|
|
| This appendix implements STANAG 2103/QSTAG 187, Edition 6, and STANAG 2104/QSTAG 189, Edition 6. |
This appendix addresses
the following areas of concern for fire support planners on the
AirLand battlefield:
-
Deep operations.
-
Close operations.
-
Rear operations.
-
Counterfire.
-
Suppression of enemy air
defenses.
-
Nuclear operations.
To successfully conduct a
deep attack, the FSCOORD, G2, and G3 must cooperate fully to keep
the proper emphasis on deep operations.
In the offense, a deep attack
is conducted primarily by fire to isolate, immobilize, and weaken
the enemy in depth in order to sustain the momentum of the attack.
In such an attack, fires are planned to block the movement of
enemy reserves.
In the defense, the deep attack
may be conducted by fires and/or by maneuver forces.
In either the offense or the
defense, fires are planned to degrade and disrupt enemy--
-
Attacking echelons.
-
Fire support.
-
Command, control, and communications.
-
Combat support and combat
service support.
Lance missiles, Army tactical
missile system (ATACMS), EW, attack helicopters, and BAI are the
primary tools used to provide long-range deep attack fires. When
maneuver elements are used in the deep attack, artillery may be
required to accompany the force. When field artillery accompanies
the maneuver force in the deep attack, fire support considerations
include the following:
-
Mutual support must be planned
for FA units equipped with automated fire support equipment.
-
Extended communications lines
are required between the MBA force artillery and the accompanying
artillery units.
-
Ammunition expenditure will
be large.
-
Maneuver force assistance
may be needed to ensure security and survivability of FA units.
-
Target acquisition and intelligence-gathering
assets will be taxed because of distances, frequency, and speed
of moves.
-
Logistical support to include
recovery, repair, and resupply, constrain the force.
-
Mobility of FA units must
match that of the maneuver force.
-
Command and control problems
are inherent in any force operating at extended ranges horn its
parent organization.
-
Simultaneous interdiction
fires using long-range weapon systems must be planned to add weight
to the attack.
When the deep attack force has outdistanced the MBA artillery, organic mortars, accompanying artillery, and CAS provide most of the fire support for the force.
Successful deep operations
create the conditions for future victory. The following factors
must be considered in planning for deep operations:
-
Deception.
-
Deep surveillance and target
acquisition.
-
Interdiction by ground or
air fires, ground or aerial maneuver, special operations forces
(SOFs), or any combination thereof.
-
Command, control, and communications
countermeasures.
-
Command and control.
A sample of a deep operations
plan format is shown below. Individuals or elements shown in parentheses
indicate responsibility for information in the paragraphs.
At the operational level,
close operations include the efforts of large tactical formations
- corps and army groups, joint or unified headquarters - to win
current battles. At the tactical level, close operations include
the efforts of smaller tactical units to win current engagements.
Among the activities typically making up close operations are
the following:
-
Maneuver (including deep maneuver).
-
Close combat (including close
air support).
-
Indirect-fire support (including
counterfire).
-
Combat support and combat
service support of committed units.
-
Command and control.
Timely fire planning provides
adequate fire support to protect our forces in the close and rear
battles. At the same time, it keeps the enemy from effectively
developing his own operations by providing for deep attack of
targets, which would interfere with our battle plan. The process
by which this is achieved includes the following:
-
The formulation of a fire
plan to coordinate the allocation of resources. This includes
the allocation of GS artillery and details of control arrangements
and proposals for the use of TACAIR. Thus, the fire plan can be
modified to meet changing requirements.
-
The acquisition of information
and high-payoff targets and the passing and processing of that
information.
-
The consideration of weapon
resources available and the selection of the most suitable weapons
to attack the targets.
In any fire planning, there
are certain common guidelines.
The basic principle of mass
must be kept in mind when making a fire plan. It can be achieved
only by a proper organization for combat, proper selection of
weapons and ammunition, and, in some cases, the amendment of a
tactical plan.
The provision of adequate
fire support depends on flexibility, both in planning before and
control during the event. It is also necessary to allow for modifications
in the fire plan to cater to unforeseen circumstances.
A simple fire plan is easier
and quicker to produce, has a better chance
of being understood by all concerned, and is easier to modify
if necessary.
Surprise in defense and attack
may be prejudiced by the preparations for supporting fire and
by the use of stereotype methods. To avoid loss of surprise, careful
consideration must be given to the amount of prior adjustment
of fire that may be carried out. Some may be essential if fire
is to be brought down close to our own troops. In other cases,
it may be advantageous to accept a proportion of nonadjusted fire,
especially if it can be adjusted by observation during the actual
engagement of the target. The ideal, of course, is to bring down
accurate fire without any obvious preparation. This requires accurate
and common survey between target acquisition sensors and attack
systems.
Many weapons are used to produce
fire support, and their differing characteristics are designed
for a specific task or tasks. The weapons available must be considered
as a whole, each complementing the other. At division level, the
main weight of fire support comes from the division- and corps-allotted
field artillery. Yet, to make a fire plan first with field artillery
and then to add air, mortar, and naval gunfire results in a badly
balanced plan that fails to make the best use of available resources.
Fire support must be coordinated so that each weapon plays the
part for which it is best suited.
The supply of ammunition for
a fire plan must be considered in the early stages of planning.
The ability of the logistic system to provide the quantities of
ammunition required affects the weight of fire support available.
It can be a controlling factor in the selection of H-hour and
could affect the whole operational plan. Hence, every effort should
be made to forecast the need for ammunition in time for the logistic
system to have adequate stock ready rather than react after the
need has arisen.
The general sequence is the
same for both informal and formal fire plans. In a formal fire
plan, apart from the greater time available for its preparation,
more fire support resources are used. Thus, greater coordination
and detailed planning at higher headquarters are required. An
informal fire plan usually is coordinated by the headquarters
originating the plan.
In an informal fire plan,
the planner knows the resources available to him. In a larger,
formal fire plan, an allocation of resources usually is given
with the task when it is handed down from higher headquarters.
If the operation originates at the lower level, it may be necessary
to ask for an allocation of extra resources. This allocation usually
is made in terms of fire units, ammunition, and aircraft. It may
be qualified by times available or restrictions to certain phases.
In formal fire planning, the initial allocation of fire support
is a planning allocation, which can be changed as planning proceeds
and priorities are established. When considering resources, direct-fire
weapons integral to the attack force, such as armor, must be considered
as well as other sources. In either case, the more information
available on the enemy layout and dispositions, the more accurate
and effective will be the fire support. Information availability
also determines the resources retained under the commander's direct
control and the priorities of fire.
The commander's concept is
considered against the fire support available. The FSCOORD must
advise the commander when he is making his estimate. Once the
commander has determined his concept, warning orders should be
issued to fire support agencies concerned. This allows preparations
to commence, including adjustment and planning for redeployment,
reallocation of resources, and bids for extra support.
Once the course of action
has been determined, the detailed fire plan may be begun. The
FSCOORD must know the following:
-
The targets to be engaged
and timings.
-
Any targets on call.
-
Requests from the G3 air for
TACAIR.
-
The effect required on each
target, which he translates into terms of weapons and types of
ammunition.
-
The priority of engagement
of targets.
-
Arrangements for changing
the fire plan.
-
Policy on adjustment of targets
before H-hour.
The various types of fire
support required in battle and the terms used to describe such
fire support include those discussed below.
Fire support tasks in all
phases of war are as follows:
-
Interdiction (attack at depth).
-
Counterfire.
-
Suppression of enemy air defense
systems.
-
Support that includes counterpreparation
fire, close planned fire, and final protective fires (FPFs).
-
Covering fire as support to
a counterattack.
-
Preparation fire.
-
Covering fire.
-
Defensive fire to cover reorganization.
The aim of interdiction fire
is to disrupt, delay, and destroy enemy forces that, because of
range limitations or intervening terrain, cannot fire their primary
weapon systems on friendly forces. Targets include first-echelon
forces not participating in the direct battle and follow-on echelons.
Interdiction fire creates windows for friendly unit offensive
maneuver. Brigade commanders may develop a requirement for interdiction
fires based on their concept of the operation and war games or
rehearsals. These targets may then be given to the division main
command post FS cell for inclusion in the division's planned or
on-call target list.
