An Analysis Of The Command And Control And Integration Of Marine Air-Ground Task Force Tactical Fixed Wing Aviation In Sustained Joint Force Operations Ashore CSC 1985 SUBJECT AREA Aviation WAR SINCE 1945 SEMINAR AND SYMPOSIUM An Analysis of the Command and Control and Integration of Marine Air-Ground Tack Force Tactical Fixed Wing Aviation in Sustained Joint Force Operations Ashore LtCol W. Todd Frommelt, Jr., USMC 1 April 1985 Marine Corps Command and Staff College Marine Corps Development and Education Command Quantico, Virginia 22134 Abstract An Analysis of the Command and Control and Integration of Marine Air-Ground Task Force Tactical Fixed Wing Aviation in Sustained Joint Force Operations Ashore LtCol W. Todd Frommelt, Jr., USMC This paper is a discussion and analysis of the command and control (C2) of Marine Air-Ground Task Force (MAGTF) tactical fixed wing aviation (TACAIR) in sustained joint force land operations. The analysis examines background C2 information, the Commandant Marine Corps (CMC) White Letter 7-81 on the subject, and the problems associated with the joint service issues surrounding the C2 of MAGTF TACAIR when the MAGTF's substantive air combat element is opera- ting in an integrated joint air battle environment. The paper attempts to consolidate and clarify the C2 issues, discusses clarification to CMC guidance issued subsequent to the JCS "Omnibus" policy statement and proposes a Marine Corps/MAGTF Joint Interoperability of Tactical Command and Control Systems (JINTACCS) program implementatation of the "Omnibus" provisions. The paper does this in eight chapters. The first five chapters provide a rather extensive background on "Omnibus", air command historical perspectives, the Services' air command and control structures, further Service C2 issues and associated terminology problems. These reviews attempt to provide a reader with the C2 background on Service perspectives and considerations necessary to fully appreciate the very real difficulties encountered when a joint force commander attempts to establish a coordinated and integrated air campaign. Chapters Six and Seven review the "Omnibus" and pro- pose procedures to effectively implement the integration of MAGTF TACAIR into the joint force air campaign utilizing the soon to be approved JINTACCS air operations joint interface operating procedures and air tasking cycle messages. The final chapter presents conclusions and recommendations derived from the analysis. Annexes B and C offer clarified versions of the "Omnibus" statement and Operational Handbook 5-1.1, Command and Control of MAGTF TACAIR for consideration. The paper has been developed in response to my percep- tions of significant misunderstandings within the Corps and other Services of what the "Omnibus" represents. I hope it serves to clarify the issue and consolidate pertinent material for review. The paper's length and background material may be somewhat disconcerting. It is expected that a reader may use the table of contents to select those chapters which are of most interest and skip those which may contain only background with which he is familiar. TABLES OF CONTENTS PAGE PREFACE 1 CHAPTER ONE -- INTRODUCTION The Ominbus 12 Purpose and Scope 19 Terminology 21 Outline 22 CHAPTER TWO -- TACAIR C2 HISTORICAL PERSPECTIVES World War II 24 Korea 33 Vietnam 37 CHAPTER THREE -- BASIC TACAIR C2 BACKGROUND MAGTF TACAIR C2 46 Air Foce TACAIR C2 64 Army TACAIR C2 77 Navy TACAIR C2 84 Joint Task Force (JTF) TACAIR C2 86 CENTCOM TACAIR C2 Example 108 JINTACCS TACAIR C2 111 CHAPTER FOUR - FURTHER BACKGROUND The Push for "Functional Componency" and "Unity of Command" 130 Command Relationships 144 Applicable Issues Related to Avaiation Functions 147 Areas of Influence and Interest 152 CHAPTER FIVE -- TERMINOLOGY BACKGROUND TACAIR Command and Control Terminology 156 Air Mission Terminology 164 Omnibus Terminology 174 JINTACCS Terminology 179 PAGE CHAPTER SIX - OMNIBUS REEXAMINED The General Support Apportionment 182 Coordinating and Integrating MAGTF Direct Support 186 Command and Control and Communications Dependencies 188 Transition to Doctrine 190 CHAPTER SEVEN -- OMNIBUS IMPLEMENTATION AND JINTACCS JINTACCS Preplanned Air Tasking Cycle 193 Other Air Tasking Cycles 200 CHAPTER EIGHT -- CONCLUSIONS AND RECOMMENDATIONS Conclusions 204 Recommendations 209 ANNEXES: A -- Annotated Bibliography A-1-A-6 B -- Proposed Reworded Omnibus B-1 C -- Operational Handbook 5-1.1, Command and Control of USMC TACAIR C-1 APPENDIX 1. Extracts of MCDEC Draft Revision to OH 5-1.1 C-1-2- C-1-13 APPENDIX 2. Comments on OH 5-1.1 Draft Revision C-2-4- C-2-4 LIST OF FIGURES PAGE FIGURE 3-1. Typical MAGTF/ACE Composition 48 FIGURE 3-2. Example ACE Employment 53 FIGURE 3-3. Example TAF and ACF 69 FIGURE 3-4. Air Force TACS and MAGTF MACCS 73 FIGURE 3-5. Air Force - Army TACAIR C2 81 FIGURE 3-6. Example JTF Command 89 FIGURE 3-7. JCS Pub 12 Component Air Employment/Allocation Plan Message 97 FIGURE 3-8. JCS Pub 12 CJTF Sortie Allotment Message Example 99 FIGURL 3-9. JCS Pub 12 Sample "Common Air Tasking" 101 FIGURE 3-10. Example JCS Pub 12 Air Employment/Allocation Plan Message 103 FIGURE 3-11. Example JCS Pub 12 CJTF Sortie Allotment Message 104 FIGURE 3-12. Example JCS Pub 12 Cross-Force ATO: Navy to Air Force 106 FIGURE 3-13. JINTACCS TIDP Example AIRSUPREQ with SARTS 122 FIGURE 3-14. JINTACCS TIDP Example ALLOREQ with Partial SARTS 124 FIGURE 3-15. JINTACCS TIDP Example SORTIEALOT with Partial SARTS 125 FIGURE 3-16. JINTACCS TIDP Example REQCONF with Partial SARTS 126 FIGURE 3-17. JINTACCS TIDP Example REQSTATASK with Partial SARTS 127 PAGE FIGURE 4-1. MAGTP Employments in Sustained Land Operations 145 FIGURE 5-1. Marine Corps - Air Force Fixed Wing TACAIR Mission/Function Terminology 165 FIGURE 5-2. Fixed Wing TACAIR Functions by Nature of Support Provided 171 FIGURE 5-3. Graphic Presentation of Fixed Wing TACAIR Missions 173 FIGURE 6-1. Example CJTF Apportionment 184 FIGURE 7-1. Example CJTF Apportionment Guidance to MAGTF 194 FIGURE 7-2. Example MAGTF ALLOREQ 8ALLOCAT Set 195 FIGURL 7-3. Example MAGTF ALLOREQ 8JNTEXC Set 196 FIGURE 7-4. Example CJTF SORTIEALOT 8ALLOT Set Extract 198 PREFACE The command and control of Marine Corps tactical aviation assets when employed as an integral part of a MAGTF in sustained joint-service land operations has been the subject of decades-long controversy. The subject and related issues often drift somewhat from that central theme, but the basic thrust remains the command and control of MAGTF TACAIR. The same may be said of this paper. Its central theme and related discussions are directed at the command and control of Marine Air-Ground Task Force (MAGTF), tactical fixed wing aviation (TACAIR) in situations totally removed from amphibious operations -- sustained operations ashore. The Marine Corps does not particularly like employment in sustained land operations -- it's neither equipped, trained or doctrinally oriented for such combat. Since WWII, however, with limited Army assets (divisions) available, such employments have become reality in both conflict and contingency planning. In practical application, MAGTF employment with the Army and Air Force presents a theater commander with both a unique combat force and some unique integration requirements. I have found the topic of interest since my first exposure to it in 1981 when CMC White Letter 7-81 was promulgated. Commandant of the Marine Corps (CMC) White Letters promulgate guidance from the Commandant to all Marines on significant matters which he feels need elaboration. In March of 1981, the chiefs of all the Services promulgated a "JCS Policy Statement for the Command and Control of USMC TACAIR in Sustained Operations Ashore." This policy statement reflected a vigorously negotiated concensus on the issue and was very assuredly a statement which warranted White Letter guidance. The policy statement also became known as the "Omnibus". I'm not sure where that title came from -- and don't believe it matters -- but since it has become widely associated with the JCS policy statement and is a bit less cumbersome, I will use the word "Omnibus" to refer to the statement often. The Omnibus is essentially a compromise between the USAF and the USMC on command and control of a theater's or joint task force's MAGTF tactical fixed wing aviation when the MAGTF includes a substantive air combat element and is engaged in a sustained land campaign. The USAF, expecting to be the joint force's predominant air arm, wants command and control of all force air assets. The USMC views its organic air combat element as inseparable. Both positions are convincingly supportable -- and hence, the controversy is born. I distinctly remember reviewing the White Letter shortly after its distribution to the Corps. I can remember seeing it as a seemingly simple and reasonable arrangement for sharing and integrating MAGTF air assets in a joint task force environment in what seemed straight- forward and understandable terms. I also remember some startingly sharp comments from several of my senior officers directed towards those "x!:Z$ (expletives deleted) headquarters gentlemen who had "given away the farm" to the Air Force! Being relatively quick witted, I immediately recognized the need for caution in discussions concerning the Omnibus. "Not for me to worry" thought the Major on his way to a rather tiring-sounding job at MCTSSA (Marine Corps Tactical System Support Activity) to work on something called "interoperability" and JINTACCS (Joint Interoperability of Tactical Command and Control Systems.) Well, JINTACCS and interoperability turned out not only more challenging and interesting than that impression, but also to be at times intimately involved with Omnibus. This involvement with Omnibus through my activities with JINTACCS let me see both the Air Force and other Service perspectives as well as the Marine Corps'. I have gradually come to realize that what was promul- gated as a JCS policy statement representing an agreement between all Service chiefs on the issue of command and control of USMC TACAIR must be recognized as something far short of an "agreement" which has done far less than "resolve" the issue of the command and control of Marine TACAIR in sustained land operations. I have also become aware of a very prevalent lack of understanding within the Marine Corps' lower command echelons of what Omnibus meant and within the Air Force of the Marine Corps concept of MAGTF integrity, organization, and command and control. I changed courses in the development of this paper several times. In research, I was surprised to find little in writing about the Marine Corps or Air Force perspectives of what the Omnibus statement says. It seems the almost traditional Marine Corps-Air Force command and control dialogue (tactful wording, no?) has moved upwards or onwards to "the bigger and greater issues" (although related intimately) of functional versus service componency within Unified Commands. For a time, then, I thought that should be the focus of my thesis. As it turns out, far more eloquent and conversant authors have churned out a plethora of point papers, memoranda and studies on this very important and very current topic. The Advanced Amphibious Study Group Background Paper, Service vs. Functional Components, 23 July 1982, is a thorough and well written analysis. After uncovering and digesting all these materials, I would have felt somewhat foolish continuing in a redundant effort or similar direction. While these studies and point papers are all relevant to the Omnibus and are necessary responses to a very real issue confronting the Marine Corps and Air Force (and the Army and Navy to a lesser degree), my concern became that unless we somewhow returned our focus to the Omnibus, any mutual (albeit limited, perhaps even flawed) understanding and agreement that we may have in Omnibus on the command and control of USMC TACAIR in sustained operations ashore would be lost. In early 1981, the Marine Corps and Air Force came to an understanding on the issue. I expect it was the result of hard negotiations and perceived compromises on both sides. I will show in the paper that the agreement is flawed. I will also propose that it can be fixed and that it can be implemented. Perhaps if the Air Force knew more clearly how we interpreted the statement (I suspect we should also work on ensuring that we in the Corps know how we interpret it) and how we propose to implement our interpretation, their pressure for fuctional componency in unified and joint commands would be eased. If that's too presumptuous then let's at least get our focus back to the Omnibus -- to clarify its intent, promote its understanding, offer some corrections and develop effective implementation procedures. That's what this paper is all about. A quick review of the bibliography would show that my sources include a wide variety of Services doctrinal publications, JCS Publications, air power books, and innumerable papers and staff writings. I am thankful to the many Marine and Air Force officers whose less formal verbal contributions to my research assisted me greatly and yet may not he formally recognized with attribution. My sources also include previous personal efforts in this area while at MCTSSA and are in several places annotated as MCTSSA or MCDEC formal papers. I comment in that regard when major extracts are incorporated in the thesis. I realize that its size may be intimidating. Remember that I (prehaps foolishly) felt it appropriate to consolidate substantive background information in the initial chapters. A reader may choose to skip such background material and still expect to have covered in analysis my major conclu- sions. I hope the writing of this paper proves of value to the Corps in this somewhat complex and politicized area of concern. CHAPTER ONE Introduction The Marine Corps plans to go into future combat as a Marine Air-Ground Task Force (MAGTF) composed of a MAGTF command element, a ground combat element, an aviation combat element and a combat service support element. The MAGTF is sized and organized for a specific mission with its elements drawn from resources residing in the peacetime structures ot the Fleet Marine Forces (FMF's), divisions, air wings and fleet service support groups. Sizing of the MAGTF is generally guided by the mission and determination of the ground combat element to be employed. When built around a battalion landing team, the aviation combat element is normally a composite helicopter squadron occasionally strengthened by OV-10 or AV-8 aircraft. This size MAGTF is termed a Marine Amphibious Unit (MAU) and is capable of relatively limited combat operations such as non-combatant personnel evacuations. It may also be considered the forward deployed element of a larger MAGTF. The larger MAGTF's, Marine Amphibious Brigades (MAB's) and Forces (MAF's) are organized around ground combat elements of one or more regiments or divisions, and aviation combat elements of composite group or wing size respectively. As the size of these MAGTF's expands, they are capable of an increasingly wider range of combat effort from amphibious assault to sustained operations ashore. When a large MAB or MAF sized MAGTF is employed, it will include an aviation combat element task organized to provide all the functions of Marine aviation from offensive air support to the command and control of its assets. This aviation combat element (ACE), while highly capable of independent offensive action, is inherently tasked as an organic, integral supporting air component of the MAGTF's air-ground team.1 The concept of Marine aviation as an organic supporting arm of the MAGTF is a pervasive element of Marine Corps doctrine, has been developed through decades of experience and is provided tor in U.S. law. The organizational and doctrinal precepts which establish the bonds within MAGTF air-ground teams provide its commander an integrated combined arms force of enhanced flexibility, responsiveness and power.2 While the Marine Corps views its combat organizations as synergistic by virtue of the tightly integrated effec- tiveness of its combined arms, the inherent flexibility of tactical fixed wing aviation make such assets appear quite separabie to other commanders with other missions and interests in mind. This is especially the case when the MAGTF is considered for employment in a joint service sustained land campaign. Envision, if you will, a European, Southeast Asian or Korean theater of operations involving a division and wing sized MAGTF, an Army corps or more of several divisions (each) and a tactical (U.S.) air force of several wings. All Services agree on the require- ment for unity of command in such a scenario and have gone to great lengths to promote and prepare for implementing command relationships. Undoubtedly the most complete documentation of this premse is found in JCS Publication 2 (hereafter JCS Pub 2), Unified Action Armed Forces (UNAAF). Does it seem consistent with the principle of unity of command to employ a small (relatively!) MAGTF, with its supporting air combat assets ranging deeping into the enemy's rear areas and attacking second and third echelon targets, as an independent entity-- a total force within a force? The theater commander would probably need justi- fication to do so. The Air Force component commander would logically be interested in absorbing at least the MAGTF TACAIR and command and control assets into his command. The Army component commander would logically be interested in absorbing the MAGTF ground combat element into his command. The synergistic effect we the Marine Corps like to attribute to our air-ground team may apply as well to the additive effects these Air Force and Army component commanders, and the theater commander, might hope to achieve by organizing theater forces into single land and air components. Such "functional" organization, while having obvious command advantages, is at the expense of MAGTF integrity and is an anathema to the Marine Corps. The Corps trains, organizes and functions as a combined arms team. Its ground combat elements lack the mobility and firepower of similarly sized Army elements, and this requires a dependence on its organic air power for most effective firepower and force projection. Additionally, the expeditionary basis of the Marine Corps in law requires this type of force structure. This introduction, however, is not the place to provide continued justification for the MAGTF integrity argument. Let it be sufficient for now to say that the Marine Corps view is that the integrated MAGTF in the sustained land combat scenario will better serve the theater commander than will the additive impact of parcel- ing its ground and air combat elements to the Army and Air Force components. The paper will go into more detail on this issued by reviewing the "functional" componency issue in Chapter 4. The Marine Corps is not inflexible regarding its doctrinal stance on MAGTF integrity. While adamantly resisting efforts and proposals to sever the MAGTF combat elements, it does see the potential inefficiency of employing a MAGTFs tactical fixed wing aviation and air command and control elements as completely independent and MAGTF self-serving assets within a theater or joint task force environment. It has historically cooperated with, supported, and even had its MAGTF's under the operational control of a variety of unified force commanders. World War II, Korea and Vietnam each saw MAGTF's employed in concert with the other Services. In each period, the command and control of organic Marine TACAIR was exercised in a variety of organizational command structures. What the Marine Corps generally has perceived as losses of control over organic TACAIR and diminished responsiveness to Marine requirements,3 the Air Force has perceived as necessary, incomplete and grudgingly won assumptions of more centralized command and control of theater tactical aviation assets. In November 1979, the issue was raised (again) formally and soon became elevated to the JCS and Heads of Service level. In March of 1981, the JCS Policy Statement (popularly known as the "Omnibus") was promul- gated. The "Omnibus" Statement POLICY FOR COMMAND AND CONTROL OF USMC TACAIR IN SUSTAINED OPERATIONS ASHORE The Marine Air-Ground Task Force (MAGTF) commander will retain operational control of his organic air assets. The primary mission of the MAGTF air combat element is the support of the MAGTF ground element. During joint operations, the MAGTF air assets will normally be in support of the MAGTF mission. The MAGTF commander will make sorties available to the joint force commander, for tasking through his air component commander, for air defense, long-range interdiction, and long-range reconnais- sance. Sorties in excess of MAGTF direct support require- ments will be provided to the joint force commander for tasking through the air component commander for the support of other components of the JTF, or of the JTF as a whole. Nothing herein shall infringe on the authority of the Theater or joint force commander, in the exercise of operational control, to assign missions, redirect efforts, and direct coordination among his subordinate commanders to insure unity of effort in accomplishment of his overall mission, or to maintain integrity of the force, as precribed in JCS Pub II, "Unified Action Armed Forces (UNAAF)."4 The Omnibus statement represents an agreement by the Chiefs of Service as a guiding principle for the employment of Marine Corps TACAIR in sustained combat operations ashore. The Omnibus was promulgated to Marines via CMC White Letter 7-81 of 29 June 1981. The White Letter emphasized the importance of the policy statement and offered background and elaboration on its substance. More importantly, it stressed that only through adherence to the basic precepts of MAGTF employment, the Omnibus agreement included -- in training, in joint/combined operations planing activities and in our proper articulaton of these precepts -- can the effectiveness of the MAGTF in combat be realized. 5 Let's take a look, then, at the Omnibus "agreement" and evaluate what it says, starting with the title. It obviously deals with the "command and control" of MAGTF "TACAIR" assets, and is restricted to "sustained operations ashore" applications. JCS Pub 1 defines the phrase "command and control" as "The exercise of authority and direction by a properly designated commander over assigned forces in the accomplishment of the mission...." "TACAIR" is not JCS Pub 1 defined but the White Letter provides that "Marine TACAIR is construed in this paper as tactical fixed wing aircraft...." "Sustained operations ashore" is undefined but can reasonably be interpreted as restricting application to MAGTF employments in sustained land combat succeeding, or in other than, amphibious operations. The first two Omnibus sentences affirm agreement on the organizational integrity of the MAGTF in that the MAGTF commander will retain operational control of his air assets and that those air assets' primary mission is the support of the MAGTF. "Operational control" is defined in JCS Pub 1 as synonymous with operational command: Those functions of command involving the composition of subordinate forces, the assignment of tasks, the designation of objectives and the administrative direc- tion necessary to accomplish the mission... 6 It further relates that it is exercised through the established chain of command: The next two sentences will be evaluated in detail throughout the paper, principally in Chapter 6, The Omnibus Reexamined. For this introduction, let it suffice to explain that there are two categories of sorties that the MAGTF commander will "make available" or "provide" to the joins force commander, "for tacking through his air component commander" in "support of" the JTF as a whole or its components. The first category is unnamed but includes sorties for "air defense, long-range interdiction, and long-range reconnaissance." Air defense is defined in JCS Pub 1 as: air defense--All defensive measures de- signed to destroy attacking enemy aircraft or missiles in the earth's envelope of atmosphere, or to nullify or reduce the effectiveness of such attack. See also active air defense; passive air defense.7 Air defense sorties in the Marine Corps comprise a defen- sive portion of its "antiair warfare (AAW) operations."8 If such sorties were provided to the JTF commander for tasking by the Air Force, the Air Force mission tasking category would be "defensive counter-air (DCA)," a portion of their counter-air effort to achieve air superiority.9 I will not even try at this point to evaluate the terms "long-range interdiction" and "long-range reconnaissance." While interdiction and reconnaissance are to varying degrees determinable, adding the phrase "long-range" to them completely muddles the picture. In any event, this first category of MAGTF provided sorties establishes a foundation of MAGTF support of the JTF in quasi-functional aviation mission areas which share important character- istics. While they would be conducted by MAGTF TACAIR whether in a uni-service or joint service environment, they would not generally be executed in "direct support" of the MAGTF ground combat element. There certainly are exceptions to this and the omission of the offensive portion of AAW is another anomaly -- but, generally, these are mission areas in which TACAIR provides "general" as opposed to "direct" support of the MAGTF. They are, in other terms, missions conducted whose effects the ground combat element commander may not see or appreciate (much) but whose conduct is nevertheless essential. In the joint service operational environment, they are missions also which are conducted against opposition forces and other targets which often cannot be assessed as directly threatening to one part of the joint force and not another. Is an enemy air strike engaged by MAGTF fighters or missiles coming at the MAGTF or enroute to an Army, Air Force or JTF target? If we knew, should we let it go by to be engaged by someone else? Certainly not. Air defense for the JTF should be provided as an integrated umbrella for the JTF as a whole. By the same reasoning, is the opposing armor concentration at a "long range" beyond the JTF ground elements of interest or threatening only to one component or another? That would indeed be hard to say. "Long-range" interdiction and reconnaissance should be certrally managed for the benefit of the JTF as a whole and their centralized coordination (minimally) is essential for mission deconflictions and to prelude redundancy. The problems in terminology aside, this category of sorties provided by the MAGTF commander, in accordance with the Omnibus, is designed to formalize the MAGTF commitment to participate in these designated aviation functions when the JTF commander assumes such responsibility for the JTF as a whole. If the JTF commander elects to run a force-wide air defense campaign, centrally controlled by an air component commander, the MAGTF will make its air defense sorties available for that commander's tasking rather than conducting an independent sector air defense. The same premise is extended to the long-range interdiction and reconnaissance campaigns. The Omnibus commits the MAGTF to participation in joint force air campaigns executed with "pooled" joint force air assets. The MAGTF receives general" support from its sortie contributions because the functional campaigns addressed are conducted for the JTF as a whole. By providing sorties for tasking, operational control of its contributed air assets is maintained by the MAGTF. The second category of sorties provided to the JTF commander by the MAGTF is termed "excess." The provision of excess sorties to the JTF commander by all air capable Service components has long been an uncontested premise of joint force operations. Idle and uncommitted force assets must be made available to support other JTF components which may be experiencing requirements shortages. Another practical and realistic justification of this support for the JTF is the implied future return of such support rendered. Air Force excess used to support MAGTF CAS requirements on one day makes it realistically easier for the MAGTF to provide "excess" CAS support to help the Air Force in its support of the Army the next day. Navy excess" bombers provided the Air Force one day may make it easier for the Air Force to support Navy shortages some other time. There are, however, problems with the term and the subtleties of implementing the sharing of "excess" sorties. Again, this introduction will stay superficial. The MAGTF air planning and tacking process may identify sorties available in excess of MAGTF requirements and such sorties will be made available to the JTF commander. It should be considered a MAGTF requirement, however, to provide air defense and long-range interdiction and reconnaissance to either itself or to the JTF as discussed earlier. Excess sorties, then, must be determined as availability beyond those sorties required in direct support of the MAGTF and those sorties provided to the JTF "umbrella" campaigns. The White Letter's "...in excess of MAGTF dorect support: requirements... " phraseology is troublesome.10 More detailed dicussion will appear in Chapter 5. These distinctive categories of sorties, those pro- vided to general support air campaigns of the JTF as a whole and those provided as MAGTF excess, are very significant contributions to the joint force air effort. They are distinctive in other terms as well. The MAGTF expects equivalent "general" support in return for its sorties provided to the air defense and long-range inter- diction and reconnaissance campaigns; the air defense "umbrella" would cover MAGTF airspace and MAGTF nominated targets for interdiction and reconnaissance would receive equitable prioritization. Such is not the case with excess sorties. They are given up for tasking freely with only an implied expectation of future returned support from other components when they generate "excess" themselves. To confuse the two categories of sorties provided is unaccept- able and may have potentially harmful implications. The Omnibus concludes with a reaffirmation of the authority of the theater or joint force commander to exercise "operational control" of his force as defined previously in this chapter. This operational control authority includes functions relating to the composition and direction of subordinate forces necessary to accomplish the mission. Since the Omnibus, I can find but one reference to the employment of a MAGTF within a JTF (exercise or operation/contingency plan) which provided for MAGTF TACAIR sortie contributions of the scope provided for in the policy statement. And that's fine. The theater or joint force commander has the authority to organize operations as he sees appropriate. Without exercise, however, the policy will prove difficult to implement. In the one exercise, Gallant Knight 82, the MAGTF ACE found use of JTF air tasking procedures in compliance with the Omnibus "totally unworkable."11 We obviously need practice -- and a clear understanding of the Omnibus provisions. Purpose and Scope The Omnibus is flawed in many ways, making it hard to understand and difficult to implement. There is currently very concerted pressure from the Air Force and to some extent from the Army to realign JCS Pub 2, UNAAF, to promote "functional componency" and the severing of the MAGTF ground and air components -- which would, by the way, eliminate the need for the Omnibus. The Joint Interoper- ability of Tactical Command and Control Systems (JINTACCS) program is approaching an expected implementation date of September 1986. It includes air tasking messages and interface iperating procedures which will potentially provide a major overhaul of current JCS common air tasking guidance and procedures. These three factors have reduced Service impetus to refine the Omnibus and its implied agreements, and to resolve implementation problems. Their focus is now more towards the confrontation over the service versus functional componency issue and the approaching JINTACCS implementation. This paper will hopefully serve to resurface the Omnibus and explain its intent, illuminate its many problem areas, discuss at least potential corrections and propose usable implementation procedures using JINTACCS air tasking standards. What this paper will not do is to dwell on inter- service positions of doctrine, command and control or terminology. To deal with these areas fully would take forever. My emphasis is going to be the JCS policy state- ment for command and control of USMC TACAIR in sustained operations ashore; the Omnibus, its meanings, problems and proposed corrections and implementation procedures. Terminology As has been discussed already, the Omnibus -- indeed all interservice efforts -- are troubled and complicated due to the Services' use of non-standard terminology. There have been standardization conferences and studies for decades but essentially the problems remain. The tradi- tional alignments by missions et the Marine Corps and Navy and of the Air Force and Army have promoted standardization amongst the pairings, but differences still exist even there. The terminology problems which shroud the Omnibus will be considered in greater detail in succeeding sections of the paper, particularly in Chapter 5, Terminology Background. This paper attempts to address the Omnibus problems, including those associated with language, in a logical sequence. It would be impossible, however, to consolidate the terminology problem discussions any sooner than Chapter 5. The reader, then, is asked to take them as they come and wait until that chapter for a more consoli- dated review. Priority will, of course, be given to JCS Publication 1 definitions. The Omnibus language and Service peculiar terminology will be source identified. Outline What I intend to do in the remainder of this paper is consolidate background information on TACAIR command and control (C2) -- touching on both the Service and joint force systems, organizations and operating procedures -- and subsequently illuminating peripheral issues and topics which have a direct bearing on Service perceptions and principles in their conduct of TACAIR C2. The paper will consolidate and compare Service, mainly Air Force and Marine Corps, terminology as it applies to TACAIR, the Omnibus and JINTACCS, and then reexamine the Omnibus with all of this background information in mind. Before concluding, I intend also to outline a JINTACCS and JTF implementation proposal. JINTACCS will rewrite substantial existing joint interface operating procedures when imple- mented in 1986. This implementation proposal may prompt more timely Marine Corps' preparation for that evolution. Chapter 2 TACAIR C2 Historical Perspectives Chapter 3 Basic TACAIR C2 Background Chapter 4 Further Background -- other TACAIR C2 issues Chapter 5 Terminology Background -- TACAIR, Omnibus, and JINTACCS Chapter 6 Omnibus Reexamined Chapter 7 JINTACCS and Omnibus-- implementation proposal Chapter 8 Conclusions and Recommendations CHAPTER ONE Notes 1FMFM 0-1, Marine Air-Ground Task Force (Wash- ington, D.C.: Hdqtrs USMC, 31 Aug 79), pp. 1-1 through 2-23. 