An Analysis Of The Command And Control And Integration Of Marine Air-Ground Task Force Tactical Fixed Wing Aviation In Sustained Joint Force Operations Ashore CSC 1985 SUBJECT AREA Aviation WAR SINCE 1945 SEMINAR AND SYMPOSIUM An Analysis of the Command and Control and Integration of Marine Air-Ground Tack Force Tactical Fixed Wing Aviation in Sustained Joint Force Operations Ashore LtCol W. Todd Frommelt, Jr., USMC 1 April 1985 Marine Corps Command and Staff College Marine Corps Development and Education Command Quantico, Virginia 22134 Abstract An Analysis of the Command and Control and Integration of Marine Air-Ground Task Force Tactical Fixed Wing Aviation in Sustained Joint Force Operations Ashore LtCol W. Todd Frommelt, Jr., USMC This paper is a discussion and analysis of the command and control (C2) of Marine Air-Ground Task Force (MAGTF) tactical fixed wing aviation (TACAIR) in sustained joint force land operations. The analysis examines background C2 information, the Commandant Marine Corps (CMC) White Letter 7-81 on the subject, and the problems associated with the joint service issues surrounding the C2 of MAGTF TACAIR when the MAGTF's substantive air combat element is opera- ting in an integrated joint air battle environment. The paper attempts to consolidate and clarify the C2 issues, discusses clarification to CMC guidance issued subsequent to the JCS "Omnibus" policy statement and proposes a Marine Corps/MAGTF Joint Interoperability of Tactical Command and Control Systems (JINTACCS) program implementatation of the "Omnibus" provisions. The paper does this in eight chapters. The first five chapters provide a rather extensive background on "Omnibus", air command historical perspectives, the Services' air command and control structures, further Service C2 issues and associated terminology problems. These reviews attempt to provide a reader with the C2 background on Service perspectives and considerations necessary to fully appreciate the very real difficulties encountered when a joint force commander attempts to establish a coordinated and integrated air campaign. Chapters Six and Seven review the "Omnibus" and pro- pose procedures to effectively implement the integration of MAGTF TACAIR into the joint force air campaign utilizing the soon to be approved JINTACCS air operations joint interface operating procedures and air tasking cycle messages. The final chapter presents conclusions and recommendations derived from the analysis. Annexes B and C offer clarified versions of the "Omnibus" statement and Operational Handbook 5-1.1, Command and Control of MAGTF TACAIR for consideration. The paper has been developed in response to my percep- tions of significant misunderstandings within the Corps and other Services of what the "Omnibus" represents. I hope it serves to clarify the issue and consolidate pertinent material for review. The paper's length and background material may be somewhat disconcerting. It is expected that a reader may use the table of contents to select those chapters which are of most interest and skip those which may contain only background with which he is familiar. TABLES OF CONTENTS PAGE PREFACE 1 CHAPTER ONE -- INTRODUCTION The Ominbus 12 Purpose and Scope 19 Terminology 21 Outline 22 CHAPTER TWO -- TACAIR C2 HISTORICAL PERSPECTIVES World War II 24 Korea 33 Vietnam 37 CHAPTER THREE -- BASIC TACAIR C2 BACKGROUND MAGTF TACAIR C2 46 Air Foce TACAIR C2 64 Army TACAIR C2 77 Navy TACAIR C2 84 Joint Task Force (JTF) TACAIR C2 86 CENTCOM TACAIR C2 Example 108 JINTACCS TACAIR C2 111 CHAPTER FOUR - FURTHER BACKGROUND The Push for "Functional Componency" and "Unity of Command" 130 Command Relationships 144 Applicable Issues Related to Avaiation Functions 147 Areas of Influence and Interest 152 CHAPTER FIVE -- TERMINOLOGY BACKGROUND TACAIR Command and Control Terminology 156 Air Mission Terminology 164 Omnibus Terminology 174 JINTACCS Terminology 179 PAGE CHAPTER SIX - OMNIBUS REEXAMINED The General Support Apportionment 182 Coordinating and Integrating MAGTF Direct Support 186 Command and Control and Communications Dependencies 188 Transition to Doctrine 190 CHAPTER SEVEN -- OMNIBUS IMPLEMENTATION AND JINTACCS JINTACCS Preplanned Air Tasking Cycle 193 Other Air Tasking Cycles 200 CHAPTER EIGHT -- CONCLUSIONS AND RECOMMENDATIONS Conclusions 204 Recommendations 209 ANNEXES: A -- Annotated Bibliography A-1-A-6 B -- Proposed Reworded Omnibus B-1 C -- Operational Handbook 5-1.1, Command and Control of USMC TACAIR C-1 APPENDIX 1. Extracts of MCDEC Draft Revision to OH 5-1.1 C-1-2- C-1-13 APPENDIX 2. Comments on OH 5-1.1 Draft Revision C-2-4- C-2-4 LIST OF FIGURES PAGE FIGURE 3-1. Typical MAGTF/ACE Composition 48 FIGURE 3-2. Example ACE Employment 53 FIGURE 3-3. Example TAF and ACF 69 FIGURE 3-4. Air Force TACS and MAGTF MACCS 73 FIGURE 3-5. Air Force - Army TACAIR C2 81 FIGURE 3-6. Example JTF Command 89 FIGURE 3-7. JCS Pub 12 Component Air Employment/Allocation Plan Message 97 FIGURE 3-8. JCS Pub 12 CJTF Sortie Allotment Message Example 99 FIGURL 3-9. JCS Pub 12 Sample "Common Air Tasking" 101 FIGURE 3-10. Example JCS Pub 12 Air Employment/Allocation Plan Message 103 FIGURE 3-11. Example JCS Pub 12 CJTF Sortie Allotment Message 104 FIGURE 3-12. Example JCS Pub 12 Cross-Force ATO: Navy to Air Force 106 FIGURE 3-13. JINTACCS TIDP Example AIRSUPREQ with SARTS 122 FIGURE 3-14. JINTACCS TIDP Example ALLOREQ with Partial SARTS 124 FIGURE 3-15. JINTACCS TIDP Example SORTIEALOT with Partial SARTS 125 FIGURE 3-16. JINTACCS TIDP Example REQCONF with Partial SARTS 126 FIGURE 3-17. JINTACCS TIDP Example REQSTATASK with Partial SARTS 127 PAGE FIGURE 4-1. MAGTP Employments in Sustained Land Operations 145 FIGURE 5-1. Marine Corps - Air Force Fixed Wing TACAIR Mission/Function Terminology 165 FIGURE 5-2. Fixed Wing TACAIR Functions by Nature of Support Provided 171 FIGURE 5-3. Graphic Presentation of Fixed Wing TACAIR Missions 173 FIGURE 6-1. Example CJTF Apportionment 184 FIGURE 7-1. Example CJTF Apportionment Guidance to MAGTF 194 FIGURE 7-2. Example MAGTF ALLOREQ 8ALLOCAT Set 195 FIGURL 7-3. Example MAGTF ALLOREQ 8JNTEXC Set 196 FIGURE 7-4. Example CJTF SORTIEALOT 8ALLOT Set Extract 198 PREFACE The command and control of Marine Corps tactical aviation assets when employed as an integral part of a MAGTF in sustained joint-service land operations has been the subject of decades-long controversy. The subject and related issues often drift somewhat from that central theme, but the basic thrust remains the command and control of MAGTF TACAIR. The same may be said of this paper. Its central theme and related discussions are directed at the command and control of Marine Air-Ground Task Force (MAGTF), tactical fixed wing aviation (TACAIR) in situations totally removed from amphibious operations -- sustained operations ashore. The Marine Corps does not particularly like employment in sustained land operations -- it's neither equipped, trained or doctrinally oriented for such combat. Since WWII, however, with limited Army assets (divisions) available, such employments have become reality in both conflict and contingency planning. In practical application, MAGTF employment with the Army and Air Force presents a theater commander with both a unique combat force and some unique integration requirements. I have found the topic of interest since my first exposure to it in 1981 when CMC White Letter 7-81 was promulgated. Commandant of the Marine Corps (CMC) White Letters promulgate guidance from the Commandant to all Marines on significant matters which he feels need elaboration. In March of 1981, the chiefs of all the Services promulgated a "JCS Policy Statement for the Command and Control of USMC TACAIR in Sustained Operations Ashore." This policy statement reflected a vigorously negotiated concensus on the issue and was very assuredly a statement which warranted White Letter guidance. The policy statement also became known as the "Omnibus". I'm not sure where that title came from -- and don't believe it matters -- but since it has become widely associated with the JCS policy statement and is a bit less cumbersome, I will use the word "Omnibus" to refer to the statement often. The Omnibus is essentially a compromise between the USAF and the USMC on command and control of a theater's or joint task force's MAGTF tactical fixed wing aviation when the MAGTF includes a substantive air combat element and is engaged in a sustained land campaign. The USAF, expecting to be the joint force's predominant air arm, wants command and control of all force air assets. The USMC views its organic air combat element as inseparable. Both positions are convincingly supportable -- and hence, the controversy is born. I distinctly remember reviewing the White Letter shortly after its distribution to the Corps. I can remember seeing it as a seemingly simple and reasonable arrangement for sharing and integrating MAGTF air assets in a joint task force environment in what seemed straight- forward and understandable terms. I also remember some startingly sharp comments from several of my senior officers directed towards those "x!:Z$ (expletives deleted) headquarters gentlemen who had "given away the farm" to the Air Force! Being relatively quick witted, I immediately recognized the need for caution in discussions concerning the Omnibus. "Not for me to worry" thought the Major on his way to a rather tiring-sounding job at MCTSSA (Marine Corps Tactical System Support Activity) to work on something called "interoperability" and JINTACCS (Joint Interoperability of Tactical Command and Control Systems.) Well, JINTACCS and interoperability turned out not only more challenging and interesting than that impression, but also to be at times intimately involved with Omnibus. This involvement with Omnibus through my activities with JINTACCS let me see both the Air Force and other Service perspectives as well as the Marine Corps'. I have gradually come to realize that what was promul- gated as a JCS policy statement representing an agreement between all Service chiefs on the issue of command and control of USMC TACAIR must be recognized as something far short of an "agreement" which has done far less than "resolve" the issue of the command and control of Marine TACAIR in sustained land operations. I have also become aware of a very prevalent lack of understanding within the Marine Corps' lower command echelons of what Omnibus meant and within the Air Force of the Marine Corps concept of MAGTF integrity, organization, and command and control. I changed courses in the development of this paper several times. In research, I was surprised to find little in writing about the Marine Corps or Air Force perspectives of what the Omnibus statement says. It seems the almost traditional Marine Corps-Air Force command and control dialogue (tactful wording, no?) has moved upwards or onwards to "the bigger and greater issues" (although related intimately) of functional versus service componency within Unified Commands. For a time, then, I thought that should be the focus of my thesis. As it turns out, far more eloquent and conversant authors have churned out a plethora of point papers, memoranda and studies on this very important and very current topic. The Advanced Amphibious Study Group Background Paper, Service vs. Functional Components, 23 July 1982, is a thorough and well written analysis. After uncovering and digesting all these materials, I would have felt somewhat foolish continuing in a redundant effort or similar direction. While these studies and point papers are all relevant to the Omnibus and are necessary responses to a very real issue confronting the Marine Corps and Air Force (and the Army and Navy to a lesser degree), my concern became that unless we somewhow returned our focus to the Omnibus, any mutual (albeit limited, perhaps even flawed) understanding and agreement that we may have in Omnibus on the command and control of USMC TACAIR in sustained operations ashore would be lost. In early 1981, the Marine Corps and Air Force came to an understanding on the issue. I expect it was the result of hard negotiations and perceived compromises on both sides. I will show in the paper that the agreement is flawed. I will also propose that it can be fixed and that it can be implemented. Perhaps if the Air Force knew more clearly how we interpreted the statement (I suspect we should also work on ensuring that we in the Corps know how we interpret it) and how we propose to implement our interpretation, their pressure for fuctional componency in unified and joint commands would be eased. If that's too presumptuous then let's at least get our focus back to the Omnibus -- to clarify its intent, promote its understanding, offer some corrections and develop effective implementation procedures. That's what this paper is all about. A quick review of the bibliography would show that my sources include a wide variety of Services doctrinal publications, JCS Publications, air power books, and innumerable papers and staff writings. I am thankful to the many Marine and Air Force officers whose less formal verbal contributions to my research assisted me greatly and yet may not he formally recognized with attribution. My sources also include previous personal efforts in this area while at MCTSSA and are in several places annotated as MCTSSA or MCDEC formal papers. I comment in that regard when major extracts are incorporated in the thesis. I realize that its size may be intimidating. Remember that I (prehaps foolishly) felt it appropriate to consolidate substantive background information in the initial chapters. A reader may choose to skip such background material and still expect to have covered in analysis my major conclu- sions. I hope the writing of this paper proves of value to the Corps in this somewhat complex and politicized area of concern. CHAPTER ONE Introduction The Marine Corps plans to go into future combat as a Marine Air-Ground Task Force (MAGTF) composed of a MAGTF command element, a ground combat element, an aviation combat element and a combat service support element. The MAGTF is sized and organized for a specific mission with its elements drawn from resources residing in the peacetime structures ot the Fleet Marine Forces (FMF's), divisions, air wings and fleet service support groups. Sizing of the MAGTF is generally guided by the mission and determination of the ground combat element