Death March: The Other View CSC 1984 SUBJECT AREA History DEATH MARCH: THE OTHER VIEW Submitted to Mr. Rudolph V. Wiggins, Ph. D. in Partial Fulfillment of Requirements for Written Communications The Marine Corps Command and Staff College Quantico, Virginia Major G. J. Wright United States Marine Corps April 6, 1984 DEATH MARCH: THE OTHER VIEW OUTLINE Thesis: The brutality of the Japanese guards as they moved POWs north along the Bataan peninsula can not be denied. There were, however, many con- ditions unknown to most that led to the death of thousands of prisoners that cannot and should not be attributed to the Japanese soldier. I. A Place in History A. Futility and its aftermath B. The other view II. General King's Dilemma A. The surrender B. An unfulfilled promise III. The Death March A. The undeniable brutality B. Tragic conditions 1. Training differences 2. Large numbers of prisoners 3. Limited quantities of food, water and supplies 4. Poor physical condition of the prisoners 5. Limited medical facilities 6. High incidene of disease 7. Failure of the Japanese evacuation plan 8. Low prisoner morale IV. Let the Dead Bury the Dead DEATH MARCH: THE OTHER VIEW by Major Gary J. Wright, USMC A Place In History Most battles have a place in history. Some are remem- bered for the tactical genious displayed by a resourceful general. Still others hold their place in annals for their daring maneuver of forces snatching victory at the very last moment. Yet other battles are significant in their futility. In part, the defense of the Philippines during World War II falls into this latter category. The invasion force swept over Luzon is such large numbers and against such an ill-prepared force that the outcome was known before the first casualty fell victim. Notwithstanding, the signifi- cance of the Philippine struggle was its aftermath. The move- ment of prisoners of war became the historical post-mortem that separates this battle from all others. This movement of prisoners became known as the Bataan "Death March" and was historically infamous for the meaning- less loss of life. Most considered Japanese inhumanity to be central to the merciless death of POWs. The brutality of the Japanese guards as they moved POWs north along the Ba- taan peninsula cannot be denied. There were, however, many con- ditions unknown to most that led to the death of thous- ands of prisoners that cannot and should not be attibuted to the Japanese soldier. General King's Dilemma On 9 April 1942, a very dejected, demoralized General Edward P. King surrendered his Philippine Luzon Force to the Japanese. The American-Filipino (Am-Fil) force had, since 8 December 1941, fought a fight of futility against the Japanese invaders. General King "felt, he said later, like General Lee who, on the same day seventy-seven years earlier, just before meeting with Grant at Appomatox, had remarked, "Then there is nothing left to do but to go and see General Grant, and I would rather die a thousand deaths.'"1 What was General King's mission that had failed so drasti- cally? The mission of the Am-Fil force was never realistically thought of in such grand terms as to repulse the invaders; never to throw them back into the South China Sea from whence they came. On the contrary, General Douglas Mac Ar- thur, commander of all U. S. Army forces in the Far East, decided on a bold course. He would pull his troops back to the shelter of Bataan, a small, mountainous jungle penin- sula that juts out into the mouth of Manila Bay. From here there was no way out, no es- cape. Every single one of the defenders would be doomed to death or capture. But so long as MacArthur and his men could hold out...the Japanese timetable for cap- ture of the Indies might well be drasti- cally delayed.2 Delay was the key word, and indeed they did. The Am-Fil force, outnumbered almost 3 to 1, continued to fall back over the course of 98 days. They attempted to hold along successive defensive lines but to little avail. The beleagured forces, however, had a promise from their even-then famous MacArthur that "help is on the way from United States. Thousands of troops and hun- dreds of planes are being dispatched."3 So positive was MacArthur's message and so contrary was "President Roose- velt's February 23rd fireside chat"4 write-off of the Luzon Force, that the effect on morale was devastating. The entire text of MacArthurs's message is footnoted.5 It was out of this feeling of betrayal that the nickname "the battling bastards of Bataan" arose. In fact, the "battling bastard" line was a part of a song that reflec- ted this sense of hopelessness and betrayal. We're the battling bastards of Bataan; No momma, no pappa, no Uncle Sam No aunts, no uncles, no nephews, no nieces No rifles, no guns or artillery pieces And nobody gives a damn....."6 On the island of Corrigidor, Major General Wainwright upon learning of General King's surrender, sent the fol- lowing message to General MacArthur: At six o'clock this morning (9 April 1942), General King, commanding Luzon Force without my knowledge or approval, sent a flag of truce to the Japanese commander....Enemy on the east had enveloped both flanks....Physical exhaustion and sickness due to a long period of