The MAGTF Weak Link - Rear Area Security CSC 1984 SUBJECT AREA National Security THE MAGTF WEAK LINK - REAR AREA SECURITY Submitted to United States Marine Corps Command and Staff College Quantico, Virginia in Partial Fulfillment of Requirements for Written Communication Major B. M. Youngs United States Marine Corps April 6, 1984 THE MAGTF WEAK LINK - REAR AREA SECURITY Outline Thesis statement: To be victorious in future conflicts the Marine Corps must increase its awareness of the threat to rear areas, improve training methods in rear area security and organize the MAGTF with adequate resources to provide for its rear area security. I. Introduction II. The Threat A. World War II historical examples B. Airborne, Reconnaissance and Division Units C. Recent Developments - OMG, Air Assault Brigades and Spetsnaz III. Current Doctrine A. Army view - FM 31-85 and FM 100-5 B. Marine Corps view - LFM 02 and FMFM 6-1 C. Problem areas in Marine Corps doctrine IV. Proposals A. Threat awareness B. Combat training for CSS personnel C. Establish a rear area security force V. Conclusion THE MAGTF WEAK LINK - REAR AREA SECURITY It is generally accepted that the U. S. Marine Corps must be capable of defeating enemies that will outnumber it in future conflicts. The next conflict will indeed provide the Marine Corps with significant challenges and questions. A major issue is the question of rear area security: Who pro- vides it and how should it be accomplished? Presently, rear area security has no clearly articulated doctrine. "An army marches on its stomach,"1 and indeed it may have in 1814 when Napoleon allegedly wrote these words, but surely even the brilliant Napoleon would be amazed were he to see all the logistical support required by our Marine Air Ground Task Force (MAGTF). In his last posture statement as Commandant of the Marine Corps, General R. H. Barrow stated, "The Marine Corps remains ready to respond to all missions....forward deployed Marine Air Ground Task Forces (MAGTF's) are the root source of our versatility, flexibility and readiness."2 The capability of the Marine Corps to win future con- flicts will depend largely upon not only how well we fight, but more importantly, how well we can logistically sustain ourselves. MAGTF's are by their nature equipment heavy and require large logistic support systems. The MAGTF rear area, from which the logistic support operates, is potentially our "achilles heel". Rear area security has been a continuing problem for armies throughout history. Today is no different; the capa- bility of the Soviet Union to inflict damage to our rear areas is a serious threat. Those threats and actions within the MAGTF rear area which impede or deny the orderly flow of supplies and services to the forward maneuver elements affect directly the ability of those maneuver elements to accomplish their mission. The U. S. Army's FM 100-5, Operations, considered to be the capstone publication for U. S. maneuver warfare, specifi- cally warns: "Just as we plan to fight in the enemy's rear area, so he plans to fight in ours. The enemy will carefully coordinate his attack in our rear area with his actions in the main battle area....the object of these rear area attacks is to destroy critical links, to cause disrup- tion, and to degrade the capability of forces dedicated to support or reinforce the main effort."3 To be victorious in future conflicts, the Marine Corps must increase its awareness of the threat to rear areas, improve training methods in rear area security and organize the MAGTF with adequate resources to provide for its rear area security. Perhaps at the outset, some terms should be defined. The rear area is the area in the rear of the combat and forward areas.4 Rear area security (RAS) is defined as those measures taken prior to, during, and/or after an enemy airborne attack, sabotage action, infiltration, guerrilla action, and/or initiation of psychological or propaganda warfare to minimize the effects thereof.5 Rear area protec- tion (RAP) includes all measures taken to prevent interrup- tions of combat support (CS) and combat service support (CSS) operations.6 A historical review of rear area operations reveals that the Soviet Union has traditionally been successful in employing forces in the enemy's rear area. These rear area operations were conducted to disrupt or destroy enemy combat support and combat service support operations and as economy of force measures to force enemy commanders to divert tactical or frontline units in defense of their