The AirLand Battle will be
fought throughout the depth of the battlefield. Operations in
the rear include efforts to secure the force, neutralize or defeat
enemy operations in the rear, and secure freedom of action in
the deep and close battles. The brigade commander is responsible
for plans and operations throughout the brigade area of operations.
He assigns tasks to subordinate and supporting commanders to accomplish
all brigade missions. The brigade S3 includes detailed planning
for the entire rear area as part of operational planning for offensive
and defensive missions.
The FSB commander is responsible
for BSA security and terrain management. His goals in this area
include the following:
Secure the BSA and facilities.
Minimize enemy interference
Minimize enemy interference
in support operations.
- Ensure freedom of movement of friendly troops throughout the BSA. This will involve control of dislocated civilians which is coordinated with the division G5 through the DISCOM headquarters.
Defeat Level I threats and
respond appropriately to Level II and III threats as discussed
in this chapter.
Provide and coordinate area
The FSB commander is responsible
for BSA security. As such he has command and control of all elements
in the BSA for defense and positioning. Normally, the BSA is a
base cluster with the FSB commander as the base cluster commander.
The major elements in the BSA become unit bases. The senior individual
in each base is the base commander. The FSB SOP will cover as
many defense procedures as possible. Each base will be given specific
responsibilities in the OPORD. Guidance for these responsibilities
is given in this chapter.
In addition, all ground units
entering the brigade area must report to the brigade rear CP and
the FSB CP to coordinate routes, terrain, communications, and
CSS. The rear CP will contact the main command post to confirm
the operational aspects of the coordination.
The S2/S3 section of the FSB
CPis the base cluster operations center. The FSB CP is collocated
with the brigade rear CP within the BSA defensive perimeter. Alternate
BCOCs should also be designated. Possibilities include the FSB
company CPs and maneuver battalion field trains. In urban terrain,
the FSB S2/S3 may have to establish subordinate base clusters
and BCOCs within the BSA. One of these may be designated the alternate
Each base will send a representative
to the BCOC staff meetings. In addition, the BCOC will issue a
situation report on a regular basis, twice daily if possible.
The report will provide intelligence updates, reporting requirements,
and impending BSA movement orders.
Communications for BSA security
will be conducted by wire, radio, signals, and personal contact.
The primary means will be wire. Each base will be required to
establish a wire linkup to the BCOC. The BCOC will operate a switchboard
24 hours a day. Other elements located in the BSA are responsible
for laying wire from their CPs to the BCOC. The ADA and field
artillery units in the BSA will have direct wire communications
with the BCOC to provide early warning of enemy aircraft and to
facilitate calls for fire. A sample wire net is shown in Figure
Ideally, the FSB would also
operate a separate rear operations radio net. However, availability
of radios is not likely to permit this. Therefore, if wire communications
are lost, units will monitor the FSB command net which will serve
as the BCOC radio net. If communications by these means are lost,
the tenant activities are responsible for sending a messenger
to the BCOC to provide coordination.
In addition, units in the
BSA cannot rely on wire and FM communications to relay alert status.
Too much time would pass before every soldier received the message.
The FSB should establish readily recognizable signals that are
easy to initiate. For example, the warning for an NBC attack could
be a pyrotechnic signal which could be relayed quickly with voice,
hand and arm, or horn signals. Similar signals should
be specified in the SOP for air and ground attacks or to change frequencies. Detailed
information and instructions would follow by radio, wire, or messenger.
The all-clear signal would only be passed via command channels.
Like all other Army forces,
the FSB must perform IPB. The FSB's interest is twofold. First, the sustainment planning
considerations described in Chapter 2 are based on the FSB's knowledge
of the enemy (for example, his projected use of chemical munitions
affects the FSB's stockage of MOPP gear) the weather (fog may
make aerial resupply impossible), and the terrain (lack of adequate
road nets may mandate evacuation by air). Related to but distinct from
the support, implications of IPB are the rear operations considerations.