2CMC White Letter 7-81, Command and Control of USMC TACAIR In Sustained Operations Ashore (Washington, D.C.: Hdqtrs USMC, 29 Jan 81), p. 1. 3CMC White Letter 7-81, p. 1, enclosure (2). 4CMC White Letter 7-81, enclosure (1). 5CMC White Letter 7-81, p. 1. 6JCS Pub 1, DOD Dictionary of Military and Associated Terms (Washington, D.C.: JCS, 1 Apr 84), p. 263. 7JCS Pub 1, p. 14. 8FMFM 5-5, Antiair Warfare (Washington, D.C.: Hdqtrs USMC, 14 Jul 80), p. 44. 9JCS Pub 1, p. 93. 10CMC White Letter 7-81, p. 5, enclosure (2). 11CG Third MAW message 240039Z Feb 82, Joint Readiness Exercise Gallant Knight 82, After Action Report Concerning RDJTF Common Air Taskin Procedures. CHAPTER TWO TACAIR C2 - Historical Perspectives Before getting into much detail on current command and control structures, systems and issues, a short review of aviation command and control history will be of benefit. This chapter will look at three major conflicts, World War Two, Korea and Vietnam, and the aviation C2 structures and relationships through which theater commanders employed their multi-service aviation resources. Keep in mind that one major area of influence pertinent to command and control structures and relationships is not directly addressed -- that of the personalities and convictions of the commanders involved. This influence on C2 is substantial, perhaps even paramount. To examine it, however, would require volumes of research. Instead, the reader is asked to keep its influence in mind as this and succeeding chapters are reviewed. The paper will occasionally touch on personalities of commanders, but much like political/Service parochialisms, they are not subjected to analysis. World War Two World War Two provides innumerable examples of variety in joint and combined forces command structures. Its combat zones included maritime theaters such as most of the Pacific campaigns, continental theaters as in Central Europe and innumerable combinations of the two. Experi- ences gained in this war provided much of the impetus for the National Security Act of 1947 which reorganized the defense establishment completely. It not only brought into being a separate and distinct Department of the Air Force in legal status equal to the Navy and Army as departments, but also established unique roles and missions for the Services and established, under a joint chiefs of staff, unified commands in strategic areas. The North African theater of operations is very note- worthy in an examination of tactical command and control. General Eisenhower, serving as the Commander-in-Chief (CINC), Allied Forces Northwest Africa, commanded a force of American, French, and British Corps. As established in Army Field Manual 1-5 of the time, doctrine for the use of air power at the start of the campaign provided that air support was attached to, and directed by, the supported ground force commander. Army formations, therefore, had supporting air support commands while no overall theater commander for air was provided.1 Airpower was imple- mented to support these independent ground operations and as a result there was virtually no effort to apply theater-wide air campaign strategies. The German Air force was initially able to confront these separate air support commands piecemeal and decisively maintained air superiority. The ineffectiveness of allied air was recognized quickly as was the major factor in its weakness -- fragmented command. A reorganization of all allied forces in the broad Mediterranean theater was accomplished at the Casablanca Conference in January 1943. It estab- lished Allied Naval, Ground and Air CINC's for the entire Mediterranean theater, with Air Officers subordinate to the Mediterranean Air Command for Northwest Africa, the Middle East and Malta. The Air Officer/Commander of the Northern African Air Force had four subordinate commands: the Strategic Air Force, the Tactical Air Force, Coastal Air Force and Troop Carrier Command. A further look at the Tactical Air Force reveals that four separate air forces retained identity under this reorganization. Three of these, the American XII Air Support Command, the British Desert Air Force and the Royal Air Force 242 Group, each were assigned close support of specified ground forces.2 The fourth, the Tactical Bomber Force, was concerned with the conduct of a mission equivalent to today's inter- diction. This centralized air command structure facili- tated the application of air power and its inherent advantage of speed, range and flexibility. And while the success of the Allies in North Africa was in no small part influenced by this more efficient air forces organization, there were problems in the integration and reduction of support proferred to the land and naval forces from this integrated air command. For instance, in E. Morison's The Two-Ocean War: A Shoot History of the U.S. Navy in the Second World War, the premise is made that Mediterranean Air Command and Northwest African Air Forces set mission priorities which resulted in virtually no tactical close support for the allied amphibious and airborne landings at the start of the Sicily invasion.3 General Patton often complained of the low priority given to the close support of his Army by air. The "interdiction" mission was quickly becoming the glamor stock of the Air Corps with a very high apportionment priority. Shifting to the Normandy invasion, the command struc- ture was the subject of long and hard arguments and nego- tiations at all levels of Service and national command. In general, the most difficult TACAIR related areas of concern were control of the strategic bomber forces and the "functional compontent commander" issues. Two strategic bomber commands existed for the invasion -- separate and distinct commands, one RAF and one U.S. -- under the temporary operational direction of the Allied Supreme Commander (Eisenhower). Neither were ever under the Allied tactical air commander, who himself commanded two tactical air forces, one RAF and one U.S. Strategic bomber forces were withdrawn from Eisenhower's command soon after the success of the assault. After the assault and consolidation phases of Over- lord, there were further command structure arguments. The resulting structure evolved essentially into three pairs of geographically oriented Army groups and their supporting tactical air forces throughout all of Europe -- each of the air commands under Eisenhower and his deputy, British Air Chief Marshal Teder. It is of interest to note that; 1) the strategic bomber commands were not in this chain of command and, 2) the allies retained a separate "air-ground team," the First Allied Airborne Army, throughout the remainder of the war in Europe. This was withheld as a theater-wide force of opportunity or strategic reserve.4 The Normandy invasion command structure included an air (tactical) "component" commander, Allied Expeditionary Air Forces, over RAF and U.S. Tactical Air Forces. After the invasion, Eisenhower decided to act as overall land forces commander as well as Supreme Commander. While this was principally a political decision, it and the avail- ability of his air-oriented deputy resulted in the elimination of the Allied Expeditionary Air Force command and any vestages of an air component commander. American airmen at the time accepted the loss gladly because it served to reduce the pressure on high command levels to secure strategic bomber assets for tactical support operations. The major strategic bombing offensive had become very important to the Army Air Corps. They saw this very publicized campaign as a very impressive influence in their efforts to ensure that the end of the war would also bring birth to a separtate Air Force. It was also, of course, important to them because of their belief in the effectiveness of the strategic mission in contributing to the successful conclusion of the war. Although not a Marine Corps vs. Air Force confronta- tion, the African and European TACAIR C2 experiences continue today to provide fuel to Service perspectives on joint force command structures. The same can be said of the war in the Pacific. The Pacific offensive of the allies was characterized by as many command structures as ther were campaigns in the progress of "island hopping" operations. In general, they necessarily reflected the principles of maritime/naval task organization to meet the particular circumstances of the mission. In the Solomons, the command structure reflected both Service and "functional" organization. The Pacific Ocean Area theater commander, Admiral Nimitz had in Admiral Halsey, Commander, South Pacific (COMSOPAC), the equivalent of a sub-unified command. Under COMSOPAC were a variety of forces including an Amphibious Force Task Force, (composed of Marine, Navy and Army units), other Naval forces, Army Forces South Pacific, South Pacific Aircraft (land based air), and a South Pacific Island Bases command. In Guadalcanal, the principle landing force was the 1st Marine Division. All aviation units ashore, Marine, Army, Navy and Allied, were under the Division's commander. Land based air from the Army and Navy were under a Navy task force command and carrier-based and amphibious force aviation ashore were under their respective force commanders who were commanded in turn by the Expeditionary Force task force commander. Thus aviation resources were employed in three separate contingents.5 In the Gilbert Islands campaign against Tarawa and Makin, the command structure was task organized for the dual objective islands. Air continued to be organized for the tactical situation and to optimize the advantages of land and sea-basing. In the Marianas, air was organized in support of the campaign in three commands, land based air, a fast carrier task force in general support of the operation, and a carrier support group providing air support to the landing force. The Army contingent was organized into the landing force as a whole and did not have Service component representation at amphibious task force or fleet level. This and subsequent operations in the South Pacific theater saw a variety of command structures, all under the ultimate command of the CINC Pacific Fleet/Pacific Ocean Areas. In the Southwest Pacific theater, with General MacArthur as commander, the command organization reflected a more complex approach. At the Leyte campaigns there were three separate Army components and an Allied Air Forces command -- with Naval air under Allied Naval Forces, Southwest Pacific. Naval carrier groups were employed "in support of" landing forces while Marine land-based air was organized under the Fifth Air Force within the Allied Air Forces command. In the Central Pacific, the operation at Okingawa was characterized by an Army commander of the landing force, Tenth Army -- including the Marine III Amphibious Corps -- and a Marine commander of its organic tactical air force. In Southeast Asia the U.S., British and Chinese forces endured command structures which were "by no means militarily or organizationally optimal... established to support unalterable political realities in the theather."6 This is mentioned to highlight yet another influence on command structures, the political aspect. One need only review the current NATO organization for command to see that it is still an influence today. World War II, then, provides historical precedence for just about any command structure a proponent might desire. The command of air was centralized and decentralized at a wide variety of command levels. Joint air forces were organized as Service components, geographic forces and functional elements. Command structures were influenced by factors as abstract as politics and commander personalities and as concrete as assets available, objectives and opposition forces. Collaboration, coordination, mutual support, various "in support of" relationships and total integration of air forces were used to bring available air power to bear on the enemy. Unity of command was found to be indispensible -- but at which level of the command structure it should reside was not demonstrated decisively. Certainly some organizations worked better than others, just as some air commanders apportioned and employed their assets better than others and just as some air staffs planned their various air campaigns better than others. One further item had also become clear. Air power had become a decisive combat arm of the commander and to organize the country's principle air power command as a supporting organic component of the Army was untenable. As separatist air power promoters such as Mitchell, Douhet and Blunt had been espousing for years, the Air Force needed separate Service status and the United States was ready to agree. In 1947, the U.S. defense estabishment was reorganized under the National Security Act of 1947. establishing three Service departments under a Department of Defense. The Departments of the Army, Navy (to include the Marine Corps as a separate Service within the Depart- ment) and the Air Force were assigned unique responbili- ties and functions for operations, missions and doctrines. The Act (as amended) further established under the new JCS "unified commands in strategic areas." These were the evolutionary successors of World War II theater commands.7 Korea In Korea command and control again became a major problem.8 Under the CINC, United Nations Command, were the U.S. "Unified" Far East Command (FECOM) and the Allies Command. Under the FECOM came the Far East Air Force (FEAF), the Naval Forces Far East (NAVFE) and Far East Ground Force Command. This latter command was not initally activated as the CINC, General MacArthur, commanded FECOM and Army ground forces. Under the Ground Force Command, the Eighth Army and X Corps operated as adjacent commands untile late in 1950 when the Eighth Army absorded the X Corps and Genral Ridgewar was given command of all ground operations in Korea.9 While these command relationships reflected both regional and functional organization, it was not a distinct "functional" command structure and this concerned the Air Force. Despite FEAF operational control of Marine air after the Inchon operation by its Fifth Air Force, NAVFE air operated "in support of" instead of under USAF desired operational control. The operational control argument, and an all important targeting jurisdiction question, make the Korean TACAIR C2 question revelant to this background. General Stratomeyer, FEAF commander, maintained that the principle of centralized control of air power in a theater applied to naval aviation. NAVFE opposed placing his air under FEAF for many reasons. It is interesting to note the effects of ambigious terminology in this instance, however, as they reappear in several forms throughout this paper. Stratemeyer, of course, requested that FECOM grant FEAF operaitional control of naval air. The FECOM response was to place all aircraft in support of the FEAF mission under FEAF operational control (the over-land campaign) and all aircraft in support of the NAVFE mission under NAVFE control. That seeined quite reasonable, especially since there was no naval mission to speak of. The FECOM guidance didn't stop there however. The FECOM directive also stated that when both FEAF and NAVFL were assigned to a mission in Korea, FEAF was delegated FECOM's prerogative for "coordination control". FEAF wanted this interpreted as operational control while NAVFE interpreted it as an "in support of" relationship.10 Despite this interpreta- tion difference, by mid-1952 most of the coordination of air operations was concentrated in the Joint Operations Center (JOC) of 5th Air Force. This JOC had good NAVFE representation, as was also the case in the FEAF Targetting Committee. The targeting issue is one which can be constructively introduced at this point. In joint operations, target prioritization for attack and/or reconnaissance can be a very political and tactically significant concern for all commanders. This is especially so for the ground forces commanders who are concerned first about the apportionment of total air to the close air support function and then to the prioritization of targets they have nominated in the deep strike and reconnaissance mission categories, versus those generated by other commanders. In Korea, coordina- tion of the deep strike/interdiction and reconnaissance efforts of the several air forces was attempted through the establishment of a joint targeting office. A General Head- quarters Targeting Selection Committee was created within the FECOM headquarters, with representation from both FEAF and NAVFE. FEAF rankled under this arrangement feeling that this was a functional usurption of an air component commander responsibility. While the FECOM Targeting Selection Committee continued throughout the war, FEAF's own targeting committee was gradually staffed with senior 5th Air Force and NAVFE representatives and essentially fed the FECOM commander targeting recommendations for approval. The essential points are: 1) that a central targeting agency is required for joint operations and, 2) that, regardless of whether it resides at the JTF or air component level, it must have access to all and the best intelligence available, must have equitable representation from all supported elements of the task force, and must be responsive to both the users and the JTF commander's guidance. Other Marine Corps concerns in the Korean C2 arena were immediate close air support (CAS) responsiveness -- often sluggish due mostly to the staggering communications and staffing congestion into a very large, centralized operations center -- and a continued unswerving Air Force insistence on an extremely resource consuming interdiction campaign, often at the expense of CAS.11 To a ground commander or the commander of an air-ground team, troops in contact requesting support are of utmost import -- and when your organic air is in theater, its simply intolerable to have it's support not under your control. Korea, then, despite the defense establishment reorganization and Service mission clarification, demonstrated that command and control of TACAIR was still a sensitive, if not problematic, area of concern for the unified commander. Command structures were distinctly simpler and more workable -- perhaps as much due to the uniqueness of the combat zone and the limited forces employed than as to applications of WWII experiences and "lessons learned" or the new Department of Defense. Vietnam Vietnam saw command and control of TACAIR revived as a Service issue of significant importance. The rather long course of the conflict and relatively controlled intensity of the air war served to make C2 structure and relation- ships adaptable but also still resistant to change. The unified command structure of the theather in its entirety was complex and cumbersome throughout the war, making it understandably hard to simplify that of its subordinate elements. Many factors contributed to this overall complexity -- divergent strategic perspectives of commanders, severe differences in Service rivalries and conflicting doctrines. It is not necessary to cover all these areas, however, as much of the pertinent material has been developed previously in the WWII or Korean discussions of this chapter. TACAIR C2 issues in Vietnam, however, do add to this historical perspective in several areas. U.S. forces were introduced into the Vietnam theater over an extended period of time, starting as early as 1950 with a small Military Advisory Group (MAG) working with and through the French. The role of assigned Air Force and Army advisors changed significantly after the French withdrawal in 1955. The next seven years saw increased involvement and commitment of both Services to the advisory and assistance roles and in 1962 the command structure was reorganized to reflect it. The Military Assistance Command, Vietnam (MACV) was established as a sub-unified command under CINCPAC, with subordinate Air Force and Army commands of the 2nd Air Division Advanced Echelon (of the 13th Air Force, Philippines) and U.S. Army Support Group, Vietnam, respectively. This sub-unified command concept was not favored by all the Services. The Army and Air Force, instead, strongly favored creation of a unified command for the Southeast Asian theater, reporting directly to the JCS. CINCPAC, of course, was (and remains) a Navy commander, while the MACV staff was in all likelihood going to be heavily ground or Army weighted. The Service rivalry lines were apparent and as the MACV staff developed, the Air Force was allotted the J-2 and J-5 positions, the Army J-1, J-3 and J-4 and the Marine Corps the head of the Combat Operations Center and the Chief of Staff.12 As argued by the Army, MACV leaned heavily towards the premise that Vietnam was a counterinsurgency theater, primarily a land war for which the Army held principal responsibility. The CINC's of Pacific air forces (CINCPACAF) and naval forces (CINCPACFLT), in turn, wanted to minimize force contributions to MACV. Ostensibly this would enable them to keep their main elements available for the greater Southeast Asian contingencies while they could still provide forces to MACV "in support of" as the situation dictated. As Laos air operations intensified, the Air Force build up in Thailand proceeded rapidly. As 1965 approached, the theater had a Military Assistance Command, Thailand (MACTHAI) in operation, predominantly major elements of the 13th Air Force, and a Navy Task Force (TF-77) in the Gulf of Tonkin. All elements remained under a 7,000 mile distant single commander, CINCPAC, with major air elements in each of the subordinate commands, COMUSMACV, CINCPACAF, CINCPACFLT and COMUSMACTHAI. Eventually the situation was further complicated with the support of B-52's of the Strategic Air Command. The Air Force had peculiar internal command structure problems that do not require elaboration here. These did, however, further complicate the coordination of the "outside of South Vietnam" interdiction campaign. Marine participation in this campaign was relatively minor (A-6 operations in Laos and Cambodia) and was fully integrated into 7th Air Force (the outgrowth of tho 2nd Air Division under MACV) operations. The "outside of South Vietnam" interdiction campaign involved strikes within North Vietnam, Laos and, to a lesser degree, Cambodia, with the 7th Air Force and the Navy's TF-77 (carrier air wings) the principle players. While CINCPACAF, of course, wanted control of carrier air, traditional Service arguments eventually resulted in the PACAF/7th Air Force being delegated, instead, "coordinating authority", expressly not including Air Force operational control of Navy aircraft, for the air campaign in North Vietnam. What resulted was the negotiation of a "route package" control arrangement. These geographic areas of responsibility were assigned based on target density and importance, component air resources available and range limitations of carrier air. It was not an ideal arrange- ment but rather a compromise approach to a sensitive command and control issue further influenced by the Navy's range and carrier operating limitations. Such geographic responsibilities made it difficult if not impossible to adjust an interdiction effort as tactical and operational situations varied. This "coordinating authority" was compromised into a geographic separation of target areas as his principle means of "coordinating" the joint air effort and was at a serious disadvantage in the application of total available air power. Returning to "in-country" operations, MACV in 1965- 1966 was organized into two Army Field Forces, the III Marine Amphibious Force (III MAF), the 7th Air Force and several other commands. The U.S. Army, Vietnam, Command handled administration and logistics for all Army units in-country. The structure was a combination of regional and functional elements. It is interesting to note that until April 1966, the CG, III MAF was the "Naval Component Commander" under COMUSMACV. When the command U.S. Naval Forces, Vietnam was created, III MAF was simultaneously made a uniservice force under the operational control of COMUSMACV. Until early 1968, III MAF not only had operational control of all Marine combat elements but of significant Army units as well. Marine air was organic and was commanded and directed by III MAF in support of I Corps (northern South Vietnam) forces. "Excess" sorties were provided to the 7th Air Force. In February 1968, COMUSMACV reorganized the force structure in I Corps in anticipation of the Tet offensive. This reorganization also included the decision to give the Air Operations Deputy, MACV, responsibility for "single management" of fixed wing aircraft in South Vietnam. While the Air Force interpreted this as operational control, the Marine Corps viewed "mission direction," the phrase used in the MACV directive, as something certainly less than operational control. In 1970, a revised MACV directive stated that mission direction was "the authority delegated to one commander (i.e., Deputy COMUSMACV for Air) to assign specific air tasks to another commander (e.g., CG III MAF) on a periodic basis as implementation of a basic mission previously assigned by a superior commander (COMUSMACV).13 There were further changes in the command structures as U.S. forces were phased out of country, but this "mission direction" and "single management" relation- ship existed until the phase-out was complete... with the Air Force claiming "operational control" and the Marine Corps saying "no" but complying with 7th Air Force "mission direction. Enough historical perspective. In the three periods of conflict examined, air command and control structures and relationships have varied signficantly. They have evolved throughout each of the conflicts as a result of changes in the tactical sitiuation and force compositions, unique aspects of the battle theater and a myriad of other reasons. Some generalizations can certainly be made. The U.S. Air Force is a proponent of centralized command. It consistently promotes and even fights vehemently for a single air commander in "command" of all theater air assets, including its own strategic assets of SAC. The U.S. Navy has not allowed its air assets to be employed in other than an "in support of" relationship to the overall JTF air campaign. It is enthusiastically supportive of joint force operations but will not release its aviation arm to Air Force control. The Marine Corps, as generally the smallest combat element in a joint operation, often finds itself in a tenuous position -- with its organic air assets convetted by the Air Force and its ground element looked upon as a small maneuver elements of the much larger U.S. ground force. The Marine Corps has been flexible, adapting to many varied command relationships, and has generally succeeded in its efforts to retain MAGTF unity. It has held tenaciously to its "operational control" over MAGTF organic air. As was mentioned early in this chapter, the personalities and preferences of commanders and their subordinates and their often parochial Service politics, while not herein emphasized, have and will continue to play a major role in influencing TACAIR C2. CHAPTER TWO Notes 1William Moymer, Air Power in Three Wars (Wash- ington, DC: Dept of Air Force, 1978), p. 40. 2Moymer, p. 42. 3U.S.M.C. Advanced Amphibious Study Group Back- ground Paper (AASGBP) Service vs. Functional Components. (Washington, DC: Hdqtrs USMC, 1982), p. 3-2. 4USMC AASGBP, p. 3-9. 5USMC AASGBP, p. 3-1,2. 6USMC AASGBP, p. 3-11. 7Roser, H.B., LtCol, USMC, Point Paper 781-84 (Washington, DC: Hdqtrs USMC, 1984), p. 3, Tab F. 8Moymer, Air Power in Three Wars, p. 52. 9USMC AASGBP, p. 3-11. 10Moymer, Air Power in Three Wars, p. 58. 11Roser, H.G., LtCol, USMC, Point Paper 781-84, p. 3-13. 12Moymer, Air Power in Three Wars, p. 70. 