Mounted Task Force Operations: A Proposed Operational Handbook
CSC 1985
SUBJECT AREA Warfighting
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TABLE OF CONTENTS
SECTION TITLE
1 INTRODUCTION
2 CONSIDERATIONS FOR EMPLOYING THE MTF
3 ELEMENTS OF THE MTF AND TASK ORGANIZATION
4 COMMAND AND CONTROL OF THE MTF
5 OFFENSIVE OPERATIONS
6 DEFENSIVE OPERATIONS
7 MTF MOVEMENT
8 ENGINEER SUPPORT
9 MOUNTED RECONNAISSANCE
10 RIVER CROSSING OPERATIONS
11 LINKUP OPERSTIONS
12 FIREPOWER AVAILABLE TO THE MTF
13 OPERATIONS IN AN NBC ENVIRONMENT
14 COMBAT SERVICE SUPPORT
A-H APPENDICES
SECTION 1
INTRODUCTION
101. GENERAL
a. Mounted Task Forces are employed by Marine Corps ground commanders to
develop superior firepower and mobility which, when augmented by aviation and logistic power of the MAGTF, enable Marine Forces to gain favorable decisions on the battlefield. Mounted Task Forces (MTF) generally form the main effort of the ground combat element in all forms of battle. The MTF may execute roles in any type of combat and is especially useful against enemy mechanized forces. MTF's are employed to exploit local success in battle and to disrupt and destroy opposing forces by rapid, decisive and powerful thrusts through points of enemy weakness into his vital command, fire support and logistic elements, causing his wholesale collapse as a cohesive force.
b. The following circumstances favor the employment of the MTF in a USMC ground
combat element (GCE):
- Terrain permits full exploitation of firepower and mobility.
- A proper balance of tank and mounted infantry units is achieved,
corresponding to the terrain.
- Air parity or superiority is achieved.
- Adequate logistic support is furnished.
- Coordination of fire and movement is optimized by the designation of a point of main effort by the commander.
c. Because of its immense power and extensive flexibility, the MTF may be successfully employed in all forms of combat. This power suits it well to the offensive. However, it is equally suited to offensive use in the conduct of the delay or defense. Succeeding sections of this handbook detail the techniques and tactics used by the MTF in battle.
102. BACKGROUND
a. Tanks, assault amphibians and other fighting vehicles originally entered Marine Corps organizations as the FMF prepared for amphibious operations in the late 1930's. Tank-infantry tactics employed by the FMF in the Pacific War proved suitable for assaulting fortified beaches and zones and for military operations in urban terrain (MOUT). Other than the armored column postwar USMC doctrine recognized no techniques of mechanized combat comparable to those of western armies. In response to the spreading of mechanized warfare to the Third World, the USMC in the 1970's developed the Mechanized Combined Arms Task Force (MCATF), in an attempt to copy chief attributes of U.S. Army armored and mechanized combat techniques.
b. The MCATF concept, although instructive, proved a false premise for the Corps. There are no true mechanized or armored forces in the FMF, only tank and amphibian units with all direct support artillery being towed. Furthermore, combined arms combat remains a tactic not exclusive to mechanized forces. All USMC combat forces seek to use combined arms tactics. The reality for the FMF lies in its line infantry and towed artillery, by far the bulk of its ground strength. The former can be mounted in supporting (not organic) assault amphibian units to perform the function of motorized infantry. They cannot be expected to perform as mechanized infantry except by improvisation because of their normal organization and scope of training. Tank units complement the mounted infantry and other arms must be furnished with mobility comparable to these elements, recognizing the reality that tanks, LVT's, towed and SP artillery, LAV's, HMMV's and motor transport equipment all display varied speeds and terrain-crossing capabilities. Recognizing these factors, this publication will classify all such task-organized units as "mounted" vice "mechanized" as a clearer iteration of FMF ground organization for combat in highly mobile operations. Only this term recognizes the existing and enduring conditions of organization and training found in the FMF, a force organized for amphibious operations which must be able to fight mobile battles in subsequent operations ashore.
103. INTEGRATION OF FORCES
Integration of forces can only occur when the respective functions of the various types are recognized:
a. Functions of unit types:
(1) Infantry (of the line) - holds ground; maneuvers within range of organic
weapons.
