine Corps policy and doctrine. aircraft. The next point addresses deployment of MAGTF air assets in advance of the ground element. There are certain scenarios where all or portions of the air combat element (ACE) will deploy into a theater of operation well in advance of the ground combat element (for instance due to time constraints in assemblying, loading, and floating amphibious shipping). In these instances a MAGTF foward command will be esablished (i.e. the ACE, normally the Marine Air Wing commander, would become the MAF foward commander). As the MAGTF foward commander he would then operate in compliance with the provisions of the Omnibus Agreement. If an aviation force is in place and operationally mission capable prior to requirements for MAGTF direct support, the MAGTF foward commander will offer all his available sorties to the JFC in accordance with the excess sortie provision of the agreement. In all cases the MAGTF commander retains operational control. This is accomplished through the apportionment, allocation, and tasking processes. JCS Pub 1 provides the following definitions: Apportionment- The determination and assignment of the total expected effort by percentage and/or by priority that should be devoted to the various air operations and/or geographic areas for a given period of time. Allocation- The translation of the apportionment into total numbers of sorties by aircraft type available for each opera- tion/task. Tasking- The process of translating the allocation into orders, and passing these orders to the units involved. Each order normally contains sufficient detailed instructions to enable the executing agency to accomplish the mission successful- ly. To understand how the MAGTF commander accomplishes these actions, it is necessary to examine them at the joint force or theater level first. The JFC starts by making an apportionment decision based upon his concept of operations and the enemy situation. This, normally, is in the form of a percentage of utilization by functional area (i.e. offensive counter air, interdiction, CAS, etc.). This effectively provides a demarcation between which portion of the Air Force component commander's effort will be utilized supporting the ground component, and which portion is devoted to the theater or joint force air war. How the JFC arrives at this decision is not specified. He may make this decision in isolation with his staff, with the advice of all his subordinate component commanders, or simply by accepting the recommendation of his Air Force component commander. Included in the air assets that are affected by this decision are those sorties provided to the JFC by the Marines in accordance with the Omnibus Agreement. The Air Force component commander takes the apportionment decision along with any concurrent guidance and allocates the resources available to him (organic Air Force plus Marine sorties provided) among the various missions designated by the JFC. This allocation consists of translation of apportion- ment (which is predicated upon availability) into sortie numbers with distribution among using units where applicable. The Air Force component commander then tasks them through his Air Tasking Order (ATO) normally in the form of a message. JCS Pub 12 contains the detailed procedures for effecting these actions. At the MAGTF level, the MAGTF commander apportions his assets by percentage or priority based upon his concept of operations and the enemy situation. Additionally, the MAGTF apportionment decision includes identification of sorties in the areas of air defense, long-range interdiction and long-range reconnaissance which will be made available to the JFC. Through- out the apportionment process the MAGTF commander's first priority is supporting the accomplishment of the MAGTF's assigned mission. Normally the allocation process for the MAGTF occurs at the MAGTF Tactical Air Command Center (TACC).93 In the event sorties are available in excess of MAGTF requirements, these sorties are made available to the JFC; likewise if there is a shortage of Marine TACAIR assets to support the MAGTF, these shortages are identified to the JFC.94 Tasking for the MAGTF occurs at the MAGTF TACC and consists of development of a frag or ATO. Here there must be liaison and 93For a detailed discussion of the factors and mechanics involved in the MAGTF apportionment and allocation processes see OH 5-3, Tasking USMC Fixed-Wing Tactical Aviation, July 1982, section 3. 94CMC, White Letter 7-81, encl (2), p. 5. coordination between the MAGTF TACC and the Air Force component TACC. While the framework for these actions is relatively straight- foward, and there is amplifying guidance for the conduct of these three processes (JCS Pub 12, OH 5-1.1, and OH 5- 3), the Marine Corps experiences problems in the practical application of these tasks. Many Marine officers do not understand that there are two unique categories of sorties provided to the JFC for tasking through the Air Force component commander. The first category consists of those sorties provided in the three specific mission areas, when the Air Force component commander assumes responsi- bility for air defense, long-range interdiction, and long-range reconnaissance. The second category of sorties provided are the excess