The aim of counterfire is
to destroy or neutralize the enemy indirect-fire systems, to include
mortar, artillery, air defense, missile, and rocket systems. Observation
posts and field artillery command and control facilities are also
counterfire targets. Counterfire allows freedom of action to supported
maneuver forces and is accomplished with mortars, guns, and aircraft.
Counterfire is planned and executed for offensive and defensive
operations, or it is fired in response to a request from a maneuver
commander. An efficient combined arms target acquisition system
is required, and counterfire should be controlled at the highest
level that can ensure the timely attack of targets. See Section
IV for a detailed discussion of counterfire.
SEAD is that activity which
neutralizes, destroys, or temporarily degrades enemy air defense
systems in a specific area to enable air operations to be successfully
completed. Army SEAD operations are designed to support operational
and tactical plans by protecting Army aviation assets near the
FLOT or during cross-FLOT operations. SEAD also includes the protection
of Air Force aircraft (such as CAS aircraft) supporting the ground
commander's operation. The basic principle of Army SEAD operations
is see-kill. This means that enemy air defense systems are attacked
immediately upon detection, consistent with the commander's intent
and the best application of resources. Formal SEAD fire planning
normally is conducted and coordinated at division level or higher
and may involve other services (J-SEAD).
When enemy preparations for
an attack are discovered, his forces must be brought under the
maximum mass of counterpreparation fire immediately. The objective
is to defeat his ability to mount the assault and to start the
close defensive operation at the longest practicable range. Defensive
fire provides close support to maneuver. It inflicts both personnel
and equipment casualties on the enemy.
A defensive fire plan provides the framework on which to fight a defensive battle. It allows the maximum weight of fire to be brought to bear quickly on the enemy's preparation for the attack and his assault. All available weapons must be included in this fire plan.
The volume of fire required
on each target may not be known in the planning stages. The success
of a defensive fire plan depends on the flexibility of response.
The fire support command and control system, coupled with its
communications, provides the medium for this flexibility. A large
part of the defensive battle is fought and controlled through
this system.
Defensive fire planning starts
with an examination of the enemy's probable action, usually based
on his approaches to our position. The fire plan should not be
based on individual defensive fire tasks but rather on the treatment
of particular approaches. This must include the routes, assembly
areas, lines of departure, and ground over which the enemy will
assault. An enemy is particularly vulnerable in his initial moves
for an attack and when organizing into assault formation. Once
an enemy attack gets under way, one of the main purposes of a
defensive fire plan is to seal off the attack and keep the enemy
from reinforcing it.
Fire planning is conducted
through a formal top-down process with bottom-up refinement as
time permits. The corps G2, in conjunction with the G3 and FS
cell representatives, performs a detailed IPB and target value
analysis for the entire corps area of operation. Named areas of
interest and target areas of interest are included in the IPB.
High-payoff targets for the corps and specific targets of interest
and/or schedules of fire come top down to the division
FS cell. Concurrently, the division G2 and FSCOORD must refine
the corps guidance for the division area and concept of operation.
As they are developed, the division FSCOORD receives from corps
targets in the division zone and area of interest which have been
developed by the corps IPB and/or acquired by corps or higher
acquisition assets. The FSCOORD, working with other FS cell members,
the G2 and the G3, develops targets within the division zone.
He adds these targets of particular interest to the division target
list and passes the target list to each brigade. The target development
process continues, concurrently, down to company level. After
review of the battalion target list, the company FSO nominates
additional targets in his zone or sector and forwards his target
list back up to the battalion FSO. The battalion FSO considers
the targets he receives from each company FSO, consolidates them
(for example, eliminates duplications) and forwards a copy of
the refined target list back to the brigade FSO. As target lists
are developed at each level, fire plans are prepared to support
the commander's intent for synchronizing the scheme of maneuver
with fire support. Fire plans also allocate targets to the appropriate
fire support agency or asset for execution at the appropriate
time.
Usually, there is some warning
of an enemy attack. The enemy must be brought under the maximum
mass of counterpreparation fire as early as possible. The close
defensive battle should start at the longest practicable range.
The ideal defensive fire plan is one that disrupts the enemy's
preparations to such an extent that he cannot mount an assault,
Counterpreparation fire disrupts the enemy's preparations for
an attack or a counterattack. It does this by striking him in
his assembly areas; breaking up his attack formations; disorganizing
his command, control, and communications; impairing his target
acquisition efforts; and reducing his morale. Counterpreparations
are usually scheduled as on call. The counterpreparation may be
phased - although this is certainly not required - to successively
attack certain types of targets.
Phase 1 includes--
-
Forward elements.
-
Indirect-fire systems.
-
Observation posts.
-
Command posts.
-
Communications and reserves
while attack of indirect-fire systems continues.
| NOTE: Targets are selected, usually at brigade level or higher, on likely enemy approaches to defensive positions. |
The aim of planned fire is
to break up the enemy's attacks by striking him when he is forming
up or assaulting. Subsequently, the fire is adjusted to continue
attacking him during his assault until he is forced to break off
the attack. Targets are initially selected by company commanders;
the final selection is made by the battalion commander. Further
coordination occurs at higher levels to prevent duplication of
targets; for example, near unit or force boundaries. When selecting
planned fire targets, the following factors are paramount:
-
The likely enemy approaches.
-
The location on the ground
at which the enemy is likely to be first detected when attacking.
-
The likely enemy assembly
area.
-
The use of planned targets
as reference points for subsequent adjustment of fires.
The force SOPS should establish
a standard response for certain defensive fire tasks. The SOP
also may identify the FSCOORDs or units which may initiate these
responses. This procedure ensures that ammunition expenditure
is controlled, that priorities are maintained, and that FSCOORDs
or units authorized more fire support resources are kept informed
as the battle progresses.
For the purpose of fire planning,
the attack may be considered as basically a movement problem;
that is, the movement of enough force onto an objective to achieve
an aim. The enemy will strive to prevent this by using his fire
support, obstacles, and maneuver. The main purpose of a fire plan
for an attack is to neutralize enemy direct and indirect fire
during all stages of the attack and to prevent reserves and second-echelon
interfering.
A fire plan for an attack
can forces for an attack can vary from an informal fire
plan required as soon as possible to a formal fire plan in support
of an attack some time in the future.
Informal Fire plan. Depending
on the time available, informal fire planning may be necessary
at brigade level and below. An informal fire plan is developed
to meet a relatively urgent H-hour. However, the maneuver commander
may have to delay his H-hour if artillery redeployment or ammunition
availability so necessitates; and this should be one of the factors
considered in his estimate. Having targets on call will be more
normal than having a timed program related to a rate of advance.
Fire may have to be adjusted as the attack proceeds if there was
not enough time to do so previously. Well-rehearsed fire planning
drills between commanders and FSCOORDs and/or FSOs are essential.
Formal Fire Plan. The
formal offensive fire plan follows the same top-down process
with bottom-up refinement as discussed earlier. The plan
often involves a large concentration of fire support resources.
The coordinating headquarters normally is the division or corps
FS cell (usually one level above the headquarters making the
fire plan). A substantial redeployment of artillery and a large-scale
positioning program for ammunition may be required. This is the
responsibility of the coordinating headquarters. Consequently,
a considerable amount of time usually is needed for planning and
coordination.
The best prepared fire plan
rarely goes beyond H-hour without some changes. FSCOORDs and/or
FSOs at all levels must ensure that fire planning and target adjustment
drills are well-rehearsed and procedures for changing the fire
plan are clearly understood by all.
The fire plan must cover the
entire attack and be integrated with the actions of the attacking
troops. Offensive fire planning should include the types of fire
discussed below.
Preparation fire may vary
from a brief, intense bombardment on selected targets to a prolonged
effort over several days, covering a large number of targets.
Commanders must be clear on what they hope to achieve by this
sort of fire. The effectiveness of preparation fire varies with
each situation; and its feasibility depends on such factors as
surprise, deployment, ammunition supply, and type of weapons available.
Preparation fire is planned by the commander planning the attack.
Normally, fire begins before H-hour and may extend beyond it.