insufficient food is the real cause of this terrible disaster.7 The death and misery that followed the surrender was in no way envisioned by either side. General Homma, Com- mander of the victorious Japanese 14th Army "spoke warmly to Americans of how well they would be treated. But the actions of many Japanese officers and men belied these statements."8 THE DEATH MARCH The 14th Army staff upon Am-Fil surrender, was faced with a dual dilemma. On the one hand, it had to continue to press the attack on to Corregidor Island just off the coast of Bataan, where several thousand American forces and General Wainwright's headquarters had fled. And, on the other hand, General Hommas's staff was faced with a massive evacuation of prisoners to POW camps. There was no way to know how many prisoners who started the POW evacuation, failed to live through the ordeal. Suffice to say, the numbers were excessive. But was Japanese brutality the only cause? If not, what else? Well, there were many factors in addition to Japanese inhumane treatment that contributed to what became known as the Death March. Those factors included training dif- ferences; unanticipated large number of prisoners; limited quantity of food, water and vehicles; poor physical condi- tion of prisoners; limited medical facilities; high inci- dence of disease; failure of the Japanese evacuation plan; and low prisoner morale. Even under the most humane con- ditions, thousands of prisoners would not have survived. A closer examination reveals why. Training Differences. The post war and pre campaign training of the Am-Fil force was not rigorous. With the exception of a few long hikes, the soldiers defending the Philipines had not ex- perienced the hardship or deprivation that is required for battle. As one survivor of Bataan reflected "Our pre-war training...lacked reality most of all. The way to train troops for the rigors is...not only in making thirty or forty miles on foot, but in doing it hungry....Make our troops tough and hard...by putting into training as close to battle experience as possible."9 The Japanese forces, on the other hand, were well trained and highly disciplined. The result was a tena- cious warrior capable of performing under extremely ad- verse conditions. "The brutality of the Japanese soldiers' training and the rough discipline of his army did not in any way excuse the harsh treatment of the prisoners."10 This regimen did however lead to greater expectations of the prisoners. When the prisoners did not do what was ex- pected of them, the Japanese soldiers naturally reverted to what they had experienced. Another aspect of cultural training differences that contributed to the horrors of the Death March....(was) the...unquestioning obedience to orders with which the Japanese soldier was inculcated...the crowded assembly areas, the packed warehouse at Lubao and the jammed boxcars are ready examples. The guards were probably told to place their charges in a given area or building. It mattered not that there were soon too many prisoners for the space provided.11 Large Number of Prisoners Prior to the surrender, General Homma's staff was unsure as to the size of the enemy force. One of the initial estimates placed the Am-Fil force at 25,000. "General Homma thought this very low and ordered another estimate whereupon his staff came up with the number 40,000. It was this figure that was settled on and upon which evacu- ation plans were based. In actuality the number of soldiers and civilians trapped forward of Japanese lines exceeded 104,000. Thus, what little food, water and trans- portation resources that were available, was drasticaly short of what was required."12 The 14th Army faced with the problem of the attack on Corregidor, could not spare the guards needed to escort such large numbers of prisoners. Consequently, it was commonplace to have two or three guards escorting over one- hundred prisoners.13 As mentioned previously, the Japanese soldier was not trained to be tolerant or understanding. In addition the situation itself, given the guard to pri- soner ratio, was untolerable. So therefore the movement of prisoners became the proverbial powder keg. "All the Japanese soldier knew was that he was responsible for moving a large number of prisoners a certain distance, probably within a given time and that he would be severly punished if any captives escaped."14 Over and over again the powder keg was lit. Prisoners fell out of formation or questioned orders and, true to training, the guards dealt with the problem. The guards could not risk the escape of other captives which was very likely given the guard to prisoners ratio. Thus swift and brutal treatment was the most expedient, efficient and unavoidable means of handling such an overwhelming number of the prisoners. Limited Quantities of Food, Water and Supplies General Wainwright, in a message to General Marshall, MacArthur's Chief of Staff, stated "that disaster was im- minent unless supplies arrived soon...at one-third ration, poorly balanced and very deficient in vitamins...the troops will be starved into submission."15 The short quant- tity of food prior to surrender seemed an abundance after surrender. Now at the mercy of the Japanese supply