13USMC AASGBP, 3-17. CHAPTER THREE Basic TACAIR C2 Background This chapter will examine the TACAIR command and control (C2) apparatus maintained by the Services, both inter and intra-service, and to a lesser extent that of the Unified Command/Joint Task Force (JTF) structure. It will also introduce the JINTACCS program's interface operating procedures -- now in the final stages of development and certification. The examination is not going to be in depth. It will, instead, touch on the basic structures, systems and philosophies of the Services and the higher level command structures under which they can operate. It stays principally at the tactical theater and JTF levels and does not address strategic or national command and control. The emphasis on the tactical C2 will intention- ally be on the Omnibus mission areas -- antiair warfare (USN/USMC) or counter air (USAF) and offensive air support. As the following sections are considered, two major influences on command and control should be kept in mind; the personalities and preferences of commanders in the C2 structures (already mentioned), and the inherent uniqueness of every conceivable conflict in which they find themselves engaged. These two influences have and will consistently make generalizations arduous, result in innumerable variations in command and control structures and procedures, and provide very reasonable justification for procedural and structural flexibility, adaptability and, where written guidance is concerned, even non- specificity (if not ambiguity!). The authority of a commander to organize his command as he deems appropriate is acknowledged and provided for throughout the Department of Defense. MAGTF TACAIR C2 The U.S. Marine Corps is a Service under the Depart- ment of the Navy separate yet closely tied to the U.S. Navy (Service). Title 10 U.S. Code, paragraph 5013, states in part that: The Marine Corps should be organized, trained and equipped to provide fleet Marine forces of combined arms, together with supporting air components, for service with the fleet in the seizure or defense of advanced naval bases and for the conduct of such land operations as may be essential to the prosecution of a naval campaign. In addition,...such other duties as the President may direct. However, these addi- tional duties may not detract from or interfere with the operation for which the Marine Corps is primarily organized. Marine Corps policy is that Fleet Marine Forces will normally be employed as integrated air-ground teams, task organized for specific missions. These task organizations are called Marine Air-Ground Task Forces (MAGTF's) and consist of command, ground combat, aviation combat and combat service support (CSS) elements. Both the aviation and CSS elements are distinctly supporting elements of the MAGTF's ground combat element. There are three basic types of MAGTF's; Marine Amphibious Units (MAU's), Brigades (MAB's) and Forces (MAF's) generally built around infantry battalion, regiment and division-sized landing teams. Further background was provided in Chapter 1. The MAB sized MAGTF is capable of amphibious and sustained land operations of limited scope while the MAF or larger MAB sized MAGTF is capable of a full range of combat opera- tions. These larger MAGTF's carry with them organic aviation and command and control resources to provide all the required functions of Marine aviation; air reconnais- sance, antiair warfare, assault support, oftensive air support, electronic warfare and control of aircraft and missiles. There is normally only one aviation combat element (ACE) in a MAGTF and it contains aviation command and control, combat support and combat service support units as assigned in its task organization. Essentially, the remainder of this section will deal only with the ACE command and control apparatus as it applies to fixed wing TACAIR. It will consider this ACE in support of a full MAF to realistically discuss a Marine aircraft wing (MAW) sized air combat element and its full spectrum of aviation functional capabilities. The air combat element of a Marine Amphibious Force (division or larger ground combat element) is essentially a Marine aircraft wing -- of which the Marine Corps has four (one reserve). A wing-sized ACE employed in combat will have squadrons of fighter, attack, air refueler/transport, and observation fixed wing aircraft, detachments of recon- naissance and electronic warfare aircraft, a variety of helicopter squadrons, an air control group of communica- tions, C2, and air defense missile squadrons/batteries, a headquarters squadron and a support group. The ACE would be commanded by the wing commanding general who in combat operations usually becomes the Tactical Air Commander or TAC of the MAGTF. For simplicity, he is referred to subsequently as the TAC. The TAC is directly responsible to the MAGTF commander for the ACE's support of the MAGTF. Click here to view image This wing-sized ACE would be task organized in accord- ance with its mission and would likely include over 200 fixed wing aircraft and helicopters. The Air Control Group would include a Tactical Air Command Center (TACC), perhaps two Tactical Air Operations Centers (TAOC's), a Direct Air Support Center (DASC), a battalion of IHAWK missiles, Stinger missiles and other aviation C2 elements. ACE tactical operations are supervised and managed by the Tactical Air Commander through the TACC, the senior command and control agency. The TACC functions: ...as the senior MAGTF air command and control agency and to establish the operational command post of the Marine Air Command and Control Systems (MACCS) from which the TAC can super- vise, direct, control, and coordinate all MAGTF tactical air operations.1 The TACC has a myriad of tasks and duties in this role but more detail will only be provided as required to support the discussions in the remainder of the paper. Essentially though, the TACC is the "hub" of the many spokes in the wheel of an extensive Marine Air Command and Control System (MACCS). To facilitate the discussions that follow, this paper will consider the TACC and ACE command element as a fully integrated ACE C2 center. Not all wing commanders may choose to do so. Subordinate to the TACC are the agencies TAOC and DASC. The TAOC(s) of the MACCS are designed to control an air defense sector(s), enroute air traffic and air defense operations, including both aircraft and missiles. It is the primary source of radar surveillance information to the MACCS while both the TACC and TAOC(s) are capable of air track and C2 data exchange with other tactical data systems, including those of each of the U.S. services and NATO. These tactical data information link (TADIL) exchanges are an essential capability of the MACCS, expanding its surveillance and control capacity dramatically. The role of the TAOC is: ...to detect, identify and control the inter- cepts of hostile aircraft and missiles and to provide navigational assistance to friendly aircraft. Additionally, the TAOC functions as the alternate TACC/TADC when directed.2 The DASC is the principle air control agency respon- sible for the conduct of tactical operations directly supporting ground forces of the MAGTF. It operates in a decentralized mode of operations but is directly supervised by the TACC. It coordinates close air support strikes, assault support, and air reconnaissance missions which require coordination with fire support means; it dissemi- nates verbal air track information to Stinger units and coordinates the distribution of direct air support air assets assigned by the TACC to terminal control agencies. It works closely with the Fire Support Coordination Center (FSCC) of the GCE and is often co-located with that agency. It does not currently employ organic sensors (radar) or receive data link information and depends entirely on voice position reports and other communications to control assets assigned. Its role is: ...to provide the means of processing direct air support requests, to coordinate aircraft employment with other supporting arms, and to control assigned aircraft and unassigned air- craft transiting their area of control.3 These are the major MACCS agencies through which the ACE TAC exercises command and control of his aviation assets. An example of their employment will be helpful in understanding much of the succeeding chapter's material. The MAGTF is designed for amphibious operations. With the limited amphibious lift available it would, however, take far too long to realistically put together an amphibious task force for a MAF sized operation. In this example, then, a forward deployed MAU is used to occupy/ seize a lightly defended port city and its medium size airport. Amphibious shipping is gathered at U.S. ports to embark another one "plus" MAB. While Navy carrier battle group (CVBG) air and naval gunfire support the MAU ashore, another "stripped" MAB is flown into the city's airport and marries up with maritime prepositioned equipment being offloaded at the port. The Marine aviation combat element's fixed wing assets flight ferry to a friendly air facility some 200 miles away while the MAGTF's helicopter assets, are built up through strategic airlift at the local airfield. Air Force and Army assets are simultaneously preparing for deployment and strategic airlift starts bringing them to friendly facilities adjacent to the theater. For the initial week, however, it is a Navy- Marine Corps amphibious operation. Within the Amphibious Objective Area (AOA), the MAGTF commander is subordinate to the Commander, Amphibious Task Force (CATF) and is also wearing the Commander, Landing Force (CLF) hat. The CATF has operational control of the MAGTF as a whole, it being a part of the ATF, while the MAGTF commander exercises command over the MAGTF elements. Initially, control of MAGTF air is conducted through the Navy TACC afloat. As Marine C2 elements are established, control authority incrementally passes ashore. The first element ashore is normally the DASC and it soon begins controlling direct air support to the GCE. In this case, Navy C2 agencies would be handing off close air support (CAS), assault support and other direct air support to the DASC as these aircraft approach the MAGTF's beachhead. As soon as possible, the TACC, TAOC and IHAWK elements are established ashore. The TACC and its subordinate MACCS agencies remain subordinate to the TACC (Navy) afloat until they are fully prepared to assume their responsibilities. The TACC (Marine) ashore is termed a Tactical Air Direction Center (TADC) until it assumes control of the landward sector of the AOA, and essentially is "monitoring" the air operations of the Navy TACC afloat. The TAOC and IHAWK elements are integrated by voice and data link into the amphibious airspace control and air defense networks as soon as they're operational. For simplicity, assume that the TACC (Marine) is operational and assumes control of the landward sector about the time the ACE's fixed wing squadrons become operational at the distant friendly base. Figure 3-2 depicts, then, a MAB (reinforced) sized MAGTF controlling a force beach head (FBH) within an amphibious objective area whose over-water airspace is controlled by the Navy (TADC) and the over-land airspace is controlled by the MAGTF (TACC). Click here to view image At this stage in the operation, both Navy and Marine Corps fixed wing aviation support is being provided to the MAGTF and controlled by the TACC once "feet dry." While Marine air support flows directly into and out of the TACC, Navy air from the CVBG comes to the TACC via the CATF -- although shortcuts may be authorized and/or established. The TACC has now assumed responsibilities for the C2 of all Marine air operations in support of the MAGTF, ranging from deep air support (DAS) to close air support, and all the other functions of Marine aviation. The Navy is protecting the ATF shipping and seaward flank and supports the landing force/MAGTF as requested. The TACC operates two major sections -- one for plans and one for current operations and is manned by an integrated crew of the wing headquarters and MACG. The planning section is developing expected aviation requirements from one to several days in advance and developing in increased detail the ACE's daily air tasking (or fragmentary) order (ATO). The operations section is coordinating and managing the current period's air opera- tions, executing the ATO, directing air defense operations and making operational decisions to meet the changing tactical situation. The TACC's planning or air tasking process is of particular importance to this paper. The air tasking process can be separated into two distinct repeditive cycles, preplanned and immediate. The preplanned air tasking cycle involves the preparation of an ATO for a specific future period, usually of a day's duration. It, of course, meets air support requirements foreseen in advance. The immediate air tasking cycle involves the rapid reaction to, planning, adjustment for and fulfilling of air support requirements which develop on short notice. It will often involve sacrificing or delaying preplanned operations to fill higher priority "immediate" air support requirements. The emphasis within the paper will be with the preplanned air tasking process. Although a MAGTF commander and TAC may organize the process as they see fit, the following discussion describes a realistic procession of the planning involved. It is substantially derived from OH 5-3, Tasking USMC Fixed Wing Aviation. The preplanned air tasking process begins with guidance from the commander. At this point in the example, it may be the CATF, MAGTF commander or TAC, most probably all three. TACC planners naturally hope for general, "mission oriented" guidance but it may, of course, be as detailed as the commander(s) desire. This commander's guidance is normally called "apportionment." The term, however, can apply to several levels of command, depending on how specific a senior commander is in his apportionment order. Apportionment--The determination and assignment of the total expected effort by percentage and/or by priority that should be devoted to the various air operations and/or geographic areas for a given period of time.4 It may take the form of a statement as general as "continue to maintain air superiority and interdict enemy third echelon assembly areas as possible" or be as specific as "apportion air effort as follows: 40% anti-air warfare, 40% close air support, 20% deep air support." While this preplanned air tasking process is underway, the TACC is accumulating air support requirements and support requests from several supported elements. Since each day's planning process will usually take place over several preceding days, the TACC planners are also in various stages of preplanning for several air tasking cycles simultaneously. The next stage of preplanning involves the translation of apportionment guidance into total numbers of sorties by aircraft type available. This is termed allocation. allocation--The translation of the apportionment into total numbers of sorties by aircraft type avail- able for each operation/task.5 This allocation phase is probably the most complex and demanding portion of the air tasking process. To realize the full potential and effectiveness of available air resources, and to simultaneously maximize the ACE's con- tribution to the overall MAGTF objective, requires that aviation tasks be prioritized and integrated into the MAGTF commander's concepts of operations. Each of the aviation functions are complementary yet always are in competition for the use of limited assets. Planners use three basic sets of information; the numbers and types of available resources, the array of targets and operational require- ments suitable for air operations, and the MAGTF commander's guidance on threat and air support priorities.6 The TACC planners are of necessity mated with an extensive intelligence apparatus drawing information from within the MAGTF and external agencies to provide and evaluate the opposition. This threat analysis and the targeting evolution provide the foundation for combat power require- ments determination and cannot be overemphasized. Combat power requirements are converted to ground and air combat support requirements and the air support portion is ready for further refining. This refinement begins with air tasking prioritization. The requirements to achieve and maintain air superi- ority are always considered the highest priority. That may seem unreasonable to many ground commanders, but the simple fact is that no other air-ground operation can be conducted effectively without the air superiority umbrella overhead. "Dominance in the air battle...that permits the conduct of operations...without prohibitive interference..."7 is paramount and the sorties required to achieve and maintain the required degree of air superiority are essentially skimmed off the top" of ACE asset availability. The Marine aviation function which includes the air superiority requirement is antiair warfare (AAW), further categorized into offensive and defensive AAW operations. Offensive AAW generally consists of striking into an enemy's rear areas to destroy his aircraft, air facilities and air defenses before they are employed against the MAGTF. This is potentially the most efficient means of achieving air superiority but is also quite costly in terms of sorties required and potential attrition. The more enemy aircraft damaged on the ground and the longer his airfields are inoperable, the smaller his offensive air effort will be. Defensive AAW, also termed "air defense", is concerned with minimizing the enemy air offensive through aircraft and missile interception (active), and camouflage, hardened defensive positions and dispersion (passive). The TACC planners not only allocate into the AAW function but must also plan the offensie and defensive mix. The TAC presents his AAW plan and the remaining sortie availability to the MAGTF commander and the GCE commander at an apportionment conference or through some other expedient means as directed. The GCE commander presents his CAS and other support requirements planning. After review, the MAGTF commander approves or modifies the AAW plan and in so doing also detemines the sorties available for the remaining fixed wing air effort. This remainder is essentially dedicated to the offensive air support (OAS) operations of CAS and DAS (close in meaning to the more common term interdiction). The rest of the apportionment conference deals with the apportionment and allocation of assets into these mission areas. Determining the mix of sorties within OAS is at least as difficult as the AAW mix determination. CAS requirements of the GCE may well be critical -- but some dozens of hours before-hand, they still are just educated estimates. DAS requirements are generated by both the TAC and GCE commanders and often higher commanders as well. DAS is potentially a more efficient manner to engage opposing forces, similar to the offensive AAW effort, with strikes against massed concentrations of enemy assets prior to their tactical deployment. The TAC and GCE commanders, staffs and/or representatives weigh the costs and benefits involved in a variety of air employment options. They consider the impact of ACE surges to provide more sorties, the timing of DAS strikes, possible adjustments to GCE operations, the availability of external air support, and the reassignment of other fire support assets. Their deliberations deter- mine the best possible OAS (CAS/DAS) mix. After this conference, the GCE commander knows the CAS effort available and which of his nominated targets for DAS will be struck. An apportionment agreement such as this may well be used for several succeeding tasking cycles with only mission details changing daily. The ACE leaves the conference knowing his allocation of sorties by aircraft type and number to AAW, CAS, and DAS, and those DAS targets selected for strike. For the GCE commander, his next task is to allot available CAS sorties to fulfill requirements of his subordinate ground units and to forward the selected or tentatively "approved" CAS air support requests to the ACE. When necessary requests exceed the allocation, further adjusting is attempted by both elements. The ACE can also request additional support from outside the MAGTF. The ACE TACC planners commence roughing the ATO and wait on the consolidated GCE air support request. Once the air support requests are received, external MAGTF (e.g. Navy) air support is integrated, and the support require- ments and allocation refined, the planners produce what has now become the ATO. Once published and distributed it is passed to the TACC operations section for execution during the period covered. The ATO serves several purposes; it tasks the ACE's operational groups and squadrons, is used by various control agencies to coordinate their activities, confirms the GCE (or other supported unit) requests and provides mission details for other sorties provided in support of the MAGTF from other force components, in the example, the Navy's CVBG. In this portion of the paper, external air support is touched only lightly. It will be covered in greater detail later in the chapter. For now, assume that the TAC would probably come to the apportionment conference with the MAGTF and GCE commanders with at least a general idea of what external support will be available. While the commanders can consider such support, they will not know specific availabilities until sometime during the day prior to the tasking period. Before leaving the MAGTF air tasking process two - further items need be examined; the OAS apportionment for the MAGTF, and the term allotment. Air support in the Marine Corps is of two categories, preplanned and immediate. Immediate air missions are those for which no requirement was foreseen in advance but, due to the threat posed or importance and fleeting nature of the target, must be engaged rapidly, most often by divert- ing preplanned missions. Preplanned missions are those for which requirements were foreseen in advance and which allow for detailed mission coordination, planning and integration into the supported unit's operations. In the CAS category, they are further categorized as scheduled or on-call. Preplanned scheduled missions are assigned complete mission details in the ATO to include specified targets and target times. Preplanned on-call missions are assigned many mission details, but due to the anticipated fluidity of battle, one or more mission details are withheld, usually including target time and specific target location. Such missions are placed on ground or air alert status "on-call" for certain periods of time. The distinction between preplanned on-call missions in execution and "immediate" missions is often hazy. If the GCE commander or the TAC desire, they may put aircraft in alert status for "immediate" contingencies, in addition to those preplanned on-call missions requested by the GCE. Given the mobility current potential opposing forces may present, the majority of preplanned missions may have to be "on-call". This is applicable to the paper in that CAS and other OAS requests are a major element of the "direct support" an ACE provides to its MAGTF. It is easy to see that between preplanned scheduled and on-call missions and a reserve for potential "immediate" requirements beyond those preplanned, planners can obligate major portions of available sorties. TACC planners must weigh the reduced availability and effective- ness of all such alert sorties against the flexibility for contingencies gained when allocating aircraft to alerts. The term allotment is used internally to the MAGTF by the GCE commander in his distribution of CAS and other OAS sorties amongst his subordinate units. It must remain distinct from the higher headquarters use of the term in the JCS Pub 1 context: allotment--The temporary change of assignment of tactical air forces between subordinate commands. The authority to allot is vested in the commander having operational command. For instance, a joint task force commander may allot the use of several Air Force component sorties to the MAGTF to fill a MAGTF air support request. Allotment at the joint task force (JTF) or unified command level will most often take this form and is a part of the process termed common air, or cross-force, tasking. Before discussing JTF TACAIR C2 and common air tasking, however, a quick look at Air Force, Navy and Army TACAIR C2 is appropriate. Air Force TACAIR C2 The United States Air Force is a separate Service component of the Department of Defense established by the National Security Act of 1947 and amendments "...to perform prompt and sustained offensive and defensive air opera- tions." The primary functions of the Air Force (JCS Pub 2, paragraph 20402) as apply to this paper include the gaining and maintenance of general air supremacy, the defeat of enemy air forces, the control of vital air areas, the establishment of local air superiority and the furnishing of close combat air support to the Army, to include tactical reconnaissance and interdiction of enemy land power and communications.8 Air Force missions as apply to this paper include: counter air (CA), air interdiction (AI), and close air support (CAS). These are extracted from Air Force Manual (AFM) 1-1, Functions and Basic Doctrine of the United States Air Force. The central beliefs of the Air Force for employing aerospace forces (air power) to wage war (again from AFM 1-1) are: 1) employ aerospace power as an indivisible entity based on objectives, threats, and opportunities (p 2-10) 2) conduct simultaneous strategic and tactical actions (p 2-11) 3) gain control of the aerospace environment (p 2-11) 4) attack an enemy's warfighting potential (p 2-13) 5) consider both offensive and defensive action (p 2-15) 6) exploit the psychological impact of aerospace power (p 2-17) 7) develop a coherent pattern for employing forces (p 2-18) 8) establish one authority for air defense and airspace control (p 2-20) 9) command, control, communications and intelligence (p 2-20) Inherent in these central beliefs are the Air Force's premises for an all-encompassing unity of command, centralized control and decentralized execution, and the critical importance of the counter-air and air interdiction campaigns for air superiority and strikes against an opponent's warfighting potential. Some further quotes from AFM 1-1 highlight these premises: Unity of command, combined with common doctrine, obtains unity of effort by the coordinated action of all forces towards a common goal. While coordination may be attained by cooperation, it is best achieve by giving a single commander full authority.9 Control of the aerospace environ- ment gives commanders the freedom to conduct successful attacks which can neutralize or destroy an enemy's warfighting potential.10 ...an air commander must consider ... the enemy, the air actions that will most clearly deny enemy objectives, and the needs and requirements of friendly surface forces.11 While the urgency of enemy actions may require direct attacks against forces in contact, efficient use of air forces should emphasize attack in depth upon those targets that deny the enemy the time and space to employ forces effectively.12 Although battlefield situations may interrupt this plan of attack, air and surface commanders must remain committed to their coordinated actions and must not allow the full impact of aerospace power to be diverted away from the main objective.13 Through the process of taking these actions, an air commander has specific authorities and responsibilities. As a specified air commander, he makes apportionment decisions on where the overall weight of effort will go. As an air component commander, he makes apportionment recommendations.14 As a critical element of the interde- pendent land-naval-aerospace team, aerospace power can be the decisive force in warfare.15 One may surmise from these and other such statements that the Air Force as a Service is very enamored with what it feels are its primary roles in theater tactical warfare -- air defense and air interdiction -- and that it further desires command authority over all tactical aviation assets in a theater to be vested in a single air commander. It is, of course, committed and dedicated to providing close air support as well as to the land forces, but such support may easily be viewed as a distraction or degrading influence on its main campaigns of counter air and air interdiction. Whether or not these are valid perceptions is not too important. That they may exist as perceptions of the other Services or their components is the relevant point. Anyhow, such premises set the Air Force apart from MAGTF air combat element TACAIR -- and from the air elements of the Army and Navy as well. MAGTF TACAIR supports the MAGTF as an organic subordinate element. Every mission it normally flies is in direct or general support of the MAGTF. Unlike the ACE, the Air Force often has its own independent missions and objectives within the theater. It may develop and conduct at least major portions of its counter-air and especially its air inter- diction campaigns with little consideration of a particular land force's objectives. This is mentioned to provide the reader some distinctions in command and control philosophy between the Air Force and the Marine Corps -- not to say that such is wrong. Once past these philosophy differ- ences, however, the command and control structures and systems employed are remarkably similar. The Air Force has several major air commands which organizationally contain tactical air assets. They would normally be employed tactically under the existing unified command structure as numbered air forces. In a theater of operations such as Europe, there may, for example, be three or four numbered air forces established under the Air Forces, Europe, command. These air forces would, in turn, be composed of several wings each with several squadrons of aircraft. Wings are usually functionally organized with fighter (including attack), reconnaissance, airlift or strategic assets assigned. For a Marine Corps comparison, the Air Force wing is similar to a Marine group with aircraft squadrons assigned. The numbered air force, then, is somewhat similar to the Marine Corps wing. Although air forces are flexibly sized, a numbered air force operating in a combat theater would probably be significantly larger than a MAGTF ACE in regards to fixed wing tactical air- craft. To facilitate further discussions in this and subsequent chapters, the following ACE and Tactical Air Force (TAF) structures will be used: click here to view image Admittedly, both the TAF and ACE are rather large. The intent is to portray the potential relative numbers of TACAIR assets rather than necessarily realistic theater components. The ACE brings with it a command and control apparatus which had already bean discussed. The TAF has very similar C2 apparatus. One major difference is that where continuing missions dictate, such as in Korea and Europe, numbered air forces (TAF's) and their supporting C2 apparatus are already in place and operating. Although not as expeditionary as the Marine Corps MACCS, the Air Force Tactical Air Control System, TACS, is also capable of strategic mobility. In the example continued through this paper, the Air Force TACCS will be considered employed with a joint task force of one of the unified commands -- for instance Central Command. The Air Force component of this example JTF is the tactical air force depicted in Figure 3-3. Within the JTF command structure, this TAF's commander is then the Air Force Component Commander (AFCC). He may wear other hats but for now this will be his title. The TAF headquarters (TAFHQ) element does not contain its own tactical opera- tions center. Like the ACE, the TAF/AFCC utilizes his TACS organization and equipment to plan, direct, control and coordinate tactical air operations. The major agencies of a deployed TACS are discussed below. The Air Force TACS discussion should begin with its Tactical Air Control Center (TACC). The TACC is the heart and senior agency of the TACS. Although the TAFHQ is distinct, its AFCC uses the TACC as his operations center. It provides the commander information handling capability necessary for the centralized control of assigned air resources, decentralized execution of operations, and all required coordination and integration of operations internal and external to the Air Force component. Despite the "control" center terminology, its role in the TACS parallels closing that of the MACCS and its TACC, a "command" center. To preclude confusing the two agencies, when there may be a question as to which is being referred to, the Air Force TACC will be denoted as TACC-AF and the Marine TACC, the TACC-M. The TACC-AF has several principal subordinate agencies through which it authorizes decentralized execution of air operations. The Combat Reporting Center (CRC) directs within its area of responsibility air defense operations, provides aircraft guidance or monitoring for both offensive and defensive missions, may relay mission changes to airborne aircraft and coordinates control of missions with other elements of the TACS as required. It is the primary element concerned with the decentralized execution of air defense and airspace control and is very similar in role to the MACCS TAOC. Subordinate to the CRC are one or more Combat Reporting Posts (CRP's) and, subordinate to them, Forward Air Control Party (FACP) elements. These CRP's and FACP's are supervised by the CRC and provide extensions to its radar surveillance and control capabilities. A CRC might normally be supported by two CRP's, each with two or more FACP's. The TACS will also employ one or more Air Support Operations Centers (ASOC's) subordinate to its TACC to coordinate and direct tactical air operations in support of ground forces. Normally one ASOC is employed for each Army corps supported and ASOC's work closely with their respective Corps Tactical Operation Centers (CTOC's). The ASOC is, of course, very similar in function to the MACCS DASC. In fact it has only been in the past several years that the Air Force has transitioned to the ASOC termi- nology. As in the MAGTF the ASOC/DASC is the principal coordinator and director of air support provided the ground element. The TACS has many more agencies, systems and equip- ments. The E-3A Sentry, for instance, is an airborne warning and control system which not only extends radar surveillance but can also function as an airborne TACC or CRC it required. The Airborne Battlefield Command and Control Center (ABCCC) is an airborne management and communications element used as an extension of the combat operations section of the TACC. The TACC also deals with its operating wings via wing operations centers (WOC's) -- similar but far more sophisticated (equipment) than she MAGTF ACE's aircraft group headquarters. So although the Air Force TACS is more extensive, elaborate and in some ways more sophisticated than the MACCS, the C2 apparatus is far more similar than different, as reference to the below figure suggests. Click here to view image Internal to the TACC-AF are similar parallels. The TACC is made up of three major divisions; plans, intelli- gence and operations. As in the TACC-M, the TACC-AF Combat Plans Division recommends force allocation and develops and issues the Air Tasking Order. It, of course, does so with some sophisticated computer assistance, the Computer- Assisted Forces Management System (CAFMS). (Someday we'll get help too!) The Intelligence Division both supports TACC plans with threat assessments collection management and analysis, and TACC operations as a focal point for time perishable intelligence collection and reactions recom- mendations. The TACC-AF Combat Operations Divison supervises the detailed execution of daily air operations, through its subordinate TACS elements. In regards to the air