Mounted Task Force Operations: A Proposed Operational Handbook
CSC 1985
SUBJECT AREA Warfighting
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TABLE OF CONTENTS
SECTION TITLE
1 INTRODUCTION
2 CONSIDERATIONS FOR EMPLOYING THE MTF
3 ELEMENTS OF THE MTF AND TASK ORGANIZATION
4 COMMAND AND CONTROL OF THE MTF
5 OFFENSIVE OPERATIONS
6 DEFENSIVE OPERATIONS
7 MTF MOVEMENT
8 ENGINEER SUPPORT
9 MOUNTED RECONNAISSANCE
10 RIVER CROSSING OPERATIONS
11 LINKUP OPERSTIONS
12 FIREPOWER AVAILABLE TO THE MTF
13 OPERATIONS IN AN NBC ENVIRONMENT
14 COMBAT SERVICE SUPPORT
A-H APPENDICES
SECTION 1
INTRODUCTION
101. GENERAL
a. Mounted Task Forces are employed by Marine Corps ground commanders to
develop superior firepower and mobility which, when augmented by aviation and logistic power of the MAGTF, enable Marine Forces to gain favorable decisions on the battlefield. Mounted Task Forces (MTF) generally form the main effort of the ground combat element in all forms of battle. The MTF may execute roles in any type of combat and is especially useful against enemy mechanized forces. MTF's are employed to exploit local success in battle and to disrupt and destroy opposing forces by rapid, decisive and powerful thrusts through points of enemy weakness into his vital command, fire support and logistic elements, causing his wholesale collapse as a cohesive force.
b. The following circumstances favor the employment of the MTF in a USMC ground
combat element (GCE):
- Terrain permits full exploitation of firepower and mobility.
- A proper balance of tank and mounted infantry units is achieved,
corresponding to the terrain.
- Air parity or superiority is achieved.
- Adequate logistic support is furnished.
- Coordination of fire and movement is optimized by the designation of a point of main effort by the commander.
c. Because of its immense power and extensive flexibility, the MTF may be successfully employed in all forms of combat. This power suits it well to the offensive. However, it is equally suited to offensive use in the conduct of the delay or defense. Succeeding sections of this handbook detail the techniques and tactics used by the MTF in battle.
102. BACKGROUND
a. Tanks, assault amphibians and other fighting vehicles originally entered Marine Corps organizations as the FMF prepared for amphibious operations in the late 1930's. Tank-infantry tactics employed by the FMF in the Pacific War proved suitable for assaulting fortified beaches and zones and for military operations in urban terrain (MOUT). Other than the armored column postwar USMC doctrine recognized no techniques of mechanized combat comparable to those of western armies. In response to the spreading of mechanized warfare to the Third World, the USMC in the 1970's developed the Mechanized Combined Arms Task Force (MCATF), in an attempt to copy chief attributes of U.S. Army armored and mechanized combat techniques.
b. The MCATF concept, although instructive, proved a false premise for the Corps. There are no true mechanized or armored forces in the FMF, only tank and amphibian units with all direct support artillery being towed. Furthermore, combined arms combat remains a tactic not exclusive to mechanized forces. All USMC combat forces seek to use combined arms tactics. The reality for the FMF lies in its line infantry and towed artillery, by far the bulk of its ground strength. The former can be mounted in supporting (not organic) assault amphibian units to perform the function of motorized infantry. They cannot be expected to perform as mechanized infantry except by improvisation because of their normal organization and scope of training. Tank units complement the mounted infantry and other arms must be furnished with mobility comparable to these elements, recognizing the reality that tanks, LVT's, towed and SP artillery, LAV's, HMMV's and motor transport equipment all display varied speeds and terrain-crossing capabilities. Recognizing these factors, this publication will classify all such task-organized units as "mounted" vice "mechanized" as a clearer iteration of FMF ground organization for combat in highly mobile operations. Only this term recognizes the existing and enduring conditions of organization and training found in the FMF, a force organized for amphibious operations which must be able to fight mobile battles in subsequent operations ashore.
103. INTEGRATION OF FORCES
Integration of forces can only occur when the respective functions of the various types are recognized:
a. Functions of unit types:
(1) Infantry (of the line) - holds ground; maneuvers within range of organic
weapons.
(2) Armor - executes maneuver over extended distances.
(3) Artillery (including antitank and air defense) - provides destructive and neutralizing fires, usually to support ground maneuver.
(4) Engineers (or pioneers) - Degrade or improve traversbility of terrain.
(5) Mechanized (or armored) infantry - infantry equipped and trained to
accompany and protect armor, especially against infantry and antitank.
(6) Light Infantry - holds ground; moves by special techniques or means of
movement (helicopter, parachute, stealth) by virtue of special training and
equipment (e.g., commandos, rangers, parachute, ski, mountain units).
(7) Motorized or light armored infantry - high mobility infantry; links armor and infantry of the line in fluid situations; dragoons.
b. Employment of Unit Types
(1) Infantry and Tanks. Tanks and infantry operate in mutual support at all
times. Only through a true coordination of effort can the operational tasks
be accomplished and unnecessary losses prevented. Night, adverse weather
and combat in forests, fortified zones and built-up areas require increased
proportions of infantry in formations.
(2) Antitank. Antitank missiles can augment the fire of battle tanks to a
considerable distance. The following factors apply:
- The most effective mutual support is obtained in terrain with
long- range fields of fire.
- The limited rate of fire of missile weapons detracts from their
reinforcement capability.
- Missile carriers generally must fight from positions affording
cover and concealment.
- Missile carriers must be protected from enemy infantry assault.
- Missile characteristics increasingly prescribe flank attack.
(3) Artillery. Artillery is an effective weapon producing a high volume fire
upon designated area targets. Artillery support can only be effective when
the concept and scheme of maneuver is understood. Personal contact and
exchange of mission and task details is usually required. Artillery fire is
used to disrupt enemy measures and permit the successful maneuver of the
GCE.
(4) Attack Helicopters. When armed with antitank missiles, attack
helicopters furnish the commander an additional unit capable of extraordinary fire and maneuver; ideal for reinforcing success or forming appoint of main effort. Attack helicopters are requested through air liaison and are then operated as a maneuver unit by the commander using frag orders and ground control measures, preferable after receiving a briefing at the command post.
(5) Fixed Wing Aircraft. Close air support extends the range and power of
fire support for maneuver.
(6) Air Defense. Antiaircraft weapons systems in the MTF area will usually
consist of Redeye missile teams capable of point defense only. For this
reason, air defense remains passive in nature, reverting to self-defense
only when attacked.
(6) Combat Engineers (Pioneering). Engineers support the MTF by enhancing
the mobility of our forces and degrading that of the enemy. Combat engineers must be provided with the same mobility of MTF infantry to be effective. Although often employed in piecemeal fashion, they are most effective in company-sized units.
When pioneering requirements exceed the capacity of the MTF, the commander requests support to:
- Locate suitable fords.
- Clear barriers, obstacles, and wreckage.
- Assist in overcoming natural obstacles.
- Erect of barriers.
- Degrade trafficability of enemy approaches.
- Assist in field fortifications.
The use of pioneers requires time and preparation. They must be protected while
performing their mission.
(7) Light Infantry. In special situations, such as combat in forests and
built-up areas and by night and adverse weather, tanks and light infantry work together. Generally, the infantry provide close in protection to small tank units and act as eyes and ears for the tanks, which provide firepower and force obstacles for the advance. Special control measures are often required.
SECTION 2
CONSIDERATIONS FOR EMPLOYING THE MTF
201. THREAT
The Marine Corps is tasked with responding to contingencies throughout the world against a broad spectrum of enemy forces. Soviet combined arms forces are predominately armored and mechanized and present the most prominent threat facing Marine forces. Nations aligned with the Soviets have, in varying degrees, adopted Soviet doctrine, tactics, techniques, equipment and force structure. Soviet and Soviet styled forces not only possess sophisticated equipment, but in many cases their forces will outnumber Marine Forces. Due to the amount of information and large number of publications already published, specific threat data will not be presented in this publication. Appendix A (References) contains a section on DIA publications which describe in detail the threat to include: key equipment, organizations, tactical employment and operational weaknesses.
202. BASIC MTF PRINCIPLES
In many projected scenarios the MAGTF will be both outnumbered and outgunned. With this consideration in mind, certain basic principles for MTF operation must be identified from the onset. These principles include:
a. The primary objective of the MTF must be the destruction of the enemy's combat cohesiveness. Firepower and mobility will be elements of paramount importance on the future battlefield. Additionally, we are very likely to face an enemy who possesses superiority in numbers, mobility and firepower. It will not be necessary, however, to defeat this force in detail for our forces to succeed in battle. The MTF objective must be the destruction of the enemy's ability to function as a total force. This objective is accomplished most rapidly by engaging certain elements of the enemy force on a priority basis.
(1) A high priority should be given to the enemy's air defense units.
Traditionally, our air elements have enjoyed considerable freedom of movement in the support of our ground forces. This condition is highly unlikely on the future battlefield when the enemy air defense capability is established. This threat to the use of our air units deprives our ground forces of an essential weapon in dealing with the enemy's ground forces. Therefore, enemy air defense units must be destroyed or neutralized as soon as possible in order to conduct effective friendly close air support.
(2) The MTF's second priority should be the destruction of the enemy command
and control elements. These elements should be engaged whenever possible by air, ground, and electronic warfare (EW) assets. A thorough knowledge of enemy doctrine will greatly assist in locating and selecting the best means to engage and destroy these elements.
(3) A third priority should be the neutralization of enemy artillery. Despite his numerous armor, the threat is an artillery army, trained to depend upon artillery support as mission-essential. Depriving the threat of artillery support is vital to destroying his cohesion.
(4) A fourth priority of engagement should be to separate the enemy's
infantry from his tanks and then the individual destruction of each. By accomplishing this, the MTF capitalizes on the weaknesses of both; while, at the same time, the enemy is prevented from fully exercising his combined strength.
(5) The final priority should be attacks on the enemy's CSS elements. Soviet
operations are typified by large mechanized forces moving rapidly over great distances and extended frontages. Denying these forces the vital fuel link, ammunition, food and replacements will, in time, render his assault elements ineffective.
b. The enemy must be continuously exposed to the fun combined array of the MTF weapons and maneuver. Stereotyped operations must be avoided with emphasis on imagination and flexibility. Each unit in our force presents a specific threat to our enemy. If these units are combined and employed against the enemy, he is forced to expend a tremendous amount of time and effort to counter them. If, however, they are improperly employed, the enemy's problem will be greatly
reduced.
The avoidance of stereotyped operations has a similar advantage. The enemy who must face the possibility of night and day attacks, and rapid thrusts from any direction will be much easier to deal with than one who can predict our actions by simply reading our field manuals or identifying terrain features on the map. The commander must orient on the enemy rather than terrain. He must exploit every advantage afforded him by the ever changing situation to achieve his assigned mission.
c. In order to obtain maximum results, the MTF must be oriented to the offense. Simply a reaffirmation of a principle of war, the battlefield of the future will reward the side maintaining the initiative, flexibility and freedom of maneuver.
203. FUNDAMENTALS OF SUCCESSFUL MILITARY OPERATIONS
Throughout history armies have conducted their operations using a number of fundamentals to achieve their objectives. Rapidly changing technology and capabilities have altered the emphasis and application of these, but the fundamentals themselves remain constant. The following fundamentals are not unique to mounted operations, but should be considered when conducting mounted operations.
Human Factors
(1) Leadership. Commanders at all levels must have the ability and
determination to win the battle. The importance of the role of the leader and the difficulty of exercising effective leadership is increased on the modern battlefield by the nature of continuous operations, which
must to be sustained.
(2) Morale Morale is probably the most important single factor in war. High morale fosters an aggressive spirit. Morale is based on confidence, discipline, professional skill, physical conditioning and self-respect. These can be instilled by realistic, demanding and imaginative training. Above all, morale is enhanced by a sense of group loyalty-esprit de corps-which the commander must foster in his units. The surest way to achieve high morale is through success in battle.
(3) Initiative. Individual initiative, within the scope of the mission and
linked with resolute action, is fundamental.
(4) Flexibility. A commander at any level must have flexibility of mind and speed of decision. Unless he has these qualities he will rapidly surrender the initiative to the enemy and probably lose the battle.
(5) Endurance. Personnel must be mentally and physically prepared for battle.
b. The Selection of the Mission
(1) In every military operation it is essential to select and define the mission.
(2) The selection of the mission is one of the commander's most important duties; it demands clear and logical thought. The mission may be very specific or it may be expressed in general terms; it must be clear and direct, not ambiguous. Above all, it must express the intentions of the commander.
(3) The mission must be as widely circulated as the needs of security will allow, so that subordinates can consider it in their planning. There must be no doubt what is to be accomplished.
C. Freedom of Action. A commander requires the authority to exploit an opportunity of a favorable situation on the battlefield with energy and boldness. He must have the freedom of action to act independently within the framework of his mission and the higher commander's intent. Freedom of action has increased importance as command communications in battle may be limited by
circumstances or enemy action; at times being only intermittent and at crucial times nonexistent.
d. Aggressive Action. In all combat operations, even those in which initially the enemy has freedom of action, at all levels, commanders must seek every opportunity to retain or seize the initiative and strike the enemy. In the final analysis, success in battle depends directly upon the determination of the force, individually and collectively, to close with the enemy and to destroy his will to fight. Frequently, opportunities for victory in battle will be built on the exploitation of opportunities created by subordinate commanders who recognized and took advantage of a favorable situation.
e. Concentration of Effort. Military success will result from the concentration of superior combat power at the decisive time and place.
f. Economy of Force. A commander must allocate his forces to essential tasks, however he must not commit more forces than necessary. It is not possible to be strong everywhere and in order to be able to concentrate his forces a commander may have to accept risk by using an absolute minimum of force elsewhere.
g. Mobility
(1) Mobility is characterized by the ability of vehicles and forces to move in differing conditions and situations. It has a direct influence on a force's capability to achieve its mission. Superior mobility may compensate for numerical inferiority.
(2) Mobility is necessary to achieve concentration of effort and to deploy rapidly in order to engage the enemy.
(3) Terrain, weapon effects, unfavorable weather conditions and enemy air action will affect mobility on the battlefield. Differing degrees of mobility of forces must be taken into consideration.
h. Maneuver. In maneuver a commander attempts to position his force in such a way as to gain an advantage over the enemy in order to accomplish the mission. Both fire and maneuver are essential and must be integrated if commanders are to preserve their freedom of action and achieve success.
i. Surprise. Surprise is an effective and powerful factor in the use of force; its effect on morale can be very great. It can confer the initiative, threaten enemy morale, reduce friendly casualties and often give material advantages similar to a superior concentration of force. When other factors are unfavorable, success may depend almost entirely upon surprise.
j. Intelligence. A commander requires information and intelligence about the terrain, climate and the enemy. With basic intelligence as a background, current intelligence is required about the enemy to provide the commander with frequent observations and appreciations of his capabilities and intentions.
k. Simplicity. Unless plans are kept as simple and straightforward as possible, the speed of events and the complexity of modern warfare could well lead to considerable confusion. A complex plan may contribute to failure of an operation. Simple and logical plans are best and stand more chance of success.
l. Maintenance of Forces. A commander must make every effort to maintain the combat effectiveness of his force and must try to accomplish his aim with minimum losses.
m. Flexibility. All military plans must be flexible to allow for the unforeseen and to enable the maximum advantage to be taken of any sudden turn of events. A force must possess the flexibility to enable it to react to a change of plan and switch smoothly from one course of action to another. This entails good training, cohesive organization, communications, staff work and the maintenance of a reserve.
n. Security and Protection. The commander must take every precaution to secure and protect his force so that he can achieve his mission. He will do so through a wide range of measures including an aggressive search for and careful scrutiny of intelligence regarding the location, capability and intentions of the enemy, and denying the enemy information as to the location and strength of friendly forces and operational plans.
