Ground Air Defense In the Marine Air-Ground Task Force CSC 1985 SUBJECT AREA Warfighting GROUND AIR DEFENSE IN THE MARINE AIR-GROUND TASK FORCE FEBRUARY 1985 MAJOR R. R. BLACKMAN, JR., USMC MARINE CORPS COMMAND AND STAFF COLLEGE TABLE OF CONTENTS Page ABSTRACT iv LIST OF FIGURES vi Chapter 1. INTRODUCTION 1 2. THE THREAT 3 Introduction 3 Helicopter Capability 4 Fixed-Wing Capability 9 Missions and Tactics 14 Summary 19 3. ORGANIZATION FOR AIR DEFENSE IN THE MARINE AIR- GROUND TASK FORCE (MAGTF) 21 Introduction 21 Marine Air Command and Control System (MACCS) 23 Marine Fighter Attack (VMFA) Squadrons 25 Tactical Air Operations Center (TAOC) 26 Antiaircraft Operations Center (AAOC) 27 Light Antiaircraft Missile (LAAM) Battalion 27 Direct Air Support Center (DASC) 31 Forward Area Air Defense (FAAD) Battery 32 Small Unit Active Air Defense 36 Chapter Page 4. U. S. ARMY AND SOVIET ARMY AIR DEFENSE CAPABILITY 37 U. S. Army 37 Soviet Army 39 5. ANALYSIS OF THE AIR DEFENSE CAPABILITY OF THE MAGTF 44 Introduction 44 Analysis 45 6. THE REQUIREMENT AND THE SOLUTION 52 Requirement 52 Analysis of Alternative Air Defense Systems 52 Mix 58 Mass and Integration 60 Command and Control 61 Alternatives for the Division's Air Defense Organization 64 Comparative Analysis 71 Additional Recommendations 76 7. CONCLUSIONS 79 NOTES 82 BIBLIOGRAPHY 88 ABSTRACT Author: Blackman, Robert R., Jr. Major USMC Title: Ground Air Defense in the Marine Air-Ground Task Force Date: February 1985 Air attack against U. S. Marine Corps units, whether during an amphibious landing or subsequently during operations ashore, is not just a probability - it is a certainty. As many aspects of the Marine Air-Ground Task Force (MAGTF) become increasingly more capable with costly improvements in weapons and combat service support systems, ground air defense becomes more critical. Of concern to every Marine is whether the MAGTF has sufficient air defense to protect itself against aircraft that have penetrated to its vital areas or are in contact with its maneuver elements. The paper analyzes the premise that the MAGTF's capability for ground air defense is inadequate and, with confirmation of that, analyzes alternatives for improving this aspect of the MAGTF. The initial analysis examines Soviet aviation and concludes with a determination of the greatest threat facing each element of the MAGTF. Threat information was drawn from a variety of unclassified sources published by the Defense Intelligence Agency and the U. S. Army. Next the MAGTF's organization and capability for air defense were determined from a review of applicable Marine Corps Fleet Marine Force Manuals and U. S. Army Field Manuals as well as interviews with Marine Corps air defense officers and staff noncommissioned officers. The threat analysis and the examination of existing ground air defense form the basis for a comparison that leads to the determination that the MAGTF lacks the ground air defense capability to counter the threat. The comparative analysis as well as that particular conclusion were drawn subjectively by the author. Recommendations include initiatives for improving the mass, mix, mobility, and integration of the MAGTF's air defense weapons. Procurement of the Setter air defense weapons system; establishment of an air defense company of the headquarters battalion of the division; establishment of an air defense platoon in the headquarters company of the infantry regiment; and enhancing and restructuring the air defense units in the wing, are strongly recommended. Fulfilling these initiatives will bolster the capability of each element of the MAGTF to counter the air threat it will face when confronting a Soviet or Soviet-styled opponent. LIST OF FIGURES Figure Page 1. Mi-24/HIND D 5 2. Mi-8/HIP 6 3. Mi-2/HOPLITE 8 4. Organization of Soviet Frontal Aviation 11/12 5. Su-17 and Su-20/FITTER-C, -D 13 6. Su-25/FROGFOOT A 14 7. Marine Air Command and Control System (MACCS), Deployed 25 8. Light Antiaircraft Missile Battalion 28 9. Hawk Missile 30 10. Forward Area Air Defense (FAAD) Battery 32 11. Stinger Missile System 33 12. Gun, Air Defense Artillery, Self-Propelled, 20-mm, Vulcan 38 13. Chaparral Weapon System (M48A1) 39 14. SA-9/GASKIN 40 15. 23-mm SP Antiaircraft Gun ZSU-23-4 41 16. SA-7/GRAIL 42 17. SA-6/GAINFUL 43 18. Setter 56 19. Option W 66 20. Option X 67 21. Option Y 68 22. Option Z 69 23. Division Air Defense Structure Options 70 24. Proposed Air Defense Group, Marine Air Wing 78 Chapter 1 INTRODUCTION Air attack against U. S. Marine Corps units, whether during an amphibious landing or subsequently during operations ashore, is not just a probability - it is a certainty. Of concern to every Marine is whether the Marine Air-Ground Task Force (MAGTF) has sufficient air defense to protect itself against aircraft that have penetrated to its vital areas or are in contact with its maneuver elements. The focus of this paper is an analysis of the premise that the MAGTF's capability for ground air defense is inadequate. The analysis begins with an examination of Soviet aviation featuring an initial conclusion regarding the greatest threats facing the various elements of the MAGTF. Threat information was drawn from a variety of unclassified sources published by the Defense Intelligence Agency and the U. S. Army. Next the MAGTF's organization and capability for air defense were determined from a review of applicable Marine Corps Fleet Marine Force Manuals and U. S. Army Field Manuals as well as interviews with Marine Corps air defense officers and staff noncommissioned officers. The threat analysis and the examination of existing ground air defense form the basis for a comparison that leads to a determination that the MAGTF lacks the ground air defense capability to counter the threat. The comparative analysis as well as that particular conclusion were drawn subjectively by the author. Identifying a problem without proposing a solution is a fruitless, wasted effort. In this regard, specific initiatives have been proposed for improving the mass, mix, mobility, and integration of the MAGTF's air defense weapons to include: selection of an additional weapons system, an increase in the number of weapons system, and establishment and restructuring of air defense units within the MAGTF. The Light Armored Vehicle (LAV) air defense variant was not addressed for two reasons. The first is that the program is currently in development and has yet to be approved. Most importantly, however, the LAV air defense variant is being developed, not for general air defense support of the MAGTF, but as an exclusive air defense capability of the LAV battalion. Chapter 2 THE THREAT Introduction Historically, one of the most important tasks of Soviet aviation has been support of ground forces. The Soviets achieved substantial success during World War II with a combined-arms concept which dictated that the preponderance of aviation assets be assigned to provide air support for ground troops.1 Since World War II Soviet tactical air forces have remained strong, with aircraft that number more than five times the number of nonstrategic interceptor type aircraft in use with the air defense forces.2 In particular, a marked increase in the number of aircraft routinely expected to support ground forces has been noted over the past few years.3 The missions of Soviet tactical aviation remain virtually unchanged from the final days of World War II. They are to secure and maintain local air superiority over battle zones, attack and destroy enemy troops and equipment, limit supplies to enemy forces in the battle area, and assist friendly forces during offensive action and in the process of pursuit of the enemy.4 The most significant event in the development of Soviet aviation over the last two decades has been the reorganization of command and control structures. This initiative began in the late 1970's. The most notable impact of this reorganization is a vastly improved capability to conduct massed offensive air operations. Of further significance is the increased experimentation shown by the Soviets over the past five years with new tactics in a variety of missions including air accompaniment of ground forces.5 The Soviets consider air superiority as the "necesssary and obligatory condition" for attainment of success in combat and overall victory in a war.6 Soviet doctrine espouses the requirement for massive offensive air action and, specifies, that all things being equal, the greatest chance for victory lies with the force most effectively employing the element of surprise. In the NATO scenario, the Soviets boast a capability to launch a thousand aircraft in a coordinated non-nuclear air operation. 7 Although it is unlikely the Marine Corps would face even a portion of such an attack, it points out the Soviet desire to conduct mass air operations whenever possible. Helicopter Capability The Soviets consider air strikes an integral element of combined-arms tactics, yet only as an extension of artillery. They prefer the use of artillery and helicopters for the support of maneuver forces along a line of contact, leaving the fixed wing aircraft free to attack reserves and support forces.8 The role of helicopters has increased concurrently with the rapid expansion of their numbers. Attack helicopters, primarily the antitank guided missile equipped Mi-24/HIND and Mi-8/HIP, are employed to provide immediate fire support to motorized rifle and tank regiments and battalions (Figures 1 and 2). In addition to a variety of logistics, intelligence, liaison, and communications functions, helicopter support for airmobile operations has received increasing emphasis as a role of Soviet helicopter aviation.9 Click here to view image The Soviets expect to use airmobile forces to assist attacking forces by flying over obstacles and large areas of NBC contamination; to prevent our forces from closing gaps created by nuclear strikes; to seize and hold important objectives in our rear until the arrival of advancing troops; to conduct raids to destroy command and control facilities, radar sites, and communication centers; and to provide a highly mobile antitank capability.10 Until recently, small specially trained units were used to conduct air assault operations. Emphasis now appears to be on preparing motorized rifle battalions for this mission. There is, however, an air assault battalion resident in each combined-arms and tank army, and an air assault brigade and an airmobile assault brigade subordinate to the front commander.11 The threat to our rear areas posed by air assault operations, supported by attack helicopters and fixed-wing aircraft, should be one of great concern. The rapid expansion of rotary-wing aviation in the Soviet forces has wrought significant organizational changes. The most important is establishment of an organic helicopter squadron in the motorized rifle and tank divisions. Each squadron consists of 18 helicopters, six each of the Mi-24/HIND D/E, the Mi-8/HIP C, and the Mi-2/HOPLITE. Each HIND and HIP may be armed with various combinations of weapons with up to four antitank guided missiles and four 32-round rocket pods. The HIP C may be used for medium transport in either its armed or unarmed configuration and the HIND has a troop-carrying capacity as well. The HOPLITE is considered a light helicopter by Soviet standards and is used primarily as a utility aircraft.12 (Figure 3). Click here to view image The Soviets are also organizing an increasing number of independent attack helicopter regiments subordinate to both the combined-arms and tank armies. Each regiment consists of a mixture of antitank guided missile equipped HIND's and HIP C's totaling about 60 helicopters.13 Additionally, each army has a general purpose helicopter squadron consisting of 20 assorted helicopters.14 At the front level there is a transport helicopter regiment with 24 heavy lift and 32 medium lift helicopters and a general purpose helicopter squadron of 20-30 aircraft.15 In total there are currently over 4,000 Soviet helicopters, primarily HIP's and HIND's, assigned to active units. In addition, the Warsaw Pact countries possess another 720 helicopters.16 Fixed-Wing Capability A common belief among the Soviet military is that use of supersonic combat aircraft mainly for direct air support is wasteful. Although fixed-wing aircraft can be expected to attack along the Forward Edge of the Battle Area (FEBA), they will be used primarily to destroy targets in their enemy's rear. The Soviets recognize four stages of support by fixed-wing aircraft for offensive operations: support for movement forward; air preparation; air support; and air accompaniment. Support for movement forward is to protect units as they move up from assembly areas. Air strikes in the preparation phase generally are conducted no farther than the enemy's immediate operational depth and for a duration of from ten minutes to over an hour. Targets for preparation are those that conventional artillery and missiles cannot destroy because of their distance, mobility, or hardening. The air support stage commences as ground forces begin an offensive. A majority of the strikes are preplanned against enemy nuclear weapons, command and control systems, and reserves. As with air preparation, these targets are generally beyond the capabilities of artillery and missiles. Immediate missions are requested by ground force commanders against specific centers of resistance. Air accompaniment commences as Soviet ground forces penetrate deeply into enemy defenses. Air cover for airborne and airmobile operations is the mission most often anticipated in the air accompaniment stage. 