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Chapter 2


FUNDAMENTALS OF BRIGADE OPERATIONS

With the conclusion of the cold war, the threat to US forces has become more ambiguous than ever. Infantry brigades will be expected to conduct operations in three diverse environments: war, conflict, and peacetime. The capabilities of our potential enemies run the gamut of size, doctrinal background, organization, equipment, training, and ideological motivation. Infantry brigades may face an enemy organized in large armored and mechanized formations using combined arms tactics in conventional operations. The brigade may deploy to areas where the enemy's level of technology is inconsistent, his tactics improvised and unconventional, and his support based on a popular one.
To meet this threat, brigades must be able to operate within a joint, multinational, and or multiagency environment and must synchronize all available systems using a battlefield framework. Brigades must fight in depth. This involves striking the enemy's echelons and facilities at the same time rather than just sequentially. Technology makes such action possible, and it is the brigade commander's responsibility to orchestrate his assets so that they act in concert to achieve decisive results.

Section I
FORCE PROJECTION

The Army currently maintains a smaller forward presence than it did in the past. These forward presence forces can defend for a short period, but they depend on the timely arrival of reinforcements to continue the fight. Force projection operations are usually planned at the division level but may actually involve brigade or smaller forces. During peacetime, the infantry brigade trains and plans for war and specially assigned missions. All brigades must be able to quickly alert, mobilize, deploy, and conduct operations anywhere in the world.

2-1. STAGES OF FORCE PROJECTION

The success of a brigade in wartime operations begins with its preparations for war. These preparations include a mission-oriented training program and premobilization/predeployment plans that support the brigade's specific wartime contingencies. Given these contingencies, the brigade commander and his staff derive the critical wartime tasks and missions that the brigade will most likely be called upon to execute. They express these tasks and missions as the brigade's METL. Commanders have the responsibility for developing and executing a mission-oriented training program that incorporates all of the METL tasks. They must ensure that all training plans adhere to the fundamentals of training as set forth in FM 25-100 and FM 25-101, as well as ARTEP 7-30-MTP. Training must be mentally challenging, physically demanding, and as realistic as common sense, safety, and resources permit. Such training allows units to deploy rapidly IAW an N-hour sequence. The N-hour sequence and deployment procedures are covered in the unit tactical SOPs. The N-hour sequence is just part of the force projection picture. The complete stages of force projection are mobilization, predeployment activity, deployment, entry operations, operations, war termination and post-conflict operations, and redeployment and reconstitution. They are further discussed in the following paragraphs of this section.

2-2. MOBILIZATION

Whether deploying as part of a division or in an independent operation, the brigade will generally conduct the following sequence of activities for mobilization: planning, alert, home station, mobilization station, and POE.

a. Planning. The brigade assists the division by maintaining and improving its combat readiness, preparing mobilization plans and files as directed by higher headquarters (including logistics and family support plans), providing required data to various mobilization stations (through division headquarters) as appropriate, ensuring unit movement data accuracy, conducting required mobilization and deployment training.

b. Alert. This phase begins when the unit receives notice of a pending order. Commanders complete administrative and personnel processing actions begun during the mobilization planning phase. The alert phase concludes with preparation for deployment.

c. Home Station. Home station activities bring the reserve units onto active status. During this phase, the brigade takes the necessary steps to clear installation accounts and hand receipts, if required. The brigade also dispatches an advance party to the mobilization station.

d. Mobilization Station. In this phase, the brigade plans for and provides the specific support called for in the applicable mobilization plan or as tasked by its parent division. Throughout this phase, the brigade continues to train to METL tasks in preparation for deployment.

e. Port of Embarkation. Brigade actions at the air or the sea POE include preparing and loading equipment, and manifesting and loading personnel. This phase ends when the brigade departs from the POE.

2-3. PREDEPLOYMENT ACTIVITY

When ordered to deploy, the brigade task-organizes, echelons, and tailors its units based on the assigned mission and available lift and other resources. Higher echelon plans determine the command, communications, intelligence, and logistics relationships for the brigade. Some modifications to existing OPLANs will normally be necessary. These plans should also specify any joint and combined operations relationships, if known. Within the division plan, the brigade commander prioritizes lift requirements consistent with METT-T. He also establishes the sequence in which the brigade's units deploy relative to the movement of other forces and other services. Maximum use of in-theater intelligence sources is essential. Sources include SOF area assessments, the country team and higher headquarters.

a. Echeloning is organizing and prioritizing units for movement. Echelons are often divided into elements such as advance parties, initial combat forces, follow-on forces, and closure forces. Each echelon has a designated echelon commander. Tailoring is the adding to or subtracting from planned task organizations based upon a METT-T analysis, available transportation, pre-positioned assets, and host nation support. Task organizing is the temporary grouping of forces to accomplish a certain mission. Task organizing and echeloning occur during initial planning. Force tailoring, however, is situational dependent and occurs after a thorough METT-T assessment is completed by the commander and his staff. Brigades tailor forces after identifying initial strategic lift, pre-positioned assets, and host nation and or contract services or assets.

b. Following the receipt of a mission, the brigade prepares its personnel and equipment for deployment through preparation for overseas movement activities. These activities ensure that deploying units meet all requirements associated with deployment into another theater of operation as directed by Army regulations and local authorities.