system, which by itself was limited and overtaxed, the prisoners faced actual starvation. "The Americans soon learned that hunger is a great leveler and sought the meat of dogs, iguanas and monkeys...One officer: 'I recommend mule... Iguana is fair...I never had snake...monkey meat is all right until the animal's hands turn up on the plate.'"16 While the above seems drastic, the Am-Fil soldier probably would have resorted to such a diet prior to the surrender if he did not have to worry about a bullet. The caloric intake fell rapidly, the January ration had provided approximately 2,000 calories a day. The next month the figure declined to 1,500 and during March it was 1,000 calories daily, only one-fourth that required to sustain the average working man... (on) March 25...the men received (for the en- tire day) 8 1/2 ounces of rice, 1 1/2 ounces of flour and salt, slightly more than one ounce of canned meat and canned milk and one-half ounce of sugar."17 The prisoners also had to contend with thirst. April began the dry months in the Philippines. To compound the problem, the heat was almost unbearable. All of this added to a long march with harsh treatment made men resort to any- thing to quench their thirst. So desperate were the men that they did not hesitate to drink...They held their noses to seal off the sickening odor, but they drank all the water they could. Some were so thirsty that even the sight of swollen bodies floating in the water could not keep them from drinking. More than one man drank his fill, and then vomited in disgust at the sight and smell.18 As with food and water, all other classes of supply were virtually non-existent. As one officer of the Quar- termaster Corps said "The story of the Philippine and Ba- taan Quartermaster Depots is a saga of 'too little, too late'- a saga of supply when adequate supplies simply did not exist."19 The Am-Fil depots were drained. Soldiers fought over items that years before would have been con- sidered unserviceable. One of the items least essential but most in demand was cigarettes. "The demand for cigar- ettes was never met...For smokers the loss was a heavy one, and created a real moral problem...In the three months the men were on Bataan, they received on the average less than one cigarette a day."20 Cigarettes were not as critical as were other supplies. "As time pased uniforms became...threadbare, offering little protection agains the cold night, the rain, and the cruel thorns so abundant on Bataan."21 The Am-Fil force could not "march on its stomach" as the saying goes and likewise, it could not march on its feet. "Fully one quarter were without footgear; the rest wore shoes so badly worn that under normal conditions they would have been unfit for use...(In some units) less than 25 percent of the enlisted men...had blankets, shelter halves or raincoats."22 Finally the item that would have greatly lesssened the impact of the Death March - vehicles - were also not avail- able. "General King had ordered all supplies less trans- portation be destroyed. As indicated above, destroying all supplies must have been an easy task. But, as always happens, the 'word' was not clear, so all supplies were destroyed to include transportation. The Japanese had only half the vehicles they needed and the Japanese supply of- ficers' motto was 'a drop of gasoline is as precious as a drop of blood.'"23 Everything was in demand but nothing was in supply! Poor Physical Condition of the Prisoners The tremendous number of prisoners, coupled with the lack of food, water and other essentials, caused really the greatest evil. An evil that again was virtually out of the hands of the Japanese. The caloric deficiency, combined with the lack of important vitamins produced alarming results. Serious muscle waste and depletion of fat reserve were evident in the thin bodies and hollow cheeks of the hungry men. Night blindness, swelling, diarrhea, and dy- sentary became common, and beriberi in its incipient stages was almost universal among the troops. The men lost the capacity to re- sist even the most minor ailment, and any disease...would assume epidemic proportions.24 It was not a minority of the prisoners that were in such poor physical condition. On the contrary, only a very small number were not suffering from on sickness or another. "In the words of Colonel Harold W. Glattly, the former Luzon Force surgeon, they were 'patients rather than prisoners!'"25 In addition to those who had everything from malaria to beriberi, hospital patients were leaving hospitals pre- maturely. According to the rumor, the Japanese were releasing Filipino (hospital) prisoners... By evening a long line of Filipinos could be seen trudging from the hospital area... Many had only recently been operated on and were still wearing casts or dressings. Some had undergone amputations or serious abdominal surgery....Soon the weaker ones began to fall by the roadside, many to be shot or bayoneted....'Crippled Filipinos were strewn along the road,' wrote an Ameri- can officer. 