For BSA security , the FSB commander along with his staff, must
analyze the terrain and weather and integrate this information
with knowledge of the enemy. This enables the commander to identify
probable target areas and activities. He can then predict probable
courses of action to plan security operations.
The concept of OCOKA is used
to analyze terrain. OCOKA refers to Observation and fields of
fire, Concealment and cover Obstacles, Key terrain, and Avenues
of approach.. The FBS commander will rely heavily on information
from the brigade S2for terrain analysis. The division is supported
by a direct support terrain team which provides information to
the G2 for IPB. The G2 passes it to the brigades and DISCOM HQ.
Line of sight is required
in the BSA for radios, ground and air observers' vision, air defense
target acquisition, and fields of fire for the BSA's direct fire
Concealment is protection
from air and ground observation. Cover is protection from effects
of fire. These considerations are closely related to observation
and fields of fire. The FSB S2/S3 must determine what possibilities
the terrain offers to both friendly and enemy forces. This analysis
is vital to elements in the BSA in view of the limited weapons
available and numerous personnel and items of equipment in the
area. In built-up areas, BSA elements are likely to occupy buildings
to maximize cover and concealment. Buildings significantly reduce
heat signature. However, this technique is not effective in all
areas of the world. Planners must take into account the soundness
of buildings, availability of basements, and adequacy of the surrounding
road net to accommodate traffic for CSS and self-defense operations.
Obstacles are natural and
man-made features that stop, impede, or divert movement. Since
one of the FSB's functions is to ensure freedom of movement for
friendly forces in the rear, the FSB must be familiar with all
existing obstacles and what the effects of removing, overcoming,
or bypassing them would be. Weather effects on trafficability
also act as obstacles.
Any feature that provides
a tactical advantage is key terrain. Whether a particular feature
is key or not varies with the tactical situation. However, features
which may be key terrain features include bridges, fording sites,
high ground, choke points, and road junctions. Not only must BSA
elements optimize use of these features when available, but also
they must recognize the enemy will frequently concentrate its
efforts on these areas.
Avenues of approach are ground
and air routes by which a force may reach an objective or key
terrain feature. Considerations for avenues of approach in the
rear are their capabilities to support movement of CS and CSS
elements with their supported units and to allow rapid enemy movement
into our rear. Commanders must avoid obvious armor and helicopter
avenues of approach.
Weather affects mobility and
the functioning of virtually all items of equipment, as well as
the performance of personnel. Terrain and weather are considered
concurrently. Again, the FSB depends on the G2/S2 channels to
pass weather analysis information from the division weather team.
The five aspects of weather that affect planning are temperature
and humidity, precipitation, wind, clouds, and visibility.
Very high temperatures cause
heat injuries and increased engine wear and failure. Very low
temperatures increase cold weather injuries, damage to engines
and cooling systems, lubrication problems, and fuel requirements.
Cooler temperatures and humidity cause fog.
Precipitation affects mobility,
visibility, and effectiveness of personnel and equipment. It also
affects the quality of some stored material. Snow, even in small
amounts, reduces the effectiveness of mines. FSB planners should
consider precipitation of more than 0.1 inch per hour or 2 inches
in 12 hours critical. Six inches of snow accumulation or drifts
higher than 2 feet will have severe effects on mobility.
Wind usually favors the upwind
force by blowing dust, smoke, sand, rain, or snow on the downwind
force. It affects employment of NBC munitions, smoke, and conventional
Clouds affect air operations.
This includes logistics air missions, but also our own close air
support, as well as the enemy's ability to conduct airborne or
air assault operations in the BSA.
Though poor visibility limits
employment of airborne forces, agents and special purpose force
operations often rely on it to reduce the effectiveness of our
rear area security. Poor visibility hinders control and reduces
effectiveness of reconnaissance, surveillance, and target acquisition.