to be employed. When built around a battalion landing team, the aviation combat element is normally a composite helicopter squadron occasionally strengthened by OV-10 or AV-8 aircraft. This size MAGTF is termed a Marine Amphibious Unit (MAU) and is capable of relatively limited combat operations such as non-combatant personnel evacuations. It may also be considered the forward deployed element of a larger MAGTF. The larger MAGTF's, Marine Amphibious Brigades (MAB's) and Forces (MAF's) are organized around ground combat elements of one or more regiments or divisions, and aviation combat elements of composite group or wing size respectively. As the size of these MAGTF's expands, they are capable of an increasingly wider range of combat effort from amphibious assault to sustained operations ashore. When a large MAB or MAF sized MAGTF is employed, it will include an aviation combat element task organized to provide all the functions of Marine aviation from offensive air support to the command and control of its assets. This aviation combat element (ACE), while highly capable of independent offensive action, is inherently tasked as an organic, integral supporting air component of the MAGTF's air-ground team.1 The concept of Marine aviation as an organic supporting arm of the MAGTF is a pervasive element of Marine Corps doctrine, has been developed through decades of experience and is provided tor in U.S. law. The organizational and doctrinal precepts which establish the bonds within MAGTF air-ground teams provide its commander an integrated combined arms force of enhanced flexibility, responsiveness and power.2 While the Marine Corps views its combat organizations as synergistic by virtue of the tightly integrated effec- tiveness of its combined arms, the inherent flexibility of tactical fixed wing aviation make such assets appear quite separabie to other commanders with other missions and interests in mind. This is especially the case when the MAGTF is considered for employment in a joint service sustained land campaign. Envision, if you will, a European, Southeast Asian or Korean theater of operations involving a division and wing sized MAGTF, an Army corps or more of several divisions (each) and a tactical (U.S.) air force of several wings. All Services agree on the require- ment for unity of command in such a scenario and have gone to great lengths to promote and prepare for implementing command relationships. Undoubtedly the most complete documentation of this premse is found in JCS Publication 2 (hereafter JCS Pub 2), Unified Action Armed Forces (UNAAF). Does it seem consistent with the principle of unity of command to employ a small (relatively!) MAGTF, with its supporting air combat assets ranging deeping into the enemy's rear areas and attacking second and third echelon targets, as an independent entity-- a total force within a force? The theater commander would probably need justi- fication to do so. The Air Force component commander would logically be interested in absorbing at least the MAGTF TACAIR and command and control assets into his command. The Army component commander would logically be interested in absorbing the MAGTF ground combat element into his command. The synergistic effect we the Marine Corps like to attribute to our air-ground team may apply as well to the additive effects these Air Force and Army component commanders, and the theater commander, might hope to achieve by organizing theater forces into single land and air components. Such "functional" organization, while having obvious command advantages, is at the expense of MAGTF integrity and is an anathema to the Marine Corps. The Corps trains, organizes and functions as a combined arms team. Its ground combat elements lack the mobility and firepower of similarly sized Army elements, and this requires a dependence on its organic air power for most effective firepower and force projection. Additionally, the expeditionary basis of the Marine Corps in law requires this type of force structure. This introduction, however, is not the place to provide continued justification for the MAGTF integrity argument. Let it be sufficient for now to say that the Marine Corps view is that the integrated MAGTF in the sustained land combat scenario will better serve the theater commander than will the additive impact of parcel- ing its ground and air combat elements to the Army and Air Force components. The paper will go into more detail on this issued by reviewing the "functional" componency issue in Chapter 4. The Marine Corps is not inflexible regarding its doctrinal stance on MAGTF integrity. While adamantly resisting efforts and proposals to sever the MAGTF combat elements, it does see the potential inefficiency of employing a MAGTFs tactical fixed wing aviation and air command and control elements as completely independent and MAGTF self-serving assets within a theater or joint task force environment. It has historically cooperated with, supported, and even had its MAGTF's under the operational control of a variety of unified force commanders. World War II, Korea and Vietnam each saw MAGTF's employed in concert with the other Services. In each period, the command and control of organic Marine TACAIR was exercised in a variety of organizational command structures. What the Marine Corps generally has perceived as losses of control over organic TACAIR and diminished responsiveness to Marine requirements,3 the Air Force has perceived as necessary, incomplete and grudgingly won assumptions of more centralized command and control of theater tactical aviation assets. In November 1979, the issue was raised (again) formally and soon became elevated to the JCS and Heads of Service level. In March of 1981, the JCS Policy Statement (popularly known as the "Omnibus") was promul- gated. The "Omnibus" Statement POLICY FOR COMMAND AND CONTROL OF USMC TACAIR IN SUSTAINED OPERATIONS ASHORE The Marine Air-Ground Task Force (MAGTF) commander will retain operational control of his organic air assets. The primary mission of the MAGTF air combat element is the support of the MAGTF ground element. During joint operations, the MAGTF air assets will normally be in support of the MAGTF mission. The MAGTF commander will make sorties available to the joint force commander, for tasking through his air component commander, for air defense, long-range interdiction, and long-range reconnais- sance. Sorties in excess of MAGTF direct support require- ments will be provided to the joint force commander for tasking through the air component commander for the support of other components of the JTF, or of the JTF as a whole. Nothing herein shall infringe on the authority of the Theater or joint force commander, in the exercise of operational control, to assign missions, redirect efforts, and direct coordination among his subordinate commanders to insure unity of effort in accomplishment of his overall mission, or to maintain integrity of the force, as precribed in JCS Pub II, "Unified Action Armed Forces (UNAAF)."4 The Omnibus statement represents an agreement by the Chiefs of Service as a guiding principle for the employment of Marine Corps TACAIR in sustained combat operations ashore. The Omnibus was promulgated to Marines via CMC White Letter 7-81 of 29 June 1981. The White Letter emphasized the importance of the policy statement and offered background and elaboration on its substance. More importantly, it stressed that only through adherence to the basic precepts of MAGTF employment, the Omnibus agreement included -- in training, in joint/combined operations planing activities and in our proper articulaton of these precepts -- can the effectiveness of the MAGTF in combat be realized. 5 Let's take a look, then, at the Omnibus "agreement" and evaluate what it says, starting with the title. It obviously deals with the "command and control" of MAGTF "TACAIR" assets, and is restricted to "sustained operations ashore" applications. JCS Pub 1 defines the phrase "command and control" as "The exercise of authority and direction by a properly designated commander over assigned forces in the accomplishment of the mission...." "TACAIR" is not JCS Pub 1 defined but the White Letter provides that "Marine TACAIR is construed in this paper as tactical fixed wing aircraft...." "Sustained operations ashore" is undefined but can reasonably be interpreted as restricting application to MAGTF employments in sustained land combat succeeding, or in other than, amphibious operations. The first two Omnibus sentences affirm agreement on the organizational integrity of the MAGTF in that the MAGTF commander will retain operational control of his air assets and that those air assets' primary mission is the support of the MAGTF. "Operational control" is defined in JCS Pub 1 as synonymous with operational command: Those functions of command involving the composition of subordinate forces, the assignment of tasks, the designation of objectives and the administrative direc- tion necessary to accomplish the mission... 6 It further relates that it is exercised through the established chain of command: The next two sentences will be evaluated in detail throughout the paper, principally in Chapter 6, The Omnibus Reexamined. For this introduction, let it suffice to explain that there are two categories of sorties that the MAGTF commander will "make available" or "provide" to the joins force commander, "for tacking through his air component commander" in "support of" the JTF as a whole or its components. The first category is unnamed but includes sorties for "air defense, long-range interdiction, and long-range reconnaissance." Air defense is defined in JCS Pub 1 as: air defense--All defensive measures de- signed to destroy attacking enemy aircraft or missiles in the earth's envelope of atmosphere, or to nullify or reduce the effectiveness of such attack. See also active air defense; passive air defense.7 Air defense sorties in the Marine Corps comprise a defen- sive portion of its "antiair warfare (AAW) operations."8 If such sorties were provided to the JTF commander for tasking by the Air Force, the Air Force mission tasking category would be "defensive counter-air (DCA)," a portion of their counter-air effort to achieve air superiority.9 I will not even try at this point to evaluate the terms "long-range interdiction" and "long-range reconnaissance." While interdiction and reconnaissance are to varying degrees determinable, adding the phrase "long-range" to them completely muddles the picture. In any event, this first category of MAGTF provided sorties establishes a foundation of MAGTF support of the JTF in quasi-functional aviation mission areas which share important character- istics. While they would be conducted by MAGTF TACAIR whether in a uni-service or joint service environment, they would not generally be executed in "direct support" of the MAGTF ground combat element. There certainly are exceptions to this and the omission of the offensive portion of AAW is another anomaly -- but, generally, these are mission areas in which TACAIR provides "general" as opposed to "direct" support of the MAGTF. They are, in other terms, missions conducted whose effects the ground combat element commander may not see or appreciate (much) but whose conduct is nevertheless essential. In the joint service operational environment, they are missions also which are conducted against opposition forces and other targets which often cannot be assessed as directly threatening to one part of the joint force and not another. Is an enemy air strike engaged by MAGTF fighters or missiles coming at the MAGTF or enroute to an Army, Air Force or JTF target? If we knew, should we let it go by to be engaged by someone else? Certainly not. Air defense for the JTF should be provided as an integrated umbrella for the JTF as a whole. By the same reasoning, is the opposing armor concentration at a "long range" beyond the JTF ground elements of interest or threatening only to one component or another? That would indeed be hard to say. "Long-range" interdiction and reconnaissance should be certrally managed for the benefit of the JTF as a whole and their centralized coordination (minimally) is essential for mission deconflictions and to prelude redundancy. The problems in terminology aside, this category of sorties provided by the MAGTF commander, in accordance with the Omnibus, is designed to formalize the MAGTF commitment to participate in these designated aviation functions when the JTF commander assumes such responsibility for the JTF as a whole. If the JTF commander elects to run a force-wide air defense campaign, centrally controlled by an air component commander, the MAGTF will make its air defense sorties available for that commander's tasking rather than conducting an independent sector air defense. The same premise is extended to the long-range interdiction and reconnaissance campaigns. The Omnibus commits the MAGTF to participation in joint force air campaigns executed with "pooled" joint force air assets. The MAGTF receives general" support from its sortie contributions because the functional campaigns addressed are conducted for the JTF as a whole. By providing sorties for tasking, operational control of its contributed air assets is maintained by the MAGTF. The second category of sorties provided to the JTF commander by the MAGTF is termed "excess." The provision of excess sorties to the JTF commander by all air capable Service components has long been an uncontested premise of joint force operations. Idle and uncommitted force assets must be made available to support other JTF components which may be experiencing requirements shortages. Another practical and realistic justification of this support for the JTF is the implied future return of such support rendered. Air Force excess used to support MAGTF CAS requirements on one day makes it realistically easier for the MAGTF to provide "excess" CAS support to help the Air Force in its support of the Army the next day. Navy excess" bombers provided the Air Force one day may make it easier for the Air Force to support Navy shortages some other time. There are, however, problems with the term and the subtleties of implementing the sharing of "excess" sorties. Again, this introduction will stay superficial. The MAGTF air planning and tacking process may identify sorties available in excess of MAGTF requirements