'I remember going from ward to ward pleading with Filipino patients not to leave, recalls one surgeon...but my pleas were in vain.'26 Most on the march would have found it difficult to survive in a hospital ward. Yet, they pressed on with the hope of a haven; a place of rest. Many, instead of a haven, found their final resting place. Limited Medical Facilities The hospitals and field wards were less than adequate and limited in number prior to the Japanese invasion. These facilities, however, had not experienced the deluge of patients that the invasion, malnutrition and disease caused. Consequently, they were totally unprepared...un- prepared from beds, bandages, medicine, medical personnel and virtually every area where a need existed. To make matters worse, the Japanese lacked much of the same so as the saying goes, "to the victor belong the spoils". Japanese forces in the Philippines also suffered from a shortage of medical sup- plies, equipment and personnel. Attempts to alleviate this situation were far from successful and General Homma's requests to his superiors for medical aid had no more luck than his pleas for rice (the Japanese were also down to half rations)... The failure of the Japanese high command to provide the 14th Army with additional medical supplies meant a constant decrease in stocks on hand in the Philippines.27 The entire medical situation was, at best, totally overwhelmed. This was the case on both sides. Those who survived combat, fell victim to disease. Those who were victims of combat also fell victim to disease. Many were very sick yet there were no beds or medication available. The capacity of the two general hospitals on Bataan designed to accommodate 1,000 patients each...By the end of March, the two general hospitals had about 8,500 pat- ients and another 4,000 were being treated in a provisional hospital...admission to... hospitals was finally limited to two types; those requiring serious medical or surgical treatment and those in which the period of disability was expected to exceed 21 days.28 "By the first week in April, there may have been as many as 24,000 sick and wounded in hospitals and aid sta- tions on Bataan."29 High Incidence of Disease As has been alluded to, with the exhausted supply sys- tem, the large number of physically drained troops and the minimal medical facilities (in a jungle-tropical environ- ment) disease was everywhere. "The men lost the capacity to resist even the most minor ailment, and any disease, warned the Bataan Surgeon, would assume epidemic proper- tions."30 The Surgeon's warning turned out to be prophetic. Beriberi, almost unheard of, became very common. As one medical officer explained. "The only thing we could do when someone had dry beriberi was to get him on his feet and off the bed. The minute he grew fast to a mattress, he was dead. .Anybody who just got too sick to get out of bed was on his way to die."31 As one POW states, "...what knocked the devil out of us was malaria. Oh, boy, that killed a lot of people."32 Malaria, another killer. "A minimum of 3,000,000 quinine tablets a month was needed and the supply depots had only a six day supply by the end of March...In the days that fol- lowed (malaria patients were admitted at)...the fantastic figure of 1,000 admissions daily."33 Dysentery! "So many died of dysentery. If you had it, you needn't bother pulling up your pants. You'd just go, go, go...Of course everyone was emaciated as well... suffering from malnutrition...no one had enough to eat to match anywhere near what they used."34 Another quote from a POW medical officer to attest to the disease pla- gued status of the prisoners. Disease is now added to the list of factors which the Japanese had no control over. In this case, Bataan was the "leveler" for the Japanese suffered the same diseases along with their captives. Failure of the Japanese Evacuation Plan General Homma had anticipated the need for an evacu- ation plan. As commander of the 14th Army, he had many critical issues. The evacuation was the least of his con- cerns. As has been previously stated, the miscalculation of the number of prisoners caused the greatest problem. The Japanese were also uninformed on the physical condition of the Am-Fil force. "Homma and his staff had no real knowledge of just how bad the food situation actually was in southern Bataan...(if he had known), he would simply have sat back and waited for an offer of surrender when General King's food ran out."35 In addition, Homma's force had no incidence of disease until they broke into the Ba- taan peninsula. Therefore, they had no idea that the Luzon force was disease ridden.36 The final planning failure dealt with Homma's overes- timation of the Luzon force to continue the fight. Homma thought that, at the beginning of April, it would take one month before final victory. This was not to be. The fall of Bataan less than one week after the start of the Good Friday offensive brought the 14th Army face to face with a completely unexpected situation. It was suddenly required to take care of twice the number of prisoners expected - a large percentage of them too weak or sick to make the journey out of Bataan on foot - three weeks before it was ready to accommodate even the number and type of captives origi- nally anticipated.37 Low Prisoner Morale It is not difficult to understand what the captives' frame of mind was during the evacuation. To