Remotely Piloted Vehicles: A Sensible Approach To Development And Utilization CSC 1985 SUBJECT AREA Intelligence EXECUTIVE SUMMARY TITLE: Remotely Piloted Vehicles: A Sensible Approach to Development and Utilization I. Purpose: To examine the evolution, advantages and effective employment of the RPV on the modern battlefield. II. Problem: Present trends in RPV development threaten the very advantages which make the RPV an effective weapons system. III. Data: Key issues must be thoughtfully resolved if we are to avoid over-development of the RPV and preserve the advantages which make it effective on the modern battlefield. A primary development issue involves the multi-mission RPV configuration versus the variable payload, single mission configuration. The latter preserves the advantages of survivability, low cost, and mobility. Another decision must be made between fixed wing (FW) versus rotary wing (RW) design of the RPV. The FW RPV offers proven technology, larger payloads, lower production costs, and less vulnerability to air defense weapons. Meanwhile, the primary advantage of the RW RPV is greater mobility due to small ground support equipment (GSE) requirements. Prototypes under consideration include the Scout, Mastif, Aquila, SkyEye, and Peanut. The organizational location of the RPV platoon is also in question. Proposed locations include the Marine Air Support Squadron, Marine Air Group, artillery regiment, and headquarters battalion of the division. IV. Conclusions: Further RPV development should be based on a low cost, high quantity vehicle with variable mission payloads. Presently, the Mastif RPV best exemplifies this approach. In addition, location of the Mastif with the headquarters battalion of the division and employment in a direct support role is most advantageous. V. Recommendations: Research and development on increasingly sophisticated RPVs should be continued. However, the inherent advantages of small size/survivability and low cost/expendability should guide such future development. These principles will insure maximum operational flexibility for the battlefield commander when utilizing RPVs. OUTLINE Thesis: If we are to capitalize on the RPV, we must clearly understand its advantages and carefully base its development on practical operational requirements and financial constraint. I. RPV Retrospective A. Hammond's "Flying Bomb," WWI B. BV246, WWII C. Henschel 293D, WWII D. Mistrel, WWII E. Photo/Recon Vehicles, Vietnam II. Enemy Air Defense Threat A. SA-6 B. SA-4 C. SA-8/SA-9 D. ZSU/SA-7 E. Mission Success Probability III. Survivability A. Small size/small radar signature B. Slow speed/ground clutter C. Durable, difficult to destroy D. RPV/SAM trade-off VII. USMC RPV Program A. USMC ROC B. RPV Platoon Organization C. RPV Platoon Mission D. Current RPV Experience VIII. The development of the RPV must not compromise the weapon's inherent advantages if it is to enjoy further success on the modern battlefield. REMOTELY PILOTED VEHICLES: A SENSIBLE APPROACH TO DEVELOPMENT AND UTILIZATION Remotely Piloted Vehicles (RPVs) have become somewhat of a "buzz" word since their successful use by the Israelis in the Bekaa Valley of Lebanon. It's as though a revolutionary new weapons system sprang full grown from the head of the magnificent Israeli war machine-not so. RPVs have been around for years and have enjoyed a markedly evolutionary development throughout this century. However, only after successfully penetrating the Syrian air defense network did the RPV finally penetrate the consciousness of American military planners. Typically, this sudden "discovery' of the RPV prompted big expectations with big plans and bigger yet dollars required to implement them. If we are to capitalize on the RPV, we must clearly understand its advantages and carefully base its development on practical operational requirements and financial constraint. RPV Restrospective The history of RPVs began soon after the first manned flight. In 1917, G. H. Carliss contracted with the Navy to produce a pilotless biplane. It was not controlled from the ground and was intended as an aerial torpedo. The engine of this "flying bomb" was preset to shut-down, based on a time/distance estimate, over a given target. Simultan- eously, the wings would fall away and the fuselage would drop, like a torpedo, onto the target.1 The Kettering Bug, developed during the same period, worked on the same principle. Both designs proved highly inaccurate. During WWII the Germans devoted much effort to unmanned aircraft research. Their efforts produced the BV246, Henschel 293D, and the Mistel. The BV246 was a glider launched from a high-flying bomber. It was designed to attack British