and such sorties will be made available to the JTF commander. It should be considered a MAGTF requirement, however, to provide air defense and long-range interdiction and reconnaissance to either itself or to the JTF as discussed earlier. Excess sorties, then, must be determined as availability beyond those sorties required in direct support of the MAGTF and those sorties provided to the JTF "umbrella" campaigns. The White Letter's "...in excess of MAGTF dorect support: requirements... " phraseology is troublesome.10 More detailed dicussion will appear in Chapter 5. These distinctive categories of sorties, those pro- vided to general support air campaigns of the JTF as a whole and those provided as MAGTF excess, are very significant contributions to the joint force air effort. They are distinctive in other terms as well. The MAGTF expects equivalent "general" support in return for its sorties provided to the air defense and long-range inter- diction and reconnaissance campaigns; the air defense "umbrella" would cover MAGTF airspace and MAGTF nominated targets for interdiction and reconnaissance would receive equitable prioritization. Such is not the case with excess sorties. They are given up for tasking freely with only an implied expectation of future returned support from other components when they generate "excess" themselves. To confuse the two categories of sorties provided is unaccept- able and may have potentially harmful implications. The Omnibus concludes with a reaffirmation of the authority of the theater or joint force commander to exercise "operational control" of his force as defined previously in this chapter. This operational control authority includes functions relating to the composition and direction of subordinate forces necessary to accomplish the mission. Since the Omnibus, I can find but one reference to the employment of a MAGTF within a JTF (exercise or operation/contingency plan) which provided for MAGTF TACAIR sortie contributions of the scope provided for in the policy statement. And that's fine. The theater or joint force commander has the authority to organize operations as he sees appropriate. Without exercise, however, the policy will prove difficult to implement. In the one exercise, Gallant Knight 82, the MAGTF ACE found use of JTF air tasking procedures in compliance with the Omnibus "totally unworkable."11 We obviously need practice -- and a clear understanding of the Omnibus provisions. Purpose and Scope The Omnibus is flawed in many ways, making it hard to understand and difficult to implement. There is currently very concerted pressure from the Air Force and to some extent from the Army to realign JCS Pub 2, UNAAF, to promote "functional componency" and the severing of the MAGTF ground and air components -- which would, by the way, eliminate the need for the Omnibus. The Joint Interoper- ability of Tactical Command and Control Systems (JINTACCS) program is approaching an expected implementation date of September 1986. It includes air tasking messages and interface iperating procedures which will potentially provide a major overhaul of current JCS common air tasking guidance and procedures. These three factors have reduced Service impetus to refine the Omnibus and its implied agreements, and to resolve implementation problems. Their focus is now more towards the confrontation over the service versus functional componency issue and the approaching JINTACCS implementation. This paper will hopefully serve to resurface the Omnibus and explain its intent, illuminate its many problem areas, discuss at least potential corrections and propose usable implementation procedures using JINTACCS air tasking standards. What this paper will not do is to dwell on inter- service positions of doctrine, command and control or terminology. To deal with these areas fully would take forever. My emphasis is going to be the JCS policy state- ment for command and control of USMC TACAIR in sustained operations ashore; the Omnibus, its meanings, problems and proposed corrections and implementation procedures. Terminology As has been discussed already, the Omnibus -- indeed all interservice efforts -- are troubled and complicated due to the Services' use of non-standard terminology. There have been standardization conferences and studies for decades but essentially the problems remain. The tradi- tional alignments by missions et the Marine Corps and Navy and of the Air Force and Army have promoted standardization amongst the pairings, but differences still exist even there. The terminology problems which shroud the Omnibus will be considered in greater detail in succeeding sections of the paper, particularly in Chapter 5, Terminology Background. This paper attempts to address the Omnibus problems, including those associated with language, in a logical sequence. It would be impossible, however, to consolidate the terminology problem discussions any sooner than Chapter 5. The reader, then, is asked to take them as they come and wait until that chapter for a more consoli- dated review. Priority will, of course, be given to JCS Publication 1 definitions. The Omnibus language and Service peculiar terminology will be source identified. Outline What I intend to do in the remainder of this paper is consolidate background information on TACAIR command and control (C2) -- touching on both the Service and joint force systems, organizations and operating procedures -- and subsequently illuminating peripheral issues and topics which have a direct bearing on Service perceptions and principles in their conduct of TACAIR C2. The paper will consolidate and compare Service, mainly Air Force and Marine Corps, terminology as it applies to TACAIR, the Omnibus and JINTACCS, and then reexamine the Omnibus with all of this background information in mind. Before concluding, I intend also to outline a JINTACCS and JTF implementation proposal. JINTACCS will rewrite substantial existing joint interface operating procedures when imple- mented in 1986. This implementation proposal may prompt more timely Marine Corps' preparation for that evolution. Chapter 2 TACAIR C2 Historical Perspectives Chapter 3 Basic TACAIR C2 Background Chapter 4 Further Background -- other TACAIR C2 issues Chapter 5 Terminology Background -- TACAIR, Omnibus, and JINTACCS Chapter 6 Omnibus Reexamined Chapter 7 JINTACCS and Omnibus-- implementation proposal Chapter 8 Conclusions and Recommendations CHAPTER ONE Notes 1FMFM 0-1, Marine Air-Ground Task Force (Wash- ington, D.C.: Hdqtrs USMC, 31 Aug 79), pp. 1-1 through 2-23. 2CMC White Letter 7-81, Command and Control of USMC TACAIR In Sustained Operations Ashore (Washington, D.C.: Hdqtrs USMC, 29 Jan 81), p. 1. 3CMC White Letter 7-81, p. 1, enclosure (2). 4CMC White Letter 7-81, enclosure (1). 5CMC White Letter 7-81, p. 1. 6JCS Pub 1, DOD Dictionary of Military and Associated Terms (Washington, D.C.: JCS, 1 Apr 84), p. 263. 7JCS Pub 1, p. 14. 8FMFM 5-5, Antiair Warfare (Washington, D.C.: Hdqtrs USMC, 14 Jul 80), p. 44. 9JCS Pub 1, p. 93. 10CMC White Letter 7-81, p. 5, enclosure (2). 11CG Third MAW message 240039Z Feb 82, Joint Readiness Exercise Gallant Knight 82, After Action Report Concerning RDJTF Common Air Taskin Procedures. CHAPTER TWO TACAIR C2 - Historical Perspectives Before getting into much detail on current command and control structures, systems and issues, a short review of aviation command and control history will be of benefit. This chapter will look at three major conflicts, World War Two, Korea and Vietnam, and the aviation C2 structures and relationships through which theater commanders employed their multi-service aviation resources. Keep in mind that one major area of influence pertinent to command and control structures and relationships is not directly addressed -- that of the personalities and convictions of the commanders involved. This influence on C2 is substantial, perhaps even paramount. To examine it, however, would require volumes of research. Instead, the reader is asked to keep its influence in mind as this and succeeding chapters are reviewed. The paper will occasionally touch on personalities of commanders, but much like political/Service parochialisms, they are not subjected to analysis. World War Two World War Two provides innumerable examples of variety in joint and combined forces command structures. Its combat zones included maritime theaters such as most of the Pacific campaigns, continental theaters as in Central Europe and innumerable combinations of the two. Experi- ences gained in this war provided much of the impetus for the National Security Act of 1947 which reorganized the defense establishment completely. It not only brought into being a separate and distinct Department of the Air Force in legal status equal to the Navy and Army as departments, but also established unique roles and missions for the Services and established, under a joint chiefs of staff, unified commands in strategic areas. The North African theater of operations is very note- worthy in an examination of tactical command and control. General Eisenhower, serving as the Commander-in-Chief (CINC), Allied Forces Northwest Africa, commanded a force of American, French, and British Corps. As established in Army Field Manual 1-5 of the time, doctrine for the use of air power at the start of the campaign provided that air support was attached to, and directed by, the supported ground force commander. Army formations, therefore, had supporting air support commands while no overall theater commander for air was provided.1 Airpower was imple- mented to support these independent ground operations and as a result there was virtually no effort to apply theater-wide air campaign strategies. The German Air force was initially able to confront these separate air support commands piecemeal and decisively maintained air superiority. The ineffectiveness of allied air was recognized quickly as was the major factor in its weakness -- fragmented command. A reorganization of all allied forces in the broad Mediterranean theater was accomplished at the Casablanca Conference in January 1943. It estab- lished Allied Naval, Ground and Air CINC's for the entire Mediterranean theater, with Air Officers subordinate to the Mediterranean Air Command for Northwest Africa, the Middle East and Malta. The Air Officer/Commander of the Northern African Air Force had four subordinate commands: the Strategic Air Force, the Tactical Air Force, Coastal Air Force and Troop Carrier Command. A further look at the Tactical Air Force reveals that four separate air forces retained identity under this reorganization. Three of these, the American XII Air Support Command, the British Desert Air Force and the Royal Air Force 242 Group, each were assigned close support of specified ground forces.2 The fourth, the Tactical Bomber Force, was concerned with the conduct of a mission equivalent to today's inter- diction. This centralized air command structure facili- tated the application of air power and its inherent advantage of speed, range and flexibility. And while the success of the Allies in North Africa was in no small part influenced by this more efficient air forces organization, there were problems in the integration and reduction of support proferred to the land and naval forces from this integrated air command. For instance, in E. Morison's The Two-Ocean War: A Shoot History of the U.S. Navy in the Second World War, the premise is made that Mediterranean Air Command and Northwest African Air Forces set mission priorities which resulted in virtually no tactical close support for the allied amphibious and airborne landings at the start of the Sicily invasion.3 General Patton often complained of the low priority given to the close support of his Army by air. The "interdiction" mission was quickly becoming the glamor stock of the Air Corps with a very high apportionment priority. Shifting to the Normandy invasion, the command struc- ture was the subject of long and hard arguments and nego- tiations at all levels of Service and national command. In general, the most difficult TACAIR related areas of concern were control of the strategic bomber forces and the "functional compontent commander" issues. Two strategic bomber commands existed for the invasion -- separate and distinct commands, one RAF and one U.S. -- under the temporary operational direction of the Allied Supreme Commander (Eisenhower). Neither were ever under the Allied tactical air commander, who himself commanded two tactical air forces, one RAF and one U.S. Strategic bomber forces were withdrawn from Eisenhower's command soon after the success of the assault. After the assault and consolidation phases of Over- lord, there were further command structure arguments. The resulting structure evolved essentially into three pairs of geographically oriented Army groups and their supporting tactical air forces throughout all of Europe -- each of the air commands under Eisenhower and his deputy, British Air Chief Marshal Teder. It is of interest to note that; 1) the strategic bomber commands were not in this chain of command and, 2) the allies retained a separate "air-ground team," the First Allied Airborne Army, throughout the remainder of the war in Europe. This was withheld as a theater-wide force of opportunity or strategic reserve.4 The Normandy invasion command structure included an air (tactical) "component" commander, Allied Expeditionary Air Forces, over RAF and U.S. Tactical Air Forces. After the invasion, Eisenhower decided to act as overall land forces commander as well as Supreme Commander. While this was principally a political decision, it and the avail- ability of his air-oriented deputy resulted in the elimination of the Allied Expeditionary Air Force command and any vestages of an air component commander. American airmen at the time accepted the loss gladly because it served to reduce the pressure on high command levels to secure strategic bomber assets for tactical support operations. The major strategic bombing offensive had become very important to the Army Air Corps. They saw this very publicized campaign as a very impressive influence in their efforts to ensure that the end of the war would also bring birth to a separtate Air Force. It was also, of course, important to them because of their belief in the effectiveness of the strategic mission in contributing to the successful conclusion