2-4. DEPLOYMENT

Deployment includes preparing or moving the brigade, its equipment, and supplies to the area of operations in response to a crisis or natural disaster. Deployments take place in four phases: movement to the POE, strategic lift, reception at the POD, and onward movement. Deployment tasks overlap mobilization tasks and take place at the same time.

a. Movement to the Port of Embarkation. Units deploying with the brigade complete their preparation for overseas movement based on the mobilization plan and the CINC's time phased deployment list. Units update their automated unit equipment lists to deployment equipment lists and submit them to the installation transportation office for transmission to TRANSCOM. Based on information given to the joint operations planning and execution system, TRANSCOM provides movement guidance for the brigade's movement to the POE through its component command.

b. Strategic Lift. This phase begins with the departure of brigade elements on strategic lift from the POE. It ends with the brigade's closure in theater. The brigade commander and his staff must be prepared to update intelligence and, as necessary, modify plans while in transit.

c. Reception at the Port of Debarkation. This phase applies only to unopposed entry operations. It begins with the arrival of brigade units at the POD in the theater and ends when the brigade departs the POD. Except in opposed entry operations, the brigade can expect CS and CSS elements to help process them through the POD. The primary requirement is coordinating the brigade's onward movement to its first destination.

d. Onward Movement. This phase begins with personnel and equipment linkup, sustainment, the receipt of pre-positioned systems or logistics stocks at designated marshaling areas, and the reconfiguration of brigade forces. It ends when the brigade arrives at the gaining command's staging areas where preparations for decisive operations occur.

2-5. ENTRY OPERATIONS

Entry requirements following deployment vary. A brigade's entry into an area of operations can be either opposed or unopposed. In both cases, the brigade may use an intermediate staging base (ISB) to complete preparations and shorten lines of communications. Also, early deployment of FAAD weapons and sensors should be considered to protest the force from enemy RISTA aerial platforms.

a. Unopposed Entry. Unopposed entry operations generally support host nation or forward presence forces. Hostilities may be underway or imminent, but the POD is secure and under friendly control. Commanders sequence their combat forces and supporting structure into the contingency area to gain and sustain the initiative and protect the force. Actions include the following:

  • Link up with in-theater forces.
  • Prepare to assist the host nation or forward presence forces.
  • Protect the brigade and other collocated units, if required.
  • Task-organize or re-task-organize.
  • Build up the combat abilities through training, familiarization, and acclimatization of the troops to the environment.

  • Facilitate the arrival of follow-on forces.

b. Opposed Entry. Opposed entry requires the integration and synchronization of multiservice capabilities in a concerted military effort against a hostile force. It is an extremely complex and hazardous operation that risks the assault force's defeat. Natural forces such as unfavorable weather and sea states represent hazards that are not normally such dominant factors. The assault force's key advantages lie in its mobility, flexibility, ability to concentrate balanced forces, and the ability to strike with great power at a selected point in the hostile defense system. Opposed entry operations exploit the element of surprise. They also capitalize on enemy weaknesses by applying the required type and degree of force at the most advantageous times and places. The threat imposed by the existence of a US forcible entry capability induces the enemy to disperse his own forces, and in turn may result in his making wasteful efforts to defend everything. The typical sequence in this type operation is to gain, secure, and expand a lodgment as part of a larger force before continuing operations. As an assault force, the brigade deploys by various means (ground movement, parachute, helicopter, landing craft) into the objective area to seize initial assault objectives, neutralize enemy units, prepare obstacles, and secure additional LZs. The intent is to introduce additional forces as quickly as possible to secure the initial lodgment area.

2-6. OPERATIONS

Fighting battles remain the brigade's primary purpose. The fundamentals of brigade operations are discussed later in this chapter. Additional separate chapters continue this discussion for offensive, defensive, and other operations, as well as operations other than war.

2-7. WAR TERMINATION AND POST-CONFLICT OPERATIONS

When hostilities cease, or when a truce goes into effect, brigade forces transition to a period of post-conflict operations. This occurs even if residual combat operations are still underway outside the brigade's area. Planning must begin before hostilities stop. Anticipation and proper planning during this critical period are necessary to restore conditions in the AO to a state favorable to US national policy.

a. The brigade focuses on restoring order and reducing confusion that exists after combat operations end. It may assist other support forces in repairing infrastructure while continuing to prepare for redeployment. Its presence continues to contribute to the achievement of strategic goals. Tasks for the brigade may include humanitarian efforts, disaster relief, population control, and other operations other than war activities. The brigade is not well suited to extended post-conflict operations without augmentation.

b. Force protection remains paramount throughout this period. Hostilities may resume unexpectedly. Soldier discipline and the continuation of tactical protective measures will best ensure the ability of the brigade to resume combat operations quickly should the need arise.