sorties, which are offered or received without any expectation of support in return. Despite the plethora of definitive guidance on the subject, many Marines have the mistaken belief that MAGTF will provide to the JFC excess sorties only in the areas of air defense, long-range interdiction, and long-range reconnaissance.95 There are Marine commanders and staff officers who do not fully understand their responsibilities in the apportionment and allocation processes.96 This lack of understanding on the part of some Marine Corps 95CO Marine Corps Tactical Systems Support Activity (MCTSSA) ltr D122-.3/WTF:cj over 3900-303 dtd 14 November 1983 and CO MCTSSA ltr D122-3/WTF:meb over 3920-303-1 dtd 12 March 1984. "Personal observations of author during joint exercises. players in this area is exacerbated by the Air Force's interpre- tation of the Omnibus Agreements often making working relationships at the operational levels difficult. For example, the Air Force does not share the Marine Corps interpretation of what sorties are in excess of MAGTF requirements. The necessity for understanding and cooperation between the Air Force and the Marine Corps has been brought to the forefront with the advent of the Joint Tactical Interoperability Tactical Command and Control Systems (JINTACCS) where written joint interface operating procedures must be developed to effect the necessary interService functioning. A large portion of the problem of developing a system of information data exchange for JINTACCS centers around the Air Force's interpretation of the Omnibus Agreement. The JCS reached agreement on the policy set forth in the Omnibu Agreement in a meeting on 27 March 1981.97 in April 1981 the Air Force issued Doctrinal Information Publication (DIP) No. 10 in response to the Omnibus Agreement. In this publication it is stated that the JCS agreement "is an interim JCS Omnibus Agreement on the way the MAGTFs should be integrated into plans for sustained operations ashore. This is a first step."98 (bold added for emphasis). No where else is or has the Omnibus Agreement been referred to as interim.! Next the Air Force drafted DIP No. 11 outlining the command relationships for the MAGTF. This publication contains a copy of 97JCS Memorandum 2521/384-8, p. 14. 98DIP Ho. 10, p. 1. the following message which was sent by the JCS to the CINCs of all unified add specified commands:99 THE JOINT CHIEFS OF STAFF WISH TO INSURE THAT ALL UNDERSTAND THE ORGANIZATIONAL AUTHORITY OF FIELD COMMANDERS IN THE DEVELOPMENT OF THEIR PLANS. COMMAND- ERS DO HAVE THE AUTHORITY TO ORGANIZE THEIR FORCES AS THEY DETERMINE TO BE MOST EFFECTIVE FOR IMPLEMENTATION OF THEIR OPERATIONAL PLANS, TO INCLUDE EXERCISING. Also included in DIP No. 11 is an attachment providing the Air Force interpretation of the debate items in the 4 December 1981 OCS meeting in which the JCS agreed to send this message. it states that the JCS agreed that during sustained operations ashore a field commander should place "the Marine ground forces subordinate to a land component commander."100 Concerning control of MAGTF air it repeats the intent of the Omnibus Agreement. Speaking of this message, the Air Force states: "the Air Force endorses the message as the most current iteration and interpretation of this issue."101 Upon review of what is presented in DIP No, 11 along with the unofficial opinions of individuals knowledgeable on this subject, it appears that the 4 December 1981 message was sent as 99JCS 042226Z Dec 81, subj: Command Relationships in Operational Plan Development. 100DIP No. 11, p. 21. 101DIP No. 11, p. 2. a compromise measure following deadlocked debate centering around the repeated nemesis: whether Marine TACAIR should come under control of a theater Air Force component commander? Clearly, the Air Force then attempted to establish the position that this message abrogated the Omnibus Agreement. However, such is not the case. The Omnibus Agreement remains in force as written. But has it served to quell the issue? Has it helped or hurt the Marine Corps? Is it an end all to this subject? Chapter VI Functionalism vs. MAGTF Integrity Through simple reflection on the military history of the past fifty years it is prudent to expect that the Omnibus Agreement might not serve as an end all to the basic issue. While it has delineated guidance on the issue, establishing what has been the true historical precedent of MAGTF employment as doctrine, such specificity has led to a redirection of efforts aimed at unseating prescribed arrangements. During August 1971, both the Air Force and the Army issued memorandums for the JCS dealing with the issue of MAGTF employ- ment. The Air Force memorandum was brief, simply calling for the JCS to specify whether a MAGTF would come under a land component commander for sustained operations ashore or whether it would be employed as a separate component (hence the JTF would have four components: land, naval, air, and Marine Corps).102 The Army memorandum paralleled the Air Forces, concluding that "JCS should accept subordination of a MAGTF to a land component."103 Having lost the TACAIR issue with the Omnibus Agreement, the Army and the Air Force have made a concerted effort (as reflected in these memoranda) to transfer the issue to a doctrin- al battle over componency; focusing upon the issue of whether the 102Department of the Air Force Memorandum for the Director Plans and Policy Joint Staff (No. 87-81), subj: Command Relationships for the MAGTF in Sustained Operations Ashore (J-5P156-81/D), 27 August 1981, p. 1. 