SECTION 3
ELEMENTS OF THE MTF AND TASK ORGANIZATION
301. GENERAL
A combat battalion for MTF operations is built around an infantry or tank battalion headquarters and task organization is accomplished by the attachment or cross-attachment of tank, infantry and AAV units as well as other arms determined by mission requirements. The headquarters of the combat battalion possesses the requisite ability to request, and coordinate the proper utilization of the various supporting arms of the MAGTF to include: artillery, naval gunfire and close air support.
a. Headquarters. The MTF headquarters is the MTF commander's means for exercising command and control of his force. Command and control is defined by JCS Pub 1 as, "The exercise of authority and direction by a properly designated commander over assigned forces in accomplishment of the mission. Command and control functions are performed through an arrangement of personnel, equipment, communications, facilities and procedures which are employed by a commander in planning, directing, coordinating, and controlling forces and operations in the accomplishment of the mission."
(1) In a regimental-size MTF the headquarters of an infantry regiment forms the command echelon of the MTF. The headquarters of a battalion-sized MTF will be a tank or infantry battalion headquarters depending on the preponderance of tank or infantry forces in the MTF.
(2) The command groups of either regimental or battalion-sized MTF's will normally operate from LVTC-7 and LVTP-7 vehicles.
b. Combat Element. All areas are task organized to form the combat elements of the MTF. Regimental-sized MTF's consist of at least two combat battalion-sized forces while a battalion-sized MTF will include at least two company-sized forces. The Light Armored Vehicle Battalions, (LAVB) may also be attached to a regimental MTF (or companies to a battalion MTF). They may operate either as a combat or combat support unit, depending on missions assigned. Operational Handbook (OH) 9-4, Organization and Operational Concepts for the Light Armored Vehicle Battalion, best describes the employment of the LAVB.
(1) The battalions organize for combat by dividing their Headquarters and Service Companies into command and support echelons and task organizing tank and infantry companies into combinations of tank-pure, tank-heavy, infantry-heavy and pure infantry teams by cross-attachment.
(2) The weapons company of the infantry battalion MTF is attached out to the command, combat and support echelons of the parent battalion and does not operate as a tactical entity. The antitank company of the tank battalion MTF reverts to the tactical control of the GCE commander, who uses it in task organizing the GCE and establishing his antitank point of main effort.
c. Combat Support. Combat engineers, air defense, artillery, attack helicopters and reconnaissance units may be attached, placed in direct support or, in the case of helicopters, "dedicated" in the support of the MTF. Close air support and naval gunfire support complete the combined arms arrayed with the MTF.
d. Combat Service Support (CSS). CSS must be adapted to the speeds, distances, and potentially high consumption rates of POL and ammunition characteristic of mounted operations. While combat and combat support components have organic CSS elements, they will not be sufficient to sustain the MTF. A Mobile Combat Service Support Detachment (MCSSD) will be formed from the Combat Service Support element of the MAGTF to support the MTF when it operates beyond its own capabilities. The MCSSD will move so as to be responsive to the requirements of the MTF. Section 14 describes the combat service support of the MTF.
302. MTF PECULIAR TERMINOLOGY
The MFT is generally described by the relative preponderance of the infantry and tank units of which it is formed. The ration of forces is determined by the type of terrain and the threat to be encountered. At the lowest level, mounted infantry and tank platoons may be cross-attached to form company-sized combined arms teams.
a. Mounted infantry. Infantry mounted on some means of transport, retaining its tactical integrity.
b. Infantry heavy. An organization with more infantry companies/platoons than tank companies/platoons. It is employed in close terrain or areas with a high threat from antitank weapons and units.
c. Tank heavy. More tank companies/platoons than mounted infantry companies/platoons. The tank heavy force should be employed when the area of operation is open and consists of few natural obstacles or built-up areas, speed and shock effect are desired or strong enemy armor opposition is expected.
d. Balances - equal numbers of tank and mounted infantry companies/platoons. A balanced force may be advantageous when the situation is unclear but the commander desires a reserve of considerable tank power.
e. Pure - Companies/platoons of either tanks or mounted infantry, with no cross-attachment. Pure companies/platoons may be employed within the MTF when mission requirements dictate.
f. Team - a company sized unit composed of tanks and mounted infantry, normally designated by the company headquarters placed over these units.
303. MTF ORGANIZATIONAL CONCEPTS
a. A regimental-sized MTF will be commanded by the infantry regiment headquarters. In this organization, the tank battalion headquarters should become the headquarters for a fourth battalion-sized task force of the MTF, or it may be employed as a tank-pure battalion.
b. A battalion-sized MTF may be commanded by either infantry or tank battalion headquarters. These headquarters must in turn task organize assigned forces, as described in paragraph 302, according to METT. When the situation requires the further cross-attachment of platoons of tanks and mounted infantry, the resulting units are referred to as "teams". The teams may be commanded by either tank or infantry company headquarters.
c. While an AAV can carry up to 25 Marines, considerations of tactics, cohesion and space dictate the assignment of an AAV to a reinfoced squad of Marines. The squad with attachments should not exceed 18 Marines per vehicle. This typical infantry "tractor team" consists of a squad leader (1), AAV crew (2), rifle squad (10), machinegun team (2) and DRAGON team (2). A company mortar team (3) may be substituted for a machinegun team. The tractor team is employed easily as a heliteam if the infantry battalion must change mission and task organization. Battalion mortars will normally be carried by squads in company commander vehicles. If employment as a mortar platoon is desired, dedicated vehicles must be identified from the AAV attachments. See figure 1.
d. AAV support of MTF operations is accomplished by attaching the AAV's to the infantry and engineer units. An AAV will normally support a squad, a section will support a platoon, a platoon will support a company and a company supports a battalion. This preserves the tactical integrity of the fighting units and identifies appropriate AAV unit attachments.
304. THE TANK BATTALION
The tank battalion and its subordinate tank companies is employed gainst the enemy as a battalion; or, it may cross-attach one or more of its companies with mounted infantry companies to form a battalion task force.
a. The organization of the tank battalion is depicted in figure 2.
b. Detailed characteristics of the M60A1 tank and TOW weapons system of the tank battalion are provided in appendix C.
305. ASSAULT AMPHIBIOUS VEHICLE BATTALION
For the tank and infantry battalions to be a fully integrated combat force, the AAV battalion must also become an integral part of the task organization of the regimental MTF. The AAV's provide mobility, limited armor protection and additional firepower for the infantry.
a. It is generally accepted that the current AAV, the LVTP-7, lift capacity of 25 combat-equipped Marines is ambitious when considering MTF operations. Mechanized exercises have revealed that 18 personnel per AVV is more realistic number. Additionally, the AAV should primarily be employed to transport assault elements in tactical situations. The use of the AAV in other roles, such as transporting supplies is based on availability. Wheeled vehicles should be used in MTF operations as logistics transports and prime movers of equipment. AAV units should, in all cases, bring with them the appropriate organizational CSS.
BATTALION COMMAND POST
2 LVTC-7
1 LVTP-7
RIFLE COMPANY (REIN) X 3 COMBAT ENGINEER PLATOON
13 LVTP-7 3 LVTP-7
Company CP (1 LVTP-7)
Mortar Squad
Rifle Platoon (REIN) X 3
Platoon Leader
60mm Mortar Team
Assualt Team
Tractor Team X 3
Rifle Squadron
MG Team
DRAGON Team
Total AAV’s: 2 LVTC-7
43 LVTP-7
ASSIGNED TO
COMMANDER’S VEHICLES NOT ASSIGNED AAV’S
FAAD Team Heavy MG Section, Wpns Co
FO TOW Section, HQ Co, Inf Rgt.
FAC
NGF Spotter
Liaison Personnel
Corpsmen
Figure 1
Typical Infantry Battalion MTF
TANK BATTALION
TABLE OF ORGANIZATION NO. 4238X
Tank Bn
49-945
M60A1 – 70
M88A1 – 5
TOW – 72
H&S Co AT (TOW) CO TANK CO
T/O NO. 4237P T/O 4235M T/O NO. 4233M
24 – 296 5 – 241 5 – 102
M160A1 – 2 TOW – 72 M60A1 – 17
M88A1 – 1 M88A1 – 1
BN HQ CO HQ CO HQ CO HQ
13-43 2-30 2-37 2-39
M60A1-2 M60A1-2
M88A1-1
CO M Sec MAINT. PLT TOW PLT TANK PLT
2-73 3-74 1-68
MT PLT SUPPLY PLT TOW SEC
2-73 2-42 0-22
TOW-8
Chaplain MED SEC TOW SQD
2-2N 1-17N 0-5
0-1M TOW – 2
1st Tk BN 4 Tk Co, AT Co
2nd Tk Bn 4 Tk Co, ATCo
3d Tk Bn 3 Tk Co, ATCo
4th Tk Bn (RES) 3 Tk Co, 2 AT Plt
8th Tk Bn (RES) 4 TK Co, AT Co
1st T.V. Bn 2 Tk Co, 2 Aav Co
Figure 2
b. The organization of the standard assault amphibian battalion is depicted in figure 2. The composition of each of the assault amphibian vehicle companies is also shown. It should be noted that the LVTR in each AAV company headquarters provides CSS support and should not be included when computing lift.
c. Detailed characteristics of the LVTP-7, LVTR-7 and LVTC-7 are provided in appendix C. Appendix D contains an indepth discussion of LVTC-7 employment considerations.
d. The assault amphibian vehicle battalion as shown in figure 3 has sufficient assets to provide mobility to the assault elements of four infantry battalions (one AAV Company per Battalion) and a regimental size headquarters. Since task organization is dependent on the situation at hand, the best approach to the allocation of AAV's is to maintain unit integrity of AAV's and supported units by assigning AAV's to each squad i.e., four per infantry platoon. However, the supported unit's mission has utmost priority in determining task organization and unit integrity.
e. There are 187 LVTP-7's and 15 LVTC-7's within the battalion. If the AAV battalion H&S Company supports the regiment headquarters, then each AAV company can support the infantry battalions it attaches to or supports with 43 LVTP-7 and 3 LVTC-7 vehicles. If the tank battalion is attached to the regiment, at least 2 LVTC-7's should be allocated to it from the AAV company assets. As vehicles availability drops from mechanical or combat casualties, H&S company vehicles should be used as replacements. AAV Battalion and Company sections not required for mounting the MTF's will use organic wheeled vehicles for transport and generally be relegated to rear areas, except as employed in the MTF combat trains.
(1) Battalion and regimental headquarters will normally require 2 or 3 LVTC-7 vehicles. The number of headquarters requiring AAV mobility, the number of AAV's available and the mission of each headquarters will be the deciding factors in determining how many LVTC-7's/LVTP-7's will be made available to each headquarters.
(2) The individual Infantry company headquarters will normally not use LVTC-7's. Tank company commanders will command from a tank which has the most adequate communication equipment for that purpose. Infantry company commanders will command from a LVTP-7.
f. AAV and Infantry Command and Control Relationship. Assault Amphibian units may be employed to support units by establishing command relationships of operational control, attachment or direct support which are defined in FMFM 9-2 Amphibious Vehicles and JCS Pubs 1.
(1) Assault amphibian units are most commonly employed by attachment, or in direct support of infantry units (and bring their organic combat service support with them). Together, the assault amphibian vehicle units and infantry units form the basis of the MTF. This organization requires close coordination and cooperation based upon intense training to form a finely tuned combat unit in minimal time.
(2) When the AAV's are attached, the infantry unit is responsible for their logistic support. When in direct support of the infantry, the AAV's must receive logistic support from the parent unit.
(3) AAV unit commanders have control of the AAV's and embarked personnel during the ship-to-shore movement. This is a unique relationship necessary for the effective conduct of the amphibious assault. Upon initiation of subsequent operations ashore in the MTF's, the AAV's provide mobility to the infantry in its conduct of combat operations, and therefore their tactical employment is controlled by mounted unit commanders. This control is exercised through the normal chain of command, from company/team commander through
ASSAULT AMPHIBIAN VEHICLE BATTALION
TABLE OF ORGANIZATION NO. 4655M
AAV BN
46 – 1095
LCTP-7 – 187
LVTC-7 –15
LVTR-7 – 6
H&S CO AA CO
T/O 4654N T/O 4652M
18 – 219 7 – 219
LVTP-7 – 15 LVTP-7 – 43
LVTC-7 – 3 LVTC-7 – 3
LVTR-7 – 2 LVTR-7 – 1
BN HQ CO HQ
9-33 2-14
CO HQ
3-83
LVTP-7 – 3
COMMSEC MT SEC LVTC-7 – 3
2-26 1-23 LVTR-7 – 1
AA PLT PLT
MAINT PLT HQ AAV PLT 1-34
1-38 L-59 LVTP-7 – 10
LVTR-7-2 LVTP-7 – 15
LVTC - 3
SUPPLY SEC CHAPLAIN
2-25 2-2N
0-1M
MED SEC
1-19N
2nd AA Bn 4AA Co
3rd AA Bn 4AA Co
4th AA Bn 2AA Co
1st T.V. Bn. 2AA Co, 2Tk Co
Figure 3
the subordinate infantry platoon commanders to the lowest level, the squad/tractor team leader. Infantry commanders must utilize the expertise of AAV unit leaders in planning the employment and executing movements of the AAV's.
(4) The current configuration of the communications system in the LVTP-7 does not provide adequate communications capability at the troop commanders station for the infantry company/team commander to exercise command and control from that position. Until requisite modification to the vehicle is effected, the infantry company/team commander should command his unit from the vehicle turret. The FO will occupy the troop commander station. The
infantry platoon commanders, who normally operate on only one radio frequency, will occupy the troop commanders positions, as will the squad leaders.
(5) The AAV unit commander acts as technical advisor to the company/team commander concerning the employment and logistical support of his vehicles.
(8) Command relationships remain unchanged when infantry units are temporarily dismounted from AAV's to conduct assaults or establish defenses. Actions of the units are closely coordinated to ensure accomplishment of the assigned mission. AAV leaders and crewmen remain with their vehicles during such situations to provide fire support to the infantry or local security for the vehicles, according to the plan of the infantry commander.
(7) Infantry commanders must provide adequate time during the course of operations to perform maintenance on their vehicles and equipment. Refueling and rearming should be accomplished daily, preferably at night. Operator maintenance is performed by AAV crews at halts, assisted and covered by mounted unit personnel. Higher echelon maintenance and repair
are requested as provided by the battalion S-4.
(8) The assault amphibian vehicle battalion commander will normally advise
the regimental MTF commander on the tactical and technical aspects of
employing the AAV battalion. Assault amphibian vehicle company commanders
will normally be employed in an advisory capacity for subordinate
battalion-commanders or separate battalion-sized MTF's. If the AAV
battalion commander is tasked with commanding the regiment combat trains,
he will reserve an LVTC-7 vehicle for his command post.
306. SAMPLE TASK ORGANIZATIONS
Task organization the MTF is the prerogative of the commander and is based on the factors of METT. The following examples illustrate how this might be accomplished by cross attachment of tanks and AAV mounted infantry. Cross-attachment is not attempted below platoon level, except under unusual, special operations such as MOUT, combat in forests or in a fortified zone (all unsuited in any case for a MTF).
a. Regimental-sized MTF. Figure 4 depicts an infantry regiment with tank battalion and a AAV battalion attached. As a MTF, infantry companies are mounted in AAV's and tank and infantry companies are cross-attached. Possible organizations are:
(1) One tank company is cross-attached with each infantry battalion resulting in four infantry-heavy battalion-sized MTF's as in figure 5.