c. Post-conflict activities span a wide range of tasks. These may include: controlling indigenous, enemy, and friendly personnel in and around the unit locations; assisting with EPW control assisting in civil affairs in populace and resource control; and retraining of forces to unit standards. Civil affairs tasks could include providing security for the host nation's people, assisting local civil police, and protecting property. Such activities contribute to restoring order and protecting the local population. Also, the brigade may be required to assist in establishing or reestablishing the essential infrastructure of the host country. During postconflict, the brigade will begin retraining and or training its own forces on critical tasks. With proper augmentation and planning, the brigade can provide specialized skills and training, which can be an immediate assistance to the host government. Usually, these skills are found within attached CS and CSS units such as the staff judge advocate, PSYOP, medical, engineers, law enforcement, signal, transportation, maintenance, and civil affairs. The brigade may also be tasked to participate in nation-assistance activities and humanitarian assistance.

d. During this stage, the brigade may begin to transfer specific responsibilities within its area of operations to external units or agencies. For example, the International Red Cross may assume responsibility for medical treatment of all non-US military personnel in the AO. Specialized military forces may be deployed by a higher headquarters or JTF commander to reestablish and control law and order. Many US and international agencies could be involved in this action. Transferring responsibilities may merely involve withdrawing from a previously occupied position. In other cases, the transfer will be more complicated. Whatever the situation, the brigade commander ensures an orderly, disciplined transfer within the AO and prepares units for redeployment or action elsewhere.

2-8. REDEPLOYMENT AND RECONSTITUTION

This stage includes two major functions: deployment back to home station or to another theater, and consolidation and reorganization as part of division reconstitution.

a. Redeployment. Redeployment is the preparation for and movement of the brigade from a theater to its designated follow-on CONUS or OCONUS base or to any other location. Commanders must contend with the same challenges as in deployment. Force protection remains critical. Redeployment activities must be planned and executed to optimize the readiness of redeploying forces and material to meet new contingencies or crises. Redeployment phases include reconstitution for strategic movement, movement to the redeployment assembly areas, movement to the POE, strategic lift, reception at the POD, and onward movement.

b. Reconstitution. Reconstitution activities include rebuilding unit integrity and accounting for soldiers and equipment. These activities continue after the force arrives in CONUS or in the home theater. The focus is on reconstituting units and their assigned equipment to premobilization levels of readiness, regenerating logistic stockpiles, and accounting for mobilized equipment and supplies.

2-9. DEPTH AND SIMULTANEOUS ATTACK

Technological advance in terms of weapons, information and communications systems makes it possible to conduct operations at the same time throughout the enemy's depth to gain synergistic effects. Depth and simultaneous attack is the simultaneous application of combat power against the enemy throughout the depth of the battlefield.

a. Objective. The objective of a simultaneous attack in depth is to accelerate the defeat of the enemy. Although this concept is not new or unique to the US Army, modern technology improves our ability to link these two concepts. US forces have the combat potential to engage enemy centers of gravity and critical combat systems throughout the depth of the battlefield in a unified effort. This presents the enemy commander with the dilemma of having to react to multiple threats. In short, it is possible for US forces to create conditions where the enemy has insufficient resources for reaction and few places to hide. The action of depth and simultaneous attack could be perceived as piecemealing combat power, as if all targets are of equal importance. By applying the principle of mass, all elements of combat power may be synchronized so that they will have the desired effect on the enemy in the shortest time. The principle of economy of force dictates that those targets which yield the most effective employment of combat power will be targeted. By applying the principles of war, simultaneous operations in depth must still maintain the nested concept relationship. In other words, the term simultaneous does not relieve the commander of his obligation to tie the purpose of supporting efforts to the main effort.

b. Planning. Simultaneous attacks in depth are normally planned by division or higher staff, but brigades must be prepared to refine those plans and execute the operation. Commanders must apply the principles of war and tenets of Army operations, concentrating the effects of combat power at critical places and times. In preparing for depth and simultaneous attack, commanders must answer the following questions:

  • Is it possible to find and identify enemy elements in near-real-time?
  • Is it possible to strike the enemy with precision and highly lethal effects, in near-real-time, at the times and places of our choosing?
  • What is the desired end state?
  • How does that end state support the purpose/intent or higher?
  • What action/sequence will result in the desired end state?
  • How should available resources be allocated/task organized?

(1) Commanders must clearly understand the composition, disposition, and intent of the enemy within his battle space. Combat formations, centers of gravity, reserves, air defenses, logistic support systems, and C3 locations must be known in the near-real-time throughout the planning phase until the time of attack.

(2) To synchronize the attack, commanders and staff must establish links between sensor/reconnaissance assets and his combat elements to ensure near-real-time engagement of critical mobile targets. Engagement areas and trigger events are specified and coordinated; long-range, secure communications and near-real-time information systems are used to control the operation.

(3) The operation must be planned to achieve specific objectives. With simultaneous attacks in depth, it is critical to tie the objectives to specific points in time or events. Subordinates must have a clear understanding of the commander's intent--especially his plan for how the attack will be synchronized.