have lost in battle; to have been promised reinforcements from on high only to be told from on "higher" (by the fireside) that there would be no reinforcements; in a jungle with virtually no food, water, transportation and death from some foreign disease or bayonet; morale was non-existent. Soldiers just saw no reason to continue. They gave up...life! POW state- ments include the following; I knew one guy, and there were a lot, who wouldn't eat...He died gradually because he gave up eating. I know one kid from our outfit, God we slap- ped him, kicked him,...Anything to try to make him want to fight. But I found out when a man gives up, you're not going to get him back. Not everyone that died, died because they gave up, buy many did. Some of our men seemed able to give up and die in three weeks or less.38 Let the Dead Bury the Dead At the onset the Bataan prisoner evacuation was doomed. With or without Japanese brutality, it was destined to earn its infamous title, Death March. It becomes apparent that conditions were so desperate that many would have died even if the Japanese had continued on to their next conquest and simply left the defeated behind. For the American and Filipinos of the Luzon Force who suffered through the difficult fighting on Ba- taan, April was indeed "the cruelest month" Sick, starving, exhausted, they entered the vale of captivity and met a horror they never foresaw. The agony they endured, the death they often welcomed, were not deviously and maliciously plan- ned. Instead they were the result of tragic con- ditions.39 NOTES 1Louis Morton, "The Battling Bastards of Bataan," Military Affairs, Summer 1951, p. 113 2Stanley Falk, The Battling Bastards (New York: W.W. Norton & Co. Inc., 1962) p. 27 3T. Parker, "The Epic of Corregidor-Bataan, Dec- ember 24, 1941-May 4, 1942." U.S. Naval Instituted Pro- ceedings, January 1943, p. 13. 4Louis Morton, "The Battling Bastards of Bataan," Military Affairs, Sumner 1951, p. 112 5T. Parker, "The Epic of Corregidor-Bataan, De- cember 24, 1941-May 4, 1942." U.S. Naval Institute Pro- ceedings, January 1943, p. 13. FORT MILLS, P.I. January 15, 1942. Subject: Message from General MacArthur To: All Unit Commanders The following message from Gen. MacArthur will be read and explained to all troops. Every company commander is charged with personal re- sponsibility for the delivery of this message. Each headquarters will follow up to insure recep- tion by every company or similar unit. "Help is on the way from the United States. Thousands of troops and hundred of planes are being dispatched. The exact time of arrival of reinforcements is unknown as they will have to fight their way through Japanese attempts against them. It is imperative that our troops hold until these reinforcements arrive. "No further retreat is possible. We have more troops in Bataan than the Japanese have thrown against us; our supplies are ample; a determined defense will defeat the enemy's attack. "It is a question now of courage and determina- tion. Men who run will merely be destroyed but men who fight will save themselves and their country. "I call upon every soldier in Bataan to fight in his assigned position, resisting every attack. This is the only road to salvation. If we fight we will win; if we retreat, we will be destroyed. "MacArthur" "By Command of General MacArthur" 6Harold Baldiwn, "The Fourth Marines at Corregi- dor", Marine Corps Gazette, December 1946, p. 28 7Duane Schultz, Hero of Bataan: The Story of General Jonathan M. Wainwright (New York: St. Martin's Press, 1981) p. 244-45. 8Falk, p.222 9M. Hill, "Lessons of Bataan", Infantry Journal, October 1942, p. 10 10Falk, p. 235 11Ibid, p. 235 12Ibid, p. 57-59 ` 13Ibid, p. 234 14Ibid, p. 234 15Morton, p.108 16Ibid, p. 109 17Ibid, p. 110 18Falk, p. 135 19Harold Arnold, "The Lesson of Bataan', Quarter- master Review, November 1946, p. 12. 20Morton, p. 110 21Ibid, p. 110 22Ibid, p. 120 23Falk, p. 216 24Morton, p. 111 25Falk, p. 213 26Ibid, p. 98 27Ibid, p. 65 28Morton, p. 111 29Falk, p. 38 30Morton, p. 110 31Donald Knox, Death March, (New York: Harcourt Brace Jovanovich, 1981) p. 222 32Ibid, p. 179 33Morton, p. 111 34Knox, p. 168 35Falk, p. 60 36Ibid, p. 60 37Ibid, p. 62 38Knox, p. 166-168 39Falk, p. 240 BIBLIOGRAPHY Arnold, H. "The Lessons of Bataan", Quartermaster Review (November 1946), 12-15, 60, 63 Babcock, C. "Philippine Campaign", Cavalry Journal (March 1943), 5-7; (May 1943) 28-35 Baldwin, H. The Fourth Marines at Corregidor, Marine Corps Gazette, (December 1946), 20-29 Dyess, W. E. The Dyess Story. New York: Putnam, 1944 Falk, S. T. Bataan: The March of Death, New York, Norton, 1981 Keats, J. They Fought Alone. Philadelphia: Lippincott, 1963 Morton, T. "Bataan Diary of Major Achille C. Tisdelle", Military Affairs, (Fall 1947), 131-148 Morton, "The Battling Bastards of Bataan." Military Affairs, (Summer 1951), 107-113 Parker, T. "The Epic of Corregidor-Bataan." U.S. Naval Institute Proceedings, (January 1943), 9-22 Schultz, D. Hero of Bataan: The Story of General Jonathan M. Wainwright, New York: St. Martins, 1981 Wainwright, J. M. General Wainwright's Story. New York: Doubleday, 1946 Whitehead, A. With the 26th Cavalry in the Philippines, Cavalry Journal, (December 1941) 7-22