17 The Soviets carefully integrate air support into an overall defensive fire plan. The primary task of Soviet air support in the defense is counterpreparation, designed to launch a powerful, surprise, concentrated strike of short duration to disrupt an enemy's attack plans. Targets for counterpreparation include nuclear warheads and delivery systems; artillery in firing positions; aviation on airfields; armored or mechanized forces preparing to attack; major command and control facilities; communications centers; rivercrossing sites and equipment; and ammunition and fuel dumps. The Soviet defensive fire plan also calls for air strikes against attacking forces that are out of range of artillery and tactical rockets, and concentrated fire by all fire support weapons on forces reaching or penetrating forward defensive positions. 18 Soviet tactical aviation is organized on a functional/mission-related basis. Soviet ground forces do not have organic fixed-wing assets. Air units that support combined-arms and tank armies are found at the front level, where their strength and composition vary considerably. Front aviation generally consists of assets allocated by the supreme high command and tailored to meet the aviation support requirements of the front for a particular operation or period of time. Front aviation may include two or three air divisions and independent regiments of reconnaissance aircraft. Air divisions may be either fighter, fighter-bomber, or fighter-interceptor (Figure 4). Click here to view image Each type of air division normally consists of 118 aircraft.19 Soviet tactical aircraft assigned to operational units total approximately 6,280 of which almost 2,500 are specifically designed for ground attack. The comparatively unsophisticated aircraft in the Soviet inventory during the early 1970's have been replaced over the course of the last decade by dual-role aircraft offering double the tactical radius and triple the ordnance potential. The varied assortment of Soviet air-to-ground ordnance include laser-guided bombs, electro-optical and laser-guided missiles, cluster munitions, and specialized airfield attack weapons. The great majority of attack aircraft are Su-7/17 FITTER's which have strike and interdiction capabilities at night and in adverse weather (Figure 5). Click here to view image There is also an ever increasing number of Su-25 FROGFOOT's, a specifically designed ground attack aircraft very similar to the USAF A-10 (Figure 6). Click here to view image Missions and Tactics The Soviets view centralized control and mass as corollary principles. Strict centralized control is considered one of the critical elements for the successful conduct of air combat operations. Through centralized control aviation assets can be rapidly concentrated to deliver massive strikes against the enemy's main attack or in support of their own main attack after initial dispersion to avoid destruction by an enemy's nuclear or massive conventional strikes. Centralized control also allows the Soviets to enhance the planning and execution of surprise strikes, to maintain a strong air reserve; and to simplify coordination among aviation assets performing different missions in the same air space. In a rapidly changing combat situation, centralized control expedites the reallocation of assets to accomplish important missions that arise suddenly, such as destruction of nuclear weapons, aviation, or reserves. It would seem that decentralized control of aviation assets, on the other hand, especially attack helicopters, is advantageous when combat operations are conducted on separate, disconnected axes. In such situations, combined arms commanders control and employ allocated aviation assets according to the needs of their maneuver forces.20 Primary targets for Soviet ground attack aircraft are troop concentrations, tactical missile sites, reserves, airfields, logistics facilities, and lines of communications; while primary tasks for fighters include air intercept/air combat and the ultimate attainment of air superiority. Soviet emphasis on dual role capability for fighters and fighter-bombers is reflected in crew training. Fighter-bomber crews spend about a quarter of their training time flying air-intercept and air-to-air combat missions, while fighter pilots spend one quarter of their training time on ground attack missions.21 Specific targets are those which do not change positions over a prolonged period. Supporting aircraft usually operate in small groups of four to eight planes, in pairs and, often, individually. This allows them to fly at high speeds, at low altitudes, and in close combat formations for overcoming antiaircraft defenses. Such tactics do not exclude massing, but in fact aid in concentrating aviation assets along decisive attack corridors for accomplishing main ground force missions. The Soviets believe excessive massing on a single target to be unnecessary and dangerous, because of its vulnerability to enemy nuclear strikes and antiaircraft defenses. The ever increasing Soviet air support capability is a function of constantly improving methods for overcoming enemy antiaircraft defenses. A portion of the air strike would be assigned to neutralize and destroy antiaircraft defense weapons on the ground. To this end, extensive use will be made of surprise attacks from different directions, complex aerial maneuvers, decoys and diversionary tactics, and evasive actions designed to hamper antiaircraft defenses. Though the low altitude attack (50 to 100 meters) is a main method for getting through an antiaircraft defense, the Soviets recognize that aircraft flying at low altitude can suffer losses from modern low-altitude antiaircraft defense weapons and from small arms fire by ground troops. Therefore, they consider the use of armor on aircraft essential. Stereotyped low-altitude tactics are avoided. They rely heavily on complex maneuvers and extensive use of radioelectronic jamming equipment as well as the destruction of enemy antiaircraft weapons by ground forces.22 The Soviets have long sought aircraft that could operate from small, unpaved airfields and insure reliable air support to their ground forces. To help fulfill this need, the combat helicopter, as the Soviets refer to it, has emerged as an ideal weapons system for providing adequate support in both offensive and defensive operations. Missions for the combat helicopter include destruction of enemy tanks, other armored vehicles, antitank weapons, personnel, artillery, and missiles. They are also considered effective against enemy helicopters in the air and on the ground and fixed-wing aircraft on the ground. The Soviets appear to see air support for ground forces in the meeting engagement as the most important role of the combat helicopter by restricting the enemy's maneuvering room and supplying real-time reconnaissance to ground commanders. In this role against preplanned targets, combat helicopters provide additional fire to support artillery during fire preparation and helicopterborne operations. In the later, they escort troop carrying helicopters and destroy enemy fire means en route to and at the landing site.23 Combat helicopters also operate on call for ground commanders, available to destroy newly discovered targets, attack counterattacking enemy tanks, reinforce artillery fire, and provide direct air support in meeting engagements and in pursuit of the enemy.24 The search and destroy role is likely to be employed during periods of limited visibility; when information about the enemy is incomplete; or when the enemy's flanks are exposed. Among the targets sought during a search and destroy mission would be missiles on the move or in firing positions; radars, command and control facilities; antitank weapons; and enemy helicopters on the ground and in the air. Ambush techniques are used employing combat helicopters in forest clearings, on broken terrain, in built-up areas, and in river deltas to gain surprise. The Soviets consider a two to four aircraft flight the most efficient combat formation for this type of mission.25 The Soviets consider the following to be a viable scheme of maneuver for combat helicopters: They would approach the target, concealed by taking advantage of the variations in the terrain, pop-up suddenly for 20 to 30 seconds, aim, strike, and quickly withdraw. After firing on the target, a quick reduction in altitude is recommended by a sideslipping maneuver and then withdrawl to a safe area. Soviet combat helicopters practice delivering attacks against targets from horizontal flight, from a gentle dive, from a pitch-up, from a hovering (pop-up) position, and from the ground. In employing these tactics, several launching positions could be prepared ahead of time where the helicopters secretly mass. The helicopters would rise up from behind their cover on the request of the combined-arms commander, identify the targets, engage them, and then disappear behind cover.26 The Soviets are developing systems and tactics to improve the effectiveness of air support in poor weather and at night. At present, Soviet air operations slow considerably under these conditions because of inadequate aircraft and ground-based equipment and shortcomings in crew training. Also a portion of the Soviet mutual identification and target designation systems used during complex weather conditions and for night flying are unsophisticated by U. S. standards. In an attempt to correct these shortcomings the Soviets have equipped about 20 percent of the third-generation, fixed-wing jet aircraft introduced during the 1970's and their combat helicopters with radio-electronic and infrared instruments. Even with increased availability of modern, sophisticated equipment that allow the Soviets to search for, detect, and destroy targets at night and in poor weather at low altitudes, they continue to believe that - for air support of ground troops - it is important to train pilots to navigate by landmarks, to search for targets visually, and to determine the distances to targets without technical aids.27 Summary The increase in the number of Soviet ground attack aircraft, especially combat helicopters, in the last decade, and the concurrent improvement in range, armaments, and avionics have been remarkable. In a future conflict with the Soviets or Soviet-styled forces the Marine Corps will face a formidable air- threat. Although the USSR is capable of attacking at night and under adverse weather conditions, on the FEBA and to the rear, with great numbers of both combat helicopters and fixed-wing aircraft, Marine Corps units should be able to anticipate the when, what, and how of air attacks they might receive. Specifically, the air threat facing Marine Corps units on the FEBA will be from combat