of the war. Although not a Marine Corps vs. Air Force confronta- tion, the African and European TACAIR C2 experiences continue today to provide fuel to Service perspectives on joint force command structures. The same can be said of the war in the Pacific. The Pacific offensive of the allies was characterized by as many command structures as ther were campaigns in the progress of "island hopping" operations. In general, they necessarily reflected the principles of maritime/naval task organization to meet the particular circumstances of the mission. In the Solomons, the command structure reflected both Service and "functional" organization. The Pacific Ocean Area theater commander, Admiral Nimitz had in Admiral Halsey, Commander, South Pacific (COMSOPAC), the equivalent of a sub-unified command. Under COMSOPAC were a variety of forces including an Amphibious Force Task Force, (composed of Marine, Navy and Army units), other Naval forces, Army Forces South Pacific, South Pacific Aircraft (land based air), and a South Pacific Island Bases command. In Guadalcanal, the principle landing force was the 1st Marine Division. All aviation units ashore, Marine, Army, Navy and Allied, were under the Division's commander. Land based air from the Army and Navy were under a Navy task force command and carrier-based and amphibious force aviation ashore were under their respective force commanders who were commanded in turn by the Expeditionary Force task force commander. Thus aviation resources were employed in three separate contingents.5 In the Gilbert Islands campaign against Tarawa and Makin, the command structure was task organized for the dual objective islands. Air continued to be organized for the tactical situation and to optimize the advantages of land and sea-basing. In the Marianas, air was organized in support of the campaign in three commands, land based air, a fast carrier task force in general support of the operation, and a carrier support group providing air support to the landing force. The Army contingent was organized into the landing force as a whole and did not have Service component representation at amphibious task force or fleet level. This and subsequent operations in the South Pacific theater saw a variety of command structures, all under the ultimate command of the CINC Pacific Fleet/Pacific Ocean Areas. In the Southwest Pacific theater, with General MacArthur as commander, the command organization reflected a more complex approach. At the Leyte campaigns there were three separate Army components and an Allied Air Forces command -- with Naval air under Allied Naval Forces, Southwest Pacific. Naval carrier groups were employed "in support of" landing forces while Marine land-based air was organized under the Fifth Air Force within the Allied Air Forces command. In the Central Pacific, the operation at Okingawa was characterized by an Army commander of the landing force, Tenth Army -- including the Marine III Amphibious Corps -- and a Marine commander of its organic tactical air force. In Southeast Asia the U.S., British and Chinese forces endured command structures which were "by no means militarily or organizationally optimal... established to support unalterable political realities in the theather."6 This is mentioned to highlight yet another influence on command structures, the political aspect. One need only review the current NATO organization for command to see that it is still an influence today. World War II, then, provides historical precedence for just about any command structure a proponent might desire. The command of air was centralized and decentralized at a wide variety of command levels. Joint air forces were organized as Service components, geographic forces and functional elements. Command structures were influenced by factors as abstract as politics and commander personalities and as concrete as assets available, objectives and opposition forces. Collaboration, coordination, mutual support, various "in support of" relationships and total integration of air forces were used to bring available air power to bear on the enemy. Unity of command was found to be indispensible -- but at which level of the command structure it should reside was not demonstrated decisively. Certainly some organizations worked better than others, just as some air commanders apportioned and employed their assets better than others and just as some air staffs planned their various air campaigns better than others. One further item had also become clear. Air power had become a decisive combat arm of the commander and to organize the country's principle air power command as a supporting organic component of the Army was untenable. As separatist air power promoters such as Mitchell, Douhet and Blunt had been espousing for years, the Air Force needed separate Service status and the United States was ready to agree. In 1947, the U.S. defense estabishment was reorganized under the National Security Act of 1947. establishing three Service departments under a Department of Defense. The Departments of the Army, Navy (to include the Marine Corps as a separate Service within the Depart- ment) and the Air Force were assigned unique responbili- ties and functions for operations, missions and doctrines. The Act (as amended) further established under the new JCS "unified commands in strategic areas." These were the evolutionary successors of World War II theater commands.7 Korea In Korea command and control again became a major problem.8 Under the CINC, United Nations Command, were the U.S. "Unified" Far East Command (FECOM) and the Allies Command. Under the FECOM came the Far East Air Force (FEAF), the Naval Forces Far East (NAVFE) and Far East Ground Force Command. This latter command was not initally activated as the CINC, General MacArthur, commanded FECOM and Army ground forces. Under the Ground Force Command, the Eighth Army and X Corps operated as adjacent commands untile late in 1950 when the Eighth Army absorded the X Corps and Genral Ridgewar was given command of all ground operations in Korea.9 While these command relationships reflected both regional and functional organization, it was not a distinct "functional" command structure and this concerned the Air Force. Despite FEAF operational control of Marine air after the Inchon operation by its Fifth Air Force, NAVFE air operated "in support of" instead of under USAF desired operational control. The operational control argument, and an all important targeting jurisdiction question, make the Korean TACAIR C2 question revelant to this background. General Stratomeyer, FEAF commander, maintained that the principle of centralized control of air power in a theater applied to naval aviation. NAVFE opposed placing his air under FEAF for many reasons. It is interesting to note the effects of ambigious terminology in this instance, however, as they reappear in several forms throughout this paper. Stratemeyer, of course, requested that FECOM grant FEAF operaitional control of naval air. The FECOM response was to place all aircraft in support of the FEAF mission under FEAF operational control (the over-land campaign) and all aircraft in support of the NAVFE mission under NAVFE control. That seeined quite reasonable, especially since there was no naval mission to speak of. The FECOM guidance didn't stop there however. The FECOM directive also stated that when both FEAF and NAVFL were assigned to a mission in Korea, FEAF was delegated FECOM's prerogative for "coordination control". FEAF wanted this interpreted as operational control while NAVFE interpreted it as an "in support of" relationship.10 Despite this interpreta- tion difference, by mid-1952 most of the coordination of air operations was concentrated in the Joint Operations Center (JOC) of 5th Air Force. This JOC had good NAVFE representation, as was also the case in the FEAF Targetting Committee. The targeting issue is one which can be constructively introduced at this point. In joint operations, target prioritization for attack and/or reconnaissance can be a very political and tactically significant concern for all commanders. This is especially so for the ground forces commanders who are concerned first about the apportionment of total air to the close air support function and then to the prioritization of targets they have nominated in the deep strike and reconnaissance mission categories, versus those generated by other commanders. In Korea, coordina- tion of the deep strike/interdiction and reconnaissance efforts of the several air forces was attempted through the establishment of a joint targeting office. A General Head- quarters Targeting Selection Committee was created within the FECOM headquarters, with representation from both FEAF and NAVFE. FEAF rankled under this arrangement feeling that this was a functional usurption of an air component commander responsibility. While the FECOM Targeting Selection Committee continued throughout the war, FEAF's own targeting committee was gradually staffed with senior 5th Air Force and NAVFE representatives and essentially fed the FECOM commander targeting recommendations for approval. The essential points are: 1) that a central targeting agency is required for joint operations and, 2) that, regardless of whether it resides at the JTF or air component level, it must have access to all and the best intelligence available, must have equitable representation from all supported elements of the task force, and must be responsive to both the users and the JTF commander's guidance. Other Marine Corps concerns in the Korean C2 arena were immediate close air support (CAS) responsiveness -- often sluggish due mostly to the staggering communications and staffing congestion into a very large, centralized operations center -- and a continued unswerving Air Force insistence on an extremely resource consuming interdiction campaign, often at the expense of CAS.11 To a ground commander or the commander of an air-ground team, troops in contact requesting support are of utmost import -- and when your organic air is in theater, its simply intolerable to have it's support not under your control. Korea, then, despite the defense establishment reorganization and Service mission clarification, demonstrated that command and control of TACAIR was still a sensitive, if not problematic, area of concern for the unified commander. Command structures were distinctly simpler and more workable -- perhaps as much due to the uniqueness of the combat zone and the limited forces employed than as to applications of WWII experiences and "lessons learned" or the new Department of Defense. Vietnam Vietnam saw command and control of TACAIR revived as a Service issue of significant importance. The rather long course of the conflict and relatively controlled intensity of the air war served to make C2 structure and relation- ships adaptable but also still resistant to change. The unified command structure of the theather in its entirety was complex and cumbersome throughout the war, making it understandably hard to simplify that of its subordinate elements. Many factors contributed to this overall complexity -- divergent strategic perspectives of commanders, severe differences in Service rivalries and conflicting doctrines. It is not necessary to cover all these areas, however, as much of the pertinent material has been developed previously in the WWII or Korean discussions of this chapter. TACAIR C2 issues in Vietnam, however, do add to this historical perspective in several areas. U.S. forces were introduced into the Vietnam theater over an extended period of time, starting as early as 1950 with a small Military Advisory Group (MAG) working with and through the French. The role of assigned Air Force and Army advisors changed significantly after the French withdrawal in 1955. The next seven years saw increased involvement and commitment of both Services to the advisory and assistance roles and in 1962 the command structure was reorganized to reflect it. The Military Assistance Command, Vietnam (MACV) was established as a sub-unified command under CINCPAC, with subordinate Air Force and Army commands of the 2nd Air Division Advanced Echelon (of the 13th Air Force, Philippines) and U.S. Army Support Group, Vietnam, respectively. This sub-unified command concept was not favored by all the Services. The Army and Air Force, instead, strongly favored creation of a unified command for the Southeast Asian theater, reporting directly to the JCS. CINCPAC, of course, was (and remains) a Navy commander, while the MACV staff was in all likelihood going to be heavily ground or Army weighted. The Service rivalry lines were apparent and as the MACV staff developed, the Air Force was allotted the J-2 and J-5 positions, the Army J-1, J-3 and J-4 and the Marine Corps the head of the Combat Operations Center and the Chief of Staff.12 As argued by the Army, MACV leaned heavily towards the premise that Vietnam was a counterinsurgency theater, primarily a land war for which the Army held principal responsibility. The CINC's of Pacific air forces (CINCPACAF) and naval forces (CINCPACFLT), in turn, wanted to minimize force contributions to MACV. Ostensibly this would enable them to keep their main elements available for the greater Southeast Asian contingencies while they could still provide forces to MACV "in support of" as the situation dictated. As Laos air operations intensified, the Air Force build up in Thailand proceeded rapidly. As 1965 approached, the theater had a Military Assistance Command, Thailand (MACTHAI) in operation, predominantly major elements of the 13th Air Force, and a Navy Task Force (TF-77) in the Gulf of Tonkin. All elements remained under a 7,000 mile distant single commander, CINCPAC, with major air elements in each of the subordinate commands, COMUSMACV, CINCPACAF, CINCPACFLT and COMUSMACTHAI. Eventually the situation was further complicated with the support of B-52's of the Strategic Air Command. The Air Force had peculiar internal command structure problems that do not require elaboration here. These did, however, further complicate the coordination of the "outside of South Vietnam" interdiction campaign. Marine participation in this campaign was relatively minor (A-6 operations in Laos and Cambodia) and was fully integrated into 7th Air Force (the outgrowth of tho 2nd Air Division under MACV) operations. The "outside of