103Department of the Army Memorandum for the Director Joint Staff, subj: Command Relationships for the MAGTF in Sustained Operations Ashore (J-5P156-81/D), 24 August 1981, p. 2. MAGTF should comprise a fourth component in joint force structur- ing. By establishing the MAGTF under a land component commander (a relationship which has occurred in certain instances, histori - cally (see Chapter IV)), as a written mandate, a prelude for future trilateral functional organization is steadily formed. The logical follow on is to place all aviation under a functional air component. It is interesting to note that this proposal to establish definitive guidance for placing the MAGTF under a land component commander in effect inhibits JFC authority in organiz- ing his forces in the manner he determines most effective; the very same argument which the Air Force had used previously against the Omnibus Agreement's delineatior, of MAGTF integrity. In February 1982 the Air Force held a planners conference at which MAGTF command relationships were discussed. The resultant Air Force position was that a theater command structure should consist of a ground force component controlling all ground operations, an air component controlling all air operations, and a naval component controlling all naval operations. It is important to remember that JCS Pub 2, Chapter 11 states that the terms "Service component commands" and "component commands" are synonymous and can be used interchangeably. In a memorandum to the JCS, dated 19 April 1982, the Chief of Staff of the Air Force proposed that JCS Pub 2 be changed to remove the term "Service component" and to assert that unified commands are designed to employ forces "functionally, distinct and separate from their military departments, and that the role of the Services is to organize, train, equip, and provide forces for theme combatant commands."104 Records at Headquarters Marine Corps (HQMC) document the fact that during a two year period (July 1980 - July 1982) the MAGTF TACAIR issue was addressed from one angle or another (command and control of USMC TACAIR, air command and control, review of JCS Pub 2, functional vs. Service component etc.) over forty times by the JCS or their operational deputies. Throughout 1982, every OPLAN under review was challenged by the Air Force on the issue of a MAGTF Service component vice a trilateral functional component relationship. In a representa- tive OPLAN under review (where the subordinate unified commander involved was an Air Force officer) the OPLAN came up for review, rewritten, deleting all references to COMMARFOR (Commander Marine Forces) (the USMC component commander) and replac- ing "Air Force" component commander with "air", component command- er.105 An "air" vice "Air Force" component implies more than one Service. The usage of air component commands is found in "combined" plans. Combined operations have not been addressed hereinbefore. Without totally investigating this subject, a few points should be made. JCS Pub 1 defines combined force as "a military force composed of elements of two or more allied nations." Combined 104Memorandum by the Chief of Staff of the Air Force for the JCS (CSAFM 07-82), subj: Proposal to Change JCS Pub 2 Unified Action Armed Forces, 19 April 1982, p. 105Documentation of OPLAN involved omitted due to classification. force structure is normally organized functionally under air. land, and naval components. The Air Force justification for revising JCS Pub 2 (CSAFM 07-82) cites combined doctrine and utilize the rationale of aligning national (joint) doctrine with combined philosophy. It must be appreciated that combined dortrine is adapted to certain scenarios where alliances unite military forces from a multitude of nations, e.g. NATO, Korea, each of which possesses separate Service components of varying sizes and force structure. Therefore in the international arena it may be necessary and prudent to organize along functional lines for purposes of support, to cover all mission areas, and to place like Service components together. CSAFM 07-82 states that: 106 We have espoused to our allies the doctrine of employ- ing forces functionally through land, naval, and air component commands. This has been accepted by our allies with a sense of military judgement that bears the weight of logic and experience. However not all combined commands are functionally organized. Figure 6, from Air Force TACM 2-1, depicts the command structure for Allied Command Europe. It is composed of various geographic (area) commands which are broken into subordinate commands (geographically), some of which possess more than one land compontent. The ACE mobile force is "formed by seven countries, 106CSAFM 07-82, p. 1. Click here to view image it comprises seven infantry battalion groups,... ground support fighter squadrons, and reconnaissance aircraft."107 Addition- ally there is one uni-Service command (UK Air). Clearly this is not the trilateral functional arrangement the Air Force is attempting to subscribe