(4) Commanders and staff must plan deception into their operation. This is critical in operations in depth, because friendly forces may be thinly spread throughout the depth of the battlefield, and will be vulnerable to massing of enemy forces. Deception should be used to prevent the enemy from understanding our intent as friendly forces move throughout the depth of the battle space.

(5) Redundancy must be planned into the operation within the capabilities of the unit. Indirect fires, CAS, and air assault forces may be used to support or augment friendly forces as long as these assets are brought in and used on the enemy within the timeline of the simultaneous attack.

(6) Rehearsals must be planned to ensure the attack is synchronized throughout the depth of the battlefield. Since a simultaneous attack in depth hinges on a near-real-time information flow, staffs are the focal point of all rehearsals. They should be well rehearsed in their role before involving troops and other combat support elements in the rehearsal.

c. Execution. In coordinating a simultaneous attack in depth, the commander executes a number of actions throughout the depth of the battlefield. These actions may include the use of organic and supporting fires, combined arms maneuver, and psychological and special operations forces. The following actions are typical of simultaneous attacks in depth:

(1) Destruction of air defense systems. The commander focuses his reconnaissance, intelligence, surveillance, and target acquisition (RISTA) assets against enemy air acquisition and air defense weapons, to free the skies for friendly infiltration.

(2) Blinding the enemy. Commanders seek to deny the enemy use of his RISTA assets, to prevent the enemy from determining the intent of friendly operations. Early deployment of FAAD weapons and sensors should be considered to protect the force from enemy RISTA aerial platoons.

(3) Winning the information war. Since a simultaneous attack depends on information flow, it is critical to gain electromagnetic-spectrum supremacy. Information channels must remain open, and efforts must be made to deny the enemy use of his information systems.

(4) Elimination of enemy indirect fires. Indirect fires pose the greatest threat to friendly troops and combat systems in simultaneous attacks in depth. Preemptive strikes and an aggressive counterbattery plan must be employed to accomplish the commander's intent for enemy indirect fire systems.

(5) Maneuver of highly mobile forces against critical targets. Commanders employ combined arms against a variety of objectives at varying depths throughout the battlefield. The rapid commitment of forces extend the decisive action of close combat throughout the battle space.

Section II
TACTICAL BATTLEFIELD FRAMEWORK

A battlefield framework helps commanders visualize how they will employ forces. At the tactical level of war, the battlefield framework consists of four interrelated concepts: area of operations, area of interest, battle space, and battlefield organization.

2-10. TERMS

The following terms are defined by FM 101-5-1:

  • Area of Operations: A geographic area assigned by a higher commander usually defined by lateral and rear boundaries.
  • Area of Interest: The area of concern to the commander, including the area of operations, areas adjacent thereto, and extending into enemy territory to the objectives of current or planned operations.
  • Battle Space: A conceptual volume determined by the maximum capabilities of a unit to acquire and physically dominate the enemy. It includes areas beyond the area of operations. It varies over time according to how the commander positions his assets.
  • Battlefield Organization: Determine the purpose and relationship of the activities of the battlefield, then determine how to arrange them.

a. Of these terms, area of operations is the easiest to understand, because it is graphically expressed through overlays from higher headquarters. Area of interest and battle space are less tangible concepts. Although battle space is described as an "intellectual" exercise, it has more limits than the area of interest. The commander must be able to physically dominate the enemy in his battle space. This "domination" is achieved by influencing activities outside the AO through observation expression of intent to supporting efforts, and planning for the use of combat multipliers in GS roles. Yet in doing so, he should consider not just the effects of his own forces, but all friendly forces, including joint and multinational. Thus, the emphasis on operations in a battle space is on unity of effort versus strict unity of command.

b. For example, the brigade, which is the division main effort, has the task of destroying the enemy on objective A (Figure 2-1). The brigade AO is defined by the boundaries on the division operations overlay. The brigade's battle space extends beyond the AO to include objectives B and C. Two supporting effort attacks from forces outside the brigade will interdict enemy forces on objectives B and C to prevent them from interfering with the main effort by reinforcing objective A. The main effort brigade commander dominates objectives B and C, even though they are outside his AO, because of his understanding of the division commander's intent, his analysis of how his main effort relates to the supporting efforts on his flanks, and his ability to communicate with those supporting efforts. Objective A is important to the enemy, and he will commit his tactical reserve to regain it.

c. Once the brigade destroys the enemy on objective A, the division commander plans for the brigade to transition to the defense. The brigade retains objective A to draw the enemy tactical reserve into an EA where it will then be destroyed by corps assets. Thus, the brigade commander's area of interest includes the enemy tactical reserve expected to eventually attack objective A. However, the enemy is currently too far away for friendly forces to influence. The enemy will only move into range to try to regain objective A. By identifying this future enemy as part of his AI, the brigade commander generates information and intelligence requirements to facilitate his planned operation.