South Vietnam" interdiction campaign involved strikes within North Vietnam, Laos and, to a lesser degree, Cambodia, with the 7th Air Force and the Navy's TF-77 (carrier air wings) the principle players. While CINCPACAF, of course, wanted control of carrier air, traditional Service arguments eventually resulted in the PACAF/7th Air Force being delegated, instead, "coordinating authority", expressly not including Air Force operational control of Navy aircraft, for the air campaign in North Vietnam. What resulted was the negotiation of a "route package" control arrangement. These geographic areas of responsibility were assigned based on target density and importance, component air resources available and range limitations of carrier air. It was not an ideal arrange- ment but rather a compromise approach to a sensitive command and control issue further influenced by the Navy's range and carrier operating limitations. Such geographic responsibilities made it difficult if not impossible to adjust an interdiction effort as tactical and operational situations varied. This "coordinating authority" was compromised into a geographic separation of target areas as his principle means of "coordinating" the joint air effort and was at a serious disadvantage in the application of total available air power. Returning to "in-country" operations, MACV in 1965- 1966 was organized into two Army Field Forces, the III Marine Amphibious Force (III MAF), the 7th Air Force and several other commands. The U.S. Army, Vietnam, Command handled administration and logistics for all Army units in-country. The structure was a combination of regional and functional elements. It is interesting to note that until April 1966, the CG, III MAF was the "Naval Component Commander" under COMUSMACV. When the command U.S. Naval Forces, Vietnam was created, III MAF was simultaneously made a uniservice force under the operational control of COMUSMACV. Until early 1968, III MAF not only had operational control of all Marine combat elements but of significant Army units as well. Marine air was organic and was commanded and directed by III MAF in support of I Corps (northern South Vietnam) forces. "Excess" sorties were provided to the 7th Air Force. In February 1968, COMUSMACV reorganized the force structure in I Corps in anticipation of the Tet offensive. This reorganization also included the decision to give the Air Operations Deputy, MACV, responsibility for "single management" of fixed wing aircraft in South Vietnam. While the Air Force interpreted this as operational control, the Marine Corps viewed "mission direction," the phrase used in the MACV directive, as something certainly less than operational control. In 1970, a revised MACV directive stated that mission direction was "the authority delegated to one commander (i.e., Deputy COMUSMACV for Air) to assign specific air tasks to another commander (e.g., CG III MAF) on a periodic basis as implementation of a basic mission previously assigned by a superior commander (COMUSMACV).13 There were further changes in the command structures as U.S. forces were phased out of country, but this "mission direction" and "single management" relation- ship existed until the phase-out was complete... with the Air Force claiming "operational control" and the Marine Corps saying "no" but complying with 7th Air Force "mission direction. Enough historical perspective. In the three periods of conflict examined, air command and control structures and relationships have varied signficantly. They have evolved throughout each of the conflicts as a result of changes in the tactical sitiuation and force compositions, unique aspects of the battle theater and a myriad of other reasons. Some generalizations can certainly be made. The U.S. Air Force is a proponent of centralized command. It consistently promotes and even fights vehemently for a single air commander in "command" of all theater air assets, including its own strategic assets of SAC. The U.S. Navy has not allowed its air assets to be employed in other than an "in support of" relationship to the overall JTF air campaign. It is enthusiastically supportive of joint force operations but will not release its aviation arm to Air Force control. The Marine Corps, as generally the smallest combat element in a joint operation, often finds itself in a tenuous position -- with its organic air assets convetted by the Air Force and its ground element looked upon as a small maneuver elements of the much larger U.S. ground force. The Marine Corps has been flexible, adapting to many varied command relationships, and has generally succeeded in its efforts to retain MAGTF unity. It has held tenaciously to its "operational control" over MAGTF organic air. As was mentioned early in this chapter, the personalities and preferences of commanders and their subordinates and their often parochial Service politics, while not herein emphasized, have and will continue to play a major role in influencing TACAIR C2. CHAPTER TWO Notes 1William Moymer, Air Power in Three Wars (Wash- ington, DC: Dept of Air Force, 1978), p. 40. 2Moymer, p. 42. 3U.S.M.C. Advanced Amphibious Study Group Back- ground Paper (AASGBP) Service vs. Functional Components. (Washington, DC: Hdqtrs USMC, 1982), p. 3-2. 4USMC AASGBP, p. 3-9. 5USMC AASGBP, p. 3-1,2. 6USMC AASGBP, p. 3-11. 7Roser, H.B., LtCol, USMC, Point Paper 781-84 (Washington, DC: Hdqtrs USMC, 1984), p. 3, Tab F. 8Moymer, Air Power in Three Wars, p. 52. 9USMC AASGBP, p. 3-11. 10Moymer, Air Power in Three Wars, p. 58. 11Roser, H.G., LtCol, USMC, Point Paper 781-84, p. 3-13. 12Moymer, Air Power in Three Wars, p. 70. 13USMC AASGBP, 3-17. CHAPTER THREE Basic TACAIR C2 Background This chapter will examine the TACAIR command and control (C2) apparatus maintained by the Services, both inter and intra-service, and to a lesser extent that of the Unified Command/Joint Task Force (JTF) structure. It will also introduce the JINTACCS program's interface operating procedures -- now in the final stages of development and certification. The examination is not going to be in depth. It will, instead, touch on the basic structures, systems and philosophies of the Services and the higher level command structures under which they can operate. It stays principally at the tactical theater and JTF levels and does not address strategic or national command and control. The emphasis on the tactical C2 will intention- ally be on the Omnibus mission areas -- antiair warfare (USN/USMC) or counter air (USAF) and offensive air support. As the following sections are considered, two major influences on command and control should be kept in mind; the personalities and preferences of commanders in the C2 structures (already mentioned), and the inherent uniqueness of every conceivable conflict in which they find themselves engaged. These two influences have and will consistently make generalizations arduous, result in innumerable variations in command and control structures and procedures, and provide very reasonable justification for procedural and structural flexibility, adaptability and, where written guidance is concerned, even non- specificity (if not ambiguity!). The authority of a commander to organize his command as he deems appropriate is acknowledged and provided for throughout the Department of Defense. MAGTF TACAIR C2 The U.S. Marine Corps is a Service under the Depart- ment of the Navy separate yet closely tied to the U.S. Navy (Service). Title 10 U.S. Code, paragraph 5013, states in part that: The Marine Corps should be organized, trained and equipped to provide fleet Marine forces of combined arms, together with supporting air components, for service with the fleet in the seizure or defense of advanced naval bases and for the conduct of such land operations as may be essential to the prosecution of a naval campaign. In addition,...such other duties as the President may direct. However, these addi- tional duties may not detract from or interfere with the operation for which the Marine Corps is primarily organized. Marine Corps policy is that Fleet Marine Forces will normally be employed as integrated air-ground teams, task organized for specific missions. These task organizations are called Marine Air-Ground Task Forces (MAGTF's) and consist of command, ground combat, aviation combat and combat service support (CSS) elements. Both the aviation and CSS elements are distinctly supporting elements of the MAGTF's ground combat element. There are three basic types of MAGTF's; Marine Amphibious Units (MAU's), Brigades (MAB's) and Forces (MAF's) generally built around infantry battalion, regiment and division-sized landing teams. Further background was provided in Chapter 1. The MAB sized MAGTF is capable of amphibious and sustained land operations of limited scope while the MAF or larger MAB sized MAGTF is capable of a full range of combat opera- tions. These larger MAGTF's carry with them organic aviation and command and control resources to provide all the required functions of Marine aviation; air reconnais- sance, antiair warfare, assault support, oftensive air support, electronic warfare and control of aircraft and missiles. There is normally only one aviation combat element (ACE) in a MAGTF and it contains aviation command and control, combat support and combat service support units as assigned in its task organization. Essentially, the remainder of this section will deal only with the ACE command and control apparatus as it applies to fixed wing TACAIR. It will consider this ACE in support of a full MAF to realistically discuss a Marine aircraft wing (MAW) sized air combat element and its full spectrum of aviation functional capabilities. The air combat element of a Marine Amphibious Force (division or larger ground combat element) is essentially a Marine aircraft wing -- of which the Marine Corps has four (one reserve). A wing-sized ACE employed in combat will have squadrons of fighter, attack, air refueler/transport, and observation fixed wing aircraft, detachments of recon- naissance and electronic warfare aircraft, a variety of helicopter squadrons, an air control group of communica- tions, C2, and air defense missile squadrons/batteries, a headquarters squadron and a support group. The ACE would be commanded by the wing commanding general who in combat operations usually becomes the Tactical Air Commander or TAC of the MAGTF. For simplicity, he is referred to subsequently as the TAC. The TAC is directly responsible to the MAGTF commander for the ACE's support of the MAGTF. Click here to view image This wing-sized ACE would be task organized in accord- ance with its mission and would likely include over 200 fixed wing aircraft and helicopters. The Air Control Group would include a Tactical Air Command Center (TACC), perhaps two Tactical Air Operations Centers (TAOC's), a Direct Air Support Center (DASC), a battalion of IHAWK missiles, Stinger missiles and other aviation C2 elements. ACE tactical operations are supervised and managed by the Tactical Air Commander through the TACC, the senior command and control agency. The TACC functions: ...as the senior MAGTF air command and control agency and to establish the operational command post of the Marine Air Command and Control Systems (MACCS) from which the TAC can super- vise, direct, control, and coordinate all MAGTF tactical air operations.1 The TACC has a myriad of tasks and duties in this role but more detail will only be provided as required to support the discussions in the remainder of the paper. Essentially though, the TACC is the "hub" of the many spokes in the wheel of an extensive Marine Air Command and Control System (MACCS). To facilitate the discussions that follow, this paper will consider the TACC and ACE command element as a fully integrated ACE C2 center. Not all wing commanders may choose to do so. Subordinate to the TACC are the agencies TAOC and DASC. The TAOC(s) of the MACCS are designed to control an air defense sector(s), enroute air traffic and air defense operations, including both aircraft and missiles. It is the primary source of radar surveillance information to the MACCS while both the TACC and TAOC(s) are capable of air track and C2 data exchange with other tactical data systems, including those of each of the U.S. services and NATO. These tactical data information link (TADIL) exchanges are an essential capability of the MACCS, expanding its surveillance and control capacity dramatically. The role of the TAOC is: ...to detect, identify and control the inter- cepts of hostile aircraft and missiles and to provide navigational assistance to friendly aircraft. Additionally, the TAOC functions as the alternate TACC/TADC when directed.2 The DASC is the principle air control agency respon- sible for the conduct of tactical operations directly supporting ground forces of the MAGTF. It operates in a decentralized mode of operations but is directly supervised by the TACC. It coordinates close air support strikes, assault support, and air reconnaissance missions which require coordination with fire support means; it dissemi- nates verbal air track information to Stinger units and coordinates the distribution of direct air support air assets assigned by the TACC to terminal control agencies. It works closely with the Fire Support Coordination Center (FSCC) of the GCE and is often co-located with that agency. It does not currently employ organic sensors (radar) or receive data link information and depends entirely on voice position reports and other communications to control assets assigned. Its role is: ...to provide the means of processing direct air support requests, to coordinate aircraft employment with other supporting arms, and to control assigned aircraft and unassigned air- craft transiting their area of control.3 These are the major MACCS agencies through which the ACE TAC exercises command and control of his aviation assets. An example of their employment will be helpful in understanding much of the succeeding chapter's material. The MAGTF is designed for amphibious operations. With the limited amphibious lift available it would, however, take far too long to realistically put together an amphibious task force for a MAF sized operation. In this example, then, a forward deployed MAU is used to occupy/ seize a lightly defended port city and its medium size airport. Amphibious shipping is gathered at U.S. ports to embark another