Threat evaluation is a detailed study of the enemy forces. It considers their organization, tactical doctrine, equipment, and support systems. The FSB's interest for security purposes is in rear area threat evaluation. The FSB S2/S3 prepares a doctrinal template to reflect the enemy's air assault, airborne, operational maneuver group, and special purpose force employment doctrine. Other rear area threats (insurgents, guerrillas, terrorists, agents, and potential civil unrest) cannot be depicted in a doctrinal template. For these threats, an unconventional warfare situation map and population status overlay are prepared. The situation map shows probable operating areas, headquarters, encampments, and movement routes for unconventional forces. The rear area population status overlay shows areas with a high potential for civil unrest or with concentrations of enemy sympathizers. The overlay also shows where psychological operations would and would not be effective.
Once the threat evaluation
is complete, this information is integrated with weather and terrain
factors to determine how the threat is likely to operate in our
rear areas. Again, the brigade S2 will evaluate the threat and
advise the brigade S3. He will perform threat integration for
the entire rear area; the FSB commander must ensure threat integration
for the BSA is coordinated with the brigade. Due to the limited
resources available to the FSB commander to defeat the threat,
he must identify specific areas of interest. These may include
Landing zones and drop zones.
Key road junctions.
Small groups of individuals
attempting to move through or evade detection in the BSA.
Areas with insurgency sites.
Terrorist operating or headquarters
Detailed information on IPB
is in FM 34-10.
The FSB's responsibility for
BSA security makes it imperative that the FSB CP and brigade staff
maintain a close relationship. Intelligence information possessed
by the brigade with implications for BSA security must be passed
to the FSB S2/S3. In addition, he receives information from DISCOM
S2 channels. However, intelligence gathering should not be restricted
to these sources. Local authorities, dislocated
civilians, and local civilians are valuable intelligence sources.
Information may also be obtained from base commanders within the
BSA, military police, truckers, customers, elements of the MI
battalion in the BSA, and any other elements moving into the area.
In addition, information should
flow laterally as well as vertically. For instance, while medical company personnel must pass
information like task force casualty estimates to the FSB S2/S3,
they should also notify other FSB companies simultaneously whenever
The elements located in the
BSA vary with a number of factors. The FSB commander and staff
will coordinate with the brigade S4 to determine who will be in
the BSA. The list below is a representative example of division
elements that could be expected to locate in the BSA:
Brigade rear CP.
FSB supply company CP.
Class I point.
Class III point.
Class II, IV, and VII point.
Ammunition transfer point.
Salvage collection point.
GRREG collection point.
FSB maintenance company CP.
Class IX point.
FSB medical company CP.
Medical clearing station.
Class VIII point.
Military police platoon.
EPW collection point.
Military intelligence team.
ADA battery (-).
Forward signal platoon (-).
Field artillery battalion
Maneuver battalion task force
Some of the BSA tenants can
be expected to always locate in the BSA, for example the brigade
rear CP and the FSB company headquarters. Others may move in and
out of the BSA depending on METT-T. Examples may be the division
military intelligence elements and the decontamination platoon.
In addition, the maneuver battalion task force field trains may
not always be located in the BSA.
In some cases, trains may
not be echeloned. In other cases, field trains may be located
closer to the battalion troops than to the FSB elements, and it
may not be feasible to integrate them into the BSA security plan.
Sometimes terrain features may make such integration impractical.
In short, although the field trains will normally locate in the
BSA, they must not be expected to be there when support or tactical
considerations make another location more favorable.
In all cases, the composition
of BSA elements will not remain static. The FSB must be able to
track and control changes. To accomplish this, all ground units
entering the brigade area must send a representative to report
to the brigade rear CP and FSB CP. They will coordinate movement
routes, positioning for units locating in the BSA, communications,
support requirements and procedures, and security responsibilities
and arrangements. Guards at points of entry into the BSA will
direct representatives of entering units to the rear CP/FSB CP
location. Also, base commanders will notify the BCOC of all LOGPAC
arrivals and departures. Movement of displaced civilians and local
civilians must also be controlled.