2-11. TACTICAL BATTLEFIELD ORGANIZATION

Within the AO, the brigade commander organizes the tactical battlefield into deep, close, and rear components. Deep, close, and rear operations are not separate and distinct. Each aspect works in concert with the others to provide a synergistic effect. At the tactical-level of warfare, commanders consider all aspects of three-dimensional battle and use standard control measures to organize battlefields within their AO. Tactical battles are commonly linear with deep, close, and rear components. These components are not separate and distinct but are synchronized efforts throughout the entire tactical battle. Not only are these components synchronized, but to defeat an enemy rapidly with minimum friendly casualties, commanders may apply combat power at the same time throughout the depth of the battle area. Inherent in all these operations is a battle to protect the force.

2-12. DEEP OPERATIONS

FM 101-5-1 defines deep operations as "all actions which support the friendly scheme of maneuver and which deny to the enemy commander the ability to employ his forces not yet engaged at the time, place, or in the strength of his choice. "

a. Usually, the brigade does not execute its own deep operations, but it acts as an element of the corps or division deep battle. On occasion and only when properly resourced, the brigade can conduct its own deep operations. This conduct of deep operations is especially true in operations other than war and on noncontiguous battlefields (Figure 2-2). This is possible because deep operations are not necessarily a function of depth but they are a function of what forces are being attacked and the intent of the operation. Deep operations prevent the enemy from using his resources where and when he wants to on the battlefield. The brigade conducts deep operations if the action's purpose are as follows:

  • Limit the enemy's freedom of action.
  • Alter the tempo of operations in favor of the brigade.
  • Deny the enemy the capability to concentrate his forces.
  • Isolate the close operation.
  • Destroy the enemy's will to fight.

b. Brigades usually conduct deep operations by the concept of deep maneuver. Infantry forces may reach the enemy's rear by means of stay-behind, infiltration, airborne insertion, or air assault. The commander provides CSS for deep maneuver forces using extreme caution in order not to compromise the mission. Logistics support can be provided through task organization or through lines of communication.

2-13. CLOSE OPERATIONS

Forces in immediate contact with tile enemy are fighting close operations. These usually include reconnaissance and security actions, main and supporting efforts, and reserve actions.

a. Reconnaissance. Reconnaissance is the precursor to all operations. Reconnaissance actions yield information on the disposition of an enemy force and its intent as well as environmental conditions. Effective reconnaissance allows the commander to gain and maintain contact with the enemy as well as to direct other friendly units into the fight. Reconnaissance units will normally orient their movement on the movement of the enemy. Reconnaissance units may have to fight for information but usually avoid decisive combat.

b. Security. Security, on the other hand, protects and conserves the combat power of friendly units. Security is an inherent part of all military operations. At the tactical level, security actions protect the command against surprise attack and hostile air and ground observation. All units conduct security actions while specific units may be tasked to conduct security missions (for example, screen, guard, cover, and area security). Security forces orient their movements on the force or facility to be secured.

c. Main and Supporting Effort. The main effort is assigned to only one unit at a time. Normally, the commander visualizes the accomplishment of his unit's purpose by his main effort. If the situation changes, the commander shifts and applies combat power as necessary to reinforce his main effort or shifts the main effort completely. Designating a main effort provides the focus that each subordinate and supporting commander uses to link his actions to the action of those around him. It is part of a commander's concept that permits initiative but maintains direction and cohesion. Supporting the main effort requires synchronization of combat, CS, and CSS resources.

d. Reserve Actions. Reserves give a commander options and flexibility. Reserves provide an edge against uncertainty. Reserves exploit successes, gain opportunity, and expedite victory. They are used to weight the main effort to maintain momentum provide security, and defeat enemy counterattacks. Reserve actions are not solely in response to unforeseen enemy actions.

2-14. REAR OPERATIONS

The objective of rear operations is to ensure a freedom of maneuver and continuous (or continuity of) operations. Rear operation are numerous, complex, and continuous. Rear operations include the functions of sustainment, terrain management, movement control, and reconnaissance and security. They are usually orchestrated by the FSB commander through the rear CP.

Section III
BATTLEFIELD OPERATING SYSTEMS

A variety of functions help the commander build and sustain combat power. At the tactical level, these functions are the battlefield operating systems. Commanders integrate and coordinate these functions to synchronize battle effects in time, space, and purpose.

2-15. PERSONNEL INTELLIGENCE RESPONSIBILITIES

The commander drives the brigade's intelligence effort. The commander's role in intelligence begins before the current crisis or operation, but well before and is continuous throughout the operation. The commander focuses the intelligence effort and ensures the effort is responsive to the information requirements and to the subordinates. He does this by clearly stating the PIRs and targeting priorities. In the PIR and IR, the commander includes the requirements for intelligence support to force protection and BDA. Through the S2, the commander ensures the intelligence system, both his own and that of higher echelons, is responsive to the needs and focused on the requirements of the brigade.

a. The S2 and the DS MI company commander are a team whose mission is to provide IEW support to the commander. The team is responsible to the commander for planning and directing the intelligence activities of the brigade. The S2 is the senior intelligence officer and the primary staff officer for intelligence. The S2 directs and supervises the commander's IEW operations including counterintelligence. He also ensures the commander is supported with timely intelligence, targets, and BDA. The S2 coordinates with the S3 and FSO to ensure EW is fully integrated with fire support.

