Counter-Terrorism--How Far Can We Morally Go? CSC 1984 SUBJECT AREA General COUNTER-TERRORISM--HOW FAR CAN WE MORALLY GO? Submitted to Col Robert J. Berens, USA(Ret) In Partial Fulfillment of Requirements for Written Communications The Marine Corps Command and Staff College Quantico, Virginia Major E. J. Robeson IV United States Marine Corps April 1, 1984 COUNTER-TERRORISM--HOW FAR CAN WE MORALLY GO? Outline Thesis Statement: Terrorism is becoming increasingly common, and poses great dilemmas for those seeking to balance individual human rights with the obligation to protect the masses. What's to be done? I. Introduction II. The nature of terrorism A. Immoral? B. Moral? III. Does terrorism's nature really matter? IV. Presently accepted defensive countermeasures A. General purpose measures B. International agreements V. Proposed offensive countermeasures A. Increased public awareness programs B. High technology initiatives C. Legislative repeals/reforms 1. Intelligence enhancements 2. Aut dedere aut judicare 3. Media curbs D. Pragmatic retribution 1. Counter-terror 2. Coersive interrogation (torture) 3. Psychological operations VI. Summary COUNTER-TERRORISM--HOW FAR CAN WE MORALLY GO? Early on a quiet Sunday morning in October 1983, a yellow Mercedes truck circled in a vacant parking lot adjacent to the U.S. Marine compound in Beirut, Lebanon. Steadily, the truck gathered speed and then headed on its course. Crashing barriers and ignoring commands to halt, the driver guided his deadly cargo into position under a large building where hundreds of Marines were sleeping. A thunderous explo- sion followed.... Amid the debris of broken concrete and crushed, lifeless bodies there lay a shattered hope--that America would be exempted from terrorism and the dilemmas that countering it might bring. But we have not been exempted, and, as professional military officers, our efforts to defeat the terrorist may confront us with some serious moral dilemmas. How should we respond to the outrages of terrorism? What effective counter-terrorist actions can be taken which will not be as abhorrent as the terrorist acts themselves? What are the moral dilemmas for the counter-terrorist who knows that the bomb is ticking somewhere, but the suspect is disinclined to cooperate? At what point do we lose our moral ascendancy by permitting coersive interrogation (torture), even for a "higher good?" Terrorism is becoming increasingly common, and poses great dilemmas for those seeking to balance indivi- dual human rights with the obligation to protect the masses. What's to be done? All of these questions need resolution, but there may be an even more fundamental question. This question concerns our understanding of terrorism itself. Even though terrorism is indiscriminate, unrestrained violence, is it inherently immoral, or is it simply an unusual, but legitimate, tool of warfare? We cannot really design countermeasures without a convincing answer to this question. Accepting the premise that terrorism is immoral presupposes that each man, as a unique creature, possesses "...certain inalienable rights." Since terrorism seeks to deny or destroy those fundamental rights, the terrorist is operating beyond mere criminality. By his own desires and preconceived malice, he has chosen to step outside the bounds of civilized conduct and bring fear and violence to those who are harmless or uninvolved--whether men, women or children. Consequently, are not his actions so despicable as to be patently immoral? If the military officer accepts this argument, then under what moral constraints must he labor in fighting terrorism? Do normal rules still apply? After all, the terrorist is exposed as: ...something more than a common criminal. He not only violates particular rights, he also rejects the principles on which rights exist, and aims at destroying the capacity of the government to protect them. Once the terrorist is seen...as an enemy of rights in general, an argument can be made that he has forfeited all of his [own] rights. How can one who actively engages in a campaign aimed at destroying the effectiveness of the rights of all others in society now come forward and coherently ask that any of his rights be respected while still maintaining that he need not respect the rights of others?1 This is a powerful argument, but it leads the military profes- sional toward a conclusion which is not easily reconciled with present law and international conventions. Perhaps we can escape this dilemma by hypothesizing that terrorism is not immoral after all, but could be appro- priate, depending upon the