Not only are changes in the
elements located in the BSA occurring, but also changes are constantly
taking place within the elements. MSTs in the UMCPs will vary
in composition. Medical evacuation elements constantly move in
and out of the BSA. Supply elements are involved in resupply efforts.
Personnel available for defense actions may be extremely limited
within certain bases. Base commanders must keep the BCOC informed
of their situations.
Locations of elements within
the BSA will vary depending on METT-T. Figure 5-2 presents one
possible arrangement. Though the FSB commander and S2/S3 must
use their best judgment in positioning units, some general guidelines
to be considered include --
Position the brigade rear
CP/FSB CP near the center of the BSA perimeter for C2 and security
Position field trains forward
in the BSA near routes between supply points and combat trains.
Ensure field trains and other
bases locate their CPs near the rear of their bases, closer to
the BCOC to enhance communications and protection of C2 facilities.
Balance the advantages of
dispersion (reduced destruction from a single enemy strike) with
the disadvantages (C3 constraints and extended perimeter). In
general, though specific situations may dictate otherwise, the
BSA can be expected to occupy an area 4 to 7 kilometers in diameter.
Make supply points accessible
to both customers and resupply vehicles and helicopters.
Keep class III points away
from other supplies to prevent contamination. They should also
be located at least 100 feet from water sources.
Locate the ATP at least 180
meters from other supplies and 620 meters from the nearest inhabited
Position GRREG and salvage
points near the MSR possibly near the ATP to maximize backhaul
missions of vehicles used for ammunition supply.
Locate the class I point near
the water point whenever water sources allow.
Locate the clearing station
away from likely target areas (ATP, class III point, bridges,
road junctions) but near evacuation routes and an open area for
landing air ambulances.
- Locate maintenance sites to be accessible to customers, including recovery/ evacuation vehicles.
- Locate maintenance sites to be accessible to customers, including recovery/ evacuation vehicles.
Ensure maintenance shops,
along with parking and equipment holding sites are on firm ground
Position the signal platoon
and MP platoon headquarters near the FSB CP to enhance supportand security.
Position the ATP adjacent
to the maintenance company site to allow the maintenance company,
which has the most self defense assets in the FSB, to provide
protection for the austerely staffed ATP.
Position the ATP near the
rear of the BSA and near but off the MSR so that the large numbers
of corps trailers bringing ammunition into the area do not clog
up the MSR within the BSA. The ATP requires sufficient area to
perform transload operations without interfering with BSA traffic.
Position units with heaviest
fire-power, such as the maintenance company, along the most
threatening avenues of approach.
In addition to the C2 relationships
discussed above, the FSB CP must ensure proper coordination is
maintained with the elements discussed below. Due to the limited
assets available to the BSA, the BCOC must coordinate all minefield,
obstacles, and artillery fires within the BSA. One technique that
may be used is to arrange in advance to have designated field
artillery and ADA representatives (and perhaps the MP platoon
leader) automatically report to the BCOC when the threat status
reaches a predetermined level.
The BCOC will develop the
fire planning required to implement the execution of fire support
for the BSA. The FSB S2/S3 will coordinate fires with the BSA
FSO designated by the field artillery battalion commandeer. Together,
they will plan targets for the BSA defense and help establish
preplanned engagement areas for artillery and close air support.
These fires will be coordinated with the brigade fire support
coordinator, through the service battery or directly from the
BCOC to the main CP. Targets are placed in the TACFIRE systems
for both brigade and division implementation. Artillery (and ADA)
overlays must include displaced civilian camps, routes, and information
on arts, monuments, and archives.
Calls for fire from the bases
are made to the BCOC via field phones. If phones are not available,
FM radio will be used. As previously mentioned, a direct line
will link the BCOC and FA service battery CP. Calls will be made
in accordance with procedures detailed in FM 6-30. An aerial fire
support officer may be on call to adjust fires as necessary. TC
25-4-1 gives details on planning and conducting fire coordination
The BSA must be protected
from enemy air strikes. ADA assets likely to be available in the
BSA are Stingers if the BSA is one of the main defensive priorities.