navigational transmitters by utilizing its on-board homing device and explosives.2 The Henschel 293D was a rocket-propelled bomb with a TV camera. It was guided onto target by a carrier/launcher aircraft utilizing the TV camera.3 The Mistel was actually a JV-88 bomber with a large warhead. It was launched from a carrier aircraft and guided to a target by radio control. The American Aphrodite Project in WWII was similar to these projects in that it utilized remotely controlled B-17s packed with explosives for "kamikaze" raids.4 Viet Nam demonstrated the reconnaissance capability of the RPV. A wide range of prototype RPVs did an important, but little known, job of enemy surveillance and bomb damage assessment for U. S. air strikes. In fact, approximately eighty percent of all reconnaissance pictures from Viet Nam were taken by RPVs.5 In view of the foregoing historical retrospective, the RPV is obviously not a revolutionary new weapon. It has slowly, but persistently, evolved behind developments in electronics and enemy air defense. Enemy Air Defense Threat To fully understand the uniqueness of the RPV on the modern battlefield, one must realize the formidability of the enemy's air defense network and its resultant small window of vulnerability. For example, enroute to the FEBA to strike an advancing enemy, an aircraft must run a lethal gauntlet of air defense weapons. At medium altitude and distances of forty, thirty, and ten kilometers before the FEBA, it is within the engagement zone of the SA-6, SA-4, and SA-8/SA-9 missiles, respectively. Once across the FEBA, the aircraft is within the low altitude envelope of the ubiquitous SA-7 and the dreaded ZSU-23/4. The medium to high altitudes across the FEBA are guarded by the SA-2, SA-3, and SA-11.6 To be more specific, if its target is part of a Soviet Motorized Rifle Division (MRD), the aircraft must contend with twenty SA-6 launchers with 60 missiles, 120 to 150 SA-7s, at least sixteen ZSU-23/4s, several hundred ground and vehicle mounted machineguns, and finally the doctrinal small arms anti-aircraft fire of each Soviet infantryman.7 Considering that the aircraft must run this gauntlet again on egress, if he successfully ingresses, an aircraft- loss probability between thirty and eighty percent is not difficult to accept.8 Survivability Through a very small window of vulnerability in this lethal air defense network, the RPV has emerged. As mentioned earlier, this was demonstrated by Israeli RPVs against Syrian air defenses in the Bekaa Valley. The tactical aspects of this success will be discussed in a following section. At this point, we are concerned with the characteristics of the RPV which lend it to such tactics. Basically, the key to its success lies in the RPV's small infrared signature and its slow speed over the ground which make it difficult to detect and to distinguish from clutter, respectively. Furthermore, RPVs are very difficult to disable or destroy. Trials have demonstrated the ineffectiveness of gunfire against them; proximity-fused missiles are effective but disproportionately expensive which may limit their use.9 Thus, the very simplicity of the RPV enhances its survivability by allowing it to "underwhelm" existing complex air defenses. It is important to note that within the context of this discussion, "survivability" emphasizes the RPV's ability to successfully penetrate enemy defenses and accomplish its mission. Successful recovery after mision accomplishment is considered less important herein. Operational Flexibility The operational flexibility of the RPV is obvious in the myriad of missions to which it lends itself. These include reconnaissance, target acquisition, radio relay, laser designation, NBC detection, electronic countermeasures (ECM), electronic support measures (ESM), and harassment. Undoubtedly many more missions could be imagined and therein lies a possible pitfall for the effective utilization of the RPV. For example, as the missionn increases so does the size, complexity, and thus, the cost of the RPV. This decreases its major tactical advantages: Small size/ survivability and low cost/expendability. A possible solution to the dilemma of operational flexibility versus tactical effectiveness was proposed by Commander D. M. Parker in the August 1984 issue of Proceedings. He envisioned a basic airframe with interchangeable payloads for different missions. Each vehicle might include the following capabilities: Intelligence/Reconnaissance Vehicle Television and forward-looking infrared radar Data link information exchange Communications intelligence and signals intelligence relay capability Laser designator Harassment Vehicle Electronic support measures system Explosive