one "plus" MAB. While Navy carrier battle group (CVBG) air and naval gunfire support the MAU ashore, another "stripped" MAB is flown into the city's airport and marries up with maritime prepositioned equipment being offloaded at the port. The Marine aviation combat element's fixed wing assets flight ferry to a friendly air facility some 200 miles away while the MAGTF's helicopter assets, are built up through strategic airlift at the local airfield. Air Force and Army assets are simultaneously preparing for deployment and strategic airlift starts bringing them to friendly facilities adjacent to the theater. For the initial week, however, it is a Navy- Marine Corps amphibious operation. Within the Amphibious Objective Area (AOA), the MAGTF commander is subordinate to the Commander, Amphibious Task Force (CATF) and is also wearing the Commander, Landing Force (CLF) hat. The CATF has operational control of the MAGTF as a whole, it being a part of the ATF, while the MAGTF commander exercises command over the MAGTF elements. Initially, control of MAGTF air is conducted through the Navy TACC afloat. As Marine C2 elements are established, control authority incrementally passes ashore. The first element ashore is normally the DASC and it soon begins controlling direct air support to the GCE. In this case, Navy C2 agencies would be handing off close air support (CAS), assault support and other direct air support to the DASC as these aircraft approach the MAGTF's beachhead. As soon as possible, the TACC, TAOC and IHAWK elements are established ashore. The TACC and its subordinate MACCS agencies remain subordinate to the TACC (Navy) afloat until they are fully prepared to assume their responsibilities. The TACC (Marine) ashore is termed a Tactical Air Direction Center (TADC) until it assumes control of the landward sector of the AOA, and essentially is "monitoring" the air operations of the Navy TACC afloat. The TAOC and IHAWK elements are integrated by voice and data link into the amphibious airspace control and air defense networks as soon as they're operational. For simplicity, assume that the TACC (Marine) is operational and assumes control of the landward sector about the time the ACE's fixed wing squadrons become operational at the distant friendly base. Figure 3-2 depicts, then, a MAB (reinforced) sized MAGTF controlling a force beach head (FBH) within an amphibious objective area whose over-water airspace is controlled by the Navy (TADC) and the over-land airspace is controlled by the MAGTF (TACC). Click here to view image At this stage in the operation, both Navy and Marine Corps fixed wing aviation support is being provided to the MAGTF and controlled by the TACC once "feet dry." While Marine air support flows directly into and out of the TACC, Navy air from the CVBG comes to the TACC via the CATF -- although shortcuts may be authorized and/or established. The TACC has now assumed responsibilities for the C2 of all Marine air operations in support of the MAGTF, ranging from deep air support (DAS) to close air support, and all the other functions of Marine aviation. The Navy is protecting the ATF shipping and seaward flank and supports the landing force/MAGTF as requested. The TACC operates two major sections -- one for plans and one for current operations and is manned by an integrated crew of the wing headquarters and MACG. The planning section is developing expected aviation requirements from one to several days in advance and developing in increased detail the ACE's daily air tasking (or fragmentary) order (ATO). The operations section is coordinating and managing the current period's air opera- tions, executing the ATO, directing air defense operations and making operational decisions to meet the changing tactical situation. The TACC's planning or air tasking process is of particular importance to this paper. The air tasking process can be separated into two distinct repeditive cycles, preplanned and immediate. The preplanned air tasking cycle involves the preparation of an ATO for a specific future period, usually of a day's duration. It, of course, meets air support requirements foreseen in advance. The immediate air tasking cycle involves the rapid reaction to, planning, adjustment for and fulfilling of air support requirements which develop on short notice. It will often involve sacrificing or delaying preplanned operations to fill higher priority "immediate" air support requirements. The emphasis within the paper will be with the preplanned air tasking process. Although a MAGTF commander and TAC may organize the process as they see fit, the following discussion describes a realistic procession of the planning involved. It is substantially derived from OH 5-3, Tasking USMC Fixed Wing Aviation. The preplanned air tasking process begins with guidance from the commander. At this point in the example, it may be the CATF, MAGTF commander or TAC, most probably all three. TACC planners naturally hope for general, "mission oriented" guidance but it may, of course, be as detailed as the commander(s) desire. This commander's guidance is normally called "apportionment." The term, however, can apply to several levels of command, depending on how specific a senior commander is in his apportionment order. Apportionment--The determination and assignment of the total expected effort by percentage and/or by priority that should be devoted to the various air operations and/or geographic areas for a given period of time.4 It may take the form of a statement as general as "continue to maintain air superiority and interdict enemy third echelon assembly areas as possible" or be as specific as "apportion air effort as follows: 40% anti-air warfare, 40% close air support, 20% deep air support." While this preplanned air tasking process is underway, the TACC is accumulating air support requirements and support requests from several supported elements. Since each day's planning process will usually take place over several preceding days, the TACC planners are also in various stages of preplanning for several air tasking cycles simultaneously. The next stage of preplanning involves the translation of apportionment guidance into total numbers of sorties by aircraft type available. This is termed allocation. allocation--The translation of the apportionment into total numbers of sorties by aircraft type avail- able for each operation/task.5 This allocation phase is probably the most complex and demanding portion of the air tasking process. To realize the full potential and effectiveness of available air resources, and to simultaneously maximize the ACE's con- tribution to the overall MAGTF objective, requires that aviation tasks be prioritized and integrated into the MAGTF commander's concepts of operations. Each of the aviation functions are complementary yet always are in competition for the use of limited assets. Planners use three basic sets of information; the numbers and types of available resources, the array of targets and operational require- ments suitable for air operations, and the MAGTF commander's guidance on threat and air support priorities.6 The TACC planners are of necessity mated with an extensive intelligence apparatus drawing information from within the MAGTF and external agencies to provide and evaluate the opposition. This threat analysis and the targeting evolution provide the foundation for combat power require- ments determination and cannot be overemphasized. Combat power requirements are converted to ground and air combat support requirements and the air support portion is ready for further refining. This refinement begins with air tasking prioritization. The requirements to achieve and maintain air superi- ority are always considered the highest priority. That may seem unreasonable to many ground commanders, but the simple fact is that no other air-ground operation can be conducted effectively without the air superiority umbrella overhead. "Dominance in the air battle...that permits the conduct of operations...without prohibitive interference..."7 is paramount and the sorties required to achieve and maintain the required degree of air superiority are essentially skimmed off the top" of ACE asset availability. The Marine aviation function which includes the air superiority requirement is antiair warfare (AAW), further categorized into offensive and defensive AAW operations. Offensive AAW generally consists of striking into an enemy's rear areas to destroy his aircraft, air facilities and air defenses before they are employed against the MAGTF. This is potentially the most efficient means of achieving air superiority but is also quite costly in terms of sorties required and potential attrition. The more enemy aircraft damaged on the ground and the longer his airfields are inoperable, the smaller his offensive air effort will be. Defensive AAW, also termed "air defense", is concerned with minimizing the enemy air offensive through aircraft and missile interception (active), and camouflage, hardened defensive positions and dispersion (passive). The TACC planners not only allocate into the AAW function but must also plan the offensie and defensive mix. The TAC presents his AAW plan and the remaining sortie availability to the MAGTF commander and the GCE commander at an apportionment conference or through some other expedient means as directed. The GCE commander presents his CAS and other support requirements planning. After review, the MAGTF commander approves or modifies the AAW plan and in so doing also detemines the sorties available for the remaining fixed wing air effort. This remainder is essentially dedicated to the offensive air support (OAS) operations of CAS and DAS (close in meaning to the more common term interdiction). The rest of the apportionment conference deals with the apportionment and allocation of assets into these mission areas. Determining the mix of sorties within OAS is at least as difficult as the AAW mix determination. CAS requirements of the GCE may well be critical -- but some dozens of hours before-hand, they still are just educated estimates. DAS requirements are generated by both the TAC and GCE commanders and often higher commanders as well. DAS is potentially a more efficient manner to engage opposing forces, similar to the offensive AAW effort, with strikes against massed concentrations of enemy assets prior to their tactical deployment. The TAC and GCE commanders, staffs and/or representatives weigh the costs and benefits involved in a variety of air employment options. They consider the impact of ACE surges to provide more sorties, the timing of DAS strikes, possible adjustments to GCE operations, the availability of external air support, and the reassignment of other fire support assets. Their deliberations deter- mine the best possible OAS (CAS/DAS) mix. After this conference, the GCE commander knows the CAS effort available and which of his nominated targets for DAS will be struck. An apportionment agreement such as this may well be used for several succeeding tasking cycles with only mission details changing daily. The ACE leaves the conference knowing his allocation of sorties by aircraft type and number to AAW, CAS, and DAS, and those DAS targets selected for strike. For the GCE commander, his next task is to allot available CAS sorties to fulfill requirements of his subordinate ground units and to forward the selected or tentatively "approved" CAS air support requests to the ACE. When necessary requests exceed the allocation, further adjusting is attempted by both elements. The ACE can also request additional support from outside the MAGTF. The ACE TACC planners commence roughing the ATO and wait on the consolidated GCE air support request. Once the air support requests are received, external MAGTF (e.g. Navy) air support is integrated, and the support require- ments and allocation refined, the planners produce what has now become the ATO. Once published and distributed it is passed to the TACC operations section for execution during the period covered. The ATO serves several purposes; it tasks the ACE's operational groups and squadrons, is used by various control agencies to coordinate their activities, confirms the GCE (or other supported unit) requests and provides mission details for other sorties provided in support of the MAGTF from other force components, in the example, the Navy's CVBG. In this portion of the paper, external air support is touched only lightly. It will be covered in greater detail later in the chapter. For now, assume that the TAC would probably come to the apportionment conference with the MAGTF and GCE commanders with at least a general idea of what external support will be available. While the commanders can consider such support, they will not know specific availabilities until sometime during the day prior to the tasking period. Before leaving the MAGTF air tasking process two - further items need be examined; the OAS apportionment for the MAGTF, and the term allotment. Air support in the Marine Corps is of two categories, preplanned and immediate. Immediate air missions are those for which no requirement was foreseen in advance but, due to the threat posed or importance and fleeting nature of the target, must be engaged rapidly, most often by divert- ing preplanned missions. Preplanned missions are those for which requirements were foreseen in advance and which allow for detailed mission coordination, planning and integration into the supported unit's operations. In the CAS category, they are further categorized as scheduled or on-call. Preplanned scheduled missions are assigned complete mission details in the ATO to include specified targets and target times. Preplanned on-call missions are assigned many mission details, but due to the anticipated fluidity of battle, one or more mission details are withheld, usually including target time and specific target location. Such missions are placed on ground or air alert status "on-call" for certain periods of time. The distinction between preplanned on-call missions in execution and "immediate" missions is often hazy. If the GCE commander or the TAC desire, they may put aircraft in alert status for "immediate" contingencies, in addition to those preplanned on-call missions requested by the GCE. Given the mobility current potential opposing forces may present, the majority of preplanned missions may have to be "on-call". This is applicable to the paper in that CAS and other OAS requests are a major element of the "direct support" an ACE provides to its MAGTF. It is easy to see that between preplanned scheduled and on-call missions and a reserve for potential "immediate" requirements beyond those preplanned, planners can obligate major portions of available sorties. TACC planners must weigh the reduced availability and effective- ness of all such alert sorties against the flexibility for contingencies gained when allocating aircraft to alerts. The term allotment is used internally to the MAGTF by the GCE commander in his distribution of CAS and other OAS sorties amongst his subordinate units. It must remain distinct from the higher headquarters use of the term in the JCS Pub 1 context: allotment--The temporary change of assignment of tactical air forces between subordinate commands. The authority to allot is vested in the commander having operational command. For instance, a joint task force commander may allot the use of several Air Force component sorties to the MAGTF to fill a MAGTF air support request. Allotment at the joint task force (JTF) or unified command level will most often take this form and is a part of the process termed common air, or cross-force, tasking. Before discussing JTF TACAIR C2 and common air tasking, however, a quick look at Air Force, Navy and Army TACAIR C2 is appropriate. Air Force TACAIR C2 The United States Air Force is a separate Service component of the Department of Defense established by the National Security Act of 1947 and amendments "...to perform prompt and sustained offensive and defensive air opera- tions." The primary functions of the Air Force (JCS Pub 2, paragraph 20402) as apply to this paper include the gaining and maintenance of general air supremacy, the defeat of enemy air forces, the control of vital air areas, the establishment of local air superiority and the furnishing of close combat air support to the Army, to include tactical reconnaissance and interdiction of enemy land power and communications.8 Air Force missions as apply to this paper include: counter air (CA), air interdiction (AI), and close air support (CAS). These are extracted from Air Force Manual (AFM) 1-1, Functions and Basic Doctrine of the United States Air Force. The central beliefs of the Air Force for employing aerospace forces (air power) to wage war (again from AFM 1-1) are: 1) employ aerospace power as an indivisible entity based on objectives, threats, and opportunities (p 2-10) 2) conduct simultaneous strategic and tactical actions (p 2-11) 3) gain control of the aerospace environment (p 2-11) 4) attack an enemy's warfighting potential (p 2-13) 5) consider both offensive and defensive action (p 2-15) 6) exploit the psychological impact of aerospace power (p 2-17) 7) develop a coherent pattern for employing forces (p 2-18) 8) establish one authority for air defense and airspace control (p 2-20) 9) command, control, communications and intelligence (p 2-20) Inherent in these central beliefs are the Air Force's premises for an all-encompassing unity of command, centralized control and decentralized execution, and the critical importance of the counter-air and air interdiction campaigns for air superiority and strikes against an opponent's warfighting potential. Some further quotes from AFM 1-1 highlight these premises: Unity of command, combined with common doctrine, obtains unity of effort by the coordinated action of all forces towards a common goal. While coordination may be attained by cooperation, it is best achieve by giving a single commander full authority.9 Control of the aerospace environ- ment gives commanders the freedom to conduct successful attacks which can neutralize or destroy an enemy's warfighting potential.10 ...an air commander must consider ... the enemy, the air actions that will most clearly deny enemy objectives, and the needs and requirements of friendly surface forces.11 While the urgency of enemy actions may require direct attacks against forces in contact, efficient use of air forces should emphasize attack in depth upon those targets that deny the enemy the time and space to employ forces effectively.12 Although battlefield situations may interrupt this plan of attack, air and surface commanders must remain committed to their coordinated actions and must not allow the full impact of aerospace power to be diverted away from the main objective.13 Through the process of taking these actions, an air commander has specific authorities and responsibilities. As a specified air commander, he makes apportionment decisions on where the overall weight of effort will go. As an air component commander, he makes apportionment recommendations.14 As a critical element of the interde- pendent land-naval-aerospace team, aerospace power can be the decisive force in warfare.15 One may surmise from these and other such statements that the Air Force as a Service is very enamored with what it feels are its primary roles in theater tactical warfare -- air defense and air interdiction -- and that it further desires command authority over all tactical aviation assets in a theater to be vested in a single air commander. It is, of course, committed and dedicated to providing close air support as well as to the land forces, but such support may easily be viewed as a distraction or degrading influence on its main campaigns of counter air and air interdiction. Whether or not these are valid perceptions is not too important. That they may exist as perceptions of the other Services or their components is the relevant point. Anyhow, such premises set the Air Force apart from MAGTF air combat element TACAIR -- and from the air elements of the Army and Navy as well. MAGTF TACAIR supports the MAGTF as an organic subordinate element. Every mission it normally flies is in direct or general support of the MAGTF. Unlike the ACE, the Air Force often has its own independent missions and objectives within the theater. It may develop and conduct at least major portions of its counter-air and especially its air inter- diction campaigns with little consideration of a particular land force's objectives. This is mentioned to provide the reader some distinctions in command and control philosophy between the Air Force and the Marine Corps -- not to say that such is wrong. Once past these philosophy differ- ences, however, the command and control structures and systems employed are remarkably similar. The Air Force has several major air commands which organizationally contain tactical air assets. They would normally be employed tactically under the existing unified command structure as numbered air forces. In a theater of operations such as Europe, there may, for example, be three or four numbered air forces established under the Air Forces, Europe, command. These air forces would, in turn, be composed of several wings each with several squadrons of aircraft. Wings are usually functionally organized with fighter (including attack), reconnaissance, airlift or strategic assets assigned. For a Marine Corps comparison, the Air Force wing is similar to a Marine group with aircraft squadrons assigned. The numbered air force, then, is somewhat similar to the Marine Corps wing. Although air forces are flexibly sized, a numbered air force operating in a combat theater would probably be significantly larger than a MAGTF ACE in regards to fixed wing tactical air- craft. To facilitate further discussions in this and subsequent chapters, the following ACE and Tactical Air Force (TAF) structures will be used: click here to view image Admittedly, both the TAF and ACE are rather large. The intent is to portray the potential relative numbers of TACAIR assets rather than necessarily realistic theater components. The ACE brings with it a command and control apparatus which had already bean discussed. The TAF has very similar C2 apparatus. One major difference is that where continuing missions dictate, such as in Korea and Europe, numbered air forces (TAF's) and their supporting C2 apparatus are already in place and operating. Although not as expeditionary as the Marine Corps MACCS, the Air Force Tactical Air Control System, TACS, is also capable of strategic mobility. In the example continued through this paper, the Air Force TACCS will be considered employed with a joint task force of one of the unified commands -- for instance Central Command. The Air Force component of this example JTF is the tactical air force depicted in Figure 3-3. Within the JTF command structure, this TAF's commander is then the Air Force Component Commander (AFCC). He may wear other hats but for now this will be his title. The TAF headquarters (TAFHQ) element does not contain its own tactical opera- tions center. Like the ACE, the TAF/AFCC utilizes his TACS organization and equipment to plan, direct, control and coordinate tactical air operations. The major agencies of a deployed TACS are discussed below. The Air Force TACS discussion should begin with its Tactical Air Control Center (TACC). The TACC is the heart and senior agency of the TACS. Although the TAFHQ is distinct, its AFCC uses the TACC as his operations center. It provides the commander information handling capability necessary for the centralized control of assigned air resources, decentralized execution of operations, and all required coordination and integration of operations internal and external to the Air Force component. Despite the "control" center terminology, its role in the TACS parallels closing that of the MACCS and its TACC, a "command" center. To preclude confusing the two agencies, when there may be a question as to which is being referred to, the Air Force TACC will be denoted as TACC-AF and the Marine TACC, the TACC-M. The TACC-AF has several principal subordinate agencies through which it authorizes decentralized execution of air operations. The Combat Reporting Center (CRC) directs within its area of responsibility air defense operations, provides aircraft guidance or monitoring for both offensive and defensive missions, may relay mission changes to airborne aircraft and coordinates control of missions with other elements of the TACS as required. It is the primary element concerned with the decentralized execution of air defense and airspace control and is very similar in role to the MACCS TAOC. Subordinate to the CRC are one or more Combat Reporting Posts (CRP's) and, subordinate to them, Forward Air Control Party (FACP) elements. These CRP's and FACP's are supervised by the CRC and provide extensions to its radar surveillance and control capabilities. A CRC might normally be supported by two CRP's, each with two or more FACP's. The TACS will also employ one or more Air Support Operations Centers (ASOC's) subordinate to its TACC to coordinate and direct tactical air operations in support of ground forces. Normally one ASOC is employed for each Army corps supported and ASOC's work closely with their respective Corps Tactical Operation Centers (CTOC's). The ASOC is, of course, very similar in function to the MACCS DASC. In fact it has only been in the past several years that the Air Force has transitioned to the ASOC termi- nology. As in the MAGTF the ASOC/DASC is the principal coordinator and director of air support provided the ground element. The TACS has many more agencies, systems and equip- ments. The E-3A Sentry, for instance, is an airborne warning and control system which not only extends radar surveillance but can also function as an airborne TACC or CRC it required. The Airborne Battlefield Command and Control Center (ABCCC) is an airborne management and communications element used as an extension of the combat operations section of the TACC. The TACC also deals with its operating wings via wing operations centers (WOC's) -- similar but far more sophisticated (equipment) than she MAGTF ACE's aircraft group headquarters. So although the Air Force TACS is more extensive, elaborate and in some ways more sophisticated than the MACCS, the C2 apparatus is far more similar than different, as reference to the below figure suggests. Click here to view image Internal to the TACC-AF are similar parallels. The TACC is made up of three major divisions; plans, intelli- gence and operations. As in the TACC-M, the TACC-AF Combat Plans Division recommends force allocation and develops and issues the Air Tasking Order. It, of course, does so with some sophisticated computer assistance, the Computer- Assisted Forces Management System (CAFMS). (Someday we'll get help too!) The Intelligence Division both supports TACC plans with threat assessments collection management and analysis, and TACC operations as a focal point for time perishable intelligence collection and reactions recom- mendations. The TACC-AF Combat Operations Divison supervises the detailed execution of daily air operations, through its subordinate TACS elements. In regards to the air tasking cycle and the processes used to distribute sorties from apportionment guidance into air missions, the TACC-AF and its TAF commander produce an ATO much like the MAGTF's ACE, although on a much larger scale. The basic steps of apportionment, allocation, allotment and ATO production are the same. Some of the major differences have been touched on previously. First, the TAF will normally be the principal air capable component of the JTF and will have componenet status equal to the Navy and Army components and, in some command structures, the MAGTF. It has its own JTF missions and, as concerns TACAIR, is normally responsible for JTF air defense and the air interdiction campaign. It will also normally be assigned to support of the Army component for close support air requirements. This is, of course, a major difference and certainly justifies TAF emphasis on its air defense and interdiction missions as well as its support relationship with the Army. Its air defense and interdiction campaigns provide "general support" to the Army and the rest of the JTF and, while the interdiction campaign will be coordinated to various degrees with the JTF land forces, it is principally planned by the TAFHQ in response to the JTF commander's guidance. One can surmise that the JTF commander would develop this guidance with advice from each of his subordinate commanders. The fact remains that this sets Air Force air tasking cycle planning well apart from that of the ACE -- whose