Firing may start at a prescribed time, or it may be held on call
until needed, The preparation may be phased as follows:
-
Phase 1 - attack of fire support
means and observation capabilities, including artillery headquarters
and command posts.
-
Phase 2 - attack of main command
posts, communications facilities, assembly areas, and reserves.
-
Phase 3 - attack of defensive
areas in the forward portions of the position areas and targets
that pose an immediate threat to attacking units or forces.
Covering fire is used to cover
the movement of the attacking unit or force during the formation,
assault, and initial stages of reorganization during the early
stages of the attack. Its most effective form is massing of fire
on a time schedule. There may be targets on call, and some weapons
must be superimposed on targets to provide a reserve of firepower.
This reserve is used to engage targets of opportunity or to counter
unexpected enemy action.
Covering fire is used during
the attack and counterattack. The aim of covering fire is to protect
assaulting troops by neutralizing enemy direct-fire weapons that
can engage them during the attack and counterattack. Neutralization
is achieved when the enemy is prevented from maneuvering, observing,
and using his weapons effectively and a 10 percent kill rate is
inflicted. To be effective, covering fire support should be potentially
lethal, intense, and continuous. Covering fire support for an
attack always should be planned in advance by the commander planning
the attack. Normally, it includes one or all of the following:
schedules, targets on call, and targets of opportunity.
Schedules. Schedules
establish planned timings for individual targets to cover the
period of the attack. The schedule must be modifiable, since few
attacks go exactly as planned. If communications are lost, fire
support would be provided in accordance with the schedule; the
maneuver force would have to adjust its rates of movement to synchronize
with the schedule.
Targets on Call. These
are planned targets that are arranged in all detail less their
timings. They ensure a quick response and can be called for at
any time. This is a form of contingent fire planning.
Targets of Opportunity.
At times in an attack,
covering fire support may be needed on targets that have not been
planned. Fire can be called for by FSOs, COLTs, forward observers,
air observers, naval gunfire liaison officers or air liaison officers
supporting the attack, and the assaulting troops themselves. All
combat arms officers and non-commissioned officers also should
be trained to call for and adjust fire support.
The attacking unit or force
is most vulnerable to counterattack during reorganization. Defensive
fire to cover this phase must be included in the fire plan. Initially,
these targets are planned from maps, air photographs, or other
information sources. Then they are confirmed and, if possible,
adjusted as soon as possible after the assault arrives on the
objective.
Normally, this cover consists
of massed fire on call and an allotment of weapons and ammunition.
Opportunity exploitation tasks may have to be supported by resources
retained under the commander's direct control for the purpose
of influencing the battle when required. The commander may have
to reallocate fire support resources or change priority of fires.
The neutralization of enemy
guns and mortars should be a continuing process throughout the
attack. Demands for fire support resources at critical stages
of the attack may restrict counterfire for certain periods. Even
though counterfire is coordinated at the highest level, normally
division or above, it must be considered at all stages of planning
the attack. It must not be treated as a separate subject after
the stages discussed earlier are planned. Counterfire must be
considered as the neutralization of the enemy's main fire support.
Its importance to the success of the attack cannot be overemphasized.
H-hour is determined by tactical
considerations and the time necessary to prepare for the attack.
A commander may have to decide on the relative importance of launching
his attack quickly as opposed to waiting for guaranteed accuracy
of fire support. In larger-scale attacks, the preparations could
be lengthy. They could include positioning of ammunition, redeployment
of resources, and, possibly, movement forward of extra fire support.
From these factors, a D-day can be established. H-hour may still
be governed by technical requirements. For example, if resources
must be moved under cover of darkness to new primary positions
before they fire the fire plan, H-hour cannot be early in the
evening. If close air support is to be relied upon to any extent,
daylight and certain weather conditions may be needed.
In the same way the commander
provides for a maneuver reserve for all stages of an attack, he
also must retain control over fire support resources (GS or GSR)
that are immediately responsive to his needs. The commander does
this to--
-
Engage previously undetected
targets that threaten to break the momentum of the attack.
-
React to enemy initiatives;
for example, prevent the enemy from moving his reserve to reinforce
a faltering sector of his defense.
-
Maintain a capacity for counterfire
throughout the attack.
-
Provide for defensive fire
during the reorganization stage.
-
Ensure he has enough firepower
available to support exploitation or extraction of specific
elements as dictated by the tactical situation as it develops
during the attack.
-
The likely enemy reactions
to the attack.
-
The size and composition of
the likely Threat force at each stage of the attack (both maneuver
and firepower elements).
-
The number and type of targets
that must be attacked simultaneously during the attack.
-
The number and type of fire
units and ammunition available for the attack.
-
The size of the ammunition
reserve that can be established for all stages of the battle.
-
The ability to position fire
support resources under centralized control so that they can be
superimposed on the fire of others. This should be planned so
that the removal at short notice of the superimposed fire does
not seriously diminish the effects of fire on the target nor affect
the structure of the fire plan.
A fire plan can be changed
during its execution to meet unforeseen circumstances. The authority
to do this should be kept at the highest feasible level, usually
with the commander of the operation. Orders for changes must be
clear and simple so they can be readily understood in the heat
of battle. Change is easier if its possibility is considered during
planning by--
-
Keeping the plan as simple
as possible.
-
Dividing coveting fire into
clearly defined stages.
-
Grouping targets.
-
Keeping enough GS fire units
superimposed. The proper handling of GS firepower can sometimes
obviate the necessity for a change to the fire plan.
Fire delivered in support
of any plan should be observed. Observers from the artillery,
Army aviation, Navy, or Air Force, as appropriate, should be located
where they can observe the effect of fire and make any necessary
adjustments. Also, they should be able to pass back information
on the progress of the attack. To be effective, these observers
should be in static positions and not intimately involved in the
battle.
Mobile observers are needed
with the attacking troops to deal with targets of opportunity.
They also provide observation, reporting, and liaison during the
critical reorganization phase. In particular, they adjust the
defensive fire tasks that have been planned and request any additional
planned close targets for inclusion in the list of defensive fire
tasks.
The briefing of observers,
either accompanying an attack or observing it from a static or
airborne position, is most important. They must fully understand
the tactical plan and the fire plan, the authority for modification,
and the allocation of observers for the adjustment of fire.
The purpose of rear operations
is to ensure friendly forces freedom of action to support combat
forces in the close and deep operations. Depending on the threat
level involved (see Chapter 4, Section VI), rear operations CPs
control available forces for rear area security. The FSCOORD considerations
unique to rear operations are discussed in this section.
The following are fire support
tasks unique to rear operations:
-
Establish an FSE within the
operations cell of the rear CP.
-
Identify fire support assets
available for rear area fire support.
-
Select and prepare supplementary
positions for indirect-fire weapons if needed.
-
Arrange survey control for
rear area positions for indirect-fire weapons.
-
Determine FA ammunition considerations
for rear operations.
Command and control considerations
operations include the following:
-
Fire support agencies committed
to in rear support rear area forces are
designated by on-order missions.
-
Communications procedures
(net, call signs, and so forth) to plan and execute fire support
are established and disseminated.
Considerations in fire support
planning and coordination for rear operations are as follows:
-
Implement fire support into
rear operations plans.
-
Plan fires and targets in
the rear area.
-
Coordinate for route clearance
with the rear CP CSS cell and with the rear operations cell for
the movement of FA units through the corps or division rear area.
The principal means of fire
support normally available to support rear operations are mortars,
field artillery, and aircraft. In those areas near a coastline,
NGF support also may be available.
Dedicated fire support for
rear operations should be considered when the Threat situation
dictates and sufficient fire support assets are available.
For some rear operations,
field artillery with a 6,400-mil firing capability positioned
within the MBA may be able to support rear operations from its
current positions. Other actions may require supplementary positions
from which artillery can provide support. Routes to those positions
are reconnoitered. Firing positions are prepared as time and the
situation permit. Communications for fire support are planned.
Maneuver elements assigned to rear operations will have their
company fire support teams in place. This gives these elements
FSCOORDs at levels through brigade-size forces.
The following factors must
be addressed in planning fire support for rear operations:
-
Assembly and movement of reserves:
- º
Position reserves to support
their anticipated commitment and to be secure from observation
and attack.