warhead ("Kamikaze") Electronic Warfare Vehicle (Electronic Countermeasures -ECM) Jamming capability Chaff-laying capability In the Intelligence/Reconnaissance configuration, the RPV satisfies Wellington's " . . . guessing what I might meet beyond the next hill or around the next corner." Thus, the commander is capable of penetrating the fog of battle with real-time information provided by on-board television cameras, radars, and communication relays. In addition to this configuration's role in target acquisition and laser designation for M198 artillery, it can also be used for deep air support. For example, the RPV can provide laser target designation for smart bombs released from stand-off aircraft. Subsequently, it can provide BDA for the target. In the Harassment configuration, the RPV is concerned with electronic warfare support measures (ESM) and/or "kamikaze" attack missions with an on-board explosive warhead. The Israelis were very successful with the RPV in the ESM role in the Bekaa Valley. Beaming electronic signals to simulate Israeli jets, the RPVs provoked the Syrians into activating their SAM radars. These air defense locations were then data-linked from the RPV to E-2C command and control aircraft, which then relayed strike missions to F-4 aircraft with anti-radiation missiles and bombs.10 A variation of this ESM mission is called SAM "soaking." For example, a high altitude, high speed RPV carrying several inexpensive, highly radar reflective gliders is launched into enemy SAM coverage. Once on-board electronic equipment detects SAM radars, the RPV releases one of the gliders, simulating a strike aircraft. The glider, in a shallow descent, can remain airborne about ten minutes or until struck by a SAM. After "soaking" the enemy radars with decoy gliders, a strike aircraft arrives from the opposite direction as the SAM launchers are reloading.11 Meanwhile, a "kamikaze" RPV with an on-board warhead could simplify the above mission by eliminating the need for a manned aircraft tasked with destroying the SAMs. Equipped with a simple homing device, the "kamikaze" RPV could identify and attack any radiating SAM site. Thus, the enemy is forced into a disproportionate trade, i.e., SAM for RPV, and in the process, becomes vulnerable to multiple RPV attacks, especially when reloading his launchers. In addition, the harassment vehicle with explosive warhead could be used in a deep air support role. The RPV would be tasked with attack of fixed or transient targets in the rear zone of the battlefield or at even deeper penetration ranges up to 150 kilometers beyond the FEBA. Typical targets would include parked aircraft, communication sites, service areas, and railroads. High quantity/low cost RPVs particularly fit this "kamikaze" mission. The electronic warfare configuration is primarily an electronic countermeasures (ECM) platform. In this configuration, the RPV is tasked with jamming and chaff- laying missions. In the jamming role, the platform can either spot jam, i.e., jam a single frequency, or barrage jam, i.e., jam the entire frequency spectrum. Since barrage jamming requires greater emitting power than spot jamming, the RPV is useful in bringing the jammer closer to the enemy receiver. This allows for a low power and thus, a lost cost, system to disrupt the enemy.12 Tasked with chaff laying, the RPV can also be very useful. This mission was described by Colonel Paul G. Fahlstrom in the November 1984 issue of Amphibious Warfare Review. Flying in front of an attacking force, perhaps a few thousand meters, they could clear a corridor for the passage of assault helicopters, or neutralize run-in and run-out corridors for close air support operations. To confuse the enemy and allow our forces to operate within his observation- decision-execution time, multiple SEAD missions could be run simultaneously, some for real attacks and others for feints.13 Obviously, the many missions to which the RPV lends itself are a boon to operational flexibility. However, the tactical effectiveness of the RPV, attributable in part to size and cost, is the keystone of this flexibility and must weigh appropriately in operational development. Economic Practicality In examining the economic practicality of the RPV, it is important to realize that warfare reduced to its simplest terms is basically applied economics. This is true in both a strategic and tactical sense. Strategically, an opponent loses when he can no longer support the economic effort requried for war. For example, Germany in WWI was not actually defeated on the battlefield, but instead was undermined by civil unrest caused by the war's economic pressure. A quick parallel can be drawn with today's