The FSB S2/S3 will coordinate with the Stinger section chief for
BSA defensive fires. Assets are positioned to cover anticipated
air avenues of approach. The FSB S2/S3 posts locations of the
systems and air corridors covered on his sector sketch. The ADA
base in the BSA will run a line to the BCOC. This will ensure
early warning of all inbound aircraft. In addition, although
not located in the BSA, HAWK and Patriot units may be assigned
sectors that encompass the BSA and support ADA fires within the
BSA. The FSB S2/S3 will also coordinate with the brigade S3 through
the rear CP to identify safe air corridors for logistics air missions
and to ensure all ADA assets are aware of impending friendly air
movements in and around the BSA. ADA operations are discussed
in FM 44-3.
When engineer assets are located
in the BSA, they will be made available to the BCOC for survivability
and countermobility operations. Therefore, the FSB S2/S3 must
be prepared to take advantage of assets as they become available.
Along with an engineer designated by the brigade engineer, he
will plan barriers and minefield according to guidelines and principles
presented in FMs 5-100 and 5-102.
A direct support military
police platoon is usually operating from the BSA. The battlefield
missions performed by this platoon may include battlefield circulation
control, area security, operation of the EPW point, and law enforcement.
Battlefield circulation control
is performed along MSRs and in and around the BSA. MPs use traffic
control points, mobile patrols,and temporary road signs to accomplish
this mission. Coordination between MPs and the FSB CP is essential
to ensure movement in the area is controlled. Displaced civilian
control and coordination with the local government must be included
The area security mission
of the MPs is vital to rear operations. MPs employed in the brigade
rear provide a light, mobile force that can move, shoot, and communicate.
Their mobility makes it possible for them to detect the threat
as they aggressively patrol road nets and key terrain features
throughout the rear area. Their organic communications enable
them to advise the rear CP, base clusters, bases, and moving units
of impending enemy activity. MPs may also be used for convoy security
and to protect static positions as required. However, when used
in this manner, missions which capitalize on MP mobility are degraded.
MPs conduct collection, evacuation,
and internment operations to support their EPW mission. The EPW
point holds EPWs captured by brigade units until they can be evacuated
to the division central collection point. FM 19-40 covers EPW
operations in detail.
Law and order operations are
only performed when the brigade commander requires them and the
tactical situation permits. This mission is usually the lowest
priority during war.
The brigade commander sets
priority of missions for the DSMP platoon. However, in some cases
the brigade commander will give tasking authority to the FSB commander
to support the area security mission and battlefield circulation
control aspect of the terrain management mission. The FSB commandeer
must use this asset to maximum advantage. Details on MP platoon
operations are in 19-4.
The FSB commander is responsible
for integrating base defense plans into a base cluster defense
plan. As discussed, this requires development of a rear operations
communications system and coordination with field artillery, engineer,
ADA, and MP units. As part of the terrain management function,
the FSB S2/S3 assigns a defensive position and a sector to each
base in the BSA. Bases on likely avenues of enemy approach are
given a smaller sector. The S2/S3 tries to ensure each base's
sector of fire overlaps the adjacent base's sector. He does this
by checking sector sketches provided by bases or personally coordinating
with base commandeers. Gaps are covered by planning for fires,
obstacles, patrols, OPs, or sensors. The FSB S2/S3 must carefully
coordinate this planning with each base to avoid having troops
engage friendly forces.
The BSA defense plan must
be integrated into the plan for the entire brigade rear. This
requires the BCOC to coordinate with the brigade S3 for the overall
plan. It must also coordinate directly with other BCOCs in the
brigade rear to plan mutually supporting fires and to prevent
firing upon each other.