rear areas. Successful rear area operations in military history serve to emphasize the importance and magnitude of the rear area security problem. In 1943, two nights prior to the Russian counteroffensive, Russian partisan forces cut the German rail lines of communi- cations in over 8,400 places. This operation rendered nearly 7,000 miles of rail lines useless for the needed movement of German reinforcements during the critical phase of the German defense. Also, in Byelorussia, during the summer of 1944 the Russian Army organized a partisan force of over 370,000 men; to counter this problem, the German Army was forced to employ nearly 13 divisions in a rear area security role.7 More recently, in Vietnam, essential manpower requirements were pulled from combat support and combat service support units to occupy static defensive positions. Armored combat power and air assets were diverted from offensive operations to provide convoy security and line of communication (LOC) security. Even with the dedication of vast combat resources, the North Vietnamese and Viet Cong guerrillas succeeded in harrassing, disrupting and, on occasion, destroying rear area support operations. These historical examples have pointed out some interesting and supportive facts about rear area operations: (1) rear area security has often failed to receive command attention propor- tionate to the threat; (2) rear area operations have histori- cally been an effective tactic; (3) rear area operations are relatively constant and are conducted to disrupt logistical support, to withdraw combat troops from operations against opposing regular forces, and to commit reserves to the extent that they cannot influence regular operations. The Soviet Army has had tremendous experience with rear area operations and is cognizant of their effectiveness. Having stated the historical significance of rear area opera- tions, it is now appropriate to examine briefly the threat imposed by our most likely enemy in future conflicts. Undoubtedly, there are those who doubt that the Marine Corps will ever be engaged in combat against Soviet or Warsaw Pact forces. They may be correct. However, a cursory review of Marine Corps contingency plans reveals the possibility of Marines supporting naval campaigns in Norway or protecting critical choke points, i.e., the La Peruse Straits or guarding U. S. availability to Middle East oil assets. The fact remains, there are numerous instances where Marines could reasonably find themselves facing Soviet or Warsaw Pact forces or their trained surrogates.8 If the Marine Corps does fight Soviet forces or their surrogates, it will be facing a definite threat to its rear areas and must be prepared to engage and defeat this threat. The lessons of World War II are still vivid in the minds of the Soviet military hierarchy. The two principles of war which seem to dominate Soviet military doctrine are: offensive and mass. Western strategists and tacticians are continuously working on methods to defeat or counter these Soviet capabilities. The immediate question should be, "What is the threat today?" The principles of war, economy of force (the recipro- cal of mass) and the offensive, are the driving factors in the importance of rear area operations as a force multiplier in Soviet doctrine today. The evolution of Soviet doctrine for the employment of ground forces developed rapidly in post World War II. Soviet conventional ground forces were trained and equipped to maneuver motorized rifle and tank units in seizing objectives deep in the enemy rear areas. Soviet doctrine continues to emphasize the offensive and high-speed penetration of enemy defenses and combat formations to seize deep objectives. The Soviet desant concept9 advocates employing forces in the enemy rear areas or flanks. This concept is a consol- idation of Soviet thinking in the employment of airborne, heliborne, and amphibious forces in economy of force opera- tions to disrupt the enemy rear area. The desant concept is an accessory to the principle of the offensive because its primary purpose is to support the advance of the Soviet regular ground forces. The Soviet forces involved in rear area operations would be drawn primarily from three sources: airborne units, long- range reconnaissance units from tank and motorized rifle units, and designated combined arms units (also called forward detachments) from tank and motorized rifle units.10 The Soviet Union maintains the world's largest airborne force which is organized into seven active