rising domestic dissent over the proposed U. S. defense budget. Tactically, a commander may be defeated by the "cost" of achieving a particular military goal. This was most aptly described by Captain G. D. Williams in the Winter 83/84 issue of Canadian Defense Quarterly. Why cannot our hypothetical NATO commander afford to attack? Because he is equipped with aircraft which cost twenty or more million dollars each, and yet for any given attack he can only hope to destroy one or two operational tagets such as tanks, and in the attempt to do so he has a measurable risk of losing his own aircraft. It tanks cost roughly two million dollars, he must destroy ten just to break even. Can he do this, or will he lose his aircraft before he reaches this "quota"? There is the question.14 The RPV can obviously mitigate some of these problems. Cost estimates for an RPV airframe vary from $85,000 to $919,000 15, depending upon the on-board mission configuration. This is considerably less than a twenty million dollor aircraft and a million dollar pilot. In addition to the one-time, single-unit cost advantage of the RPV, its life cycle costs are also much less expensive than that on manned vehicles. For example, off-the-shelf technology coupled with a design which lends itself to mass production makes the RPV comparatively inexpensive to procure and produce. Also, long term fuel, maintenance, and training costs are greatly reduced. Current Issues Design: Fixed Wing (FW) versus Rotary Wing (RW)16 The design question revolves around several primary considerations: vulnerability, maintainability, performance, ground support equipment (GSE), production costs, and technical risk. For example, the RW vehicle, because of its rotor disk, presents a much larger vulnerable area than its FW counterpart. Also, the maintenance requirements for a RW RPV is two to three times greater than with an equivalent FW vehicle. Meanwhile, the performance of the FW RPV in terms of payload is 8 to 10 percent greater than the RW vehicle. Production costs are also greater with the RW RPV. The main advantage of RW design is its lack of accompanying GSE. This is due to its vertical takeoff and landing capability. In contrast, FW RPVs require a rail system for launch and net system for recovery. The support equipment comprising these FW launch and recovery systems create a transportability and mobility problem not found with the RW vehicle. Consequently, the higher production cost of the RW design is neutralized by the GSE costs associated with the FW RPV. Finally, technical risk is a crtical design consideration. Many FW vehicle designs under consideration have already proven themselves in combat and are available in current off-the-shelf technology. Meanwhile, a RW design inherits the risk associated with immature technology that has yet to produce off-the-shelf hardware. Primary RPV Prototypes Under Consideration17 Scout. The Scout is a twin-boom fiberglass FW RPV which is manufactured by Israel Aircraft Industries and saw combat in the Lebanon conflict. Typical of FW RPVs, a Scout unit consists of four to six airframes, a launcher, a ground control station, a retrieval net, and a crew of twelve. Relatively unsophisticated by state-of-the-art standards, the airframe is comparatively inexpensive and combat proven. Mastiff. The Tadvian Mastiff, also a FW RPV combat proven by Israel, has a two cylinder piston engine which drives a two blade pusher propellor. The Mastiff can employ several packages such as reconnaissance, target acquisition, and electronic warfare. Aquila. The Aquila, a FW RPV, is being developed by Lockheed. It is a very sophisticated, state-of-the-art system which is capable of all weather, day or night operations. In addition, its sponsor, the U. S. Army, envisions the Aquila as a multi-mission, single configuration vehicle. As suggested earlier, this creates a more expensive, less expendable, and less survivable vehicle. SkyEye. The SkyEye is a multi-purpose, yet low cost, FW RPV produced by Developmental Sciences, Inc. This low cost is accomplished, in part, by interchangeable payloads, i.e., different configurations for varying missions placed on a basic airframe. A composite, twin-boom vehicle powered by a 40-horsepower, two-cycle engine, the SkyEye can be recovered by net, parachute, or skids. Although less sophisticated electronically than Aquila, SkyEye offers greater flight endurance, greater payloads, and greater tolerance in center of gravity. The latter allows it to fire 2.75 inch rockets. This offensive capability enhances its capability as a "harassment vehicle" and as a possible counter to the Mi-8 "Hip" and Mi-24 "Hind." The SkyEye is also less expensive per vehicle