joint doctrine to; rather, national Service components serve as she building blocks for this organi- zation. To justify not utilizing the MAGTF as a Service component because of combined doctrine is a mistake, the result of an attempted oversimplistic approach. The MAGTF is unique. No other allied nation possesses a Service like the MAGTF, possess- ing organic air and the means to control it. The MAGTF is bigger than she Armies and Air Forces of some countries. Additionally the MAGTF has the ability to integrate its command and control into the conbined structure (ie. NATO and South Korea) and has and continues to successfully participate in combined and joint exercises maintaining MAGTF integrity. The Omnibus Agreement is written in joint vice combined terminology, however the spirit and intent of the agreement is readily translatable into the combined arena, as is evidenced in the results of repeated exercises. 1984 did not see a decline in efforts to resurrect the basic issue. It saw the dissemination of DIP No. 12 by the Air Force, entitled, "Command Relationships". Its basic theme remains 107Tactical Air Command Manual (TACM) 2-1, Tactical Air Operations, 15 April 1978, p. 11-17. centered on the functional componency vs. Service component issue, very much in line with the single manager for TACAIR tact of DIP N0. 10 and DIP No. 11. It parallels the earlier works; replete with historical views and semantical analyses of JCS Pub 2. Obviously this battle is not over. Despite many repeated initiatives, there has not been any JCS action to countermand, lessen, or rescind the Omnibus Agreement. The issue will probably not be brought to a JCS vote until those proposing change are sure of winning. Currently it appears deadlocked with the Air Force and Army supporting functionalism in opposition to the Navy and Marine Corps. But the issue has remained alive in various forms, even as the key players (the members of the JCS) change. This issue is orchestrated from the highest levels. That is where it belongs, if it must exist. What is important is what the issue means to Marines in the fleet? Prior to looking at the implications of change, it is beneficial to see what has been occurring at the operational levels. The source of this desired insight is contained in the results of joint exercises. The ability of the MAGTF to successfully function as a Service component (in terms of both the objectives of the MAGTF and the JTF) while operating under the precepts of the Omnibus Agreement, is well documented in after action reports (AARs) of many joint exercises. Analysis of a representative sample, encompassing a variety of contingent scenarios (NATO, South Korea, and the Middle East) yields consistently successful results: 1) Successful integration of Marine Air Command and Control into local air defense systems. 2) Successful practice of command relationships. 3) Effective testing and practice of common air tasking (CAT) procedures. 4) Expeditious execution of the tasking of excess sorties with correct procedures well disseminated and well known, These comments all reflect experiences derived from exercising the MAGTF as a Service component. They are taken from a one year sample of joint force level AARs (individual reference omitted due to classification). In the five force level AARs there were no deleterious consequences mentioned concerning employment of the MAGTF as a Service component. However this is not to imply that there were not minor difficulties in execution and some lessons learned. These are best summarized by the following problem areas which are extracted from a Marine Corps report.108 It should be noted that the force level AAR for the same exercise did not portray these or any other problem areas concerning the basic issue. 1) There were several ATO distribution problems, with copies of the ATO never being received by Marine Forces on two of the exercise days. 108CG THIRD MAW 240039Z FEB 82, subj: Joint Readiness Exercise After Action Report Concerning Common Air Tasking Procedures (UNCLAS). 2) The Air Force component commander attempted to include all available fixed-wing sorties (Air Force, Navy, and Marine) in the ATO. Once the ATO was disseminated, the Air Force component commander "demonstrated total in flexibility with regard to implementation of timely changes to the ATO." 3) The definitions and terms employed in the air employment plan message do not reflect USMC aviaiton functions and mis- sions. The air employment plan message is sent by subordinate commanders to the CJTF to identify any excess sorties and unfulfilled requirements (reference- JCS Pub 12, Vol IV). 4) Current Air Force component commander procedures pointed to the fact that the Air Force "wants to pursue an air campaign in context that air power is the ultimate weapon and that there is absolutely no thought given to the fact that aviation is a supporting arm and therefore must integrate ite efforts so as to optimize its support of the ground forces and the overall JTF objectives". 