circumstances. Could our revulsion to terrorist acts simply be an artificial humanistic conditioning that hinders our ability to view terrorism pragmatically? Could terrorism, in fact, be nothing more than war as it should be fought without Victorian regard for "innocents?" Perhaps our loathing of terrorist acts is merely selective. How appalled are we when Afghani terrorists (or are they freedom fighters?) bomb a Soviet diplomat into socialistic paradise? Could terrorism really be simply another appropriate tool of warfare? This question has been debated at length in many forums. The delegates to the United Nations during the discussion of the Draft Convention for the Prevention and Punishment of Certain Acts of International Terrorism have provided a majority opinion. This sentiment of most of the governments of the world today was expressed by the Indonesian delegate, Mr. Joewono. He stated: A distinction should be drawn between terrorism perpetrated for personal gain and other acts of violence committed for political purposes. Although recourse to violence must ultimately be eliminated from relations between peoples, it must be borne in mind that certain kinds of violence were bred by oppression, injustice, and the denial of basic human rights, and the fact that whole nations were deprived of their homeland and their property. It would be unjust to expect such peoples to adhere to the same code of ethics as those who possessed more sophisticated means of advancing their interests....Such acts could not be classified as terrorism; on the contrary, they were to a certain extent to be regarded as anti-terrorist acts aimed at combatting a much more repulsive kind of terrorism, namely colonialism and other forms of domination. These forces of violence were legitimate, being founded on the right of self-determination proclaimed in the Charter and often reaffirmed by the United Nations.2 As Americans in a westernized culture, we are probably astonished that other governments could formally equivocate on the question of terrorism, but we shouldn't be. Our own traditional moral foundations, derived from our Judeo-Christian heritage and its basic document, The Bible, could also be seen to advocate terrorism or other unrestricted violence under certain conditions. In The Bible we find numerous accounts of battles and wars fought at God's direction and by his rules. Over and over again, the children of Israel were commanded to attack evil countries and peoples and to kill them all--the men, the women and the little children. Because God had declared that their cause was just, the Israelites were permitted to practice systematic terrorism and could, furthermore, view it as being a righteous act. Based on this evidence, could there be a dichotomy between our absolute condemnation of terrorism, and our concern that counter-terrorist acts be effective, but not brutalizing? If our cause is just, why should we restrain ourselves? Scholars and theologians would certainly be quick to note in rebuttal that the Israelites had direct revelation from God, while today, we no longer share that privilege. They might further ask, how then can terrorism or unrestrained counter-terrorism be condoned if the cause cannot be proven to be just? This argument is persuasive and it could perhaps be used to deter American military officers from those prac- tices, but it neglects the fact that several terrorist groups, particularly in the Middle East, have already declared their cause to be just and have embraced terrorism as a means to further their aims. Therefore, a more relevant question might be, if your opponent is already operating in fundamentally evil ways and without any moral restraints, what could not be considered an appropriate countermeasure? In other words, why would not the depravity of terrorism elevate any countermeasures to the status of a righteous act? How can unrestrained violence be effectively contained without resorting to every available resource and means? Doesn't international law recognize the right to defend oneself by matching the level of violence of the response to that of the offense, as in a reprisal? Unfortunately, answering these questions could lead the military professional toward the same conclusion from which he might be seeking to escape. It would appear, then, that regardless of whether terror- ism is viewed as a legitimate tool of warfare, or as a contemptible immoral act, that there are persuasive arguments which would permit the counter-terrorist to respond based solely on military effectiveness without incurring any moral dilemmas at all. Even