b. The commander and S2 must direct the intelligence effort daily to ensure support of the current operations and planning. This is especially important in an era of force projection operations where the brigade may deploy on short notice and have little time to prepare for the operation. In a force projection operation, the brigade could receive IEW support under the intelligence principle of split-based operations. In this principle, the brigade deploys with the brigade's DS MI company and other key intelligence personnel to form a small, flexible, tailored IEW organization with access to intelligence databases and systems outside the AO. The division G2 and ACE form an intelligence support base that provide tailored intelligence to the brigade throughout the operation. Split-based operations take advantage of long haul communications, automated intelligence processing, and direct broadcast dissemination systems. Split-based operations ensure the brigade receives continuous, timely, and relevant IEW support during all stages of force projection operations.

c. With a clear understanding of the commander's intent and course of action, the S2 integrates IEW support into all battlefield activities. The S2 supports these activities in the following manner using all available assets:

(1) Deep operations.

- Dedicating acquisition systems to support targeting, deep attack and BDA.

- Planning EW support.

- Identifying uncommitted enemy reserves and reinforcing forces.

- Conducting CI operations to deny the enemy knowledge of friendly OPLANs and preparations.

- Identifying enemy CSS and C2.

- Supporting SEAD.

(2) Close operations.

- Collecting tactical intelligence on the composition, disposition, strength, weaknesses, and intent of the enemy in contact.

- Conducting counterintelligence operations in support of force protection.

- Recommending engagement area.

- Providing predictive intelligence.

- Supporting SEAD.

(3) Rear Area Operations.

- Identifying, analyzing, and providing early warning of threats.

- Identifying, terrain that supports friendly rear area operations.

- Recommending OPSEC measures and EP to protect C2 and support areas.

d. To meet the commander's requirements, the S2 executes IEW operations within the framework of the intelligence cycle. The cycle consists of the following steps:

  • Plan and direct.
  • Collect.
  • Process.
  • Produce.
  • Disseminate.

The over-arching principle is intelligence synchronization to ensure IEW operations are linked to the commander's requirements and respond in time to influence decisions and operations.

(1) During the plan and direct step, the DS MI unit commander, in coordination with the S2, tactically tailors the MI assets available, identifying personnel, logistics (IEW specific), and communications (connectivity) requirements. The S2 concentrates on identifying, prioritizing, and validating IRs; developing collection and R&S plans; issuing specific orders and requests for collection; and monitoring the availability of collection information.

(2) During the collection step, the S2 uses the DS MI company, reinforcing MI assets, and other brigade units to execute the collection or R&S plan. Collection requirements outside the scope of the brigade are forwarded to the division G2 as RFIs.

(3) The process and production steps at the brigade level are indistinguishable. The S2 receives battlefield information from the maneuver units and support units, and also analyzed intelligence from the DS MI unit. This information is integrated, evaluated, analyzed, and synthesized into all source intelligence. The S2 disseminates current intelligence using standard reports, graphics, or verbal notification.

(4) The dissemination step is the last step where the S2 provides the intelligence reports to all brigade units, the division G2 (who makes interdistribution to current operations and the ACE), and adjacent unit S2s/G2s. The brigade S2 uses the automated terminal for dissemination to higher and adjacent and the brigade O&I net to lower. The communications architecture must be sufficiently robust to ensure a continuous push and pull of intelligence to all commanders.

e. Inherent to the intelligence cycle steps are the following intelligence tasks:

(1) Indications and warnings. Indications and warnings identify opportunities or vulnerabilities that may require immediate action. They prevent surprise through anticipation and reduce risk from enemy actions that are counter to the planning assumptions. At the brigade level this is normally conducted by execution of the R&S and collection plan. Indications and warnings alert the unit commander to move the unit from its current mission to a branch or sequel operation or to a totally different contingency.

(2) Intelligence preparation of the battlefield. An IPB is a systematic, continuous process of analyzing the threat and environment in a specific geographic area. The S2 uses the IPB process to continually assess threats to, and opportunities for, the friendly force. The process consists of the following steps:

  • Defining the battlefield environment.

  • Describing the battlefield effects.

  • Evaluating the threat.

  • Determining threat COAs.

(a) Using the IPB process, the S2 predicts threat COAs and identifies the events that will enable him to confirm or deny each threat COA.

(b) The commander uses the IPB to understand the battlefield and the options it presents to friendly and threat forces. The commander and his staff use the results to war-game threat COAs against friendly actions, evaluate future threat actions, and perform situation and target development. This generates refined intelligence requirements, which the S2 includes in the R&S plan as well as the decision support template and BOS synchronization matrix produced by the S3. These products support the commander and his staff in decision making by developing specific unit OPLANS or OPORDs. By applying the IPB process, the commander gains the information necessary to selectively apply and maximize his combat power at critical points in time and space on the battlefield. (For more information on IPB, refer to FM 34-130.)