º Move reserves under protection from enemy observation and interdiction.
-
Deployment routes free from
observation.
-
Redeployment of fire support
assets to--
- º
Support future operations.
º Protect them from enemy observation and interference.
-
Maintenance and protection
of sustainment efforts:
- º
Protect against ground, air,
and missile attack.
º Accumulate stocks to support projected operations without decreasing support to currently engaged units.
-
Maintenance of command and
control.
- Deployment of command posts and communications networks where they can continue the fight without a break in operating tempo.
JCS Pub 1 defines counterfire
as fire intended to destroy or neutralize enemy weapons.
Counterfire consists of fires
targeted throughout the battlefield that are intended to attack
the total enemy fire support system. It includes fires against
accompanying mortars; helicopter forward operating bases; vector
target designation points (VTDPs); fire support C2;
artillery, rocket, and missile systems; and support and sustainment
installations.
Counterfire gains freedom
of action for all friendly maneuver forces and is provided by
all of the fire support means, both lethal and nonlethal. Counterfire
is not a separate battle. It is inseparably tied to close and
deep operations and is part of the overall combined arms fight
to achieve fire superiority. A fine line may exist between counterfire
and attack at depth. However, once a target is capable (that is,
within range) of affecting the close fight, its attack is considered
counterfire.
Counterfire is a function
the force commander must address; it is not solely the responsibility
of the force artillery commander. Intelligence assets must be
prioritized to accurately locate; and operational attack assets
(such as artillery, mortars, TACAIR, attack helicopters, naval
gunfire, and EW assets) must be brought to bear on the total enemy
fire support system.
In the Soviet Army, the artillery
is the arm of decision and the king of battle. Historically,
from the Great Patriotic War to more recent experiences in Afghanistan,
the Soviets exploit the success of fire support with maneuver
forces.
Threat artillery is the decisive
factor to achieve victory and guarantee success. Its ability to
concentrate and mass fires for the main attack is expected to
achieve devastating effects.
Typically, a Threat front
commander pushes forward the target acquisition, C2,
and artillery assets from both the first- and second-echelon armies.
Our maneuver commanders will likely see across the FLOT an array
of fire support systems that includes accompanying regimental
fire support systems as well as supporting artillery positioned
forward from division and army levels. Supporting artillery will
be organized into regimental artillery groups, divisional artillery
groups (DAGs), and army artillery groups (AAGs). The graphic
shows a doctrinal laydown of the target set belts
for Threat fire support systems.
Accompanying artillery, RAGs,
and DAGs focus primarily on support of close operations against
friendly maneuver elements. However, as required, they will also
engage our fire support assets to support the Threat maneuver
commander's efforts to gain fire superiority. In most situations,
the primary targets for accompanying and supporting artillery
are friendly maneuver forces and battle positions, not friendly
artillery, The mission of the Chief of Artillery or Chief of Missile
Troops and Artillery - as part of the overall reconnaissance,
surveillance, target acquisition, and fire support effort - is
to use his organic and supporting assets to locate friendly maneuver
units and then create the conditions for a breakthrough attack
by destroying them with intense and overwhelming fires. These
fire support systems (cannons, target acquisition, and C2)
are employed forward and located within 10 km of the FLOT.
The Soviets will also conduct
extensive counterfire operations against our fire support systems.
Their number one target priority remains the location and destruction
of our nuclear-capable artillery and missile units. Doctrinally,
Soviet counterfire operations are conducted primarily by use of
AAG assets; however, RAGs and DAGs can also be used to support
the counterfire battle. Centralizing control of his counterfire
effort allows the Threat commander to mass large volumes of fires,
possibly at the expense of timeliness. This potentially slower
response may allow us to interrupt the Threat commander's decision
cycle - a key ingredient to AirLand Battle success.
During Threat offensive operations, the main objective of Soviet fire support is to create a breakthrough situation in our maneuver force forward positions. When on the defense, the main objective of Threat fire support is to disrupt our attack formations through interdiction, massing and firing a solid wall of fire (barrages) in front of their own forward defensive positions. Our counterfire effort must negate this intense, numerically overwhelming condition and give our force commander an opportunity to achieve fire superiority. Fire superiority allows freedom of action for maneuver forces to achieve maintain dominance and to use direct systems to attack Threat maneuver forces.
Achieving fire superiority
against a force and fire with overwhelming numerical advantage
in delivery systems requires a counterfire effort that attacks
the entire Threat fire support system early, in depth, and throughout
the battle. Targeting the enemy fire support systems includes
the proactive detection and attack of enemy nonfiring systems
(sensors, C3 facilities, support, and sustainment installations)
as well as firing systems (the weapons themselves) before they
engage friendly forces; for example, MRLs in assembly areas, a
ZSU 23-4 on the road, or the signature of an operating VTDP.
The force commander must,
through counterfire, wrest the initiative from his Threat opponent.
To achieve fire superiority, our counterfire effort must do more
than merely react to Threat fires. We want to attrit the overall
Threat fire support system by using proactive counterfire and
attacking Threat forces at depth, before Threat fire support systems
can influence current operations. The counterfire efforts of the
corps and subordinate divisions must focus throughout the entire
depth of each commander's area of responsibility. Future organic
target acquisition and attack systems will further extend the
range of the corps proactive counterfire effort to 150 km.
Counterfire is a shared responsibility.
Both corps and division are responsible for counterfire planning
and execution. While the responsibility is shared, the location
of the targets sets, the capabilities of sensor platforms, and
the ranges of available weapon systems allow for an orderly and
calculated division of labor.
Counterfire must contribute
to the successful fulfillment of the corps commander's intent
and the corps mission. In some scenarios, the corps mission may
best be accomplished by planning and executing counterfire centrally
at corps. To fix responsibility for counterfire within the corps,
consideration must be given to--
-
The location of hostile targets.
-
The level at which the necessary
assets and the ability to synchronize acquisition, processing,
and delivery exist.
The corps commander is responsible
for counterfire throughout the depth of the corps area of responsibility.
He, his FSCOORD, and his staff assess the counterfire threat to
the corps. They determine the best way to protect the corps combat
forces and to defeat, delay, or disrupt the Threat array. This
estimate or analysis includes an assessment of the counterfire
capabilities of the corps and its subordinate divisions. The corps
commander's counterfire responsibilities include the following:
-
Describing his intent; planning;
and then deciding on the most effective course of action (COA)
and task organization for the corps and its divisions to successfully
meet the counterfire threat, protect the maneuver force, and at
the same time corps mission.
-
Segmenting the battlefield
maneuver boundaries and/or accomplish the by delineating assigning
areas of responsibility for corps and its subordinate divisions.
This helps establish the delineation of counterfire responsibilities
within the corps zone.
-
Assigning missions and responsibilities,
to include specific taskings to intelligence assets through the
G2.
-
Allocating resources. The
corps commander ensures that counterfire assets are allocated
in accordance with assigned missions and his intent. Corps assets
may be retained at corps or allocated to subordinate divisions.
Conversely, in some situations, the corps commander may require
the use of division assets to support a corps counterfire responsibility.
He should provide guidance for use of certain critical assets
such as the corps aviation brigade, BAI and reconnaissance sorties,
OH-58Ds, SOFs, and EW assets.
-
Requesting additional TA and
attack systems from army group, theater, or joint task force level
or from other EAC headquarters.
-
Detecting and attacking. The
corps detects and attacks targets within its area of responsibility,
typically beyond the established fire support coordination line
(FSCL). The corps also may attack targets within a division area
of responsibility when the division has forwarded such a request
to corps based on priority and need. Within its capability, the
corps may respond to requests for additional fires from adjacent
units.
-
Monitoring. The corps commander
monitors the execution of his intent throughout the corps area.
-
Assessing. Finally, the corps
commander must assess the protection of his combat units and the
effects of counterfire against Threat fire support systems. As
appropriate, he adjusts intelligence collection and/or attack
priorities for protection of his force and attack of enemy targets.
He may reallocate assets and/or modify the missions of subordinate
units.
