Operations, Equipment And Training Of The Infantry Division For The Anti-Landing And Amphibious Invasion CSC 1985 SUBJECT AREA Training OPERATIONS, EQUIPMENT AND TRAINING OF THE INFANTRY DIVISION FOR THE ANTI-LANDING AND AMPHIBIOUS INVASION The Writing Program Command and Staff College Lieutenant Colonel T. Kobayakawa Japan Ground Self-Defense Force April 1985 OPERATIONS, EQUIPMENT AND TRAINING OF THE INFANTRY DIVISION FOR THE ANTI-LANDING AND AMPHIBIOUS INVASION Japan established the new constitution in 1946, after World War II. Within the framework of this constitution, Japan has gradually maintained and built up the National defense forces necessary to defend our country as an independent nation.1 However, there have been two different interpretations of the constitution as to the possession of the defense forces. One group has insisted that Japan should have the forces to defend our country and the other is opposed to it. This lack of national concensus forms a great obstacle to promote the defense policy. The typical examples to show this situation can be seen in the defense spending which is limited to 1 percent of GNP ratio by the cabinet policy.2 As to the strength of Japan Ground Self Defense Forces (JGSDF), the numbers of divisions are 13, and the authorized personnel strengths are 180,000,3 and also, the pace of modernization has been very slow. Japan is an island nation so feasible forms of invasion that we will face are the land and amphibious operations. As I mentioned, there are many restrictions to our defense, and there is a firm, hard policy on the defense. I would like to take a look at one aspect of it on the free basis. I'm going to discuss the following: - Defense environments. - Defense policies against landing and amphib- ious invasion, and the best policy to be adopted. - Capabilities necessary to conduct the anti- landing and amphibious operation. - Equipments to be prepared. - Necessary training of the division to be engaged in the operation. Defense Environment Geographic Character. The island of Japan runs from north to south about 3,000 km and 200 km from east to west, and is located in the far east area. It is divided into four main islands. Flat land occupies 30% of the area which mostly faces the sea.4 Most industries with dense population are concentrated into these areas. Accordingly, there are the following characteristics: Long coastal lines with proper areas suitable for enemy amphibious operations makes the defensive area vast; long stretching territories on the four separated islands make the concentration of forces difficult in the case of invasion; and flat lands in the coastal regions are the centers of economy, politics, and industry, which are likely objective areas for the enemy. Economy of Japan. The natural resources in Japan are insufficient; rather, Japan depends on the resources from foreign countries. Blockade of imports would have an adverse affect on Japan's economy. For this reason, it is very hard for Japan to conduct protracted operations. People of Japan. Japan is now in the era of elec- tronics and intelligence. Various kinds of information are processed and transferred in a moment. Therefore, the outcome of the first battle in the anti-landing and amphibious operation will affect seriously the minds of the people of Japan. Additionally, the patience of the Japanese is getting shorter compared to that of World War II because we have enjoyed a higher level of living materially. Lack of resources would lead the people into hardships. Defense Policy of Japan. In addition to the political restrictions mentioned before, laws also impose many restrictions on such defense preparation activities which are essential to defend the country as establishment of defensive positions and construction of obstacles in peacetime or appropriate time.5 This defense setting will bring many difficulties in conducting defense operations against the possible landing and amphibious invasion. General Concepts of Anti-Landing and Amphibious Operation Taking the above mentioned into consideration, the following four concepts of operation have emerged: - Attack the enemy's rear areas or ports. - Reduce his combat power in the air and on sea. - Destroy him on the shore or in the coastal region. - Destroy him in the inland area. The Best Policy to be Adopted - Concept of Operation Although the best course of action that we should adopt for the anti-landing and amphibious operaions in the future is to be selected from one of the four concepts mentioned above. Before the selection, we must set some assumptions: - The Defense environment is not to be changed. - The invading forces launch a surprise air attack and gain air superiority and control of the sea in short periods of time and are capable of concentrating his forces necessary to achieve the goals of invasion at any time and at any place from the air and sea. These forces are all armored and motorized, have super firepower, and can conduct airborne helicop- terborne operations, and have electronic warfare capability.6 - The JGSDF expects to have little support from the JMSDF and the JASDF. Taking these assumptions into mind, the best concept of operation against such kind of invasion is "To attack enemy bases and prevent our land from being a battle- field." This concept is hard to adopt, because the basic policy of Japan is to exclusively defend the country, never permit the attack of the enemy beyond our territory of land, sea and air space.7 "Destroying the enemy inland" means that we can take