The S2/S3 keeps a sketch of
the defensive plan. It shows base sectors of fire, locations of
mines and obstacles, planned indirect fire coverage, OPs, patrol
routes, and positions of automatic and antiarmor weapons. These
weapons will include those in the BSA for repair. If the firing
system is operable, these weapons should be included in the BSA
defensive scheme, and mechanics should work on them in their fighting
positions. Whenever possible, units should occupy the same location
within the BSA relative to the other units every time the BSA
moves. They should build a habitual relationship with the units
on all sides of them. This will expedite coordination of sectors
of fire. Since night vision devices are likely to be scarce, illumination
plans must also be included in the overall BSA security plan.
Details on sector defense planning are in FM 19-4.
In addition, the BCOC must
plan for a BCOC reaction force from assets in the FSB. This force
will be called upon when a base's defenses cannot defeat the threat
and MPs and combat forces from the brigade are not immediately
available. As a minimum, the reaction force should include personnel
equipped with machine guns, grenade launchers, rifles, FM radios,
and vehicles. The FSB S2/S3 must carefully equip the reaction
force. Removal of scarce assets such as machine guns from the
defensive perimeter when the reaction force is assembled must
be considered and integrated into the defense plan. During periods
of increased readiness, the reaction force should be assembled
for immediate response. It must be well rehearsed and able to
react precisely and immediately. Rally points, battle positions,
and detailed procedures must be planned and practiced in advance.
The BCOC must ensure that
all base commanders understand the different threat levels and
the associated actions. The brigade staff must also be aware that
the FSB is neither staffed nor equipped to continue support operations
at normal levels while responding to increased levels of threat.
Support will be degraded. How much it is degraded will depend
on the level of the threat.
Level I threats are those
which can be defeated by base or base cluster self-defense measures.
They normally involve the activities of agents, saboteurs, and
terrorists. Typical actions the BCOC will require in such situations
include manning OPs fully, increasing guards and spot-checking
vehicles, tightening base security, alerting defensive perimeter
personnel, and increasing protection of key facilities. The degradation
of support will depend on the actions directed by the individual
BCOC in specific conditions. However, as a general planning guide,
the FSB can estimate that the 75 percent of available assets will
be engaged in support operations, while 25 percent defend.
Level II threats are those
beyond base or base cluster self-defense capabilities. They can,
however, be defeated by response forces, normally MPs with supporting
fires. They normally involve --
Diversionary and sabotage
operations by unconventional forces.
Raid, ambush, and reconnaissance
operations by small combat units.
Special or unconventional
A tactical combat force is
required to defeat a Level III threat. Level III threats normally
Penetration by enemy forces
from the main battle area.
Ground force deliberate operations
(for example, operational maneuver groups with linkup of smaller
airborne and assault units).
The BCOC determines the level
of threat and issues prearranged alerts to all bases. The BCOC
also determines the probability of an air attack and issues air
The BCOC should also have
planned in advance emergency move procedures. If the FSB is under
imminent danger from a Level II or III threat, the BCOC will call
for an emergency move of key BSA assets. Key elements should be
identified in advance and prepared to move to a predesignated
site with minimum notice. The commander designates key FSB elements
as required. These will likely include C2, ATP, class III, emergency
medical treatment, and austere maintenance elements. Emergency
destruction of equipment and supplies (excluding class VIII) is
performed to avoid enemy capture. Priority items for destruction
will probably include COMSEC items fuel, ammunition, vehicles,
communications equipment, and weapons. Additional information
on emergency moves is in Appendix A.
Other duties of the BCOC are
to identify primary and secondary entry points into the BSA and
designating preplanned landing zones for brigade reaction forces
to use when required. The BCOC will also conduct regular (preferably
daily) meetings with base representatives to update the defensive
The elements in the BSA are
organized into bases for self-defense. Normally, each FSB company
and each maneuver and field artillery battalion field trains in
the BSA will constitute a base. Miscellaneous small teams will
be assigned to a base by the BCOC. The base commander is responsible
for preparing the base defense plan and coordinating with the
BCOC. Each base must be capable of defending itself against a
Level I threat and delaying a Level II threat until the reaction
force arrives. If a base is faced with a Level II threat, it must
take action to prevent critical supplies and equipment from falling
into enemy hands, defend itself as long as possible, and avoid
Base commanders are responsible
for the following:
Coordinate with the base on
each side to plan mutually supporting fires and to avoid troops
engaging each other. If a problem exists in that area, the base
commander will notify the BCOC.