By using organic assets and
accessing higher-level resources, the corps commander has a capability
for proactive counterfire. (The ability of divisions to effectively
conduct counterfire with organic assets against targets beyond
30 km is currently limited by both acquisition and delivery means.)
The corps commander can--
-
Detect heavy MRL battalions,
VTDPs, helicopter forward operating bases, and other counterfire
targets. He does this by use of organic aviation assets and collectors
from the corps MI brigade, long-range surveillance units (LRSUs),
and special operations forces.
-
Attack Threat fire support
systems with MLRs and cannon battalions of the corps FA brigades
out to ranges of 30 km. Beyond 30 km, deeper strike assets (such
as EW, Lance, ATACMs, Army aviation, allocated Air Force sorties,
and ground maneuver forces) must be considered for target attack.
-
Request additional acquisition
and/or attack assets from EAC, the JTF commander, or the Air Force.
The joint attack of artillery (JAART) concept requires that attack
helicopters, TACAIR, and available indirect fires attack Threat
fire support systems across the FLOT. A JAART is similar to a
JAAT operation, but it is targeted against Threat fire support
systems. A JAART may be a viable option if the corps commander
faces an overwhelming counterfire threat and decides to commit
all available fire support assets to reduce force ratios.
The corps commander decides
how the corps will conduct counterfire operations. He influences
how subordinate division commanders fight through the allocation
of corps assets, the issuance of attack guidance, and the identification
of corps high-payoff targets. He can support a division commander's
counterfire efforts by attacking Threat fire support systems at
depth; thus, he helps to shape the division counterfire battle.
In addition to allocating
assets to divisions, the corps commander can further support a
division counterfire battle by responding to the division requests
with BAI, MLRS, Lance, and EW. With respect to counterfire in
the division area of responsibility, the corps commander--
-
Assigns missions to division
and corps fire support assets and delineates their areas of responsibility
by establishing boundaries.
-
Provides IPB products and
critical intelligence information developed at corps or received
from higher or adjacent headquarters.
-
Detects and attacks targets
forwarded by the division. As appropriate, the corps, after coordinating
with the division FSE, may attack Threat fire support targets
within the division zone by massing fires to achieve required
effects. Procedures for attacking Threat systems firing from across
boundaries also must be coordinated.
-
Task-organizes and allocates
assets. On the basis of the commander's intent and the factors
of METT-T, the corps commander can give the divisions added assets
for detection and attack of Threat fire support. Most often corps
provides nondivisional FA delivery assets to augment div arty
fire support capabilities. This can be done by either of the following
actions:
- º
Assigning an FA brigade a
tactical mission such as reinforcing or GSR to a div arty.
º Attaching the FA brigade to the division requiring augmentation. The FA brigade normally is then further attached to the div arty.
-
An additional force artillery
brigade-level C2 headquarters.
-
Additional target-processing
capability.
-
Increased firepower, typically
with a mix of cannon and rocket battalions.
Typically, most of the reactive
counterfire battle takes place within the division area of
responsibility. Most of the Threat active fire support
systems are located in this area.
The responsibilities of the
division commander mirror those of the corps commander. Although
his assets are fewer in number and variety, the division commander
does have organic target acquisition, target processing, and delivery
assets to conduct counterfire. The div arty commander, as FSCOORD
for the division, is responsible for orchestrating the division
counterfire effort.
When an FA brigade from corps
artillery is available to the division, the div arty commander
may assign it the counterfire role, Responsibility for the execution
of the division counterfire effort, however, remains with the
div arty commander.
During low-intensity conflict
(LIC) or mid-intensity conflict (MIC), Threat fire support systems
will likely be less modern and perhaps less extensive than friendly
fire support capabilities. Nevertheless, the Threat commander
will use his fires much as he would in a high-intensity environment.
Most Threat systems will include mortars and towed howitzers.
Typically, self-propelled systems and MRLs will be introduced
as the level of conflict escalates. Host nation logistics bases,
friendly laager areas, and main supply routes are all potential
targets for Threat fire support.
Counterfire responsibilities
and the planning and execution requirements for these situations
are identical to those previously discussed. Friendly capabilities
to detect and attack hostile systems and rules for engagement
are the primary differences in LIC or MIC. The light force structure
provides a more limited counterfire capability. Heavier forces,
however, may also be employed in LIC and MIC situations,
Contingency operations responding
to LIC or MIC situations could include heavy and/or light forces.
The task organization provided by the JTF commander, manifested
by contingency plans and the time-phased force deployment list,
dictate where the responsibility for counterfire will be placed
and how it will be fought.
| NOTE: The counterfire planning sequence at ail echelons uses the decide-detect-deliver methodology. These functions as implemented at corps and division are discussed below. |
Counterfire at the corps level
begins with the corps commander's guidance to the corps artillery
commander (the FSCOORD). At this level, decisions are made to
meet a specific commander's intent. The ultimate results are mission
assignments and a task organization. The intent and planning guidance
of the corps commander allow the corps FSCOORD, G3, and G2 to
develop a restated mission and to begin planning the assignment
of responsibilities and resources for counterfire to support potential
courses of action. As a minimum, the corps commander's intent
and planning guidance should include the following:
- Responsibility for specific portions of the battlefield.
-
Allocation of available assets.
-
Use of nuclear and chemical
weapons.
-
Priorities for protection
of friendly elements and attack of enemy areas.
-
Permission to execute before
H-hour.
-
Requirements for battle damage
assessment.
The G2 is a
key staff officer to help plan and execute counterfire. He is
best able to focus the intelligence collection power of the corps
through the corps tactical operations center support element (CTOCSE).
Within the corps artillery, the G2 and G3 make recommendations
to the corps G2 to maximize the use of corps TA and intelligence
collection assets. The factors of METT-T may dictate that division-level
acquisition means (such as EW assets and Fire finder radars) be
task-organized under corps control. Consistent with the corps
commander's intent, the following must be carefully considered:
-
Who will control the counterfire
fight.
-
How these tasked assets will
be returned in a timely manner to the divisions.
-
Situational templates to identify
potential targets and to develop NAIs and TAIs.
-
Decision support templates
(DSTs) to provide windows of opportunity and to help identify
the key decision points.
-
Target value analysis to give
the commander a cost-effectiveness analysis, which identifies
the high-payoff targets. High-payoff targets focus both detection
and attack assets against specific types of targets by templating,
signatures, and vulnerabilities.
The following conditions should
be met before an FSCL is established by corps:
-
There is a portion of the
corps deep operations area in which selective targeting is not
required to shape the deep operations fight.
-
The expeditious attack of
targets beyond the FSCL will support the operations of the corps,
the attacking unit, or the higher headquarters of the attacking
unit.
-
The corps and its supporting
units are willing to accept the possible duplication of effort
which may result from dual targeting beyond the FSCL.
Target acquisition tasks supporting
the corps counterfire effort flow from the decide function
and are issued in the corps collection plan.
The corps G2 and FS cell develop
the target acquisition plan and organize sensor tasking and reporting.
Specific requirements for organic collection assets and requests
for nonorganic assets are included in the corps collection plan.
The corps FAIO located in the (CTOCSE ensures that the MI brigade
assets (ASPS and EWS) understand both accuracy and time requirements
to produce valid targets. The corps artillery G2 and G3 coordinate
closely with the corps G2, FS cell, and FAIO to determine when
selected sensors will shift their priority from intelligence gathering
to target production. This shift in effort should be indicated
on the corps decision support matrix and keyed to specific events
on the battlefield. The corps artillery G2 also coordinates with
the corps G2 and FS cell to ensure his PIR for the acquisition
and attack of enemy fire support assets are included in the corps
collection plan.
The processing and developing
of targeting information from nonorganic corps assets must be
streamlined. The collection and target acquisition process must
also provide for assessment of target damage.
During the corps mission analysis
and command estimate process, the need for additional sensor assets
may be identified. One source for additional sensors which would
be under the direct control of the corps commander and his staff
is the reserve divisions, The EW and TA assets organic to a reserve
division could be used to support the corps counterfire effort
or to augment the capabilities of a committed division. One way
to do this is to task-organize the reserve division acquisition
assets (such as Firefinder radars, EW assets, and OH-58Ds) and
assign them a tactical mission such as GS to the corps or GSR
to a committed div arty. Care must be taken, however, to ensure
these assets will be available to the reserve division when it
is committed.