helicopters making surprise daylight attacks of short duration in two to four aircraft formations. Units in areas farther to the rear, such as those at combat service support areas, airfields, MAGTF command and control facilities, and amphibious task force objective-type targets will come under daylight, high speed, low altitude attack primarily from fixed-wing aircraft performing complex maneuvers, conducting extensive radio-electronic jamming, and employing "Iron Hand" type support tactics. "Iron Hands is a U. S. tactic directed against surface-to-air missiles utilizing specially equipped aircraft armed primarily with anti-radiation missiles such as SHRIKE. Air defense tactics and weapons employed by the MAGTF should be sufficiently flexible to defend against Soviet attack, but should be specifically oriented to the most likely threat. Chapter 3 ORGANIZATION FOR AIR DEFENSE IN THE MARINE AIR-GROUND TASK FORCE (MAGTF) Introduction In the Marine Corps, the antiaircraft or air defense mission has been historically associated with ground warfare. Conventional gun-type antiaircraft weapons were organic to ground units and received secondary missions as ground support weapons. The advent of guided missiles has negated traditional surface-to-surface employment possibilities while significantly complicating coordination with fixed wing operations. As a result, the air defense capability of the MAGTF is primarily resident in the Marine Air Wing (MAW). In fact, one of the six functions of Marine aviation is antiair warfare. That term is defined by the United States Navy and Marine Corps as: That action required to destroy or reduce to an acceptable level the enemy air and missile threat. It includes such measures as the use of interceptors, bombers, antiaircraft guns, surface-to-air and air-to-air missiles, electronic countermeasures, and destruction of the air or missile threat both before and after it is launched. Other measures which are taken to minimize the effects of hostile air action are: cover, concealment, dispersion, deception (including electronic), and mobility.28 All Marine Corps antiair warfare operations fall into two categories, air defense and offensive antiair warfare. Air defense is defined as: All defense measures designed to destroy attacking enemy aircraft or missiles in the earth's envelope of atmosphere, or to nullify or reduce the effectiveness of such attacks.29 Offensive antiair warfare is defined as: Combat operations conducted against the enemy air or air defense system before it can be launched or assume an attacking role. Offensive antiair warfare operations in or near thc objective area consist mainly of air attacks to destroy or neutralize hostile aircraft, airfields, radars, air defense systems, and supporting areas.30 This paper will be limited to the air defense portion of antiair warfare operations. Air defense is divided into two types, active and passive. Active air defense is defined as: Direct defensive action taken to destroy attacking enemy aircraft or missiles, or to nullify or reduce the effectiveness of such attack. It includes such measures as the use of aircraft, interceptor missiles, air defense artillery, nonair defense weapons in an air defense role, and electronic countermeasures and counter-counter measures.31 Passive air defense on the other hand is defined as: All measures, other than active defense, taken to minimize the effects of hostile air action. These include the use of cover, concealment, camouflage, deception, dispersion, and protective construction.32 Again, the scope of this discussion will be limited further to the active aspects of air defense. There are many organizations throughout the MAF that contribute to the air defense effort. Only those making larger contributions will be reviewed in detail. Marine Air Command and Control System (MACCS) The wide range of speeds and types of aircraft supporting the MAGTF makes it paramount that the controlling commander communicate directly with various aircraft flights through a centralized control system. In response to this need for very rapid transmission of orders, coordination and control of air operations over a relatively broad area by a single commander is essential. MACCS permits centralized coordination and supervision of air operations at the highest level, while incorporating decentralization of control authority to subordinate agencies. Disparate roles, missions, and characteristics of aircraft dictate a functional, rather than an area of responsibility approach to control. Once aircraft assignments are made by organizational commanders, authority for mission execution rests with the functional control agency. Overall supervision, coordination, and general control of all tactical air operations in the MAGTF is the responsibility of the Tactical Air Command Center (TACC), the senior MACCS agency. The TACC draws personnel from the Marine Air Control Group (MACG), Marine Air Wing (MAW) and exercises control through agencies established from assets both organic and nonorganic to the MACG. These agencies include the Direct Air Support Center (DASC) and Air Support Radar Teams (ASRT's) from the Marine Air Support Squadron (MASS); one or more Tactical Air Operations Centers (TAOC's) from the Marine Air Control Squadrons; the Antiaircraft Operations Center (AAOC), the Battery Control Centers (BCC's), and the Platoon Command Posts (PCP's) of the Light AntiAircraft Missile (LAAM) battalion, the Forward Area Air Defense (FAAD) platoons of the FAAD battery, the Tactical Air Control Parties (TACP's) of the Marine Division, and one or more of the air traffic control units from the Marine Air Traffic Control Squadron (MATCS).33 (Figure 7). The agency and organizations with the greatest roles in the air defense effort, including the TAOC, AAOC, LAAM battalion, DASC, and the FAAD battery, will be discussed in greater detail later. Click here to view image Marine Fighter Attack (VMFA) Squadrons Fighter aircraft are the primary and longest range Marine Corps air defense weapons. VMFA squadrons are equipped with F-4 and F/A-18 aircraft and a variety of air-to-air weapons and radars to accomplish the air defense mission. Fighter aircraft are employed at the outer limits of the air defense destruction area. Their success is absolutely critical to the accomplishment of the MAF's air defense mission. VMFA's in conjunction with the MACCS form a potent air defense system. Fighter capability is not in question. The scope of this paper will finally narrow to examine ground air defense. Tactical Air Operations Center (TAOC) Control of the Marine Corps air defense system is exercised through the TAOC, a subordinate agency of the TACC. The role of the TAOC is to detect, identify, and control to intercept both hostile aircraft and missiles. TAOC's also provide navigational assistance and mission advisories to friendly aircraft. A TAOC is designed and equipped to detect and identify all aircraft within an air defense sector, control en route air traffic, select and assign weapons to meet the enemy threat, and control the engagement of enemy air threats by interceptors or surface-to-air missiles. The TAOC has surveillance radar capabilities and is the primary source of radar control for all aircraft in its sector of responsibility. It detects, acquires, and tracks targets in an assigned area and provides an up-to-date display of aviation activity, including the employment and weapons status of interceptor aircraft and surface-to-air missile batteries and dissemination of appropriate information to designated agencies. The TAOC provides interface between adjacent and higher air defense agencies through the exchange of tactical data by means of digital and/or voice communications with interceptors and friendly aircraft, SAM fire units, adjacent TAOC's, the TACC, and joint and combined air defense agencies.34 Antiaircraft Operations Center (AAOC) The AAOC, an agency subordinate to the TAOC, is formed from LAAM battalion assets and provides control of subordinate LAAM units as well as serving as the primary control agency for FAAD teams organic to the LAAM battalion. The AAOC possesses a short-range surveillance radar that provides a search capability in excess of LAAM battery acquisition radars.35 Light Antiaircraft Missile (LAAM) Battalion The LAAM battalion is organized and equipped to provide air defense for an antiair warfare area vital to a MAF. A vital area is considered to contain critical facilities, units, or installations necessary for the landing force to accomplish its mission. Its specific mission is: To provide surface-to-air missile defense of assigned areas of operation, or installations and vital zones, against hostile low and medium altitude air attacks. The battalion is equipped with improved Hawk surface-to-air missile systems, medium and low altitude acquisition radars, fire control radars, missile launchers, and equipment for the maintenance, transport, and loading of missiles.36 The battalion's 37 officers and 651 enlisted Marines are organized into a headquarters and service battery and three missile firing batteries (Figure 8). Click here to view image Each firing battery maintains an autonomous capability to detect, identify, and evaluate threat aircraft; and to receive, assemble, test, load, and fire the improved Hawk surface-to-air missile. Each battery is divided into the battery (minus) and an assault fire unit, each with three launchers. The LAAM battalions are currently undergoing programmed organizational changes that by October 1986 will add a fourth battery to each battalion and distribute each battery six launchers into three assault fire units. This change to a triad organization will provide a significant increase in air defense capability to the MAF and will allow each battery to disperse over a larger area for better coverage and increased survivability.37 The Improved Hawk system employs two types of acquisition radar. A continuous-wave acquisition radar provides low-to-medium altitude detection and a pulse acquisition radar provides medium-to-high altitude, medium range coverage. Following detection, the system allows for target identification, friendly or foe; selection of targets for engagement; and assignment to a firing unit. A high-power illuminator radar tracks the targets and provides a reference signal to the missile. In the electronic countermeasures environment a range only radar provides ranging data for target engagement. The missile itself weighs 1,400 pounds, is supersonic with semiactive homing, and is driven by a solid propellant motor. The launcher weighs 8,813 pounds with three missiles.38 (Figure 9). Click here to view image The Improved Hawk is an excellant weapon at about one-half its unclassified ranage of 40 kilometers. Past the midpoint of the range missile performance falls off significantly.39 The missile also has a minimum range problem. The specified minimum range is approximately 3 kilometers; but adding this to the distance a jet aircraft can travel during the system's 30 seconds of reaction time, the missile cannot be fired at a target within about 10 kilometers of itself. This results in a belt of only 10 kilometers where the missile functions at its greatest level of performance. The Improved Hawk has limited operational mobility, but the system has specific site characteristics and requirements. For example, it takes a minimum of one and one-half hours to transition a battery from movement to a fully ready for firing status. The Improved Hawk is best employed when defending permanent or semi-permanent installations from fixed sites. Direct Air Support Center (DASC) The DASC is directly subordinate to the TACC and is the principal air control agency responisble for the conduct of tactical operations supporting ground forces. The DASC disseminates friendly and enemy aircraft information to FAAD units, and performs a variety of other functions involving close air support and assault support. The DASC and the ground combat element's Fire Support Coordination Center (FSCC) are ideally collocated to facilitate detailed and contiuous communications and coordination between the cooperating agencies.40 Forward Area Air Defense (FAAD) Battery The mission of the FAAD battery is to provide close-in air defense protection for elements of a MAF in forward combat areas or vital areas, and for units engaged in independent operations by destroying hostile aircraft and drones, particularly in areas not defendable by other elements of the antiair warfare system.41 The FAAD battery is organized into a battery headquarters, a service platoon, and five missile platoons (Figure 10). Each platoon consists of a headquarters section and three firing sections, each of which is composed of five two-man firing teams.42 Click here to view image FAAD support for a MAF will be provided by the FAAD battery, a FAAD platoon will generally support a Marine Amphibious Brigade (MAB), and a Marine Amphibious Unit (MAU) will be supported by a FAAD section. Marine Corps doctrine calls for command and control of FAAD weapons to be exercised through the MACCS agency (either TAOC or DASC) that can best provide rapid early warning information and weapons control conditions depending on the tactical situation and stage of the operation.43 The Redeye missile that has been in service in the Marine Corps since 1966 is currently being replaced in FAAD batteries by the Stinger missile system. The single most important advantage of the Stinger is the addition of an Identification Friend or Foe (IFF) feature which aids in identifying friendly aircraft. Other improvements include increased range and intercept capability.44 The Stinger is a short range man-portable (29 pounds), shoulder-fired, infrared-homing (heat seeking), guided missile capable of engaging aircraft at very-low-to-low altitude operating at ordnance delivery speeds (Figure 11). The missile requires no control by the gunner after firing. The unclassified range of the Stinger is in excess of 4 kilometers.45 Again, as with the Hawk missile, the Stinger's performance peaks at one-half its maximum range. Click here to view image The Stinger missile system consists of five major components, the launch tube assembly, missile, battery/coolant unit (BCU), separable gripstock, and IFF interrogator. The BCU contains a thermal battery to provide power for preflight operation and for "spinning up" the missile's internal gyroscopes and a supply of argon gas to cool the infrared detector in the missile seeker. The BCU supplies electrical power and seeker coolant to the weapon until launch or for a maximum of 45 seconds. Because a BCU is considered expended as soon as it is inserted in the weapon, there are three packed with each missile.46 The IFF component consists of an IFF interrogator worn externally by the gunner and an interconnecting cable. The interrogator operates in either mode 3 or 4. Mode 3 is a standard IFF used on commercial as well as military aircraft. Mode 4 is used by U. S. military aircraft but no other NATO countries. Once programmed with an interrogation code, the interrogator can operate in Mode 4 secure mode for 4 days. Within 4 days, the battery must be replaced and the unit reprogrammed. The unit automatically shifts from Mode 4 to Mode 3 if the unit is not reprogrammed and will remain in Mode 3 until reprogrammed. Reprogramming requires a freshly charged battery pack.47 The gunner's sequence of system operation is as follows: identifies target and centers in the sight range ring; interrogates target and listens for an IFF response; continues tracking if foe; operates a safety and actuation when target is in range; presses and holds the uncaging switch when a distinct acquisition tone is heard; superelevates the weapon and places the target in the proper lead reticle; squeezes and holds firing trigger if tone is still distirict; continues to track the target until the missile is launched; and removes BCU in less than 3 minutes to prevent damage to the reusable gripstock.48 The Stinger is an excellent weapon and is certainly superior to the Redeye, but it has some weaknesses that must be considered. The Stinger is not a system that an untrained Marine can pick up and use to knock down an enemy aircraft. In fact the training, especially that required to identify the various tones heard by the gunner, is extensive. It is not a weapon with which to take a "hip" or "snap shot". The system takes approximately 5 seconds once actuated for the gyroscopes to spin up and the infrared detector to be cooled before serious tracking can begin. With jet aircraft travelling at 200-250 meters per second, the Stinger must be positioned where it has long range observation and time to prepare for an engagement. Although man-portable, the Stinger has significant logistics requirements that are exacerbated when located with units distant from the battery headquarters. Lastly, the Stinger makes a highly visible signature that precludes shooting at a passing target if there is any concern with revealing a unit's position. Basically the Stinger should not engage a target unless there is a direct threat to the supported unit. Small Unit Active Air Defense Organic air defense in the Marine Corps division is limited to small arms. This is the last line of air defense for ground forces, but it is not considered an exercise in futility. During the Vietnam War the United States lost over 400 fixed-wing aircraft and over 2,000 helicopters to small arms ground fire.49 The effectiveness of small arms in disrupting a pilot's concentration as he flies into a hail of tracers can cause missed targets or abandoned attacks. The tactic should not be underestimated. The effort required to coordinate a unit's response and the techniques involved must be thoroughly practiced. Chapter 4 U. S. ARMY AND SOVIET ARMY AIR DEFENSE CAPABILITY In order to provide a basis for comparison with the MAGTF, a limited description of the air defense capability organic to U. S. Army and Soviet divisions will be provided. U. S. Army There are a variety of air defense organizations in the U. S. Army based on the supported unit. They run the gamut from the 32d Air Defense Command in Europe featuring thirteen air defense artillery battalions organized into four brigades, to sole organic air defense artillery battalions in each division.50 Armored, infantry, and mechanized divisions have a Chaparral/Vulcan battalion consisting of two Vulcan batteries and two Chaparral batteries. Each of the 4 batteries has 4 platoons of which 1 is a Stinger platoon with 4 sections for a total of 72 teams.51 Air defense for the airborne division is provided by four Vulcan batteries each consisting of three Vulcan platoons and a Stinger platoon. The air assault division's air defense consists of a Vulcan battery with two platoons and two Stinger batteries of three platoons each.52 The Vulcan is a short-range (1,200 meters) air defense gun system. The 6-barrel 20mm canon, range only radar, and fire control system are configured in either a self-propelled or towed version. The Vulcan is also capable of providing effective ground fire against troops and lightly armored vehicles to 2,200 meters as a direct fire weapon and to 4,500 meters in an indirect fire mode. The Vulcan in the armored, infantry, and mechanized divisions is mounted on fully tracked, lightly armored vehicle, while the Vulcan assigned to the air assault and airborne divisions is a towed version weighing approximately 3,500 pounds.53 (Figure 12). Click here to view image The Chaparral is a highly mobile, surface-to-air missile system fielded only on a fully tracked, lightly armored vehicle. The 9 foot long, 190 pound missile is guided by passive infrared homing and has a range beyond 5,000 meters (Figure 13). Chaparral is a fair weather system capable of operation only during periods of good visibility and is designed to protect stationary critical assets within the U. S. Army division against low-flying enemy aircraft.54 Click here to view image Soviet Army The air defense systems organic to a Soviet motorized rifle division are extensive. Each of three motorized regiments (both BTR and BMP) have 4 SA-9/GASKIN's, 4 ZSU-23-4's, and 30 SA-7/GRAIL's; the tank regiment has 4 SA-9/GASKIN's, 4 ZSU-23-4's, and 3 SA-7/GRAIL's; the surface-to-air missile regiment has 20 SA-6/GAINFUL's and 21 SA-7/GRAIL's; and the division headquarters has 6 SA-7/GRAIL's.55 The SA-9/GASKIN is a short-range, low-altitude, surface-to-air missile with a passive infrared seeker. It is mounted in detachable, box-like launch canisters on a modified BRDM-2 amphibious armored scout car.56 (Figure 14). Click here to view image The ZSU-23-4 is a self-propelled, gun system mounting four 23mm cannons with an effective range of 2,500 meters on a fully tracked, lightly armored vehicle. It has the capability to both acquire and track low-flying aircraft and is capable of firing on the move because of its integrated radar/gun stabilization system.57 (Figure 15). Click here to view image The SA-7/GRAIL is a man-portable, shoulder-fired, low-altitude, surface-to-air missile system similar to the U. S. Redeye or Stinger.58 (Figure 16). Click here to view image The SA-6/GAINFUL is a two-stage, solid-fuel, low-altitude, surface-to-air missile mounted three to a fully tracked vehicle resembling the ZSU-23-4 chassis. The system utilizes surveillance and target acquisition radars and has a slant range of 24 kilometers and a kill zone from 50 to 12,000 meters in altitude. 59 (Figure 17). Click here to view image Chapter 5 ANALYSIS OF THE AIR DEFENSE CAPABILITY OF THE MAGTF Introduction Air defense planning is based on four basic principles governing employment of air defense weapons: mass, mix, mobility, and integration.60 Mass, a concentration of air defense weapons, is achieved by assigning enough assets to successfully defend a generic target against attack. Mix goes hand in hand with the principle of mass, and is achieved by combining complementary weapon systems. Employment of a variety of air defense weapons in sufficient mass complicates the targeting problem for an attacker. An array of air defense weapons, each with different characteristics and capabilities that compensate for the limitations of one another, is far more difficult for an attacker to defeat than an equal or even greater number of a single system. Air defense weapons must be mobile to permit the application of the principles of mass and mix on the modern battlefield. Air defense weapons should be no less mobile than the unit they are supporting. Integration is a close coordination and unity of action among operating forces. It occurs with air defense weapons on two levels; first, air defense units must coordinate with each other to enhance their capabilities and to avoid interference; secondly, air defense and supported units must coordinate their efforts and respond to each others needs.61 Analysis MAGTF ground air defense weapon systems fail to meet even one of the principles of mass, mix, mobility, and integration. One possible reason for this failure is the consolidation of air defense weapons in an air wing. The primary and most effective air defense weapon is the fighter-interceptor aircraft. But an air wing's leader -- naval aviator -- may often rely on the fighter system to the exclusion of often ignored ground air defense weapons systems. In regards to mass, the MAF simply does not have enough air defense weapons to defend itself against a Soviet style air attack. Defense in depth of vital areas over 600 square miles of beachhead, to include widely dispersed amphibious task force objectives, landing force aviation, combat service support areas, and command and control centers, with any degree of defense-in-depth or mutual support, would be virtually impossible. All available MAF assets, the LAAM battalion and five FAAD platoons, would have to be utilized in defense of air wing and force service support group assets with nothing left to be allocated to the division (especially infantry units). For the Stinger system, mass is normally not achieved at a particular target with units smaller than a platoon.62 Without question, the FAAD platoon and Hawk battery for a MAB could not even provide necessary coverage for a Marine air group or a brigade service support group. Except in those situations where LAAM battalion and FAAD battery assets are tasked to provide