divisions.11 The most important feature of these airborne divisions and their subordinate units is that, once landed, they are a light- armor mechanized force. The BMD is the airborne equivalent of the Soviet Infantry combat fighting vehicle BMP, and, as such, provides Soviet airborne forces a significant mobility and firepower capability. Soviet doctrine assigns three basic missions to airborne forces: (1) strategic; (2) operational; and (3) tactical.12 The primary difference in these missions is the depth of operation and the nature of the objectives. Of importance to this paper are the operational and tactical missions. Operational missions in support of the Front (largest Soviet fighting organization) are executed under the control of the Front commander. These missions include seizing bridgeheads, airfields, road junctions, as well as destruction of enemy logistical facilities. Operating in the enemy rear areas, these units prevent the effective and timely employment of reserve forces and generally disrupt the enemy's offensive and defensive posture. Standard procedure for operational missions of this nature would involve dropping a regimental- sized unit up to 300km beyond the FEBA in support of a Front offensive. Ground forces linkup would occur within two to three days with the airborne forces. The tactical mission concept includes battalion to regimental-sized operations up to 100km beyond the FEBA in support of an Army offensive. Linkup in these operations is planned within 48 hours. The tactical mission has objectives similar to operational missions, but on a smaller scale. Tactical long-range reconnaissance units are found in reconnaissance battalions of motorized rifle and tank divisions, The mission of these units is to conduct ground reconnaissance of the enemy rear area up to 100km beyond the FEBA. These battalions are capable of operating in an area of 50-60km wide on three or four axes. Six to eight armored reconnaissance squads, each consisting of two to three BRDM's and/or BMP-R's and motorcycles, are used. Their primary mission is reconnaissance, but they may attack small targets of opportunity or even conduct sabotage operations against logistic units. In addition, long-range reconnaissance patrols are often flown by helicopter. They can operate throughout a rear area to locate both reserve force and command post locations and to recon possible avenues of approach.13 The special combined arms unit, also called a forward detachment, is typically composed of a motorized rifle battalion with tanks, self-propelled artillery, and air defense weapons. This detachment is a small, highly mobile and firepower intensive unit. These forward detachments take advantage of a gap in the enemy front and penetrate deep into the enemy rear area. The objectives of these small independent units vary according to the situation. These detachments are key elements in the successful linkup with airborne and heli- copter forces.14 How valid a threat is a forward detachment? According to Victor Suvorov, author of Inside the Soviet Army, one battalion in each Soviet regiment is held ready to assume the mission of a forward detachment at all times.15 In conjunction with the Soviet forces previously mentioned three additional organizations have been recently identified as having the primary mission of operating in an enemy's rear area. The three organizations are: the Spetsnaz; Air Assault Brigades; and the Operational Maneuver Group (OMG). The Spetsnaz are the special purpose or unconventional warfare forces of the Soviet Union. Each Combined Arms Army and Tank Army has a Spetsnaz Company totalling approximately 105 personnel. Depending upon its assigned mission, the company can operate as an entity or it can be fragmented into smaller groups and teams. In addition, each Front has a Spetsnaz Brigade of approximately 1300 highly-skilled, elite troops.16 Spetsnaz troops are all volunteers and are superbly trained to operate in a clandestine manner behind enemy lines. The Soviets consider that Spetsnaz operations can only be successful if they take place simultaneously on a massive scale with other operations. Spetsnaz units are placed in areas where there are numerous high-value targets (i.e., command posts, logistical facilities). The Soviet Air Assault Brigades represent a significant increase in the Front level combat capability. These brigades have a combination of battalions which are parachute and BMD- equipped. The air assault brigade is capable of undertaking a myriad of missions