advantage of mountainous terrain which limits the enemy's mobility, and which blocks the superior enemy with small forces. We concentrate our forces and commence counterattacks. This is the practicable concept of the JGSDF. However, the largest deficiency of this concept is to abandon the important densely populated and industrialized areas too early. Consequently, we will have to fight for a longer period of time under unfavorable conditions without logistical support bases. I think this concept is unfit to defend our country against invasion, especially when the enemy limits the objective of the invasion to occupy the key areas in a short period of time and tries to settle the war by occupying the areas. Therefore, the best policy that we should adopt is "Destroy the enemy on the sea and/or on the shore, or in the coastal region." Capabilities Necessary to Conduct the Anti-Landing and Amphibious Operation When we want to kill the enemy on the sea, the Air Self-Defense Force and the Maritime Self-Defense Force powers are prerequisite factors. But, now, I would like to discuss only the capabilities necessary to accomplish its role as Ground Self-Defense Forces. If the enemy invaded our country, they would use three kinds of operations, such as "ship-to-shore," "shore-to-shore," and "port-to-port."8 I think the most probable type of landing ashore is the shore-to-shore or ship-to-shore operation. Therefore, we have to use surface-to-ship missiles (SSMs) which can be fired from the ground. In that case, we cannot destroy all the ships and amphibious assault vehicles. So, mainly, the firing of SSMs must be concentrated on specific ships, such as control ships (CCS, PCS, SCS),9 sometimes naval battle ships, and amphibious assault vehicles. The effective range of this missile is at least 20 kms from the shore.10 Moreover, we must be ready for enemy electronic warfare and also, we must endure the massive enemy air attacks and use naval gunfire on targets taking advantage of the enemy's vulnerabilities. Therefore, in order to do that, all systems must be armored.11 Next, I'm going to discuss the necessary capability to destroy the enemy on the shore or coastal area. The enemy's vulnerability that we have to take advantage of will be exposed to us on or after landing. At this moment, enemy combat power is separated into two halves on the shore, the rest of them on the sea. Now, also enemy forces are converging on and around the shore. So exertion of their combat power is restricted to the minimum extent. The necessary capability to destroy the enemy at this time is massed firepower capable of firing from a longer range--a stand-off from enemy naval gunfire and air attack. In other words, this fire system must have destructive firepower with a longer range and impact on the targeted areas against the enemy armor forces. It is necessary to kill those tanks by antitank, precision guided munitions fired from indirect long-range weapons. Fortunately, today's firepower of field artillery is going to be able to destroy armored vehicles and landing craft and is going to be able to construct obstacles.12 Another necessary capability is that all our troops must be armored to hold the freedom of maneuverability under overwhelming enemy firepower. There are 13 divisions in the Japan Ground Self-Defense Forces and one of them is the armor division. In order to pursue my policy of recommending the anti-landing and amphibious operation, armored troops are required; infantry, antitank, artillery, and engineer should be armored. Air Defense Capability. The air defense is necessary to make our firepower and moibility effective under enemy air superiority. It must provide an air defense umbrella for the division deployed forward, especially to protect such positions as SSMs, artillery and antitank, and cover the infantry troops engaging the counterattack, as well as the logistical area.13 If we have sufficient means of air defense, we can cope with the enemy airborne and the helicopterborne attack conducted concurrently with the amphibious operation.14 Prompt Construcing Capability of Obstacles. It is impossible for Japan to build sea shore obstacles during peacetime. This means that we must set obstacles very quickly in the coastal area to prevent the enemy from establishing beachheads, even then we won't have sufficient time for the preparation.15 Of course, those obstacles should be integrated with the fire support means as I mentioned before. Information Collecting Capability. The enemy will conduct a feint operation to mislead our judgment as to the location and the date and time of landing. In order to defend the areas with limited forces, we must know exactly and well in advance where and when the enemy's main attack will be directed. Therefore, we must get timely information by using a lot of radar and sensors. Electronic Countermeasures. It is estimated that the enemy can conduct strong and massive jamming to impede our conduct of operation.16 We have to have sound capability to expel this jamming and protect our command and control system intact and conduct the operations. Otherwise, effectiveness of combat power would be limited to the minimum. Accordingly, we must possess both ECM and jamming capabilities to disturb their communications nets. Attack Helicopters. Attack helicopters (AHs) are very useful in this situation because of its high mobility. If we have many AHs, even though the enemy made a surprise attack to the unprepared shore, we can concentrate AH firepower very quickly. Sometimes, it