if one accepts that this reasoning is logical, he is still confronted with the obligation to obey the current laws and international conventions, and these are quite restrictive. Still, we who have pledged to defend "...against all enemies, both foreign and domestic" must do so within the framework of those laws. Has the time not come then to reexamine the present legal constraints in light of today's threat of international terrorism? Is it not essential that the guardians of our freedoms not be artificially con- strained from taking those measures which could be required to ensure that our liberties continue? If this is true, then what countermeasures are presently acceptable, and which additional methods should be added to make our response more effective? First, there are the general purpose measures already in effect. These include the screening of travelers and equipment crossing over our national borders or passing through our major communications centers. As Kupperman and Trent stated, there is considerable merit to these measures because "...screening limits potential terrorism to the most talented groups (a high-pass filter) and so tends to inhibit terrorism."3 In recent years, these measures have become even more effective with the implementation of improved sensors, metal detectors, x-ray machines and better training for security personnel. Other responses to terrorist threats have included executive protection procedures, risk analysis programs and armored vehicle services.4 All of these efforts to "harden the target" are designed to create conditions under which it would be very difficult for a terrorist to conduct a successful attack.5 There have also been numerous legal attempts to develop an international consensus for countering terrorism. These agreements have been on-going for over twenty years and a partial list includes: 1963 Tokyo Convention on Offenses and Certain Other Acts Committed Onboard Aircraft 1970 Hague Convention for the Suppression of the Unlawful Seizure of Aircraft 1970 U.N. Declaration of Principles of International Law Concerning Friendly Relations and Cooperation Among States In Accordance with the Charter of the United Nations 1971 OAS Convention to Prevent and Punish Acts of Terrorism Taking the Form of Crimes Against Persons and Related Extortions that are of International Significance 1973 Montreal Convention for the Suppression of Unlawful Acts Against the Safety of Civil Aviation 1973 U.N. Convention on the Prevention and Punishment of Crimes Against Diplomats 1980 North Atlantic Assembly Resolution on Terrorism6 Statistically, it can be demonstrated that these measures have not dissuaded terrorist groups from continuing their activities. The reason for this has been succintly stated by Admiral James D. Watkins, USN, Chief of Naval Operations. He has said: While there are many things that we can do defen- sively, this is just not good enough. After all, will building bunkers and fences higher and higher--or stringing roll upon roll of concertina wire--or wearing more and more flak jackets--really provide lasting additional security from these terrorists? Can these defensive measures really stamp out this creeping cancerous growth? No.7 It would appear then that a defensive strategy is insufficient. In addition to increased security and improved crisis management structures and techniques, there must be offensive responses. William Waugh calls this the "two-front war." Unfortunately, he then limits his offensive options to the alleviation of legitimate grievances, while prohibiting extra legal countermeasures, extra legal intelligence gathering, detention of suspects, and even media restraints.8 This is a very weak response indeed, especially in light of the numerous nihilistic terrorist groups whose only grievance is that the present governmental systems still function effectively. Fortunately, others recommend more vigorous schemes. The Long Commission, following its investigation of the Beirut bombing concluded: ... that state sponsored terrorism is an important part of the spectrum of warfare and that adequate response to this increasing threat requires an active national policy which seeks to deter attack or reduce its effectiveness.. this policy needs to be supported by political and diplomatic actions and by a wide range of timely military response capabilities.... The Commission recommends that the Secretary of Defense direct the Joint Chiefs of Staff to develop a broad range of military responses to terrorism... and direct the development of doctrine, planning, organization, force structure, education