tasking cycle and the processes used to distribute sorties from apportionment guidance into air missions, the TACC-AF and its TAF commander produce an ATO much like the MAGTF's ACE, although on a much larger scale. The basic steps of apportionment, allocation, allotment and ATO production are the same. Some of the major differences have been touched on previously. First, the TAF will normally be the principal air capable component of the JTF and will have componenet status equal to the Navy and Army components and, in some command structures, the MAGTF. It has its own JTF missions and, as concerns TACAIR, is normally responsible for JTF air defense and the air interdiction campaign. It will also normally be assigned to support of the Army component for close support air requirements. This is, of course, a major difference and certainly justifies TAF emphasis on its air defense and interdiction missions as well as its support relationship with the Army. Its air defense and interdiction campaigns provide "general support" to the Army and the rest of the JTF and, while the interdiction campaign will be coordinated to various degrees with the JTF land forces, it is principally planned by the TAFHQ in response to the JTF commander's guidance. One can surmise that the JTF commander would develop this guidance with advice from each of his subordinate commanders. The fact remains that this sets Air Force air tasking cycle planning well apart from that of the ACE -- whose total purpose is doctrinally the support of the MAGTF, and, more to the point, the GCE's missions and scheme of maneuver. This principal command orientation difference also provides a second major difference in the air tasking cycle, the interaction between the Air Force planners and the supported Army planners. Remember in the ACE and GCE planning, the ACE skims air defense requirements "off the top" of available assets/sorties. What TACAIR remaining is then negotiated, essentially, by the ACE and GCE commanders into CAS and DAS -- but in both cases with the objectives being support of the GCE. That's, of course, simplistic, but close enough to use for reference. Over at the TAFHQ, however, the planners work vary closely with the expected and eventual JTF commander's apportionment guidance and, beyond that, its "close support" relationship with the Army. If the apportionment guidance is specific, it may in effect specify by percentage of effort the sortie support provided to CAS. If it's not, then the Army commander is now in the position of the "supported" commander and must negotiate his allocation. Again, the JTF commander's apportionment guidance is influenced by preliminary recommendations from all of his subordinate commanders. It can also be assumed, however, that the Air Force component recommendations is weighed heavily. JCS Pub 2 (para 30278) gives the supporting force commander substantial latitude in weighing the requested level of support desired. No transfer of command or operational control is effected and the commander of the supporting force ascertains the supported forces' requirements and takes such action to fulfill them as is within his capabilities, consistent with the priorities and requirements of other assigned tasks.16 It should also be noted that recent negotiations between the Air Force and Army have resulted in a "Joint Service Agreement on Joint Attack of the Second Echelon (J-SAK)". This agreement formally recognizes Army influence on a portion of the air interdiction campaign termed battlefield air interdiction which will be discussed in latter sections of this paper. The Air Force-Army relationship, like that of the Navy-Marine Corps, is not simply "in support of". There is a lot of tradition, history, and "joint" service doctrine between each of the pairings which goes far beyond the relationship of supporting/supported services. As it applies to the tasking processes, however, the relationship remains far removed from that of the MAGTF's GCE and its organic, supporting air arm, the ACE. The relationship can be looked at further after a discussion of the Army TACAIR C2. Army TACAIR C2 The Army is the Service component of the Department of the Army which has the primary (applicable) function to organize, train, and equip Army forces for the conduct of prompt and sustained combat operations on land -- specifically, forces to defeat enemy land forces and to seize, occupy and defond land area.17 As is the case with each of our Services, the Army feels it has a very unique and important mission. While the power to deny or to destroy is possessed by all the military Services, the fundamental truth is that only ground forces possess the power to exercise direct, con- tinuing, and comprehensive control over land, its resources, and its peoples. Land forces thus perform important, and largely unique, functions besides denial and destruction: landpower can make permanent the otherwise transitory advantages achieved by air and naval forces.18 The Army, itself, maintains a significant organic air arm as an "integral part of the Army commander's land combat forces and as such, is immediately responsive to his needs."19 This organic air support (principally heli- copters), however, is not TACAIR as it relates to this paper. The supporting relationship between the Army and the Air Force and other Services providing tactical air support is one which provides the Army "essential capability" but Other service support, while providing an essential capability, requires a relatively long lead time in planning and may be subject to withdrawal or cancellation on short notice due to factors over which Army commanders have little or no control such as higher priority requirements, adverse weather, or enemy action.20 Then while "air support operations assist in the attainment of the immediate tactical objectives" of the Army and provide "an essential capability", they are not under Army command. This section will address the concepts and organization for integration of air support into the Army's "Air-Land Battle" philosophy. The Army's expeditionary force in a remote combat theater will probably be one or more corps, each with five or less divisions. These corps comprise a theater army normally commanded by the joint task force's Army (or Land) component commander. If only one corps is employed, that corps commander is the Army component commander. To con- tinue the MAGTF and TAF examples, the discussion will assume two corps each with two or three divisions and various support organizations. The Corps tactical operations center (CTOC) functions as the command and control center for operations and planning. Tactical objectives assigned and assessed by the corps commander are passed to the divisions for planning and execution. This organization is supported by the Army Air/Ground Operations System (AGOS) which integrates the Army's Air-Ground System (AAGS) and the Air Force's Tactical Air Control System (TACS) to provide tactical air support for Army ground operations. The Army has in addition to its ground maneuver elements very significant organic air and air defense arms. These elements require C2 structures and apparatus which are elements of the AGOS but do not relate directly to the paper. It is sufficient to note that the employed Army in the joint force theater has airspace and air traffic control and air defense responsibilities and interfaces in the JTF organization. Further discussion will emphasize the Army C2 of Air Force (and Navy/Marine as appropriate) TACAIR support provided. The Army component commander exercises command and control over assigned forces through his tactical oper- tions center. TOC's are established at all levels of subordinate headquarters, down to battalion level. The senior TOC, however, establishes a battlefield coordination element (BCE) to be located at the Air Force TACC. This BCE staff agency conducts air tasking, intelligence and operations coordination with TACC-AF for the Army component. The BCE must be closely linked to the TACC. The BCE has the LCC's priorities and guidance and pos- sesses the requisite knowledge of the situation on the battlefield. Collocation and close coordination between the TACC and BCE, in conjunction with the ACC and LCC dialogue, provides the coordination mechanism for successful joint air- land combat operations.21 (ACC and LCC in this quote refer to air and land component commanders respectively.) Through this BCE, the Army component commander's planning and operational input are represented at he TAFHQ TACC. As mentioned previously, further coordination is accomplished for direct air support execution processes by the assignment of Air Force air support operations centers (ASOC's) (USMC DASC equivalents) at each Army Corps TOC. The structure is depicted below.22 Click here to view image In the execution of preplanned air support and immediate CAS, the Army C2 apparatus, in conjunction with the TACS, coordinates the entrance of tactical air support into airspace under its control and through its air defense system. The co-located ASOC works closely with the Army corp(s) to filter CAS missions through to terminal controllers working with subordinate Army units. As relates to the air tasking cycle, Army preplanning input is normally coordinated through the BCE at the TACC- AF. In some areas, direct input from the Army component commander to the JTF commander is made but the BCE, through the TACC, is normally his representative. The initial input is a recommendation for air apportionment for subsequent operations, based on anticipated Army operations in the period covered and initial air support requirements in CAS and certain air interdiction. This recommendation will usually be integrated with the AFCC recommendation. The apportionment decision and guidance of the CJTF establishes percentages or priorities of effort for the TAF. As has been mentioned before, CJTF apportionment guidance may be very general and may not break out Army-requested portions of the air interdiction effort. If this is the case, Army- TAF negotiations establish a percentage of the air inter- diction effort projected for Army requested battlefield air interdiction (BAI).23 After percentages are agreed upon for CAS and BAI (and other tactical air support), the Army component commander is now aware of the approximate sorties available for the period addressed. Much like the MAGTF process, this portion of the cycle may start out as a daily operation, to support the normally daily ATO execution period, but over a period of time will probably result in the establishment of a periodic baseline set of percentages, with adjustments made as often as are required. The Army component ccommander generally then allocates most of his apportioned tactical air support sorties to subordinate commands. This allocation and suballocation may ripple down well into the component command structure. Tactical air support requests (TAR's) for the period are aligned with the sortie availabilities and the TACS elements at each of the levels is advised. These TAR'S are then used, of course, to develop the TAF's ATO. One further area needs to be mentioned. In the air interdiction category, Army input will normally be made as early in the process as possible and is made through an integrated "surveillance- reconnaissance-attack-assessment" process in which Army nominated air interdiction targets are prioritized.24 Those interdiction targets which have near term effect and influence on the operations of friendly land forces, while not in close proximity to them, are referred to as BAI and get targetted as the BAI allocation permits. This, essentially, is the applicable Army TACAIR C2 background. With the advent of the Army's airland battle concept in the past several years, and its emphasis on corps level operations and deep atack, there has been increasing controversy on tactical C2 with the Air Force. Command and control of operations well beyond the FLOT/FEBA has long been considered by the Air Force as its domain. While some further discussions will touch these issues, they will be limited to the perspectives of the paper. No attempt has been made to cover them all. Navy TACAIR C2 The Navy, of course, is the larger sister Service of the Marine Corps within the Department of the Navy. The Services are intimately related in their naval/amphibious functions and also in the aviation procurement and support areas. The Navy has a very substantial supporting air arm which is provided for in law. The Navy's JCS Pub 2 principal functions are: To organize, train, and equip Navy and Marine Corps forces for the conduct of prompt and sustained combat operations at sea, including operations of sea- based aircraft and land-based naval air components--specifically, forces to seek out and destroy enemy naval forces and to suppress enemy sea commerce, to gain and maintain general naval supremacy, to control vital sea areas and to protect vital sea lines of communication, to establish and maintain local superiority (including air)in an area of naval opera- tions, to seize and defend advanced naval bases, and to conduct much land and air operations as may be essential to the prosecution of a naval campaign. This paper will not examine Navy TACAIR C2 in any depth. There are several reasons for this. For one, the Navy C2 systems and apparatus are very analogous to those already discussed for the other Services. Its TACAIR command structure is somewhat simplified due to its usual consolidation within one or more fixed wing carrier battle groups (CVBG's). The CVBG's contain surface and subsurface ships and embarked carrier air wings. Navy doctrine provides for the support of joint task forces as either a part of the JTF (as its naval component) or through an "in support of" relationship. In either case, the Officer in Tactical Command (OTC) has overall responsibility for successfully accomplishing the mission of his force. TACAIR and C2 capabilities of his force are coordinated and integrated into the JTF without loss of operational control of any assets. The air defense and control assets of the naval force consist principally of innumerable sensors and missile systems aboard major combatant vessels, the Navy and Airborne Tactical Data Systems (NTDS and ATDS), the F-2C airborne radar system and TACAIR of the carrier air wing(s). The NTDS and ATDS are compatible with the Marine MACCS and Air Force TACS allowing tactical data sharing between components and, depending on the tactical situa- tion, will often enable the Navy to assume responsibility for air C2 of the seaward side of the JTF area of opera- tions. Navy TACAIR will be employed over land to support CATF/MAGTF amphibious operations and, subsequently, to support other JTF objectives as excess sortie availability permits. Although the tactical situation may often allow extensive integration of Navy anti-air warfare operations into the overall JTF air defense network, the Navy "treads very softly" when it comes to the integration of TACAIR in overland operations. Its TACAIR, of course, must be primarily concerned with fleet defense and with this in mind it cannot tolerate any loss of operational control. It will coordinate land targeting efforts, will participate in the air tasking cycle and will make excess sorties available to the JTF commander as possible. These comments are based on observations of the author and further research was not deemed necessary. Joint Task Force (JTF) TACAIR C2 This section will discuss the integration of the com- ponent service's TACAIR C2 apparatus under a typical joint task force command structure. The discussion will continue with the example force structure of previous sections and how they would normally operate together in accordance with current JCS publications. It will also look at the U.S. Central Command Operations SOP (R525-1) as a sample unified command application and will end with a more detailed look at the Omnibus as it might be reflected in the air tasking and planning processes. An appropriate starting point would be an overview of some of the pertinent JCS publications. JCS Pub 2 is the foundation for joint force command structures and opera- tions. This Unified Action Armed Forces (UNAAF) provides guidance governing the exercise of command by unified, specified and joint force commanders. It provides guidance for and supports the intent of Congress in establishing these commands to provide unitied direction to component assigned forces -- through this "operational command" by the specified or unified/joint commander. JCS Pub 8, Doctrine for Air Defense from Oversea Land Areas, prescribes "doctrines and principles governing the activities and performance" of joint forces conducting or planning overseas air defense operations. It provides broad guidance to the joint force commander for establish- ing a coordinated and integrated air defense system under a single commander -- the Area Air Defense Commander (AADC). This AADC's mission "will be to coordinae and integrate the entire air defense effort within the unified command." An additional joint service publication, (AFM 1-3, FM 100-28, NWP 17, and LFM 04) Doctrine and Procedures for Airspace Control in the Combat Zone, is closely related. It deals with airspace control while JCS Pub 8 is exclusively air defense oriented. JCS Pub 12, Tactical Command and Control Procedures for Joint Operations, is a multiple volume publication which provides guidance for the joint force commander in establishing command and control procedures for the coordination of his multi-service organization. In conjunction with JCS Pub 10, it goes into great detail on air defense management. Of particular applicability is its Volume IV, Part IV, Chapter 1, "Common Air Tasking." Until the probable implementation of revised "joint interface operating procedures" via the JINTACCS program in September 1986, this chapter will continue to be a principle source of JCS-level doctrine on joint force air tasking. It was revised as recently as December 1982 and now includes as a "special consideration" the Omnibus policy statement. Other joint service publications are pertinent to this discussion but have been used as background reference in general -- either noted or referenced in the annotated bibliography rather than specifically mentioned in the text. Among them are the recent bilateral "Army-Air Force Agreement for the Joint Attack of the Second Echelon (J-SAK)", several NATO Allied Tactical Publications (principally ATP's 33 and 40), applicable Naval Warfare Publication (NWP's) and Landing Force Manuals (LFM's), and, of course, JCS Pub 1 and its definitions. These publications provide guidance for a United States conduct of warfare in a theater perspective as a joint service team (of components) under the direction of a single commander. This single commander is vested with authority over each of his component Service elements which is termed operational command and which is exercised through his "Service component" (JCS Pub 2) commanders. The command structure of an example sustained land opera- tions JTF, subordinate to one of the U.S. Unified Commands, is provided below. Click here to view image There are enumerable variations possible given the Service preferences and tactical considerations involved. The Army may want its JTF component to be the "Land Component Commander" -- with the MAGTF as a subordinate element. The Air Force would probably agree -- but would prefer the MAGTF split into ground and air elements with the (Air Force) "Air Component Commander" having the ACE subordinate to this commander. The Navy would likely prefer to be a supporting force, not subordinate to the JTF at all. What really matters is the force's unity of command, unity of effort (e.g., teamwork towards the JTF mission), and the CINC, Unified Command, and Commander, JTF (CJTF) concepts of command which in their minds will optimize those principles. Joint force commanders are guided and provided authority over the component elements in JCS Pub 2. For the senior Unified Commander: Unity of effort among Service forces assigned to unified or specified commands is achieved by exercise of operational command and administrative command organization.25 These commanders shall have full opera- tional command over the forces assigned to them and shall perform such functions as are assigned by competent authority.26 ...the commander of a unified command or specified command is authorized to.... Plan for, deploy, direct, control, and coordinate the action of assigned forces...27 Within unified commands, operational command will be exercised through Service component commanders... or in some cases through the commanders of subordinate commands.28 The subordinate CJTF exercises "operational control" over his entire force, synonymous with the Unified Commander's operational command: Operational Command. Those functions of command involving the composition of subordinate forces, the assignment of tasks, the designation of objectives, and the authoritative direction necessary to accomplish the mission. Operational com- mand should be exercised by the use of the assigned normal organizational units through their responsible commanders or through the commanders of subordinate forces established by the commander exercising operational command.29 Using the preceding Service examples, the example CJTF has under his operational control; an Army component consisting of a field army of two corps and four to six divisions; an Air Force component of a tactical air force with several assorted wings; a Navy component of one or more carrier battle groups under the command of an OTC; and a Marine component of a large MAGTF as previously described. The CJTF has elected to employ the MAGTF as a "uni-service force" for this example operation. The general missions of these components are: Army -- seize and occupy designated JTF objectives and destroy opposing forces in zone; Air Force -- achieve and maintain air superiority over the landward JTF area of operations, conduct JTF air interdiction campaigns as directed, provide direct support to the Army and provide other support as directed; Navy -- achieve and maintain naval supremacy over adjacent JTF sea areas, and air superiority over seaward JTF area of operations; Marine -- seize and occupy designated JTF objectives and destroy opposing forces in zone; be prepared to reembark aboard amphibious shipping and tactical airlift for redeployment within JTF area of operations. In addition, the Air Force is designated the Area Air Defense Commander, the Airspace Coordinating Authority and will be responsible for the activities of the Joint Rescue and Coordination Center and Joint Targeting Panel (to be discussed later). In the next paragraphs, the paper will look at the CJTF's operations and intelligence staffs, emphasizing their impact on and responsibilities for TACAIR, and the JTF's air tasking cycle. When a JTF is formed, its commander is normally augmented with or otherwise forms a joint staff with balanced representation to all the Services involved. There is, however, usually no standing headquarters organizational tables and certainly no established head- quarters facilities or equipments. The CJTF accumulates these facilities and equipment as are required for the mission and as are available from the Unified Commander's resources. Often the CJTF will co-locate his staff and headquarters with an appropriate headquarters of one of his assigned components. For instance, when the JTF mission involves an amphibious assault, he may co-locate with the amphibious task force commander. In a sustained land combat operation, he may be with the theater Army commander. In either case, he may also locate his staff headquarters far removed from the actual combatant commands. It is, of course, his decision, and he will ensure that required communications are established to provide for the exercise of command. For this example, it is assumed that he is separated from each of the component headquarters and that he and his staff have enumerable communication paths to each of his component commanders. This paper will discuss only two joint staff elements, the J-3 and J-2. His J-3 Operations Staff has ground, air and sea elements within both their Plans and Operations Sections. This J-3 staff, of course, directly commands no combatant joint assets. It, instead, serves the CJTF for the control of operations through overall direction, tasking, and support of the subordinate components. Much as was discussed earlier with the TACC-M and TACC-AF, the Plans and Operations Sections work future and present operations respectively. The Plans Section air element also represents the CJTF in the air tasking cycle. The Operations Section monitors and influences as required current operations, and also responds to component support requests of an immediate nature. There are several pertinent joint agencies that will often be operated through the J-3. There will normally be one or more joint movement control centers that coordinate logistics, tactical lift, etc., within the JTF. There currently (author's perception) is a general preference to make this an all-modes "movement" control center but as the situation requires it may also be split into airlift, sealift and ground transport sections. There will also usually be a joint rescue coordination center (JRCC) established to coordinate and conduct with dedicated assets search and rescue type operations. These centers may be established at the joint force headquarters or charged to a Service component best able to perform them for the CJTF. Dealing exclusively with the air staff sections will be two other joint agency commanders, the Airspace Control Authority and the Area Air Defense Commander. Their activities will normally be combined under the principal air component of the force which will normally be the Air Force Component Commander. As designated by the CJTF, the Airspace Control Authority plans, establishes and coordinates the airspace control structure and procedures for the JTF and ensures coordination and integration with the Area Air Defense Commander's JTF air defense structure. The J-2 Intelligence Staff is completely joint in all of its sections (as prescribed in JCS Pub 2 general terms) and is tasked with assuring the availability of sound intelligence, considering operations area information and opposing forces data in their entirety. It is further tasked to plan the collection, processing and dissemination of intelligence as a coordinated effort with minimal duplication amongst the JTF components. While the JTF's Intelligence Staff may have access to national intelligence sources, it probably has no collection assets of its own and, instead, receives its information by tasking the components. It may be expedient or efficient to centralize certain intelligence support functions in the JTF. When feasible, JCS Pub 2 suggests that such functions should be charged to the Service component best able to perform the function. One area usually considered in this vein is the master target list(s) of the JTF. A joint targeting panel (JTP) will normally be established at the JTF headquarters or the responsibility charged to the most capable Service component. Component interests here are very important and the "jointness" of the panel must provide for equitable component representation and weighing of prioritization. Since this agency deals with targets predominantly for interdiction and tactical reconnaissance, the Air Force component will often be charged with integrating its targeting agency to perform the joint functions. Component commanders will nominate targets to the JTP which considers and adds them to the joint targets list(s), assigns them priorities in accordance with CJTF guidance, tasks them to appropriate components for action and performs other tasks as required to maintain and disseminate to the components a current joint targets list(s). The air tasking cycle of a typical JTF is the princi- pal subject of JCS Pub 12, Volume IV, Chapter 1, "Common Air Tasking" and will be used as the primary source for the succeeding discussion. This Chapter's purpose is "to promulgate standard procedures for coordinating the air effort in a joint operation and to establish a standard format for the exchange of information during the air tasking process."30 It is comprised of general pro- cedures and standard message formats for the air tasking cycle. Although no longer addressed in the latest JCS Pub 12 revision, the air tasking cycle is conducted within apportionment guidelines promulgated as often as required by the CJTF. Although not necessarily occurring for each daily tasking cycle, the process begins when the CJTF solicits and considers air apportionment recommendations from his component commanders and then issues his apportionment guidance. The component responses and the succeeding exchanges are outlined in JCS Pub 12 as follows: Air Employment/Allocation Plans: are submitted by the air-capable components to the CJTF. These plans normally take the following message format: click here to view image The employment/allocation section of the message provides the CJTF an estimate of the total TACAIR effort of the component and the excess sorties it expects to produce. It takes the form of multiple rows and columns with a row of data for each type of aircraft (TYP) and successive columns of total sorties (SA), sorties of defensive counter air (DCA), offensive counter air (OCA), interdiction (INT), CAS and other air support missions (SUP) such as electronic warfare, SAR, etc. The "EX" column reflects anticipated excess sorties expected by type aircraft. This is defined as "Those sorties, of the total available, by type of aircraft, remaining after allocation to support the origi- nating command's mission." There is also a remarks space for amplification of each row of data. The request section of the message allows the originator to reflect support requirements unfilled by his assigned air support and, with other component "excess", forms the basis for any number of cross-force air support missions later in the cycle. The CJTF reviews the component employment plans for approval or adjustment as required. He then consolidated reported excess sorties and preliminary air support requests and pairs as many of the requests with excess sorties as is possible. The next message in the cycle is the CJTF's Sortie Allotment Message. Sortie Allotment Message: is sent to all components in response to their Air Employment/Allocation Plans. It is used to approve or adjust these component plans and allots paired component excesses to other component shortages/air support requests. Its format is quite similar to the preceeding messge. For each component the first two sections address support provided and support received and the third section approves and/or adjusts the employment plan. Click here to view image While in this extract only one component is addressed, the normal message would contain several iterations of these sections, an iteration for each component. In this example's paragraph A, the Navy component is providing four CAS sorties to the Army reflecting a pairing between the Navy's reported excess (support available) and a CAS shortage reported by the Army (requesting command) and CJTF's allotment for tasking of the sorties from the Navy to the Army. In paragraph B, the Navy component sees that a DCA shortage reported has been filled by CJTF allotment of two Air Force sorties which were excess. In paragraph C, the Navy has had its employment plans for its E2C air- craft modified -- a touchy area but one beyond the scope of this paper. At this point the components have CJTF- approved employment plans, know which of their shortages will be filled -- and by whom -- and, further, which of their reported excess sorties were allotted -- and to whom. Mission details are then passed from requesting commands to supporting commands via Cross-Force Air Tasking Order messages. Cross-Force Air Tasking Order (ATO) Message: is sent by each component who has had a shortage (reported in its employment plan as a preliminary air request) filled by CJTF allotment (of another component's excess) to the component directed to support it in the Sortie Allotment message. This message essentially feeds the supporting component all the air mission data required to conduct the mission. While a format is presented in JCS Pub 12, it is extremely incomplete and is not depicted here. CJTF's will undoubtedly promulgate their own standardized formats, reflecting a compromise between component Service prefer- ences. Once the exchanges of cross-force ATO's are complete, each of the air capable components completes the tasking process by incorporating the cross-force support into their internal taskings, publishing its intra-service ATO and sending a confirmation message to the requesting/ supported component, confirming the support mission(s). This is, of course, a very simplified discussion of JCS Pub 12's "Common Air Tasking." In