Assign each individual a fighting
position. Positions should provide overhead cover. Positions must
also allow interlocking sectors of fire.
Ensure proper individual fighting
positions are prepared. Soldiers should use all available cover.
Positions should provide frontal protection from direct fire while
allowing fire to the front and oblique. Protection from indirect
fire requires a depression or hole at least 1 1/2 feet deep. Details
on fighting positions are in FM 5-103.
Deploy crew-served weapons
in fighting positions with primary and secondary sectors of fire.
They cover the most likely enemy approaches. Instructions for
preparing positions for each type of crew-served weapon are also
in FM 5-103. The base commander must ensure each weapon has an
adequate range card. Identify target reference points to be able
to direct fire against approaching ground or air enemy forces.
Deploy all weapon-carrying
vehicles on the base perimeter. As discussed previously, this
includes combat vehicles in the BSA for repair.
Ensure vehicles are properly
positioned. Natural cover and concealment are used as much as
possible. Frontal parapets may be used with vehicles on the perimeter
Setup observation posts and
listening posts. The FSB cannot constantly occupy a full perimeter
and perform its mission. Early warning is imperative. Therefore,
OPs and LPs are critical. OPs must provide a good view of the
sector, which ideally overlaps with the adjacent OP sectors. Both
the OPs/LPs and routes to them must provide cover and concealment.
They should not be in positions that attract attention (such as
isolated groups of trees) or on the very peaks of hills where
positions would be silhouetted. Further guidance on OPs may be
found in FMs 19-4 and 17-98.
Establish patrols when required.
Enforce noise and light discipline.
Ensure camouflage is used
properly. Guidance can be found in FM 5-20.
Plan and establish hasty obstacles.
Create a base reaction force
to respond immediately against a threat within the base. Ensure
the force has covered and concealed routes to each sector on the
Ensure soldiers know alert
signals and proper responses to artillery and air attacks. Since
soldiers are not continuously occupying the perimeter, they must
be well trained to quickly respond to early warnings.
Prepare sector sketches and
provide to the BCOC. These will be updated at regular BCOC meetings.
Sketches will include major terrain features, weapon positions,
and OP positions.
Whenever engineer assets are
available, fuel tankers and drums are protected by berms or deep-cut
protective positions. Natural terrain concealment and camouflage
nets are also used. Class I, II, and IV items are protected in
deep-cut trenches if time allows, but construction of trenches
for those items is a low priority. Traffic control must include
measures to conceal movement at, to, and from supply points. At
water points, control of spills and drainage is required to avoid
standing pools of water which reflect light. As discussed in Appendix
D, night resupply is used to maximize the concealment of darkness.
In the base company area,
individual positions are prepared near billeting areas and on
the periphery of work stations. Simple cut-and-cover or other
expedient shelters are constructed next to key shop facilities
for quick protection from artillery and air attacks.
The role of the medical company must be carefully considered by the FSB commander. There are three possibilities. First, the clearing station may be located near the center of the BSA to be protected by surrounding bases. This increases the size of the BSA without adding any defenders to man the perimeter. This also increases traffic movement in the middle of the BSA. A second option is to assign a sector of the BSA perimeter to the medical company. Medical personnel can carry individual small arms for their own defense and the defense of the wounded and sick in their charge against those not acting in accordance with the law of land warfare. However, the duty of medical personnel is to care for the sick, wounded, and injured. In addition, to questions on conformance with the Geneva Convention accord, the commander must realize the perimeter sector assigned to the medical company would have no crew-served weapons. The final option is to locate the clearing station away from the rest of the FSB. It is then essentially protected by the enemy's compliance with the Geneva Convention. In view of the medical company's mission to provide area support to units in the BSA and the constant coordination required with BSA elements, this option may not be feasible under most circumstances.
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