air defense of the same vital area, there is no mix of air defense weapons in the Marine Corps. In those instances where FAAD assets are available for allocation to the division, there is no mix at all. This contrasts with the mix of Vulcan, Chaparral, and Stinger found in the U. S. Army division; and the ZSU-23-4, SA-6, SA-9, and SA-7 mix found in the Soviet division. Mobility of Marine Corps air defense weapons is also inadequate. The Hawk missile system, which requires a minimum of 1 1/2 hours, under ideal conditions, to bring a battery from the travel mode to a ready-to-fire status, can only be considered for defense of stationary point targets. The Stinger system relies on the M151 jeep for its mobility which precludes it from staying up with mechanized forces unless embarked in the Landing Vehicle Tracked (LVT) or from reaching over watch positions in rugged terrain. Whether moving in the jeep or embarked in the LVT, Stinger gunners must stop the vehicle and dismount before engaging the target due to the significant backblast. Integration of Marine Corps air defense weapons is deficient on both levels, among air defense units and between air defense and supported units. It is further degraded by their consolidation in the air wing. Although both the FAAD battery and LAAM battalion are commanded and controlled through the MACCS and are administratively subordinate to the Marine Air Control Group, they are distinct units with no ties except to a senior unit which supports a number of functions in addition to air defense. There is no organization in the MAF dedicated to air defense nor, is there a focal point for this aspect of warfare. The type of air defense support provided to the Force Service Support Group (FSSG), the division, and the wing varies greatly. Support for the FSSG and wing is primarily defense for fixed installations and, in the case of the FSSG, an occasional supply convoy. The division is unique in that support is of maneuver units. Unit to unit support vice unit to installation, requires far more coordination, inter-personal contact, and team building than has been afforded to date. Integration of air defense units and FSSG and wing units is less difficult to accomplish and is frankly less critical than providing the level of integration required between air defense and division units. Adequate support of the division requires an integration of air defense units that allows for training that leads to a thorough understanding of the missions, requirements, limitations, and capabilities of both the supported and supporting unit. Every training exercise of battalion-size or larger should include air defense units and air defense requirements in the scenario, but does not. Presently air defense units in support of the division, specifically Stinger sections, generally participate only in large scale training exercises in which other air wing assets participate. They usually arrive shortly before the exercise commences and therefore have not participated in prior planning. The unit often receives its mission only minutes before it must be executed. There is no opportunity for discussion on how or where to best employ the unit in support of the scheme of maneuver. The supported unit commanders never get to know, nor are they able to establish, rapport with members of the Stinger units because rarely are they the same Marines. Air defense officers from the FAAD battery rarely come in contact with officers from the supported unit. They do not have the opportunity to discuss the strengths and weaknesses of specific personnel but, most importantly, they never sit down and discuss tactics and employment techniques and considerations. Another indication of the complete lack of integration between the division and air defense units is the absence of special staff officers for air defense on division staffs. There are special staff officers for engineering and armor support, but no one beside the air officer (who as a naval aviator or naval flight officer is not familiar with the job) is available to advise the commanding general or G-3 on the employment of air defense assets. The uniqueness of the amphibious operation magnifies the inadequacy of air defense in the Marine Corps. "The primary role of AAW in an amphibious operation is to ensure that the degree of air superiority required for a successful operation is achieved and maintained."63 Air superiority is defined as: That degree of dominance in the air battle of one force over another which permits the conduct of operations by the former and its related land, sea, and air forces at a given time and place without prohibitive interference by the opposing force.64 Because of the vulnerability of the landing force during the initial stages of the operation "the degree of dominance" necessary for a successful operation must be virtually complete. The density and organization of the MAF's air defense weapons are not capable of supporting the overall antiair warfare effort. The only air defense weapons that can be expected to land in the first few hours of D-Day are very limited number of Stingers allocated to support the division. The Marine Corps force structure study completed in 1981 determined that a MAF's air defense was inadequate and analyzed four alternative structures for improving that capability. The first (Option A) was a base option consisting of one LAAM battalion with four batteries in the triad configuration and one FAAD battery with five platoons. This represents the currently programmed air defense structure for the MAF. This option provides 12 Hawk firing units and 75 Stingers at a cost of 1,124 Marines. Option B adds a second FAAD battery to the base option and makes it organic to the division. This option adds 75 Stingers to the base at a total cost of 1,401 Marines. Option C retains the LAAM battalion and FAAD battery in the air wing and adds an air defense battalion to the division. This battalion would consist of two batteries each of the Army's Vulcan gun system and Chaparral missile system. This option provides 24 Vulcan and 24 Chaparral systems additive to the base option at a total cost of 1,743 Marines. Option D was similar to Option C except that the Army's Division Air Defense (DIVAD) gun system replaces the Vulcan in the Marine division's air defense battalion. Total personnel for this option is 1,784. These options were examined in a highly analytical approach and the study recommended Option B. The study rationalized that this option provided the greatest gain in effectiveness based on a comparison of improved firepower, survivability, tactical mobility, maneuver, and area coverage with increased personnel, weight, and square footage requirements. Comments from the Fleet Marine Force regarding this recommendation were universally in favor of expanding the MAF's ground air defense capability. The majority of comments strongly favored an organic air defense capability for the division. Some commands commented that the capability offered by Option B was inadequate and made alternate proposals. It is clear that the FMF recognizes the shortfall in air defense capability and is strongly in favor of initiatives to improve it.65 Chapter 6 THE REQUIREMENT AND THE SOLUTION Requirement The requirement, simply stated, is to improve the mass, mix, mobility, and integration of air defense weapons in the MAF, and especially in the division. An air defense organization should be developed that addresses the threat and generates maximum adherence to these principles. The threat can be summarized as follows: units on the FEBA will be engaged primarily by combat helicopters; while rear areas, combat service support installations, airfields, and command and control facilities will come under attack by high performance jet aircraft. Improvements in mass, mix, and mobility will be discussed concurrently. Improved integration as well as general recommendations for improving the overall air defense effort will be discussed separately. Analysis of Alternative Air Defense Systems Inherent in any effort to improve the mass, mix, and mobility of Marine Corps air defense weapons is the requirement to add a complementary weapon to the air defense arsenal. In order to determine which weapon, relative merits of three U. S. produced air defense systems, not in service with the Marine Corps, but either currently available or near production, will be evaluated as candidates for procurement and integration into the air defense system. The advantages and disadvantages of each system, especially as each pertains to Marine Corps use, will be weighed. A recommendation will follow. Guns, such as the Army's Vulcan and the Soviet's ZSU-23-4, will be discussed as a generic system. Gun systems have two advantages. The first is rapid employment. There is virtually no delay between identifying a target and engaging it. This is especially important while engaging helicopters employing anti-tank guided missiles from pop-up maneuvers. A helicopter must be brought under fire immediately to disrupt the pilot's guidance of the missile. Putting fire, especially a stream of tracers, near the helicopter can be as important, initially, as actually hitting it. The other advantage is effectiveness of the gun in its secondary mission against collateral ground targets such as troops and lightly armored vehicles. The gun, then, is a versatile weapon that can be brought to bear quickly and is especially effective in handling meeting engagements with a helicopter. There are a number of disadvantages generally associated with gun systems. A gun, such as the Vulcan, without automated target acquisition, tracking, and ranging capability is a daylight, fair-weather only air defense weapon. To gain an all weather capability requires an array of radars which then become susceptible to electronic countermeasures. The Soviet ZSU-23-4 possesses an acquisition, tracking, and ranging capability which gives it an all-weather capability but also makes it more susceptible to detection and jamming. A high rate of fire and limited storage space for ammunition limits gun engagement time. The Vulcan's rate of fire, for example, is 3,000 rounds per minute. Only 1,000 rounds of ready-to-fire ammunition are loaded in the gun, with additional storage space for 800 to 1,000 rounds in the carrier.66 This limits the weapon's engagement time to approximately 40 seconds before the crew must dismount and manually reload from boxed ammunition. Although the firing rate of antiaircraft guns is intentionally high, rounds still arrive within the dispersion pattern at the target one at a time. This is an inherent disadvantage of guns. It can be compared to using an automatic rifle versus a shotgun when hunting game birds. You are better off with the shotgun, from which projectiles cover the pattern simultaneously. The last disadvantage is less academic. Guns are simply old-fashioned. There is little or nothing that can be done to improve them at this point in their development. While enemy aircraft and tactics are improving, guns are at an evolutionary standstill. The mobility of gun systems varies greatly, from towed systems to those mounted on wheeled or tracked vehicles. The cost of gun systems varies proportionately with their style of mobility since the gun and radar remain virtually unchanged regardless of the prime mover. The next air defense system to be discussed is the Setter. The Setter is currently under joint development by two Army research and development and procurement organizations, Missile Command (MICOM) and Tank-Automotive Command (TACOM). The Setter (named after the gun dog) mounts eight Stinger missiles outboard on a Remote Electric Drive Turret (RED-T) carried on the 1 1/4 ton 4x4 High Mobility Multi-Wheeled Vehicle (HMMWV). Inboard on the turret are mounted 54 Hypervelocity Rockets (HVR) arranged in six clips of nine rockets. Each HVR is 60 inches long by 1.8 inches in diameter and carries 18 flechette-like tungsten alloy steel penetrators, 2.8mm in diameter and 112mm long. The penetrators were originally conceived as a close-in anti-helicopter weapon, but they now appear to provide Setter with an equally capable weapon for engaging lightly armored