(2) Armor - executes maneuver over extended distances.
(3) Artillery (including antitank and air defense) - provides destructive and neutralizing fires, usually to support ground maneuver.
(4) Engineers (or pioneers) - Degrade or improve traversbility of terrain.
(5) Mechanized (or armored) infantry - infantry equipped and trained to
accompany and protect armor, especially against infantry and antitank.
(6) Light Infantry - holds ground; moves by special techniques or means of
movement (helicopter, parachute, stealth) by virtue of special training and
equipment (e.g., commandos, rangers, parachute, ski, mountain units).
(7) Motorized or light armored infantry - high mobility infantry; links armor and infantry of the line in fluid situations; dragoons.
b. Employment of Unit Types
(1) Infantry and Tanks. Tanks and infantry operate in mutual support at all
times. Only through a true coordination of effort can the operational tasks
be accomplished and unnecessary losses prevented. Night, adverse weather
and combat in forests, fortified zones and built-up areas require increased
proportions of infantry in formations.
(2) Antitank. Antitank missiles can augment the fire of battle tanks to a
considerable distance. The following factors apply:
- The most effective mutual support is obtained in terrain with
long- range fields of fire.
- The limited rate of fire of missile weapons detracts from their
reinforcement capability.
- Missile carriers generally must fight from positions affording
cover and concealment.
- Missile carriers must be protected from enemy infantry assault.
- Missile characteristics increasingly prescribe flank attack.
(3) Artillery. Artillery is an effective weapon producing a high volume fire
upon designated area targets. Artillery support can only be effective when
the concept and scheme of maneuver is understood. Personal contact and
exchange of mission and task details is usually required. Artillery fire is
used to disrupt enemy measures and permit the successful maneuver of the
GCE.
(4) Attack Helicopters. When armed with antitank missiles, attack
helicopters furnish the commander an additional unit capable of extraordinary fire and maneuver; ideal for reinforcing success or forming appoint of main effort. Attack helicopters are requested through air liaison and are then operated as a maneuver unit by the commander using frag orders and ground control measures, preferable after receiving a briefing at the command post.
(5) Fixed Wing Aircraft. Close air support extends the range and power of
fire support for maneuver.
(6) Air Defense. Antiaircraft weapons systems in the MTF area will usually
consist of Redeye missile teams capable of point defense only. For this
reason, air defense remains passive in nature, reverting to self-defense
only when attacked.
(6) Combat Engineers (Pioneering). Engineers support the MTF by enhancing
the mobility of our forces and degrading that of the enemy. Combat engineers must be provided with the same mobility of MTF infantry to be effective. Although often employed in piecemeal fashion, they are most effective in company-sized units.
When pioneering requirements exceed the capacity of the MTF, the commander requests support to:
- Locate suitable fords.
- Clear barriers, obstacles, and wreckage.
- Assist in overcoming natural obstacles.
- Erect of barriers.
- Degrade trafficability of enemy approaches.
- Assist in field fortifications.
The use of pioneers requires time and preparation. They must be protected while
performing their mission.
(7) Light Infantry. In special situations, such as combat in forests and
built-up areas and by night and adverse weather, tanks and light infantry work together. Generally, the infantry provide close in protection to small tank units and act as eyes and ears for the tanks, which provide firepower and force obstacles for the advance. Special control measures are often required.
SECTION 2
CONSIDERATIONS FOR EMPLOYING THE MTF
201. THREAT
The Marine Corps is tasked with responding to contingencies throughout the world against a broad spectrum of enemy forces. Soviet combined arms forces are predominately armored and mechanized and present the most prominent threat facing Marine forces. Nations aligned with the Soviets have, in varying degrees, adopted Soviet doctrine, tactics, techniques, equipment and force structure. Soviet and Soviet styled forces not only possess sophisticated equipment, but in many cases their forces will outnumber Marine Forces. Due to the amount of information and large number of publications already published, specific threat data will not be presented in this publication. Appendix A (References) contains a section on DIA publications which describe in detail the threat to include: key equipment, organizations, tactical employment and operational weaknesses.