(2) Another example using the same assets as in Figure 4 would be to form a MTF as shown in Figure 6. This regimental-size MTF includes one pure mounted infantry battalion, two infantry heavy battalion MTF's, and a balanced MTF of two tank companies and two mounted infantry companies.
(3) A third option could be as shown in figure 7, which would provide a tank heavy battalion-sized MTF, a mounted infantry heavy MTF and two pure mounted infantry battalions.
(4) In any event, commanders must understand the decreased cohesion attendant upon cross-attachment as a technique and must resist the urge to cross-attach as a matter of course. Units of the MTF will require some time together to develop their best effectiveness, therefore task
organizations should change as little as possible and only according to conditions of METT.
b. Battalion-size MTF. Once forces have been allocated to the battalion commander, he then in turns task organizes to meet his particular mission and situation. The same principles are followed at battalion level as at regimental. Companies/teams are formed by cross-attaching tank and mounted infantry platoons where desirable. Figure 8, 9, and 10 illustrate three methods of task organizing the same MTF, Combat support elements will come from the infantry battalion's weapons company and the combat engineer units if assigned. These combat support elements must be provided mobility equal to that of the remainder of the company/team.
Figure 4
INFANTRY REGIMENT WITH TANK AND AAV BATTALIONS ATTACHED
Figure 5
REGIMENTAL-SIZED MTF WITH 4 COMBAT BATTALIONS
Figure 6
REGIMENTAL-SIZED MTF WITH 4 COMBAT BATTALIONS
Figure 7
REGIMENTAL-SIZED MTF WITH 4 COMBAT BATTALIONS
BATTALION SIZE MTF
WITH 2 INFANTRY
COMPANIES AND 1 TANK
COMPANY AND 1
COMPANY
Figure 8
FIRST ALTERNATE
BATTALION MTF
Figure9
Figure 10
SECOND ALTERNATE BATTALION MTF
307. COMBAT SUPPORT
a. Artillery. Artillery is the primary supporting arm of a MTF and provides most of the suppressive fire which allows the companies/teams and battalion task forces to maneuver. MTF's require highly responsive artillery support best provided by self-propelled artillery reinforcing the direct support artillery. Self-propelled artillery provides better cross-country mobility than towed artillery and is more suitable for MTF operations. Its support vehicles are wheeled, however. Self-propelled artillery also reduces time for emplacement and displacement to allow a more rapid response to frequently changing situations. When only towed artillery is available, detailed planning must be effected to ensure timely displacement so that continuous fire support is available. A artillery battalion in direct support of a regimental-sized MTF will probably require more firing batteries than normally used in support of an infantry regiment. MTF operations can require numerous battery displacements each day. Towed units displace using their own prime movers, helicopters or AAV's. A point to consider when displacing with AAV's is that the FDC, ammunition, etc., should also move in AAV's. Also in the cue of self-propelled artillery, AAV's are extremely useful in providing cross-country mobility for ammunition and the FDC. These vehicles may be available if only three infantry battalions are mounted in the regiment MTF.
(1) Artillery support to a leading company/team may be provided by dedicated batteries when the enemy situation is vague. This method of employment must be carefully considered. Even though the responsiveness of fire support to the leading company/team would be greatly increased, the dedication of the battery would reduce the firepower immediately available to the MTF as a whole. This concept is most appropriate in support of
the advance guard in a movement to contact.
(a) The dedicated battery's primary responsibility would be to provide immediate fire support to a forward company/team of the MTF. (See FM 6-20, Fire Support in Combined Arms Operations, pages B-8 and B-9).
(b) Targets that do not present an immediate threat to the designated company/team should be engaged by other supporting artillery units.
(2) Artillery in support of a MTF will be assigned a standard mission in support of the MTF. An artillery unit or groupment may be task organized to support a specific MTF operation.
b. Mortars. Company/teams should be supported by attached battalion mortars whenever possible. Mortars provide the immediate suppressive fires or illumination until artillery or close air support can be delivered on a target. Marking targets for close air support is also a capability of mortars. The range of 81mm mortars, the lengthy distances and rapid movement associated with MTF operations and the lack of lethality against armored fighting vehicles usually precludes their use as a platoon under battalion control.
c. Engineers. Engineer support must be provided to enhance the mobility of the MTF. This support will generally take the form of minefield breeching and obstacle clearing. The engineers should be well forward in the MTF so that they can rapidly move to the front to accomplish their task. A stationary MTF presents a lucrative target and is deprived of its primary advantage of mobility. Engineers will also be required to emplace mines and obstacles along the MTF flanks to disrupt enemy attacks.
d. Reconnaissance. Reconnaissance personnel attached to the MTF will normally come from the Reconnaissance Battalion, Marine Division. They must have appropriate transportation to allow them to accomplish their mission in front of the MTF. The Reconnaissance Battalion can provide one company motorized for mounted reconnaissance missions. The ACE can provide aerial reconnaissance in the form of observers and sensors. However, enemy air defense may constrain
the use of aircraft for forward reconnaissance. See Section 11 for additional information on reconnaissance.
e. Antiarmor. There are numerous weapon systems available, both internally and externally, to the MTF for employment in antiarmor roles. Organic to units within the MTF are Tanks, TOW, Dragon, LAW, mines and artillery. Aviation assets are key external antiarmor systems along with, to some degree, naval gunfire. The MTF must designate his antiarmor point of maint effort by allocating TOW, FASCAM and attack helicopter units to the most vital unit's control.
f. Air Support. Within the constraints imposed by enemy air defense, terrain and weather, the ACE can provide a significant contribution to the MTF.
(1) Close Air Support. Attack aircraft are the primary means of engaging targets beyond the range of artillery. They can be particularly effective in attacking moving targets such as enemy armored formations. At night, OV-10D and A-6 aircraft can locate and attack moving armor.
(2) AH-1 Cobras and AH-IT (TOW) Cobras should be placed in dedicated support of the MTF. These aircraft can be used in screening missions or as an antiarmor reserve. The ACE commander may be tasked or may desire to locate forward arming and refueling points (FARP) in the MTF combat trains to sustain his dedicated support helicopters.
(3) Helicopter Transport. Transport helicopters can play a key role in MTF operations. They may be employed to transport follow-on forces rather than trucks or AAV's or they can be used to shuttle forward the large quantities of fuel and ammunition required to keep the MTF moving. Helicopters could be used to insert blocking forces against which the MTF could smash the enemy. Although not organic to the MTF, transport helicopters should be an
integral part of MTF planning.
g. Air Defense. Immediate, short range air defense for the MTF will consist of the redeye/stinger teams and the considerable small arms and heavy machine guns that can be brought to bear on the enemy aircraft. The HAWK missile system will be employed when the MTF operates within the HAWK envelope. When the MTF moves outside the HAWK envelope, fighter aircraft will have to be assigned air superiority missions consistent with the offensive antiair warfare plans and the air defense requirements of the MAGTF. The MTF must provide a warning system to include designation of air sentries and sectors of observation to prevent surprise air attack. FMFM 5-SC, Employment of Forward Area Air Defense Battery, contains guidance on the control and employment of FAAD units and weapons. However, MTF maneuvers may force the decentralization of FAAD fire unit actions.
h. Naval Gunfire. Naval gunfire, may be effectively used until the MTF moves out of range. It is advantageous in that ships can provide continuous support while displacing to another position. Large volumes of fire can be brought to bear on an area target in a short period of time. FMFM 7-2, Naval Gunfire Support.
308. COMBAT SERVICE SUPPORT (CSS)
The MTF must be able to conduct a 24-hour day, continuous land battle. In order to support this concept, CSS must be integrated into the MTF in such a way that the force will be able to exploit opportunities that arise. It is not acceptable that logistics constraints prevent tactical success, particularly in view of the fact that the MTF is most likely to be employed at a point where decisive results are expected. The MTF commander must have a thorough understanding of CSS concepts and problems so that he can plan for and execute CSS operations needed to maintain the momentum of the force, just as he plans for and executes maneuver and fire support. MTF's generally carry 2-3 days of supplies. They also may plan replenishment and support from rear combat service support areas..Replenishment can be by fixed wing aircraft, helicopters and/or trucks.
a. The Mobile Combat Service Support Detachment (MCSSD) replenishes and provides support to the unit CSS trains. The MCSSD contains a slice of the assets from the CSSE. Refer to Section 14
b. Combat elements utilize their own organic CSS as well as the CSS organic support that comes with the cross-attached units. These combined to comprise the trains. Refer to Section 14 for details.
309. TRAINING
Units must train as they are going to fight. How units will train is dependent on many factors which vary from assigned missions to assets available. Some basic principles are cited below that should be considered general guidelines in establishing training programs.
a. Training should be conducted by units task organized in the manner anticipated for combat. Include all assets of the combat, combat support and combat service support elements in training exercises. Supporting arms must be included to familiarize everyone with the complexity and problems associated with their coordination. Battle drills must be prepared and practiced at all levels of the MTF, from tractor team and tank crew through battalion. Confusion is the rule rather than the exception in combat, and the more familiar personnel are with one another and their tasks, the more likely they are to pull together and defeat the enemy.
b. Enemy tactics should be studied and taught at all units and at all levels using force on force evolutions to ensure training is realistic. This will allow both forces to learn and train simultaneously. The aggressor will learn the enemy tactics while the opposing force will learn how to counter enemy tactics.
c. Training during darkness and periods of limited visibility is necessary because the threat forces include night operations in their doctrine. When night operations are well executed, the MTF can achieve tactical surprise.
d. Training should be continuous for extended periods of time to achieve the realism of 24 hour operations for several consecutive days. The requirement for rotation of personnel and equipment will soon become evident since people and equipment cannot function indefinitely without rest or maintenance. Proper exercise of the combat service support functions over extended distances and long periods of time is required to achieve full effectiveness of MTF operations.
e. Although limited by training areas and ranges in some locations, units should use live fire exercises whenever possible.
f. Training programs should include the full spectrum of offensive and defensive operations. Source documents (FM's and FMFM's) should be consulted to ensure completeness and depth. See Appendix A.
g. Training for operations and survival in an NBC environment is a necessity. The best trained force will become ineffective or will be eliminated if not prepared for the NBC environment.
h. Training should be conducted in a electronic warfare (EW) environment. Communications will be lost, intercepted, jammed and located. Use all assets available to create the most realistic combat environment. Alternate means of communications must be practiced to be effectively used when actually needed.
i. Cross-training of individuals and teams will greatly improve MTF effectiveness after units have suffered casualties. For example, training rifle platoons in the use of crew served weapons in weapons platoons of the rifle company will provide the depth in personnel needed to keep key weapons in continuous operation during combat.
j. Leaders train subordinates. It is often necessary to hold classes or tactical exercises without troops (TEWT) for the leaders to be properly trained before teaching the troops. TEWT exercises in wheeled vehicles can take advantage of off-base training to gain maneuvering room and distances appropriate to MTF operations.
k. Principal staff officers should be trained in proper radio procedures and in the techniques of effective radio communications since normally MTF operations will normally require principal staff officers to operate their own equipment.
SECTION 4
COMMAND AND CONTROL OF THE MTF
401. GENERAL
The thrust of the preceding sections is that no standard organization exists for the MTF. Elements are task organized to accomplish the mission. Task organization provides for flexibility and simplicity of command and control of the MTF. Regimental and battalion headquarters should have mobility equal to that of their maneuver forces. Generally, this may require the streamlining of staff personnel to meet the limited space available in vehicles. Command and control procedures must provide for the positive control of the MTF's combat, combat service support and supporting arms. One method of assuring positive control is to keep these elements continually abreast of the operational situation to include the commander's future plans and intentions. MTF operations generally require a greater degree of decentralized control than exists in amphibious operations. Small unit leaders will assume greater responsibilities because of the extended ranges of MTF operations and the rapidity of events that require immediate decisions and actions.
402. MISSION-TYPE ORDERS AND TACTICS
Mission-type orders are used when mission-type tactics are employed by the MTF. Mission-type tactics reflect a way of conducting warfare whereby the commander clearly states the objective or the focus of the main effort without restricting the freedom of action for the subordinate anymore than is necessary. Limits, directions, control measures and restrictions are imposed when appropriate to facilitate control and coordination among friendly forces. The emphasis is on the senior to define to the junior what must be accomplished without restricting his freedom of action and telling him exactly how to do it. Mission-type orders require the commander to be perfectly clear as to what must be accomplished. Once the subordinate receives his mission he must use his initiative until the mission is accomplished; if his mission is jeopardized, he must communicate this to the commander.
a. Mission-type orders have no new or unique format and are expressed orally or in writing using the general format for operation orders and fragmentary (FRAG) orders set forth in FMFM 3-1, Command and Staff Action. Most MTF operations will use FRAG orders after the issuance of the original operations orders. The FRAG order should embody the characteristics of mission-type orders. Mission-type orders require the commander to determine intent - what they want to happen to the enemy. While detailed orders may be necessary at times, commanders must trust trained subordinates to make correct on-the-spot decisions within the mission framework. Such decentralization converts initiative into performance, allowing rapid reaction to capture fleeting opportunities. Mission orders need to cover only three important points.
(1) They should clearly state the commander's intent (mission).
(2) They should establish clear limits or controls when necessary for coordination.
(3) They should delineate the available resources and support from outside sources.
b. The subordinate commander must fully understand his commander's intent and the overall mission of the force. If the battle develops so that previously issued orders no longer fit the new circumstances, the subordinate must inform his commander and propose appropriate alternatives. If his, is not possible, he must act as he knows his commander would and make a report as soon as possible.
c. To insure that his concept is driving the operation to completion, the commander must supervise and stay abreast of changing situations. He must have an overall view of the battle based on minimal reports from subordinates, information from surveillance systems, and his own personal observations. He must compare enemy and friendly situations, assess progress, and if necessary, issue orders to change unit tasks. The process of staying abreast of the situation and reassessment of the original intent in light of changing situations is one of the commander's critical responsibilities.
d. Mission-type orders can be issued to units at any echelon of command capable of operating separately or semi-detached. A mission-type order may be issued to a platoon if it is assigned a mission to maneuver separately from its parent company.
e. Mission-type orders will contain the details necessary to ensure proper coordination with higher, adjacent and supporting units. Normally this can be accomplished on a map overlay using existing techniques and control measures.
403. COMMAND POST CONFIGURATION
Command posts (CP's) are configured to furnish the regimental or battalion commander with the personnel and equipment that he requires to command and control the operations of his maneuvering forces and supporting arms. Regimental and battalion CP's are very similar in composition and functioning. Regimental and battalion CP's should have mobility equal to that of their maneuver battalions/companies. The first step for commanders and planners in developing CP's for MTF operations is becoming familiar with the capabilities and means of employing the LVTC-7. Appendix C contains detail characteristics of all AAV's while Appendix D describes how the LVTC-7 should be employed.
a. A and B Command Groups. Marine Corps MTFs have tended to reflect amphibious doctrine in operational techniques. The use of duplex command groups, used in the amphibious landing to phase the command post ashore in the midst of the assault landing waves, has been applied in the experimental MCATF operations. In general, the notion has been one of alternating command between the "A" Command Group, led by the unit CO, and the "B" Command Group, led by the unit XO. The relieved command group presumably rests and plans future operations when out of "command". This practice has generalized the several hours of the amphibious assault command post technique into presumed days of mounted operations. Its errors are manyfold:
o Command responsibility circumscribed.
o Tactical direction and planning separated.
o Divisibility of staff sections assumed.
o Adequacy of communications equipment and vehicles assumed.
o Staff attention to vital rear echelon functions neglected.