than the Aquila. Canadian LTD Cl-227 (Peanut). The CL-227 is a RW RPV. Its nickname "Peanut" comes from its shape. It has a flight endurance of two to three hours and a maximum speed of 130 knots. Because of its easy launch and recovery character- istics discussed earlier, the CL-227 could easily be adapted for shipboard use. In addition, it is a single-purpose platform with a very limited payload capacity. The CL-227 is not yet in full production and is still in the developmental stage. Multi-Purpose Versus Single-Purpose Configuration Presently, the multi-purpose configuration for the RPV is in favor. This is evident, in part, by the Army's sponsorship of the Aquila as well as a recent Army "Air Vehicle Study" by Captain James Hesson, Jr. dated 19 March 1984. The trend is toward more sophisticated, multi-purpose, state-of-the-art vehicles. This also translates as more expensive, less expendable, and less survivable vehicles. These RPVs are less survivable due to larger payloads and thus larger sizes and radar cross sections. In addition, the cost of the multi-purpose vehicle makes them fewer in number, less expendable, and thus, less flexible operationally. The quality versus quantity argument is often applied in favor of the multi-purpose RPV. However, in the modern battlefield scenario, we might do well to recall our old adversary, Lenin, who advised that, "Quantity has a quality all its own." Also, the case for a high quantity, single-purpose, low cost, expendable RPV gains perspective when compared with the cost of today's artillery munitions and air to ground missiles. For example, a single Copperhead artillery round costs $30,000; a single TOW missile is $5,000; a single I2R Maverick missile is $129,000; and a single AIM-7M air to air missile is $193,000. By comparison, an expandable RPV in the $100,000 cost range seems much more reasonable. Organizational Location In this regard, only Marine Corps considerations will be addressed. Current arguments for organizationally locating a RPV platoon include placing them with a Marine Air Support Squadron (MASS), with a Marine Aircraft Group (MAG), with an artillery regiment, or with the headquarters battalion of a division. From an aviation command and control perspective, the MASS location is logical. Through the Direct Air Support Center (DASC), the RPV,could be effectively tasked and subsequently monitored within controlled airspace. Assigned to the MAG, perhaps as part of a fixed wing observation (VMO) squadron, the RPV would be with an existing reconnaissance and communication relay mission. In addition, maintenance for the airframe and equipment such as forward-looking infrared radar (FLIR) would already be in place. The artillery regiment also has a mission in common with the RPV: target acquisition and destruction. As part of the target acquisition battery (TAB), the RPV could provide rapid, large scale target acquisition as well as real-time damage assessment. The "kamikaze" mission of the RPV would also be integral to the artillery mission of target destruction/fire support. Headquarters battalion of the division poses several advantages for employment of the RPV. If utilized in a general or direct support role, it would be close to the user and could be employed throughout the range of missions previously discussed. In addition, it could be deployed nearer the FEBA, thus increasing its mission radius beyond the FEBA. USMC RPV Program On 1 October 1984, a joint Navy/Marine Corps program office for remotely piloted vehicles was established. This complemented earlier programs established by the U. S. Army and Air Force. On 27 March 1984, the Commandant of the Marine Corps published the Required Operational Capability (ROC) for a Remotely Piloted Vehicle. This document listed three primary missions for the RPV: reconnaissance, surveillance/ target acquisition, and VHF/FM radio relay. Furthermore, it envisioned a RPV platoon consisting of a headquarters section, maintenance section, and three flight sections, with each flight section having one ground control station and four to six RPVs. For twenty-four hour operation, each section would require twelve enlisted Marines. The headquarters section would consist of two officers and eight enlisted. In addition, eight enlisted Marines would comprise the maintenance section. One RPV platoon would support a MAF or two independent MABs. Equipment requirements for organization, maintenance float, and war reserve are estimated at eighteen ground control stations and 108 air vehicles, with individual unit prices beginning at $425,000 and $85,000, respectively. Operationally, the ROC intends that the RPV be centrally located in a single MAGTF unit and