202. BASIC MTF PRINCIPLES
In many projected scenarios the MAGTF will be both outnumbered and outgunned. With this consideration in mind, certain basic principles for MTF operation must be identified from the onset. These principles include:
a. The primary objective of the MTF must be the destruction of the enemy's combat cohesiveness. Firepower and mobility will be elements of paramount importance on the future battlefield. Additionally, we are very likely to face an enemy who possesses superiority in numbers, mobility and firepower. It will not be necessary, however, to defeat this force in detail for our forces to succeed in battle. The MTF objective must be the destruction of the enemy's ability to function as a total force. This objective is accomplished most rapidly by engaging certain elements of the enemy force on a priority basis.
(1) A high priority should be given to the enemy's air defense units.
Traditionally, our air elements have enjoyed considerable freedom of movement in the support of our ground forces. This condition is highly unlikely on the future battlefield when the enemy air defense capability is established. This threat to the use of our air units deprives our ground forces of an essential weapon in dealing with the enemy's ground forces. Therefore, enemy air defense units must be destroyed or neutralized as soon as possible in order to conduct effective friendly close air support.
(2) The MTF's second priority should be the destruction of the enemy command
and control elements. These elements should be engaged whenever possible by air, ground, and electronic warfare (EW) assets. A thorough knowledge of enemy doctrine will greatly assist in locating and selecting the best means to engage and destroy these elements.
(3) A third priority should be the neutralization of enemy artillery. Despite his numerous armor, the threat is an artillery army, trained to depend upon artillery support as mission-essential. Depriving the threat of artillery support is vital to destroying his cohesion.
(4) A fourth priority of engagement should be to separate the enemy's
infantry from his tanks and then the individual destruction of each. By accomplishing this, the MTF capitalizes on the weaknesses of both; while, at the same time, the enemy is prevented from fully exercising his combined strength.
(5) The final priority should be attacks on the enemy's CSS elements. Soviet
operations are typified by large mechanized forces moving rapidly over great distances and extended frontages. Denying these forces the vital fuel link, ammunition, food and replacements will, in time, render his assault elements ineffective.
b. The enemy must be continuously exposed to the fun combined array of the MTF weapons and maneuver. Stereotyped operations must be avoided with emphasis on imagination and flexibility. Each unit in our force presents a specific threat to our enemy. If these units are combined and employed against the enemy, he is forced to expend a tremendous amount of time and effort to counter them. If, however, they are improperly employed, the enemy's problem will be greatly
reduced.
The avoidance of stereotyped operations has a similar advantage. The enemy who must face the possibility of night and day attacks, and rapid thrusts from any direction will be much easier to deal with than one who can predict our actions by simply reading our field manuals or identifying terrain features on the map. The commander must orient on the enemy rather than terrain. He must exploit every advantage afforded him by the ever changing situation to achieve his assigned mission.
c. In order to obtain maximum results, the MTF must be oriented to the offense. Simply a reaffirmation of a principle of war, the battlefield of the future will reward the side maintaining the initiative, flexibility and freedom of maneuver.
203. FUNDAMENTALS OF SUCCESSFUL MILITARY OPERATIONS
Throughout history armies have conducted their operations using a number of fundamentals to achieve their objectives. Rapidly changing technology and capabilities have altered the emphasis and application of these, but the fundamentals themselves remain constant. The following fundamentals are not unique to mounted operations, but should be considered when conducting mounted operations.
Human Factors
(1) Leadership. Commanders at all levels must have the ability and
determination to win the battle. The importance of the role of the leader and the difficulty of exercising effective leadership is increased on the modern battlefield by the nature of continuous operations, which
must to be sustained.
(2) Morale Morale is probably the most important single factor in war. High morale fosters an aggressive spirit. Morale is based on confidence, discipline, professional skill, physical conditioning and self-respect. These can be instilled by realistic, demanding and imaginative training. Above all, morale is enhanced by a sense of group loyalty-esprit de corps-which the commander must foster in his units. The surest way to achieve high morale is through success in battle.
(3) Initiative. Individual initiative, within the scope of the mission and
linked with resolute action, is fundamental.