Commanders will determine the preferred method and siting of exercising command and control over their mounted regiments and battalions. They may chose a duplex deployment into "A" and "B" command groups. This handbook, recognizing the likely conditions facing MTF's outside of garrison conveniences, recommends echelonment of command posts under the following scheme for regiments and battalions.
b. Main Command Post (mounted battalion or mounted regiment):
LVTC-7 LVTP-7 REAR
COMMAND POST
(USING VEHICLES AS AVAILABLE)
CO S-3 Liaison NCO with XO
motorcycle
S3 S-3A
Radio operators (4)
S2 S-3 NCO
Driver
FSC S-3 NCO
Gunner
Arty Ln O Comm Ops NCO
Messengers, Liaison
Comm O Officers as required Air Ln NCO
Comm Tech Arty Ln NCO
Veh Cdr Radio Operators
as required
Driver
c. Command Post Functioning
(1) The size of the LVTC-7 vehicle permits the combination of the Combat Operations Center (COC) with the Fire Support Coordination Center (FSCC), thus affording unusual convenience to the commander and his staff. Although their functions remain distinct, the physical proximity of the COC and FSCC permits the greatest collaboration of the S-3 and FSC.
(2) The heart of the command post is the COC, where the S-3 and S-2 Officers monitor the MTF in battle. Here the situation map is maintained and the tactical situation is assessed. Planning, orders and monitoring of executions are accomplished. The S-3 officer leads the command post and is responsible for its training and functioning to the commander. The S-2 is responsible for external security, such as sentries, air watch and a warning system. The Communications Officer is responsible for the vehicle, crew and technical functioning of communications systems.
(3) In the event the commander departs the command post during combat operations, a command group follows him to assure continued communications with the command post. Usually these include: Liaison Officer (S-3 Staff), Communications Officer/OpsChief, Escort/vehicle crew.
(4) The FSCC is the vital link between the commander and fire support echelons of the landing force. In the FSCC, a fire support map is maintained and artillery and aviation support is monitored by the Artillery Liaison Officer (ArtyLnO) and the Air Liaison Officer (ALO), under the supervision of the FSC. The FSC executes the fire support portion of the commander's orders and responds to his personal directives, or in his absence those of the S-3 Officer.
(5) During long halts or operational lulls, the Command Post operates on 5-man watch sections to permit staff officers time to rest, plan and coordinate actions. Each section establishes port-starboard watches as follows:
PORT SECTION STBD
SECTION
COC: S-3 S-2
Radio Op. Radio op
FSCC: Comm Off FSC
ArtyLnO ALO
Radio Op Radio
Op
(6) In the event that the command post is destroyed or rendered I
ineffective during an operation, the Executive Officer forms a provisional
command post from personnel, vehicles and communications assets available
in the rear command post and field trains. Replacement vehicles and
equipment are requested immediately from higher headquarters as the
provisional command post assumes command and control of the MTF. Until the
provisional command post becomes effective, the senior unit commander
assumes command, using communications resources of his unit.
(7) The rear command post personnel will maintain the operations and
intelligence journals, monitor all nets assigned to the MTF and maintain
the NBC Control Center. In the event that provisional CP is activated to
replace the main CP, any available communications capable vehicles may be
pressed into service: Communications van, MRC-110/109 vehicles, tank
recovery vehicles/tanks, etc.
(8) The command posts exercise control over the MTF by:
- Assessing the tactical situation
- Determining the plan
- Communicating clear and precise orders, and
- Monitoring the execution of the orders.
Rapid reaction, skilled handling and the capability of solving problems are
the desired characteristics of command post operations.
The MTF staff compiles an accurate assessment of the tactical situation from:
- The reports and orders of higher HQ
- Reports and messages of subordinate companies
- Orientation by adjacent units, and
- POW interrogation.
Gaps in information are filled to the greatest practicable extent by:
- Increased battle reconnaissance and observation
- Liaison with civil authorities and adjacent units, and
- Interrogation of local Inhabitants.
However, a commander must formulate timely plans, often without obtaining all
possible information.
(9) The commander and his staff brief subordinate commanders as often as
the situation demands, but at least once in a 24 hour period. At the
commanders brief, the current situation map is displayed and the commander
states his assessment of the situation and his mission. He then describes
his planned execution of the mission, including the concept of operation.
The S-2 briefs the enemy situation followed by the S-3 with subordinate unit
missions, coordinating instructions and command/signal notes. The FSC briefs
the supporting arms plan, availability and specific requirements of fire
support coordination. The S-4 or his designated representative then briefs
administrative and logistic matters. The commander then concludes with f
final details, observations and matters requiring command emphasis. The
preferred style of orders is mission-oriented, although factors of tactical
situation or training may dictate detailed orders.
(10) Subsequent orders for an operation are issued in the form of warning
orders and frag orders, using brevity code to maximum extent, usually given
over the radio. ALL MTF COMMANDERS GIVE RADIO ORDERS PERSONALLY TO ENSURE
SECURITY, BREVITY AND EMPHASIS.
404. COMMUNICATIONS
MTF operations present challenges and their own unique requirements in addition
to normal communications considerations. FMFM 10-1, Communications established
nominal communication support requirements. However, in the case of MTF
operations radios have increased importance due to the long distances and
frequent movements of friendly units. Communication by wire and messenger
should be used when practical, these means have limited use when moving. Radio
communications have limitations such as mechanical reliability, terrain masking,
distance limitations, user knowledge and training, and vulnerability to enemy
electronic warfare. These limitations must be accepted, planned for and overcome
since radios are key to MTF operations.
a. Distance Factors. The extended distances associated with MTF operations
become an important factor when communication planning for MTF operations is
initiated. Distance capabilities of radios must be considered when the main body
of the MTF can easily be spread over 10km, with reconnaissance and screening
forces 10-20km from the main body. The GCE or MAGTF headquarters may be up to
100km from the MTF. Distances and terrain will often require relaying messages
through other units or on alternate nets. Retransmission by ground or airborne
means are often the only solutions to maintaining vital radio communications
over extended distances. The first major step in communications planning must be
the paring of the number of required radio nets to the barest minimum,
eliminating duplication of function and redundancy of stations required to
operate.
b. Training. Training personnel in the capabilities and limitations of radio
communications and are fundamental to facing the reality of radio in support of
MTF operations. Commanders and communications planners must regularly
anticipate and determine when radio relay is required.
c. Maintenance. Scheduled maintenance of radio equipment must continue
during combat operations. Failures will occur, but with a proper maintenance
program, reliability can be maintained at much higher levels.
d. Visual Communications. Hand-and-arm signals, flags and pyrotechnics augment
communication within the MTF. All units must be capable of executing missions
when radio use has been denied by enemy action or own maneuvers. Appendix E
provides some examples of signals.
e. Motorcycle Couriers. Motorcycles can be used effectively to carry
messenger., guides, and scouts. Couriers also can be of value in providing a
means of maintaining contact between spread out units. Motorcycle couriers are
not as fast as some other methods of communication, but they can be more
reliable and secure. They must be monitored since they generally travel over
unfamiliar terrain, have little to no protection from enemy fire and can become
easily fatigued. Whenever the courier departs one location for another, the
sending unit should notify the receiving unit by radio that a courier is on the
way. The receiving unit then acknowledges the message when the courier has
arrived.
f. Communications Security. Communications security is the protection
resulting from all measures designed to deny to unauthorized persons information
of value which might be derived from the possession and study of communications
or to mislead unauthorized persons in their interpretations of the results of
such a study. Communications security is a command responsibility as well as the
individual responsibility of all users of communications. In addition to
responsibility for planning, supervising, and coordinating communications
security matters, the communications-electronics officers provides assistance in
supervising communications security within the command. Section 9 of FMFM 10-1,
Communications covers communications security more thoroughly.
405. ELECTRONIC WARFARE (EW)
Electronic warfare is an essential element of combat power. Its contribution lies in exploiting enemy weakness, protecting freedom of action, and reducing security and communication vulnerabilities. A modern military force depends on electronics for command and control of forces and employment of weapon systems. Because of this dependence on electronic devices, Marine forces, as well as enemy forces, are vulnerable to actions which can reduce the effectiveness of these devices or gain intelligence from them. An electronic warfare system that enables the commander to degrade the effectiveness of enemy electronic activities is a powerful weapons that can be used to support both offensive and defensive operations. Hence, EW could be the critical factor in deciding victory or defeat. Electronic warfare is an element of combat power having three facets-electronic counter countermeasures (ECCM), electronic warfare support measures (ESM), and electronic countermeasures (ECM). OH 3-4, Electronic Warfare Operations Handbook, should be consulted for details on electronic bare and the threat.
406. FIRE SUPPORT COORDINATION
A plan of attack consists of the scheme of maneuver and the plan of supporting fires. How well those fires of organic combined arms and supporting arms are planned and coordinated will often mean the difference between success or failure in MTF operations. MTF operations have a few unique requirements for planning and coordinating fires. Frequent displacements of artillery units is common, and the MTF can easily move outside the range of its naval gunfire. Open terrain will favor enemy air defense weapons and hamper friendly close air support and vertical assault. Regardless of whether the fires come from units within the MTF or from units in support of the MTF, radio communications are critical for requests and coordination. Given the available assets and the potential distance factors associated with MTF's operations, the plan of attack must include both a scheme of maneuver and an effective plan of supporting fires. This will require planning to maintain adequate communications between maneuver forces, organic combined arms, the MTF FSCC, and control agencies of higher headquarters.
a. The Direct Air Support Center (DASC) coordinates close air support, vertical airlift and reconnaissance missions which require coordination with fire support means. The DASC should be located in close proximity of the ground combat element FSCC for ease of coordination. However, the requirement for uninterrupted communications and continuous operation of the DASC are essential overriding factors. Previous attempts to place a DASC in LVTC-7's to attain mobility equal to that of the MTF FSCC have been unsuccessful due to insufficient communication equipment in the LVTC-7, frequent movement and terrain masking. Therefore, if the MTF is the ground combat element, the DASC should anticipate moving in trace between the MTF and other elements of the MAGTF. In this case plans must be made to provide ground or airborne radio relays between the DASC and MTF FSCC. The airborne DASC capability can be used for limited periods when weather conditions are suitable and the enemy air defense threat is minimal.
b. The artillery FO, NGF spotter and FAC can travel with the infantry company commander in his command vehicle, a LVTP-7. Some of these observers may also travel in LVTP-7's adjacent to the command vehicle. Occasionally for adequate observation it may be necessary to open one or both cargo hatches on the LVTP-7 and forfeit the armor protection normally provided. FAC's, must rely on their organic radio with the antennae extending out of the cargo hatch. FO's operate the troop commander radio. 81mm mortars are carried in the company commander's vehicle and are unloaded to fire direct lay when needed by him.
c. In tank companies, the command vehicles are tanks. The FO or FAC can ride as loaders in the command post tanks. Which observer rides with the company commander depends on the situation and the commander's need to coordinate fires. The firepower of a buttoned-up tank may be restricted when a FO or FAC rides as a loader. NGF spotters may required LVTP transportation because of their radio equipment.
407. CONTROL MEASURES
Control measures are essential to the effective control of the MTF. Control measures and their associated symbols are key to fire support coordination, controlling movement, reporting status and brevity in issuing orders. In addition to the control measures and their related symbols that are normally found in military operations, the visual identification of units embarked in various vehicles becomes an important aspect of control in MTF operations.
b. Vehicle Identification. Vehicle identification is required to control movement on the main supply route and tactical maneuvers of assaulting units. Each element of the MTF may have attachments from a common organization, an example being AAV's which may be attached to infantry, tank, artillery and combat service support elements. In order for supported commanders to control their forces, it is necessary that all their vehicles be readily identifiable. Vehicles may be marked with tape, colored panels or in any manner that can be changed as task organizations change. Appendix E provides an example of identifying vehicles by means of display boards.
SECTION 5
OFFENSIVE OPERATIONS
501. GENERAL
a. Battle. The MTF in combat switches rapidly from mass and dispersion. By dispersing, enemy recce and weapons effects are reduced, especially nuclear and chemical weapons effects. However, offensive and defensive potential suffers, bringing the necessity for rapid and decisive massing of forces at the precise moment called for in the commander's plan. The surprise of the enemy in unexpected situations is the surest method of success. Radio security, camouflage and cover, reconnaissance, terrain analysis and use of night or foul weather are the prerequisites of surprise, which is then exploited by speed of one's own maneuver. The surprise is denied to the enemy by reconnaissance and security measures.
In battle the commander needs to establish a point of main effort regardless of the type of combat operation being conducted. Maneuver units and/or fire mass at the precise location and time to effect a decisive, surprising blow against the enemy situation. The selection of the point of main effort determines the specific form of maneuver (penetration, envelopment, frontal).
The ultimate decision in battle will be effected by the employment of a reserve by battalion and larger MTF's. It consists of combat units and may include combat support. It is employed in its entirety to exploit success, form a point of main effect, or relieve crisp. The reserve must be constantly prepared for employment. Upon employment of the reserve, the commander must form a new reserve from own or reinforcing units.
b. Reconnaissance. Rapid decisions are obtained, objectives are attained and battalions effectively employed only when timely information of the enemy and the terrain are obtained. The MTF conducts reconnaissance without special orders at all times in the presence of the enemy through:
Continuous observation of the battlefield
Armored scouts (e.g. tanks or AAV's)
Unarmored scouts (light vehicles or jeeps)
Foot patrols
Fire, or combat action.
Leaders at all levels are responsible for battle reconnaissance. The battalion commander prescribes recce operations of the companies and coordinates their efforts and those of adjacent units.
In the event armored reconnaissance is formed or attached to the MTF, it win be exploited in "recon pun" tactics. The speed, armor, firepower and communications of armored recce vehicles allow such units to bypass or overrun weak, unarmored enemy forces and to break contact with superior, armored enemy forces. The armored recce section consists generally of 2-3 tanks or armored cars, reinforced if possible by infantry. An NBC monitoring capability is desirable for each recce section. In operations, the recce sections form a "point" up to 10km in advance (15km in the pursuit) of the leading companies of the MTF and seek their recce objectives and enemy locations. Radio contact is maintained with the MTF to report gaps in enemy defenses, locations of fords, defiles and bypasses.
c. Security measures protect the MTF from enemy surprise and furnish time for effective countermeasures to be employed in combat. Security is usually provided by the employment of:
Alert personnel stationed on vehicles and crew served weapons.
Observation posts/listening posts (incl sensors).
Patrols
Sentries.
In addition the following measures will increase the general security of units:
Noise discipline (personnel and engines).
Light discipline.
Cover and concealment.
Air and NBC defense readiness (incl. NBC sensors)
Electronic security.
Barriers
Effective organization for combat.
Security measures apply equally on the march as in combat positions. Civilian
populations will be closely scrutinized as potential saboteurs, commandos or partisans.
d. Marches are undertaken by units not in contact to reposition for future
employment or combat operations. They differ from the movement to contact in
three ways:
Purpose (relocation, not contact).
Prescribed speed, interval.
The mission is rapidity in movement of organized units.
Planning will begin with a Warning Order, estimate of situation, detailing of quartering parties and recommended courses of action. A detailed movement plan will be devised upon the commander's decision and the March Orders issued. The MTF Advance Party will consist of an OIC, security detachment, support personnel (comm, medical) and subordinate unit representatives. The principal task of the advance party is the rapid assembly of arriving units in off-road positions. For typical task organization, control measures, security measures and tables, see Appendix H.
e. Offensive Operations.
(1) The objective of offensive operations is to defeat the enemy, gain ground and to gain decision in battle. Offensive actions may also:
Repell the enemy.
Locate the enemy.
Encircle the enemy.
Link-up with own forces.
(2) The commander selects a point of main effort, wherever the enemy shows weaknesses or the terrain offers possibilities of bringing the thrust of units and the force of weapons to bear in such a way that the attack can rapidly penetrate to the enemy's rear. If opportunities appear at a point other than the expected one, this will be exploited without hesitation. By means of a swift shift of fire and concentration of forces at the point which promises success, a new point of main effort will be formed.