(3) Situation development. Situation development provides an estimate of the enemy's combat effectiveness and current operations based on continuous IPB. It confirms or denies enemy COAs and explains what the enemy is doing in relation to the friendly force. In situation development the S2 uses the DST and ISM to determine the types of information needed, the degree of specificity, and the latest time the information is of value. The S2 implements intelligence synchronization through the collection plan by issuing specific orders and requests to the DS MI company. Other units of the brigade are tasked by the intelligence annex of the OPORD. The R&S tasks are listed in paragraph 3 of the order. Tasking and positioning of MI assets takes time; therefore, the S2 must anticipate future requirements. By monitoring the situation, the S2 can redirect intelligence operations for timely delivery of the intelligence required for decisions.

(4) Target development and support. Target development and support uses intelligence and precision fires to set the conditions that allows the commander to employ maneuver in a decisive phase. During IPB, the S2 identifies high-value targets that are critical to the enemy commander's success. Through war-gaming, high-value targets are nominated as high-payoff targets. The S2 advises the commander on the viability of collection against each high-payoff target. The S2 is responsible for the direct dissemination of targeting information from the collection assets to the FSE. He is involved in the entire decide-detect-deliver-assess process of lethal and nonlethal fires.

(5) Force protection. Intelligence support to force protection must identify and counter enemy intelligence collection. Counterintelligence operations identify, locate, and target an enemy's ability to target and affect friendly forces, facilities, and operations. At the brigade level, these operations are conducted by thorough counterreconnaissance throughout the brigades area of operations. The S2 must assess friendly vulnerabilities and the threat's ability to exploit those vulnerabilities. Based upon the S2's risk assessment, the S3 evaluates the risks and develops EEFIs for the commander's approval. Threats identified will prompt the commander and his staff to develop countermeasures against the threat's best opportunities.

(6) Battle damage assessment. The S2 performs BDA if the commander specifies conditions that he wants to achieve before beginning a subsequent COA. The BDA determines if the commander's operational and targeting actions have met the conditions for initiating subsequent COAs. If the desired operational conditions have not been met, BDA provides the commander with the information necessary to decide if, when, and how the targets should be reengaged. The requirement for BDA is identified early during targeting so that the S2 can ensure targets are nominated for poststrike collection.

2-16. MANEUVER

Maneuver is both an element of combat power and a principle of war. Forces undertake tactical maneuver to gain operational results. As the commander develops his concept of an operation and considers the maneuver of all his forces, he retains a balance when applying maneuver, firepower, and protection. Generating combat power on the battlefield requires combining the movement of combat forces and employment of their direct fires in combination with fire support. The brigade commander creates the conditions, largely through maneuver, that will allow his subordinate elements to accomplish the unit's purpose.

a. Although infantry brigades can operate in any environment, they are best used to exploit the advantages of restricted terrain, limited visibility, adverse weather, and urban warfare. In both the offense and the defense, infantry brigades depend on terrain for their survival. In the offense, they are employed in restrictive terrain. They infiltrate at night or conduct stay-behind operations to secure limited objectives and to attack high-payoff targets. They are well suited for air assault operations. They also close with and destroy the enemy. In the defense, infantry brigades position battalions laterally and in depth for the best use of terrain. Even in the defense, infantry brigades conduct air assault and infiltration operations. They are augmented based on the factors of METT-T. They require additional artillery, engineer, antiarmor forces, and mobility augmentation when defending against heavy enemy forces in open terrain.

b. Reconnaissance and security operations are subsets of the maneuver BOS. Reconnaissance is the precursor to all military operations. It provides information on terrain and the enemy to all commanders and staffs. Reconnaissance verifies or refutes analyzed information in IPB products. Reconnaissance missions include area, zone, route, and force-oriented reconnaissance, which are accomplished by ground (mounted or dismounted), air, or technical means.

(1) Ground reconnaissance performed close to the enemy is often high risk. However, this type of reconnaissance provides the brigade commander with an all-weather, eyes-on target capability. All units in the brigade can and do perform some sort of ground reconnaissance in the conduct of their operations.

(2) The use of air reconnaissance assets provided by division may be lower in risk, but air assets can be hampered by environmental factors. These systems can, however, cover large areas quickly.

(3) Technical means can cue other reconnaissance assets. Employing technical means is low in risk. Technical assets can cover large areas or they can be focused on precise targets.

The complementary use of all these assets provides the commanders with an accurate picture of the battlefield. The divisional brigade does not have an organic reconnaissance or security organization (separate brigades have their own cavalry troop). Therefore, the brigade relies on division and subordinate elements for reconnaissance and security. Brigades may conduct security operations (advance, flank, or rear guard) for a larger force. They may also participate as part of a division in a corps covering force. (See Chapter 5 for a discussion on defensive operations.)