because of its unique structure, mobility, and firepower. The brigade consists of three battalions with approximately 2,500 personnel; the battalions are employed by airborne drop or by helicopter. The missions assigned the heliborne battalions include neutralization of command posts, seizure of key terrain, and destruction of logistics sites.17 Soviet doctrine for the employment of heliborne forces states that those forces can be inserted anywhere in the tactical depth of the enemy's defense or combat formations up to 50km from friendly forces. The Operational Maneuver Group (OMG) appears to be a large one-way raiding force, composed of infantry, tanks, artillery, air defense and a heavy air assault component.18 The Soviets believe that successful OMG operations could severely disrupt the enemy rear area, thereby increasing the chances of maintaining the rapid advance of Army and Front level forces. The OMG is a specially tailored combat force with no fixed structure. The OMG has three main missions, all of which are directed at the enemy's rear area: (1) destruction of enemy weapons systems; (2) destruction of the enemy's in-depth defense or offensive combat formation (actions by the OMG would include destruction of command and control positions, logistics assets and surprise attacks on flank and rear area units); (3) seizure of deep key terrain and critical objectives. It should be readily apparent that the Soviet threat to rear area security is quite significant. Soviet operations in the rear area will not of themselves be of sufficient scale to bring about a Soviet victory. One major function of all the forces mentioned is to reduce the enemy's capacity to resist, thus making it easier for the main attacking forces to accomplish their missions. Having described the Soviet threat to rear areas, it would be appropriate to review what current doctrine provides the conduct of rear area security operations. U. S. Army doctrine is found in FM 31-85, Rear Area Protection (RAP) Operations. Though issued in 1970, it does provide a basic philosophy of RAS and eight principles which are still valid: austerity, command, economy of force, inte- grated protection, offensive, responsiveness, supervision, and priority of risks.19 The cornerstone of Army doctrine is FM 100-5, Operations, which provides information on Rear Area Protection and gives a concise and meaningful resume of the threat as it is projected and adequately outlines responsibilities for rear and combat operations (RACO). Very little mention is to be found in any Marine Corps FMFMs or Operational Handbooks (OH's) about rear area security operations. The "cornerstone document" of the Marine Corps MAGTF, FMFM 0-1, Marine Air-Ground Task Force Doctrine, makes no mention of rear area security or rear area combat opera- tions. It is this author's impression that the problem of rear area security has been wished away by continually denying the existence of a formidable threat and by giving the responsibility for rear area security to the CSS commander; the CSS commander, however, does not have the means to accom- plish this mission. The subject of rear area security in an amphibious operation is addressed in Landing Force Manual (LFM)02, Doctrine for Landing Forces. The overall responsibility for the security of the rear area of the landing force is the commander of the landing force (CLF). He is responsible for the integration of local security plans into the overall area plan. This is clearly oriented for defensive operations. Rear area security is also addressed in FMFM 6-1, The Marine Division. This source discusses in detail the concept of rear area security, the planning procedures and responsi- bilities for rear area security, forces available and organi- zation of forces for rear area security. Even though the above areas are addressed, the primary focus of the information provided is on amphibious landing and defensive situations; nothing is mentioned about security for logistic elements during offensive operations. The MAGTF is not a permanent organization; it is task organized for a specific mission. Forward deployed MAGTF's are capable of rapid response to a number of contingencies and provide a measured application of power to prescribed contingency situations. The composition of MAGTF's may vary, but the organizational structure will include a single command element with a ground combat element, aviation combat element, and combat service support element as subordinate co-equal elements.20 The Marine Corps