(3) Every attack requires preparations. The time allowed for preparations,
troop-leading steps, etc will be as short as possible, allowing absolutely necessary actions to be taken by subordinate commanders. If the situation is such that the enemy can be surprised or forestalled, an attack will be launched without preparations or delay. This can only be ensured through training. Surprise and readiness will compensate for lack of concentrated power but coordination must be achieved during battle to provide reinforcement of success and logistic support. If the enemy has superior strength or readiness, the attack must be prepared thoroughly, achieving maximum combat power at the outset.
(3) Control measures will be minimized to meet the commanders objectives and still afford subordinates maximum opportunity and flexibility. Usually a single objective is assigned for each operation with additional intermediate objectives assigned only when absolutely necessary. A line of departure and boundaries are mandatory control measures. Phase Lines and Target Reference Points (TRP's) will be used to maintain adequate control over movement. The line of departure and phase lines are automatically reported on crossing by units. TRP's are reported only when so ordered or when assigned as an intermediate objective. Generally, dual axes of advance are ordered, with subordinate units free to operate in and out of these axis, as long as such deviations do not endanger or conflict with adjacent friendly units. The battalion MTF attack frontage may extend 4-5km, but company formations should not exceed 750m in width. When terrain is open, a battalion MTF may attack in a single formation approximately 1500m wide: double line, wedge, inverted wedge being preferred (company formations do not exceed 750m width):
Figure 15a. MTF Formations
502. FORMS OF MANEUVER
a. Frontal Attack. A frontal attack strikes the enemy across a broad front and over the most direct approaches. For deliberate attacks, the frontal attack is unquestionably the least preferable because it exposes the MTF to the concentrated fire of the defender over the most obvious approach. In many instances, the penetration or envelopment is initiated by means of the MTF first undertaking the frontal attack. Figure 15b depicts MTF units in a frontal attack.
(1) The frontal attack is the quickest approach to the enemy, and is useful in overwhelming light defenses, covering forces or disorganized units. It will often be the best form of maneuver for a hasty attack in a meeting engagement or for exploiting the effects of nuclear or chemical strikes immediately after they occur.
(2) The frontal attack is also used in exploitation and pursuit and during the envelopment by the committed subordinate formations.
Fig 15b
Frontal Attack
b. Penetration. In the penetration, a powerful main attack passes through the enemy defensive positions on a narrow front while one or more simultaneous supporting attacks exert pressure on a broad front to deceive the enemy and hold him in place. The purpose of the penetration is to penetrate the defensive line in order to pour combat power into the enemies' rear; severing his LOC's, disrupting his command and control, destroying the cohesion of his force and, if necessary, physically destroying his force by fire into his rear. MTF's are well suited for employment in exploiting this form of maneuver. Figure 15c depicts MTF units involved in a penetration.
Figure 15c
Penetration
(1) The penetration usually progresses in three stages: rupturing the forward enemy defensive positions, widening the gap to permit the employment of follow-on forces, and seizing objectives to destroy the continuity of the enemy defense.
(2) The main attack is characterized by a preponderance of combat power organized in depth. This consists of a leading force (penetrating force) and one or more follow-on forces which give depth to the main attack. The leading force ruptures the enemy defensive positions on a narrow front in a powerful and violent attack. It then widens the gap to permit the employment of follow-on forces, or it maintains the momentum of the main attack by driving on to overrun or seize assigned objectives.
(3) Follow-on forces in the main attack may be used to widen the gap after the leading force has ruptured the enemy defensive positions, or they may pass through the leading force and maintain the momentum of the attack by overrunning or seizing assigned objectives in the enemy rear. Follow-on forces may also be employed to attack enemy forces isolated by the momentum of leading forces.
(4) One or more supporting attacks are launched simultaneously with the main attack. These attacks are launched on a wide front to deceive the enemy as to the location of the main attack and to fix him in place. By fixing the enemy in place, he is prevented from disengaging and reacting to the main attack.
(5) The reserve may be used to widen the gap if necessary, but it would most
likely be used to reinforce success such as being used for exploitation.
(6) Strong fire support is an important element in the preponderance of combat power used in the main attack. It contributes to the power and violence of the main attack and is effective in reducing friendly casualties. Preparation fires cover the movement of the main and supporting attacks and then concentrate to demoralize and weaken the enemy at the point where the main attack ruptures the enemy defensive positions. When the rupture is effected, fire support shifts to support the attacks to widen the gap and the attacks on assigned objectives. Fire support is also used to limit the enemy's ability to react, neutralize his reserve, and engage targets of opportunity.
(7) Objectives are selected in the enemy rear to break up the continuity of his forces and to make his forward defensive positions untenable. Objectives are selected at least to the depth of the enemy reserve and include his fire support means, command and control installations, and reserve, as well as key terrain.
(8) To facilitate the momentum of the main attack, lateral movement should not be unduly restricted by boundaries or obstacles. Intermediate objectives are normally assigned to the main attack only if they are essential to the
accomplishment of the mission. Close liaison must be maintained with forces in contact to facilitate one force passing through another.
(9) Consideration is given to the penetration as a form of maneuver when the
enemy is overextended or weak and when his flanks are unassailable. The terrain may be unfavorable to other forms of maneuver or the terrain may favor a penetration because of an abundance of avenues of approach. The availability of superior fire support may favor a penetration, or a penetration may be used when time does not permit another form of maneuver. The penetration is considered when overwhelming combat power is not available since it enables friendly forces to mass resources and develop the preponderance of combat power at the point of penetration.
c. Envelopment. The envelopment is the preferred from of maneuver in MTF
operations since the speed and mobility of the MTF can be optimized and attacking directly into the main strength of the enemy's defenses can be avoided. Figure 15d depicts MTF units involved in an envelopment.
Fig- 15d
Envelopment
The envelopment avoids the enemy's strength - his front where the effects of his fire and obstacles are greatest. The main attack maneuvers around the enemy's main defenses to secure objectives on the enemy flank or rear. The envelopment itself should be far enough to the enemy's flank or rear that if detected, it will still force the enemy into other than his preferred positions. This procedure causes him, at a minimum, to reorient his attention in a new direction, reassess the situation, and make new decisions, an of which require time. The envelopment usually enables the attacking force to suffer minimum damage while gaining maximum opportunities to destroy the enemy.
503. TYPES OF OFFENSIVE OPERATIONS
MTF's are offensive in nature, and as such, they are particularly well suited to conduct or participate in an types of offensive operations as outlined in the FMFM 6 series. The types of offensive operations are:
o movement to contact
o hasty attack
o deliberate attack
o exploitation
o pursuit
o other special purpose operations
a. Movement to Contact is conducted to gain or restore contact with the enemy. It includes generally any movement toward the enemy by the battalion short of actual contact. It is desirable to gain contact with the smallest possible element, leaving the commander freedom of maneuver. A hasty attack upon contact will permit fixing/bypass, flanking or penetraton/overrurning of the enemy as ordered by the commander. These actions must be determined rapidly during a meeting engagement, a common result of a movement to contact. Despite the characteristic limited knowledge of the enemy, minimal time to observe, analyze and execute and rapidly changing situations, bold offensive actions alone will retain the initiative, even if coordination suffers accordingly, all units must be prepared to attack from the march into the flanks of enemy formations, seeking to destroy command units supporting arms and rapidly eliminating combat elements, even if these outnumber friendly forces by a substantial margin.
(1) During the movement to contact, forces are organized into an advance
guard, flank and rear guard, and a main body.
(a) An advance guard may be used to assist the covering force (MAF-sized operations) and to prevent premature deployment of the main body. It develops the situation along designated routes or axes of advance.
The advance guard is usually a tank heavy or balanced force moving in front of the MTF. It operates within range of the artillery moving with the main body.
(b) Flank and rear guards are used to protect the main body from ground observation, surprise, and direct fire. Infantry-heavy forces may be preferred for rear guard operations.
(c) The remainder of the MTF moves in the main body. The main body
nor many moves on parallel axes.
(2) Movement to contact is characterized by decentralized control and usually an initial reinforcing of leading forces (advance guard) when contact is established. The principle is to make initial contact with the enemy minimum with the force.
(3) Depending on the terrain, the battalion-sized MTF will generally move with two companies in the main body, utilizing parallel axes. Formations are employed within the companies for security and control
b. Hasty Attack. This type of attack is characterized by trading preparation time for surprise. In order to maintain momentum or retain the initiative, minimum time is devoted to preparation, and the forces used for the attack are those which are readily available. A hasty attack seeks to the advantage of the enemy's lack of readiness, and involves boldness, surprise and speed in order to achieve success before the enemy has has time to establish or improve his defense posture.
(1) Hasty attacks evolve from meeting engagements or successful defenses. In either case, the commander deploys and attacks quickly to seize the initiative and to keep the enemy from organizing resistance.
(2) The commander must be prepared to make immediate use of every available asset on the shortest possible notice. Speed of attack will offset a lack of thorough preparation, but from the onset of the engagement, commanders must commit all available resources to the attack.
c. Deliberate Attacks. A deliberate attack becomes necessary when the enemy has established a main defensive zone and is prepared to resist with all forces at his disposal. He can be defeated only if his main defenses are overcome and his rear command, fire support and logistics are destroyed or threatened. Penetration, envelopment or turning attacks will accomplish this objective. The principal characteristics of this form of attack are:
Detailed study of enemy situation.
Thorough examination of terrain.
Precise choice of tactics, task organization.
Detailed fire support coordination.
The power of a coordinated attack is in the planning which enables all units to apply the maximum practicable combat power upon the enemy. When this power is positioned at the point of main effort against an enemy weakness - flank, rear, isolated position - energetic fire and maneuver will defeat the enemy defenses and permit seizure of assigned objectives.
Upon seizure of objectives, the MTF commander must consolidate company positions, reconstitute or reposition the reserve, continue combat reconnaissance to maintain contact with the enemy, link-up with adjacent units, establish security and conduct logistic operations. Ensuing action will depend upon the enemy and higher authority but the commander must be prepared to execute the most likely courses - exploitation, movement to contact, defense (under NBC Warfare conditions, dispersal is a fourth possibility.
d. Exploitation. Exploitation is the bold continuation of the attack to maximize success in face of perceived weakness of the enemy, such as the overrunning of his CP's, artillery, and/or logistics (these are always reported to higher HQ). Exploitation is a rapid advance into the depth of the enemy which prevents him from reconstituting a defense. The battalion attacks rapidly, in deep formations with reconnaissance covering the flanks. The commander makes rapid decisions, based upon his mission, whether to overrun or bypass enemy units. Built-up areas, forest belts and areas with thick vegetation are generally avoided. Above all, momentum of the attack must be preserved.
Under NBC Threat, this rapidity of movement may be the only means of preservation, since the enemy win most likely resort to such weapons when his defensive system collapses. Enemy counterattacks will be met with massed supporting arms and usually no more than a single company, while the bulk of the MTF skirts the opposition and continues the mission. Defended positions are usually bypassed but if such is not possible, the battalion must attack through, using supporting arms to neutralize anti-tank weapons. If the supporting arms are outdistanced and the attack halted, the battalion must deploy and consolidate.
e. Pursuit. The pursuit is executed in order to destroy an enemy incapable of organizing a defense by bringing him to battle as rapidly as possible. It is ordered by higher authority, usually upon receipt of reports by subordinate units of successful penetration, enemy disorganization and lack of resistance. In the pursuit, the MTF fights to the limits of men and material. Darkness, fatigue and lack of resupply are not reasons for breaking off the pursuit. Speed and forward echelonment without regard to danger to flank and rear are characteristic of the pursuit.
f. Other Special Purpose Operations. In addition to the five major types of offensive operations discussed above, commanders must also be prepared to conduct certain special purpose operations. They are:
o Reconnaissance in force.
o Raids.
o Relief.
1) Reconnaissance in Force. This type of operation is characterized as a general intelligence gathering evolution. The purpose is to test the enemy, detect a weakness in his position, make him react or to develop the situation. A strong force is generally employed to deceive the enemy into believing the operation is a deliberate attack. The operation is planned and executed like a movement to contact except for the lack of detailed knowledge of the enemy. The mission most often requires a terrain objective which, if threatened or occupied, will cause the enemy to react. Sufficient reserves are maintained to exploit success of any discovered enemy weaknesses or to extricate the force should that become necessary.
(a) The speed, mobility and combined arms character of an MTF makes
this organization particularly well suited for utilization in
reconnaissance force operations.
(b) The battalion-sized MTF is normally the smallest unit that would
conduct a reconnaissance in force against a sophisticated enemy
possessing modern weapons and mechanized equipment.
(c) The force conducting the operation must be:
1 Strong enough to make the enemy react.
2 Flexible enough not to become decisively engaged.
3 Strong enough to exploit, if the opportunity for
exploitation presents itself.
(d) The types of attack, forms of maneuver, formations and techniques of
movement outlined in this and other sections are generally applicable
and will be utilized in reconnaissance in force operations.
(2) Raid. A raid is an attack into enemy held territory designed to deliver a rapid, violent attack against a selected enemy unit to inflict maximum losses, disrupt control, and destroy equipment. It may be employed to achieve the objectives of reconnaissance in force, if circumstances are favorable. This type of operation is ordered by the force commander when a vulnerable target-objective is presented and enemy weapons or weather prohibit the employment of air assault raid forces.
The raid force consists primarily of tank units with infantry, engineers, etc., attached only for specific tasks. It conducts a rapid mounted assault through enemy territory, with no attempt to seize an objective, rather returning in a single thrusting movement. The assault force uses a formation of minimum time-length, to minimize detection and counter-measures. There is no evacuation of equipment, only crews are recovered. The only deviation from the raid route permitted is to attack enemy forces observed to be moving, hence threatening the operation. Special fire support actions are planned to cover the withdrawal of the force.
(3) Relief operations by the MTF will usually be ordered only in extremis by higher HQ, because of the need to hold its power in reserve. However, it remains conceivable that a unit might require relief by the MTF pending the arrival of reinforcements to the force commander. On the other hand, the MTF will often be relieved in place for employment elsewhere or change of mission.
Generally a relief is conducted by three methods: static, by attack or by delay. Higher HQ will specify method, time of beginning and end, time of shift of responsibility for sector, and coordination of security, support and logistics.
The relief is a dangerous operation, presenting weakness to a prepared enemy. It is carried out in darkness or foul weather with the protection of supporting arms and higher HQ reserves. Careful cooperation by commanders, coordination measures and special communications and liaison arrangements are required. The following measures will be ordered by the commanders:
Arrival and briefing of advance elements: operations, logistic and fire support staff, company XO's.
Order of turnover of battle positions, facilities and barriers.
Time and method of turnover of security and patrolling.
Exchange of consumable supplies and designated equipment.
Routes, control and schedule of arrival and departure march units.
Camouflage and deception measures and discipline.
Exchange of communications COI's, takeover of telephone circuits.
If both relieved and relieving forces are similiarly equipped and organized, then the relived unit operation order is subsumed by the relieving unit and changed only after relief is completed.
It should be noted that dissimular units effecting relief cannot conduct a true one-for-one relief below the company level for lack of common weapons, etc. Battalion CP's will co-locate as early as possible, with the relieving commander assuming responsibility for the defense once all companies have reported relief. If the situation dictates, a rear element may be left by the relieved unit to assist in defensive operations or exchange of material.
If the relief is to be conducted as an attack, circumstances dictate that the
commanders arrange:
Exchange of liaison personnel, operation orders and COI's.
Battlefield reconnaissance.
Security for the approach march.
Allocation of routes, assembly areas.
Clearing of friendly and/or enemy barriers.
Repair or reinforcement of bridges.
Support of relief force by relieved unit, by fire.
Logistic preparations, especially medical services.
The commander of the relief-attack force is responsible for overall operations, unless otherwise ordered. The relieved force operates in support from its original positions.