(4) Flexibility. A commander at any level must have flexibility of mind and speed of decision. Unless he has these qualities he will rapidly surrender the initiative to the enemy and probably lose the battle.
(5) Endurance. Personnel must be mentally and physically prepared for battle.
b. The Selection of the Mission
(1) In every military operation it is essential to select and define the mission.
(2) The selection of the mission is one of the commander's most important duties; it demands clear and logical thought. The mission may be very specific or it may be expressed in general terms; it must be clear and direct, not ambiguous. Above all, it must express the intentions of the commander.
(3) The mission must be as widely circulated as the needs of security will allow, so that subordinates can consider it in their planning. There must be no doubt what is to be accomplished.
C. Freedom of Action. A commander requires the authority to exploit an opportunity of a favorable situation on the battlefield with energy and boldness. He must have the freedom of action to act independently within the framework of his mission and the higher commander's intent. Freedom of action has increased importance as command communications in battle may be limited by
circumstances or enemy action; at times being only intermittent and at crucial times nonexistent.
d. Aggressive Action. In all combat operations, even those in which initially the enemy has freedom of action, at all levels, commanders must seek every opportunity to retain or seize the initiative and strike the enemy. In the final analysis, success in battle depends directly upon the determination of the force, individually and collectively, to close with the enemy and to destroy his will to fight. Frequently, opportunities for victory in battle will be built on the exploitation of opportunities created by subordinate commanders who recognized and took advantage of a favorable situation.
e. Concentration of Effort. Military success will result from the concentration of superior combat power at the decisive time and place.
f. Economy of Force. A commander must allocate his forces to essential tasks, however he must not commit more forces than necessary. It is not possible to be strong everywhere and in order to be able to concentrate his forces a commander may have to accept risk by using an absolute minimum of force elsewhere.
g. Mobility
(1) Mobility is characterized by the ability of vehicles and forces to move in differing conditions and situations. It has a direct influence on a force's capability to achieve its mission. Superior mobility may compensate for numerical inferiority.
(2) Mobility is necessary to achieve concentration of effort and to deploy rapidly in order to engage the enemy.
(3) Terrain, weapon effects, unfavorable weather conditions and enemy air action will affect mobility on the battlefield. Differing degrees of mobility of forces must be taken into consideration.
h. Maneuver. In maneuver a commander attempts to position his force in such a way as to gain an advantage over the enemy in order to accomplish the mission. Both fire and maneuver are essential and must be integrated if commanders are to preserve their freedom of action and achieve success.
i. Surprise. Surprise is an effective and powerful factor in the use of force; its effect on morale can be very great. It can confer the initiative, threaten enemy morale, reduce friendly casualties and often give material advantages similar to a superior concentration of force. When other factors are unfavorable, success may depend almost entirely upon surprise.
j. Intelligence. A commander requires information and intelligence about the terrain, climate and the enemy. With basic intelligence as a background, current intelligence is required about the enemy to provide the commander with frequent observations and appreciations of his capabilities and intentions.
k. Simplicity. Unless plans are kept as simple and straightforward as possible, the speed of events and the complexity of modern warfare could well lead to considerable confusion. A complex plan may contribute to failure of an operation. Simple and logical plans are best and stand more chance of success.
l. Maintenance of Forces. A commander must make every effort to maintain the combat effectiveness of his force and must try to accomplish his aim with minimum losses.
m. Flexibility. All military plans must be flexible to allow for the unforeseen and to enable the maximum advantage to be taken of any sudden turn of events. A force must possess the flexibility to enable it to react to a change of plan and switch smoothly from one course of action to another. This entails good training, cohesive organization, communications, staff work and the maintenance of a reserve.
n. Security and Protection. The commander must take every precaution to secure and protect his force so that he can achieve his mission. He will do so through a wide range of measures including an aggressive search for and careful scrutiny of intelligence regarding the location, capability and intentions of the enemy, and denying the enemy information as to the location and strength of friendly forces and operational plans.