5) During the exercise the Air Force component commander's attitude "was one of attempting to implement absolute control vice coordination" when dealing with the Marine aviation as "every effort was made to restrict initiatives" in supporting the Marine ground forces scheme of maneuver beyond the fire support coordination line (FSCL). The Air Force's "arrogant attitude" was exemplified by instances when Air Force sorties were flown within the Marine forces objective area without any attempted coordination on the part of the Air Force (to include a strike which was conducted inside the Marine force's FSCL). These items which affected MAGTF aviation during this particular joint exercise are representative of problems fre- quently encountered and are worthy of analysis. Procedures for CAT and ATO distribution need refining. This is a real problem which is currently being addressed and hopefully reconciled with the advent of JINTACCS. The develop- ment of JINTACCS interface operating procedures appears to include procedures for efficient handling of joint mission (ie. air defense) sorties and cross force (excess sorties) tasking. However other ATO problems are likely to endure: communication difficulties, Air Force lead time requirements, and the lack of universally accepted phraseology. These are all problems which will arise regardless of whether the MAGTF is employed as a Service component, maintaining its integrity, or in the manner currently espoused by the Air Force. ATO lead time is a major concern. It would be severely magnified in scope if Marine TACAIR was to fall under operational control of the Air Force component commander. Problems with the dissimilarity of terms are highlighted with the comparison of DAS and INT. In the Marine Corps, DAS is equivalent solely to the Air Force mission of INT, however the Air Force mission of BAI may fall into the Marine Corps definition of either CAS or DAS (dependent upon the target: location with respect to the FSCL). While the Marine Corps resists usage of Air Force terminology, in certain OPLANS the Marine Corps has signed off on usage of these terms. An across the board policy or adjustment is needed. The remaining problem highlighted by the Marine AAR centers on the interpretation and application of the doctrine and concept of MAGTF employment. All players, Air Force and Marine, must understand, appreciate, and employ the role of the Air Force component commander as one of coordinating authority vice one of direction. Marines should be given a large enough parcel of airspace (airspace control sector) to take full advantage of the Marine Corps capability to project firepower beyond the FSCL. These problems do not always arise and are probably best describ- ed as "personality dependent" and the likely result of Marine planning staffs, commanders, and liaison officers who are unable to effectively articulate proper doctrine and employment proced- ures. Failing satisfaction at this level, it should be a JFC problem. The bottom line is that the system works. It works in all scenarios. At the operational level there are no major prob- lems, and the problems that do exist are identified. They do not revolve around the current established doctrinal employment of the MAGTF. Rather they are the nuts and bolts inter-working procedures which must be identified and hammered out through exercise at the operational level. Herein is how the system works with MAGTF integrity. However given the continual efforts at higher levels to ammend JCS Pub 2 and to reorganize along a trilateral functional basis, the potential implications at the operational level should be contrasted with the current situation potrayed above. Chapter VII Implication for Marines From the theater level perspective, centralized control of airpower is clearly the most efficient means of operation. Service affiliations should be placed aside, allowing a doctrine of single management to emerge. Viewing air employment at a level below the theater level results in limits on the effects and effectiveness of airpower. A decentralized control of air assets leads to an inappropriate division of the battlefield where the air commander is unable to mass his forces in times of necessity -- offensive or defensive. Air forces inherently have a broader scope than surface- bound forces. Tactically, this perspective is viewed from the vantage of the entire theater. In line with this perspective all peripheral, attached, assigned, and in support of air resources must work for one air component commander. The air component commander is then responsible for planning and integrating these assets and insuring their protection and tactical employment to properly marshal their maneuver, firepower, and psychological potential. A single manager of all theater air assets provides the mechanism for managing all assets (ie. EW, CAS, air defense, air refueling etc.) in support of theater requirements, providing for coordinated, effective, integrated air operations. Centralized management and direction results in decreased late sorties, missed targets, inappropriate ordnance loads and otherwise inefficient air asset employment. Additionally, aviators receive the benefits of more planning time, better sequencing, and improved management. These are all arguments and justifications which have been put forth by the Air Force. Admittedly they suggest a strong case for managing the finite resources of air power in order to maximize the punch in terms of effort expended, provide a means for massing air power, and