If the relief is ordered as a delay, the relieved unit conducts a passage of lines with the relieving unit.
505. BYPASS OF THE ENEMY
An enemy force may be bypassed by a combat element if the enemy force is so small or so lacking in mobility as to pose little or no threat to the MTF operations. The commander of the subordinate unit bypassing the enemy must receive permission to do so from the MTF commander. An independent battalion-sized MTF, or a regimental-sized MTF must receive permission from the GCE or the commander if guidelines for bypassing the enemy have not already been established. Any bypassed enemy must be reported so that following forces will not be surprised.
a. Maneuvering forces may bypass some enemy forces and merely report them to the next higher headquarters without further action. Most enemy forces which are bypassed will have to be contained until they can be destroyed by following forces or until they surrender. Since the attacking force has the initiative, the force assigned the task of containing the bypassed enemy may be smaller than the force contained. The containing force carries out its mission by using direct and indirect fires, which occupy the enemy force so that it cannot maneuver against, or fire effectively on the bypassing forces.
b. Depending on the nature of the bypassed enemy force the containing force may be mechanized or transported by trucks, helicopters or be foot mobile. The commanders guidance should be issued in general terms before operations commence to allow subordinate commanders the most freedom of action when encountering small or immobile enemy forces. FM 71-2, The Tank and Mechanized Infantry Battalion Task Force, Chapter 4, contains an example of how to conduct a bypass of the enemy.
506. MEETING ENGAGEMENTS
A meeting engagement occurs when the combat units of the MTF come upon the enemy
suddenly. Little or no information is known about the enemy initially. The enemy may be moving or stationary.
a. The unit which meets the enemy takes action on contact. Reacting immediately, the unit making first contact returns fire, deploys, reports and develops the situation. Suppressive fire from other organic or supporting arms should assist the against the enemy. The cognizant company seeks to maintain forward motion of the battalion force and provides an immediate and accurate report to battalion headquarters.
b. The goal, once contact is made, is to gain the upper hand by overcoming the enemy before he can effectively react. To do so, a battalion commander must keep his forces in a posture which facilitate maneuver quickly to assist the company/platoon in contact, he must receive quick and accurate reports on the enemy, and he must issue instructions immediately.
c. Based on the reports made by the company commander and his own observations, the battalion commander has at least four options:
(1) Order the company to eliminate the enemy and continue forward with the
battalion.
(2) Order the company to fix the force and bypass the enemy with the rest of
the battalion.
(3) Conduct a hasty attack as rapidly as possible.
(4) Establish a hasty defense if the enemy cannot be overcome or bypassed,
while the regimental commander responds to the situation.
c. If the enemy is moving when a meeting engagement occurs, speed of decision and execution is critical. Threat doctrine for two converging forces is to immediately conduct a hasty attack from the line of march and attempt envelopment. The battalion commander must quickly estimate the force ratios and either go to a hasty defense or begin a hasty attack to outflank and destroy the enemy.
d. Meeting engagements can occur with any size unit. The echelons of command used in this discussion were merely selected for ease of explanation.
507. TECHNIQUES OF MTF ATTACKS
MTF assault units use two general techniques of attack based on the principle that the infantry remains mounted as long as possible. The two techniques of attack are tanks and infantry attack together and tanks and AAV's support by fire only. (See FMFM 9-1, Tank Employment/Antim echanized Operations).
a. Tanks and Infantry Attack Together. This is the preferred type of attack. Assault companies move from the line of departure to the objective as a fighting unit. The intent is for the infantry to remain mounted in the AAV's at least until the forward defensive positions of the enemy have been breached. If the enemy is weak or over extended, the infantry may remain mounted, overrunning the position and attacking into the enemy's rear areas. Tanks of the company will generally lead the formation by 100 - 300 meters. Speed is essential and maintained to the highest degree possible. Smoke is extensively employed to mask the defender's observation. The critical decision of whether to close with the enemy mounted or dismounted should be based on the following considerations:
(1) Mounted.
(a) Infantry normally moves mounted through enemy final protective fires, and onto and through enemy positions when these conditions are met:
1Enemy antitank fires have been suppressed by friendly fires or smoke.
2Rapid mounted movement onto and through the enemy position
is possible.
(b) If required to clear remaining enemy elements, the unit commander
normally designates a dismount area beyond the enemy positions so
they can be cleared from the rear. The exact dismount area selected
by the company/platoon commander depends on the terrain and the
configuration of the enemy's defenses. Each squad leader must locate
his AAV to take best advantage of terrain masking, fields of fire,
and the ability to provide vehicle support of the dismounted infantry
as they mop up the position from rear to front.
(c) Mounted infantry may move onto and through enemy positions under
friendly overhead artillery and mortar fires. This technique
provides excellent suppression of enemy fires when most needed; or if
resistance is light and terrain permitting, infantry may lift and
shift indirect fires and move onto and through enemy positions using
the AAV's machine gun and fire from personnel in the cargo hatch to
suppress the enemy.
(2) Dismounted. When the above conditions for closing with the enemy while mounted do not exist, the company/platoon dismounts as close as possible to the enemy in the best covered and concealed position available which will facilitate dismounted maneuver. It never voluntarily dismounts in the open under direct enemy observation and fire. The company/platoon must be able to dismount and assault rapidly. Rapid deployment is accomplished through a combination of clear orders and battle drills.
a. Tanks and AAV's Support by Fire Only. If during the assault unexpected antitank fire is received in such volume that it cannot be suppressed by all immediately available fire support resources, and continuation in the mounted mode would result in unacceptable casualties, the infantry is dismounted in defilade locations (if possible) and infantry assault on foot. Tanks and AAV's support by fire. This is the least preferred type of attack.
(1) Tanks and AAV's support the infantry assault by direct suppressive fire. The tanks and AAV's should constantly reposition themselves to preclude presenting stationary targets for an extended period of time. The vehicles rejoin the infantry on the objective as soon as possible after the final assault is initiated.
(2) In this type of attack, dismounted infantry will require a greater density of suppressive fire support to compensate for their lack of armor protection and decreased mobility.
SECTION 6
DEFENSIVE OPERATIONS
601. GENERAL
The primary purpose of defensive operations is to kill and destroy enough men and vehicles to convince the enemy that his attack is too costly and that he must halt. The reasons the landing force undertake a defensive operations include:
a. To gain time pending the development of more favorable conditions for
undertaking the offense.
b. To deny entrance of the enemy into an area.
c. To economize forces in one area in order to concentrate superior forces for decisive offensive action elsewhere.
d. To reduce enemy capability with minimum losses to friendly forces.
e. To trap and destroy hostile forces.
f. To permit the employment of nuclear weapons.
g. To ensure the integrity of an objective.
The MTF is best employed in the defensive as an offensive counter strike force
positioned in reserve within the battle area of the landing force. It is conceivable, however, that the conditions forcing the force commander to initiate defensive operations might also dictate the positioning of the MTF on the force FEBA with the mission of defending a portion of that FEBA. In such cases, the MTF is task organized according to dictates of METT and assigned a frontage and as much depth as the terrain and commanders estimate will permit, for the ability to fight within the depth of a battle area is essential to successful defense by a tank-heavy or balanced task force, in particular.
602. CONCEPT OF DEFENSE
In the defense, the defender takes every opportunity to seize the initiative and to destroy the enemy. The defender seizes the initiative by:
a. Selecting the battle area.
b. Forcing the enemy to react in conformity with the defensive plan.
c. Exploiting enemy weaknesses and errors by offensive operations
e. Counterattacking.
603. TYPES OF DEFENSE
Contemporary defensive doctrine emphasizes three types of defensive schemes: Area, Mobile and Active. Area defenses emphasize forward placement of weapons, attrition tactics and moderate to light reserves. The mobile defense emphasizes relatively weak forces on the FEBA, planned enemy penetration into killing zones and large powerful reserves to isolate and destroy enemy penetrations. The so-called active defense seeks to present strength on the FEBA and powerful counterattacks by positioning virtually all combat power on or near the FEBA, counterattacking enemy penetrations with disengaged units from the FEBA. All these forms present advantages and weaknesses to USMC forces and the commander's choice of defensive scheme will depend upon analysis of METT.
604. DEFENSIVE ECHELONS
a. The Marine Corps' defensive echelons include the covering force area and battle area (defensive area in JCS Pub 1). A general description of the defensive echelons for a MAF with a division sized GCE is as follows:
(1) Covering Force Area. The MAF covering force area begins at the forward
edge of the battle area (FEBA) and extends as far to the front and the
flanks as security elements are employed. Forces in the covering force
area furnish information of the enemy; delay, deceive, and disrupt him as
much as possible; and provide a counterreconnaissance screen. The security
forces also may have the mission of locating and developing nuclear
targets. Forces operating in the area may include elements from higher
echelons, such as covering forces and units to provide aerial surveillance
and flank security. Forces in the covering force area will consist of the
general outpost (GOP), combat outposts (COP), flank security forces,
aerial surveillance elements, and patrols.
(2) Battle Area. The forward defense area extends rearward from the FEBA to the rear boundaries of the subordinate elements that occupy positions within the forward defense area. The size of the battle area is dependent upon the type of units located on the FEBA and to the depth to which they are deployed. Forces engage the enemy in decisive combat in order to retain specific terrain, destroying or disrupting the enemy forces.
605. MTF DEFENSIVE PLANNING
a. Generally, the MTF's employ an area defense in which a reserve force will be positioned as in the mobile defense, but the bulk of combat power will be echeloned forward to destroy the enemy forward of the FEBA or, alternately, within the defensive area.
b. The companies fight from changing battle positions within battalion battle areas. An enemy assault force will be met with massed fire support coordinated with the fire and maneuver of various company-sized combat units as it approaches the FEBA and attempts to pass through the battle area. The battle positions and company missions are planned by the battalion commander so as to permit:
- Surprise Fire
- Flanking Engagements
- Mutual Supporting Positions
- Minimal Changes for Night or Poor Visibility
Open flanks and terrain within the battle area which cannot be dominated will be covered by barriers or security elements.
c. The company battle positions will not exceed 2000m in breadth and 1000m in depth. In special cases, such as in extremely broken terrain, the battalion commander may specify platoon positions of up to 1000m in breadth and depth.
d. Above all, it must be remembered that the defense is a battle against armored fighting vehicles. Therefore, as in the offensive, the commander designates a point of main effort, where the main enemy armored threat is expected to develop. This point of main effort is formed through:
- Numbers of battle positions.
- Use and reinforcement of obstacles.
- Massing of fire support.
- Use of air and artillery-delivered special munitions (e.g., FASCAM) to
develop barriers.
- Local attacks and employment of the reserve.
e. The battalion commander engages the enemy with as many companies as possible, employing the reserve as necessary. The reserve should be employed:
- To reinforce a position likely to endanger the enemy.
- To counterattack and destroy an enemy force within the battle area.
- To block a breakthrough, preferably in concert with the reserve element of higher headquarters.
f. The regiment authorizes the establishment of battalion combat outposts (COP), especially when it is impossible to conduct a delay before the FEBA. The COP may be established up to 10 Km from the FEBA, in strength of up to a company. A single commander is tasked as COP and given time to prepare a designated position which will screen the approaches to the FEBA, give early warning of enemy approach and give indication of the enemy main effort. The COP unit will include air and artillery observers. Its task organization will reflect METT and may include any of the arms noted in Section I.
- Its mission may include:
- Erection of barriers
- Observation
- Contact with adjacent forces
- Active reconnaissance
- Destruction of weak enemy forces
- Delay of superior enemy forces
- Withdrawal on order
- Occupation of FEBA or reserve position.
g. If a COP is not established, the battalions normally erect a security line up to 3Km in front of the FEBA, occupied by reconnaissance and forward observer positions up to a platoon in size.
h. The MTF, if assigned a defensive area, occupies it by echelons in the following order: security, reserve, battle positions. The commanders survey their positions by day for occupation at night or under poor visibility. The commander's order details his appreciation of the situation, mission and concept of operation, to include his point of main effort. His order will establish the following, as much as possible in graphic form:
- Security and reconnaissance
- Task organization and boundaries
- Company battle positions
- Supporting arms coordination, including illumination
- Location and mission of reserve
- Planned counterattacks
- Key terrain features
- Location of fire line, within which enemy is engaged at will (assigned by companies if omitted).
i. Special attention is given to antitank guided missiles (DRAGON and TOW) on the defense. Generally, they are assigned to companies, which employ them in their positions with the following conditions:
- Cover, concealed firing positions prepared
- Favorable fields of fire assigned
- Launch missiles prior to opening tank fire
- Withdraw first to successive positions during combat in depth of position
- Tanks and/or infantry provide close-in defense of ATGM positions.
j. Infantry are employed to deny key terrain and counter enemy infantry attacks.
606. CONDUCT OF THE DEFENSE
a. First warning of the enemy's approach will come via higher headquarters alert. The MTF commander will direct his available reconnaissance units to obtain and hold contact with the enemy force. The COP or security line forces engage the enemy with supporting arms, destroy his advance recce and, in face of the main attack, delay to the battle area, assuming assigned positions.
b. As the enemy forces near the battalion FEBA, the companies remain concealed in assigned positions. The battalion commander decides how the threat will be engaged, designates the point of main effort and orders the companies to occupy those battle positions necessary to form the point of main effort. The companies open fire independently, usually when the enemy crosses the "fire-line" defined earlier by the company or (seldom) battalion commander. The objective of the fire-fight is to halt the enemy attack and destroy as many vehicles as possible, producing the greatest possible confusion. The halting of the enemy attack can best be exploited by counterattack of the reserve into the rear or flank of the enemy formation.
c. The commander fights enemy assault from the occupied battle positions or by shifting companies among positions to obtain favorable positions and mass against an enemy force. Fire by artillery and air support is employed to breakup enemy mass and isolate portions of the battlefield. Typical uses include:
- Disruption of largest formations in the approach
- Attack of armored units by improved conventional munitions
- Covering of open flanks, gaps and barriers
- Neutralization of enemy observation positions
- Blocking of breakthrough forces
- Support of counterattack forces
- Battlefield illumination.
In conditions of darkness or poor visibility, conditions are altered somewhat because of the limited field of fire and observation infantry, in particular attain importance since they can approach and destroy tanks in position with hand-held AT weapons.
Figure 16a. The Defensive Battle
d. The repelling of the enemy attack is reported to higher headquarters and the security line is reestablished. However, if the enemy advance continues in spite of fire and maneuver and the employment of the reserve, the battle continues within the defensive area. Timing is the key of battle within the defensive area. If companies are maneuvered too late, penetration and loss of freedom of maneuver may result. Too early a shift may cause terrain to be given up too easily and the mission sacrificed. Companies are the-fore maneuvered by the battalions so as to avoid their decisive engagement, using the reserve as necessary to reduce pressure upon engaged companies. During combat within the battle area, the battalions vacate positions in front of the enemy and occupy those dominating his flanks. By continuous fire and maneuver, the enemy will be faced with destructive fires and movements away from his attack orientation.
e. A successfully combat within the defensive battle area will bring the opportunity for a counterattack, hopefully by the higher headquarters reserve. The available companies of the tank battalion operate on the flanks of this counterattack, supporting by fire.
f. Upon conclusion of the defensive battle, the commanders order:
- Reconnaissance to gain contact with the enemy
- Reoccupation of forward positions
- Reestablishment of security and contact with adjacent units
- Evacuation of wounded and POW's, crew, and personnel redistribution
- Repair/replenish/evacuate weapons and equipment.