2-17. FIRE SUPPORT

Fire support is the integration and synchronization of both lethal and nonlethal fires and effects to suppress, neutralize, or destroy enemy forces, combat functions, and facilities in pursuit of operational and tactical objectives. It is the collective and coordinated employment of the fires of armed aircraft, land-and sea-based indirect fire systems, and electronic warfare systems against ground targets to support land combat operations at both the operational and tactical levels.

a. Fires supporting the brigade result in the commander's ability to quickly mass combat power at the proper time and place. Fires aid the brigade commander in seizing the initiative deep, close, and rear by destroying, neutralizing, or suppressing enemy units and systems. The commander allocates fires to support his maneuver battalions by establishing proposed priority. allocation, and restrictions of each system available. (In some cases, he may allocate maneuver elements to support his fire systems.) The commander establishes the purpose. This important step does not have to be in fire support language, but the FSCOORD must understand what the commander wants from his fires.

b. The Army does not fight alone. The Army achieves victory quicker and with fewer casualties with the integration of its own fire capabilities with sister services and multinational partners. Joint and combined fires can support Army operations at all levels. (Army corps and divisions may provide fires for the joint or combined force.) During entry operations, joint (or combined) fires provide the core fire support and interdiction capabilities for the brigade. Once the brigade establishes a lodgment and as soon as force packaging allows, divisional assets will augment joint fires. In early entry operations, joint fires capabilities are critical in providing protection for the force.

c. The key to receiving timely and effective joint fires is getting into the joint targeting cycle. Fire planners use a decide-detect-deliver-assess targeting model and understand the targeting cycle used in joint operations. The fire planner must comply with the sister service time requirements for submitting requests. All requests must be prioritized.

d. Functions within this BOS such as establishing support coordination measures, SEAD, use of Army aviation and control measures that overlap with other BOS and require detailed coordination and control.

2-18. MOBILITY AND SURVIVABILITY

The battlefield operating system includes both engineer and NBC functions. Specifically, it addresses mobility, countermobility, survivability smoke, and NBC defense operations. These actions provide mobility to division units, degrade the enemy's ability to move on the battlefield and provide protective emplacements for personnel and equipment.

a. Mobility, countermobility, and survivability operations are planned consistent with the commander's intent and complement the concept of operation. They support the brigade's deep, close, and rear fights--both in the offense and in the defense. Engineers must be active players in the IPB process, mass to support the main effort, require external support, and coordinate the control of obstacles.

b. Mobility operations consist of breaching both friendly and enemy minefield and obstacles, gap crossing, maintaining supply routes, preparing combat trails between battle positions, and supporting forward aviation units. Countermobility operations attack the enemy's ability to execute his plan. These operations use terrain, friendly and enemy-emplaced obstacles to disrupt enemy combat formations, and interfere with enemy command and control. These operation confuse enemy commanders. Optimally, countermobility is accomplished with a full integration of obstacles and fires. Slowing enemy movement creates opportunities that other combat systems can exploit.

c. Maneuver commanders ensure that obstacles support their intent, mission, and scheme of maneuver but do not degrade their friendly mobility. Well-planned countermobility operations are combat multipliers that enhance the effects of friendly direct and indirect fires.

d. Survivability operations consist primarily of preparing fighting and protective positions. Survivability operations also include NBC defenses.

2-19. AIR DEFENSE

The brigade air defense operations consist of all activities that nullify or degrade the effects of enemy air and missile attacks and surveillance on friendly units, supplies, and facilities. These operations include passive measures and coordination with Army, Air Force, Navy and Marine aviation, and the fire support BOS for A2C2 integration. All units in the brigade conduct active and passive air defense. Air defense assets are limited and must be integrated into the brigade scheme of maneuver and in concert with the division air defense plan. The air defense system identifies and engages enemy aerial platforms before the force is attacked. The air defense BOS is also concerned with the following:

  • Aerial portion of the S2's IPB.
  • Targeting enemy air bases and air fields.
  • Allocating air defense weapons and sensors.
  • Early warning.
  • Advising the force on CAAD.

Any actions taken pertaining to these items are based on the commander's ADA priorities.

2-20. COMBAT SERVICE SUPPORT

The brigade CSS system must support the overall intent and concept of the commander. Sustaining the brigade fight requires all CSS elements to adhere to the sustainment imperatives of anticipation, integration, continuity, responsiveness, and improvisation CSS elements of the brigade are integrated into the command and control system so that they can shift support effort to the critical place and time to weight the battle. Sustainment operations enable the brigade commander to mass combat power. Before tactical operations, the brigade commander establishes criteria for the withdrawal of units for reconstitution. The division reconstitution effort focuses on the reorganization of organic assets to quickly return to combat. A unit's combat capability equates to its ability to continue to fight effectively--a function of availability leadership, manned and operable systems, and morale. (See Chapter 9 for a more detailed discussion of CSS.)

2-21. BATTLE COMMAND

The concept of battle command was introduced in the 1993 edition of FM 100-5 and expands the Army's notion of C2. Battle command distinguishes the essence of command from its implementing functions. While battle command includes previous thoughts on command and control, but it incorporates the art and the science of decision making and leadership to accomplish missions. Battle command emphasizes the subjective aspects of war fighting and, therefore, focuses on the human dimension. (For a detailed discussion of the concept of battle command to brigade operations, see Chapter 3 of this manual.)



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