and training necessary to defend against counter terrorism. If, as the Long Commission suggests, our present counter- measures are inadequate, it would seem relevant to examine what we could be doing to improve our situation. Certainly, one of the basic elements of a response strategy must be to maintain confidence in the government and its legitimacy, while ensuring public order.9 To accomplish this, any counter-terrorist activities must be not only acceptable, but also achieve popular support. Since the importance of this support cannot be overestimated, the government must be able to define its actions so as to protect its base of legitimacy, while denying any terrorists' counter claims.10 One of the best means to accomplish this according to Mr. J. B. Motley is to "...establish within the public community a greater awareness of and sensitivity to...the type of decisions that may be required by federal...agencies."11 What decisions should we be making? What response will solve the terrorism dilemma? Unfortunately, the problem appears to be multi-faceted, and many analysts believe that there is no single "magic formula" solution, and only a combination of responses will be effective.12 However, the application of highly specialized technology would appear to be one very effective response for controlling terrorism. One approach would be to utilize computer technology to share information on the international level much more extensively than is presently done. This could create difficulties due to possible infringement of civil liberties, but without extensive, hard, intelligence data, counter-terrorist plans will be ineffective.13 The use of heuristic computer models could also enhance and sharpen terrorist-type identification and potential target projections.14 Other high-tech solutions could involve impregnating detonators and explosives with easily detected taggants15, and greatly expanding video, audio and other electronic surveillance.16 Non-brutalizing suspect interrogation through the use of lie detectors, hypnosis, or drugs should also be considered. However, as Kupperman wrote, "The problem is far more than technological. It is political, it is economic, it is regulatory, and it is legislative."17 It is in this legislative area that many of the present "moral dilemmas" could perhaps be solved. Recognizing inter- national terrorism as a clear and present danger today could save the nation from the quandary faced by President Lincoln over a century ago when, under other difficult conditions, he declared, "I conceived that I may, in any emergency, do things on a military ground which cannot constitutionally be done."18 This reality was demonstrated more recently by Canadian Prime Minister Trudeau's response to the terrorist campaign of the Front de Liberation Quebecois. On October 16, 1970, he authorized the government "...to do anything it deemed necessary for the security, defense, peace, order and welfare of Canada."19 Sensitizing the American public to the threat of terrorism and demonstrating the need for stronger security measures, up to and including the military option, would provide the political climate needed to resolve some of the present legal constraints, especially those surrounding the use of military force in responding to terrorist acts. This should be done, not only because it is right, but also because it is practical. As one writer stated "...rules made with too much disregard of the issue of military utility are not likely to survive. Any legal rule, on the basis of its own authority as law, can bear only so much weight of contrary interest;"20 and when the nation is threatened, there will certainly be that contrary interest, as Rudyard Kipling so graphically reminded us in his stirring poem, "Tommy." While restructuring our laws, however, it is important to clearly differentiate between legitimate and illegitimate uses of violence, i.e., the use of "force" by authorized agents of the state as distinguished from the use of "violence" by those challenging the state's authority.21 Another critical area needing legislative relief is intelligence collection, processing and dissemination. Mr. J. B. Motley suggests the following list: Repeal those portions of Executive Order 12036 which restricts intelligence collection techniques and other intelligence functions. Restore the Internal Security Division of the Department of Justice. Reinstitute the security research files and index...of the U.S. Civil Service Commission. Exempt intelligence agencies from the Amended Freedom of Information Act and the Privacy Act. Reassess