schematic terms: Click here to view image Several notes are necessary. The traditional Air Force- Army air support relationship will normally have Army participation in the process incorporated via the Air Force. Air support provided to Army units by another CJTF component is often considered, then, as support of the Air Force vice the Army. No Army shortages would actually get into the process unless the Air Force could not fill them. The same situation would exit for any supported/supporting relationship established within the JTF, including the Navy-Marine Corps relationship within amphibious task force operations. JCS Pub 12 also offers a timeline of "NLT's" for these message exchanges. The employment plans are transmitted NLT 29 hours prior to the ATO effective period (e.g., for an ATO period of 0600 3 May to 0600 4 May, the components employment plans are on the wire by 0100 2 May!); the CJTF's Sortie Allotment NLT 23 hours prior; component Cross-Force ATO's NLT 19 hours prior; ATO confirmations NLT 14 hours and; intra-service ATO's ASAP. 31 It should also be noted that this is the preplanned air tasking cycle only and no reference is made to "common air tasking" of a more immediate nature to cover changes in the support requirements and ATO's during execution. The extensive lead times referenced are not unrealistic, sadly, and force extensive preplanning by all supported elements of the JTF. To better visualize what these messages look like, the following examples are presented from JCS Pub 12: Click here to view image It can be seen that these JCS Pub 12 message formats and procedures provide for common air tasking exclusively through component-provided "excess" sorties. Other cross- force support may be derived from establishing supported/ supporting command relationships. Aside, then, from the "special considerations" section where the Omnibus statement is reproduced, there are no provisions for its implementation. If the MAGTF was to provide sorties to the CJTF for air defense and/or certain interdiction and reconnaissance of forts, the implication might be that these would be reported as "excess" (EX in the message formats) or through special procedures developed in the CJTF's operations orders or plans. The author has a lot of discomfort with the application of the term "excess" to sorties provided by the MAGTF for JTF air defense, inter- diction and reconnaissance. Chapter 5 will cover this area in some detail. It should, finally, be noted that the JINTACCS program messages and interface operating procedures will supercede this JCS Pub 12 process when approved for implementation. CENTCOM TACAIR C2 EXAMPLE United States Central Command (CENTCOM) is an existing unified command which would probably draw component forces from each of the military Services in its execution of an assigned mission. In support of its various operations plans, CENTCOM has developed and maintained an SOP for operations, USCENTCOM Regulation R-525-1. Appendix 12 to Annex C (Operations) outlines a unique approach to "common air tasking" using elements from JCS Pub 12, the Omnibus statement and other Service doctrine. A review of this appendix will provide an example of a unified commander's authority to exercise operational command of his component forces as he interprets existing JCS guidance in the TACAIR C2 and air tasking areas. In the general discussion of common air tasking (CAT) procedures, USCINCENT assumes responsibility for the execution of the overall air campaign and designates COMUSCENTAF (the Air Force component commander) as coordinating authority for air (CAA), an option within JCS Pub 2, for the purposes of CAT. The paper will address the authorities of a coordinating authority later. For now, be aware that they include the authority to require consul- tation but not to compel agreement in (his) coordinating efforts. CENTCOM's CAT is defined as "assets of a com- ponent or supporting command remaining after allocation is made to support that commander's mission."35 This is, of course, esentially the same definition as that for "excess" sorties from JCS Pub 12, without the stigma of the basic meaning of "excess." The CENTCOM CAT process differs from JCS Pub 12 in several respects. First, the CINC's air tasking guidance (apportionment plus other) may include requests to components to provide additional CAT assets for common tasking in support of specific operations of another component. This is a realistic authority, but is the first time the author has seen it in writing. It essentially allows the CINC to direct a component to create excess sorties. Components respond to the CINC's guidance with a "CAT Plan" (vice an employment/allocation plan). This CAT Plan does not include an employment plan of the component and instead contains only CAT (excess) assets offered and component shortages (requests for air support). These CAT Plans are sent to the COMUSCENTAF (the CAA) as well as the CINCCENT. The CAA, with support from component liaison officers, pairs CAT assets with requests for support, informs components of the status of their requests, and returns unused CAT assets to the offering components. The CAA/COMUSCENTAF then promulgates all common air tasking in a special CAT section of the COMUSCENTAF ATO. Intraservice ATO's will be published by the other compo- nents, exclusive of missions they may be flying under the CAT ATO. Component subordinate units would then deal with both their intraservice ATO and applicable portions of the CAT ATO. 36 This process eliminates several steps from the JCS Pub 12 air tasking cycle. It essentially combines the Sortie Allotment, Cross-Force Tasking and Confirmation messages into the COMUSCENTAF ATO and other preliminary liaisons. This will require a massive effort at the Air Force component TACC and will require that all components receive (and digest applicable portions) a quite massive COMUSCENTAF ATO. An earlier version of this process proved "totally unworkable" to the participating MAGTF in the RDJTF (predecessor to CENTCOM) exercise Gallant Knight-82, principally due to magnitude of the TACC-AF effort in coordinating and producing a timely ATO and deficiencies in supporting communications circuits.37 Despite such potential problems, the CENTCOM process does provide the procedural capacity to integrate and coordinate component TACAIR in a JTF environment. It is the only written guidance the author was able to find concerning current JTF TACAIR C2 procedures which have provisions to accommodate the Omnibus statement's sortie provisions. The final section of this chapter will look at the nearly complete JINTACCS character-oriented message standard program and its provisions for TACAIR tasking. JINTACCS TACAIR C2 The Joint Interoperability of Tactical Command and Control Systems (JINTACCS) program is a Department of Defense inter-service standardization program which has as its goal the development of JTF operations messages and procedures to improve interoperability among DOD Services and agencies. While the program now has several sub- programs under the direction of the Joint Tactical Command, Control and Communications Agency (JTC3A), this paper will deal only with the original aspect of the program, that of the development of standardized character oriented (tele- type) messages (COM), voice backup messages, and accompany- ing interface operating procedures (IOP's) to effectively utilize the messages developed. The messages developed in the program currently cover inter-service information exchange requirements in a joint task force environment for the functional segments of intelligence, air operations, (land combat) operations control, fire support and maritime operations. The messages are very structured, detailed and man/ machine readable teletype formats composed of sets and fields of "allowable" coded data entries. These regulated formats will hopefully make Service transitions to automated message content processing a reality in the not too distant future. All Services and participating agencies are well along towards initial automated assistance processing capability -- and none too soon. Following nearly a decade of developmental activity, certification testing and two operational effectiveness demonstrations (OED's), the message standards and IOP's are currently undergoing their final OED in exercise Solid Shield '85. Barring unexpected problems in the OED, Service approval of the standards is expected in 1986 with a projected JCS implementation scheduled for September of that year. If the program succeeds in its intentions, joint forces will have increased interoperability through the availability of standardized messages and operating procedures and machine assisted/enhanced tactical information exchanges. The message standards, rules and data base are destined to become JCS Pub 25, U.S. Message Text Formats for Joint Operations, while the joint IOP's will be incorporated into JCS Pub 12.38 While this paper will review JINTACCS air C2 messages, especially those of the air tasking cycles, it will deal more principally with the accompanying interface operating procedures as they relate to TACAIR C2 and the Omnibus. JINTACCS messages and IOP's will be the JCS standard utilized by the joint force commander of the near future for inter-command information exchange. As such its review is very pertinent. No coverage of maritime, fire support or operations control is intended and only minor reference to the intelligence segment is made. The future set of joint interface operating procedures (JIOP) is currently in the format of the JINTACCS Joint Procedures Training Manual (JPTM) for Service staffing and use by USLANTCOM in OED '85. This JTPM will be used as the principle source for the following discussions.39 The JPTM contains guidance in consonance with current JCS Pubs for JTF organization, C2, and CJTF/component interrelationships and information exchange. It further describes each interfacing Service's and agency's command and control facility. These procedures, interrelationships and information exchange requirements closely parallel those which have been discussed previously in this chapter. There are some differences and elaborations which will be highlighted in the following review. One of the first major differences which appears is in the JPTM's discussion of the normal JTF command relation- ships. It should be remembered that this final JTPM was prepared by USREDCOM, a unified command composed prin- cipally of the Air Force and Army. With that in mind, the following is extracted: COMJTF exercises operational control of all assigned forces through the Land Component Commander (usually Army Forces Commander), the Air Component Commander (usually the Air Force Forces Commander), and the Naval Component Commander (usually Naval Forces Commander). (Forces/elements from other unified commands and Department of Defense/United States Agencies may operate either in support of, or under the operational control of COMJTF as the JCS may direct).40 As has been discussed previously, this is not in conform- ance with JCS Pub 2 guidance. While an option of the unified commander, the exercise of operational command of components is "normally" through Service component commanders. That note made, the rest of the joint head- quarters/staff discussion parallels that already presented in the paper. Throughout the JTPM, staff agencies and C2 posts are referred to as operational facilities or OPFACS. As apply to the CJTF headquarters and staff, pertinent functions are essentially as previously outlined. The OPFACS align with the previous discussions as follows: the J-3 interfaces as the Joint Operations Center (JOC); the J-2 as the Joint Intelligence Center (JIC); and the AADC, Joint Movement Center (JMC) and JRCC remain as previously discussed. The JIC description includes responsibility assignment for the administration of joint targeting activity. The component C2 elements have OPFACS aligned closely with the previous service discussions. Although related to command and control of TACAIR, the paper will continue here to brush over joint force air defense organization and structure. The JINTACCS program essentially left the JCS Pub 2, 8, 10 and 12 procedures for joint air defense as they presently exist. Necessary messages were developed for both current teletype (COM) exchanges and the voice back-up of data link messages. The authority and relationships between the AADC and partici- pating air defense components remain in consonance with existing doctrine and procedures. Joint SAR and "movement" (or airlift) are addressed extensively in the air opera- tions segment but do not directly involve the paper's subject of TACAIR. The remainder of this section, then, will look at the JINTACCS air tasking cycles as they apply to TACAIR and as they diverge from existing JCS Pub 12 guidance. To begin discussion of the JINTACCS air tasking cycle, several terms need to be examined as presented in and apply to the JPTM. Air Tasking Cycle. The interrelated series of actions that begins with one or more requests for the air support and, upon approval, culminates in the publishing of an intra-Service air tasking order. Air tasking cycles may deal with either pre- planned or immediate missions. Preplanned Mission. A mission, in response to a preplanned mission request, which can be anticipated sufficiently in advance to allow detailed coordination and planning. Preplanned missions may be further categorized as scheduled or on- call. Scheduled missions fulfill specific requirements at a specific time. On-call missions involve aircraft preloaded with ordnance in expectation of a particular type of mission, placed in an appropriate ground alert readiness condition, and then launched when requested by the supported unit. Immediate Mission. A mission, in response to an immediate mission request, which could not be identified sufficiently in advance to permit detailed coordination and planning. Preplanned, scheduled and on-call missions may be diverted from their original purpose to fulfill immediate, high priority requirements.41 These definitions are substantively in agreement with JCS Pub 1 and Service publications. They form, along with the following two terms, the basis for the two major JINTACCS air tasking cycles and significant variations thereof. Air Operations in Close Support. In accordance with established doctrine, or at the direction of the COMJTF, one air capable service component of the JTF may be designated to provide air support to another service component of the JTF, and answer directly the supported service com- ponent's requests.... Cross-Force Support. This includes all sorties flown by air capable service components in support of other service components of the JTF It encompasses those situations in which the supporting service has: been designated to provide direct support to another service component (in "close support"), agrees to provide requested support after approved liaison/coordination is effected, or is otherwise tasked to provide support by the COMJTF.42 Close support is a JCS Pub 1 and 2 term for a formal supported/supporting relationship established between components such as will normally be the case between the Air Force and Army. If direct liaison is authorized (DIRLAUTH) between two components, simplified cross-force support may be available through such DIRLAUTH. The COMJTF (CJTF) may task inter-component support in several ways but most often this will take the form of CJTF directed sortie allotments in the preplanned air tasking cycle. A review of the JINTACCS messages developed for the air tasking cycles (ATC's) will facilitate understanding of the succeeding ATC discussions. CJTF apportionment guidance: no unique JINTACCS message exists for this purpose but the guidance is noted as part of the preplanned ATC. Air Support Request (AIRSUPREQ): this message is used by components or subordinate units to request air support. It includes as much mission detail as possible. It is also used to pass mission data between supported and supporting components to add to or otherwise change data previously provided. It will be the message counterpart to the current JCS Tactical Air Request (TAR) Form. SARTS: this "standard air request/tasking sets" is not actually a message. It is, rather, a group of standard sets utilized within any of the air tasking messages to amplify detailed mission data. Allocation/Request (ALLOREQ): this message is the JINTACCS equivalent to the JCS Pub 12 Air Employment/Allocation Plan message. It is used by components to pass to the CJTF employment/allocation plans, excess sorties anticipated and requested cross-force air support (shortages/requests). The basic AIRSUPREQ sets and SARTS are included as mission data is available. Sortie Allotment (SORTIEALOT): this message his the equivalent of the JCS Pub 12 message of the same name. It is used by the CJTF to approve/modify component employment plans, allot sorties (normally declared excess) from one component to another (to fill shortages), and passes all available mission data on approved cross-force support to the supporting component. Request Confirmation (REQCONF): this message is used by a component to confirm cross- force support missions with the supported component. Alert Launch Order (ALORD): this message is used by a supported component to order the launch of supporting component sorties placed in ground alert status. Joint Launch Report (JLNCHREP): this message is used to inform a supported component that a cross-force support mission has been aborted, delayed, canceled, or launched in response to an ALORD. It should be noted that the USAF has a unique message with- in JINTACCS which they will use in lieu of the REQCONF. This is their combination internal ATO and cross-force confirmation message, the ATOCONF. It will be received in lieu of the REQCONF by components supported by the USAF in the preplanned ATC. The preplanned air tasking cycle starts with the exchange of CJTF apportionment guidance, component allocation (employment) plan responses (ALLOREQ) and the CJTF's return allotment message to the components -- as was discussed under the JCS Pub 12 section. The only substantive differences in the JINTACCS process at this point is the much more complete (and structured) format of the messages. The IOP also allows for a close support relationship which impacts, somewhat, on the supporting component's ALLOREQ. The supporting component's employ- ment plan and excess sorties (ALLOREQ) would incorporate preplanned air support requests of the supported component -- therefore not offering excess sorties to the CJTF until all possible requested support was allocated to the supported component. At this point in the preplanned ATC, supporting com- ponents, having received tasking in the CJTF SORTIEALOT'S allotment section, send REQCONF confirmations to the supported components. As more detailed mission data becomes available, it is passed to the supporting component via AIRSUPREQ messages. Execution during the tasked period is in accordance with normal procedures. The ALORD/ JLNCHREP exchange is used to request and confirm launches of ground alert aircraft. Immediate air support require- ments which develop after the preplanned ATC process is underway or during the actual air tasking execution period are supported by a separate process. Example preplanned ATC messages from the JINTACCS Technical Interface Design Plan (TIDP) are provided at the end of the chapter. The immediate air tasking cycle varies significantly depending on the establishment (or lack of such) of close support relationships. With no close support relationship established, a component needing immediate cross-force support sends its AIRSUPREQ message to the CJTF. The CJTF will normally not have excess sorties "in his pocket" to apply to such requests since preplanned excess not allotted in the period's SORTIEALOT are returned to the offering component. The CJTF will, instead, use voice circuits or other means available to inquire from his air-capable components as to sortie availability. His negative or positive response to the requesting component or his positive response and allotment tasking to a providing component, are formatted in another message used for this immediate ATC: Air Mission Request/Tasking (REQSTATASK): this message is used by the CJTF to respond to a requesting component -- and to task a supporting component if one is found -- concerning an immediate air support request. A supporting component confirms such tasking with a REQCONF, or a JLNCHREP if immediate launch of alert aircraft is exercised. Where a close support relationship does exist, a supported component sends it immediate AIRSUPREQ directly to its supporting component, greatly reducing the response time and message traffic involved. At this point, no further discussion of the JINTACCS TACAIR C2 documentation is required. A REQSTATASK message example from the JINTACCS TIDP concludes Chapter 3. Click here to view image CHAPTER 3 Notes 1USMC, Fleet Marine Force Manual (FMFM) 5-1 Marine Aviation (Washington, D.C.: Hdqtrs USMC, 1979), p. 49. 2FMFM 5-1, p. 51. 3FMFM 5-1, p. 54. 4JCS Publication 1 DOD Dictionary of Military and Associated Terms (Washington, D.C.: JCS, 1984), p. 32. 5JCS Pub 1, p 24. 6Operational Handbook (OH) 5-3 Tasking USMC Fixed Wing Aviation (Quantico, Va.: MCDEC, 1982), p. 1-2. 7JCS Pub 1, p. 21. 8JCS Publication 2 Unified Action Armed Forces (UNAAF) (Washington, D.C.: JCS, 1974), p. 20. 9Air Force Manual (AFM) 1-1 Functions and Basic Doctrine of the United States Air Force (Washington, D.C.: Dept. of the Air Force, 1984), P. 2-8. 10AFM 1-1, p. 2-11. 11AFM 1-1, p. 2-13. 12AFM 1-1, p. 2-14. 13AFM 1-1, p. 2-14. 14AFM 1-1, p. 2-12. 15AFM 1-1, p. 1-3. 16JCS Pub 2, p. 56. 17JCS Pub 2, p. 18. 18Army Field Manual (FM) 100-26 Air-Ground Operations System (Washington, D.C.: DOA, 1973), P. 3-1. 19Army FM 1-1 The Army (Washington, D.C.: DOA, 1981), p. 8. 20FM 100-26, P. 3-1. 21U.S . Readiness Command Pamphlet 525-8 General Operating Procedures for Joint Attack of the Second Echelon (J-SAK), (MacDill AFB, F1: USREDCOM, 1984), p. 2-5. 22USREDCOM Pamphlet 525-8, p. 2-3. 23USREDCOM Pamphlet 525-8, p. 4. 24USREDCOM Pamphlet 525-8, p. 1-3. 25JCS Pub 2, p. 6. 26JCS Pub 2, p. 6. 27JCS Pub 2, p. 37. 28JCS Pub 2,, p. 37. 29JCS Pub 2, p. 36. 30JCS Publication 12 Tactical C2 Procedures for Joint Operations (Washington, D.C.: JCS, 1982), Volume IV, Part IV, p. I-1. 31JCS Pub 12, Vol. IV, Part IV, p. I-3. 32JCS Pub 12, Vol. IV, Part IV, Figure I-2, p. I-9. 33JCS Pub 12, Vol. IV, Part IV, Figure I-5, pp. I-13, 14, 15. 34JCS Pub 12, Vol. IV, Part IV, Figure I-6, p. I-22. 35USCINCCENTCOM, Operations SOP, Regulation 525-1 (MacDill AFB, Fl: USCENTCOM, 1984), p. C-12-1. 36USCINCCENTCOM, Reg. 525-1, p. C-12-2. 37CG 3D MAW message DTG 240039Z Feb 82. 38JTC3A "JINTACCS Update", (Ft. Monmouth, N.J.: JITF, 1984), pp. 1-5. 39JTC3A "JINTACCS Update", p. 14. 40USREDCOM Joint Procedures Training Manual for Message Text Formats (MacDill AFB, Fl: USREDCOM, 1984), p. I-2. 41USREDCOM JPTM, pp. III-41, 42. 42USREDCOM JPTM, p. III-42. CHAPTER FOUR Further Background There are several issues confronting the Services which inhibit to various degrees the "jointness" of any unified action. JCS Pub 2 gives the commander of a joint force substantial authority and a wide variety of suggested command options and guidance. The potential variety of missions assigned, forces allotted, threats opposed and general tactical situations encountered, as perceived by very different commanders and their staffs, require this flexibility. Many applicable issues deal with understand- able Service desires to influence the joint force commander in his choices of organization and execution options. This chapter will illuminate some of these issues as they apply to the command, control and integration of joint force TACAIR. The Push for "Functional Componency" and "Unity of Command" Probably the principal issue currently confronting the Services as relates to the command and control of TACAIR is the major effort by the Air Force to convince the Services and JCS that "functional componency" should be the basis for standard, or normal, joint force command relationships. As was mentioned in the preface, argumentative papers and articles for both sides of the issue are abundant. Air Force Doctrinal Information Publications (DIP's) 10, 11, and 12 all treat the issue as do numerous Marine Corps point papers and a major study produced by the Advanced Amphibious Study Group. Rather than argue the Marine Corps Position, the paper will, instead, outline the opposing Positions through narrative and extracts from existing material. The Air Force perspective is currently outlined in publications drafted or revised since 1981 -- the year that Omnibus was promulgated. Starting with the April 1981 Doctrinal Information Publication 10, two subsequent DIP's on the MAGTF and joint command and, most recently, a late 1984 revision to AFM 1-1, Functions and Basic Doctrine of the United States Air Force, the Air Force has conducted a very energetic campaign to promote what it terms "functional componency" within unified commands (in particular, theater level). It maintains that only through the centralized command of all joint force land, air and sea resources under such "functionally" oriented commanders, subordinate only to the joint force commander, can the necessary levels of integration be achieved to gain or maintain control of the respective operations mediums -- land, aerospace and sea. It argues that the unity of command warfighting principle must be applied at the "functional component" level as well as at the unified commander level. From AFM 1-1: Unity of command is the principle of vesting appropriate authority and responsibility in a single commander to effect unity of effort in carrying out an assigned task. Unity of command provides for the effective exercise of leadership and power of decision over assigned forces for the purpose of achieving a common objective. Unity of command, combined with common doctrine, obtains unity of effort by the coordinated action of all forces toward a common goal. While coordination may be attained by cooperation, it is best achieved by giving a single commander full authority. Unity of command is imperative to employing all aerospace forces effectively. The versatility- and decisive striking power of aerospace forces places an intense demand on these forces in unified action. To take full advantage of these qualities, aerospace forces are employed as an entity through the leadership of an air commander. The air commander orchestrates the overall air effort to achieve stated objectives. Effective leadership through unity of command produces a unified air effort that can deliver decisive blows against an enemy, dissipate his strengths, and exploit his weaknesses. The air commander, as the central authority for the effort, develops strategies and plans, determines priorities, allocates resources, and controls assigned aero- space forces to achieve the primary objective. Success in carrying out these actions is greatly enhanced by an effective command, control, com- munications, and intelligence network.1 The air (component) commander essentially assumes command of all theater air assets and protects them from attempts by other commanders to divide air power amongst them- selves -- to control it when needed for their own missions. For the greatest good of the combined forces in a theater of war "There must be a command structure to control the assigned air power coherently and consistently and to ensure that the air power is not frittered away by dividing it among army and navy commands."2 The theater perspective of warfare is emphasized as is the theme of centralized control. Centralized control is essential to positive control of aerospace power. Centralized control is established under a single air commander who directs the employment of forces at a level of command from which the overall air situation can best be judged.3 When Omnibus was agreed to and promulgated, the Air Force somewhat hedged on its acceptance of the policy statement. It considered the "interim" Omnibus a "first step" only and soon published a related series of DIP's. From DIP 10, April 1981: The basic organizational tenet of joint and combined operations is that one commander should control land, sea and air components and that the components should act as a joint team of land, sea and air forces. The principle of centralized control, under a single commander, has been derived from history, and should be the basis for organizational arrangements to joint and combined plans. The Marine Corps has inserted uni-Service employment into joint and combined plans expanding their functions -- roles and missions. Independent USMC operations during sustained operations ashore is anathema to the functioning of the unified command structure as postulated in JCS Pub 2.4 DIP 10 presents Air Force perspectives on joint organiza- tions in operations plans, historical background on the differences between the Air Force and Marine Corps on C2 of TACAIR, rationale for a "single manager for all tactical air assets within theater of operations" and further functional componency arguments. Some further extracts: By their nature, aerospace forces have broader perspectives than surface-bound forces. From a tactical air stand point, this perspective is viewed from the entire theater. Additionally, from this perspec- tive all peripheral, attached, assigned, and "in support of" air resources must work for one air component commander. This air commander is charged with planning for the integration of these air assets and ensuring their protection as well as employment strategy to effectively employ their maneuver, firepower, and psychological potential. USMC officers assigned to joint and combined positions have placed wording in plans that restricts the flexibility of air resources as they do not view air employment from a theater-wide perspective. Rather they threat air resources as highly mobile -- yet fixed -- artillery; a view that limits the effects and effectiveness of airpower. During combat, this decentralized control of air assets leads to the inappropriate division of the battlefield where the air commander is unable to mass his forces in times of necessity -- offensive or defensive. The North Vietnamese route pack structure exemplifies this in- appropriate division where the 7th Air commander was unable to mass Air Force and Navy strikes for mutual support.5 To accomplish the theater objectives the commander employs his assets through land, naval and air component commanders. COMPONENT COMMANDER (Land/Naval/Air) ... operational command will be exercised through the Service component commanders (JCS Pub 2, para 30202b). The component commander, based upon the apportionment decision of the commander, allocates forces to accomplish the theater objectives. Air Component Commander. The Air Component Commander exercises operational control -- targeting and tasking authority -- over fixed wing air elements.6 DIP 11 discusses Air Force perspectives of the MAGTF and the Marine Corps preferences on command relationships. DIP 12, Command Relationships, is the latest in the series of related guidance material disseminated within the Air Force and serves to consolidate and refine their perspec- tives and policies on the C2 of (Marine) TACAIR: "The mission to be accomplished and the objective to be attained in accomplish- ment of the mission are the two most fundamental of all considerations in the establishment of command organization. AND ...each commander shall organize his force so as best to perform his mission . . . The arrangement and groupment of Service elements within his force should be sufficiently flexible to meet the planned phases of the contemplated operation and any development that may necessitate a change in plan. (emphasis added) JCS PUB 2, UNIFIED ACTION ARMED FORCES The Service component methods of command used in our current operational plans do not serve this stated purpose. Instead, the organization of our forces is motivated more by an attempt to preserve the autonomy of the individual Services to direct the employment of their own Service forces. Consequently, the Air Force has proposed (as endorsed by the Army) that we modify our current approach to employing joint forces. The suggestion to change is based on the imperatives of historical military experience and the earnest desire to establish the most effective structure for unified effort. It is the assertion of the Air Force that employ- ing U.S. Armed Forces through functional com- ponents (air, land, and naval), rather than Service components (USAF, USA, and USN and USMC), would establish an improved unified employment structure. Functional employment of forces would reduce the complications of introducing forces from one theater to another, create a structure for the operational employ- ment of a multi-Service force under one func- tional