The deliver function
for counterfire executes the acquisition and attack guidance of
the commander. The attack of counterfire targets must feature
streamlined target processing and violent, massed fires.
The FAIO located in the CTOCSE facilitates transmittal of timely targeting information to the FS cell and/or the FA headquarters controlling the counterfire fight. He also gives CTOCSE personnel the accuracy and timeliness requirements for friendly attack of targets.
The FS cells process targets
by matching target defeat criteria, commander's attack guidance,
and attack system capability. The corps FS cell attacks counterfire
targets by--
-
Using cannon, rocket, and
missile assets of corps FA brigades assigned a GS or GSR mission.
-
Providing the corps G3 air
target locations and desired effects for TACAIR packaging.
-
Coordinating with the G3 for
attack with corps aviation and/or EW assets.
-
Forwarding counterfire targets
via fire support channels to subordinate divisions for attack.
-
Providing targets to adjacent
corps for attack.
The decide function for counterfire
at division mirrors that at corps. Priorities are established,
combat assets are allocated, and tasks are specified to best meet
the commander's intent.
The division FSCOORD, G2,
and G3 develop and recommend the following:
-
Target priorities for acquisition.
They coordinate with the EWS for EW target acquisition.
-
High-value targets and priorities.
-
Target selection standards
for accuracy and timeliness.
-
Decision points and time lines
for execution.
-
Fire support coordinating
measures to expedite the attack of counterfire targets consistent
with the commander's intent (for example, CFLs and boundaries).
-
Requirements for target damage
assessment.
The division G2 is responsible
for developing and implementing the division collection and target
acquisition plan. This plan identifies the tasks MI assets must
perform to support the maneuver and fire support plans developed
by the FSCOORD and G3. The G2 also coordinates with the div arty
on how artillery TA assets can be used to support the overall
plan.
Generally, within the division, intelligence flow and target detection involve several agencies.
G2. The G2 focuses the overall
collection and target acquisition effort for the division. He
coordinates with div arty for the support of its acquisition assets.
Military Intelligence Battalion.
The MI battalion TOC
and its TCAE are the central point for data collection from both
DS and GS intelligence assets. They are the link to the corps
MI brigade.
Division Tactical Operations
Center Support Element. The
division TOC support element (DTOCSE) gives the division access
to sensitive compartmented information. The division FAIO is in
the DTOCSE. He can transmit perishable or time-sensitive targeting
data to either the FS cell or the artillery headquarters controlling
the counterfire battle (div arty or a supporting FA brigade) while
providing location accuracy requirements to collection assets.
To know where to send information, the FAIO must know what information
or targets must be processed by the FS cell for attack by other
than FA assets and what targets are to be engaged by the FA. The
use of the attack guidance matrix developed during the command
estimate process is essential to providing the FAIO this information.
Electronic Warfare Staff
Officer. The EWSO helps
the DTOCSE translate mission guidance for EW systems under division
control.
Air Liaison Officer. The
ALO provides current capabilities and status of Air Force assets.
Division Artillery S2.
The div arty S2 has staff responsibility for the division target
acquisition battery assets. He is aided by the counterfire officer
and the target production section. They recommend positioning,
target coverage and/or changes in coverage, and organization for
combat for the div arty TA assets. The div arty S2 must coordinate
the radar target acquisition plan as discussed below.
Command and Control. The
div arty has several possible options for the employment of its
radars:
-
It can keep them centralized
with all assets reporting information to a central headquarters
(div arty or a supporting FA brigade). The same headquarters would
also control and coordinate positioning and zones of search for
the radars.
-
It can attach assets to subordinate
units. Thus, the subordinate unit can establish reporting procedures
and coverage requirements and can position the attached asset
(for example, attach an AN/TPQ-36 radar to a DS battalion).
-
It can use a combination of
the above. For example, it can retain the AN/TPQ-37s or AN/TPS-25s
or -58s under div arty control and give command and control of
(attach) the AN/TPQ-36s to the DS battalions.
| NOTE: Regardless of which option the div arty chooses, the radars should be attached to a subordinate headquarters for survivability and logistical support. |
Positioning Considerations.
Both tactical and technical
aspects of positioning must be considered.
Zones of Search. Search
zones prioritize the search pattern and provide the reaction posture
of the radars to best meet the maneuver commander's intent and
priorities. Each Firefinder radar can store up to nine different
zones. There are four different types of zones used with
the radar. Those types and their functions are as follows:
-
Critical friendly zone (CFZ).
The CFZ designates the highest priority friendly locations of
the maneuver commander and provides the most responsive priority
of fires from the radars. Cued radars detecting incoming rounds
into this zone immediately generate a priority request for fire.
FSCOORDs recommend to maneuver commanders positioning of CFZs
and their size for best responsiveness. Typical CFZs include maneuver
assembly areas, headquarters, forward arming and refueling points
(FARPs), and other troop concentrations.
-
Call-for-fire zone (CFFZ).
The CFFZ designates a search area beyond the FLOT that the maneuver
commander wants suppressed or neutralized. The CFFZ designation
is closely tied to the IPB process. A CFFZ would likely be a suspected
RAG or DAG position. The CFFZ provides the second most responsive
priority for fires from the radar.
-
Artillery target intelligence
zone (ATIZ). An ATIZ enables a maneuver commander to watch an
area closely while assigning higher priority to more important
areas. Targets identified in this zone will be evaluated for attack
as received but will not automatically generate a fire mission.
-
Censor zone (CZ). A CZ is
used to designate areas from which the commander does not want
to attack targets. This zone is often used to avoid overlap and
duplication.
-
Radars under the operational
control of div arty. Div arty designates specific zones for each
radar. In some instances, all division radars may be assigned
the same nine zones. A specific zone may be designated on request
from a subordinate maneuver commander or for the support of the
division as a whole. The division may also have some zones either
designated by the corps commander or shared with adjacent divisions.
-
Radars under the operational
control of the close support battalions. To coordinate all coverage
within the division, the div arty may still designate all or a
portion of the zones for these radars. Zones may also be assigned
independent of other division radars to reflect the protection
priorities of the supported maneuver commander.
-
A combination of the above.
Radiate Time. Threat
EW activity considered with mission requirements will dictate
cumulative radiation time before survivability moves are required.
FM 6-121 provides a radiation time survivability chart. In some
LIC or MIC situations where no counterradar threat exists, radars
could conceivably radiate continuously. Commanders should decide,
and radar technicians should closely monitor, radiation times
and movement requirements.
Cueing. One
of the most difficult planning factors is the determination of
when and how to best cue the radar for activation. The counterfire
headquarters must establish cueing guidance for radar sections.
Both authority to cue and priority for cueing requirements must
be clearly understood. Planned cueing schedules are normally ineffective.
Therefore, cueing guidance should specify the cueing agent and
the radar section to which he is linked (to include C2
and communications) and should establish the specific conditions
for activating the radar. The cueing scheme should be included
in rehearsals. Key personnel for cueing include FSCOORDs, FSEs,
cueing agent(s), S2s of radar-controlling headquarters, and the
radar section(s).
Fire Support Coordinator.
The FSCOORD recommends
to the maneuver commander designation and activation of CFZs based
on mission and intent. The S2 must know where CFZs are and their
effective times.
Fire Support Element. FSEs
coordinate communications links among cueing agents located in
the CFZs, radars, and attack assets.
Cueing Agents. Cueing
agents maintain communication with radars and establish internal
alert procedures within the CFZ with the maneuver commander.
Radars. Radars
respond to requests from cueing agents and generate requests for
fire.
Coordination of zones among
adjacent radars provides both optimized detection and priority
for attack. Coordination of cueing guidance and search zones is
a dynamic process that must be closely tied to both operations
planning and target acquisition. Successful management of these
assets by the counterfire headquarters is as critical to fire
support success as the positioning of attack assets and firing
positions.
The FSCOORD and division G3
supervise the execution of counterfire within the division.
The division FS cell coordinates
and monitors the execution of counterfire through--
-
The div arty S3 for all cannon
and rocket systems available to the division.
-
The ALO for allocated TACAIR
support.