current limitations imposed on intelli- gence agencies by the Foreign Intelligence Surveillance Act.22 There should also be strong attempts on the international front to obtain agreement from all states to accept the obligation aut dedere aut judicare--extradite the terrorist, or try him or her yourself23. Consensus on media curbs on the reporting of terrorist and counter-terrorist activities should also be reached. Beyond these legislative changes which could, by fiat, create a climate where a stronger security framework could be more easily defended on moral grounds, there are the counter-terrorist activities themselves. As President Reagan has stated, "Let terrorists be aware that when the rules of international behavior are violated, our policy will be one of swift and effective retribution."24 Of course, the form that this retribution should take must be "morally" acceptable. As the earlier discussion has proved, however, there are strong grounds--morally as well as practically--to argue that the pragmatic approach is not only defensible, but even commendable because of its effectiveness. As retired ambassador, John David Lodge, stated: If we could stop preaching, we might even be able to learn something from our friends in Argentina, Uruguay and Chile regarding how they have successfully handled and are handling the most cunning, cynical, vicious, brutal, relentless challenge of our time. When will we catch on that the conflict is taking place in a jungle world?25 Such a tough line approach would combine harsh and effective temporary measures with a consistent policy of maximizing the risk of punishment run by the terrorists and minimizing their potential rewards.26 We should begin these operations by acquiring the necessary intelligence. Col Tuilard of the French Army, while fighting Algerian terrorists had this to say about gathering needed information: If the suspect makes no difficulty about giving the information required, the interrogation will be over quickly. Otherwise, specialists must use all means available to drag his secret out of him. Like a soldier, he must [now] face the suffering and perhaps the death which he has so far avoided.27 Although there are political risks to such measures, this type of activity, if properly presented to the public, would be devastating for the terrorist. He would have unleashed approved counter-terrorism, and reaped few political benefits. This same no-holds-barred approach could be used in counter-terrorist psychological operations. The old Chinese proverb, "Kill one and frighten 10,000 others," can be effective for the counter-terrorist too. As one unnamed official put it: We have got to get our hands dirty, really dirty.... Cut off a few Moslem heads, stick them in the belly of a pig, deliver the package to their comrades with the message: "You aren't going to Paradise. You're going to be nothing but pig _ ."28 Certainly the lifting of restrictions on assassinations would provide important opportunities to conduct surgical strikes which could have great deterrent effects. These special powers, even if granted by law, would represent a partial curtailment of the normal liberties found in a democracy, but having such temporary expedients already available to be used as ultimate weapons could prove to be highly effective in deterring or defeating terrorism. Another advantage to having these difficult decisions made now is to preempt a possible heated public debate at the hour of crisis when harsh techniques, not rhetoric, are critically needed. A protracted counter-terrorist campaign using "classical" methods of informers, infiltrators, coersive interrogation, detentions, assassinations, and military operations would not necessarily be any less repulsive to a liberal, democratic society, but, once approved, it could be conducted on a comparatively low visibility and clandestine basis. The virtue of such quiet operations would be the avoidance of sympathy-generating publicity for the terrorist groups.29 In summary, it is essential that the United States develop a coherent, well-planned strategy to combat domestic as well as international terrorism. Such a strategy must be capable of swift implementation, follow public policy state- ments of U.S. response to terrorist acts, allow for contingen- cies, spell out limits of American patience, and specify the types of punitive measures which terrorists can expect.30 This strategy must be reasonable and acceptable to the American people. This can be done if the emphasis is shifted from the questionable rights of the terrorist to the moral necessity to