vehicles. The penetrators are released from the rocket at about 200 meters and reach maximum effective range at 1,500 to 2,000 meters with a velocity of approximately 1,400 meters per second in four to six mil dispersion patterns. The HVR's can be fired in volleys of three, six, or nine. A three-round volley will therefore release a swarm of 54 penetrators.67 Setter carries a two man crew (gunner and driver) in the lightly armored cab of the HMMWV. The RED-T traverses 360 degrees and elevates from -10 to +60 degrees. It uses a Forward Looking Infrared (FLIR) sensor for night engagements, a daylight television for surveillance and target acquisition, and a laser rangefinder. The gunner's monitor can show either the FLIR or the TV image. A portable fire control console allows dismounted operation by the gunner up to 75 meters from the vehicle. Additional storage is provided in the HMMWV for four Stingers and four nine-round HVR clips. Development is due to be completed in October 1985.68 (Figure 18). Click here to view image The greatest advantage of Setter is the mix of air defense weapons inherent in the system. The HVR, an ideal weapon for immediate engagement of helicopters, and the longer range Stinger missile make an excellent combination. Like the air defense gun, the Setter can be employed effectively against ground targets, especially lightly armored vehicles. Unlike the gun, the HVR places its projectiles on target simultaneously ensuring hits if the target is in the dispersion pattern. The Setter lacks acquisition and tracking radars, but the characteristics of the weapons systems do not require them to make it effective. Setter is ideally suited for employment on the FEBA where the HVR would be used in rapid engagements against helicopters at close range (less than 2,000 meters) and the Stinger against visually acquired jet aircraft and helicopters at longer ranges (to 4,000 meters). The combination of FLIR, TV imaging, and a laser rangefinder provides state of the art fire control while rendering electronic countermeasures ineffective. The capability to remotely control the weapons systems enhances crew survivability. The Setter is helicopter transportable by both the CH-46 and CH-53. It's ground mobility, limited to that of the HMMWV, is sufficient to support most infantry operations but will be deficient in support of mechanized operations. The last new system to be evaluated is the Saber. Saber is a hand-held, man-portable, laser guided, surface-to-air missile. Once fired, the missile adjusts its course to or "rides" a laser beam that the gunner places on the target. Saber was Stinger's competition in determining a successor for the Redeye.69 The Saber's greatest strength is its quick response. The missile can be fired immediately upon identifying a target within range. In fact, within a specific envelop, the missile can be fired at a point away from an aircraft and then brought back on target by putting the laser beam on the aircraft and drawing the missile to it. Two advantages of the Saber are related to the fact it is a laser-riding missile and not infrared-homing like the Stinger. The first is that it cannot be countered or distracted by flares dropped from the target or other aircraft. The other is its effectiveness against ground targets. The Saber is highly accurate in engaging moving vehicles or bunkers and its warhead is effective against such targets. The major disadvantage of the Saber is that it is not a fire and forget weapon. The gunner must hold the weapon sight on target throughout the engagement. This is the primary reason for Saber's loss to Stinger in the competition for Redeye's replacement. Saber's lack of an IFF system is another disadvantage, but in it's anticipated role the defect is not disqualifying. The man-portability of the Saber has both advantages and disadvantages, on one hand it is limited to the mobility of the supported unit and therefore will always be in a position to support, but on the other, without being externally mounted on a dedicated vehicle, the gunner will have to disembark and acquire the target, increasing the engagement time. Mix The first step in overcoming the weaknesses in the MAGTF's air defense capability is to select a system that will improve the mix of weapons. Of the systems previously discussed, Setter is the best alternative for providing the MAGTF and especially the ground combat element with a weapon to complement the Hawk and Stinger surface-to-air missiles. Although the Saber and Stinger have very different guidance systems, they are similar weapons. The Saber's unique advantages, notably its capability against ground targets and invulnerability to infrared distractors do not outweigh its lack of a fire and forget feature. At this point in the development of air defense weapons and missiles in general, adoption of an other than fire and forget system is a step backwards. The length of the average hand-held missile engagement, projected to last 9.2 seconds, combined with the very distinct signature left by such missiles makes the Saber gunner extremely vulnerable to suppressive fire.70 Air defense gun systems are simply outdated. At the current state of technology the gun has no where to go and has no distinct advantage over a missile system. As with Saber, any system without a fire and forget feature is a step backwards. Like the Setter, they are quick to engage the target and effective against ground targets, but have limited ammunition storage capacity and even their simple range-only-radars are susceptible to electronic countermeasures. It is highly susceptible to suppressive fire and its projectiles reach the target in a stream rather than simultaneously which is substantially more effective. The inherent mobility of the Setter is a vast improvement over the Stinger and Hawk systems. It allows for target engagement without dismounting and is capable of supporting a great majority of the ground missions. Mass and Integration Enhancements in mass and integration will be discussed concurrently. Improvement in the mass of air defense weapons, brought about by procurement of Setter, would necessitate organizational changes that will, in turn, have an impact on integration. Furthermore, discussion of enhanced integration and organizational changes dictates a detailed analysis of command and control requirements. Before embarking on any discussions of command and control, it will be useful to define these terms: Command includes the authority and responsibility for effectively using available resources; planning the employment of assigned forces; and directing, controlling, and coordinating the employment of those forces to accomplish assigned missions. Control is authority, less than command, delegated by the commander to designated agencies to direct, control, and coordinate specific functional activities during combat operations.71 The key to these definitions, as far as this discussion is concerned, is that the commander employs forces, but may delegate the authority to designated agencies to control and coordinate specific functional activities. The first question that arises is whether the division should have an organic air defense organization. Organic air defense within the division is not unknown, even in the missile age. The Redeye missile system was first introduced into the Fleet Marine Force as an integral part of each division in September 1966. The FAAD battery was moved to its present place in the air wing in February 1969 in order to group all antiair warfare assets under the command and control of the MACCS.72 The change was brought about by members of the aviation community who expressed concerns over the increased possibility of shooting down one of our own aircraft. This is certainly a valid concern, but one that requires a hard look. Aviation's greatest concern in this regard should be from missile systems, such as the Hawk, that acquire, track, and intercept targets by radar only. The Hawk must be closely controlled to prevent inadvertent engagement of friendly aircraft. Stinger and Setter, on the other hand, ace terminal air defense weapons employed after visual acquisition of targets by units under air attack. Command and Control At this point it is necessary to digress and synopsize the current doctrine for weapons control and coordination of FAAD units: Fire direction of FAAD units includes target assignment and its relationship to zones of fire and is the responsibility of the TAOC. The TAOC considers zones of fire, early warning, and target assignment when coordinating the fire of LAAM and FAAD units. Air defense warnings and weapons control conditions are established by the Commander Amphibious Task Force (CATF) and Commander Landing Force (CLF) and disseminated over the MACCS communications nets. Air defense warnings are defined as follows: - Red: Attack is imminent or in progress. - Yellow: Attack is probable. - White: Attack is not probable. Weapons control conditions are as follows: - Weapons Free: Fire may be opened on all aircraft, except helicopters, not recognized as friendly. FAAD gunners may engage high speed aircraft not positively identified as friendly. Engagement of helicopters requires positive identification. - Weapons Tight: This command means do not open fire, or to cease firing on any aircraft (or on bogey specified, or in section indicated) unless a target(s) known to be hostile. FAAD gunners may engage any aircraft positively identified as hostile. - Hold Fire: This command means do no open fire or to cease firing on raid/track designated. FAAD gunners do not fire unless directly under attack by aircraft. In the event of loss of communications, FAAD units go to weapons tight condition. If the previous condition was weapons free, the weapons tight condition is assumed immediately. If prior to the communications loss, the weapon was in a hold fire status, FAAD units will maintain hold fire for a period of ten minutes and then assume weapons tight. Authority to change the FAAD weapons control conditions is vested in the CLF and is normally exercised through the MACCS. It is anticipated that the normal weapons control condition will be weapons tight and that changes will be infrequent.73 It would seem on first impression that the command and control procedures just described apply more to defense of fixed installations than to fluid situations expected along the FEBA. In actuality, because of the limited ranges, visually acquired targets, and the fact that units will more than likely be under attack once Setter or Stinger are employed, the execution of the air defense command and control system as it applies to air units on FEBA is not overly restrictive. What is severely limited by the current organization is integration of air defense units with supported units and the capacity of supported commanders to exercise control in the employment of a weapons system. There is a unique requirement for integration in the division that can only be satisfied by establishment of an organic air defense organization. The control of air defense units on the FEBA is by necessity flexible and is exercised primarily through establishment of weapons control conditions. Responsibility for the establishment of the ground commander's air defense priorities and the command necessary to employ assets to support prioritization should reside with the supported maneuver unit. That by no means precludes control by MACCS and detailed coordination between MACCS and division air defense units. In fact the MACCS would remain the senior air defense agency. A TACC would continue to pass air defense warnings, and would have responsibility for setting weapons control conditions. But, an air defense unit simply does not have to be administratively part of the MACG to be controlled by MACCS or to ensure acceptable safety levels for friendly aircraft. Establishment, then, of an air defense organization organic to the division would improve both mass and integration of air defense weapons in the MAF without degrading command and control effectiveness. Alternatives for the Division's Air Defense Organization Realistic options for the structure of the air defense battalion proposed for the