component, improve the effort to develop joint doctrine, and enhance a smooth transition from joint to combined operations.7 In presenting historical examples of problems with command relationships over the period since WW II, DIP 12 finds that: LESSONS LEARNED: Joint planning and employment of forces as Service entities is ineffective, inefficient, and does not foster common doctrine. When the military action becomes intense and the prompt and concentrated use of firepower is essential, functional employment of forces that crosses Service barriers is the most effective method to coordinate and integrate forces towards a common purpose.8 It concludes that JCS Pub 2 is ambiguous on force employ- ment, and needs changing: Therefore, the Air Force, with the support of the Army, has recommended the following actions: - Commanders should normally plan to employ their forces functionally. This is the fundamental concept of unified action, and JCS Pub 2 must be changed primarily in the context of that broad objective (this would in no way limit a CINC's authority or flexibility to arrange his forces so as best to accomplish his assigned mission). - Delete the term "Service component" and use only the term "component" to describe the subordinate commander tasked with the operational employment of air, land, or naval forces. - The exclusive use of components in war- time command relationships would help to clarify the distinctions between Service and component areas of authority and responsibility and to implement one of the basic intentions of our past leaders in drafting and enacting the Reorganization Act of 1958. - When referring to the tasks within each Military Department of administering and supporting Service forces, the specific (senior Service commander) should be referred to in operations plans.9 While granting that the Air Force can cite historical examples where joint force integration and cooperation have been less than noteworthy, the Marine Corps maintains that the overall argument is flawed in several respects. JCS PUB 2, UNIFIED ACTION ARMED FORCES The Service component methods of command used in our current operational plans do not serve this states purpose. Instead, the organization of our forces is motivated more by an attempt to preserve the autonomy of the individual Services to direct the employment of their own Service forces. Consequently, the Air Force has proposed (as endorsed by the Army) that we modify our current approach to employing joint forces. The suggestion to change is based on the imperatives of historical military experience and the earnest desire to establish the most effective structure for unified effort. It is the assertion of the Air Force that employ- ing U.S. Armed Forces through functional com- ponents (air, land, and naval), rather than Service components (USAF, USA, and USN and USMC), would establish an improved unified employment structure. Functional employment of forces would reduce the complications of introducing forces from one theater to another, create a structure for the operational employ- ment of a multi-Service force under one func- tional component, improve the effort to develop joint doctrine, and enhance a smooth transition from joint to combined operations.7 In presenting historical examples of problems with command relationships over the period since WW II, DIP 12 finds that: LESSONS LEARNED: Joint planning and employment of forces as Service entities is ineffective, inefficient, and does not foster common doctrine. When the military action becomes intense and the prompt and concentrated use of firepower is essential, functional employment of forces that crosses Service barriers is the most effective method to coordinate and integrate forces towards a common purpose.8 First, as was recognized in DIP 12, "normalizing" functional vice Service componency in the make-up of unified commands at all levels is contrary to the vast majority of current JCS level doctrine, in particular, JCS Pub 2. JCS Pub 2 mentions as a broad objective to be achieved by the unified commands the "Integration of the Armed Forces into an efficient team of land, naval, and air forces." This, however, is JCS Pub 2's only reference to "land, naval and air forces" in other than Service related contexts. This statement and others like it in various documents (such as the Unified Command Plan) is interpreted or at least used by the Air Force to promote an "intent of Congress" call for functional componency. It is the Marine Corps premise, however, that this type statement, instead, refers to the three mediums in which the Service components operate. It is the Services, themselves, which are "functionally" oriented in accordance with their assigned functions and responsibilities. JCS Pub 2 makes repeated references to the use of Service components as the basic structure of unified commands while also providing a great degree of flexibility to the overall unified force commander -- to plan for, deploy, organize, direct, coordinate and control his assigned forces. para. 30202: ...operational command will be exercised through the Service component commanders... or through the commanders of subordinate commmands.... para. 30203: pertaining to the exercise of directive authority "...is not intended to: (1) Discontinue Service responsi- bility for logistic support." and administrative support of component commands. para. 30205: Sound command organization should provide for: a. Centralized direction... para. 30213: Maintenance of Uni-Service Integrity. The command organization should integrate components of two or more Services into efficient teams while, at the same time, preserving to each Service its uni-service responsibilities. The commander of any force must give due consideration to these responsibilities. Further- more, organizational integrity of Service components should be maintained insofar as practicable to exploit fully their inherent capabilities.10 para. 30215: As to methods of exercising command by a unified force commander: (a) Through the Service component commanders. Although these extracts relate to the commander of a unified command, verbage in paragraphs 30234 and 30255 reflect similar authorities of subordinate unified and joint task force commanders. Paragraphs 30209 through 30212 also provide guidance for the organizational form of a command, including area and functional basis. The author could quote JCS Pub 2 for pages to support Service com- ponency at all levels of the unified command sructure. So, too, is there (lesser) support for the functional arguments. The Marine Corps premise, however, is as much behind preserving the unified commander's prerogative and authority for composition of subordinate forces as it is for promoting its preference for Service componency. JCS Pubs currently slant heavily towards this Marine Corps preference in their Service component verbage. Secondly, the Marine Corps position is supportable on a military efficiency and effectiveness level argument. Service forces are structured and trained to accomplish their primary missions as established by law and guided by JCS doctrine. A joint force commander must know that to employ and fight forces in a manner other than that in which they have trained and existed would sacrifice effec- tiveness. Communications, despite standardization efforts at various levels, still exhibit significant Service idio- syncracies. Logistics and administrative support to forces provided to unified commanders are very substantially Service oriented. To eliminate the Service component at any level would severely encumber these Service responsi- bilities. The MAGTF organization brings with it a fully integrated staff, command and control and coordination networks and systems and combat service support elements. To split this organization into ground and air elements would destroy the economies of integration in these areas and would require extensive reorganization and augmenta- tion. The MAGTF entity also provides the unified commander a unique, independent combined arms force capable of employment, reemployment and forceable entry anywhere within his area of responsibility. To dismember the MAGTF would destroy that flexibility and capability and diminish drastically the synergism of the integrated air-ground team. There is also question as to what a functionally organized component command structure provides when such a component includes forces of two or more Services. This aspect -- the authority and responsibility of, say, the "Air Component Commander" -- is the heart of the matter and is not well defined. The ambiguities in the command rela- tionships associated with a variety of historically used "air component commander" terms have existed as long as joint operations have been conducted. The Marine Corps position is accepting of "coordinating authority" for TACAIR and, as formally accepted in the Omnibus, single manager/mission direction authority as it relates to air defense and deep interdiction and reconnaissance. The Marine Corps position is tolerant also of the employment of the MAGTF as a subordinate element of an overall Land Component Commander. What is intolerable is the loss of MAGTF integrity or loss of operational control of any of its organic assets. It can accept tasking authority over designated portions of its TACAIR -- but it cannot accept an externally dictated TACAIR "weight of effort" deter- mination by anyone other than the joint force commander. This weight or priority of effort variable must be reserved to ensure adequate TACAIR support of the MAGTF. Its loss under the suspected "full command" relationship proposed within "functional componency" is contrary to the essence of MAGTF doctrine. It is probably also the essence of the of the Air Force's ultimate objective in the campaign for functional componency. Marine Corps (and Navy) beliefs maintain that unity of command, unity of effort and effective joint force integration are achieved through the designation of a joint force commander with the authority and responsibilities outlined in the current JCS Pub 2. It should also be noted that when the National Security Act of 1947 (and its subsequent amendments) and U.S. statutes reorganized the defense establishment, they not only created an independent Air Force Service, but also provided that both the Marine Corps and Navy were to have organic tactical aviation elements within the Services to support their functions, roles and missions. The arguments beyond the basic "functional componency" issue propose that when such organic Service TACAIR is involved in a theater of operations, it should be essentially stripped from its responsible Service -- and placed under the operational command/control of the Air Component Commander. Neither the statutes nor JCS doctrine imply that organic TACAIR was provided the Services only for their principal functions -- to be (normally?) reassigned to another Service when sup- porting collateral roles or missions. JCS Pub 2, instead, describes various supporting concepts, coordinating author- ities and attachment options available to the commander. These will be examined in Chapter 5. Command Relationships Although not presented in consolidated form, the paper has touched on historical, planned and proposed varieties of employment of a MAGTF within a joint force command structure. Each of several of these employment possibi- lities carries with it one or more potential command relationships to which the MAGTF and its TACAIR may find themselves subject. A brief examination of these command relationships is the subject of this section. The Marine Corps organizes for combat as a MAGTF. While the major elements of the MAGTF may actually arrive at or depart from a combat theater at different times, each element doctrinally remains under the command of the MAGTF commander. Within a (non-amphibious) joint force, the Marine Corps expects above all else to maintain its MAGTF integrity. There are, then, two basic command structures acceptable for the MAGTF within the joint force; one in which the MAGTF is employed as one of several equal-status Service components, and one in which the MAGTF is employed as an element of the forces assigned to a Land Component Commander. Click here to view image These two options do not consider the Navy-Marine Corps amphibious relationship (although the MAGTF could conceiv- ably remain subordinate to the Navy component) nor does it consider the dismemberment of the MAGTF into separate air and ground elements as desired by the Air Force. In the second case, the MAGTF is probably under the operational control of the Land Component Commander. The capability still exists, although somewhat cumbersome to exploit, for the CJTF to detach the MAGTF for independent theater operations. If the Army force commander is designated a Land Component Commander, however, the chances are that the Air Force commander has been designated the Air Component Commander. The authorities of these "functional" componencies as apply especially to other Service forces in the joint force must be spelled out in the establishing orders. While JCS Pub 2 touches on command organization on functional basis, its guidance is too general to establish acceptable authority without extensive elaboration. In either case, the roles of the predominant TACAIR force commander, normally the Air Force component, are a principal concern of the Marine Corps -- and this paper. MAGTF TACAIR, through the MAGTF and JTF commanders, will have a relationship with this air commander. His roles as the AADC, the Airspace Control Authority, and coordinator of CJTF command air tasking (excess) sorties are already established in joint doctrine. Omnibus adds to that set of responsibilities in its implied acceptance of his probable roles as coordinator of the JTF's air defense, interdiction and reconnaissance campaigns. These roles need to be defined and clearly understood when the CJTF establishes the command relationships. Historically MAGTF TACAIR has had relationships with such a joint force air component commander ranging from simple mutual support to complete loss of operational control. In very few cases has the relationship been perceived identically by the MAGTF, CJTF or Air Force -- and Omnibus does little to correct this regrettable dilemma. Chapter 5 will review the terminology ambiguities which contribute significantly to the problem. Applicable Issues Related to Aviation Functions Several aviation functional issues impact upon Omnibus implementation and the integration of designated MAGTF TACAIR into the joint force air environment and have not yet been examined. Some will be addressed more logically in the terminology discussions of the next chapter; others will be addressed below. Air defense is a principal element of the anti-air warfare or counter air functions of aviation. It is, more than most other aviation functions, intimately related to and dependent on Service or force command and control systems. It is important to distinguish between the "C2 of TACAIR" and the C2 systems and procedures used to conduct air defense. Command, control and direction assume dif- ferent practical meanings when used in the context of air defense C2 systems such as the MACCS and TACS. Essentially air defense C2 and direction are activities through which air commanders execute air defense operations through their C2 and weapons systems. Air direction is a form of control in this context which is involved in current operations to regulate, employ and maintain a balance between limited assets and priorities. Air control is the external direction of the maneuvering of an aircraft in relation to another object -- such as a radio or data link instruction to a fighter being maneuvered to intercept a hostile air track. Service command and control systems, in the air defense perspective, are highly compatible and mutually supportive. They are most often very easily integrated in a joint force environment through data link (TADIL's) and voice communication nets. In most operations or contin- gency plans and in joint exercises, the Services' organic air C2 systems are intergrated into the joint force air defense network in accordance with their capabilities, capacities and the tactical situation. Guidance from JCS doctrine (JCS Pubs 8, 10 and 12 principally) and the force commander's directives provide both the technical and operational data to effect this integration. Service or joint force introduction into a theater with an already existing C2 system creates a different situation. If the theater C2 system is still operational, the incoming force may not be tasked to integrate and may, instead, establish its C2 systems to monitor and probably supplement or back-up a portion of the overall network. The MAGTF will normally do either of these -- integrate into the new or established network or set up to monitor and supplement the theater system. The MAGTF prefers to be assigned an airspace/air defense sector overhead the MAGTF's (ground) area of responsibility. MAGTF direct support air operations would logically be expected to be the predominant air activity within at least a portion of this area. The assignment of such a sector is in consonance with JCS Pub 8. Any air defense network depends on integrated sensor (radar) data shared throughout the total system by each Service subscriber. This sharing of air track information maintains very comparable system's effectiveness despite different sensor limitations, attritions and down times. The MAGTF MACCS benefits especially in low altitude coverage afforded by Air Force AWACS E-3A's and Navy E-2C's. The MACCS benefits the TACS and NTDS through its very diverse TADIL buffers for linking between Service and allied systems. Assigning the MAGTF a sector for air defense/airspace control contributes significantly to the joint force network and facilities the MAGTF's organic direct (air) support. Air Interdiction is defined in JCS Pub 1 and Army and Air Force doctrine generally as operations against an enemy's military potential before it can be brought to bear effectively against friendly forces -- at such distances from those friendly forces as to not require detailed integration with them. The Air Force considers this as a mission which addresses targets essentially from the Fire Support Coordination Line (FSCL) out to the limits of TACAIR ranges -- and also an air campaign for which the Air Force is responsible. With the development of the Army's Air-Land Battle Doctrine, Army interest in the deep battle has assumed greater tactical priority. This deep battle -- to destroy, divert, delay or disrupt enemy forces of the "second echelon" -- obviously includes the air interdiction campaign as well as Army deep assaults and missile strikes. Army desire for control or at least greater influence over the air interdiction campaign, however, is a sensitive issue to the Air Force. Enter J-SAK. In late 1984, the Army and Air Force concluded an agreement on "joint attack of the second echelon" (J-SAK). A principal segment of the agreement is an Air Force acceptance (re-acceptance?) of the term Battlefield Air Interdiction (BAI) as a portion of the function air interdiction which applies to: attacks against land force targets which have a near term effect on the operations or scheme of maneuver of friendly forces, but are not in close proximity to friendly forces. ... The primary difference between BAI and the remainder of the air interdiction effort is the near term effect ad influence produced against the enemy in support of the land component commander's scheme of maneuver. BAI attacks require joint coordination at the component level during planning and may require coordina- tion during execution. BAI is executed by the air component commander as an integral part of a total air interdiction campaign.11 The J-SAK agreement on BAI closes a definition gap in the Air Force reference to ground attack in close and general support of a ground force. Interdiction by all referenced definitions refers either to area denial type targets such as roads, railways, bridges, communication centers, supply centers and the like, or to "...the enemy's military potential before it can be brought to bear...." This leaves a rather grey area between attacks on closely engaged enemy (CAS) and those echelons of an enemy not engaged at the FEBA/FLOT. Enemy there, although not in close contact, could be either capable of engaging friendly forces from longer ranges or could be upon the close engagement rapidly. BAI is not a clean gap filler. The restrictive air interdiction definition, of which BAI is supposedly "an integral part....", still requires "no detailed integration" and talks about a very ambiguous "distance". That may be somewhat irrelevant because, in fact, the Air Force's concept of an "air interdiction" campaign is far more encompassing than those limitations might allow. [THERE IS A PAGE MISSING FROM THE ORIGINAL PAPER] be discussed and, hopefully, placed beyond concern of the Omnibus provisions. These terms are "area of influence" and "area of interest". They are proposed for Omnibus control purposes in OH 5-1.1 and are an integral part of the Army's airland battle doctrine. From JCS Pub 1: area of interest--That area of concern to the commander, including the area of influence, areas adjacent thereto, and extending into enemy territory to the objectives of current or planned opera- tions. This area also includes areas occupied by enemy forces who could jeopardize the accomplishment of the mission. area of influence--A geographical area wherein a commander is directly capable of influencing operations by maneuver or fire support systems normally under his command or control.12 The Army airland battle doctrine within FM 100-5, Operations, talks to the area of influence as that within which the current battle is fought and the area of interest as an area which must be additionally monitored for enemy potential that may affect future operations. The terms are most often related to potential "time to contact" between the FLOT and enemy forces located. The area of interest is monitored for information which will affect tactical maneuver and firepower requirements. Within the enclosed area of influence, the commander needs to acquire detailed intelligence and target enemy forces for attack. Air Force commentary on these terms defines a corps sized area of influence as extending out to about a 90 NM radius from the FLOT and some 40 NM for a division. The area of interest extends roughly out to 200 NM for the Corps. These terms and distances are very significantly sub- jective. They may very well be useful for the commander of a MAGTF, employed independently or within a CATF's AOA, to limit and guide subordinate commanders' tactical planning. Their use by the MAGTF in a joint force environment for anything but such planning is probably unacceptable. A joint force commander with several ground forces under his command will require the establishment of unit boundaries, zones or areas of responsibility. To allow or assign the subordinate commanders such imprecise, greatly overlapping and very subjective areas of influence and interest would serve no practical purpose in that regard. When organic or assigned air support is incorporated into the determination of an "area of influence," that area comes into obvious conflict with adjacent units. Its use as a determining factor in combat responsibilities assignment such as targeting or airspace control seems to the author redundant, unmanageable and illogical. The terms will only be addressed further in the subsequent proposals to change OH 5-1.1. CHAPTER 4 Notes 1AFM 1-1, Functions and Basic Doctrine of the United States Air Force (Wash, D.C.: Dept. of the Air Force, 1984), p. 2-8. 2AFM 1-1, p. 4-2. 3AFM 1-1, p. 4-2. 4USAF Doctrinal Information Pub (DIP) 10, Back- ground Information on Air Force Perspectives for Coherent Plans (Wash, D.C.: Hdqtrs USAF, 1981), p. 1. 5DIP 10, Attachment 2, p. 1. 6DIP 10, Attachment 4, p. 4. 7DIP 12, Command Relationships (Wash, D.C.: Hdqtrs USAF, 1984), p. 1. 8DIP 12, Attachment 1, p. 7. 9DIP 12, Attachment 1, p. 9. 10JCS Pub 2, p. 43. 11US REDCOM Pamphlet 525-8, p. 2-7. 12JCS Pub 1, p 34. [THERE IS A PAGE MISSING FROM THE ORIGINAL PAPER] accomplishment of the assigned mission. Control, also from Pub 1, is authority that may be less than full command. The connected term "command and control" is the "...exercise of authority and direction by a properly designated commander over assigned forces...." One can see very subtle differences in even the basic terms. Operational command in the military JCS Pub 1 context is: Those functions of command involving the composition of subordinate forces, the assignment of tasks, the designation of objectives and the authoritative direc- tion necessary to accomplish the mission. It should be exercised through the use of the assigned normal subordinate organizational unit commanders. It does not include such matters as administration, discipline, internal organization and unit training (unless requested) and in areas of logistic support of a subordinate it very often is limited to coordination only. It, further, is uniquely applied to the operational control exercised by commanders of unified and specified commands over assigned forces. The terms operational command and operational control are synonymous in Department of Defense references. Change in operational control (OPCON), also known as CHOP, is therefore a change in operational command as defined. OPCON is, then, also a very authoritative relationship -- one which gives the authority for organization (not internal to elements), composition of forces, assignment of tasks and objectives and authoritative direction. (Although the word "organization" does not apply in the JCS Pub 1 or 2 definitions of OPCON, JCS guidance has on several occasions confirmed that such is included in the authorities of operational command.) In TACAIR C2 vernacular, this covers planning, appropriate apportion- ment, allocation, allotment, tasking authority, and the C2 of assigned forces. The operational control of the unified commander, theater commander and other joint force commanders over assigned forces is not normally subject to misunder- standing. It is the relationships between the forces assigned to such commanders, especially at a joint task force lever, which are often subject to great disagreement. The CJTF, for instance, cannot be involved too deeply in the detailed conduct of land or air operations of his force and will often delegate authorities and responsibilities to subordinate Service component commanders -- normally the commander with the preponderance of such resources. These designated commanders may also be assigned distinctive titles such as "Air Component Commander" (ACC), "Land Component Commander," or "Coordinating Authority for Air" (CAA), in addition to their Service component commander title. These titles mean little until their authorities and responsibilities are defined and promulgated. Coordinating authority is defined in JCS Pub 1 (and 2): A Commander or individual assigned responsibility for coordinating specific functions or activities involving forces of two or more Services .... The commander or individual has the authority to require consultation between the agencies involved, but does not have the authority to compel agreement. In the event that essential agreement cannot be obtained, the matter shall be referred to the appointing authority. JCS Pub 2 notes that a coordinating authority is more applicable to planning than operations but is useful "when it is desired to coordinate two or more agencies for a special common task without disturbing normal organiza- tional relationships in other matters." "Component com- mander" is discussed in JCS Pub 2 but leans very distinc- tively towards the Service component commander application. The only component-related JCS Pub 1 definition is that of an Air Force Component Headquarters, a field headquarters charged with conduct of Air Force operations. The terms air and land component commander are not JCS defined. Attachment as a command relationship is similar to "coordinating authority" in that it is not defined in it self. Within JCS Pub 1, attachment is the placement of a unit(s) or personnel in an organization on a temporary nature. The authority of the receiving organization is subject to limitations imposed by the attachment order. If none are stated, the receiving organization exercises command and control over the attachment to the same degree as his organic assets (less, normally, personnel tranfers and promotions). JCS Pub 2 grants authority over and responsibility for the attachment only as provided in the attachment order, and to require compliance to applicable reseiving command general regulations. Attached units must have their command relationships and responsibilities delineated in the attachment order. The relationship between the joint force commander and his immediate subordinate commands is OPCON. Relationships below that level involving different Services need to be clearly delineated in the establishment order. The title Air Component Commander means little unless the command structure and relationships are well defined. The title Coordinating Authority for Air means little unless the "specific functions or activities," and the participants are clearly delineated. Unless the term OPCON is used to define the relationship, the relationship is something less than that and needs definition. Of particular conern to the MAGTF commander will be command relationship descrip- tions and definitions which use terms like air component commander, single manager, and tasking authority -- as these very often are construed and used by the Air Force as OPCON -- and are sufficiently ambiguous to possibly authorize directing of priorities or weights of effort. Support relationships are also used in TACAIR C2. Support from JCS Pubs 1 and 2 is "the action of a force that aids, protects, complements or sustains another force in accordance with a directive requiring such action."7 Supporting relationships do not effect a transfer of command or operational control. There are several different types of support, first from JCS Pub 1: General support is that support which is given to the supported force as a whole and not to any particular subdivision thereof.8 Close support is that action of the sup- porting force against targets or objectives which are sufficiently near the supported force as to require detailed integration or coordination of the supporting action with the fire, movement, or other actions of the supported force.9 Mutual support is that support that units render each other against an enemy, because of their assigned tasks, their position relative to each other and to the enemy, and their inherent capabilities.10 JCS Pub 2 elaborates on these definitions. Mutual support is planned to facilitate attainment of common objectives -- but may also help with separate objectives of the forces. A joint force commander can direct mutual support and coordinate that support through joint planning and other liaisons. JCS Pub 2 continues in its discussion of general support to reflect that a supporting force in "general support" of another should have described in the establish- ing directive the purpose and scope of action taken. It may also include the strength to be allocated in support and further coordinating instructions. In its discussions of a "close support" relationship, it relates that the supported force will exercise general direction of the supporting effort within acceptable practices of the Service of the supporting force -- to include designation of objectives or targets, timing and duration of the supporting action.11, In each of these support relation- ships, the supported force commander is required to indicate in detail the support missions desired and all necessary coordinating information. The supporting force commander is required to take such necessary action to fill the desired missions, consistent with the priorities and requirements of other assigned tasks. The supporting force commander normally prescribes his own tactics and the strength to be committed to the support action unless it is directed in the establishing directive.12 Interestingly (to the author), the term direct support is not mentioned in JCS Pub 2. It's JCS Pub 1 definition: A mission requiring a force to support another specific force and authorizing it to answer directly the supported force's request for assistance.13 Although many consider "direct support" to be an artillery mission, the JCS Pub 1 in no way restricts it to such -- as it does for other types of artillery missions. As applies to TACAIR C2, direct support appears to be a much cleaner and more appropriate counterpart to general support than "close support." The close support definition actually implies that forces need to be within an estab- lished "close support" relationship to fly CAS cross-force. The author sees no