observe the social norms, defend our institutions, and preserve law and order.31 Historically, once war has been declared, United States citizens have been very supportive of extremely strong responses. This can be easily demonstrated by citing approval of Sherman's "total war" campaign during the War Between the States, the activities of the Bomber Command in World War II, and even the use of the atomic bomb to force cessation on our terms. Once the American people become convinced that international terrorism has become a "third form of warfare,"32 having taken its place alongside conventional and guerrilla warfare, they will undoubtedly accept the premise that the truly moral response is the one which is most effective. FOOTNOTES 1David C. Rapoport and Yonah Alexander, The Morality of Terrorism (New York, 1982), p. 294. 2Ibid., p. 85. 3Robert H. Kupperman and Darrell M. Trent, Terrorism: Threat, Reality, Response (Stanford, 1979), p. 76. 4Patterns of International Terrorism 1980, National Foreign Assessment Center, Central Intelligence Agency Publication, June 1981, p. 17. 5Kupperman and Trent, p. 79. 6Walter Laquer, The Terrorist Reader (Philadelphia, 1978), p. 272. 7James D. Watkins, Admiral, USN, CNO, "All Hands," Shipmate (Annapolis, 1984), p. 10. 8William L. Waugh, Jr., International Terrorism (Salisbury, 1982) pp. 238-241. 9Paul Wilkinson, Terrorism and the Liberal State (New York, 1977), p. 105. 10Ibid., p. 116. 11J. B. Motley, U.S. Strategy to Counter Domestic Political Terrorism (Washington, D.C., 1983), p. 99. 12Waugh, p. 240. 13J. Shaw et al., Ten Years of Terrorism (New York, 1979), p. 30. 14Kupperman and Trent, p. 313. 15Ibid., p. 81. 16Shaw et al., p. 30. 17Kupperman and Trent, p. 81. 18R. C. Clark, Technological Terrorism (Old Greenwich, 1980), p. 210. 19L. R. Bess, Terrorism and Global Security: The Nuclear Threat (Boulder, 1979), p. 87. 20Bernard Brodie, War and Politics (New York, 1973), p. 274. 21Henry Biener, Violence and Social Change: A Review of Current Literature (Chicago, 1968), p. 4. 22Motley, pp. 100-01. 23J. Shaw et al., p. 163. 24Richard Harwood et al., "Terrorism," The Washington Post, February 12, 1984, Section A., p. 16. 25Clark, p. 198. 26Paul Wilkinson, British Perspectives on Terrorism (Boston 1981), p. 161. 27Alistair Horne, A Savage War of Peace (New York, 1978), p. 199. 28Harwood, p. 16. 29Bess, p. 86. 30Motley, p. 98. 31Dr. John Burton, Deviance, Terrorism and War (New York, 1979), p. 83. 32Maj Robert L. Wolf, "Anticipating Trouble," Marine Corps Gazette, February 1984, p. 18. BIBLIOGRAPHY Beres, L. R. Terrorism and Global Security: The Nuclear Threat. Boulder: Westview Press, 1979. Biener, Henry. Violence and Social Change: A Review of Current Literature. Chicago: University of Chicago Press, 1968. Brodie, Bernard. War and Politics. New York: MacMillian Publishing Co., Inc., 1973. Burton, John. Deviance, Terrorism and War. New York: St. Martin's Press, 1979. Clark, R. C. Technological Terrorism. Old Greenwich: The Devin-Adair Co., 1980. Elliott, J. D. and L. K. Gibson. Contemporary Terrorism. Gaithersburg: International Association of Chiefs of Police Press, 1978. Harwood, Richard et al. "Terrorism," The Washington Post, February 12, 1984, Section A., pp. 1, 15-16. Horne, Alistair. A Savage War of Peace. New York: Viking Press, 1978. Kupperman, Robert H. and Darrell M. Trent. Terrorism: Threat, Reality, Response. Stanford: The Hoover Institution Press, 1979. Laquer, Walter. The Terrorist Reader. Philadelphia: Temple University Press, 1978. Motley, J. B. U.S. Strategy to Counter Domestic Political Terrorism. Washington, D.C.: National Defense University Press, 1983. Munger, Murl D. The Growing Utility of Political Terrorism. Carlisle Barracks: Strategic Studies Institute, 1977. Norton, A. R. and M. H. Greenberg. Studies in Nuclear Terrorism. Boston: G. K. Hall and Co., 1979. Rapoport, David C. and Yonah Alexander. The Morality of Terrorism. New York: Pergamon Press, 1982. Rapoport, David C. and Yonah Alexander. The Rationalization of Terrorism. New York: Pergamon Press, 1983. Shaw, J., Gueritz, E. F., and Younger, A. E. Ten Years of Terrorism. New York: Crane, Russak and Company, Inc., 1979. Watkins, James D. "All Hands." Shipmate, March, 1984. Waugh, William L. Jr. International Terrorism. Salisbury: Documentary Publications, 1982. Wilkinson, Paul. Terrorism and the Liberal State. New York: John Wiley and Sons, 1977. Wilkinson, Paul. British Perspectives on Terrorism. Boston: George Allen and Unwin, 1981. Wolf, Robert L., Maj, USMC. "Anticipating Trouble." Marine Corps Gazette, 78 (February 1984), pp. 18-20.