total purpose is doctrinally the support of the MAGTF, and, more to the point, the GCE's missions and scheme of maneuver. This principal command orientation difference also provides a second major difference in the air tasking cycle, the interaction between the Air Force planners and the supported Army planners. Remember in the ACE and GCE planning, the ACE skims air defense requirements "off the top" of available assets/sorties. What TACAIR remaining is then negotiated, essentially, by the ACE and GCE commanders into CAS and DAS -- but in both cases with the objectives being support of the GCE. That's, of course, simplistic, but close enough to use for reference. Over at the TAFHQ, however, the planners work vary closely with the expected and eventual JTF commander's apportionment guidance and, beyond that, its "close support" relationship with the Army. If the apportionment guidance is specific, it may in effect specify by percentage of effort the sortie support provided to CAS. If it's not, then the Army commander is now in the position of the "supported" commander and must negotiate his allocation. Again, the JTF commander's apportionment guidance is influenced by preliminary recommendations from all of his subordinate commanders. It can also be assumed, however, that the Air Force component recommendations is weighed heavily. JCS Pub 2 (para 30278) gives the supporting force commander substantial latitude in weighing the requested level of support desired. No transfer of command or operational control is effected and the commander of the supporting force ascertains the supported forces' requirements and takes such action to fulfill them as is within his capabilities, consistent with the priorities and requirements of other assigned tasks.16 It should also be noted that recent negotiations between the Air Force and Army have resulted in a "Joint Service Agreement on Joint Attack of the Second Echelon (J-SAK)". This agreement formally recognizes Army influence on a portion of the air interdiction campaign termed battlefield air interdiction which will be discussed in latter sections of this paper. The Air Force-Army relationship, like that of the Navy-Marine Corps, is not simply "in support of". There is a lot of tradition, history, and "joint" service doctrine between each of the pairings which goes far beyond the relationship of supporting/supported services. As it applies to the tasking processes, however, the relationship remains far removed from that of the MAGTF's GCE and its organic, supporting air arm, the ACE. The relationship can be looked at further after a discussion of the Army TACAIR C2. Army TACAIR C2 The Army is the Service component of the Department of the Army which has the primary (applicable) function to organize, train, and equip Army forces for the conduct of prompt and sustained combat operations on land -- specifically, forces to defeat enemy land forces and to seize, occupy and defond land area.17 As is the case with each of our Services, the Army feels it has a very unique and important mission. While the power to deny or to destroy is possessed by all the military Services, the fundamental truth is that only ground forces possess the power to exercise direct, con- tinuing, and comprehensive control over land, its resources, and its peoples. Land forces thus perform important, and largely unique, functions besides denial and destruction: landpower can make permanent the otherwise transitory advantages achieved by air and naval forces.18 The Army, itself, maintains a significant organic air arm as an "integral part of the Army commander's land combat forces and as such, is immediately responsive to his needs."19 This organic air support (principally heli- copters), however, is not TACAIR as it relates to this paper. The supporting relationship between the Army and the Air Force and other Services providing tactical air support is one which provides the Army "essential capability" but Other service support, while providing an essential capability, requires a relatively long lead time in planning and may be subject to withdrawal or cancellation on short notice due to factors over which Army commanders have little or no control such as higher priority requirements, adverse weather, or enemy action.20 Then while "air support operations assist in the attainment of the immediate tactical objectives" of the Army and provide "an essential capability", they are not under Army command. This section will address the concepts and organization for integration of air support into the Army's "Air-Land Battle" philosophy. The Army's expeditionary force in a remote combat theater will probably be one or more corps, each with five or less divisions. These corps comprise a theater army normally commanded by the joint task force's Army (or Land) component commander. If only one corps is employed, that corps commander is the Army component commander. To con- tinue the MAGTF and TAF examples, the discussion will assume two corps each with two or three divisions and various support organizations. The Corps tactical operations center (CTOC) functions as the command and control center for operations and planning. Tactical objectives assigned and assessed by the corps commander are passed to the divisions for planning and execution. This organization is supported by the Army Air/Ground Operations System (AGOS) which integrates the Army's Air-Ground System (AAGS) and the Air Force's Tactical Air Control System (TACS) to provide tactical air support for Army ground operations. The Army has in addition to its ground maneuver elements very significant organic air and air defense arms. These elements require C2 structures and apparatus which are elements of the AGOS but do not relate directly to the paper. It is sufficient to note that the employed Army in the joint force theater has airspace and air traffic control and air defense responsibilities and interfaces in the JTF organization. Further discussion will emphasize the Army C2 of Air Force (and Navy/Marine as appropriate) TACAIR support provided. The Army component commander exercises command and control over assigned forces through his tactical oper- tions center. TOC's are established at all levels of subordinate headquarters, down to battalion level. The senior TOC, however, establishes a battlefield coordination element (BCE) to be located at the Air Force TACC. This BCE staff agency conducts air tasking, intelligence and operations coordination with TACC-AF for the Army component. The BCE must be closely linked to the TACC. The BCE has the LCC's priorities and guidance and pos- sesses the requisite knowledge of the situation on the battlefield. Collocation and close coordination between the TACC and BCE, in conjunction with the ACC and LCC dialogue, provides the coordination mechanism for successful joint air- land combat operations.21 (ACC and LCC in this quote refer to air and land component commanders respectively.) Through this BCE, the Army component commander's planning and operational input are represented at he TAFHQ TACC. As mentioned previously, further coordination is accomplished for direct air support execution processes by the assignment of Air Force air support operations centers (ASOC's) (USMC DASC equivalents) at each Army Corps TOC. The structure is depicted below.22 Click here to view image In the execution of preplanned air support and immediate CAS, the Army C2 apparatus, in conjunction with the TACS, coordinates the entrance of tactical air support into airspace under its control and through its air defense system. The co-located ASOC works closely with the Army corp(s) to filter CAS missions through to terminal controllers working with subordinate Army units. As relates to the air tasking cycle, Army preplanning input is normally coordinated through the BCE at the TACC- AF. In some areas, direct input from the Army component commander to the JTF commander is made but the BCE, through the TACC, is normally his representative. The initial input is a recommendation for air apportionment for subsequent operations, based on anticipated Army operations in the period covered and initial air support requirements in CAS and certain air interdiction. This recommendation will usually be integrated with the AFCC recommendation. The apportionment decision and guidance of the CJTF establishes percentages or priorities of effort for the TAF. As has been mentioned before, CJTF apportionment guidance may be very general and may not break out Army-requested portions of the air interdiction effort. If this is the case, Army- TAF negotiations establish a percentage of the air inter- diction effort projected for Army requested battlefield air interdiction (BAI).23 After percentages are agreed upon for CAS and BAI (and other tactical air support), the Army component commander is now aware of the approximate sorties available for the period addressed. Much like the MAGTF process, this portion of the cycle may start out as a daily operation, to support the normally daily ATO execution period, but over a period of time will probably result in the establishment of a periodic baseline set of percentages, with adjustments made as often as are required. The Army component ccommander generally then allocates most of his apportioned tactical air support sorties to subordinate commands. This allocation and suballocation may ripple down well into the component command structure. Tactical air support requests (TAR's) for the period are aligned with the sortie availabilities and the TACS elements at each of the levels is advised. These TAR'S are then used, of course, to develop the TAF's ATO. One further area needs to be mentioned. In the air interdiction category, Army input will normally be made as early in the process as possible and is made through an integrated "surveillance- reconnaissance-attack-assessment" process in which Army nominated air interdiction targets are prioritized.24 Those interdiction targets which have near term effect and influence on the operations of friendly land forces, while not in close proximity to them, are referred to as BAI and get targetted as the BAI allocation permits. This, essentially, is the applicable Army TACAIR C2 background. With the advent of the Army's airland battle concept in the past several years, and its emphasis on corps level operations and deep atack, there has been increasing controversy on tactical C2 with the Air Force. Command and control of operations well beyond the FLOT/FEBA has long been considered by the Air Force as its domain. While some further discussions will touch these issues, they will be limited to the perspectives of the paper. No attempt has been made to cover them all. Navy TACAIR C2 The Navy, of course, is the larger sister Service of the Marine Corps within the Department of the Navy. The Services are intimately related in their naval/amphibious functions and also in the aviation procurement and support areas. The Navy has a very substantial supporting air arm which is provided for in law. The Navy's JCS Pub 2 principal functions are: To organize, train, and equip Navy and Marine Corps forces for the conduct of prompt and sustained combat operations at sea, including operations of sea- based aircraft and land-based naval air components--specifically, forces to seek out and destroy enemy naval forces and to suppress enemy sea commerce, to gain and maintain general naval supremacy, to control vital sea areas and to protect vital sea lines of communication, to establish and maintain local superiority (including air)in an area of naval opera- tions, to seize and defend advanced naval bases, and to conduct much land and air operations as may be essential to the prosecution of a naval campaign. This paper will not examine Navy TACAIR C2 in any depth. There are several reasons for this. For one, the Navy C2 systems and apparatus are very analogous to those already discussed for the other Services. Its TACAIR command structure is somewhat simplified due to its usual consolidation within one or more fixed wing carrier battle groups (CVBG's). The CVBG's contain surface and subsurface ships and embarked carrier air wings. Navy doctrine provides for the support of joint task forces as either a part of the JTF (as its naval component) or through an "in support of" relationship. In either case, the Officer in Tactical Command (OTC) has overall responsibility for successfully accomplishing the mission of his force. TACAIR and C2 capabilities of his force are coordinated and integrated into the JTF without loss of operational control of any assets. The air defense and control assets of the naval force consist principally of innumerable sensors and missile systems aboard major combatant vessels, the Navy and Airborne Tactical Data Systems (NTDS and ATDS), the F-2C airborne radar system and TACAIR of the carrier air wing(s). The NTDS and ATDS are compatible with the Marine MACCS and Air Force TACS allowing tactical data sharing between components and, depending on the tactical situa- tion, will often enable the Navy to assume responsibility for air C2 of the seaward side of the JTF area of opera- tions. Navy TACAIR will be employed over land to support CATF/MAGTF amphibious operations and, subsequently, to support other JTF objectives as excess sortie availability permits. Although the tactical situation may often allow extensive integration of Navy anti-air warfare operations into the overall JTF air defense network, the Navy "treads very softly" when it comes to the integration of TACAIR in overland operations. Its TACAIR, of course, must be primarily concerned with fleet defense and with this in mind it cannot tolerate any loss of operational control. It will coordinate land targeting efforts, will participate in the air tasking cycle and will make excess sorties available to the JTF commander as possible. These comments are based on observations of the author and further research was not deemed necessary. Joint Task Force (JTF) TACAIR C2 This section will discuss the integration of the com- ponent service's TACAIR C2 apparatus under a typical joint task force command structure. The discussion will continue with the example force structure of previous sections and how they would normally operate together in accordance with current JCS publications. It will also look at the U.S. Central Command Operations SOP (R525-1)