division must use as their basis the Stinger and Setter systems. These weapons have the characteristics, capability, and mobility that make them the most effective available to satisfy the specific requirements for air defense in the division. The first two options provide each infantry regiment with an organic air defense platoon as well as an air defense organization at the division-level. One option consolidates divisional organic assets in an air defense battalion, and the final option also establishes an air defense battalion but provides each infantry battalion with an organic air defense capability as well. Option W. This option establishes an air defense company within the division's headquarters battalion. This company would have three Stinger platoons and one Setter platoon. It also provides the infantry regiment an organic air defense capability in the form of a platoon within the headquarters company. This platoon would consist of 4 Stinger sections and one Setter section (Figure 19). Option X. This alternative is similar to Option W but consolidates the Setter assets at the division-level. The division's air defense company would have two Stinger platoons and two Setter platoons, while the regiment's air defense platoon would have four Stinger sections (Figure 20). Option Y. This option consolidates tbe division's air defense assets in a battalion consisting of two Stinger companies and a Setter company (Figure 21). Option Z. The last option adds to Option Y a Stinger section to be incorporated into the weapons company of each infantry battalion (Figure 22). Figure 23 provides an overview of the four options. Click here to view image Comparative Analysis Option W offers a wide variety of alternatives for task organizing in support of the division's units. The regiment's air defense platoon can support each of the battalions with a Stinger section, with the fourth section employed in defense of the regiment's command post and logistics support or to reinforce one of the battalions. The Setter section could be used in a number of ways; support for attached or supporting tanks used as a fourth maneuver element, in support of a motorized or mechanized battalion, to reinforce a Stinger section, and convoy protection. The air defense company, in particular the Stinger platoon, is capable of providing task organized support throughout the division to include: the division's command post, Fire Support Coordination Center (FSCC), Direct Air Support Center (DASC), logistics support, and maintenance facilities; artillery units; and large scale engineer operations. The Setter platoon could be tasked with support of a Mechanized Combined Arms Task Force (MCATF) up to regimental-size, providing a responsive defense against enemy helicopterborne operations in the division's rear, convoy security, or reinforcing other air defense units. In consolidating the Setter assets, Option X provides for more efficient maintenance management and allows the division commander greater flexibility in reinforcing and supporting MCATF's, rear area defense plans, and the general outpost. On the other hand, with the variety of missions that would routinely require Setter assets at the regimental level, permanent assignment would improve integration. Consolidation of all air defense assets into an air defense battalion as depicted in Option Y has distinct advantages and disadvantages. The arguments for and against consolidation boil down to advocacy for integration or efficiency. Maintenance and training are enhanced through consolidation as is the division commanders ability to mass assets and weight a specific unit in either offensive or defensive operations. The battalion also provides the division a ready-made special staff officer for air defense in the form of the battalion commander. Unlike a company commander, the battalion commander would have the staff to free him for such an assignment and would have the clout to do the job. Integration suffers increasingly the farther the supporting unit is in the chain of command from the supported. With complete consolidation, integration is sure to suffer. There are steps, however, that can be taken to improve it, specifically along the lines of the traditional relationships established between artillery and infantry units. Option Z improves integration with the maneuver elements where it is most critical, but task organizing air defense assets to the regimental level and below will still be required. Although all the options have advantages and disadvantages, each would be a quantum improvement over the present situation. The reasoning behind selecting an option must address the basis of the overall analysis: improving mass, mix, mobility, and integration without being impractical. Improving mass and integration for example, must be tempered with a realistic appraisal of the most limited and costly of Marine Corps assets - Marines. A quick look at Figure 23 will point out that establishing an air defense battalion is very costly personnel-wise. Option Y for example is 41% larger than Option W while providing only 2% more weapons systems. Option Z, the largest in structure being almost twice as large as Option X, the smallest, gives the division only 50% more weapons systems. Option W is the favored structure for the division's air defense assets. It provides the greatest flexibility and improvements in mass, mix, mobility, and integration in relation to the cost in personnel. This option gives the division 105 Stingers and 36 Setters which is considered adequate. Only Option Z, at a cost of 320 more Marines, provides significantly more weapons. All options satisfy the requirement for mix but the preferred option is the only one that mixes weapons at more than one level of command. Again, in terms of mobility, Option W alone structures the highly mobile Setter below the division-level. With this organic mobility each regiment would not have to compete for assets to support missions such as the combat outpost, defense against enemy helicopterborne operations, motorized or mechanized movements, and rapid reinforcement. Except for Option Z which provides an air defense capability directly to the battalion, Option W best integrates air defense units throughout the division. There are disadvantages associated with this option, but they are outweighed by the advantages and can be minimized through other employment techniques. Training and maintenance can not be conducted with as much economy as they might be in a consolidated structure. But the picture is brighter than one might believe. First a case could be made to consolidate every crew-served weapon in support of infantry units based on the training and maintenance argument. The recent restructuring of the infantry regiment to include an organic TOW platoon sets a precedent for decentralizing a previously consolidated capability. Company grade officers all over the Marine Corps are tasked with training units in a decentralized environment. Air defense should be treated no differently. By combining centralized coordination, decentralized execution and appropriate means, training can be conducted effectively and with reasonable economy. Likewise, maintenance of the Stinger and Setter systems can be accomplished at the regimental level. The systems are so highly sophisticated that maintenance at the unit level is, at best, preventive in nature. Stinger and Setter are equipped with built-in test equipment to pinpoint malfunctioning subsystems. Once identified, that part is replaced and shipped to a higher level of maintenance for repair. With this replacement type of maintenance, consolidation is of little or no advantage. Without an air defense battalion there is no readily available officer to serve as a special staff officer for air defense to the commanding general. The air defense company commander, without a staff, will be too actively involved in commanding his company to serve in such a capacity. The requirement is a real one and the answer is to assign a major or lieutenant colonel with MOS 7204 (Air Defense Officer) to the division G-3 as part of the existing air-ground exchange program. Before closing the discussion on the preferred option, command and control of the organizations must be addressed. In all cases the supported ground commander establishes priorities for air defense and plans the employment of his assets. The MACCS continues to pass weapons control conditions through the FSCC/DASC interface on existing nets such as the fire support coordination net, tactical net, or tactical air request net. The fact that the division's assets are terminal, point, self-defense weapons, with a mission to destroy enemy aircraft attacking the unit they are supporting, not simply passing through the area, makes simplified command and control arrangements perfectly acceptable. For this reason there is no requirement for the division's air defense weapons to be integrated into the system whereby the TAOC establishes zones of fire and makes target assignments when coordinating the fires of the air wing's LAAM battalion and FAAD battery. Based on the mission of the division's air defense units and the weapons tight condition (gunners only engage aircraft positively identified as hostile) that they will normally operate under, Marine aviation in general should have no concern with being engaged by friendly weapons because those weapons are not commanded through the MACCS. Additional Recommendations The next step in improving mass and integration is consideration of the current air defense organization in an air wing. With an air defense organization organic to the division, the FAAD battery can concern itself primarily with point defense of the rear areas, generally air wing and FSSG assets. The LAAM battalion will continue to provide longer range, medium altitude, all weather air defense umbrellas from fixed positions over the MAF as a whole. The FAAD battery's five platoons are not sufficient to provide point defense around the numerous vital areas in the MAF's rear. Simply adding more platoons to the existing battery would put an added strain on an already overloaded organization. The battery's size (Table of Organization of eight officers and 269 enlisted Marines) combined with the fact it is subordinate to the MACG and co-equal with squadrons, yet has no staff, puts an unusual burden on it. Mass, mix, and integration can all be improved by establishing a mobile air defense battalion with two Stinger batteries of three platoons each and a Setter battery of three platoons. This would nearly double the assets in the current FAAD battery, develop an easily expandable structure, and provide an organization to effectively and efficiently command and control the assets. Most importantly the battalion has the depth to provide adequate point defense to the predominantly static facilities of the air wing and FSSG with the Stinger and the mobility for convoy protection, defense of engineer operations, and rear area defense with the Setter. Taking the reorganization a step further, the new battalion and the LAAM battalion should be joined to form an air defense regiment/group (Figure 24). This consolidation will significantly improve integration between MAF level air defense units by establishing an organization that has as its sole function and focus, air defense. Using the same argument as formulated in support of the proposal for organic divisional air defense, that air defense units do not have to be administratively assigned to the MACG or anywhere in the air wing to receive control information from and be integrated with MACCS, a case can be made that the newly formed air defense regiment belongs in the FSSG. There is historical precedent as well as logical arguments for this restructuring. Upon introduction of the Hawk missile to the Marine Corps the newly formed LAAM battalion was placed in the Force Support Regiment (FSR), the forerunner of the FSSG. The FSSG is tasked, however, with providing sustained combat service support to a division and an air wing. Air defense is not combat service support. Although the new air defense group supports all the components of a MAGTF, it most appropriately belongs