is tasked with responding to contin- gencies throughout the world against numerous possible adversaries. The most significant threat is the Soviet Union and its combined arms force. If the Marine Corps is to survive and win future conflicts against combined arms threats, we must utilize all our combat assets. The Marine Corps Combined Arms Task Force (MCATF) is the employment of tank assets with infantry to accomplish a specific mission.21 The MCATF is anticipated to operate independently for long periods and should be more or less self-sufficient. Because the MCATF is a mechanized operation, it is characterized by the rapid pace of operations and a reliance on machines; it, therefore, implies increased logistical requirements and combat service support operations take on increased importance. As stated previously, the MCATF's are formed from the MAGTF, primarily from the ground combat element (GCE), but also contain two other elements, the combat service support element (CSSE) and the air combat element (ACE). The ACE may provide helicopter support to the MCATF and also a detachment to the CSSE. The MAGTF CSSE provides service support direclty to the MCATF or forms a Mobile Combat Service Support Detachment (MCSSD) to move with and support the MCATF. In 1977 a series of exercises were initiated after the Commandant of the Marine Corps approved the concept of mobile assault regiments which would be task-organized as needed (MCATF's).22 In January 1981, a MCATF-Phase IV exercise was conducted at Twenty-Nine Palms, California. The Phase IV exercise was to validate and improve the current MCATF doctrine. A major deficiency identified during the exercise was the sustainability, survivability and mobility of the CSS forces.23 "Supply lines are particularly sensitive, since all petrol and ammunition, indispensable requirements for the battle, must pass along them. Hence everything possible must be done to protect one's own supply lines and to upset or better still, cut the enemy's. Operations in the enemy's supply [rear] area will lead immediately to his breaking off the battle elsewhere, since as I have indicated supplies are the fundamental premise of the battle and must be given the priority of protection."24 As Rommel pointed out, the security of the lines of communications and logistics elements is a key factor to survivability on the battlefield. It is obvious that the MCATF today must devote attention to protecting its logistics tail. Other findings from the Phase IV exercise which indicate problems for MCATF's in future conflicts are: 1. Security forces must be provided and trained in the protection of CSS elements. 2. A command and control capability is required by the MCSSD in order to request supporting arms and to coordinate an attachment of security forces if separated from the maneuver element (GCE). 3. In mechanized operations there will likely be no secure rear area. Sinde CSS elements will continue to be forward to react to CSS requirements, these elements (MCSSD) are vulnerable to encountering enemy, especially specialized units with missions to attack rear areas.25 After examining the threat to rear areas and comparing the threat to present Marine Corps doctrine and philosophy, the following problem areas surfaced: 1. The "threat" to rear areas is not perceived as a significant problem. 2. CSS personnel do not receive sufficient combat training to defend themselves effectively. 3. The plan to use combat forces from Marine Corps forward maneuver units as rear area security severely reduces forward combat power. 4. Plans to effect rear area security normally occurs only when units are in a defensive posture. 5. The plan to use the reserve force as the rear area security force relegates the effectiveness of the reserve force employment. To make Marine Corps rear area security a distinct advantage instead of the weak link it is presently, the following proposals must be implemented, the threat posed to rear areas is formidable. An education and threat aware- ness training program must be instituted immediately. The first step in solving a problem is acknowledging that the problem exists. Acknowledgement that a rear area threat exists in offensive operations as well as defensive operations is mandatory. CSS personnel comprise the majority of rear area manpower assets. The CSS units' success and survival on the battle- field will be directly proportional to the knowledge and skills learned in basic infantry training and honed in subse- quent field exercises. The