607. ENCIRCLEMENT AND BREAKOUT
a. Encirclement by enemy assault forces must be considered a possibility in modern warfare at all times. Battalion and larger units are capable of defending and breaking encirclement. The key factor is to take advantage of enemy confusion and move before he realizes his situation and masses overwhelming force against the battalion.
b. A unit is encircled when superior enemy forces have bypassed it and lay between it and larger friendly forces. The encircled force then adopts a circular defense scheme encompassing as much terrain as possible, so as to afford the greatest freedom of action. A successful breakout will depend upon three factors: Deception as to own real strength and intentions, Mass in fire and maneuver units at the point of breakout, and Security of flanks and rear during the actual breakout.
c. Breakout organization consists of three major elements:
- Rupture forces move to concealed attack positions and lead breakout
- Reserve force may hold line initially at breakout point, then follows and prepares to lead or bypass
- Rear guard elements hold rest of perimeter simulating bulk of force, prepare to execute delay in trace of breakout.
Combat trains elements caught in the pocket follow the reserve in breakout after being reduced to essential components.
d. The decision to execute the breakout comes from higher headquarters, where the possibilities of relief attack vs. breakout are analyzed. Once the breakout, time and objective are ordered, the commander of the encircled force determines how it will conduct the breakout. The proper choice of point of main effort, rapidity and violence of execution and overwelming massing of fire will usually produce success in this form of combat.
608. RETROGRADE OPERATIONS
A retrograde operation is any movement of a command to the rear or away from the enemy. It is an operation which may be forced by enemy action or made voluntarily; in either case, such an operation must be approved by higher headquarters.
a. Types. Retrograde operations are classified as:
(1) A retirement - A retrograde operation in which a force out of contact moves away from the enemy and is administrative in nature. It is not discussed further in this publication.
(2) A withdrawal - When all or part of a force disengages from enemy force in accordance with the will of the commander.
(3) A delay - When a force trades space for time while inflicting maximum
punishment on the enemy without becoming decisively engaged.
b. Purposes. Retrograde operations are conducted for one or more of the following purposes:
(1) To disengage from combat.
(2) To avoid combat under unfavorable conditions.
(3) To draw the enemy into an unfavorable situation.
(4) To gain time without fighting a decisive engagement.
(5) To reposition the force, or elements of it, for use elsewhere.
(6) To harass, exhaust, and inflict punishment on the enemy.
(7) To reposition forces prior to a friendly nuclear attack.
(8) To shorten lines of communications.
c. Withdrawals. A withdrawal seeks to break contact with the enemy. The conditions under which the withdrawal takes place are often adverse. The enemy will usually have the initiative and the force win be vulnerable to attack while moving. The withdrawal may have to be initiated in darkness, or under conditions of limited visibility. This will be particularly true if the enemy is able to gain air superiority.
(1) A withdrawal should be conducted so that enemy interference with the
operation by offensive action is kept to a minimum; achieving this ideal will place great emphasis on surprise and speed. However, as it must always be assumed that the enemy may react, provision must be made for the security of the withdrawing force. Protective elements must be organized and tasked in accordance with the enemy's capability and own forces available.
(2) Due to the inherent difficulties of this type of operation the commander must have the flexibility to switch to any other type of operation as the situation demands (e.g., delay, defense or offense).
(3) Organization for the Withdrawal
(a) A withdrawing force should normally be organized into:
1 Forces left in contact which cover the withdrawal.
2 A main body protecting itself with advance, rear and flank
guards.
(b) Forces not required for immediate operations, including combat service support elements, should be moved out early to keep routes clear for the withdrawal.
(4) Execution of the Withdrawal
(a) The disengagement of the main body should be executed either
stealth or after a successful engagement. It is best conducted by
night or in foul weather. In face of enemy pressure, a counter
stroke by the reserve in concert with withdrawal through successive
positions may be necessary.
(b) Forces left in contact are the key to successful withdrawal, although a strong reserve is retained in the withdrawing force. The forces left in contact by the battalion will be a company-sized formation of tanks and mechanized infantry, under a single commander. These forces:
- cover the withdrawal
- conduct deception to simulate the entire unit
- defeat reconnaissance and skirmishes probes
- permit the battalion to separate from the battle area.
These forces may be weak where enemy forces are not prepared to resume the attack, friendly supporting arms are strong and darkness, weather or terrain are favorable. Stronger units are required if enemy attack preparations are apparent, terrain is not dominant or enemy avenues of approach are favorable.
The withdrawal follows the sequence (as appropriate):
- probing attacks
- delay by successive positions to open gap
- withdrawal of main force under cover of forces left in contact
- passage of friendly lines into secure area by main force and forces left in contact (now rear guard).
Upon successful breaking of contact, the battalion assumes march order with the former forces left in contact acting u either rear guard or conducting a delay operation (if pressure continues).
(5) Special Considerations
(a) Communications. Good communications are vital, and the policy for radio and electronic silence must be clearly stated. Communications links, methods of operation and density of communication traffic should remain unchanged for a long as possible to avoid disclosing the intention to disengage from the enemy. The creation of radio traffic by protective element which remains in contact will add to the overall deception of the enemy. Elements which have disengaged from the enemy will normally be ordered to keep radio silence.
(b) Artillery Support. Artillery must be organized and employed so that it can cover the entire operation. Nuclear delivery means and long-range artillery will be withdrawn early and placed far enough back so that they can cover the withdrawal. Artillery units remaining with the protective elements will attempt to maintain the previous fire support cover for as long as possible.
(c) Engineers. Engineers will be very heavily committed during the withdrawal. Both the protective element and the main body will require extensive engineer support. Some of the engineer tasks include:
1 Preparing demolitions and barriers as well as providing or maintaining routes for the withdrawal.
2 Supporting the protective element with countermobility tasks.
3 Assisting the move of the main body by dealing with unforeseen obstacles during the withdrawal.
d. The Delay. Delays trade space for time and inflicts maximum punishment on the enemy. Such operations are normally conducted with delay on successive positions or delay on alternate positions, and are ideal type actions for covering force units.
(1) Delay actions are conducted to force the enemy to take the time to
concentrate, again and again, against successive battle positions, to
overcome each in turn. Just when the enemy has everything organized, when
his artillery is starting to fire and his ground units are starting to
maneuver, the delaying force moves to its next set of battle positions.
The enemy must then go through the same time-consuming process once again.
A delaying force must do several things at once:
(a) Destroy as much of the enemy as possible,
(b) Cause the enemy to plan and conduct successive attacks; this gains time,
(c) Preserve freedom to maneuver; once immobilized by enemy fire and
maneuver, the delaying force can be bypassed, penetrated, or
destroyed; and
(d) Preserve the force. Failure to do this leads to failure in the other three.
(2)The delay comprises a series of defensive battles fought from successive positions to the battalion rear, prepared with fuel and ammunition if time and the situation permits. These positions are usually occupied under pressure of an enemy force which continues to penetrate the former series of battle positions despite the defensive and counteroffensive maneuvers of the battalion. The battalion commander will order the method of delay: either a successive displacement through intermediate positions or a simple stage withdrawal to the next formal delay line. In either case, companies may move in sequence or together as ordered by the commander.
Figure 11b. Conduct of Delays by MTF Companies
Generally, open-undulating terrain favors successive displacement, while covered terrain permits movement of companies in sequence. The strength of the delay lies in the exploitation of terrain. Its principal weakness is the numerical superiority of the enemy and lack of knowledge of his point of main effort. Hence the battalion commander must maintain the freedom of action as to how and where the enemy will be engaged.
(3) Conduct of the delay begins with the assignment of the mission the delay zone (8/10Km for a 3/4 company battalion), initial and successive delay lines, barriers and key positions are specified. Preparations are the same as the defense cited above, except that infantry must remain mounted and fire all weapons from their vehicles. Separation of infantry from their vehicles is strictly forbidden. At night or in foul weather, the infantry and tank units will be fully cross-attached.
(4) The battalion MTF delays the enemy primarily by massing fires and
shrouding his main effort with a strong defense formed by:
- Rapid shifts of battle positions by companies
- Concentrated fire of direct and indirect weapons using extensive mixtures of ammunition
- Fire and maneuver by individual platoons
- Surprise flank engagements by companies (or reserve)
- Surprise uncovering of barriers, obstacles.
Figure 16c. MTF Combat in the Delay
(5) The initial halting of the enemy attack may bring a renewed advance on a wider front, hence the battalion generally resumes its former deployment across the delay frontage at the earliest opportunity. When the intensity of enemy fire becomes superior to own firing and penetrations threaten, the commander will order a withdrawal before losses weaken the defense system of the battalion.
(6) If the MTF is unable to operate against the enemy flanks, it will have to fight on line using successive displacement or single withdrawals in which the company commanders are given considerable freedom of action to maneuver in the sense of the battalion commander's concept as given in his order, and avoiding decisive engagement. In this situation, commanders will simply report leaving each battle position by radio or alternate visual signal, to keep the commander informed of the progress of the delay. If the enemy attacks on the whole frontage, single withdrawal or in successive delay will be ordered for all companies simultaneously.
When elements of the battalion are isolated or encircled by enemy action and cannot fight themselves free, the MTF will attack with all available power in a relief or diversionary attack to retrieve the crisis. In such an emergency, the release of higher headquarters reserve may be requested.
609. PASSAGE OF LINES
a. Passage of Lines refers to the movement of a force through another force
established in a defensive or initial delay position.
The holding unit has the mission of overwatching and supporting the moving unit, defending against the enemy, controlling crossings, fords and bottlenecks, assisting movement and finally the conduct of battle against the enemy force either alone or with the support of the passing forces. The higher headquarters in command of moving and holding units in the passage of lines will direct in his order:
- location of passage points and arrival/clearing times
- the trace of the holding FEBA
- responsibility for the conduct of the operation
- allocated roads and routes for the withdrawing force
- timing of the withdrawal (or attack)
- responsibility for opening and closing of barriers.
The commander of the holding force establishes a liaison group with the moving
force and orders:
- battle positions and organization for combat
- link-up forces forward of FEBA (scouts or recon troops)
- recognition signals (visual) for units and passage points
- location of fire line
- communications with moving units
- opening and closing of barriers (if responsible)
- appropriate logistic measures.
It is essential that two unit commanders establish a clear and concise plan
permitting for concurrent actions and mutual support for the full period of
the passage of lines, including joint action against enemy forces known to be
threatening. Proper planning and liaison will reduce the operation to a
simple link-up by withdrawing forces with battalion scouts forward of the FEBA
and an escorted movement through the battalion defensive area, under cover of
companies in battle positions. The approaching enemy is engaged on order or
when he reaches the fire line. The same principles are involved if the moving
force is passing through into an attack, in which case the holding unit is
relieved upon completion of the passage of lines.
SECTION 7
MTF MOVEMENT
701. REQUIREMENT FOR MOVEMENT
Movement constitutes the very essence of mounted operations. In order to survive and accomplish its mission, the MTF must move on the battlefield. Once the enemy is seen or contacted then it becomes necessary to move forces into position to accomplish whatever the MTF may be tasked to accomplish. The ability to move, which is a requirement for all combat operations within all combined arms formations, is even more essential to MTF operations.
702. PRINCIPLES OF MOVEMENT
a. General. In battle, all movement is governed by two basic principles: Terrain and tactical order.
b. Use of Terrain. MTF units must make maximum use of the natural cover and concealment in order to survive and accomplish their missions. Cover is protection from enemy fire; concealment is protection from enemy observation. Cover should be used whenever possible. If there is no cover, the concealment offered by trees, shadows, brush, and structures should be used. Camouflage should also be incorporated in the use of terrain.
(1) Conspicuous Landmarks. Conspicuous landmarks should be avoided because they attract enemy attention. Enemy artillery and antitank weapons will probably have been registered on them.
(2) Movement from Cover, Concealment, or Defile. Lead vehicles of a unit
emerging from a ravine, woods, or other defile should be overwatched by other vehicles, halted in concealed and/or covered positions and ready to provide suppressive fire.
(3) Dusty Terrain. Dusty terrain betrays the movement of the MTF units.
Dust can be minimized by slow movement and dispersion.
(4) Vehicle Positions. Positions behind cover are known as either hull
down or turret down positions or hide positions, depending on how much of the vehicle is protected from enemy fire.
c. Tactical Order. The commander of a mounted unit regulates the movement of his unit at any level by ordering its direction, interval, formation and technique of movement.
(1) Direction can be oriented to a physical feature, enemy or friendly unit, fire or pyrotechnic device, or a map azimuth.
(2) Interval determines the separation of units or vehicles to obtain the desired mass or dispersion.
(3) Formations are ordered to permit the commander to control his unit and place it into the most effective action on enemy contact. The formation is the primary means of protecting units on the move from overwhelming enemy fire.
(4) Techniques of movement are used generally by individual vehicles during firefights to continue movement and gain advantageous firing positions against the enemy.
3. FORMATIONS
a. General. Formations of mounted units are the same as for footmobile units. Unites must drill repeatedly to obtain proficiency and effectiveness in execution. Five basic formations exist for mounted units.
b. Column. The column places subordinate units (or vehicles in the platoon) one behind the other. Used for ease of control in confined terrain, it affords great depth but takes the greatest time for changes information.
c. Line. The line places all units side by side either perpendicular to the direction of advance or inclined in echelon. The line is an assault formation affording little change once a firefight begins, used mostly by platoons and companies.
d. Double Line. The double line, used by company to regiment size units possessing four subordinate elements, gives both depth and breadth to a unit and permits rapid changes in formation and direction. Road nets or open terrain must permit such an arrangement.
e. Wedge. The wedge is both a movement and battle formation, one unit forward, the others on line to the rear. This formation allows the commanders to advance when the enemy situation is unclear. He can rapidly focus a main effort upon contact.
f. Vee. The inverted wedge places units on line with one unit centered to the rear. It plans most firepower forward and is used when the enemy situation is known and open terrain must be covered quickly.
g. Variations. Units change formations as terrain and the enemy situation vary. Subordinate units choose formations corresponding to their own situation and the commander's intent. For instance, platoons in a company vee might deploy in line, wedge and vee under platoon leader orders.
Figure 17a. Formations.
704. TECHNIQUES OF MOVEMENT
When contact is made, fire and maneuver begin, facilitated by correct dispositions of the moving force. These movement techniques are applicable in all operations.
a. Traveling. In this technique, the elements of a unit move together as a unit. It is the fastest but least secure movement technique, and is used when speed is important and there is no enemy contact. Movement is continuous, and interval and dispersion are maintained between vehicles as terrain and administrative restrictions permit. (See figure 17b).
Figure 17b.
b. Traveling Overwatch. In this technique, the unit again move together, but with separated lead and trail elements to improve security. Traveling overwatch is used when contact is possible, but speed is desirable. The lead element moves continually along the most covered and concealed routes for protection from possible enemy observation and direct fire. The trail element moves at variable speeds, continuously overwatching. The trail element must maintain visual contact with the lead element, staying close enough to provide suppressive fire and to maneuver for support, yet are far enough to the rear that enemy direct fire engagement of the lead element does not prevent its delivery of suppressive fires or interfere with its maneuverability. (See figure 17c).
Figure 17c
c. Bounding Overwatch. The unit moves by bounds in this technique, with a trailing element always in a position to overwatch the advance of the leading element. It is the slowest, but most secure movement technique, providing the capability for immediate, direct suppresive fire on an enemy force that engages the bounding element with direct fire. This technique is used upon enemy contact. In bounding overwatch, the lead element of the unit advances to a point (first move) where it can support the advance of the rear element. On signal, the rear element moves rapidly forward to a position abreast of the leading element (second move) and halts to overwatch the next advance of the lead element (third move). Maximum use is made of folds of the earth and concealment to mask movement from likely enemy positions. (See figure 17d).
Figure 17d
(a) Variation. A variation of this technique may be used. The lead element moves to the next vantage point (first move), overwatched by the trail element. After the lead element has taken a position, the trail element advances past the lead element to a new vantage point (second move). The initial lead element then advances past the initial trail element to a new position (third move). Movement is continued until contact is made.