SECTION 3
ELEMENTS OF THE MTF AND TASK ORGANIZATION
301. GENERAL
A combat battalion for MTF operations is built around an infantry or tank battalion headquarters and task organization is accomplished by the attachment or cross-attachment of tank, infantry and AAV units as well as other arms determined by mission requirements. The headquarters of the combat battalion possesses the requisite ability to request, and coordinate the proper utilization of the various supporting arms of the MAGTF to include: artillery, naval gunfire and close air support.
a. Headquarters. The MTF headquarters is the MTF commander's means for exercising command and control of his force. Command and control is defined by JCS Pub 1 as, "The exercise of authority and direction by a properly designated commander over assigned forces in accomplishment of the mission. Command and control functions are performed through an arrangement of personnel, equipment, communications, facilities and procedures which are employed by a commander in planning, directing, coordinating, and controlling forces and operations in the accomplishment of the mission."
(1) In a regimental-size MTF the headquarters of an infantry regiment forms the command echelon of the MTF. The headquarters of a battalion-sized MTF will be a tank or infantry battalion headquarters depending on the preponderance of tank or infantry forces in the MTF.
(2) The command groups of either regimental or battalion-sized MTF's will normally operate from LVTC-7 and LVTP-7 vehicles.
b. Combat Element. All areas are task organized to form the combat elements of the MTF. Regimental-sized MTF's consist of at least two combat battalion-sized forces while a battalion-sized MTF will include at least two company-sized forces. The Light Armored Vehicle Battalions, (LAVB) may also be attached to a regimental MTF (or companies to a battalion MTF). They may operate either as a combat or combat support unit, depending on missions assigned. Operational Handbook (OH) 9-4, Organization and Operational Concepts for the Light Armored Vehicle Battalion, best describes the employment of the LAVB.
(1) The battalions organize for combat by dividing their Headquarters and Service Companies into command and support echelons and task organizing tank and infantry companies into combinations of tank-pure, tank-heavy, infantry-heavy and pure infantry teams by cross-attachment.
(2) The weapons company of the infantry battalion MTF is attached out to the command, combat and support echelons of the parent battalion and does not operate as a tactical entity. The antitank company of the tank battalion MTF reverts to the tactical control of the GCE commander, who uses it in task organizing the GCE and establishing his antitank point of main effort.
c. Combat Support. Combat engineers, air defense, artillery, attack helicopters and reconnaissance units may be attached, placed in direct support or, in the case of helicopters, "dedicated" in the support of the MTF. Close air support and naval gunfire support complete the combined arms arrayed with the MTF.
d. Combat Service Support (CSS). CSS must be adapted to the speeds, distances, and potentially high consumption rates of POL and ammunition characteristic of mounted operations. While combat and combat support components have organic CSS elements, they will not be sufficient to sustain the MTF. A Mobile Combat Service Support Detachment (MCSSD) will be formed from the Combat Service Support element of the MAGTF to support the MTF when it operates beyond its own capabilities. The MCSSD will move so as to be responsive to the requirements of the MTF. Section 14 describes the combat service support of the MTF.
302. MTF PECULIAR TERMINOLOGY
The MFT is generally described by the relative preponderance of the infantry and tank units of which it is formed. The ration of forces is determined by the type of terrain and the threat to be encountered. At the lowest level, mounted infantry and tank platoons may be cross-attached to form company-sized combined arms teams.
a. Mounted infantry. Infantry mounted on some means of transport, retaining its tactical integrity.
b. Infantry heavy. An organization with more infantry companies/platoons than tank companies/platoons. It is employed in close terrain or areas with a high threat from antitank weapons and units.
c. Tank heavy. More tank companies/platoons than mounted infantry companies/platoons. The tank heavy force should be employed when the area of operation is open and consists of few natural obstacles or built-up areas, speed and shock effect are desired or strong enemy armor opposition is expected.
d. Balances - equal numbers of tank and mounted infantry companies/platoons. A balanced force may be advantageous when the situation is unclear but the commander desires a reserve of considerable tank power.
e. Pure - Companies/platoons of either tanks or mounted infantry, with no cross-attachment. Pure companies/platoons may be employed within the MTF when mission requirements dictate.
f. Team - a company sized unit composed of tanks and mounted infantry, normally designated by the company headquarters placed over these units.