value to the JCS Pub 2 descriptions of close support given the accompanying caveat statements concerning responsibilities and prerogatives of supporting commanders. Before moving into air mission terminology, a review of applicable Service use of stated support terms is appropriate. "Direct support" is used none other than within Omnibus: "Sorties in excess of MAGTF direct support requirements will be provided to the Joint Force Commander...." It is important to note that direct support as a command relationship requires a force to support another and is authorized to answer directly the supported force's requests -- but support provided does not have to be in direct response to a supported force's request to be termed direct support. Certain sorties of such general support missions as AI or air defense may in some situations become direct support due to, for instance, the location of a target or an air intercept. General support is used in the recently Published J-SAK operating procedures pamphlet for joint attack of the second echelon: From the air perspective, close combat and general support are provided to land forces to win the battle.... General support is provided by interdicting the enemy's combat power... and by attaining and maintaining air superiority. General support attack missions are provided by...air interdiction (AI) and counter air (CA).14 This is a consistent application of the general support definition. It follows that joint force SAR, tactical airlift and tactical air reconnaissance provided as support to the joint force as a whole are all conceptually "general support", although such missions may be principally flown in direct support of requesting components. The author has used this direct and general support thrust in previous work on TACAIR C2 and will use it significantly in the remainder of the paper. Air Mission Terminology Both Air Force and Marine Corps tactical air opera- tions doctrine direct the overall functions and missions of TACAIR into distinct functional air mission categories. Service function and mission breakouts are similar in many respects. Air Force terminology is shared by the Army while Navy doctrine is similar to that of the Marine Corps. Click here to view image NOTE: Endnotes will not be used in the following section. Due to the expected need of a reader to know from where the definitions are coming as the material is read, the reference and page numbers are included in the text. Figure 5-1 is a fairly close alignment of fixed wing TACAIR functions and missions of the Marine Corps and Air Force. The alignment, is tenuous because of unique terms, different applications and slants of terms, and the continuing and often piecemeal evolution and reorgani- zation of Service documentation. There are basically two aspects of these functions and missions which are used (inconsistently) to organize the terms -- the nature of the support they provide to friendly ground forces (not the nature of the support relationship between them) and the degree of integration (and/or coordination) required with these ground forces. The antiair warfare and counter air functions of the Services are very closely aligned and aside from the terminology titles and the placement of SEAD, the Service breakouts are essentially equivalent. Note, however, that "Air Defense" is only a portion of the AAW or CA effort. This will be examined in respect to Omnibus later in the paper. The alignment problems in the lower half of Figure 5-1 are extensive. The definitions used are prioritized in order of JCS Pub 1 or most senior or recent Service docu- mentation unless otherwise noted: Air Interdiction: Air operations conducted to destory, neutralize, or delay the enemy's military potential before it can be brought to bear effectively against friendly forces, at such distance from friendly forces that detailed integration of each air mission with the fire and movement of friendly forces is not required. (JCS Pub 1, p. 18) This is a major function of aviation for the Air Force. It is the major part of the Marine Corps' deep air support category of its offensive air support function. Note that it includes effects beyond that of "interdicting", and that in modern warfare its definition is flawed in that "before it can be brought to bear effec- tively against friendly forces" and detailed integration not required" should no longer be applied. Tactical missile (surface-to-surface) units may well be interdiction targets. With extensive use of maneuver warfare and deep battle tactics, detailed integration may often be required. These considerations significantly affect the subcategory of AI missions classified now as BAI. To both update the AI definition and cleanly include BAI within the AI function would entail modifying the AI definition to provide that such air operations are "normally" against opposition before it can be brought to bear... and that integration is "normally" not required. Offensive Air Support: ...those operations that actually deliver firepower against enemy ground forces for the destruction or neutralization of installations, equipment and personnel. (FMFM 5-1, p. 7) It should be noted that the NATO term OAS addresses tactical air operations which directly support the land battle -- CAS and those parts of interdiction and tactical air reconnaissance in direct support of land operations (not airlift). FMFM 5-4 (p. 7) states further that such missions are conducted to "directly assist the attainment of ground objectives..." (emphasis added). The Marine Corps further classifies OAS missions according to the degree of coordi- nation required with ground elements -- into deep and close air support. Deep Air Support (DAS). Air attacks against hostile targets which are at such distances from friendly units as to require no coordination with the fire and movement of those units; the term "deep air support" connotes de- livery or firepower beyond the fire support coordination line to destroy, neutralize, or delay enemy ground forces before they can be brought to bear effectively against friendly forces. (FMFM 5-1, p. 7) Tactical Air Support -- Air operations carried out in coordination with surface forces which directly assist the land or naval battle. (JCS Pub 1, p. 361) "Tactical air support" is used by the Air Force and Army to address air operations which directly support the land battle and includes close air support, tactical air reconnaissance, battlefield air interdiction and tactical airlift (Army FM 101-5-1). Again, with the exception of tactical airlift, this term equates to NATO's version of OAS. Battlefield Air Interdiction: "Air inter- diction attacks against land targets which have a near term effect on the operations or scheme or maneuver of friendly forces, but are not in close proximity to friendly forces.... (US REDCOM Pamphlet 525-8, J-SAK agreement operating procedures, p. 2-7) The J-SAK operating procedures pamphlet definition is used because it represents the latest Air Force statement on BAI (Dec '84). It further states that BAI requires "joint coordination at the component level during planning and may require coordination during execution." The mission close air support requires detailed inte- gration with friendly force fire and maneuver due to the close proximity between targets and friendlies. Services and publications are in agreement on CAS and elaboration is unnecessary. The terms air reconnaissance and tactical air reconnaissance are also jointly aligned -- Services and publications essentially agree, with JCS Pub 1 defining the latter term more comprehensively. No reference is made to support or coordination with ground forces. Antisurface or maritime air operations, armed recce, and electronic war- fare will not be directly addressed, although some of the subsequent discussion may be applied. Some general observations may help illuminate the alignment problems. The functions "Offensive Air Support" (USMC) and "Tactical Air Support" (USAF) share a support provided to friendly ground force characteristic -- their inclusive missions directly assist or support land opera tions. (The principal difference is that the Marine Corps OAS breakout limits included missions to those delivering firepower on the enemy, thereby excluding recce, airlift, assault support, etc.) Air Interdiction (Air Force) and AAW/CA air missions indirectly support friendly ground forces and could be termed "General Support." These distinctions allow an alignment as follows: General Support: Antiair Warfare (or Counter Air) Air Interdiction (including armed recce/maritime) Air Reconnaissance [other missions not TACAIR -- air- lift, SAR, etc.] Direct Support: Cerain Air Interdiction (in- cluding armed recce/maritime) Certain Air Reconnaissance Close Air Support [other missions not TACAIR -- assault spt, etc.] Figure 5-2 Fixed Wing TACAIR Fuctions by Nature of Support Provided The certain air interdiction of Figure 5-2 is basic- ally the J-SAK (and NATO) BAI mission. It is also the Marine Corps' DAS air interdiction mission given its (OAS) "directly assist..." elaboration from FMFM 5-4. When the Services define missions both in accordance with their supporting nature and the level of coordination or integration required with ground forces, conflicts in terminology are unavoidable. Direct support is distin- guished by the direct and timely assistance provided to a friendly ground force and its near term effect and influence on enemy force potential. It normally would include all missions flown in "direct support" of the ground force but does not need to be specifically in response to a request for support -- a potentially confusing play on words. Direct (air) support is predominantly, but not limited to, missions flown through the request procedures of an established "direct support" command relationship. This premise, however, conflicts with the "direct air support" definition in FMFM 5-4 (p. 4). The Marine Corps term direct air support is not defined in JCS Pub 1. Coordination and integration requirements should be applied to any mission which due to proximity or influence between forces or missions so demands it. Coordination and integration are required at different command levels and in different detail not so much because of mission category or requirement origination but because of the tactical situa- tion. Air operations planning and execution liaison must be pervasive to ensure that they take place. While on the subject of integration and coordination, it may be appropriate to touch on the Fire Support Coordination Line. The JCS Pub 1 and Service definitions of the FSCL all require coordination with ground forces for missions conducted within the line and require no coordination beyond the line. This last characteristic is a flaw in the definition (author's view) -- which is supported by narrative in FMFM 5-1, p. 215, para. 5305b. An effort should be made to change this JCS definition -- to retain the coordination required within the FSCL, but to replace the no coordination required beyond the line with a statement which prescribes coordination and integration as the tactical situation dictates for missions flown against targets beyond the FSCL. The author suspects the airland battle concept of the Army and Air Force will place them in agreement. Graphic representation of these fixed wing TACAIR missions shows that surface coordination measures beyond the Fire Support Coordinaion Line are probably impractical. Click here to view image The pertinence of these discussions will become evident in the analysis of the Omnibus terminology. Omnibus Terminology The Omnibus policy statement is quite full of terms that have been identified as Service-distinct, ambiguous or otherwise not condusive to making the JCS policy statement an "agreement." To start this discussion from top to bottom, the statement's title terms "Marine Corps TACAIR" and "Sustained Operations Ashore" are not defined in the Omnibus or any other known JCS document. Marine tactical aviation/aircraft includes very tactical helicopter aircraft which are not applicable to the intent of Omnibus. The title should have been "...Fixed Wing TACAIR...". "Sustained operations ashore" is an ambiguous term -- and so long as it excludes amphibious operations, that ambiguity is probably appropriate. The first three sentences recognize the established supporting unity of the MAGTF: The MAGTF commander will retain operational control of his organic assets ...The primary mission of the air combat element is the support of the MAGTF ground element...air assets will normally be in support of the MAGTF mission. This is "Support in the Broadest Sense" (JCS Pub 2, paragraph 30272, p. 55) -- organic air support. The next sentence starts revealing terminology problems: The MAGTF commander will make sorties available to the Joint Force Commander for tasking through his air component commander for air defense, long-range interdiction and long-range recon- naissance. CMC White Letter 7-81 explains that sorties "will be made available" in this context only when the CJTF assumes responsibility for those missions for the entire force. These are missions as discussed previously which are very condusive to, and would benefit significantly from, centralized management for a joint force. They would be run by the CJTF or his representative in "general support" of the JTF components -- as a whole. If not controlled through centralized management, then they would at least require extensive coordination by some type of coordinating authority for air. The AADC from JCS Pub 8 is such an established coordinator for air defense as is the ACA, from AFM 1-3 (etc.), for airspace control. This part of Omnibus, then, is a Marine Corps agreement to contribute through sortie provision, or at least by coordination, to CJTF managed missions in general support of the force. The three mission area designations make this agreement most ambiguous. Air defense, as noted in the last section, is a sub- division of both AAW and CA. It applies to the active and passive defensive measures taken against the enemy air threat. The offensive portion of AAW/CA is distinguishable from air interdiction only by the objectives/targets of the missions -- enemy air or air defense potential. In Omnibus then, the Marine Corps basically agrees to play in the joint force "long-range interdiction" campaign, but apparently does not agree to play in the conceptually similar offensive AAW effort. This is inconsistent and the author expects it is an inconsistency based on terminology misapplication rather than intent. Just what are the joint force long-range interdiction and reconnaissance campaigns? The terms are neither defined nor discussed in any doctrinal publication the author has found. Recall, however, that air interdiction in Marine Corps doctrine (as a part of DAS and OAS) is limited to air missions which "directly assist" the ground forces. If one were to arbitrarily say that air interdiction was normally "short-range" when in direct support of ground forces and "long-range" when in general support of the total force (at such distance that detailed integration is not required with friendly forces), then it may follow that the Omnibus term refers to "general support" air interdiction. That rationale applies also to the "long-range reconnaissance" mission. The Marine Corps has agreed to participate (in Omnibus-flawed terminology)-- in TACAIR-provided general support air campaigns of AAW/CA, air interdiction and air reconnaissance. It will do so by providing sorties to the JTF manager of those campaigns -- the air component commander or whatever title is bestowed upon the preponderant air component's commander. That Omnibus refers to an ACC is without regard to the recent Air Force functional componency and air component commander authority issues, and certainly without recognition of operational control authority. It is the author's conten- tion that the "air defense" term refers to all AAW or CA efforts and that "long range" refers to those portions of AI and air reconnaissance flown in "general support" of the JTF. The following line is also troublesome: Sorties in excess of MAGTF direct support requirements will be provided... for the support of other components of the JTF, or of the JTF as a whole. The MAGTF actually has no internal direct support relation- ships -- it's all organic, support in the "broadest sense." The MAGTF, then, will satisfy its own air support require- ments that are of a direct support nature -- CAS, certain air interdiction and certain air reconnaissance -- before declaring excess fixed wing TACAIR sortie availability. "Certain" in this case is as discussed through Figure 5-3, those portions of AI and reconnaissance flown which directly support or assist ground forces. It should be noted that the MAGTF in this JTF arena would not report excess based just on internal direct support requirements. It will also have "general support" obligations as discussed previously. The MAGTF will provide such sorties as are excess after allocation to fulfill both its direct support requirements and its general support obligations. These excess sorties can be used by the CJTF in support of other components (which would be essentially a direct support relationship) or in support of the JTF as a whole (a general support relationship). In Air Force vernacular, the MAGTF in Omnibus agrees to equitably contribute sorties to the joint force AAW/CA,, air interdiction and air reconnaissance campaigns in general support of the entire JTF. It will fulfill its own direct support requirements as much as possible in CAS, BAI and tactical air reconnaissance. Sorties expected to be available in excess of those obligations and requirements will be offered to the CJTF for direct or general support within the JTF. While sounding quite clear in these terms, a reading of the existing policy statement is quite less. A reworded Omnibus is Annex B. JINTACCS Terminology This paper will provide an implementation plan for the provisions of Omnibus in the JINTACCS air tasking cycle. This section will discuss several items pertaining to particular JINTACCS terminology. TACAIR C2: As has been previously mentioned, Chapter 1 of the JPTM discusses JTF organization/command relationships in a functional componency vein. This is inappropriately not in consonance with current JCS Pub 2. In the Air Operations chapter, it also makes multiple references to the establishment of "close support" rela- tionships. While consistent with JCS Pub 2, it is the author's opinion that JTF support relationships should be either general support or direct support. The close support relationship is equivalent to establishing authority to conduct only CAS in support of another component. Actually, the JTPM close support description is more like a direct support relationship and is so referenced as such under its "Cross-Force Support" discussion. Omission of the word "close" or its change to "direct" where it appears in the JPTM "close support" narratives would not detract from the text and will be recommended. It should also be noted that the JPTM Omnibus paragraph is an earlier version of this paper's Annex B -- provided by the author while working on the JINTACCS program. Its refinement or replacement by Annex B is probably desirable. ATOCONF Message: The ATOCONF message is an Air Force message used to both confirm cross-force support missions and disseminate the internal Air Force air tasking order. The fact that it is an Air Force only originated message is rather obscure in the JPTM. While it may be compatible with CAFM's, its use by the Navy/Marine Corps, other than in reading, would be impractical due to its complexity and CAFM's orientation. There is also concern about sending cross-force a message titled an "air tasking order." Cross-force mission data, requests and confirmations are far more palatable. The CENTCOM "Common Air Tasking" (derived from JCS Pub 12).is another palatable title. CHAPTER 5 Notes 1JCS Pub 1, pp. 76 and 87. 2JCS Pub 1, p. 263. 3JCS Pub 1, p. 92. 4JCS Pub 2, p. 57. 5JCS Pub 1, p. 40. 6JCS Pub 2, p. 53. 7JCS Pub 1, p. 356. 8JCS Pub 1, p. 158. 9JCS Pub 1, p. 70. 10JCS Pub 1, p. 242. 11JCS Pub 2, p. 55. 12JCS Pub 2, pp. 55-56. 13JCS Pub 1, p. 115. 14US REDCOM Pamphlet 525-8, p. 1-2. CHAPTER 6 Omnibus Reexamined This paper has provided substantial background and analysis of fixed wing TACAIR command and control and the integration of such MAGTF assets into the joint force air operations. There are still a few Omnibus items left to be examined; the general support apportionment, coordination and integration of MAGTF direct support, communication dependencies, and the transition from policy to doctrine. The General Support Apportionment The MAGTF commander "will make sorties available", in the author's view, to participate equitably in the general support of the JTF air campaigns of antiair warfare (or counter air), air interdiction and air reconnaissance. What would "equitable participation" entail? The following discussion represents a proposal of the author. The joint task force commander must consider the JTF's tactical situation, with emphasis on the MAGTF's situation, and the expected availability of fixed wing TACAIR within each of the participating force components when developing his apportionment guidance applicable to MAGTF Omnibus participation. The apportionment guidance can be in terms ranging from general mission guidance to weight of effort mission percentages or priorities. It may be promulgated daily, for periods of several days or based on a particular phase of the operation. It's the CJTF's preference. If the apportionment is issued by mission percentages, his breakout by mission should cover the specific JTF general support campaigns -- antiair warfare, air interdiction and air reconnaissance. Antiair warfare is essentially all general support. Air interdiction and reconnaissance, however, both may include general and direct support components. To distinguish between them may not seem necessary. The MAGTF ACE and Air Force TAF, however, have limited attack and tactical reconnaissance assets available. The apportionment distinction between the percentages given to direct or general support missions would represent the CJTF's guidance on which of those limited assets gets applied to the direct support of supported ground forces (e.g., the MAGTF and its GCE and the Air Force, the Army, for example) and which would go into the JTF's general support air interdiction and reconnaissance campaigns. BAI is an acceptable discriminator for the direct support portion of AI. There is no known similar term to discriminate direct support air reconnaissance. The author suggests that the terms tactical or battlefield air reconnaissance (TAR/BAR respectively) may be suitable. TAR is JCS Pub 1 defined -- but not as direct support limited. BAR is simply an author-proposed BAI counterpart. A CJTF's apportionment might then look like this: click here to view image In this example, the CJTF has apportioned the air effort in two related paragraphs. Paragraph 1 is his guidance for air function apportionment. This guides components in the preparation of their multipurpose TACAIR (aircraft) sortie allocation. Note that the AR (air reconnaissance) and EW missions are dashed -- components will have TACAIR air- frames configured (or designed for) several peculiar missions. Reconnaissance, electronic warfare, etc. aircraft are normally not capable of a variety of support missions and components need no guidance to fly them as appropriate; hence the dashes. The OTH category would be reserved for TACAIR missions not part of the five or more preceding functional categories. EX is the CJTF's guidance relating to component provisions to support CJTF common air tasking. This, of course, is a rather tenuous category -- and if used would have to be a "requested" apportionment. To make EX pure apportionment guidance would be contrary to the "excess" definition. It is a realistic apportionment, however, as components will rarely, if ever, have any excess other than that requested and "volunteered." Pure excess sorties in combat are probably non-existent. Realistically, too, the CJTF's apportionment "guidance" is subject to various Service interpretations -- ranging from "directive" to "suggested." The author suspects that it is probably someplace in between. Paragraph 2 of the example has the CJTF breaking out direct and general support portions of the AI and AR air campaigns under discussion. In AI, for instance, this would have the MAGTF providing 40 percent of their AI efforts to the JTF AI campaign and 60 percent to direct support (BAI). Service preferences and unique capabilities and limi- tations would be taken into account. The MAGTF ACE may not have 40 percent (per example) of its effort (sorties) capable of counter air. Certainly the CJTF may add categories and amplifying instructions to either paragraph. And, of course, the CJTF may not care to go into such detail at all. The paragraphs would be repeated for each air capable Service. The Services are structured and tasked very differently -- one apportionment breakout would rarely, if ever, apply to all components. Lacking such detailed apportionment guidance, the MAGTF simply would develop its normal internal apportion- ment and allocation as if it were alone on the battlefield (considering only a portion of the threat.) Those sorties that it would have flown alone for AAW, AI and AR in "general support" of the MAGTF would then be offered as its contribution to those JTF air campaigns, to be tasked or coordinated through the designated CJTF air manager. This, of course, could be very little -- the MAGTF does not usually fly a great deal of "long-range" air interdiction and reconnaissance. Coordinating and Integrating MAGTF Direct support The direct and general support campaigns of AI and AR as developed in this paper are potentially conflicting in execution. With the MAGTF conducting direct support interdiction, or BAI, and reconnaissance, BAR (author's acronym, for grins), along the MAGTF frontage and the Air Force managing and conducting general support JTF air interdiction and reconnaissance campaigns over the JTF operations area, there is certain to be geographic over- lap. As has been discussed, there is no tactical or pure geographical dividing line between AI/AR and BAI/BAR. The coordination, integration and deconfliction of MAGTF and Air Force efforts in these areas pose difficult problems. Several proposals have been made. The Marine Corps in Operational Handbook 5-1.1 (and a 1982 CENTCOM paper) proposed the establishment of a surface coordination line separating MAGTF controlled targeting and direct support mission conduct from JTF/Air Force air interdiction and reconnaissance. This Deep Air Support Coordination Line (DASCL), as it was called, would be aligned with the MAGTF area of influence and, as possible, with its airspace - control sector. The author believes the area of interest "line" too subjective and ambiguous and the airspace control sector too unrelated to direct support or DAS to be of any use. In certain situations, such a coordination measure may be workable -- but not often enough to establish a DASCL or equivalent as a normal control measure procedure or doctrine. The author proposes several mutually supportive pro- cedures. First, the JTF AI/AR campaign manager should adopt as policy the tasking/assignment of MAGTF provided general support sorties to those AI/AR missions which are along the MAGTF frontage. This would pass a significant portion of the BAI/BAR deconfliction responsibility back to the MAGTF TACC. Secondly, the CJTF should require the MAGTF to staff a coordination element at the appropriate JTF command center, probably the TACC-AF, much like the Army's Battlefield Coordination Element. Their function would be to coordinate MAGTF BAI/BAR with the air campaign manager and applicable JTF AI/AR with the MAGTF. Mainte- nance and integration of target lists and assignments, air tasking cross-feed and preparation assistance for the MAGTF's portion of the common air tasking message (or JINTACCS ATOCONF) would be their principle tasks. It would not be a liaison officer or office. It, instead, would be an element/staff which would supplement the liaison officer in the implementation of Omnibus provisions. The author contends that if the Marine Corps wants to retain OPCON of its TACAIR beyond the FSCL, it has to make a large coordi- nation effort as outlined above. The Army-Air Force J-SAK agreement and procedures previously referenced may assist in the development of detailed targeting and air integra- tion procedures for Omnibus implementation. Command and Control and Communications Dependencies Omnibus commits the MAGTF to integrate its TACAIR extensively into the JTF air effort. Implementation of the provisions of the policy makes great demands on the command and control and communications networks of the JTF. The demands are, however, somewhat redistributed and are substantially greater than normal in respect to their required reliability, responsiveness and timeliness. A significant portion of the MAGTF ACE planning process may be shifted under Omnibus to the TACC-AF (or any CJTF designated manager's C2 center.) The JOC also has increased workloads and MAGTF coordination elements should pick up these added burdens. Each message in the preplanned air tasking cycle takes on very increased importance when Omnibus assets are being provided, allotted, tasked and confirmed. The failure or delay in communications at any place in the cycle brings the entire policy to a grinding halt, potentially wasting valuable sortie capacity -- and creating undesirable JTF vulner- abilities. The MAGTF coordination elements must be adequately staffed and fully utilized. The preplanned air tasking cycle message exchanges must be protected and provided secondary and tertiary communication paths. Air delivery of these messages may provide communications reliability worth far more than the asset cost in delivery duties. Transition to Doctrine CMC White Letter 7-81 promulgated the Omnibus policy state- ment and limited elaboration. While the White Letter explains the basic intent of the JCS policy statement, it often is ambiguous and does not go into any detail on unique terms or implementation procedures. OH 5-1.1 is the Marine Corps' only (interim and quasi-) doctrinal elaboration yet available. However, the OH not only offers several new terms and aspects of the terminology, but also contradicts the White Letter significantly. It further presents the material in a manner which might easily be interpreted by a reader as an explanation of procedures and agreements developed by the Service chiefs in the formulation of the JCS policy statement. Much of the OH, however, is totally uni-service developed and is therefore well beyond the JCS policy statement. Marine commanders in joint exercises have great difficulty implementing Omnibus given the absence of useable OH or JCS guidance. During the spring of 1983, major Fleet Marine Force commands submitted detailed review comments to OH 5-1.1. A draft revision was developed and, in June 1984, entered Marine Corps Development and Education Command (MCDEC) staffing.1 It's still there. It does, however, provide a good starting point for further transitioning of Omnibus policy into doctrine. The entire FMFM 5-series aviation doctrine publica- tions are currently under review for a major update and reorganization.2 It would be timely, then, to promulgate the draft revised OH to allow further staffing and incorporation of Omnibus into the FMFM 5-series, completing the transition from policy to doctrine. The applicable chapters of the proposed draft OH are attached as Annex C, Appendix 1, to this paper. In light of the author's research, several changes to the draft are offered in the accompanying Appendix 2. Change bars and notes referencing the numbered comment paragraphs of Appendix 2 are annotated on the applicable pages of Appendix 1. It is proposed that they be incorporated in the draft and that the "revised draft revision" be distributed for FMF review prior to final rework of the FMFM 5-series publications. This concludes the reexamination of Omnibus. Chapter 7 will provide a JINTACCS program implementation procedure for the Omnibus procedures. CHAPTER 6 Notes 1CG MCDEC letter on "C2 of Marine TACAIR" (Quantico, Va.: MCDEC, 1984), Enclosure (1), Draft Revision to OH 5-1.1, Chapters 1, 3 and 4. 