-
The division aviation officer
for employment of attack helicopter battalions.
-
The DTOCSE for EW Support.
Assignment of the counterfire
role to an FA brigade reinforcing a div arty is appropriate. The
div arty commander as the division FSCOORD, however, remains responsible
for all division fire support, to include counterfire. Div arty
must ensure the FA brigade has adequate personnel and materiel
resources for counterfire. The TAB personnel should go with the
radar assets to the FA brigade for C2 and employment
expertise.
FA brigades require both TA
assets and additional processing capability to effectively perform
counterfire. Closely linked to division maneuver through the FS
cell, the FSCOORD and div arty S3 must provide and coordinate
the following for the FA brigade:
-
Command intent for counterfire,
to include required zones and cueing guidance.
-
Intelligence support from
division-controlled assets. Counterfire targets from MI
battalion assets, div arty ATI files, and higher headquarters
must be expeditiously forwarded to the FA brigade.
-
Land management issues and
position areas for FA brigade battalions and acquisition assets
forward in the division area.
-
Traffic and movement priorities
for units and ammunition.
-
Ammunition forecasts and other
service support requirements. Often, FA brigades have equipment
not normally found in the division; for example, in 203-mm (8-inch)
battalions. Requirements for special maintenance or ammunition
must be coordinated.
-
Survey and met support for
FA brigade units.
The div arty target acquisition effort is managed by the div arty S2 and is coordinated with the division G2 and FSE. Div arty acquisition assets must support the corps effort and the intent of the division commander.
The div arty S2 recommends
an organization for combat of TA assets to best meet the division and corps commanders'
requirements. Firefinder radars can be--
-
Centralized at div arty or
at the FA brigade.
-
Decentralized by attachment
to a close support battalion. Control of radars by a reinforcing
battalion, when available, allows the brigade FSCOORD to better
manage his assets in support of the brigade battle.
-
A combination of the above.
When Firefinder radars are
attached to close support battalions, they are controlled by either
the direct support or reinforcing battalion S2. Normally, the
AN/TPQ-37 radars and the MTLRs are retained centrally. Options
for the command and control of the AN/TPQ-36 and AN/TPQ-37 radars
are shown below.
The heavy div arty is currently
authorized six OH-58D systems. A key divisional asset, the OH-58D
system is employed to best support the division commander's intent.
The capabilities of this system make it an effective combat multiplier
for counterfire within the division.
The OH-58D can help locate
and designate Threat artillery for attack with precision guided
munitions fired from cannon, aviation, or Air Force assets. The
OH-58D is most effectively employed at night or in inclement weather.
With a planning range of 10 km for its mast-mounted sights, this
valuable asset may be particularly useful for proactive counterfire
by detecting Threat fire support systems before they fire. In
some situations, this system could conceivably detect and designate
accompanying artillery, RAGs, and possibly DAGs without crossing
the FLOT. Operations forward of the FLOT demand careful consideration
and normally require packaging with other Army aviation or Air
Force assets as well as SEAD for survivability.
As previously discussed, there
are numerous ways in which field artillery can be organized to
support the counterfire effort. (Remember, counterfire is only
one consideration when organizing for combat to support the corps
or division total mission.) The following examples illustrate
one way to organize for combat. The organization for combat is
based on the commander's intent and available assets for each
scenario.
The effective employment of
air assets in the AirLand Battle gives the force commander a powerful
source of fire support. Army aviation and the air platforms of
other services, particularly the Air Force, enable the ground
commander to quickly influence the close and rear operations and
to add depth to the battlefield.
The availability of fire support
from air assets also gives the force commander the corresponding
responsibility to protect those assets. This obligation is significant
in view of the increasingly sophisticated threat that faces US
forces across the spectrum of warfare.
Advances in technology and
force structure increases have given Soviet forces, and Soviet
client forces, the capability to field integrated air defense
networks stronger than anything previously encountered by friendly
air forces. These networks, consisting of weapon systems, radars,
and C2 nodes, present a formidable all-altitude protection
umbrella.
The most efficient enemy air
defense systems will be on the high-intensity battlefield. However,
enemy air defense capabilities in mid- and low-intensity environments
pose a significant threat to US air assets. To facilitate AirLand
Battle doctrine, friendly air assets must be able to survive to
contribute their full combat potential. Therefore, SEAD is a critical
function, which must be accomplished quickly and efficiently.
SEAD operations must be synchronized
with all elements of the fire support system and with all members
of the joint and combined arms team to produce maximum combat
power. Unity of effort is essential in this endeavor. Synchronization
of all fire support requires detailed planning and coordination
and precise timing. The synchronization of fire support directed
against enemy air defense is especially critical and exceedingly
difficult.
The degree of criticality
of a given SEAD operation, as of any other operation, must depend
on the force commander's perception of the factors of METT-T.
For example, the relative worth of enemy air defense targets in
terms of high payoff varies in accordance with the need to commit
air resources. A specific enemy air defense target may always
be considered a high-value target. However, the advisability of
attacking such a target must be weighed against constraints affecting
the allocation and distribution of fire support assets. Actions
against Threat air defenses that are not engaged against friendly
air assets may not render a high payoff when ammunition expenditures
are considered. However, the key point is that once the force
commander decides that a specific air operation is necessary to
accomplish his mission, the fire support system must be fully able to perform SEAD.
To maximize aircraft survivability,
the fire perform the US Army and Air Force
have developed procedures for conducting J-SEAD operations against
enemy surface-to-air systems. Most of the SEAD operations conducted
at corps and division will be of a joint nature involving Army,
Air Force, or another service. Therefore, the scope of the discussion
on attacking enemy air defenses will include J-SEAD. However,
the fire support system can perform SEAD when the Army is operating
independent of Air Force support. For additional information,
refer to TACP 50-23/TRADOC TT 100-44-1.
Campaign SEAD operations are
preplanned, theaterwide efforts conducted concurrently over an
extended period against air defense systems that normally are
located well behind enemy lines. They are designed to systematically
attack the enemy's critical air defense facilities, systems, and
C2 nodes to reduce his overall air defense capability.
This includes establishing target priorities, aligning suppression
assets with specific targets, and positioning these assets to
effectively engage those targets. Primarily, campaign SEAD operations
are executed by Air Force suppression assets. Army participation
in campaign SEAD operations is limited. However, long-range surface-to-surface
weapons and EW systems are used to complement Air Force capabilities.
At the same time, Army forces conduct the localized and complementary
categories of SEAD to support SEAD campaigns. The overall responsibility
for campaign SEAD rests with the air component commander.
Localized SEAD increases the
effectiveness of combat operations by protecting friendly aircraft.
It allows aircraft to fly in the low and medium altitudes while
operating within the engagement envelopes of enemy air defense
systems. Localized SEAD supports CAS and Army aviation operations,
reconnaissance activity, and the establishment of corridors for
Air Force and Army aviation missions. The Army coordinates localized
SEAD operations with the Air Force through the ASOC when supporting
CAS aircraft and through the BCE when supporting other Air Force
missions such as AI. Localized SEAD operations are confined to
geographic areas associated with ground targets that will be attacked
from the air.
Complementary SEAD involves
a continuous process of seeking enemy air defense system (EADS)
targets and attacking them, thereby reducing the enemy's overall
capability. Complementary SEAD is an unstructured campaign to
degrade the enemy's air defense capability. It is conducted throughout
the battle area independent of specific aviation missions. This
differs from campaign or localized SEAD, in which targets are
preplanned. In general, all Army weapon systems capable of engaging
EADS should participate in this category of SEAD on a see-kill
basis. However, as with most aspects of AirLand Battle doctrine,
Army involvement in complementary SEAD is for the purpose of supporting
current and future objectives. The level of effort dedicated to
complementary SEAD is controlled by the prioritization of Army
fires within designated geographic areas where friendly air operations
are anticipated. Complementary SEAD also includes those actions
taken by the Army and Air Force aircrews for self-defense.
Each service has different
suppression capabilities and responsibilities in SEAD operations.
SEAD responsibilities are determined by weapon system characteristics
and SEAD mission requirements and objectives. The Army conducts
SEAD primarily near the FLOT, while the Air Force is responsible
for SEAD generally beyond the location of friendly forces.