303. MTF ORGANIZATIONAL CONCEPTS
a. A regimental-sized MTF will be commanded by the infantry regiment headquarters. In this organization, the tank battalion headquarters should become the headquarters for a fourth battalion-sized task force of the MTF, or it may be employed as a tank-pure battalion.
b. A battalion-sized MTF may be commanded by either infantry or tank battalion headquarters. These headquarters must in turn task organize assigned forces, as described in paragraph 302, according to METT. When the situation requires the further cross-attachment of platoons of tanks and mounted infantry, the resulting units are referred to as "teams". The teams may be commanded by either tank or infantry company headquarters.
c. While an AAV can carry up to 25 Marines, considerations of tactics, cohesion and space dictate the assignment of an AAV to a reinfoced squad of Marines. The squad with attachments should not exceed 18 Marines per vehicle. This typical infantry "tractor team" consists of a squad leader (1), AAV crew (2), rifle squad (10), machinegun team (2) and DRAGON team (2). A company mortar team (3) may be substituted for a machinegun team. The tractor team is employed easily as a heliteam if the infantry battalion must change mission and task organization. Battalion mortars will normally be carried by squads in company commander vehicles. If employment as a mortar platoon is desired, dedicated vehicles must be identified from the AAV attachments. See figure 1.
d. AAV support of MTF operations is accomplished by attaching the AAV's to the infantry and engineer units. An AAV will normally support a squad, a section will support a platoon, a platoon will support a company and a company supports a battalion. This preserves the tactical integrity of the fighting units and identifies appropriate AAV unit attachments.
304. THE TANK BATTALION
The tank battalion and its subordinate tank companies is employed gainst the enemy as a battalion; or, it may cross-attach one or more of its companies with mounted infantry companies to form a battalion task force.
a. The organization of the tank battalion is depicted in figure 2.
b. Detailed characteristics of the M60A1 tank and TOW weapons system of the tank battalion are provided in appendix C.
305. ASSAULT AMPHIBIOUS VEHICLE BATTALION
For the tank and infantry battalions to be a fully integrated combat force, the AAV battalion must also become an integral part of the task organization of the regimental MTF. The AAV's provide mobility, limited armor protection and additional firepower for the infantry.
a. It is generally accepted that the current AAV, the LVTP-7, lift capacity of 25 combat-equipped Marines is ambitious when considering MTF operations. Mechanized exercises have revealed that 18 personnel per AVV is more realistic number. Additionally, the AAV should primarily be employed to transport assault elements in tactical situations. The use of the AAV in other roles, such as transporting supplies is based on availability. Wheeled vehicles should be used in MTF operations as logistics transports and prime movers of equipment. AAV units should, in all cases, bring with them the appropriate organizational CSS.
BATTALION COMMAND POST
2 LVTC-7
1 LVTP-7
RIFLE COMPANY (REIN) X 3 COMBAT ENGINEER PLATOON
13 LVTP-7 3 LVTP-7
Company CP (1 LVTP-7)
Mortar Squad
Rifle Platoon (REIN) X 3
Platoon Leader
60mm Mortar Team
Assualt Team
Tractor Team X 3
Rifle Squadron
MG Team
DRAGON Team
Total AAVs: 2 LVTC-7
43 LVTP-7
ASSIGNED TO
COMMANDERS VEHICLES NOT ASSIGNED AAVS
FAAD Team Heavy MG Section, Wpns Co
FO TOW Section, HQ Co, Inf Rgt.