provide an improved management design leading to zero diverts. However while these points should be recognized, a careful distinction must also be acknowledged: observation of the fact that the Air Force is proposing a "producer" oriented system as opposed to a "consumer" oriented system. A system as espoused by the Air Force stands to impact heavily upon a MAGTF. There are real and valid implications involved here. They must be understood, for there are a variety of scenarios which could lead to either a loss of MAGTF integrity or an air component commander functionally in charge of all theater TACAIR: 1) A change to JCS Pub 2 and current joint doctrine resulting in a trilateral functional approach to joint force organization. While this is not likely, the Air Force has not backed down from its repeated attempts to institute such a change. 2) A unified commander utilizing his perogative and authority to exercise operational command to include organization of subordinate forces for missions assigned to him on either an area or functional basis. While this is possible, current exercise results and established doctrine militate against it. However, in "emergency" situations it is reasonable to expect that a JFC may temporarily assume operational control of all TACAIR. 3) The current Air Land Battle doctrine, in particular the Army- Air Force agreement on procedures for the Joint Attack of the Second Echelon (J-SAK) with its inherent division of battlefield responsibilities and structuring, may in effect serve as a de facto means of providing for the establishment of an air component commander with authority exceeding that of an Air Force component commander as established by the Omnibus Agreement and JCS Pub 2.109 This raises pertinent questions about the arrange- ment of the joint battlefield, particularly when a MAGTF conduct- ing sustained land operations is included. Given Air Force control of Marine TACAIR beyond the level established by current doctrine (Omnibus Agreement- joint missions/excess sorties) for one of the above or any other potential reasons, there are four areas of major concern to the MAGTF: 1) loss of the primary mission role of Marine TACAIR 2) responsiveness 109TRADOC Pam 525-45/TACP 50-29, General Operating Procedures for Joint Attack of the Second Echelon (J-SAK), 31 December 1984, pp. [2-2] - [2-5]. 3) structuring of the battlefield- areas of interest/influence 4) loss of MAGTF aviation force tailoring The MAGTF's aviation combat element primary mission is support of the MAGTF. This is clearly established by both Marine Corps and joint doctrine. The placement of all TACAIR under control of an air component commander would result in a loss of commitment to this first priority. While support needs of the MAGTF might be filled first from Marine aviation assets, this is not to say that Marine aviation wouldn't be used to offset Air Force shortfalls in support of the land component commander and the theater air war, potentially, to the detriment of MAGTF support requirements. There is a history of Marine air ful- filling Air Force CAS shortcomings in both Korea and Vietnam. Beyond the joint mission areas, there are certain aviation functions which in select contingency scenarios the Air Force will not have theater assets for, early on. Marine aviation will be on the scene and capable of performing these functions (ie. EW, night/all weather CAS (FLIR, TRAM, LTD), and basket refueling for allied nations aircraft). Marine Corps aviation's primary mission is not to make up for Air Force force structure deficiencies. Following fulfillment of MAGTF support reqiure- ments, excess sorties in these critical mission areas are provided to the JTF. Responsiveness is probably the greatest advantage of the centralized control, decentralized execution aviation command system of the MAGTF. It is a prime feature of Marine offensive air support and understandably an area of vital concern to the ground commander. Responsiveness in terms of dedicated assets, flexibility, and more importantly, the time factor. Minutes on the battlefield equate to lives and lost or gained objectives. The impact upon responsiveness would exist in both immediate and preplanned requests. All air support requests would have to be submitted to an additional agency, the air component commander, and possibly through a land component commander. Clearly, the more agencies involved, even assuming no communications break- downs, the greater the response time. Preplanned missions would be administered through the Air Force frag cycle. The ideal Marine Corps air tasking cycle is a 24 hour process.110 The Air Force ATO planning cycle extends out to a 72 hour process.111 The actual allocation in the Air Force process takes place around 36 hours in advance. JINTACCS should refine CAT procedures. JINTACCS is being evaluated at 24 hours, however the Marine Corps is pushing for 18 hours.112 The bottom line is responsiveness. The structuring of the battlefield in joint sustained land operations, is an area of major importance and concern to the MAGTF. 110OH 5-3, Tasking USMC Fixed-Wing Tactical Aviation, July 1982, p. 3-1. 111TRADOC Pam 525-45/TACP 50-29, p. 5-2. 112MCDEC Doctrine Department briefing on "Command and Control of Marine Air", 19 December 1984 A vari