present lack of field combat training for CSS units is attributable to command desires to keep CSS personnel involved in their primary jobs (i.e., mechanic, logistics clerk, etc.) and state that sufficient time is unavailable for combat training: "It is not my mission to fight." A reasonable balance of combat training and military occupational specialty (MOS) training is required to ensure that CSS personnel can survive and carry out their battlefield missions. Combat training for CSS personnel must receive a positive endorsement at the highest command levels. One policy, if instituted, which would have an immediate, positive impact is to require all Marines (regardless of their MOS) to attend infantry training school subsequent to recruit training. For survival it is time to make the old adage "Every Marine is a rifleman," a reality. No longer can the Marine Corps plan to use forward combat units as rear area security. This practice dilutes offensive combat power and is now unfeasible when considering the reduced size of the current infantry battalion. The infantry battalion is now equipment-heavy and manpower-light; the additional loss of manpower for rear area security cannot be viable. Also, because the Marine Corps will probably be fighting a numerically superior foe, it must maintain a potent and mobile reserve force. To assign a reserve force the secondary or additional mission of rear area security essentially negates the effectiveness of the force. The present MAGTF structure does not possess adequate capabilities to counter a rear area threat force effectively. The time has arrived to stop insisting on the importance of rear area security on one hand, while providing no units to do the job on the other hand, or expecting the mission to be accomplished by make shift units on an additional duty basis. The MAGTF must establish a rear area security force (RASF) with the specific task of rear area security. Based upon a review of the current Marine Corps Force Structure, the Military Police Company, Headquarters and Service Battalion, Force Service Support Group (FSSG) must be upgraded to battalion strength and be placed under the direct control of FSSG commander. This new battalion would then be Security Battalion, FSSG and would be structured with a Headquarters and Service Company, a Military Police Company and three security companies. Such a structure would facilitate rear area security for deployed MAGTF's (i.e., MAU, MAB and MAF) as follows: 1. Provide a continual capability to prevent interrup- tion of CSS operations by a hostile force. 2. Provide one unit capable of planning, rehearsing and executing detailed and simple plans for rear area security. 3. Provide the capability to mass and position combat power at any location in the MAGTF rear area. 4. Provide a single commander, responsible to the MAGTF commander, the responsibility of maintaining rear area security throughout the MAGTF rear area. The Security Battalion, specifically the security companies, must have increased manpower and firepower assets to accomplish its mission. Because of the significant armor threat, organic weapons must include antitank weapons (TOW, Dragon), machine guns (.50 caliber and possibly the new Mark-19, 40mm), and an organic mortar capability. This RASF must also have mobility for its mission with either the Light- Armored Vehicle (LAV) or the high mobility multipurpose wheeled vehicle (HMMWV). Although the HMMWV lacks armor protection, it still remains survivable because of its high mobility and speed. The proposals provided herein do not resolve all the questions concerning the critical issue of rear area security The fact remains, however, that Marine Corps units have rear areas which are logistically "heavy" and the potential threat to these areas will not be diminished. The security problems associated with rear areas are significant but can be overcome. By acknowledging the threat and its capabilities, through proper initial/continued combat training of CSS personnel and proper employment of the RASF, the Marine Corps can successfully frustrate the enemy's attempts to disrupt its rear area operations. Haphazard methods, insufficient and poorly trained forces, and indifferent attitudes are open invitations for disaster. These proposals will not diminish a MAGTF's offensive capability, but they will enhance its overall survivability and thereby provide the opportunity for greater successes. FOOTNOTES 1John Bartlett (ed.), Familiar Quotations (Boston: Little, Brown and Company, 1955), p. 400. 