The Army has primary responsibility
for the suppression of ground-based EADS to the limits of observed
fire. Observed fire is that fire for which the points of impact
can be seen by an observer. An observer could be a person (such
as a forward observer or an aerial observer) or target acquisition
equipment (such as air or ground radars and sensors that can control
fires on the basis of observation).
Targets that cannot be engaged
with observed fire are the primary responsibility of the Air Force.
The Army has secondary responsibility to suppress accurately located
targets out to the range limit of its weapons, In these situations,
the Army can suppress targets with unobserved indirect fire if
the targets are located accurately enough.
The air component commander
is responsible for the following actions:
-
Coordinating priorities (including
target and geographic areas) for the SEAD effort with appropriate
Air Force and Army commanders.
-
Prioritizing EADS targets
for attack.
-
Planning and executing Air
Force SEAD operations.
-
Requesting SEAD support from
other component commands when required.
Army corps and divisions play
an important part in SEAD operations. The corps FS cell and the
ASOC coordinate SEAD requirements to support CAS missions. The
corps FS cell coordinates SEAD requirements in support of other
air operations through the land component commander's BCE. The
BCE coordinates and integrates SEAD efforts, including Air Force
SEAD, in support of Army aviation operations near and beyond the
FLOT. The FS cell also advises the ASOC and BCE on Army SEAD effort
in support of Air Force assets. The corps provides SEAD support
by using its own resources or by tasking subordinate units for
support, when applicable. Also, the FS cell establishes target
and geographical area priorities and target attack guidance for
subordinate units.
The division responsibilities
are similar to those of the corps. The division requests, coordinates,
and synchronizes SEAD support from the corps and Air Force when
required. The division also develops intelligence on EADS composition
and location and disseminates it to corps, subordinate units,
and other units supporting the division.
The SEAD process starts with
the Army or Air Force unit that requests air operations. First
consideration is given to those suppression means organic to or
available to the requesting unit. When SEAD requirements exceed
the availability or capability of these means, the TACS or AAGS
structure is used to request or coordinate joint support.
SEAD is an integral part of
air or aviation mission planning. Requests from subordinate Army
echelons are consolidated, reviewed, prioritized, and scheduled
by use of available Army assets. Targets exceeding Army capabilities
are nominated and forwarded to the Air Force for scheduling and
inclusion in their SEAD operations. SEAD requests are processed
through the appropriate Army FS cell channels. (Headquarters at
EAC are organized with fire support elements.) The FS cell or
FSE at each echelon is configured to plan, coordinate, and execute
responsibilities inherent in SEAD operations. Requests for Air
Force assets are then forwarded to the BCE or the ASOC. Once approved,
the schedule and other pertinent information are sent back through
the same channels to the requesting Army echelon.
If response time is critical,
SEAD requests can be expeditiously processed. Time-sensitive SEAD
requests can be processed directly from the FS cell to the BCE
(Army requests) and from the TACC to the ASOC (Air Force requests).
The corps is the focal point
for Army SEAD operations. It assesses the situation, determines
requirements, assigns priorities, and allocates resources. Also,
the corps ensures that the Army SEAD effort is integrated into,
and synchronized with, the joint force commander's battle plan.
In the corps CP, the FSCOORD directs SEAD operations through the
functioning of the corps FS cell. This requires the coordination
of all fire support means as well as intelligence-gathering and
EW capabilities. The G2, in conjunction with the corps intelligence
cell, gives the G3 and the FSCOORD information on the projected
enemy defense threat. These data, plus airspace use information,
are integrated into the SEAD plan by the FS cell (TRADOC Pamphlet
525-9).
At the corps level, campaign
SEAD is supported by the coordinated use of air- and ground-based
acquisition platforms, which include helicopter and fixed-wing
assets. Disruptive efforts are planned to complement destructive
efforts and include the full spectrum of EW capabilities. EW systems
are used to degrade jammable threats and to neutralize enemy systems
when destruction is not feasible.
The primary lethal attack
means the Army has for supporting deep suppression is field artillery.
Long-range rockets (MLRS) and surface-to-surface missiles (Lance)
may be used to support campaign SEAD if targets are within their
ranges.
| NOTE: The conventional Lance warhead has a limited capability for SEAD. Near-term developments in MLRS range capabilities will improve the Army SEAD capability. |
The corps plans and conducts
localized suppression to protect aircraft that are required to
penetrate the FLOT. This entails the suppression of EADS along
the routes to (ingress) and from (egress) the attack objective
as well as systems surrounding the objective when they are within
range of Army attack means. A corridor may have to be established
to protect helicopters participating in air assault operations.
Within the division CP, the
FSCOORD determines the availability of acquisition and suppression
systems. When Air Force assets are to be involved in supporting
division operations, the TACP coordinates SEAD requirements and
targets with the FSCOORD. Other staff responsibilities and coordination
at division are similar to those at corps, with the FS cell directing
and coordinating the SEAD effort. The division can participate
in the three types of SEAD; however, its ability to contribute
to campaign SEAD or to conduct deep suppression is limited. Army
involvement in complementary SEAD is primarily at division level.
When the division SEAD capabilities are exceeded, support is requested
from corps.
The targeting process for
SEAD is the same as for any other target set. The targeting of
enemy air defense weapons is conducted within the framework of
the decide-detect-deliver approach to targeting and battle
management. The product of the targeting process (that is, the
successful conduct of SEAD) must ultimately accomplish one or
all of the four basic tasks of fire support. The attack of enemy
air defense weapons must--
-
Support air or aviation assets
engaged in contact with the enemy air defense threat.
-
Fulfill some aspect of the
commander's battle plan.
-
Be synchronized with the air
operation.
-
Be capable of sustaining its
effort.
The responsibilities for SEAD
targeting run across the corps and division staff sections as
discussed below.
The G3 has the primary staff
responsibility for ensuring that a particular SEAD operation is
in consonance with the force commander's battle plan for using
or supporting an air operation. The G3 confirms the commander's
requirement for SEAD in terms of synchronization with the overall
plan of battle, geographic areas such as corridors, and specific
times for SEAD support.
SEAD operations are directed
through the FS cell. The FSCOORD manages and directs the corps
or division SEAD effort.
Planning and executing the
use of nuclear weapons parallel those actions for conventional
fire support. However, a few procedures and techniques are unique,
and several considerations become increasingly important. When
determining the suitability for use of nuclear weapons, the commander
must--
-
Weigh the relative effectiveness
of nuclear and nonnuclear weapons to achieve the desired results.
-
Recognize collateral risks
(friendly troops, civilians, and obstacle creation).
-
Consider enemy responses.
-
Consider the effect of denial
or delay of release.
Nuclear weapons are available
only in limited quantities and must be used judiciously. Theater
strategic employment is directed primarily at producing a political
decision. Employment at corps level and below is explicitly intended
to influence a decision at the operational level on the battlefield.
However, tactical commanders and FSCOORDs at corps and division
levels should plan to employ and integrate those limited weapons
directed for use to achieve the greatest possible tactical advantage.
This planning must--
-
Be continuous and flexible.
-
Integrate nuclear weapons
with other fire support means and with maneuver.
-
Synchronize intelligence collection
and damage assessment with the nuclear release time frame and
time span.
-
Use maneuver to exploit the
advantage gained from nuclear weapons.
-
Be coordinated with adjacent
units.
-
Consider the effects of electromagnetic
pulse (EMP) and blackout.
-
Avoid keeping all tactical
nuclear weapons in reserve.
Nuclear weapons must be applied
to a specific purpose in the battle plan. To do this, nuclear
weapons are allocated (Do not confuse this term with "authorized
for use") to support various tactical contingencies. This
allocation process is continuous and occurs both before and after
authorization for expenditure.
A tool that enables the corps
commander and his staff to allocate nuclear weapons and integrate
them into each tactical contingency is the nuclear weapons package.
A package is a distinct grouping of nuclear weapons for employment
in a specified area during a short time to support a corps tactical
mission. A package is characterized and defined by four parameters:
-
A specified number of nuclear
weapons, listed by yield or by yield and delivery system.
-
The purpose for which the
package would be employed.