is difficult to destroy the enemy's tanks and armored vehicles under the enemy's air superiority, but we can expect that one AH can destroy more than one or two armored vehicles. Combat Service Support. Since many of our weapons will be destroyed in battle because of massive firepower, we must prepare for the next battle. Usually, we need a lot of time to repair at the high echelon maintenance, but the low echelon maintenance does not require as much time. So the Combat Service Support units of the division should consist of many small maintenance teams. Also, the division should be able to get quickly and sufficiently combat service support from the higher unit. Equipment to be Prepared. In order to accomplish the mission of the division deployed defensive area, the following equipment is required: Field Artillery Regiment. Current 105 Howitzer Battalion and 155 Battalion should be equipped with 155H self-propelled and 200 Howitzer or multiple surface-to- surface rockets. Antitank Unit. 106 Recoilless must be replaced by a medium antitank missile, and a MAT platoon should be equipped with a longer range antitank missile. Infantry Regiment. At least half of an infantry company should be armor protected, and also all infantry companies should have a short-range air defense weapon like a Stinger. Recon Unit. Equip the radar with ECM capability. Signal Battalion. Organize the ECM company and equip with necessary items. Organize the Rocket Units by the artillery brigade of the army and reinforce the division deployed forward. In order to implement all of these to all the divisions, it costs much. But at least the divisions located in the northern part of Japan, where enemy invasion is most likely, must possess these capabilities. Necessary Training of the Division to be Engaged in This Operation. The divisions have to train its soldiers and units to accomplish two typical different types of operations. The first necessary training is designed to block enemy landing and reduce its combat power. The main part of this operation is defense. Another necessary training is the offensive operation to destroy the enemy. For the defensive operation, important training is aimed to establish defensive positions and obstacles in a short period of time. We make use of terrain and reverse slope to minimize the loss of the enemy's massive fire, defeating and destroying the airborne and helicopterborne troops landing on our defensive area, direct effective fire on the targets even in the night. For the offensive operation, a night attack combined with the fire support and night movement training becomes important. Under the cover of darkness, the enemy's superior air and naval gunfire are restricted, and our movement is concealed. In addition, training for disposing of minefields promptly is required. Conclusion. I have discussed, personally, the best concept of operation, equipments, and training of the division for carrying out the battle against both landing and amphibious troops. Taking the current defense policy of Japan into consideration, it is rather difficult to have all the necessary equipment for the division and also would cost much. However, as our mission is to prevent an enemy invasion, we need sufficient and proper equipments to destroy the invading forces. The government, the Defense Agency, as well as the Ground Self-Defense Force officials know well about these, therefore, modernization will have progressed not abruptly but steadily. ENDNOTES 1The Defense Agency, Japan, Defense of Japan 1984, August 1983, pp. 68-70. 2Asagumo Shimbunsha (Press) Inc., Defense Handbook, 1983, March 25, 1983, p. 21. 3The Defense Agency, Japan, Defense of Japan 1984, August 1983, p. 76. 4Gunge Kenkuyu, Japan Military Review, November 1984, p. 55. 5The Defense Agency, Japan, Defense of Japan 1984, August 1983, pp. 304-308. 6The Officer School, Japan, Rikusenkenkyu, August 1980, p. 69. 7The Defense Agency, Japan, Defense of Japan 1984, August 1983, pp. 68-71. 8The Officer School, Japan, Rikusen Kenkuyu, October 1981, p. 11. 9Marine Corps Command and Staff College, Planning the Ship-to-Shore Movement, AY 1984-1985, pp. 14-20. 10The Officer School, Japan, Rikusen Kenkuyu, October 1981, pp. 9-30. 11The Officer School, Japan, Rikusen Kenkuyu, October 1981, pp. 9-30. 12The Officer School, Japan, Rikusen Kenkuyu, October 1981, pp. 9-30. 13The GSO, The Aggressor, Volume II, April 1978, p. 129. 14The GSO, Yagairei, Volume I, July 1979, p. 149. 15The Officer School, Japan, Rikusen Kenkuyu,October 1980, pp. 11-26. 16The GSO, The Aggressor, Volume II, April 1978, p. 16. BIBLIOGRAPHY 1. Asagumo Shimbunsha (Press) Inc., Defense Handbook, 1983, March 25, 1983, p. 21. 2. Gunge Kenkuyu, Japan Military Review, November 1984, p. 55. 3. Marine Corps Command and Staff College, Planning the Ship-to-Shore Movement, AY 1984-1985, pp. 14-20. 4. The Defense Agency, Japan, Defense of Japan 1984, August 1983, pp. 68-70. 5. The Defense Agency, Japan, Defense of Japan 1984, August 1983, pp. 68-71. 6. The Defense Agency, Japan, Defense of Japan 1984, August 1983, p. 76. 7. The Defense Agency, Japan, Defense of Japan 1984, August 1983, pp. 304-308. 8. The GSO, The Aggressor, Volume II, April 1978, p. 16. 9. The GSO, The Aggressor, Volume II, April 1978, p. 129. 10. The GSO, The Yagairei, Volume I, July 1979, p. 149. 11. The Officer School, Japan, Rikusen Kenkuyu, August 1981, p. 11. 12. The Officer School, Japan, Rikusen Kenkuyu, October 1981, pp. 9-30. 13. The Officer School, Japan, Rikusen Kenkuyu, October 1980, pp. 11-26.