support its users in a general/direct support role. Subsequent to the ROC, the headquarters battalion of the division gas been designated as the location for the RPV platoon. Generally, the launch/recovery equipment would be located with the supported unit. However, for tactical or logistical considerations, the RPVs could be launched from a central location within the MAGTF operational area and flown to a control point where control is passed to a ground control station operating from a forward position with a maneuver element of the MAGTF. Meanwhile, the Second Marine Division is presently using the Mastiff RPV to expand its experience base. Undoubtedly, tactical innovation and mission refinement will come from this "hands-on" experience. Conclusion The RPV's time has come. The Israeli experience in the Bekaa Valley provided current empirical evidence of its usefulness. Consequently, United States efforts in RPV development were revitalized. However, in our fervor to develop this weapon, we must not lose sight of the key characteristics which contribute to its success, i.e., high survivability, low cost, and high operational flexibility. Considering these parameters as amplifed in the preceding discussion, a FW RPV in a low cost, variable payload configuration seems ideal. Most importantly, this RPV should be small and expendable. Small size enhances its survivability. Expendability increases operational flexibility by providing many low cost vehicles for a wide range of very high-risk missions. In addition, logistical requirements for an expendable RPV are greatly reduced. This vehicle employed in a general or direct support role from the headquarters battalion of a division would be most effective. Presently, the Mastiff is the most effective RPV in satisfyilng these requirements. Research and development on more sophisticated RPVs should be continued. However, until these vehicles can comply with the criteria of high survivability, low cost, and high operational flexibility, they should not be considered for routine deployment with operational military forces. The utility of the RPV is effectively summarized in an old maxim attributed to Sam Colt, 19th century inventor and firearms expert, "Never send a man where you can send a bullet." However, the development of this new "bullet" must not compromise the weapon's inherent advantages if it is to enjoy further success on the modern battlefield. FOOTNOTES 1Commander Daniel M. Parker, USN, "The Empty Cockpit," United States Naval Institute Proceeding, 110 (August 1984), p. 39. 2Major Tom L. Blickensderfer, USMC, "RPVs: An Inexpensive Alternative," Marine Corps Gazette, 67 (Decmeber 1983), p. 52. 3Blickensderfer, p. 52. 4Blickensderfer, p. 52. 5Blickensderfer, p. 54. 6Captain J. D. Williams, Canadian Armed Forces, "Role of the Fighter Aircraft on the Modern Battlefield," Canadian Defense Quarterly, 32 (Winter 1983/84), p. 36. 7Williams, p. 36. 8Williams, p. 37. 9Pierre Condom, "Detecting Helicopters and RPVs," Interavia, 39 (July 1984), p. 667. 10Blickensderfer, p. 54. 11Blickensderfer, p. 55. 12Colonel Paul G. Fahlstrom, USMCR, "Remotely Piloted Vehicles in Amphibious Operations," Amphibious Warfare Review, 62 (November 1984), p. 44. 13Fahlstrom, p. 44. 14Williams, p. 37. 15U. S. Marine Corps, Required Operational Capability (ROC) No. SPA-1.11 for Remotely Piloted Vehicle (RPV), 27 November 1984, p. 8. 16Army Development and Employment Agency Unmanned Aerial Vehicle Program, Air Vehicle Study, 19 March 1984, p. 4. 17Parker, p. 44. BIBLIOGRAPHY Army Development and Employment Agency Unmanned Aerial Vehicle Program. Air Vehicle Study. Fort Eustis, VA: 19 March 1984. Blickensderfer, Tom L. Major, USMC. "RPVs: An Inexpensive Alternative." Marine Corps Gazette, 67 (December 1983), 51-55. Condom, Pierre. "Detecting Helicopter and RPVs." Interavia, 39 (July 1984), 665-667. Fahlstrom, Paul G., Colonel, USMCR. "Remotely Piloted Vehicles in Amphibious Operations." Amphibious Warfare Review, 62 (November 1984), 42-45. Fuchs, L. R., Major, USMC. "Unmanned Aircraft." Marine Corps Gazette, 65 (October 1981), 61-66. Parker, Daniel M., Commander, USN. "The Empty Cockpit." United States Naval Institute Proceedings, 110 (August 1984), 38-44. Russell, David M. "Israeli RPVs." Defense Electronics, 15 (March 1983), 86. Schemmer, Benjamin F. "Where Have All the RPVs Gone?" Armed Forces Journal International, 119 (February 1982), 38-40. U. S. Marine Corps. Required Operational Capability (ROC) No. SPA-1.11 for Remotely Piloted Vehicle (RPV), 27 November 1984. Williams, J. D., Captain, Canadian Armed Forces. "Role of the Fighter Aircraft on the Modern Battlefield." Canadian Defense Quarterly, 32 (Winter 1983/84), 36.