2General R. H. Barrow,"Congress and the Corps CMC FY-84 Posture Statement," Marine Corps Gazette, April, 1983, p. 47. 3U.S., Department of the Army, Operations, FM 100-5 (Washington: Headquarters Department of the Army, 1982), p. 14-1. 4Department of Defense, Dictionary of Military and Associated Terms, JCS Pub 1 (Washington, D.C.: The Joint Chiefs of Staff, June 1979), p. 285. 5Ibid, p. 285. 6U.S., Department of the Army, Rear Area Protection (RAP) Operations, FM 31-85 (Washington, D.C.: U.S. Government Printing Office, July 1970), p. 2-3. 7Lt.Col. L. M. Marr, USA, "Rear Area Security," Military Review, May, 1951, p. 61. 8CWO2Bryan N. Lavender, USMC, "The Threat to Rear Areas" unpublished paper (MCDEC, Quantico, Va.), January, 1984, p. 1-1. 9C. N. Donnelly, "Operations in the Enemy Rear, Soviet Doctrine and Tactics," International Defense Review, January, 1980, p. 37. 10Ibid, pp. 37-39. 11Maj. J. H. Brusstar, USA, The Soviet Airborne Forces (Washington, D.C.: Defense Intelligence Agency, 1 February, 1982), p. 3. 12Ibid, pp. 3-4. 13Donnelly, op.cit., p. 38. 14Lavender, op.cit., p. 1-4. 15Ibid., p. 1-5. 16Viktor Suvorov, "Spetsnaz: The Soviet Union's Special Forces," Military Review, March, 1984, pp. 31-35. 17Maj. R. E. Bort, "Air Assault Brigades: New Element in the Soviet Desant Force Structure," Military Review, October, 1983, pp. 22-25. 18C. J. Dick,"Soviet Operational Manoeuvre Groups - a closer look," International Defense Review, August, 1983, pp. 770-776. 19FM 31-85, pp. 3-1 - 3-2. 20U.S. Marine Corps, Marine Air-Ground Task Force Doctrine, FMFM 0-1 (Washington, D.C.: Headquarters, United States Marine Corps, August, 1979), pp. 2-2 - 2-3. 21MCDEC, USMC, Mechanized Combined Arms Task Forces (MCATF), OH 9-3A (Quantico, March, 1980), pp. 3-7. 22U.S. Marine Corps, Decisions and Designs, Inc. for the Marine Corps Development and Education Command, Post-Exercise Evaluation for the Mechanized Combined Arms Task Force - Phase IV Operation, p. ES-1. 23Ibid, p. 61. 24Edwin Rommel, The Rommel Papers, edited by B.H. Liddell Hart (New York: Harcourt Brace and Company, 1953), p. 197. 25USMC, Decisions and Designs, Inc., op.cit., pp. 97-99. BIBLIOGRAPHY Barrow, R.H., "Congress and the Corps CMC FY-84 Posture State- ment," Marine Corps Gazette, April, 1983. Bartlett, John, ed. Familiar Quotations. Boston: Little, Brown and Company, 1955. Bort, R.E., "Air Assault Brigades: New Element in Soviet Desant Force Structure," Military Review, October, 1983. Brusstar, J.H., ed. The Soviet Airborne Forces. Washington, D.C.: Defense Intelligence Agency, 1 February, 1982. Department of Defense, Dictionary of Military and Associated Terms, JCS Pub 1. Washington, D.C., Headquarters, Department of the Army, 1979. Dick, C.J., "Soviet Operational Manoeuvre Groups - a closer look,'" International Defense Review, August, 1983. Donnelly, C.N., "Operations in the Enemy Rear, Soviet Doctrine and Tactics," International Defense Review, January, 1980. Lavender, B.N., "The Threat to Rear Areas," unpublished professional article, MCDEC, Quantico, Va., January, 1984. Marr, L.M., "Rear Area Security," Military Review, May, 1951. MCDEC, USMC, Mechanized Combined Arms Task Forces (MCATF), OH 9-3A, Quantico, March, 1980. MCDEC, USMC, Fleet Marine Force IP 1-4, Quantico, December, 1982. Rommel, Edwin, The Rommel Papers, edited by B.H. Liddell Hart. New York: Harcourt, Bruce and Company, 1953. Saunders, W.N., "Logistic Support for Mechanized Units," Marine Corps Gazette, December, 1982. Suvorov, Viktor, "Spetsnaz: The Soviet Union's Special Forces," Military Review, March, 1984. U.S Department of the Army. Rear Area Protection (RAP) Operations, FM 31-85. Washington, D.C., July, 1970. U.S. Department of the Army. Armored and Mechanized Division Operations, FM 71-100. Washington, D.C., September, 1978. U.S. Department of the Army. Operations, FM 100-5. Washington, D.C., 1982. U.S. Department of the Army. Soviet Army Operations. U.S. Army Intelligence and Security Command, Washington, D.C., April, 1978. U.S. Marine Corps. The Marine Division, FMFM 6-1. Washington, D.C., March, 1978. U.S. Marine Corps. Marine Air-Ground Task Force Doctrine, FMFM 0-1. Washington, D.C., August, 1979. U.S. Marine Corps. Doctrine for Landing Forces, LFM 02 Final Draft. Quantico, Va., August, 1971. U.S. Marine Corps, Decisions and Designs, Inc. Post-Exercise Evaluation for the Mechanized Combined Arms Task Force - Phase IV Operations, MCDEC, Quantico, Va., August, 1981.
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