703. NIGHT MOVEMENT
Movement techniques at night, or during periods of poor visibility, are the same for those used during periods of good visibility, however, it will require certain adjustments since it is harder to navigate and maintain control. Movement under conditions of poor visibility is facilitated by detailed coordination, careful selection of routes, and the use of night vision equipment and battlefield illumination. When illuminating the battlefield, the locations of friendly units must not be illuminated or silhouetted. Maximum use should be made of passive devices, and the use of active devices must be controlled to maintain surprise and hide friendly locations. Movement should be keyed to easily recognizable terrain features, such as roads, fences, tree and pole lines, edges of woods, and streams. Blackout markers should be lit on vehicles.
a. Darkness can be a tremendous asset to conceal the movement of forces in preparation for either a night attack or a day attack. Attacks can be conducted mounted or dismounted depending on the situation. A night dismounted attack could be the only way to break certain obstacles or attack certain positions. The FMFM 6 series best describes how to conduct a dismounted night attack, FM 71-1, The Tank and Mechanized Infantry Company Team, and FM 71-2, The Tank and Mechanized Infantry Battalion Task Force both provide useful information on how to attack during limited visibility.
b. Enemy tactics also call for the use of night attacks. The MTF must make plans accordingly while in a defensive status.
704. BATTLE DRILLS
a. General. Drills do not fit all situations but they provide a basis on which to work. Once they have been mastered, others can be evolved and perfected to give automatic speedy reaction in crisis. Drills are not a substitute for initiative. Speed of reaction must be followed by speed of movement. Not every defile, gap or crest will contain an enemy. However, these natural obstacles provide him with certain advantages which allow the use of his weapons to best advantage. They can provide defense, force concentration, or cause exposure. They are the logical locations to expect to encounter the enemy and it is natural to take precautions to avoid casualties. While no two natural obstacles are exactly alike, if, for example, the leader knows one way of negotiating a blind corner which provides the necessary security precautions, they he can apply the drill to any blind corner, adjusting it as necessary to fit the ground.
b. Blind Corner Drill
(1) Tanks only. See figure 17e.
(a) Lead tank reports "Held-up Blind Corner Right".
(b) Platoon commander attempts to find a bypass route. If none, he orders drill and has the company commander acknowledge.
(c) Lead inside tank moves up to edge of corner without exposing himself. Crew commander conducts recon of ground past corner from his vehicle or on foot if necessary. Support is provided by the lead outside tank. Both lead tanks may use recon by fire.
(d) If ground appears clear both lead tanks round corner at the same time. Inside tank goes just far enough to fire around corner and cover move of outside tank to the first available fire position.
(e) Rear tanks close up to positions vacated by lead two.
(f) If contact occurs, a plan must be made.
(g) If no contact, resume advance in the regular order of march.
Figure 17e. Corner (Tanks). Figure 17f. Corner (Tanks-infantry).
b. Tanks Supported by Infantry. See figure 17f.
(1) The drill is basically the same as without infantry.
(2) If necessary, the platoon commander will designate a section to go forward, dismount and recon around the corner.
(3) The platoon commander should move forward to view the action.
(4) If contact is made, the platoon commander and company commander must make a plan.
(5) If no contact is made and the dismounted section indicates the corner is clear of enemy, the drill continues as in paragraph 1. The dismounted section is picked up by its AAV after the troop has rounded the corner.
(6) The platoon commander may dismount more than a section. He must balance the degree of security obtained against the number of obstacles he is likely to encounter along the route. If the whole platoon dismounts at each obstacle, the drill will be slower and the platoon may be tired before contact is made.
c. Defile Drill. Defiles are ground features which force vehicles to pass through on a very narrow frontage - often only one vehicle at a time. Examples of defiles are bridges, minefield gaps and lanes through woods. When a defile cannot be by-passed, drills are carried out.
(1) Tanks Only. See figure 17g. The drill is as follows:
(a) The platoon leader reports "Held-up defile" to the squadron commander.
(b) The platoon moves into a position to observe and cover the defile.
(c) The platoon leader or a crew commander must recon the defile either on foot or in his tank supported by the remainder of the platoon.
(d) If the passage is clear of obstacles and mines, one tank will be ordered across at best tank speed.
(e) Depending on existing conditions, the platoon leader may order one or two tanks across when the lead vehicle is firm.
(f) The platoon leader must consider the possibility of extricating the platoon and must, therefore, ensure that he has "one leg on the ground".
(g) Smoke may be used.
(h) It may be necessary to combine defile and blind corner drills.
Figure 17g. Defile (Tanks).
2) Tanks Supported by Infantry. The drill is:
(a) As in sub paragraph a above. the platoon leader brings his platoon into position to cover the defile and report: the drill to the company commander.
(b) The infantry commander moves up to view the defile. He orders one or more squads to recce the defile.
(c) The squad moves forward on foot and recess the defile, looking for mines as well as enemy.
(d) When the squad signals the defile is clear, the platoon leader sends one or two tanks through supported by the others.
(e) When they are in position the platoon leader moves the rest of the troop through followed by the infantry in its LVT's.
d. Gap Drill. The tank platoon will often have to pass gaps formed by ground features and woods, or in villages. Whenever possible, gaps should be avoided by selecting alternate routes. In the event that alternate routes are not available, the gap drill may be executed. However, the gap drill is only carried out as a result of the platoon leader's appreciation and his decision that it is necessary.
(1) Tanks Only. See figure 17h. The drill is:
(a) The platoon leader reports "Held-up Gap Left (or Right)" to the company commander.
(b) The platoon leader moves the troop into a position of observation overlooking the gap and the ground beyond.
(c) A tank must be ordered to a position of observation looking down the gap. This position may be either a fold-in the ground or the near corner of the gap. If observation from the tank is too limited a dismounted reconnaissance may be ordered.
(d) When the reconnaissance has been completed, recon by fire should be employed and a smoke screen may be placed in the gap. Subsequently two tanks cross to the next fire position past the gap at the best speed.
(e) When they are in position the rear tanks cross the gap in line with the guns pointed in the direction of the gap.
Figure 17h. Gap (Tanks).
(2) Tank Supported by Infantry. This drill is basically the same as in paragraph 2 except:
(a) When the platoon is in position overlooking the gap and next bound the infantry commander comes up and observes.
(b) He orders a squad to recon the gap. They will get as near as possible mounted and then will dismount. They must continue to consider the main threat which is to the front.
(c) The rest of the infantry stay back under cover and protect the rear of the platoon.
(d) When the recon is completed' the platoon leader orders a tank forward to a position of observation looking down the gap. The troop moves across as described in paragraph 2.
(e) The infantry then cross either all together in line between the rear two tanks or in another formation after the rear tanks have crossed.
e. Crest Drill. If crossing a crest cannot be avoided the crest drill is used.
(1) Tanks Only. See figure 171.
(a) The leading tank on seeing a long unbroken crest reports "Held-up Crest". The lead two tanks approach the crest and then the others. From turret down positions they search the ground beyond the crest and do the crew commander's appreciation.
(b) If no enemy is spotted, the platoon reverses and jockeys away from the previous positions.
(c) Two tanks continue over the crest while the others remain in hull down positions to cover their move.
(d) Ideally, all tanks should break the crest at the same time. This way they confuse the enemy momentarily by providing a number of targets when the two tanks crossing the crest are most vulnerable.
(e) When the first two tanks are in position on the next bound the others jockey and cross the crest.
Figure 17i. Crest (Tanks).
(2) Tanks Supported by Infantry. The drill for the tanks is identical as paragraph 2. As the rear tanks cross the crest the infantry commander brings his four LVT's up to look over the crest. They then reverse and jockey all crossing together at best speed.
f. Summary. It will be noted that in all drills the sequence of action is identical, that is:
(1) Warning. The lead tank reports "Held-up", etc.". The platoon leader acknowledges and warning is passed back to the company commander.
(2) Security. Tanks get into fire positions. Uncommitted LVT's get under cover and protect the rear of the platoon. The infantry commander moves up to a position of observation, normally in close proximity to the platoon leader.
(3) Recon. A squad (or more if required) moves forward, dismounts, and recons the obstacle. In the case of a crest, the recon is carried out by the leaders themselves. In the other three drills, while the detailed dismounted recon is done by a squad (or more), the platoon leader and infantry commander, in fact, are doing a visual recon of the obstacle from their vehicles and decide on what variations to the standard drill may be necessary in that particular instance.
(4) Plan. If the obstacle is such that the basic "Held-up" drill will be sufficient, then the drill is implemented. Modifications which may be dictated by the nature of the obstacle or the ground are ordered. If contact is made, the drill stops, and a plan must be made to overcome the enemy. In all cases the nature of the obstacle, degree of risk and time available will influence the decision to carry out the drill, or continue to move.
SECTION 8
ENGINEER SUPPORT
801. GENERAL
Mounted operations require responsive engineer support to enhance the mobility of the force, to increase own force survivability, and to retard the mobility of the enemy. Combat engineers of the Combat Engineer Battalion, Marine Division, provide close combat engineer support through their employment in GS/DS or as attachments to combat forces. A battalion-size MTF will normally have at least a reinforced combat engineer platoon as a component of its task organization. Circumstances may require a larger engineer component and augmentation of the combat engineer capabilities with engineer equipment, bridging, bulk fuel, and personnel from the Engineer Support Battalion, Force Service Support Group. A larger MTF would include an appropriately larger engineer component. Due to shortages in engineer capability and it's essential contribution to the battle, engineers are rarely in reserve. Combat engineer efforts must be concentrated well forward.
a. Engineer Tasks. Engineer tasks fall into one of five categories.
(1) Mobility Enhancement. These tasks ensure that friendly mobility is maintained on the battlefield. This category includes obstacle breaching/reduction, countermine operations, gap and river crossing and construction of combat roads and trails.
(2) Countermobility. These tasks reduce, prevent or slow enemy movement and mobility. This category of engineer work includes obstacle construction, demolitions, and mine warfare.
(3) Survivability. Construction of protective shelters and fighting positions, deception and camouflage measures beyond unit capability. Survivability efforts reduce the effects of enemy direct and indirect fire weapon systems by protecting individuals, equipment or task force elements. Deception and camouflage make enemy targeting more difficult and mask friendly intentions.
(4) General Engineering. This category includes heavy construction of facilities, roads, and airfields, as well as water support, bulk fuel storage, mobile electric power, hygienic and rear area bridging support.
(5) Fighting as Infantry. Engineer units can be given missions to fight alongside infantry but should be tasked to do so only when their special functions are required. Normally the engineer contribution to the battle will be more valuable when employed in mobility enhancement, countermobility, survivability and general engineering tasks.
b. Engineer Intelligence. Intelligence is essential to plan engineer operations and ensure that personnel, equipment and material are positioned within the MTF task organization. Once obtained engineer intelligence must be disseminated to operational headquarters and all engineer units. FMFM 4-4 contains formats to simplify transmitting engineer intelligence. Care must be exercised in intelligence gathering activities so as not to forewarn the enemy of friendly intentions. Engineer intelligence can be obtained from the following sources.
(1) Ground Reconnaissance. Engineer reconnaissance teams can operate with the advance guard of the MTF. The reconnaissance team should include experienced engineers capable of making quick and accurate evaluations of both natural and manmade obstacles to the movement of the MTF. Other reconnaissance elements may be tasked to gather engineer intelligence on their own or forward reconnaissance teams may be augmented with engineer personnel. Engineer reconnaissance with the advance guard of a MTF includes location of bypasses, capacity of bridges, location of engineer materials and general trafficability.
(2) Map and Aerial Photograph Analysis. Preliminary map reconnaissance can help to limit the area that must be physically inspected. Aerial photos provide the same capability and may give a better indication of actual terrain conditions and enemy activity.
(3) Aerial Reconnaissance. Rapid gathering of data is possible when helicopters are used to survey the battlefield for obstacles, crossing sites, LZ's key terrain, and road networks.
(4) Terrain and Area Studies. Intelligence staff sections and terrain analysis specialists from the topographic platoon have access to Navy and DMA intelligence products. They can provide detailed terrain estimates and analyses to include trafficability, cross-country mobility, vegetation, and slope overlays. These terrain products are useful in planning offensive and defensive operations of the MTF.
(5) Human Intelligence Sources. Local civilians and forces generally have a first hand knowledge of the area. Enemy prisoners can reveal enemy strengths, intentions and dispositions. These sources must be exploited when available to provide engineer intelligence.
c. Engineer Mobility. Engineer support is provided to components of the MTF through task organization of engineer units with the combat forces. Engineer elements must be provided for transportation equivalent to the forces they support. Engineer efforts must be coordinated to ensure that maximum benefit is obtained from engineer capabilities. Normally the senior engineer in the task force will recommend to the commander/S-3 priorities for tasks to be accomplished.
802. MOBILITY ENHANCEMENT OPERATIONS
a. In offensive operations, particularly in attacking a deliberate defense, the MTF should expect to encounter obstacles to mounted movement. Existing obstacles, both natural and cultural, such as forests, large bodies of water, canals, rivers, or gaps in the terrain can normally be identified by advance intelligence. Reinforcing obstacles can be added by enemy/friendly units to further inhibit movement. Operations are planned to avoid obstacles when possible. In offensive operations engineer equipment and units must be located well forward with leading TF elements to enable expeditious passage of the obstacle and maintain momentum. Due to unique aspects of crossing water obstacles, these operations are discussed separately in Section 10.
b. While intelligence efforts seek to discover the location of obstacles, they are often discovered through contact by the leading task force elements. Companies breach or bypass obstacles after contact by executing well rehearsed standard battle drills and implementing control measures. Obstacle locations can be predicted by matching a thorough terrain analysis with enemy capabilities and disposition. To be most effective reinforcing obstacles must be located close to natural obstacles where bypass is difficult, within range of direct/indirect fire weapons, and when covered by observation.
c. As in the case of natural obstacles, reinforcing obstacles should be bypassed whenever possible. A MTF commander encountering an obstacle which will slow or stop his advance should immediately determine if it can be readily bypassed. If he cannot bypass quickly, breaching operations are started. While these operations are underway, other MTF units should continue to search for a way to bypass the obstacle. Since obstacles are often covered by enemy fire, it is important to bypass or pass quickly so as not to delay the advance, or expose MTF units to fire longer than necessary. There are two methods commonly used to overcome an obstacle.
(1) Hasty Breach/Crossing.A hasty breach is accomplished rapidly with little reconnaissance or advance planning and when bypass is impractical. A hasty breach may be conducted under fire (an assault breach) and is preferred in order to maintain the momentum of the advance. Combat engineers moving with leading MTF elements perform the breach, as part of the assault company to which attached. However, MTF units may perform assault breaches without engineer support. In a hasty breach, breaching devices are used rapidly to clear lanes through the obstacle only wide enough to allow combat forces to continue the advance. Vehicle lanes that are eight meters wide and foot lanes one meter wide are preferred but smaller lanes that make movement, surprise and maintainance of momentum may suffice.
(2) Deliberate Breach/Crossig.A deliberate breach/crossing may be conducted by combat engineers if there is time for detailed reconnaissance and planning, if the hasty passage has failed or upon renewal of the offensive. The primary difference between hasty and deliberate passage is time and planning effort involved. In a deliberate method, necessary time is generally taken to completely clear obstacles, particularly in the cases of minefields. A deliberate passage is accomplished without interference of hostile fire and observation and behind covering TF units.
d. Passage of obstacles and bypass operations should follow the following steps.
(1) Suppress enemy fires with direct and/or indirect fire including CAS. Consider a deception operation.
(2) Obscure enemy observation with smoke.
(3) Breach/Bypass the obstacle. (Figure 19a).
(4) Secure the far side of the obstacle.
Selected Obstacles/Methods of Breaching
and Equipment Used in Breaching
Obstacle Breaching, Methods Equipment