2CG MCDEC letter on "Annual Review of MC Doctrinal Publications System" (Quantico, Va.: MCDEC, 1984), Enclosure (1), Chairman, PAB 1tr 29 Nov 84, TAB G of Enclosure (4). CHAPTER 7 Omnibus Implementation and JINTACCS As mentioned previously, the JINTACCS character oriented message standard and the concurrently developed interface operating procedures (IOP's) are scheduled for JCS-wide implementation in September 1986. At this writing, the standard and IOP's are undergoing a final operational effectiveness demonstration (OED) in the CINCLANT joint service exercise Solid Shield '85. The standard and IOP's are expected to pass the OED and be promulgated for final Service staffing over the coming year. This brief chapter will review the JINTACCS preplanned air tasking cycle, explain a proposed Omnibus implementation, and provide JINTACCS ALLOREQ and SORTIEALLOT message examples. The JINTACCS Preplanned Air Tasking Cycle To reset the stage, the JTF is established ashore in sustained land operations. It is composed of a MAF sized MAGTF, a two corps Army force, a tactical air force and a Navy component in support. The TAF is the preponderant air component and has been designated as the CJTF's Air Component Commander (ACC) (not to include OPCON, but coordination/management responsibilities) as well as AADC, ACA and manager of the general support JTF counter air, air interdiction and air reconnaissance campaigns. He is also managing the JRCC and the JMC. The CJTF is considering placing the MAGTF under the Army in a Land Component Commander relationship -- but for now is preserving full MAGTF Service componency. CJTF has been promulgating air apportionment guidance every other day. His latest message passed the following guidance to the MAGTF: Click here to view image MAGTF ACE planners now get to work translating this guidance into an employment plan for inclusion in their ALLOREQ -- due back to the CJTF some thirty hours prior to the tasking period. That MAGTF ALLOREQ not only includes its employment plan, but also lists and amplifies anticipated excess sorties for the period, requests cross- force air support which it requires and cannot fill itself and passes all available mission data on those requests. There are only two data sets of the ALLOREQ which need to be addressed in respect to Omnibus, the 8ALLOCAT and 8JNTEXC sets (allocation and joint/excess sorties sets respectively). The MAGTF would use the 8ALLOCAT to not only report its employment plan but also to make sorties available for its contributions to the general support JTF CA, AI and AR efforts. Of 200 applicable TACAIR sorties (not including recce, etc.) expected for the period, then, the JTF guidance is to fly 40 CA sorties, 60 AI/BAI sorties, 80 CAS sorties and 10 other and excess sorties. This would look as follows in the current JINTACCS set: Click here to view image This complies fully with CJTF guidance -- whether such exact compliance would normally be the case is not important here. Note that the SA column totals 220 and would be higher if more aircraft were listed. The 20 extra sorties available (SA), are from the REC (reconnaissance) and OTH (other, such as OA-4 AFAC) allocations not apportioned in total by the CJTF. The INT (AI) column totals 24 which is 30 percent of 200 sorties split between AI and BAI (.30 X 200 X .40) . BAI is computed similarly. All recce sorties to be flown are reported in the REC column as there is no functional DS/GS breakout and a comment is used instead. The 8JNTEXC set elaborates JTF general support and excess sortie categories; the tasking period for this example is 010001 to 020001: Click here to view image In this set, the MAGTF has distinguished general support from excess sorties by notes in the CMNT column and further limits and amplifies the general support and excess sorties as required. The Service ALLOREQ's also include air mission data as is available on all their shortages -- contained within the set 8REQUEST and the SARTS (Chapter 3). The data sets in Figures 7-2 and 7-3 are received at the CJTF's JOC. The CJTF now allots the JTF general support sorties to the ACC for tasking and pairs (and allots) the excess sorties provided with other compatible component requests for support. These allotments are sent to the components in the CJTF SORTIEALOT message. There are three applicable data sets in the CJTF SORTIEALOT. The 8ALLOCAT set, as was shown in the ALLOREQ example, reflects the component sortie allocations into an employment plan. The set would be repeated in the SORTIEALOT to change the employment plans of multiple components if required -- one component per set. In this example, no changes are made by the CJTF and no 8ALLOCAT set would therefore be included in the message. The 8ALLOT set is used to establish,allot and pro- mulgate the excess and request pairings for cross-force support. It would also be the CJTF's vehicle to allot the MAGTF's JTF general support sorties to the ACC. The following example does this first, then pairs the MAGTF excess with some hypothetical Army requests -- which would have been reported on the Air Force ALLOREQ due to their unique supporting relationships. Click here to view image This allotment set has now passed MAGTF general support sorties to the Air Force as ACC. It also has paired excess A-4 and AV-8 CAS sorties with Army requests -- numbers 1AR060 and 1AR066. Note that the REQNO field (request number) for general support has a joint task force (JT) request number assigned. This is appropriate since they are JTF missions and did not get allotted in response to Air Force requests. Note that in the AMPN (amplification) set, AMPN note A1 and A2 refer a reader to the subsequent 8JNTEXC set. This is because all limitations on these sorties delineated in the component ALLOREQ 8JNTEXC set still apply and are forwarded in such cases in the CJTF's SORTIEALOT 8JNTEXC set. The 8JNTEXC set should reference the assigned REQNO in the comment field. For example, the fourth line, 6 A-4 INT, of the 8JNTEXC would look like this: Click here to view image The SORTIEALOT continues with mission data duplicated from the component ALLOREQ's on all approved (APP) requests. This is essentially a direct lift from those ALLOREQ's of lines pertaining to the approved requests and is consolidated in the SORTIEALOT's 8REQUEST set and SARTS. In response to this allotment of MAGTF JTF general support sorties, the Air Force uses its ATOCONF message not just for internal ATO dissemination and cross-force support confirmation, but also to provide air mission tasking data to those CA, INT and AR sorties to be flown by the MAGTF. In an Omnibus unique play of the air tasking cycle, the MAGTF would properly respond with a REQCONF -- confirming that it will fly the allotted sorties as tasked in the ATOCONF. In this example, the MAGTF would also send a REQCONF to the Army confirming the two lines of cross-force CAS support. That essentially is all that would be required for Omnibus implementation of the general support provisions developed within the paper. The last section briefly discusses potential JCS cub 12 and CENTCOM SOP implemen- tations within their existing air tasking cycles. Other Air Tasking Cycles In Chapter Three, the paper examined the air tasking cycle of JCS Pub 12 and that of a representative unified command, U.S. Central Command (CENTCOM). Some brief notes on Omnibus implementation within these processes is appropriate. In the pure JCS Pub 12 preplanned air tasking cycle (no other is presented), the messages follow an exchange process similar to that just explained in the preceding JINTACCS section. The Air Allocation/Employment Plan and Sortie Allotment messages serve functions very similar to the JINTACCS ALLOREQ and SORTIEALOT. They, however, lack format capacity for elaboration on air requests and reported excess and do not address the general support type of sorties. This will require the use of extensive narrative in these messages to explain sortie provisions and misson request data -- similar but more comprehensive than that shown in the, CMNT and AMPN fields and sets of the JINTACCS examples of Chapter 4 and the preceding figures in this chapter. Instead of including air support request mission data within these two messages, the Pub 12 cycle follows with cross-force mission data and confirmation messages. These messages can easily be used by the JTF general support air campaign manager to task MAGTF general support sorties and by the Marine Corps to confirm such tasking. The JCS Pub 12 air tasking process, then, requires substantial narrative elaboration but is capable of implementing Omnibus without further modification. Again, distinctions mut be made between JTF general support and excess sorties provided by the MAGTF. The CENTCOM air tasking cycle was referenced as a sample unified command tasking process. Instead of excess" sorties, CENTCOM uses the term common air tasking, or CAT, sorties. It is important to keep the categories "excess" and "general support" distinct. As long as the narrative elaboration makes the distinction between "excess" and JTF general support sorties, the CENTCOM preplanned common air tasking cycle is capable of implementing the Omnibus provisions. If the CENTCOM CAT process is to include JTF general support sorties as well as excess, their definition of CAT needs to be revised. The JINTACCS preplanned air tasking cycle, messages and IOP's provide the best documented support for an Omnibus implementation. Other available processes will require much more elaborating narrative. CHAPTER EIGHT Conclusions and Recommendations The Omnibus policy statement represents significant Service compromise in, and JCS recognition of, some very basic doctrinal premises. For the Marine Corps, it is an Air Force/JCS recognition of the MAGTF as a unity, that the MAGTF commander will normally retain operational control of MAGTF elements, and that MAGTF TACAIR will remain principally in support of the MAGTF mission. For the Air Force, it is a Marine Corps/JCS recognition that MAGTF TACAIR will contribute equitably and significantly to the JTF general support missions of counter air (or at least the air defense portion), air interdiction and air reconnaissance, and, as is at least implied, that the Marine Corps recognizes these as principally Air Force component missions in support of the JTF as a whole, requiring their single management approach (less OPCON). The author contends that if the Marine Corps jointly exercised, planned and otherwise participated with the Air Force with a clear understanding of these compromises -- and an intent to integrate MAGTF TACAIR accordingly -- that much of the wind now in the sails of the functional componency issue would be spent. Omnibus establishes a policy for major integration of MAGTF fixed wing TACAIR into the JTF air effort and, practically speaking, into the Air Force air tasking process. It is the MAGTF acknowledgement not that the Air Force is any better than it is in planning antiair warfare, air interdiction or air reconnaissance but that such missions should be conducted in general support of the JTF (as a whole), under centralized management. The MAGTF will participate equitably in that JTF general support. To do so while maintaining operational control of its partici- pating assets and reserving for itself primary MAGTF direct (air) support responsibility is the concept behind the Omnibus policy. What has been lacking in the Omnibus arena is an understandable elaboration of the concept and a workable implementation plan for the exercise of its provisions. These deficiencies have been the thrust of this paper. Conclusions Historically Marine combat forces and their TACAIR have been employed in theater warfare within a wide variety of joint force command structures and relationships. The effectiveness of these structures and relationships and the impact they have had on combat efficiency have been as subjectively varied as the proficiency, personalities and perceptions of the commanders involved. The functional componency issue is essentially derived from a strong Air Force perception that history and logic demand that the unified command structure recognize functional command as the best of several command structure options. While disagreeing with that premise, the Marine Corps does agree that several aviation functions do need single joint force management. Omnibus obligates the MAGTF to support such single management so long as it does not involve its loss of TACAIR operational control. The Marine Corps prefers strongly joint force employ- ment as a uni-service force -- preferably with Service component status or under the Army as a land component commander if necessary and appropriate. These preferences are not simply self-serving. The MAGTF's unique combat potential and "synergism" as a potent, redeployable combat force justifies maintenance of MAGTF unity within a joint force environment. The benefits of unity of command at this component level must be carefully weighed. The MAGTF argues such while recognizing that the final organizational decisions are the task force and unified commanders'. Marine and Air Force command and control philosophies, procedures and systems are remarkably similar. Differences do exist principally due to the basic roles and missions of the Services. While the Marine Corps emphasis is on short duration, limited scope amphibious operations, the Air Force perspective is justifiably oriented to sustained theater warfare. This is a major impetus to their functional componency arguments. Within this theater perspective, Air Force "general support' missions are a very legitimate primary concern. They must prepare and organize to provide effective umbrella counter air, air interdiction and air reconnaissance (also SAR and airlift) to the joint force as a whole throughout the theater. MAGTF command and control and TACAIR assets are fully capable of integration into the support of these Air Force efforts. Terminology is the root of significant difficulties encountered in this integration effort. Unique terms and varying perceptions of like terms create misunderstanding and miscommunication all too frequently -- in both history and current operations. Intentionally ambiguous termi- nology, unclarified in operational exercise, is a further source of misunderstanding. Associated with these termi- nology troubles are some problems with doctrinal publica- tions. JCS Pub 2's use of general and "close" support to the exclusion of direct support tends to limit the use of the latter in the joint force environment. The author perceives that as detrimental and unduly imposing on the joint force commander. Closer to home, Marine Corps FMFM 5-series publications have some serious inconsisten- cies amongst themselves and in functionally categorizing aviation missions. By definition and implication, the Marine Corps does not have an indirect/general support air interdiction mission. All its strike missions, except offensive AAW, must directly assist the ground force as part of its offensive air support function. FMFM 5-5 incorrectly dissects AAW into active and passive elements vice FMFM 5-1's correct offensive and defensive breakouts. FMFM 5-4 does not completely support FMFM 5-1's DAS defini- tion, nor is OAS clearly defined. Direct air support is a unique Marine Corps term which the author believes is defined too restrictively. OAS is also uniquely explained and results in a breakout of aviation functions in the Marine Corps which is unnecessarily out of sync with the Air Force (Tactical Air Support), Army and NATO (OAS). There are two JCS terms the author takes issue with as well. Air interdiction's attack of the enemy potential "before it can be brought to bear effectively" and at such distances so as to not require detailed integration with friendly ground forces are characteristics which often are no longer appropriate, and in practice are no longer considered. The FSCL's "without coordination" (non-) requirement for strikes beyond it is too permissive. While this control measure is needed to ensure coordination for the ground commander of strikes inside the FSCL, coordi- nation on strikes beyond it are a function of diverse tactical situations, not some line in front of the FLOT. These are terminology problems that can be resolved and incorporated into a more complete JCS Pub 1. Omnibus is a flawed policy statement in that it uses ill-defined terminology subject to much misinterpretaton and is plain hard to decipher. Perhaps it represents the best that could be done politically? The author believes its intent was to represent a reasonable and realistic compromise between the Services on TACAIR employment. OH 5-1.1, instead of clarifying the intent and offering implementation guidance, grievously confused the issues. Although not analyzed within the report, volumes of files at MCDEC's air doctrine department and the Annex C draft revision extract attest to the Marine Corps' failure to transition from the JCS policy statement to doctrinal incorporation. It's been over four years now and with a major overhaul of the FMFM 5-series publications in progress, the time for transition to doctrine seems upon us. JINTACCS message standards and IOP's (JPTM) scheduled for implementation in 1986 offer additional impetus and utility in promulgating and implementing Omnibus. They also do a good job at refining the inter-Service relation- ships within a joint force. The latest version of the JPTM, however, (REDCOM modified) has a distinctive func- tional componency slant which must be scrutinized. It also needlessly realigns itself with the cumbersome JCS Pub 2 "close support" support relationship verbage. A basic "in support of" or direct support terminology is much preferred. The most difficult area for Omnibus implementation is the integration of MAGTF direct support beyond the FSCL (e.g., BAI and recce) with the overlapping JTF general support air interdiction and air reconnaissane campaigns. It is the author's opinion that this will be best handled by prudent tasking of MAGTF general support into the area of potential mission conflict, reasonable commanders' liaison and the formation of MAGTF TACC coordination elements to serve with the JTF's air manager. Further surface coordination measures, such as the DASCL, and areas of influence/interest, are believed unsuitable for application in what should be an integration effort. Recommendations Annex B is a reworded Omnibus aligned with the premises developed in this paper and phrased in JCS terminology. It is offered as the author's perception of the intent of the compromises which produced the Omnibus policy statement. Its promulgation in the next OH 5-1.1 may be of benefit. Annex C, Appendix 2, is the author's recommended changes to the draft MCDEC revision to the currently flawed OH 5-1.1. FMFM 5-series need to be aligned. Terms which are in conflict or otherwise flawed are OAS, DAS (FMFM 5-1 versus 5-4), AAW (FMFM 5-1 versus 5-5) and direct air support. Chapter 5 suggests a major realignment of the OAS category, including the separation of air interdiction and the adoption of the BAI term. There appears to be little justification for such important terms to be misaligned between Services. Such disparities should be eliminated as a matter of priority. JCS Pub 1 terms believed flawed are air interdiction and the FSCL. Joint service effort should be pursued to update these terms. The JCS Pub 2 discussion of close support should be reworked into the cleaner direct support (Pub 1) context. The terms excess sortie, BAI and OAS (a joint/NATO version) should be reviewed in the joint arena for inclusion of acceptable definitions into JCS Pub 1. The JINTACCS implementation schedule should be supported enthusiastically. Service final review, especially of the functional componency slant of the JPTM Chapter 1 and the close support discussions and references in Chapter 3, should be conducted in a thorough and timely manner with an emphasis on joint standardization. Service doctrinal publications should be revised accordingly. Finally, coordination with the Air Force should be effected to arrange for full and consistent exercise of the Omnibus provisions in all joint exercises. The piece- meal and inconsistent air integration efforts currently being exercised provide experiences too varied to be of long-term benefit. They are distinctly unique from one unified command, and even exercise, to the next. Omnibus should be the basis for cooperative MAGTF-Air Force joint TACAIR integration. It's a step in the right direction -- towards one another -- for both Services. Until it's communicated effectively and exercised accordingly, they may be steps that leave both Services still too far apart on this very important aspect of joint coordination. ANNEX A AMMOTATED BILIOGRAPHY ANNEX A Annotated Bibliography Joint Chiefs of Staff (JCS), Service and NATO Publications Joint Primary JCS Publication 1. DOD Dictionary of Military and Associated Terms. Washington, D.C.: JCS, 1 April 1984. JCS Pub 1 has been used throughout the paper as the principal reference for definitions. JCS Publication 2. Unified Action Armed Forces (UNAAF). Washington, D.C.: JCS, 1974. JCS Pub 2 was used extensively for command and control applications within the joint force environ- ment. The author agrees with Hdqtrs, USMC positions that componency within Pub 2 is heavily slanted towards Service componency. Whether the level of this componency is restricted to the unified command level as opposed to subordinate joint forces is perhaps open to further interpretation. JCS Publication 8. Doctrine for Air Defense from Overseas Land Areas. Washington, D.C.: JCS, 1964. Background information dealing with joint force air defense and the AADC. JCS Publication 12. Tactical Command and Control Pro- cedures for Joint Operations. Volume IV, Part 4. Washington, D.C.: JCS, 1 Dec 1984. Chapter 1 of Part 4, in particular, is the current JCS guidance on common (cross-force) air tasking within a joint force. Joint Interface Test Force (JITF). JINTACCS Functional Segments IOP. Ft. Monmouth, N.J.: JITF, 2 Dec 1984. This is the final JITF produced IOP compilation. The author used Chapters 1 (General), 2 (Intelli- gence), and 3 (Air Operations) as initial reference for JINTACCS IOP's. U.S. Central Command. Operations SOP, Regulation 525-1 (Air Tasking). MacDill AFB, Fl: Hdqtrs CENTCOM, 30 Mar 1984. The SOP is used as a sample current unified command procedural set-up for common air tasking. CENTCOM has done some excellent work in this area as discussed in the paper. U.S. Readiness Command. Joint Procedures Training Manual for Message Text Formats. MacDill AFB, Fl: USREDCOM, 15 Oct 1984. The author bases JINTACCS IOP material within the paper on this document. It is the final input to CINCLANT for the 1985 OED and as such practically supercedes the JITF IOP document. It was of interest to note the functional componency element inserted by REDCOM. U.S. Readiness Command. General Operating Procedures for the Joint Attack of the Second Echelon. USREDCOM Pamphlet 525-8. MacDill AFB, Fl: USREDCOM, 31 Dec 1984. This J-SAK SOP relates the most recent agreement between the Army and Air Force on the BAI mission -- command and control, target nomination and air tasking. USMC Primary Fleet Marine Force Manual (FMFM) 5-1. Marine Aviation. Washington, D.C.: Hdqtrs USMC, 24 Aug 1979 (reprint 1983). Basic reference for Marine aviation doctrine. FMFM 5-4. Offensive Air Support. Washington, D.C.: Hdqtrs USMC, 13 Sep 1979. Supplement to FMFM 5-1 as applies to OAS. The author used major portions of this FMFM -- in particular definitions and employment/tasking concepts and procedures. FMFM 5-5. Antiair Warfare. Washington, D.C.: Hdqtrs USMC, 14 Jul 1980. Supplement to FMFM 5-1 as applies to AAW. The author used extensively the definitions and employment concepts sections. Operational Handbook 5-1.1. Command and Control of USMC TACAIR. Quantico, Va.: Marine Corps Development and Education Command (MCDEC), 10 Sep 82. A very flawed document relating to C2 of TACAIR -- especially its treatment of Omnibus. The paper offers recommended changes in detail. Operational Handbook 5-3. Tasking USMC Fixed-Wing Tactical Aviation. Quantico, Va.: MCDEC, 27 Jul 1982. Excellent background on TACC tasking processes. USAF Primary Air Force Manual (AFM) 1-1. Functions and Basic Doctrine of the United States Air Force. Washington, D.C.. Hdqtrs USAF, 1984. A recently reorganized and updated narrative on USAF mission perceptions. AFM 1-3 (and FM 100-18, NWP-17, and LFM 04). Doctrine and Procedures for Airspace Control in the Combat Zone. Washington, D.C.: Hdqtrs USAF, 1 Dec 1975. This is essentially a joint service version for airspace control and the ACA, similar to JCS Pub 8 but for air defense and the AADC. AFM 2-7. Tactical Air Force Operations -- Tactical Air Control System (TACS). Washington, D.C.: Hdqtrs USAF, 1979. The author used this publication, updated via JINTACCS IOP material, for TACS background and employment concepts. Doctrinal Information Publication (DIP)-10. Background Information on Air Force Perspectives for Coherent Plans. Washington, D.C.: Hdqtrs USAF, April 1981. DIP 10 is one of the initial documents of the post-Omnibus USAF campaign to promote functional componency within unified commands. DIP-12. Command Relationships. Washington, D.C.: Hdqtrs USAF, Jan 1984. DIP 12 follows earlier DIP's 10 and 11 and intro- duces the desired changes to JCS Pub 2 required to promote functional componency within unified commands. USA Primary Field Manual (FM) 100-1. The Army. Washington, D.C.: Hdqtrs USA, 14 Aug 1981. Basic Army mission perception background. FMFM 100-5. Operations. Washington, D.C.: Hdqtrs USA, Sept 1982. This publication is the basic organization and operations explanation of the Air-Land Battle concept now practiced by the Army. FM 100-26. The Air-Ground Operations System. Washington, D.C.: Hdqtrs USA, 1979. The AGOS publication was used to review the Air Force-Army direct/close air support operations system. Secondary Allied Administrative Publication (AAP)-6. NATO Glossary of Terms and Definitions for Military Use. Brussels, Belgium: NATO Military Agency for Standardization (NMAS), 1 Apr 1984. Allied Tactical Publication (ATP) 33. NATO Tactical Air Doctrine. Brussels, Belgium: NMAS, 11 Mar 1976. ATP 40. Doctrine and Procedures for Airspace Control in the Combat Zone. Brussels, Belgium: NMAS, Dec 1984. DIP 1. So You Want to Know About JCS Pub 2! Washington, D.C.: Hdqtrs USAF, 25 Aug 1979. DIP 4. Service Issues -- How They Arise. Washington, D.C.: Hdqtrs USAF, 23 Feb 1979. DIP 11. Command Relationships, The Marine Air/Ground Task Force, and What Than to an Airman! Washington, D.C.: Hdqtrs USAF, 1981. FMFM 0-1. Marine Air-Ground Task Force Doctrine. Washington, D.C. Hdqtrs USMC, 31 Aug 1979. JITF. JINTACCS Technical Interface Design Plan, Volume VI, Air Operations. Fort Monmouth, N.J.: JITF, Dec 1984. Joint Service Agreement: USA/USAF Agreement for the Joint Attack of the Second Echelon. Washington, D.C.: Hdqtrs USA and USAF, 28 Nov. 1984. Books Moymer, William W. Airpower in Three Wars. Washington, D.C.: Dept. of Air Force, 1978. Retired General Moymer is one of the foremost USAF writes on theater functional componency for all joint force operations. This history is slanted heavily to support that preference but is still a very comprehensive review of TACAIR C2 and employment in WW II, Korea and Vietnam. Studies, Papers and Messages Primary Advanced Amphibious Study Group Background Paper. Service vs. Functional Components. Washington, D.C.: Hdqtrs USMC, 23 Jul 1982. This is the most comprehensive compilation of USMC Service componency arguments and directly counters many USAF functional componency arguments. Commanding General MCDEC Letter "Command and Control of Marine Tactical Aviation (TACAIR) During Sustained Land Operations as Simulated in JINTACCS Combined Functional Segment Test-02" (with Enclosure (1) -- Draft OH 5-1.1). Quantico, Va.: MCDEC, 11 Jun 1984. This is a major revision to OH 5-1.1, regrettably never promulgated. it incorporates changes proposed by the author and innumerable FMF commands. Commanding Officer MCTSSA letter "Command and Control of Marine Tactical Aviation (TACAIR) During Sustained Land Operations." Camp Pendleton, Ca.: MCTSSA, 12 Mar 1984. This letter contained OH 5-1.1 proposed changes developed by the author while working JINTACCS air operations IOP's at MCTSSA. Harke, D. M., LtCol, USMC, letter "MAGTF Command Relation- ships During Sustained Operations Ashore; Point Paper 179-82." Washington, D.C.: Hdqtrs USMC, 1 Apr 1982. This and the following three references are major point papers, with innumerable enclosures, outlining Marine Corps positions on the major TACAIR C2 and functional componency issues. Harke, D. M., LtCol, USMC, letter "Service vs. Functional Components, the Marine Corps Position; Point Paper 378-83." Washington, D.C.: Hdqtrs USMC, 20 May 1983. Roser, H. G., LtCol, USMC, letter "Information for MGen Godfrey Concerning Command and Control Issues Relating to the Employment of Marine TACAIR; Point Paper 781-84." Washington, D.C.: Hdqtrs USMC, 12 Oct 1984. Thiry, G. E., LtCol, USMC, letter "Command and Control of Marine TACAIR; Point Paper 455-84." Washington, D.C.: 2 Jul 1984. Commanding General, Third Marine Aircraft Wing message DTG 240039Z Feb 82. "Joint Readiness Exercise Gallant Knight 82 After Action Report." El Toro, Ca. This after action report elaborates on signifi- cant difficulties experienced by 3D MAW during a joint exercise in which Omnibus was exercised. It high- lights several potential communications and commander personality problem areas. Joint Chiefs of Staff message DTG 042226Z Dec 81. "Command Relationships in Operational Plan Development." Washington, D.C. This message was distributed following the Omnibus statement to reaffirm the JCS position that the joint force commander had the authority to organize his command as he deemed appropriate. Secondary Commanding General MCDEC letter "Annual Review of the Marine Corps Doctrinal Publication System." Quantico, Va.: MCDEC, 30 Nov 1984. This letter and its enclosures outline the now underway program for complete reorganization of the Marine Corps FMFM series publications. The new alignment parallels closely that of the USAF with its different levels of doctrine and operational procedures publications. Periodicals Cardwell, Thomas A., III, Col, USAF. "One Step Beyond: Airland Battle, Doctrine Not Dogma." Military Review, Vol. LXIV, No. 4, Apr. 19, 84, pp. 45-54. Col Cardwell is a major author on USAF doctrine at this time. His work in periodicals, DIP's and AFM is strongly unity of command and air functional componency related. This particular article is on doctrinal nuances and implications for the Air Force on the "deep battle" of the Airland concept. Cardwell, Thomas A., III, Col, USAF. "The Quest for Unity of Command," Air University Review, Vol, XXXV, No. 4, May-Jun 1984, pp. 25-29. A strong appeal for functional componency and theater functional component commander authority. Joint Tactical Command, Control and Communication Agency (JTC3A). JINTACCS Update. Nov 1984, pp. 1-12. (Ft. Monmouth, N.J.). This quarterly publication delineates update material on all the JINTACCS programs. Kosiba, Leo M., Col, USA. "Improving the Joint Doctrinal Process: Reinforcing Success," Military Review, Vol., LXIV, No. 1, Jan 1984, pp. 46-49. This article promotes joint service activity of many kinds to resolve and standardize the operating procedures required for joint operations. Its review of the Army-Air Force ALFA projects is particularly interesting. Machios, James A., Maj, USAF. "TACAIR Support for the Air- land Battle," Air University Review, Vol. XXXV, No. 4, May-Jun 1984, pp. 16-24. ANNEX B PROPOSED REWORDED OMINBUS ANNEX B Proposed Reworded Ominbus POLICY FOR COMMAND AND CONTROL of USMC FIXED WING TACAIR The Marine Air-Ground Task Force (MAGTF) commander will retain operational control of his organic air assets. The primary mission of the MAGTF air combat element is the support of the MAGTF ground element. During joint opera- tions, the MAGTF air assets will normally be in support of the MAGTF mission. When the joint force commander estab- lishes antiair warfare (or counter air), air interdiction and/or air reconnaissance campaigns in general support of the JTF as a whole, the MAGTF commander will make sorties available to the joint force commander, for coordination or tasking through his designated air authority, to equitably support and participate in those campaigns. The MAGTF will fulfill as much as possible its own direct support air requirements. Sorties expected to be available in excess of its joint force general support obligations and its own direct support requirments will be provided to the joint force commander for further appropriate support of the joint force. Nothing herein shall infringe on the authority of the theater or joint force commander, in the exercise of operational control, to assign missions, redirect efforts, and direct coordination among his subordinate commanders to insure unity of effort in accomplishment of his overall mission, or to maintain integrity of the force, as prescribed in JCS Pub II, "Unified Action Armed Forces (UNAAF)." ANNEX C OPERATIONAL HANDBOOK 5-1.1, COMMAND AND CONTROL OF USMC TACAIR APPENDIX 1 - EXTRACTS OF MCDEC DRAFT REVISION TO OH 5-1.1 APPENDIX 2 - COMMENTS ON OH 5-1.1 DRAFT REVISION INCORPORATING FINDINGS OF THIS PAPER APPENDIX 1, ANNEX C MCDEC Draft Revision to OH 5-1.1 of 11 June 1984 Click here to view image