in the air wing. Control of this organization will not differ from that currently exercised over the LAAM battalion and FAAD battery; the assets have simply been expanded and reorganized. Click here to view image Chapter 7 CONCLUSIONS With its current structure, the MAF lacks the ground air defense to counter the threat posed by enemy aviation. It is particularly vulnerable to air attack by Soviet forces. MAF ground assets fail to meet any of the principles of air defense employment: mass, mix, mobility, and integration. Specifically, the LAAM battalion and FAAD battery lack mass and mobility to defend vital areas in the MAF's rear against expected threats from fixed-wing jet aircraft, leaving precious few if any FAAD assets to defend the division's ground maneuver elements against an even greater primary threat, the combat helicopter. Mix is nonexistent when FAAD assets are in support of the division, and throughout the MAF limited to those instances when LAAM battalion and FAAD battery provide assets for the defense of a single vital area. Integration, between air defense units and between supporting and supported units is unsatisfactory. To satisfy these principles, a number of recommendations have been made. First is adoption of the Setter system to improve the mix and mobility of the MAF's air defense weapons. Next is the formation of air defense units in the division, and a restructuring of the assets currently in the air wing to include formation of an air defense group. These initiatives will substantially improve the mass and integration of air defense weapons. For many these would seem to be drastic steps. In light of the requirement to provide a last resort defense of the MAF's resources, especially during the very vulnerable early stages of an amphibious assault, it is by no means drastic, and in fact, too late in coming. It only appears drastic because the present capacity for ground air defense is so inadequate. The cost in terms of dollars, lift, and personnel is significant, but in comparison with potential losses in fuel, supplies, air support, command and control, and armor, it is necessary to foot the bill. Certainly building to the recommended structure will be sequential but programming should begin immediately. In addition to restructuring and expanding air defense units, three other recommendations will have a positive impact on the MAF's air defense. The first is taking steps to fill one of the billets in the division's G-3 with an air defense officer who can function, as an additional duty, as the special staff officer for air defense. The division air officer, who might be a C-130 pilot or A-6 bombadier-navigator, is simply not prepared to provide this expertise, as he is expected to now. Increased emphasis on training the MAF in passive air defense should include techniques of camouflage, deception, concealment, dispersion, mobility, and emissions control. Training should begin by taking every Marine up in a helicopter to see how vulnerable a poorly dispersed and camouflaged unit really is. This point should be stressed on every exercise. Lastly, Marines must be trained in the active air defense measures and techniques for shooting back at enemy aircraft. The effectiveness of such techniques should not be underestimated, and must be emphasized and regularly incorporated into training exercises. NOTES 1 U. S., Soviet/Warsaw Pact Division, Directorate for Intelligence Research, Defense Intelligence Agency, Defense IntelIigence Report: Soviet Air Support to Ground Troops (DDB-1300-147-79), June 1979, p. 1. 2 U. S., Soviet/Warsaw Pact Division, Directorate for Research, Defense Intelligence Agency, Force Structure Summary - USSR, Mongolia, and Eastern Europe (U) (DDB-2680-170-84), May 1984, pp. 10-16. 3 U. S., Headquarters Department of the Army, Field Manual No. 44-3: Air Defense Artillery Employment Chaparral/Vulcan/Stinger, June 1984, p. 2-1. 4 U. S., Defense Intelligence Report: Soviet Air Support to Ground Troops, p. 1. 5 U. S., Department of Defense, Soviet Military Power, April 1984, pp. 54-55. 6 U. S., Soviet/Warsaw Pact Division, Directorate for Research, Defense Intelligence Agency, Soviet Front Fire Support (DDB-1130-8-82), September 1982, p. 61. 7 U. S., Field Manual No. 44-3: Air Defense Artillery Employment Chaparral/Vulcan/Stinger, p. 2-2. 8 Ibid., p. 2-3. 9 U. S., Soviet Front Fire Support (DDB-1130-8-82), pp. 59-61. 10 U. S., Field Manual No. 44-3: Air Defense Artillery Employment Chaparral/Vulcan/Stinger, p. 2-4. 11 U. S., Headquarters Department of the Army, Field Manual No. 100-2-3: The Soviet Army; Troops, Organization and Equipment, July 1984, p. 4-123. 12 U. S., Soviet/Warsaw Pact Division, Directorate for Research, Defense Intelligence Agency, Soviet Divisional Organizational Guide (DDB-1100-333-82), July 1982, pp. 9-10, 80-81. 13 U. S., Soviet Front Fire Support (DDB-1130-8-82), pp. 60-61. 14 U. S., Field Manual No. 100-2-3: The Soviet Army; Troops, Organization and Equipment, p. 4-114. 15 Ibid., pp. 4-123, 4-125. 16 U. S., Force Structure Summary - USSR, Mongolia, and Eastern Europe (U) (DDB-2680-170-84), pp. 15, 26-33. 17 U. S., Headquarters Department of the Army, Field Manual No. 100-2-1: The Soviet Army; Operations and Tactics, July 1984, pp. 12-8, 12-9. 18 Ibid., p. 12-9. 19 U. S., Soviet Front Fire Support (DDB-1130-8-82), p. 60. 20 U. S., Field Manual No. 100-2-1: The Soviet Army; Operations and Tactics, p. 12-6. 21 U. S., Defense Intelligence Report: Soviet Air Support to Ground Troops (DDB-1300-147-79), p. 8. 22 Ibid., pp. 9-12. 23 Ibid., pp. 19-20. 24 Ibid., p. 20. 25 Ibid. 26 Ibid. 27 U. S., Field Manual No. 100-2-1: The Soviet Army; Operations and Tactics, p. 12-3. 28 U. S., Headquarters U. S. Marine Corps, Fleet Marine Force Manual 5-1: Marine Aviation, February 1983, p. 6. 29 Ibid. 30 Ibid., p. 7. 31 Ibid., p. 6. 32 Ibid., p. 7. 33 Ibid., pp. 47-49. 34 Ibid., pp. 50-51. 35 Ibid., pp. 51-52. 36 Ibid., pp. 43-44. 37 Interview with Master Sergeant Michael W. Joneas, USMC, Development Center, MCDEC, 24 January 1985. 38 U. S., Headquarters Department of the Army, Field Manual No. 44-1-2: Air Defense Artillery Reference Handbook, June 1984, p. 2-12. 39 Interview with Major John E. Ryan, USMC, Development Center, MCDEC, 16 January 1985. 40 U. S., Fleet Marine Force Manual 5-1: Marine Aviation, pp. 53-54. 41 U. S., Marine Corps Development and Education Command, Instructional Publication 5-7: Fleet Marine Force Aviation, September 1984, p. 6. 42 U. S., Headquarters U. S. Marine Corps, Fleet Marine Force Manual 5-SC: Employment of Forward Area Air Defense Battery, January 1980, pp. 14-16. 44 U. S., Field Manual No. 44-1-2: Air Defense Artillery Reference Handbook, p. 1-12. 45 Ibid., p. 1-14. 46 U. S., Headquarters Department of the Army, Field Manual No. 44-18: Air Defense Artillery Employment Stinger, September 1981, p. 2-3. 47 Ibid. 48 U. S., Field Manual No. 44-1-2: Air Defense Artillery Reference Handbook, pp. 1-12 to 1-13. 49 U. S., Headquarters U. S. Marine Corps, Fleet Marine Force Manual 5-5: Antiair Warfare, July 1980, p. 34. 50 U. S., Field Manual No. 44-1-2: Air Defense Artillery Reference Handbook, pp. A-1 to A-2. 51 U. S., Field Manual No. 44-18: Air Defense Artillery Employment Stinger, p. 3-3. 52 U. S., Field Manual No. 44-1-2: Air Defense Artillery Reference Handbook, p. 6-6. 53 Ibid., pp. 1-4 to 1-7. 54 Ibid., pp. 1-14 to 1-17. 55 U. S., Field Manual No. 100-2-3: The Soviet Army; Troops, Organization and Equipment, pp. 4-34, 4-109. 56 Ibid., p. 5-103. 57 Ibid., P. 5-93. 58 Ibid., p. 5-101. 59 Ibid., p. 5-100. 60 U. S., Field Manual 44-3: Air Defense Artillery Employment Chaparral/Vulcan/Stinger, p. 6-3. 61 Ibid., pp. 6-3 to 6-4. 62 Ibid., p. 6-3. 63 U. S., Fleet Marine Force Manual 5-5: Antiair Warfare, p. 43. 64 U. S., Fleet Marine Force Manual 5-1: Marine Aviation, p. 104. 65 U. S., Marine Corps Development and Education Command, Marine Corps Force Structure (1980-1989) Study, December 1980, pp. 11-57 to 11-69. 66 U. S., Field Manual 44-3: Air Defense Artillery Employment Chaparral/Vulcan/Stinger, p. 4-4. 67 "Setter Proposed for Light Divisions," Defence Minister and Chief of Staff, No. 5/1984, p. 57. 68 Ibid. 69 Interview with Major John E. Ryan, USMC, Development Center, MCDEC, 16 January 1985. 70 Interview with Master Sergeant Leland K. Deuel, USMC, Development Center, MCDEC, 24 January 1985. 71 U. S., Headquarters U. S. Marine Corps, Fleet Marine Force Manual 10-1: Communications, October 1980, p. 3-1. 72 U. S., Fleet Marine Force Manual 5-5C: Employment of Forward Area Air Defense Battery, p. 3. 73 Ibid., pp. 17-19. BIBLIOGRAPHY A. PRIMARY SOURCES 1. Responses by Major Commands to the CG, MCDEC Request for Comments on Marine Corps Force Structure (1980-1989) Study CG, First MarBde msg 202017Z February 1981. CG, First MarDiv msg 160058Z October 1980. CG, FMFLant ltr 3:JRB:alw 1000 of 24 February 1981. CG, Fourth MarDiv ltr 5:LBM:ewb 1000 of 10 October 1980. CG, MCAGCC ltr 3/RES/cls 1000 of 13 February 1981. CG, Second MarDiv ltr 3/BEG/pjr 3900 of 11 February 1981. CG, Third MAW ltr 38:HMW:sls 5000 of 8 October 1980. 2. Interviews Schessler, Lieutenant Colonel John, USMC. HQMC. Interview, 15 January 1984. Clymer, Major Sylvester P., USMC. MCDEC Liaison Officer, U. S. Army Missile Command. Interview, 24 January 1984. Ryan, Major John E., USMC. Development Center, MCDEC. Interview, 16 January 1984. Deuel, Master Sergeant Leland K., USMC. Development Center, MCDEC. Interview, 24 January 1984. Joneas, Master Sergeant Michael J., USMC. Development Center, MCDEC. Interview, 24 January 1984. 3. Document Setter Weapon System Specification, Prepared for Contract: DAAE07-83-C-R048, 31 May 1984. B. SECONDARY SOURCES 1. Study Marine Corps Force Structure (1980-1989) Study, December 1980. 2. Text of Briefing Mobile Weapon System (MWS), 11 May 1983. 3. Pamphlets Avenger, Boeing Corporation. Improved Hawk, Raytheon Company. Setter, U. S. Army Missile Command. 25mm Air Defense Turret for Light Armored Vehicle, General Electric Corporation. 4. Periodical "Setter Proposed for Light Divisions." Defence Minister and Chief of Staff, No.5/1984, p. 57. 5. Newpapers "Light Division Air Defense Weapon Debuts." Army Times. 10 December 1984, p. 30. "Vulcan Gun to Get New Fire Control System." Army Times. 3 December 1984, p. 26. 6. Manuals U. S., Department of Defense, Soviet Military Power, April 1984. U. S., Headquarters Department of the Army, Field Manual No. 44-1-2: Air Defense Artillery Reference Handbook, June 1984. U. S., Headquarters Department of the Army, Field Manual No. 44-3: Air Defense Artillery Employment Chaparral/Vulcan/ Stinger, June 1984. U. S., Headquarters Department of the Army, Field Manual No. 44-8: Small Unit Self-Defense Against Air Attack, December 1981. U. S., Headquarters Department of the Army, Field Manual No. 44-18: Air Defense Artillery Employment Stinger, September 1981. U. S., Headquarters Department of the Army, Field Manual No. 100-2-1: The Soviet Army; Operations and Tactics, July 1984. U. S., Headquarters Department of the Army, Field Manual No. 100-2-3: The Soviet Army; Troops, Organization and Equip- ment, July 1984. U. S., Headquarters U. S. Marine Corps, Fleet Marine Force Manual 5-1: Marine Aviation, February 1983. U. S., Headquarters U. S. Marine Corps, Fleet Marine Force Manual 5-5: Antiair Warfare, July 1980. U. S., Headquarters U. S. Marine Corps, Fleet Marine Force Manual 5-5C: Employment of Forward Area Air Defense Battery, January 1980. U. S., Headquarters U. S. Marine Corps, Fleet Marine Force Manual 10-1: Communications, October 1980. U. S., Soviet/Warsaw Pact Division, Directorate for Research, Defense Intelligence Agency, Soviet Divisional Organizational Guide (DDB-1100-33-82), July 1982. U. S., Soviet/Warsaw Pact Division, Directorate for Research, Defense Intelligence Agency, Soviet Front Fire Support (DDB-1130-8-82), September 1982. U. S., Soviet/Warsaw Pact Division, Directorate for Research, Defense Intelligence Agency, Soviet Air Support to Ground Troops (DDB-1300-147-79), June 1979. U. S., Soviet/Warsaw Pact Division, Directorate for Research, Defense Intelligence Agency, Force Structure Summary - USSR, Mongolia, and Eastern Europe (U) (DDB-2680-170-84), May 1984.