FAC
NGF Spotter
Liaison Personnel
Corpsmen
Figure 1
Typical Infantry Battalion MTF
TANK BATTALION
TABLE OF ORGANIZATION NO. 4238X
Tank Bn
49-945
M60A1 70
M88A1 5
TOW 72
H&S Co AT (TOW) CO TANK CO
T/O NO. 4237P T/O 4235M T/O NO. 4233M
24 296 5 241 5 102
M160A1 2 TOW 72 M60A1 17
M88A1 1 M88A1 1
BN HQ CO HQ CO HQ CO HQ
13-43 2-30 2-37 2-39
M60A1-2 M60A1-2
M88A1-1
CO M Sec MAINT. PLT TOW PLT TANK PLT
2-73 3-74 1-68
MT PLT SUPPLY PLT TOW SEC
2-73 2-42 0-22
TOW-8
Chaplain MED SEC TOW SQD
2-2N 1-17N 0-5
0-1M TOW 2
1st Tk BN 4 Tk Co, AT Co
2nd Tk Bn 4 Tk Co, ATCo
3d Tk Bn 3 Tk Co, ATCo
4th Tk Bn (RES) 3 Tk Co, 2 AT Plt
8th Tk Bn (RES) 4 TK Co, AT Co
1st T.V. Bn 2 Tk Co, 2 Aav Co
Figure 2
b. The organization of the standard assault amphibian battalion is depicted in figure 2. The composition of each of the assault amphibian vehicle companies is also shown. It should be noted that the LVTR in each AAV company headquarters provides CSS support and should not be included when computing lift.
c. Detailed characteristics of the LVTP-7, LVTR-7 and LVTC-7 are provided in appendix C. Appendix D contains an indepth discussion of LVTC-7 employment considerations.
d. The assault amphibian vehicle battalion as shown in figure 3 has sufficient assets to provide mobility to the assault elements of four infantry battalions (one AAV Company per Battalion) and a regimental size headquarters. Since task organization is dependent on the situation at hand, the best approach to the allocation of AAV's is to maintain unit integrity of AAV's and supported units by assigning AAV's to each squad i.e., four per infantry platoon. However, the supported unit's mission has utmost priority in determining task organization and unit integrity.
e. There are 187 LVTP-7's and 15 LVTC-7's within the battalion. If the AAV battalion H&S Company supports the regiment headquarters, then each AAV company can support the infantry battalions it attaches to or supports with 43 LVTP-7 and 3 LVTC-7 vehicles. If the tank battalion is attached to the regiment, at least 2 LVTC-7's should be allocated to it from the AAV company assets. As vehicles availability drops from mechanical or combat casualties, H&S company vehicles should be used as replacements. AAV Battalion and Company sections not required for mounting the MTF's will use organic wheeled vehicles for transport and generally be relegated to rear areas, except as employed in the MTF combat trains.
(1) Battalion and regimental headquarters will normally require 2 or 3 LVTC-7 vehicles. The number of headquarters requiring AAV mobility, the number of AAV's available and the mission of each headquarters will be the deciding factors in determining how many LVTC-7's/LVTP-7's will be made available to each headquarters.
(2) The individual Infantry company headquarters will normally not use LVTC-7's. Tank company commanders will command from a tank which has the most adequate communication equipment for that purpose. Infantry company commanders will command from a LVTP-7.
f. AAV and Infantry Command and Control Relationship. Assault Amphibian units may be employed to support units by establishing command relationships of operational control, attachment or direct support which are defined in FMFM 9-2 Amphibious Vehicles and JCS Pubs 1.
(1) Assault amphibian units are most commonly employed by attachment, or in direct support of infantry units (and bring their organic combat service support with them). Together, the assault amphibian vehicle units and infantry units form the basis of the MTF. This organization requires close coordination and cooperation based upon intense training to form a finely tuned combat unit in minimal time.
(2) When the AAV's are attached, the infantry unit is responsible for their logistic support. When in direct support of the infantry, the AAV's must receive logistic support from the parent unit.
(3) AAV unit commanders have control of the AAV's and embarked personnel during the ship-to-shore movement. This is a unique relationship necessary for the effective conduct of the amphibious assault. Upon initiation of subsequent operations ashore in the MTF's, the AAV's provide mobility to the infantry in its conduct of combat operations, and therefore their tactical employment is controlled by mounted unit commanders. This control is exercised through the normal chain of command, from company/team commander through
ASSAULT AMPHIBIAN VEHICLE BATTALION
TABLE OF ORGANIZATION NO. 4655M
AAV BN
46 1095
LCTP-7 187
LVTC-7 15
LVTR-7 6
H&S CO AA CO
T/O 4654N T/O 4652M
18 219 7 219
LVTP-7 15 LVTP-7 43
LVTC-7 3 LVTC-7 3
LVTR-7 2 LVTR-7 1
BN HQ CO HQ
9-33 2-14
CO HQ
3-83